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CIS Oracle Database Server 11g R2

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Overview

This document is intended to address the recommended security settings for the Oracle 11g, r2 Database ©, running on either an x86 (32-bit) or x64 (64-bit) AMD/Intel chip platform. This guide was tested against Amazon ami-3d739c54 and against the Intel x64 chip running a 64-bit version of Oracle Linux © 2.6.18-194 configured as a stand-alone system, running as a "Database server," including all Oracle CPUs up through April 15, 2012. Future Oracle 11g r2 critical patch updates (CPUs) may impact the recommendations included in this document.

To obtain the latest version of this guide, please visit <http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org>. If you have questions, comments, or have identified ways to improve this guide, please write us at feedback@cisecurity.org.

Intended Audience

This benchmark is intended for system and application administrators, security specialists, auditors, help desk, and platform deployment personnel who plan to develop, deploy, assess, or secure solutions that incorporate Oracle Database Server 11g R2 on Oracle Linux or Microsoft Windows Server.

Consensus Guidance

This benchmark was created using a consensus review process comprised subject matter experts. Consensus participants provide perspective from a diverse set of backgrounds including consulting, software development, audit and compliance, security research, operations, government, and legal.

Each CIS benchmark undergoes two phases of consensus review. The first phase occurs during initial benchmark development. During this phase, subject matter experts convene to discuss, create, and test working drafts of the benchmark. This discussion occurs until consensus has been reached on benchmark recommendations. The second phase begins after the benchmark has been published. During this phase, all feedback provided by the Internet community is reviewed by the consensus team for incorporation in the benchmark. If you are interested in participating in the consensus process, please visit <https://community.cisecurity.org>.

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Typographical Conventions

The following typographical conventions are used throughout this guide:

Convention	Meaning
<code>Stylized Monospace font</code>	Used for blocks of code, command, and script examples. Text should be interpreted exactly as presented.
<code>Monospace font</code>	Used for inline code, commands, or examples. Text should be interpreted exactly as presented.
<i><italic font in brackets></i>	Italic texts set in angle brackets denote a variable requiring substitution for a real value.
<i>Italic font</i>	Used to denote the title of a book, article, or other publication.
Note	Additional information or caveats

Scoring Information

A scoring status indicates whether compliance with the given recommendation impacts the assessed target's benchmark score. The following scoring statuses are used in this benchmark:

Scored

Failure to comply with "Scored" recommendations will decrease the final benchmark score. Compliance with "Scored" recommendations will increase the final benchmark score.

Not Scored

Failure to comply with "Not Scored" recommendations will not decrease the final benchmark score. Compliance with "Not Scored" recommendations will not increase the final benchmark score.

Profile Definitions

The following configuration profiles are defined by this Benchmark:

- **Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)**

Items in this profile apply to Oracle Database 11g R2 and intend to:

- be practical and prudent;
- provide a clear security benefit; and
- not inhibit the utility of the technology beyond acceptable means.

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This benchmark exemplifies the great things a community of users, vendors, and subject matter experts can accomplish through consensus collaboration. The CIS community thanks the entire consensus team with special recognition to the following individuals who contributed greatly to the creation of this guide:

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Recommendations

1 Oracle Database Installation and Patching Requirements

One of the best ways to ensure secure Oracle security is to implement Critical Patch Updates (CPUs) as they come out, along with any applicable OS patches that will not interfere with system operations.

1.1 Ensure the latest version/patches for Oracle software is installed (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle installation version, along with the patch level, should be the most recent that is compatible with the organizations' operational needs.

Rationale:

As using the most recent Oracle database software, along with all applicable patches can help limit the possibilities for vulnerabilities in the software, the installation version and/or patches applied during setup should be established according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following shell script as appropriate for your environment.

For Unix/Linux systems:

```
opatch lsinventory | grep -e "^.*Update\s*<latest_patch_version_number>\s*.*$"
```

For Windows systems:

```
opatch lsinventory | find "Update: <latest_patch_version_number>"
```


Either of the above commands should provide one result pertaining to the
<latest_patch_version_number>.

Remediation:

Download the appropriate Oracle technology patch (PSU, CPU) and apply it against the database.

References:

1. <http://www.oracle.com/us/support/assurance/fixing-policies/index.html>
2. <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alerts-086861.html>

1.2 Ensure All Default Passwords Are Changed (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle installation has a view called `DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD`, which keeps a list of all database users making use of default passwords.

Rationale:

Default passwords should be considered "well known" to attackers. Consequently, if default passwords remain in place any attacker with access to the database then has the ability to authenticate as the user with that default password. When default passwords are altered, this circumstance is mitigated.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT USERNAME  
FROM DBA_USERS_WITH_DEFPWD  
WHERE USERNAME NOT LIKE '%XS$NULL%';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this recommendation, you may perform either of the following actions.

- Manually issue the following SQL statement for each USERNAME returned in the Audit Procedure:

```
PASSWORD <username>
```

- Execute the following SQL statement to randomly assign passwords:

```
begin
for r_user in
(select username from dba_users_with_defpwd where username not like '%XS$NULL%')
loop
DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE('Password for user '||r_user.username||' will be changed. ');
execute immediate 'alter user "||r_user.username||" identified by
'||DBMS_RANDOM.string('a',16)||'"account lock password expire';
end loop;
end;
/
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10575/tdpsg_user_accounts.htm#TDPSG20000

1.3 Ensure All Sample Data And Users Have Been Removed (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Oracle sample schemas are not needed for the operation of the database. These include, among others, information pertaining to a sample schemas pertaining to Human Resources, Business Intelligence, Order Entry, and the like. These samples create sample users (BI,HR,OE,PM,IX,SH, SCOTT), in addition to tables and fictitious data.

Rationale:

The sample data is typically not required for production operations of the database and provides users with well-known default passwords, particular views, and

procedures/functions. Such users, views, and/or procedures/functions could be used to launch exploits against production environments.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, check for the presence of Oracle sample users by executing the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT USERNAME FROM ALL_USERS  
WHERE USERNAME IN ('BI','HR','IX','OE','PM','SCOTT','SH');
```

Remediation:

To remediate this setting, it is recommended that you execute the following SQL script.

```
$ORACLE_HOME/demo/schema/drop_sch.sql
```

NOTE: The `recyclebin` is not set to `OFF` within the default drop script, which means that the data will still be present in your environment until the `recyclebin` is emptied.

Impact:

The Oracle sample user names may be in use on a production basis. It is important that you first verify that `BI`, `HR`, `IX`, `OE`, `PM`, `SCOTT`, and/or `SH` are not valid production user names before executing the dropping SQL scripts. This may be particularly true with the `HR` and `BI` users.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e10831/toc.htm

2 Oracle Parameter Settings

The operation of the Oracle database instance is governed by numerous parameters that are set in specific configuration files and are instance-specific in scope. As alterations of these parameters can cause problems ranging from denial -of-service to theft of proprietary information, these configurations should be carefully considered and maintained.

Note:

For all files that have parameters that can be modified with the OS and/or SQL commands/scripts, these will both be listed where appropriate.

2.1 Listener Settings

Settings for the TNS Listener listener.ora

2.1.1 Ensure 'SECURE_CONTROL_<listener_name>' Is Set In 'listener.ora' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `SECURE_CONTROL_<listener_name>` setting determines the type of control connection the Oracle server requires for remote configuration of the listener.

Rationale:

As listener configuration changes via unencrypted remote connections can result in unauthorized users sniffing the control configuration information from the network, these control values should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To audit this recommendation follow these steps:

- Open the `$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/admin/listener.ora` file (or `%ORACLE_HOME%\network\admin\listener.ora` on Windows)
- Ensure that each defined listener as an associated `SECURE_CONTROL_<listener_name>` directive.

For example:

```
LISTENER1 =
  (DESCRIPTION=
    (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcp) (HOST=sales-server) (PORT=1521))
    (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=ipc) (KEY=extproc))
    (ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=tcps) (HOST=sales-server) (PORT=1522)))
  SECURE_CONTROL_LISTENER1=tcps
```

Remediation:

Set the `SECURE_CONTROL_<listener_name>` for each defined listener in the `listener.ora` file, according to the needs of the organization.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF327

2.1.2 Ensure 'extproc' Is Not Present in 'listener.ora' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Oracle Extproc allows to run procedures from operating system libraries. These library calls can allow to run any operating system command.

Rationale:

Extproc should be removed from the `listener.ora` to avoid that attackers are abusing the external procedure feature.

Audit:

To audit this recommendation execute the following shell commands as appropriate for your Unix/Windows environment, being sure to select either `GRID_HOME` (for RAC assessment) or `ORACLE_HOME` (for non-RAC assessment) as needed.

