

# **UBFuzz:** Finding Bugs in Sanitizer Implementations

Steve Gustaman

Original paper by Shaohua Li and Zhendong Su  
ASPLOS 2024

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
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    - Buffer overflow
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    - Use after free
- } **security issue!**

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
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
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
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
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Google OSS-Fuzz reported >20K UBs

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
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
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non-UB programs  
reported as UB


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


missing,  
unreported UB




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


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Sanitizer: many FNs = ineffective

missing,  
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- Sanitizers are widely used to detect UB
- Robustness
- It is an im

but how to effectively find  
**FN bugs** in sanitizers?

# UBFuzz:

## Finding Bugs in Sanitizer Implementations

with shadow statement insertion based program generation  
and crash-site mapping oracle

# UBFuzz Key Idea

- Goal: Find FN bugs in sanitizer (undetected, but actual UB)



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  - Generate program with UB
  - Check if sanitizer is able to detect the UB
    - **Cannot detect** → **sanitizer FN bug**

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
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# UB Program Generation

UB-free  
code



UB code



A black icon of a bug, representing the presence of undefined behavior (UB) in the code.

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struct a b[2];  
struct a *c = b, *d = b;  
  
int main() {  
    *c = *b;  
  
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\*example for stack buffer overflow UB insertion

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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



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```

\*example for stack buffer overflow UB insertion

# UB Program Generation





1. Identify and profile target
  - stack buffers
  - memory accesses
2. Compile and execute to obtain runtime information
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4. **Remove profiling**

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struct a { int x };  
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int main() {  
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shadow statement insertion

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- Approach is general
- Applied to 9 UB types in UBFuzz

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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




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


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
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


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  - Throughout 5-months testing period, found **31 new bugs**
    - 20 are confirmed, 6 are fixed



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    - CSmith + MUSIC (random C code mutator)
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  - Juliet Test Suite (collection of UB programs)
    - All 16K programs are detected as UB by sanitizers
    - Not effective to detect sanitizer FN bugs

# Conclusion

- **UBFuzz**: novel framework for testing sanitizer implementations
- With **UB program generator** that **inserts shadow statement** from UB free seed programs
- Differential testing is done with **crash-site mapping** as **test oracle**
- UBfuzz has discovered **31 bugs** in ASan, UBSan, and MSan from both GCC and LLVM

# Thank you

Steve Gustaman

[stevegustaman@kaist.ac.kr](mailto:stevegustaman@kaist.ac.kr)

```

1 int g, *ptr = &g;
2 int **p_ptr = &ptr;
3 int main() {
4     int buf[3]={1,2,3};
5     *ptr = 1;
6     *p_ptr = &buf[3];
7     *ptr = 0xffff;
8 }

```

(a) GCC ASan at -O1 missed the buffer overflow access \*ptr at line 7. [7]

```

1 volatile int a[5];
2 void b(int x) {
3     if(x)
4         a[5] = 7;
5 }
6 int main(){ b(1); }

```

(d) LLVM's ASan missed the buffer overflow at line 4. [19]

```

1 int a, c;
2 short b;
3 long d;
4 int main() {
5     a = (short)(d == c |
6             b > 9) / 0;
7     return a;
8 }

```

(b) GCC's UBSan at all levels missed the division-by-zero at line 5. [9]

```

1 int main() {
2     int *a = 0;
3     int b[3]={1, 1, 1};
4     ++b[2];
5     ++(*a);
6 }

```

(e) LLVM's UBSan missed the null pointer dereference at line 5. [20]

```

1 void b() {          9     for(;a<=5;++a){
2     int c[1];       10         int f[1]={};
3     c;              11         e = f;
4 }                  12         a||(b(), 1);
5 int main() {       13     }
6     int d[1]={1};  14     return *e;
7     int *e = d;    15 }
8     a = 0;

```

(c) GCC's ASan missed the use after scope at line 14, where the pointer e points to an inner scope variable f defined at line 10. [8]

```

1 int main() {
2     unsigned char a;
3     if (a-1)
4         __builtin_printf("boom!\n");
5     return 1;
6 }

```

(f) LLVM's MSan missed the use of uninitialized memory at line 3. [21]

Figure 12. Sample UB programs that trigger sanitizer FN bugs.