

UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, GRAZ

MASTER THESIS

Differential cryptanalysis with SAT solvers

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ABSTRACT

Hash functions are ubiquitous in the modern information age. They provide preimage, second preimage and collision resistance ensuring data and origin integrity. They are used as cryptographic primitives in protocols and applications.

In August 2006, Wang et al. showed efficient attacks against several hash function designs including MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD. With these results differential cryptanalysis has been proven useful to break collision resistance in hash functions. Over the years advanced attacks based on those differential approaches have been developed.

In this thesis we encode differential attack settings as SAT problems. SAT solvers are utilized to solve the problem revealing actual message collisions for a defined message difference.

Keywords: hash function, differential cryptanalysis, MD4, collision resistance, satisfiability, SAT solver

AFFIDAVIT

I declare that I have authored this thesis independently, that I have not used other than the declared sources/resources, and that I have explicitly indicated all material which has been quoted either literally or by content from the sources used. The text document uploaded to TUGRAZonline is identical to the present master's thesis dissertation.

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All source code is available at lukas-prokop.at/proj/megosat and published under terms and conditions of Free/Libre Open Source Software. This document was printed with Lua^AT_EX and Linux Libertine Font.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Hash functions are used as cryptographic primitives in many applications and protocols. They take an arbitrary input message and compute a hash value. Input message and hash value are considered as byte strings in a particular encoding. The hash value is of fixed length and satisfies several properties which make them useful to enable data and origin integrity.

1.1 Hash Function Properties

Definition 1 (Hash function). A *hash function* is a mapping $h : X \rightarrow Y$ with $X = \{0, 1\}^*$ and $Y = \{0, 1\}^n$ for $n \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$.

- Let $x \in X$. $h(x)$ is called *hash value of x* .
- Let $h(x) = y \in Y$. y is called *preimage of y* .

One example showing the use of hash functions as primitives is PKCS #5 specified in RFC 2898 [3]. Section 5.2 specifies PBKDF1 and PBKDF2 using an arbitrary pseudorandom function to derive password-based keys. Hash algorithms can be used as those pseudorandom functions. Given a minimum iteration count of 1000, as defined in section 4.2, yields the additional requirement that fast computation of hash values for given $x \in X$ is desirable.

Definition 2 (Preimage resistance). Given $y \in Y$. A hash function h is preimage resistant iff it is computationally infeasible to find $x \in X$ such that $h(x) = y$.

Definition 3 (Second-preimage resistance). Given $x \in X$. A hash function h is second-preimage resistant iff it is computationally infeasible to find $x_2 \in X$ with $x \neq x_2$ such that $h(x) = h(x_2)$. x_2 is called *second preimage*.

Definition 4 (Collision resistance). A hash function h is collision resistant iff it is computationally infeasible to find any two $x \in X$ and $x_2 \in X$ with $x \neq x_2$ such that $h(x) = h(x_2)$.

As far as hash functions accept input strings of arbitrary length, but return a fixed size output string, existence of preimages and collisions is unavoidable [10]. However, good hash functions make it very difficult to determine collisions or preimages.

1.2 Cryptanalysis of Hash Functions

In August 2004, Wang et al. published results at Crypto'04 [13] which revealed that MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD can be broken practically using differential cryptanalysis. On an IBM P690 machine, an MD5 collision can be computed in about one hour using this approach. Collisions for HAVAL-128, MD4 and RIPEMD were found as well. Patrick Stach's `md4coll.c` program [11] implements Wang's approach and can find MD4 collisions in few seconds on my Thinkpad x220 machine powering a .

Due to the birthday paradox, a collision attack has a generic complexity of $2^{\frac{n}{2}}$ whereas pre-image and second pre-image attacks have a generic complexity of 2^n .

TODO: discuss their approach in more detail, introduce basics of diff crypt-analysis (w/o notation)

1.3 Boolean functions

Definition 5. A *boolean function* is a mapping $h : X \rightarrow Y$ with $X = \{0, 1\}^n$ for $n \in \mathbb{N}_{\geq 1}$ and $Y = \{0, 1\}$.

The following definitions illustrate three essential boolean functions:

Definition 6. *AND* is a boolean function mapping $X = \{0, 1\}^2$ to 1 if all values of X are 1. It returns 0 otherwise.

Definition 7. *OR* is a boolean function mapping $X = \{0, 1\}^2$ to 1 if any value of X is 1. It returns 0 otherwise.

Definition 8. *NOT* is a boolean function mapping $X = \{0, 1\}^1$ to 1 if the single value of X is 0. It returns 0 otherwise.

In the following we discuss tools and how boolean functions related to general computations:

Definition 9. A *truth table* unambiguously defines a boolean function by enlisting the evaluated truth value for all possible sets of inputs.

Table 1.1 shows truth tables for AND, OR and NOT.