Unix environment:

```
grep -i extproc [$GRID_HOME|$ORACLE_HOME]/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Windows environment:

```
find /I extproc [%ORACLE_HOME%|%GRID_HOME%]\network\admin\listener.ora
```

At least one line of output is expected.

Remediation:

Remove extproc from the listener.ora.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10836/advcfg.htm#NETAG0132

2.1.3 Ensure 'ADMIN_RESTRICTIONS_<listener_name>' Is Set to 'ON' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `admin_restrictions_<listener_name>` setting in the `listener.ora` file can require that any attempted real-time alteration of the parameters in the `listener` via the `set` command file be refused unless the `listener.ora` file is manually altered then restarted by a privileged user.

Rationale:

As blocking unprivileged users from making alterations of the `listener.ora` file, where remote data/services are specified, will help protect data confidentiality, this value should be set to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To audit this recommendation execute the following shell commands as appropriate for your Unix/Windows environment.

Unix environment:

```
grep -i admin_restrictions $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Windows environment:

```
find /I admin_restrictions %ORACLE_HOME%\network\admin\listener.ora
```

Ensure ADMIN_RESTRICTIONS_<listener_name> is set to ON for all listeners.

Remediation:

Use a text editor such as `vi` to set the ADMIN_RESTRICTIONS_<listener_name> to the value ON.

Default Value:

Not set.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF310

2.1.4 Ensure 'SECURE_REGISTER_<listener_name>' Is Set to 'TCPS' or 'IPC' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The SECURE_REGISTER_<listener_name> setting specifies the protocols which are used to connect to the TNS listener.

Rationale:

As listener configuration changes via unencrypted remote connections can result in unauthorized users sniffing the control configuration information from the network, these control values should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To audit this recommendation execute the following shell commands as appropriate for your Unix/Windows environment.

Unix environment:

```
grep -i SECURE_REGISTER $ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora
```

Windows environment:

```
find /I SECURE_REGISTER %ORACLE_HOME%\network\admin\listener.ora
```

Ensure SECURE_REGISTER_<listener_name> is set to TCPS or IPC.

Remediation:

Use a text editor such as vi to set the SECURE_REGISTER_<listener_name>=TCPS or SECURE_REGISTER_<listener_name>=IPC for each listener found in \$ORACLE_HOME/network/admin/listener.ora.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e10835/listener.htm#NETRF328
2. <https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1453883.1>
3. <https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1340831.1>
4. <http://www.joxeankoret.com/download/tnspoison.pdf>

2.2 Database settings

Database settings

2.2.1 Ensure 'AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS' Is Set to 'TRUE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS setting provides for the auditing of all user activities conducted under the SYSOPER and SYSDBA accounts.

Rationale:

If the parameter `AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS` is `FALSE` all statements except of Startup/Shutdown and Logon by `SYSDBA`/`SYSOPER` users are not audited.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME) = 'AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `TRUE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS = TRUE SCOPE=SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams015.htm#REFRN10005

2.2.2 Ensure 'AUDIT_TRAIL' Is Set to 'OS', 'DB,EXTENDED', or 'XML,EXTENDED' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `audit_trail` setting determines whether or not Oracle's basic audit features are enabled. These can be set to "Operating System"(OS), "DB,", "DB,EXTENDED", "XML" or "XML,EXTENDED".

Rationale:

As enabling the basic auditing features for the Oracle instance permits the collection of data to troubleshoot problems, as well as providing value forensic logs in the case of a system breach, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='AUDIT_TRAIL';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to OS or DB, EXTENDED or XML, EXTENDED.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute one of the following SQL statements.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET AUDIT_TRAIL = 'DB,EXTENDED' SCOPE = SPFILE;
ALTER SYSTEM SET AUDIT_TRAIL = 'OS' SCOPE = SPFILE;
ALTER SYSTEM SET AUDIT_TRAIL = 'XML,EXTENDED' SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams017.htm#REFRN10006
2. <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/audit-vault/learnmore/twp-security-auditperformance-166655.pdf>

2.2.3 Ensure 'GLOBAL_NAMES' Is Set to 'TRUE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `global_names` setting requires that the name of a database link matches that of the remote database it will connect to.

Rationale:

As not requiring database connections to match the domain that is being called remotely could allow unauthorized domain sources to potentially connect via brute-force tactics, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='GLOBAL_NAMES';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `TRUE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET GLOBAL_NAMES = TRUE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams096.htm#REFRN10065

2.2.4 Ensure 'LOCAL_LISTENER' Is Set to '(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=IPC)(KEY=REGISTER)))' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'BOTH' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `local_listener` setting specifies a network name that resolves to an address of the Oracle TNS listener.

Rationale:

The TNS poisoning attack allows to redirect TNS network traffic to another system by registering a listener to the TNS listener. This attack can be performed by unauthorized users with network access. By specifying the IPC protocol it is no longer possible to register listeners via TCP/IP.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='LOCAL_LISTENER';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=IPC)(KEY=REGISTER)))`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET LOCAL_LISTENER=' (DESCRIPTION= (ADDRESS=
(PROTOCOL=IPC) (KEY=REGISTER))) ' SCOPE = BOTH;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams118.htm#REFRN10082
2. <https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1453883.1>
3. <https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/ui/km/DocumentDisplay.jspx?id=1340831.1>
4. <http://www.joxeankoret.com/download/tnspoison.pdf>

2.2.5 Ensure 'O7_DICTIONARY_ACCESSIBILITY' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `o7_dictionary_accessibility` setting is a database initialization parameter that allows/disallows with the EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE and SELECT ANY DICTIONARY access to objects in the SYS schema; this functionality was created for the ease of migration from Oracle 7 databases to later versions.

Rationale:

As leaving the SYS schema so open to connection could permit unauthorized access to critical data structures, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='O7_DICTIONARY_ACCESSIBILITY';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `FALSE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET O7_DICTIONARY_ACCESSIBILITY=FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams157.htm#REFRN10133

2.2.6 Ensure 'OS_ROLES' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `os_roles` setting permits externally created groups to be applied to database management.

Rationale:

As allowing the OS use external groups for database management could cause privilege overlaps and generally weaken security, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='OS_ROLES';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `FALSE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET OS_ROLES = FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams175.htm#REFRN10153

2.2.7 Ensure 'REMOTE_LISTENER' Is Empty with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `remote_listener` setting determines whether or not a valid listener can be established on a system separate from the database instance.

Rationale:

As permitting a remote listener for connections to the database instance can allow for the potential spoofing of connections and that could compromise data confidentiality and integrity, this value should be disabled/restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='REMOTE_LISTENER';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is empty.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET REMOTE_LISTENER = '' SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams208.htm#REFRN10183

2.2.8 Ensure 'REMOTE_LOGIN_PASSWORDFILE' Is Set to 'NONE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `remote_login_passwordfile` setting specifies whether or not Oracle checks for a password file during login and how many databases can use the password file.

Rationale:

As the use of this sort of password login file could permit unsecured, privileged connections to the database, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='REMOTE_LOGIN_PASSWORDFILE';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `NONE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET REMOTE_LOGIN_PASSWORDFILE = 'NONE' SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e40402/initparams212.htm#REFRN10184
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B28359_01/server.111/b28320/initparams198.htm#REFRN10184

2.2.9 Ensure 'REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `remote_os_authent` setting determines whether or not OS 'roles' with the attendant privileges are allowed for remote client connections.

Rationale:

As permitting OS roles for database connections to can allow the spoofing of connections and permit granting the privileges of an OS role to unauthorized users to make connections, this value should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `FALSE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET REMOTE_OS_AUTHENT = FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams210.htm#REFRN10185

2.2.10 Ensure 'REMOTE_OS_ROLES' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The remote_os_roles setting permits remote users' OS roles to be applied to database management.

Rationale:

As allowing remote clients OS roles to have permissions for database management could cause privilege overlaps and generally weaken security, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='REMOTE_OS_ROLES';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to FALSE.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET REMOTE_OS_ROLES = FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams211.htm#REFRN10186

2.2.11 Ensure 'UTIL_FILE_DIR' Is Empty with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The utl_file_dir setting allows packages like utl_file to access (read/write/modify/delete) files specified in utl_file_dir. (This is deprecated but usable in 11g.)

Rationale:

As using the `util_file_dir` to create directories allows the manipulation of files in these directories.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='UTIL_FILE_DIR';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is empty.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET UTIL_FILE_DIR = '' SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams266.htm#REFRN10230

2.2.12 Ensure 'SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON' Is Set to 'TRUE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON` information determines whether or not case-sensitivity is required for passwords during login.

Due to the security bug CVE-2012-3137 it is recommended to set this parameter to `TRUE` if the October 2012 CPU/PSU or later was applied.

If the patch was not applied it is recommended to set this parameter to `FALSE` to avoid that the vulnerability could be abused.

Rationale:

Oracle 11g databases without CPU October 2012 patch or later are vulnerable to CVE-2012-3137 if case-sensitive SHA-1 password hashes are used. To avoid this kind of attack the old DES-hashes have to be used.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to TRUE.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON = TRUE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

Impact:

If SEC_CASE_SENSITIVE_LOGON is FALSE, all user with SHA-1 hashes only ("select name,password,spare4 from sys.user\$ where password is null and spare4 is not null") are no longer able to connect to the database. In this case the password for all users without DES hash have to set again.

