

# Pre-Analysis Plan

Drivers of Distributive Preferences: Symbolic Politics vs Self-Interest in Africa

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## Introduction

In his 1957 classic *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Anthony Downs adopts as a key assumption of his model that “citizens act rationally in politics” [downs\_economic\_1957 36]. That is, citizens cast votes aimed at maximizing their benefits from government. Downs allows that utility can be derived from altruistic action, not only from their material income or benefits. Nonetheless, research on voting behavior continues to conceptualize voting as a rational and/or self-interested act. For instance, the oft-cited Meltzer-Richard model posits that voters take into account their position in the income distribution and vote to establish a system of taxation that maximizes their private material self-interest [meltzer\_rational\_1981]. The first Metaketa investigated whether voters rationally change their voting behavior based on new information about government or incumbent performance.

- Downs assumes self-interest
- Recent literature on information and accountability assumes rational voting behavior – updating behavior based on information

## Description of data

## Selection of the sample

## Hypotheses

## Variable construction

## Estimating equations

## Multiple hypothesis testing