

# Patronage and Political Stability in Africa

Leonard Arriola, 2009

---

Ethan Christensen

Wednesday 30 May, 2018

University of California, Los Angeles

# Research Question

- Question: Has the patronage-based rule of African leaders undermined their capacity to stay in power?

Claim: African leaders recruit elites into patronage coalitions to deter extra-constitutional challenges

- discourage rivals organizing
- reduce dependence on any single ally
- complicate coordination of potential rivals

- time-series cross-sectional data : 40 countries 1971-2000
- IV: cabinet size as proxy for patronage coalition (van de Walle 2001)
- DV: extra-constitutional change of executive in country-year (binary)
- proportional hazards model to estimate regime duration

- differences in cabinet size due to : regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, total population
- 23-25% overthrow hazard reduction with an additional minister
- effect bounded between 18-31 ministers
- cabinet size more significant predictor than patterns of economic development

- nature of expansion - including more non-coethnics?
- use of executive competition control variables (Ferree and Singh 2002)
- interaction between cabinet size and economy/government budget
- cabinet stability?