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams222.htm#REFRN10299
2. <https://support.oracle.com/epmos/faces/DocumentDisplay?id=1492721.1>
3. <http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-3137>

2.2.13 Ensure 'SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS' Is Set to '10' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS` parameter determines how many failed login attempts are allowed before Oracle closes the login connection.

Rationale:

As allowing an unlimited number of login attempts for a user connection can facilitate both brute-force login attacks and the occurrence of Denial-of-Service, this value (10) should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to 10.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_MAX_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = 10 SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams223.htm#REFRN10274

2.2.14 Ensure 'SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION' Is Set to 'DELAY,3' or 'DROP,3' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION` setting determines the Oracle's server's response to bad/malformed packets received from the client.

Rationale:

As bad packets received from the client can potentially indicate packet-based attacks on the system, such as "TCP SYN Flood" or "Smurf" attacks, which could result in a Denial-of-Service condition, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to DELAY, 3 or DROP, 3.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute one of the following SQL statements.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION = 'DELAY,3' SCOPE = SPFILE;
ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_FURTHER_ACTION = 'DROP,3' SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams224.htm#REFRN10282

2.2.15 Ensure 'SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION' Is Set to 'LOG' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION setting determines the Oracle's server's logging response level to bad/malformed packets received from the client, by generating ALERT, LOG, or TRACE levels of detail in the log files.

Rationale:

As bad packets received from the client can potentially indicate packet-based attacks on the system, such as "TCP SYN Flood" or "Smurf" attacks, which could result in a Denial-of-Service condition, this diagnostic/logging value for ALERT, LOG, or TRACE conditions should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to LOG.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_PROTOCOL_ERROR_TRACE_ACTION=LOG SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B28359_01/server.111/b28320/initparams214.htm

2.2.16 Ensure 'SEC_RETURN_SERVER_RELEASE_BANNER' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The information about patch/update release number provides information about the exact patch/update release that is currently running on the database.

Rationale:

As allowing the database to return information about the patch/update release number could facilitate unauthorized users' attempts to gain access based upon known patch weaknesses, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='SEC_RETURN_SERVER_RELEASE_BANNER';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to FALSE.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET SEC_RETURN_SERVER_RELEASE_BANNER = FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams226.htm#REFRN10275

2.2.17 Ensure 'SQL92_SECURITY' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The sql92_security parameter setting FALSE allows to grant only UPDATE or DELETE privileges without the need to grant SELECT privileges.

Rationale:

The default value FALSE of the parameter sql92_security is secure out-of-the-box. Several security guides recommend the insecure setting TRUE. This insecure setting TRUE allows users which need only UPDATE/DELETE privileges to select data directly instead of guessing it.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='SQL92_SECURITY';
```

Ensure `VALUE` is set to `SCOPE`.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET SQL92_SECURITY = FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams246.htm#REFRN10210

2.2.18 Ensure '_TRACE_FILES_PUBLIC' Is Set to 'FALSE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `_trace_files_public` setting determines whether or not the system's trace file is world readable.

Rationale:

As permitting the unix read permission to other anyone can read the instance's trace files file which could contain sensitive information about instance operations, this value should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT VALUE  
FROM V$PARAMETER  
WHERE NAME='_trace_files_public';
```

A `VALUE` equal to `FALSE` or lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET "_trace_files_public" = FALSE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

References:

1. http://asktom.oracle.com/pls/asktom/f?p=100:11:0:::P11_QUESTION_ID:4295521746131

2.2.19 Ensure 'RESOURCE_LIMIT' Is Set to 'TRUE' with 'SCOPE' Set to 'SPFILE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

RESOURCE_LIMIT determines whether resource limits are enforced in database profiles

Rationale:

If resource_limit is set to FALSE, none of the system resource limits that are set in any database profiles are enforced. If resource_limit is set to TRUE, then the limits set in database profiles are enforced.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT UPPER(VALUE)
FROM V$PARAMETER
WHERE UPPER(NAME)='RESOURCE_LIMIT';
```

Ensure VALUE is set to TRUE.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER SYSTEM SET RESOURCE_LIMIT = TRUE SCOPE = SPFILE;
```

Default Value:

FALSE

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams214.htm#REFRN10188

3 Oracle Connection and Login Restrictions

The restrictions on Client/User connections to the Oracle database help block unauthorized access to data and services by setting access rules; these security measures help to ensure that successful logins cannot be easily made through brute-force password attacks or intuited by clever social engineering exploits. By the use of the base profile, e.g. "DEFAULT," then assigning this profile to a client, the database administrator can set a standard policy for password security/resource use to all users assigned the 'DEFAULT' profile; however, this policy can still be overridden by local policy. All values assigned below are the recommended minimums or maximums; higher, more restrictive values can be applied at the discretion of the organization by creating a separate profile to assign to a different user group.

3.1 Ensure 'FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS' Is Less than or Equal to '5' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `failed_login_attempts` setting determines how many failed login attempts are permitted before the system locks the user's account. While different profiles can have different and more restrictive settings, such as USERS and APPS, the minimum(s) recommended here should be set on the DEFAULT profile.

Rationale:

As repeated failed login attempts can indicate the initiation of a brute-force login attack, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization (see **warning** below on a known bug that can make this security measure backfire).

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT
FROM DBA_PROFILES
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS'
AND
(
LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'
OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'
OR LIMIT > 5
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Remediate this setting by executing the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS 5;
```

3.2 Ensure 'PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME' Is Greater than or Equal to '1' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME` setting determines how many days must pass for the user's account to be unlocked after the set number of failed login attempts has occurred.

Rationale:

As locking the user account after repeated failed login attempts can block further brute-force login attacks, but can create administrative headaches as this account unlocking process always requires DBA intervention, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT
FROM DBA_PROFILES
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME'
AND
(
LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'
OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'
```

```
OR LIMIT < 1  
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Remediate this setting by executing the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PASSWORD_LOCK_TIME 1;
```

3.3 Ensure 'PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME' Is Less than or Equal to '90' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `password_life_time` setting determines how long a password may be used before the user is required to be change it.

Rationale:

As allowing passwords to remain unchanged for long periods makes the success of brute-force login attacks more likely, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT  
FROM DBA_PROFILES  
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME'  
AND  
(  
  LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'  
  OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'  
  OR LIMIT > 90  
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Remediate this setting by executing the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME 90;
```

3.4 Ensure 'PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX' Is Greater than or Equal to '20' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `password_reuse_max` setting determines how many different passwords must be used before the user is allowed to reuse a prior password.

Rationale:

As allowing reuse of a password within a short period of time after the password's initial use can make the success of both social-engineering and brute-force password-based attacks more likely, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT
FROM DBA_PROFILES
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX'
AND
(
  LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'
  OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'
  OR LIMIT < 20
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Remediate this setting by executing the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT PASSWORD_REUSE_MAX 20;
```

3.5 Ensure 'PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME' Is Greater than or Equal to '365' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `password_reuse_time` setting determines the amount of time in days that must pass before the same password may be reused.

Rationale:

As reusing the same password after only a short period of time has passed makes the success of brute-force login attacks more likely, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT
FROM DBA_PROFILES
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME'
AND
(
  LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'
  OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'
  OR LIMIT < 365
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Remediate this setting by executing the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME 365;
```

3.6 Ensure 'PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME' Is Less than or Equal to '5' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `password_grace_time` setting determines how many days can pass after the user's password expires before the user's login capability is automatically locked out.

Rationale:

As locking the user account after the expiration of the password change requirement's grace period can help prevent password-based attack against a forgotten or disused accounts, while still allowing the account and its information to be accessible by DBA intervention, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT
FROM DBA_PROFILES
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME'
AND
(
LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'
OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'
OR LIMIT > 5
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Remediate this setting by executing the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME 5;
```

3.7 Ensure 'DBA_USERS.PASSWORD' Is Not Set to 'EXTERNAL' for Any User (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `password='EXTERNAL'` setting determines whether or not a user can be authenticated by a remote OS to allow access to the database with full authorization.