Definition 10. An *algorithm* is a step-wise set of instructions to solve a problem.

Theorem 1. Every algorithm can be represented as boolean function.

Every program

v_1	v_2	$f(v_1, v_2)$	v_1	v_2	$f(v_1, v_2)$	v	$f(v)$
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1		
0	0	0	0	0	0		
(a) AND			(b) OR			(c) NOT	

Figure 1.1: Truth tables for AND, OR and NOT

1.4 Satisfiability

TODO

Definition 11. A boolean function is *satisfiable* iff there exists at least one input $x \in X$ such that $h(x) = 1$.

1.5 Thesis Outline

This thesis is organized as follows.

In Chapter 1 we discussed the basic properties and fundamentals of the tools in discussion including hash functions and SAT solvers.

In Chapter 2 we introduce the MD4 hash function and discuss possible approaches in differential cryptanalysis.

In Chapter 3 we discuss SAT solving and potential approaches to speed up SAT solvers for cryptographic problems.

In Chapter 4 we show results of our work and discuss its implications.

Chapter 2

Differential cryptanalysis

2.1 MD4

MD4 is a cryptographic hash function originally described in RFC 1186 [7], updated in RFC 1320 [8] and obsoleted by RFC 6150 [12]. It was invented by Ronald Rivest in 1990 with properties given in Table 2.1. Since 1995 [2] successful attacks have been found to break collisions, preimage and second-preimage resistance in MD4; including but not limited to [9] and [5]. A Python 3 implementation derived from a previous Python version is available at github [6].

block size	512 bits	namely variable block in RFC 1320 [8]
digest size	128 bits	as per section 3.5 in RFC 1320 [8]
internal state size	128 bits	namely variables A , B , C and D
word size	32 bits	as per section 2 in RFC 1320 [8]

TABLE 2.1: MD4 hash algorithm properties

A short summary of MD4's design is given: Once padding and length extension has been applied, the message is split into 512-bit blocks (i.e. 16 32-bit words). Four state variables A , B , C and D are initialized with hexadecimal values:

[A] 01234567 [B] 89abcdef [C] fedcba98 [D] 76543210

To process one block, three auxiliary functions are defined:

$$F(X, Y, Z) = (X \wedge Y) \vee (\neg X \wedge Z) \quad (2.1)$$

$$G(X, Y, Z) = (X \wedge Y) \vee (X \wedge Z) \vee (Y \wedge Z) \quad (2.2)$$

$$H(X, Y, Z) = X \oplus Y \oplus Z \quad (2.3)$$

2.2 Differential notation**2.3 Addition example****2.4 Differential path**

Chapter 3

Satisfiability

“What idiot called them logic errors rather than bool shit?”

3.1 Basic SAT solving techniques

3.2 SAT solvers in use

3.3 Encodings

Chapter 4

Results



4.1 Benchmark results

4.2 Related work

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Appendices

.1 Testcases

Figures ??, ??, ?? and ?? show testcases used to test performance measures.

.2 Hardware setup

In the following we introduce two hardware setups which were used to run our testcases. The first setup is referred to as “Thinkpad x220” throughout the document whereas the second setup is referred to as “Cluster”.

i		$VS_{i,0}$	$VS_{i,1}$	$VS_{i,2}$
-4	A:	01100111010001010010001100000001		
-3	A:	00010000001100100101010001110110		
-2	A:	10011000101110101101110001111110		
-1	A:	11101111110011011010101110001001		
0	A:	x-----	W:	---x-----
1	A:	-----	W:	-----
2	A:	-----x-----	W:	x-----
3	A:	xxx-----	W:	-----
4	A:	-----xx	W:	x-----
5	A:	-----xxxxxxxxxxxxx-x	W:	-----
6	A:	x-----x-----x-x-xxxx-x	W:	-----
7	A:	-----x-----x-----	W:	-----
8	A:	-----x-----x-x-x-	W:	x-----
9	A:	-----x-----x-x-	W:	-----
10	A:	-----x-x-xxx-xxx-	W:	-----
11	A:	x-----xxx-x-	W:	-----
12	A:	---x-x-	W:	x-----
13	A:	-----	W:	-----
14	A:	-x-	W:	-----
15	A:	x-x-----x-	W:	-----
16	A:	-xxx-		
17	A:	-----		
18	A:	-----		
19	A:	x-----		
20	A:	x-----		
21	A:	-----		
22	A:	-----		
23	A:	-----		
24	A:	-----		
25	A:	-----		
26	A:	-----		
27	A:	-----		
28	A:	-----		
29	A:	-----		
30	A:	-----		
31	A:	-----		
32	A:	x-----		
33	A:	-----		
34	A:	-----		
35	A:	-----		
36	A:	-----		
37	A:	-----		
38	A:	-----		
39	A:	-----		
40	A:	-----		
41	A:	-----		
42	A:	-----		
43	A:	-----		
44	A:	-----		
45	A:	-----		
46	A:	-----		
47	A:	-----		

