Worksheet 4: Matrix games

1. Apply iterative removal of dominated strategies to the following games.

(a) Player 1 $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	
Player 1 B $(1,-1)$ $(3,-2)$ Player 1 B $(0,4)$ $(2,5)$	\mathbf{F}
B $(1,-1)$ $(3,-2)$ Player 1 B $(0,4)$ $(2,3)$	-1, -2)
C (17) (29) ((5,3)
0 + 1 = 1, = 1, = 1, = 1, = 2, = 3, = 1	-7, -6)
Player 2 (c)	
$ m C \qquad D$	
(b) Player 1 $\stackrel{A}{B} = (5,-5) = (7,-7) = (4,-4) = (3,-3)$	

- 2. For each of the following two-player games, assuming Player 1 plays strategy A with probability p and Player 2 plays strategy C with probability q:
 - i. find the values of p and q that create a Nash equilibrium;
 - ii. find the expected outcomes for each player in this situation.