Rationale:

As allowing remote OS authentication of a user to the database can potentially allow supposed "privileged users" to connect as "authenticated," even when the remote system is compromised, these logins should be disabled/restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT USERNAME  
FROM DBA_USERS  
WHERE PASSWORD='EXTERNAL';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER USER <username> IDENTIFIED BY <password>;
```

3.8 Ensure 'PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION' Is Set for All Profiles (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `password_verify_function` determines password settings requirements when a user password is changed at the SQL command prompt. This setting does not apply for users managed by the Oracle password file.

Rationale:

As requiring users to apply the 11gr2 security features in password creation, such as forcing mixed-case complexity, the blocking of simple combinations, and change/history settings can potentially thwart logins by unauthorized users, this function should be applied/enabled according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME  
FROM DBA_PROFILES  
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION'  
AND (LIMIT = 'DEFAULT' OR LIMIT = 'NULL');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Create a custom password verification function which fulfills the password requirements of the organization.

3.9 Ensure 'SESSIONS_PER_USER' Is Less than or Equal to '10' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `SESSIONS_PER_USER` (Number of sessions allowed) determines the maximum number of user sessions that are allowed to be open concurrently.

Rationale:

As limiting the number of the `SESSIONS_PER_USER` can help prevent memory resource exhaustion by poorly formed requests or intentional Denial-of-Service attacks, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

To enable this setting it is necessary to enable the `RESOURCE_LIMIT` (`ALTER SYSTEM SET RESOURCE_LIMIT = TRUE;`).

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PROFILE, RESOURCE_NAME, LIMIT
FROM DBA_PROFILES
WHERE RESOURCE_NAME='SESSIONS_PER_USER'
AND
(
    LIMIT = 'DEFAULT'
    OR LIMIT = 'UNLIMITED'
    OR LIMIT > 10
);
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
ALTER PROFILE DEFAULT LIMIT SESSIONS_PER_USER 10;
```

3.10 Ensure No Users Are Assigned the 'DEFAULT' Profile (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Upon creation database users are assigned to the DEFAULT profile unless otherwise specified.

Rationale:

It is recommended that users be created with function-appropriate profiles. The DEFAULT profile, being defined by Oracle, is subject to change at any time (e.g. by patch or version update). The DEFAULT profile has unlimited settings that are often required by the SYS user when patching; such unlimited settings should be tightly reserved and not applied to unnecessary users.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT USERNAME
FROM DBA_USERS
WHERE PROFILE='DEFAULT'
AND ACCOUNT_STATUS='OPEN'
AND USERNAME NOT IN
  ('ANONYMOUS', 'CTXSYS', 'DBSNMP', 'EXFSYS', 'LBACSYS',
   'MDSYS', 'MGMT_VIEW', 'OLAPSYS', 'OWBSYS', 'ORDPLUGINS',
   'ORDSYS', 'OUTLN', 'SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA', 'SYS',
   'SYSMAN', 'SYSTEM', 'TSMSYS', 'WK_TEST', 'WKSYS',
   'WKPROXY', 'WMSYS', 'XDB');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this recommendation execute the following SQL statement for each user returned by the audit query using a functional-appropriate profile.

```
ALTER USER <username> PROFILE <appropriate_profile>
```

4 Oracle User Access and Authorization Restrictions

The capability to use database resources at a given level, or user authorization rules, allows for user manipulation of the various parts of the Oracle database; these authorizations must be structured to block unauthorized use and/or corruption of vital data and services, by setting restrictions on user capabilities, particularly those of the user `PUBLIC`; these security measures help to ensure that successful logins cannot be easily redirected.

4.1 Default Public Privileges for Packages and Object Types

Revoke default public execute privileges from powerful packages and object types

4.1.1 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_ADVISOR' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_ADVISOR` package can be used to write files located on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_ADVISOR` package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt operating system files on the instance's host, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_ADVISOR';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_ADVISOR FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_advis.htm

4.1.2 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_CRYPTO' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The DBMS_CRYPTO settings provide a toolset that determines the strength of the encryption algorithm used to encrypt application data and is part of the SYS schema. The DES (56-bit key), 3DES (168-bit key), 3DES-2KEY (112-bit key), AES (128/192/256-bit keys), and RC4 are available.

Rationale:

As execution of these cryptography procedures by the user PUBLIC can potentially endanger portions of or all of the data storage, this value should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_CRYPTO';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_CRYPTO FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_crypto.htm#ARPLS664

4.1.3 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_JAVA' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_JAVA` package can run Java classes (e.g. OS commands) or grant Java privileges.

Rationale:

The `DBMS_JAVA` package could allow an attacker to run operating system commands from the database.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_JAVA';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JAVA FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/java.112/e10588/appendixa.htm#JJDEV13000

4.1.4 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_JAVA_TEST' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_JAVA_TEST` package can run Java classes (e.g. OS commands) or grant Java privileges.

Rationale:

The `DBMS_JAVA_TEST` package could allow an attacker to run operating system commands from the database..

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_JAVA_TEST'
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JAVA_TEST FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/HackingAurora.pdf>

4.1.5 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_JOB' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_JOB` package schedules and manages the jobs sent to the job queue and has been superseded by the `DBMS_SCHEDULER` package, even though `DBMS_JOB` has been retained for backwards compatibility.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_JOB package could allow an unauthorized user to disable or overload the job queue and has been superseded by the DBMS_SCHEDULER package, this package should be disabled or restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_JOB';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_JOB FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_job.htm

4.1.6 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_LDAP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_LDAP package contains functions and procedures that enable programmers to access data from LDAP servers.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_LDAP package can be used to create specially crafted error messages or send information via DNS to the outside.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_LDAP';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LDAP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E23943_01/oid.1111/e10186/dbmsldap_ref.htm#OIMA D009