TABLE 1: TODO description

i		$VS_{i,0}$	$VS_{i,1}$	$VS_{i,2}$
-4	A:	01100111010001010010001100000001		
-3	A:	00010000001100100101010001110110		
-2	A:	10011000101110101101110011111110		
-1	A:	11101111100101010101110001001		
0	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	---x-----
1	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
2	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
3	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
4	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
5	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
6	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
7	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
8	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
9	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
10	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
11	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
12	A:	????????????????-----	W:	x-----
13	A:	????????????????-----	W:	-----
14	A:	????????????????-----	W:	-----
15	A:	????????????????-----	W:	-----
16	A:	???x-----		
17	A:	?-----		
18	A:	?-----		
19	A:	?-----		
20	A:	x-----		
21	A:	-----		
22	A:	-----		
23	A:	-----		
24	A:	-----		
25	A:	-----		
26	A:	-----		
27	A:	-----		
28	A:	-----		
29	A:	-----		
30	A:	-----		
31	A:	-----		
32	A:	x-----		
33	A:	-----		
34	A:	-----		
35	A:	-----		
36	A:	-----		
37	A:	-----		
38	A:	-----		
39	A:	-----		
40	A:	-----		
41	A:	-----		
42	A:	-----		
43	A:	-----		
44	A:	-----		
45	A:	-----		
46	A:	-----		
47	A:	-----		

TABLE 2: TODO description

i		$VS_{i,0}$	$VS_{i,1}$	$VS_{i,2}$
-4	A:	01100111010001010010001100000001		
-3	A:	00010000001100100101010001110110		
-2	A:	10011000101110101101110001111110		
-1	A:	1110111110011011010101110001001		
0	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	---x-----
1	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
2	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
3	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
4	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
5	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
6	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
7	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
8	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
9	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
10	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
11	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
12	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	x-----
13	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
14	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
15	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	-----
16	A:	????????????????????????????????		
17	A:	????????????????????????????????		
18	A:	????????????????????????????????		
19	A:	????????????????????????????????		
20	A:	????????????????????????????????		
21	A:	-----		
22	A:	-----		
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24	A:	-----		
25	A:	-----		
26	A:	-----		
27	A:	-----		
28	A:	-----		
29	A:	-----		
30	A:	-----		
31	A:	-----		
32	A:	x-----		
33	A:	-----		
34	A:	-----		
35	A:	-----		
36	A:	-----		
37	A:	-----		
38	A:	-----		
39	A:	-----		
40	A:	-----		
41	A:	-----		
42	A:	-----		
43	A:	-----		
44	A:	-----		
45	A:	-----		
46	A:	-----		
47	A:	-----		

TABLE 3: TODO description

i		$VS_{i,0}$	$VS_{i,1}$	$VS_{i,2}$
-4	A:	01100111010001010010001100000001		
-3	A:	00010000001100100101010001110110		
-2	A:	10011000101110101101110001111110		
-1	A:	11101111110011011010101110001001		
0	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
1	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
2	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
3	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
4	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
5	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
6	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
7	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
8	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
9	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
10	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
11	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
12	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
13	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
14	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
15	A:	????????????????????????????????	W:	????????????????????????????????
16	A:	????????????????????????????????		
17	A:	????????????????????????????????		
18	A:	????????????????????????????????		
19	A:	????????????????????????????????		
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27	A:	-----		
28	A:	-----		
29	A:	-----		
30	A:	-----		
31	A:	-----		
32	A:	x????????????????????????????????		
33	A:	-----		
34	A:	-----		
35	A:	-----		
36	A:	-----		
37	A:	-----		
38	A:	-----		
39	A:	-----		
40	A:	-----		
41	A:	-----		
42	A:	-----		
43	A:	-----		
44	A:	-----		
45	A:	-----		
46	A:	-----		
47	A:	-----		

TABLE 4: TODO description

Type model	Thinkpad Lenovo x220 tablet, 4299-2P6
Processor	Intel i5-2520M, 2.50 GHz, dual-core, Hyperthreaded
RAM	16 GB (extension to common retail setup)
Memory	160 GB SSD
L3 cache size	3072 KB

TABLE 5: Thinkpad x220 Tablet specification [4]

<i>Processor</i>	Intel Xeon X5690, 3.47 GHz, 6 cores, Hyperthreaded
<i>RAM</i>	192 GB
<i>L3 cache size</i>	12288 KB

TABLE 6: Cluster node nehalem192go specification [1]

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Preimage resistance, [1](#)

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Second-preimage resistance, [1](#)

Truth table, [2](#)

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