

Comments on “The Redistributive Consequences of Electoral Competition: The Case of Federal Grant Expenditures in U.S. Municipalities”

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Research Question

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- Context and data: Community Development Block Grants in U.S. cities from 2002 to 2016.

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Theory and Hypotheses

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 - Sort of core vs. swing: is it about benefit or attention?
 - No data on geographic disbursement, but consider this for theory

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 - Matters for design: may compare places with an election in 2015 vs. 2014
 - Does matching on start-year alleviate? Still have different electoral incentives
 - Matters for theory: distribution in high information vs. low information environments

Thanks!

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