4.1.7 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_LOB' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_LOB` package provides subprograms that can manipulate and read/write on BLOBs, CLOBs, NCLOBs, BFILEs, and temporary LOBs.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_LOB` package could allow an unauthorized user to manipulate BLOBs, CLOBs, NCLOBs, BFILEs, and temporary LOBs on the instance, either destroying data or causing a Denial-of-Service condition due to corruption of disk space, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.


```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_LOB';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_LOB FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_lob.htm

4.1.8 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT settings provide one of the tools that determine the strength of the encryption algorithm used to encrypt application data and is part of the SYS schema. The DES (56-bit key) and 3DES (168-bit key) are the only two types available.

Rationale:

As allowing the PUBLIC user privileges to access this capability can be potentially harm the data storage, this access should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_obtool.htm#ARPLS028

4.1.9 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_RANDOM` package is used for generating random numbers but should not be used for cryptographic purposes.

Rationale:

As assignment of use of the `DBMS_RANDOM` package can allow the unauthorized application of the random number-generating function, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_random.htm

4.1.10 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_SCHEDULER' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_SCHEDULER` package schedules and manages the database and operating system jobs .

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_SCHEDULER` package could allow an unauthorized user to run database or operating system jobs.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_SCHEDULER';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SCHEDULER FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_sched.htm

4.1.11 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_SQL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_SQL` package is used for running dynamic SQL statements.

Rationale:

The `DBMS_SQL` package could allow privilege escalation if the input validation is not done properly.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_SQL';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_sql.htm

4.1.12 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_XMLGEN' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `DBMS_XMLGEN` package takes an arbitrary SQL query as input, converts it to XML format, and returns the result as a CLOB.

Rationale:

The package `DBMS_XMLGEN` can be used to search the entire database for critical information like creditcard numbers, ...

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_XMLGEN';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLGEN FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_xmlgen.htm
2. <http://www.red-database-security.com/wp/confidence2009.pdf>

4.1.13 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_XMLQUERY' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle package `DBMS_XMLQUERY` takes an arbitrary SQL query, converts it to XML format, and returns the result. This package is similar to `DBMS_XMLGEN`.

Rationale:

The package `DBMS_XMLQUERY` can be used to search the entire database for critical information like creditcard numbers, ...

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_XMLQUERY';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_XMLQUERY FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_xmlque.htm

4.1.14 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_FILE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_FILE` package can be used to read/write files located on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_FILE` package could allow an user to read files at the operating system. These files could contain sensitive information (e.g. passwords in `.bash_history`).

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_FILE';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_FILE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_file.htm#ARPLS70896

4.1.15 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_INADDR' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_INADDR package can be used to create specially crafted error messages or send information via DNS to the outside.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_INADDR package is often used in SQL Injection attacks from the web it should be revoked from public.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_INADDR';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_INADDR FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_inaddr.htm

4.1.16 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_TCP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_TCP package can be used to read/write file to TCP sockets on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_TCP package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the TCP stream used for carry the protocols that communicate with the instance's external communications, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_TCP';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_TCP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_tcp.htm#ARPLS71533

4.1.17 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_MAIL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_MAIL` package can be used to send email from the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_MAIL` package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the SMTP function to accept or generate junk mail that can result in a Denial-of-Service condition due to network saturation, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_MAIL';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_MAIL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_mail.htm

4.1.18 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_SMTP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_SMTP package can be used to send email from the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_SMTP package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the SMTP function to accept or generate junk mail that can result in a Denial-of-Service condition due to network saturation, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_SMTP';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_SMTP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u smtp.htm

4.1.19 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_DBWS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_DBWS package can be used to read/write file to web-based applications on the server where the Oracle instance is installed.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_DBWS package could allow an unauthorized user to corrupt the HTTP stream used for carry the protocols that communicate with the instance's web-based external communications, use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_DBWS';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_DBWS FROM 'PUBLIC';
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B19306_01/appdev.102/b14258/u_dbws.htm

4.1.20 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_ORAMTS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database UTL_ORAMTS package can be used to perform HTTP-requests. This could be used to send information to the outside.

Rationale:

As use of the UTL_ORAMTS package could be used to send (sensitive) information to external websites. The use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_ORAMTS';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_ORAMTS FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/win.112/e26104/recovery.htm#NTMTS139

4.1.21 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'UTL_HTTP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `UTL_HTTP` package can be used to perform HTTP-requests. This could be used to send information to the outside.

Rationale:

As use of the `UTL_HTTP` package could be used to send (sensitive) information to external websites. The use of this package should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='UTL_HTTP';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON UTL_HTTP FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/u_http.htm

4.1.22 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'HTTPURITYPE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database HTTPURITYPE object type can be used to perform HTTP-requests. This could be used to send information to the outside.

Rationale:

tbd.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='HTTPURITYPE';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON HTTPURITYPE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/t_dburi.htm#ARPLS71705

4.2 Non-Default Public Privileges for Packages and Object Types

Non-Default Public Privileges for Packages and Object Types

4.2.1 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_SYS_SQL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_SYS_SQL` package is shipped as undocumented.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_SYS_SQL` package could allow an user to run code as a different user without entering user credentials.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_SYS_SQL';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_SYS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/guidelines.htm#DBS_EG499
2. http://asktom.oracle.com/pls/asktom/f?p=100:11:0::::P11_QUESTION_ID:1325202421535

4.2.2 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE` package is used for applying PL/SQL commands to the native RMAN sequences.

Rationale:

As assignment of use of the `DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE` package can allow to access file permissions on operating system level.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_BACKUP_RESTORE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://psoug.org/reference/dbms_backup_restore.html
2. <http://davidalejomarcos.wordpress.com/2011/09/13/how-to-list-files-on-a-directory-from-oracle-database/>

4.2.3 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQADM_SYSCALLS FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.4 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
revoke execute on DBMS_REPACT_SQL_UTL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.5 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'INITJVMAUX' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `INITJVMAUX` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `INITJVMAUX` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='INITJVMAUX';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON INITJVMAUX FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.6 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STREAMS_ADM_UTL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.7 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_AQADM_SYS' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_AQADM_SYS package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_AQADM_SYS package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_AQADM_SYS';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_AQADM_SYS FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. [http://www.google.de/#hl=de&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=DBMS STREAMS ADM UTL&oq=DBMS STREAMS ADM UTL&gs_l=serp.3..0i10i30.38260.38260.0.38463.1.1.0.0.0.105.105.0j1.1.0...0.0...1c.2.1-46wqcQeow&pbx=1&bav=on.2.or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=2569366ac9a6532d&bpc](http://www.google.de/#hl=de&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=DBMS+STREAMS+ADM+UTL&oq=DBMS+STREAMS+ADM+UTL&gs_l=serp.3..0i10i30.38260.38260.0.38463.1.1.0.0.0.105.105.0j1.1.0...0.0...1c.2.1-46wqcQeow&pbx=1&bav=on.2.or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=2569366ac9a6532d&bpc)

4.2.8 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_STREAMS_RPC' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_STREAMS_RPC` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the `DBMS_STREAMS_RPC` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_STREAMS_RPC';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_STREAMS_RPC FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.9 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_PRVTAQIM' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `DBMS_PRVTAQIM` package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run SQL commands as user SYS.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_PRVTAQIM package could allow an unauthorized user to escalate privileges because any SQL statements could be executed as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_PRVTAQIM';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_PRVTAQIM FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.10 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'LTADM' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database LTADM package is shipped as undocumented and allows privilege escalation if granted to unprivileged users.

Rationale:

As use of the LTADM package could allow an unauthorized user to run any SQL command as user SYS.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='LTADM';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON LTADM FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ohh-indirect-privilege-escalation.pdf>

4.2.11 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'WWV_DBMS_SQL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `WWV_DBMS_SQL` package is shipped as undocumented and allows Oracle Application Express to run dynamic SQL statements.

Rationale:

As use of the `WWV_DBMS_SQL` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL statements as Application Express (APEX) user.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'
AND TABLE_NAME='WWV_DBMS_SQL';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON WWV_DBMS_SQL FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/install.112/e12196/trouble.htm#HTMIG267

4.2.12 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE` package is shipped as undocumented and allows Oracle Application Express to run dynamic SQL statements.

Rationale:

As use of the `WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE` package could allow an unauthorized user to run SQL statements as Application Express (APEX) user.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'
```



```
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON WWV_EXECUTE_IMMEDIATE FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. <http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2008-1811>
2. <https://forums.oracle.com/forums/thread.jspa?threadID=953790>

4.2.13 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_IJOB' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_IJOB package is shipped as undocumented and allows to run database jobs in the context of another user.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_IJOB package could allow an attacker to change identities by using a different username to execute a database job.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_IJOB';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_IJOB FROM PUBLIC;
```

4.2.14 Ensure 'EXECUTE' Is Revoked from 'PUBLIC' on 'DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER package allows to transfer files from one database server to another.

Rationale:

As use of the DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER package could allow to transfer files from one database server to another.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation, execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE='PUBLIC'  
AND PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE'  
AND TABLE_NAME='DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER';
```

The assessment fails if results are returned.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ON DBMS_FILE_TRANSFER FROM PUBLIC;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_ftran.htm#ARPLS095

4.3 System Privileges

Revoke system privileges

4.3.1 Ensure 'SELECT_ANY_DICTIONARY' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SELECT ANY DICTIONARY` privilege allows the designated user to access SYS schema objects.

Rationale:

The Oracle database `SELECT ANY DICTIONARY` privilege allows the designated user to access SYS schema objects. The Oracle password hashes are part of the SYS schema and can be selected using `SELECT ANY DICTIONARY` privileges.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='SELECT ANY DICTIONARY'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','DBSNMP','OEM_MONITOR',
'OLAPSYS','ORACLE_OCM','SYSMAN','WMSYS');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE SELECT_ANY_DICTIONARY FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#BABHFJFJ
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25513/initparams157.htm#REFRN10133
3. <http://arup.blogspot.de/2011/07/difference-between-select-any.html>

4.3.2 Ensure 'SELECT ANY TABLE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SELECT ANY TABLE` privilege allows the designated user to open any table, except of SYS, to view it.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `SELECT ANY TABLE` privilege can allow the unauthorized viewing of sensitive data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='SELECT ANY TABLE'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA', 'MDSYS', 'SYS', 'IMP_FULL_DATABASE', 'EXP_FULL_DATABASE',
'DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE', 'WMSYS', 'SYSTEM');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE SELECT ANY TABLE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_10002.htm#SQLRF01702

4.3.3 Ensure 'AUDIT SYSTEM' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `AUDIT SYSTEM` privilege allows the change auditing activities on the system.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `AUDIT SYSTEM` privilege can allow the unauthorized alteration of system audit activities, disabling the creation of audit trails, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='AUDIT SYSTEM'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','SYS');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE AUDIT SYSTEM FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

4.3.4 Ensure 'EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY` keyword provides the user the capability to access all the table rows regardless of row-level security lockouts.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY` privilege can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXEMPT ACCESS POLICY FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/auditing.htm#DBSEG419
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/vpd.htm#DBSEG309

4.3.5 Ensure 'BECOME USER' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `BECOME USER` privilege allows the designated user to inherit the rights of another user.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `BECOME USER` privilege can allow the unauthorized use of another user's privileges, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='BECOME USER'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE BECOME USER FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B19306_01/network.102/b14266/cfgaudit.htm

4.3.6 Ensure 'CREATE_PROCEDURE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE PROCEDURE` privilege allows the designated user to create a stored procedure that will fire when given the correct command sequence.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `CREATE PROCEDURE` privilege can lead to severe problems in unauthorized hands, such as rogue procedures facilitating data theft or Denial-of-Service by corrupting data tables, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE PROCEDURE'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ( 'DBA', 'DBSNMP', 'MDSYS', 'OLAPSYS', 'OWB$CLIENT',
                    'OWBSYS', 'RECOVERY_CATALOG_OWNER', 'SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR',
                    'SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR', 'SYS', 'APEX_030200', 'APEX_040000',
                    'APEX_040100', 'APEX_040200');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE CREATE_PROCEDURE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_6009.htm#SQLRF01309

4.3.7 Ensure 'ALTER SYSTEM' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `ALTER SYSTEM` privilege allows the designated user to dynamically alter the instance's running operations.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `ALTER SYSTEM` privilege can lead to severe problems, such as the instance's session being killed or the stopping of redo log recording, which would make transactions unrecoverable, this capability should be severely restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='ALTER SYSTEM'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM','APEX_030200','APEX_040000',
'APEX_040100','APEX_040200');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE ALTER SYSTEM FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_2014.htm#SQLRF00902

4.3.8 Ensure 'CREATE ANY LIBRARY' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE ANY LIBRARY` privilege allows the designated user to create objects that are associated to the shared libraries.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `CREATE ANY LIBRARY` privilege can allow the creation of numerous library-associated objects and potentially corrupt the libraries' integrity, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE ANY LIBRARY'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM','DBA');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE CREATE ANY LIBRARY FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_6001.htm#SQLRF01301
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E18283_01/server.112/e17120/manproc007.htm

4.3.9 Ensure 'CREATE LIBRARY' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `CREATE LIBRARY` privilege allows the designated user to create objects that are associated to the shared libraries.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `CREATE LIBRARY` privilege can allow the creation of numerous library-associated objects and potentially corrupt the libraries' integrity, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='CREATE LIBRARY'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM','DBA');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE CREATE LIBRARY FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_6001.htm#SQLRF01301
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E18283_01/server.112/e17120/manproc007.htm

4.3.10 Ensure 'GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE keyword provides the grantee the capability to grant access to any single or multiple combinations of objects to any grantee in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to potential complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY OBJECT  
PRIVILEGE' AND GRANTEE NOT IN  
( 'DBA', 'SYS', 'IMP_FULL_DATABASE', 'DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE' );
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99914

4.3.11 Ensure 'GRANT ANY ROLE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `GRANT ANY ROLE` keyword provides the grantee the capability to grant any single role to any grantee in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `GRANT ANY ROLE` capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to potential complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY ROLE' AND  
GRANTEE NOT IN ( 'DBA', 'SYS', 'DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE', 'IMP_FULL_DATABASE',  
'SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR', 'SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR' );
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE GRANT ANY ROLE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99903

4.3.12 Ensure 'GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE` keyword provides the grantee the capability to grant any single privilege to any item in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE` capability can allow an unauthorized user to potentially access/change confidential data or damage the data catalog due to potential complete instance access, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS  
WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE'  
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99876

4.4 Role Privileges

Revoke powerful roles

4.4.1 Ensure 'DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE provides DELETE privileges for the records in the system's audit table (AUD\$).

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE can allow the destruction of audit records vital to the forensic investigation of unauthorized activities, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE  
FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS  
WHERE granted_role='DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE'  
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DBA','SYS');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99873
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

4.4.2 Ensure 'SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE` provides `SELECT` privileges on all data dictionary views held in the `SYS` schema.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the `SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE` can allow the disclosure of all dictionary data, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE
FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS
WHERE granted_role='SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE'
AND grantee not in
('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','EXP_FULL_DATABASE','OEM_MONITOR');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99873
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

4.4.3 Ensure 'EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE provides EXECUTE privileges for a number of packages and procedures in the data dictionary in the SYS schema.

Rationale:

As permitting unauthorized access to the EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE can allow the disruption of operations by initialization of rogue procedures, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE  
FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS  
WHERE granted_role='EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE'  
AND grantee not in ('DBA','SYS','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','EXP_FULL_DATABASE');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.


```
REVOKE EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG99873
2. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

4.4.4 Ensure 'DBA' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBA role is the default database administrator role provided for the allocation of administrative privileges.

Rationale:

As assignment of the DBA role to an ordinary user can provide a great number of unnecessary privileges to that user and opens the door to data breaches, integrity violations, and Denial-of-Service conditions, application of this role should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE  
FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTED_ROLE='DBA'  
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('SYS','SYSTEM');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE DBA FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#DBSEG4414

4.5 Table and View Privileges

Revoke table and view privileges

4.5.1 Ensure 'ALL' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' on 'AUD\$' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.AUD$` table contains all the audit records for the database of the non-Data Manipulation Language (DML) events, such as `ALTER`, `DROP`, `CREATE`, and so forth. (DML changes need trigger-based audit events to record data alterations.)

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to manipulate the `SYS_AUD$` table can allow distortion of the audit records, hiding unauthorized activities, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE TABLE_NAME='AUD$'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('DELETE_CATALOG_ROLE');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE ALL ON AUD$ FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/auditing.htm#CEGDGIAF

4.5.2 Ensure 'ALL' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' on 'USER_HISTORY\$' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.USER_HISTORY$` table contains all the audit records for the user's password change history. (This table gets updated by password changes if the user has an assigned profile that has password reuse limit set, e.g., `PASSWORD_REUSE_TIME` set to other than `UNLIMITED`.)

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to manipulate the records in the `SYS.USER_HISTORY$` table can allow distortion of the audit trail, potentially hiding unauthorized data confidentiality attacks or integrity changes, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE TABLE_NAME='USER_HISTORY$';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE ALL ON USER_HISTORY$ FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. <http://marcel.vandewaters.nl/oracle/database-oracle/password-history-reusing-a-password>

4.5.3 Ensure 'ALL' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' on 'LINK\$' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.LINK$` table contains all the user's password information and data table link information.

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users to manipulate or view the `SYS.LINK$` table can allow capture of password information and/or corrupt the primary database linkages, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE  
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS  
WHERE TABLE_NAME='LINK$';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE ALL ON LINK$ FROM <grantee>;
```

4.5.4 Ensure 'ALL' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' on 'SYS.USER\$' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SYS.USER$` table contains the users' hashed password information.

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to open the `SYS.USER$` table can allow the capture of password hashes for the later application of password cracking algorithms to breach confidentiality, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE TABLE_NAME='USER$'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('CTXSYS','XDB','APEX_030200',
'APEX_040000','APEX_040100','APEX_040200');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE ALL ON SYS.USER$ FROM <username>;
```

References:

1. <http://dba.stackexchange.com/questions/17513/what-do-the-columns-in-sys-user-represent>

4.5.5 Ensure 'ALL' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' on 'DBA_%' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database DBA_ views show all information which is relevant to administrative accounts.

Rationale:

As permitting users the authorization to manipulate the DBA_ views can expose sensitive data.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT * FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE TABLE_NAME LIKE 'DBA_%'
and GRANTEE NOT IN ('APEX_030200','APPQOSSYS','AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE','CTXSYS',
'EXFSYS','MDSYS','OLAP_XS_ADMIN','OLAPSYS','ORDSYS','OWB$CLIENT','OWBSYS',
'SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE','WM_ADMIN_ROLE','WMSYS','XDBADMIN','LBACSYS',
'ADM_PARALLEL_EXECUTE_TASK');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

Replace <non-DBA/SYS grantee>, in the query below, with the Oracle login(s) or role(s) returned from the associated audit procedure and execute:

```
REVOKE ALL ON DBA_ FROM <Non-DBA/SYS grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e25789/datadict.htm#autold2

4.5.6 Ensure 'ALL' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' on 'SYS.SCHEDULER\$_CREDENTIAL' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL` table contains the database scheduler credential information.

Rationale:

As permitting non-privileged users the authorization to open the `SYS.SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL` table.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_TAB_PRIVS
WHERE TABLE_NAME='SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE ALL ON SYS.SCHEDULER$_CREDENTIAL FROM <username>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/appdev.112/e25788/d_sched.htm#ARPLS72292
2. <http://berxblog.blogspot.de/2012/02/restore-dbmsschedulercreatecredential.html>

4.5.7 Ensure 'SYS.USER\$_MIG' Has Been Dropped (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The table `sys.user$mig` is created during migration and contains the Oracle password hashes before the migration starts.

Rationale:

The table sys.user\$mig is not deleted after the migration. An attacker could access the table containing the Oracle password hashes.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT OWNER, TABLE_NAME
FROM ALL_TABLES
WHERE OWNER='SYS'
AND TABLE_NAME='USER$MIG';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
DROP TABLE SYS.USER$MIG;
```

4.6 Ensure '%ANY%' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `ANY` keyword provides the user the capability to alter any item in the catalog of the database.

Rationale:

As authorization to use the `ANY` expansion of a privilege can allow an unauthorized user to potentially change confidential data or damage the data catalog, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
```



```
WHERE PRIVILEGE LIKE '%ANY%'
AND GRANTEE NOT IN ('AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE','DBA','DBSNMP','EXFSYS',
'EXP_FULL_DATABASE','IMP_FULL_DATABASE','DATAPUMP_IMP_FULL_DATABASE',
'JAVADEBUGPRIV','MDSYS','OEM_MONITOR','OLAPSYS','OLAP_DBA','ORACLE_OCM',
'OWB$CLIENT','OWBSYS','SCHEDULER_ADMIN','SPATIAL_CSW_ADMIN_USR',
'SPATIAL_WFS_ADMIN_USR','SYS','SYSMAN','SYSTEM','WMSYS','APEX_030200',
'APEX_040000','APEX_040100','APEX_040200','LBACSYS');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE '<ANY Privilege>' FROM <grantee>;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/network.112/e16543/authorization.htm#D_BSEG99877

4.7 Ensure 'DBA_SYS_PRIVS.%' Is Revoked from Unauthorized 'GRANTEE' with 'ADMIN_OPTION' Set to 'YES' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The Oracle database `WITH_ADMIN` privilege allows the designated user to grant another user the same privileges.

Rationale:

As assignment of the `WITH_ADMIN` privilege can allow the granting of a restricted privilege to an unauthorized user, this capability should be restricted according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
```

```
WHERE ADMIN_OPTION='YES'  
AND GRANTEE not in ('AQ_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE','DBA','OWBSYS',  
                    'SCHEDULER_ADMIN','SYS','SYSTEM','WMSYS');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE <privilege> FROM <grantee>;
```

4.8 Ensure Proxy Users Have Only 'CONNECT' Privilege (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Do not grant privileges directly to proxy users

Rationale:

A proxy user should only have the ability to connect to the database.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, GRANTED_ROLE  
FROM DBA_ROLE_PRIVS  
WHERE GRANTEE IN  
  (  
    SELECT PROXY  
    FROM DBA_PROXIES  
  )  
AND GRANTED_ROLE NOT IN ('CONNECT');
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE CONNECT FROM <proxy_user>;
```

4.9 Ensure 'EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE' Is Revoked from 'OUTLN' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Remove unneeded privileges from OUTLN

Rationale:

Migrated OUTLN users have more privileges than required.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE'
AND GRANTEE='OUTLN';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE FROM OUTLN;
```

4.10 Ensure 'EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE' Is Revoked from 'DBSNMP' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Remove unneeded privileges from DBSNMP

Rationale:

Migrated DBSNMP users have more privileges than required.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT GRANTEE, PRIVILEGE
FROM DBA_SYS_PRIVS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE'
AND GRANTEE='DBSNMP';
```

Lack of results implies compliance.

Remediation:

To remediate this setting execute the following SQL statement.

```
REVOKE EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE FROM DBSNMP;
```

5 Audit/Logging Policies and Procedures

The ability to audit database activities is among the most important of all database security features. Decisions must be made regarding the scope of auditing since auditing has costs – in storage for the audit trail and in performance impact on audited operations – and perhaps even the database or system in general. There is also the additional cost to manage (store, backup, secure) and review the data in audit trail.

Measures must be taken to protect the audit trail itself, for it may be targeted for alteration or destruction to hide unauthorized activity. For an audit destination outside the database, the recommendations are elsewhere in this document. Auditing recommendations for potential database audit destinations is below.

Auditing “by session” typically creates fewer (until 11g) and slightly smaller audit records, but is discouraged in most situations since there is some loss of fidelity (e.g. object privilege GRANTEE). More detailed auditing creates larger audit records. The `AUDIT_TRAIL` initialization parameter (for DB|XML, extended – or not) is the main determining factor for the size of a given audit record – and a notable factor in the performance cost, although the largest of the latter is DB versus OS or XML.

This section deals with standard Oracle auditing since auditing of privileged connections (as `sysdba` or `sysoper`) is configured via the `AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS` initialization parameter and is otherwise not configurable. The basic types of standard auditing are object auditing, statement auditing and privilege auditing and each behaves differently.

Object auditing applies to specific objects for which it is invoked and always applies to all users. This type of auditing is usually employed to audit application-specific sensitive objects, but can be used to protect the audit trail in the database.

Privilege auditing audits the use of specific system privileges, but typically only if the user actually possesses the audited privilege. Attempts that fail for lack of the audited privilege are typically not audited. This is the main weakness of privilege auditing and why statement auditing is usually preferred, if the option exists.

Statement auditing audits the issuance of certain types of statements, usually without regard to privilege or lack thereof. Both privilege and statement audits may be specified for specific users or all users (the default).

In the following items, if the check returns any records, the item is in compliance. If it returns 'no records found', it is not in compliance.

5.1 Enable 'USER' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The USER object in the Oracle database an account through which a connection may be made to interact with the database according to the roles and privileges allotted to account. It is also a schema with may own database objects. This audits all activities and requests to create, drop or alter a user, including a user changing their own password. (The latter is not audited by 'audit ALTER USER'.)

Rationale:

Any unauthorized attempts to create, drop or alter a user should cause concern, whether successful or not. It can also be useful in forensics if an account is compromised and is mandated by many common security initiatives. An abnormally high number of these activities in a given period might be worth investigation. Any failed attempt to drop a user or create a user may be worth further review.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL Statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='USER'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS'
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT USER;
```

Impact:

This would the current 5.2 (audit CREATE USER), 5.3 (audit ALTER USER), and 5.4 (audit DROP USER) privilege audits with the single statement auditing option "audit USER". Any action audited by those three privilege audits would also be audited by this. In addition, this would audit:

- 1) Attempts to create user by anyone without the CREATE USER system privilege
- 2) Attempts to drop user by anyone without the DROP USER system privilege
- 3) Attempts to alter user by anyone without the ALTER USER system privilege
- 4) Users changing or attempting to change their own passwords (which is not done by auditing ALTER USER).

5.2 Enable 'ALTER USER' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `USER` object for the Oracle database is a specification of an object which is an account through which either a human or an application can connect to, via a JDBC or log into, via a

CLI, and interact with the database instance according to the roles and privileges allotted to account.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a USER can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='ALTER USER'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT ALTER USER;
```

5.3 Enable 'DROP USER' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The USER object for the Oracle database is a specification of an object which is an account through which either a human or an application can connect to, via a JDBC or log into, via a CLI, and interact with the database instance according to the roles and privileges allotted to account.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a USER can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='DROP USER'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT DROP USER;
```

5.4 Enable 'ROLE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The ROLE object allows for the creation of a set of privileges that can be granted to users or other roles. This audits all attempts, successful or not, to create, drop, alter or set roles.

Rationale:

Roles are a key database security infrastructure component. Any attempt to create, drop or alter a role should be audited. This statement auditing option also audits attempts, successful or not, to set a role in a session. Any unauthorized attempts to create, drop or alter a role may be worthy of investigation. Attempts to set a role by users without the role privilege may warrant investigation.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='ROLE'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```


Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting:

```
AUDIT ROLE;
```

Impact:

The change to the audit/check is to ensure that the audit is in effect for all users, regardless of proxy or success.

The change to the title, description and rationale are to better clarify what it actually does. (e.g. It does NOT audit "all ROLE activities/requests". For example, it does not audit role grants and revokes.)

5.5 Enable 'SYSTEM GRANT' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

This will audit any attempt, successful or not, to grant or revoke any system privilege or role - regardless of privilege held by the user attempting the operation.

Rationale:

Logging of all grant and revokes (roles and system privileges) can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities. Any unauthorized attempt may be cause for further investigation.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE  
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS  
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='SYSTEM GRANT'  
AND USER_NAME IS NULL  
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
```

```
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'  
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT SYSTEM GRANT;
```

5.6 Enable 'PROFILE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The PROFILE object allows for the creation of a set of database resource limits that can be assigned to a user, so that that user cannot exceed those resource limitations. This will audit all attempts, successful or not, to create, drop or alter any profile.

Rationale:

As profiles are part of the database security infrastructure, auditing the modification of profiles is recommended.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE  
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS  
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='PROFILE'  
AND USER_NAME IS NULL  
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL  
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'  
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT PROFILE;
```

Impact:

The statement auditing option 'audit PROFILE' audits everything that the three privilege audits 'audit CREATE PROFILE', 'audit DROP PROFILE' and 'audit ALTER PROFILE' do, but also audits:

- 1) Attempts to create a profile by a user without the CREATE PROFILE system privilege.
- 2) Attempts to drop a profile by a user without the DROP PROFILE system privilege
- 3) Attempts to alter a profile by a user without the ALTER PROFILE system privilege.

5.7 Enable 'ALTER PROFILE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `PROFILE` object allows for the creation of a set of database resource limits that can be assigned to a user, so that that user cannot exceed those resource limitations.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `PROFILE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='ALTER PROFILE'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT ALTER PROFILE;
```

5.8 Enable 'DROP PROFILE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `PROFILE` object allows for the creation of a set of database resource limits that can be assigned to a user, so that that user cannot exceed those resource limitations.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `PROFILE` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='DROP PROFILE'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT DROP PROFILE;
```

5.9 Enable 'DATABASE LINK' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

All activities on database links should be audited.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `DATABASE LINK` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='DATABASE LINK'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT DATABASE LINK;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

5.10 Enable 'PUBLIC_DATABASE_LINK' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `PUBLIC DATABASE LINK` object allows for the creation of a public link for an application-based "user" to access the database for connections/session creation .

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation, alteration, or dropping of a `PUBLIC DATABASE LINK` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='PUBLIC_DATABASE_LINK'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT PUBLIC DATABASE LINK;
```

5.11 Enable 'PUBLIC SYNONYM' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `PUBLIC SYNONYM` object allows for the creation of an alternate description of an object and public synonyms are accessible by all users that have the appropriate privileges to the underlying object.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `PUBLIC SYNONYM` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='PUBLIC SYNONYM'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT PUBLIC SYNONYM;
```

5.12 Enable 'SYNONYM' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `SYNONYM` operation allows for the creation of a an alternative name for a database object such as a Java class schema object, materialized view, operator, package, procedure, sequence, stored function, table, view, user-defined object type, even another synonym;

this synonym puts a dependency on its target and is rendered invalid if the target object is changed/dropped.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a `SYNONYM` can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of suspect/unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='SYNONYM'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT SYNONYM;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

5.13 Enable 'GRANT DIRECTORY' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `DIRECTORY` object allows for the creation of a directory object that specifies an alias for a directory on the server file system, where the external binary file LOBs (BFILEs)/ table data are located.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the creation or dropping of a DIRECTORY can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='GRANT DIRECTORY'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT GRANT DIRECTORY;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

5.14 Enable 'SELECT ANY DIRECTORY' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The SELECT ANY DICTIONARY capability allows the user to view the definitions of all schema objects in the database.

Rationale:

As the logging of user activities involving the capability to access the description of all schema objects in the database can provide forensic evidence about a pattern of unauthorized activities, the audit capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='SELECT ANY DICTIONARY'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT SELECT ANY DICTIONARY;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

5.15 Enable 'GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE allows the user to grant or revoke any object privilege, which includes privileges on tables, directories, mining models, etc. This audits all uses of that privilege.

Rationale:

Logging of privilege grants that can lead to the creation, alteration, or deletion of critical data, the modification of objects, object privilege propagation and other such activities can be critical to forensic investigations.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS
```

```
WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE'  
AND USER_NAME IS NULL  
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL  
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'  
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT GRANT ANY OBJECT PRIVILEGE;
```

Impact:

The change to the check/audit insures that it is in effect for all users regardless of proxy or success.

The change to the title more accurately reflects what it actually does.

The previous reference to being able to drop or modify "users and other critical system components" is essentially wrong. There is no object privilege I know of that can be used directly to drop or create a user. There may be some confusion due to documentation bugs (see notes), but this allows one only to grant object privileges, not system privileges like DROP ANY TABLE, DROP USER or ALTER PROFILE. (Of course, one could construct scenarios where granting execute on something might enable one to do so.)

References:

1.

5.16 Enable 'GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE' Audit Option (Not Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

This audits all uses of the system privilege named GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE. Actions by users *not* holding this privilege are *not* audited.

Rationale:

GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE allows a user to grant any system privilege, including the most powerful privileges typically available only to administrators - to change the security

infrastructure, to drop/add/modify users and more. Auditing the use of this privilege is part of a comprehensive auditing policy that can help in detecting issues and can be useful in forensics.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT PRIVILEGE, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_PRIV_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE PRIVILEGE='GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT GRANT ANY PRIVILEGE;
```

References:

1. http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e26088/statements_4007.htm#SQLRF01107

5.17 Enable 'DROP ANY PROCEDURE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The `AUDIT DROP ANY PROCEDURE` command is auditing the creation of procedures in other schema.

Rationale:

Dropping procedures of another user could be part of an privilege escalation exploit and should be audited.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='DROP ANY PROCEDURE'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT DROP ANY PROCEDURE;
```

5.18 Enable 'ALL' Audit Option on 'SYS.AUD\$' (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

The logging of attempts to alter the audit trail in the `SYS.AUD$` table (open for read/update/delete/view) will provide a record of any activities that may indicate unauthorized attempts to access the audit trail.

Rationale:

As the logging of attempts to alter the `SYS.AUD$` table can provide forensic evidence of the initiation of a pattern of unauthorized activities, this logging capability should be set according to the needs of the organization.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT *
FROM DBA_OBJ_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE OBJECT_NAME='AUD$'
AND ALT='A/A'
AND AUD='A/A'
AND COM='A/A'
AND DEL='A/A'
AND GRA='A/A'
AND IND='A/A'
AND INS='A/A'
AND LOC='A/A'
AND REN='A/A'
```

```
AND SEL='A/A'  
AND UPD='A/A'  
AND FBK='A/A';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT ALL ON SYS.AUD$ BY ACCESS;
```

5.19 Enable 'PROCEDURE' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

In this statement audit, "PROCEDURE" means any procedure, function, package or library. Any attempt, successful or not, to create or drop any of these types of objects is audited, regardless of privilege or lack thereof. Java schema objects (sources, classes, and resources) are considered the same as procedures for purposes of auditing SQL statements.

Rationale:

Any unauthorized attempts to create or drop a procedure in another's schema should cause concern, whether successful or not. Changes to critical store code can dramatically change the behavior of the application and produce serious security consequences, including privilege escalation and introducing SQL injection vulnerabilities. Audit records of such changes can be helpful in forensics.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE  
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS  
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='PROCEDURE'  
AND USER_NAME IS NULL  
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL  
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'  
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT PROCEDURE;
```

5.20 Enable 'ALTER SYSTEM' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

This will audit all attempts to ALTER SYSTEM, whether successful or not and regardless of whether or not the ALTER SYSTEM privilege is held by the user attempting the action.

Rationale:

Alter system allows one to change instance settings, including security settings and auditing options. Additionally alter system can be used to run operating system commands using undocumented Oracle functionality. Any unauthorized attempt to alter the system should be cause for concern. Alterations outside of some specified maintenance window may be of concern. In forensics, these audit records could be quite useful.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE  
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS  
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='ALTER SYSTEM'  
AND USER_NAME IS NULL  
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL  
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'  
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT ALTER SYSTEM;
```

Impact:

The change to the check/audit is to ensure that the audit is in effect for all users regardless of proxy, whether successful or not.

The previous Description was wrong - it is not "auditing" that "allows to modify the database settings".

5.21 Enable 'TRIGGER' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

A TRIGGER may be used to modify DML actions or invoke other (recursive) actions when some types of user-initiated actions occur. This will audit any attempt, successful or not, to create, drop, enable or disable any schema trigger in any schema regardless of privilege or lack thereof. For enabling and disabling a trigger, it covers both alter trigger and alter table.

Rationale:

Triggers are often part of schema security, data validation and other critical constraints upon actions and data. A trigger in another schema may be used to escalate privileges, redirect operations, transform data and perform other sorts of perhaps undesired actions. Any unauthorized attempt to create, drop or alter a trigger in another schema may be cause for investigation.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='TRIGGER'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT TRIGGER;
```


Impact:

The statement auditing option 'audit TRIGGER' audits almost everything that the three privilege audits "audit CREATE ANY TRIGGER", "audit ALTER ANY TRIGGER" and "audit DROP ANY TRIGGER" audit, but also audits:

1. Statements to create, drop, enable or disable a trigger in the user's own schema.
2. Attempts to create a trigger by a user without the CREATE TRIGGER system privilege.
3. Attempts to create a trigger in another schema by users without the CREATE ANY TRIGGER privilege.
4. Attempts to drop a trigger in another schema by users without the DROP ANY TRIGGER privilege.
5. Attempts to disable or enable a trigger in another schema by users without the ALTER ANY TRIGGER privilege.

The one thing is audited by any of the three privilege audits that is not audited by this is "alter trigger ...compile" if the trigger is in another's schema, which is audited by "audit ALTER ANY TRIGGER", but only if the user attempting the alteration actually holds the ALTER ANY TRIGGER system privilege. "Audit TRIGGER" only audits "alter table" or "alter trigger" statements used to enable or disable triggers. It does not audit alter trigger or alter table statements used only with compile options.

5.22 Enable 'CREATE SESSION' Audit Option (Scored)

Profile Applicability:

- Level 1 - RDBMS (RAC and non-RAC)

Description:

Audit all attempts to connect to the database, whether successful or not. Also audits session disconnects/logoffs. The commands to audit SESSION, CONNECT or CREATE SESSION all accomplish *exactly* the same thing – they initiate statement auditing of the connect statement used to create a database session.

Rationale:

Auditing attempts to connect to the database is basic and mandated by most security initiatives. Any attempt to logon to a locked account, failed attempts to logon to default accounts or an unusually high number of failed logon attempts of any sort, for any user, in a particular time period may indicate an intrusion attempt. In forensics, the logon record may be first in a chain of evidence and contains information found in no other type of audit

record for the session. Logon and logoff in the audit trail define the period and duration of the session.

Audit:

To assess this recommendation execute the following SQL statement.

```
SELECT AUDIT_OPTION, SUCCESS, FAILURE
FROM DBA_STMT_AUDIT_OPTS
WHERE AUDIT_OPTION='CREATE SESSION'
AND USER_NAME IS NULL
AND PROXY_NAME IS NULL
AND SUCCESS = 'BY ACCESS'
AND FAILURE = 'BY ACCESS';
```

Lack of results implies a finding.

Remediation:

Execute the following SQL statement to remediate this setting.

```
AUDIT SESSION;
```

Impact:

This is just a clarification. There is no change the what is actually audited. The check does now included conditions to insure that this auditing applies regardless of user or proxy and that it must include auditing both success and failure.

Appendix: Change History

Date	Version	Changes for this version
12-11-2012	1.0.0	Initial release.

DRAFT