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## PowerShell Conference Europe

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***Miriam Wiesner***

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PowerShell Conference Europe

# I'm in your browser, eating your cookies (...and bypassing your MFA)

*Miriam Wiesner*



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**PSCONF EU SPEAKER**

# Miriam Wiesner

- Sr. Security Research Program Manager 
  - Sentinel Research
  - <https://github.com/miriamxyra>
- Author of the book “PowerShell Automation and Scripting for Cybersecurity - Hacking and defense for red and blue teamers”
  - Amazon.com: <https://aka.ms/mw-book>
  - Packt: <https://aka.ms/mw-book-packt>




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# What happened before...



- MFA was **not** enabled in the original research scenario
- Ways to circumvent MFA are **not in scope** of this demo

Phishing

AitM

Social Engineering

XSS

## How are attackers actually bypassing MFA?

MFA Fatigue

Legacy Fallback  
Options

Cookie Replay


Session Hijacking



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


cookies.sqlite




*How to get my cookies...  
(and bypass MFA)*

- ✓ Steal cookie database
- ✓ Extract cookies
- ✓ Replay cookie in headless browser
- ✓ Reuse cookie for device authentication
- ✓ Profit



cookies.sqlite



PS C:\Users\0mN0mNinj4>\_



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# Access token and scopes

Token Type	Role
Access Token	Defines what resources and operations the token can access (authorization)
Refresh Token	Can be used to request new access tokens with the same or fewer scopes
Id Token	Defines who the user is (authentication)

- The token can only be used to access the resources and operations **defined by those scopes**.
- When using a refresh token, the client can request a **subset** of the original scopes.
- Scopes:
  - ~~Azure Portal: c44b4083-3bb0-49c1-b47d-974e53cbdf3c~~
  - Microsoft Azure PowerShell: 1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2





# Device Authentication – in a browser



## Enter code to allow access

Once you enter the code displayed on your app or device, it will have access to your account.

**Do not enter codes from sources you don't trust.**

LMY49NFHQ

Next



## Pick an account

You're signing in to **Microsoft Azure PowerShell** on another device located in **Sweden**. If it's not you, close this page.



Miriam Victim  
Miriam-Victim@DefenderATEVET06.onmicrosoft.com  
Signed in



Use another account

Back



miriam-victim@defenderatevet06.onmicrosoft.com

## Are you trying to sign in to Microsoft Azure PowerShell?

Only continue if you downloaded the app from a store or website that you trust.

Cancel

Continue



## Microsoft Azure PowerShell

You have signed in to the Microsoft Azure PowerShell application on your device. You may now close this window.



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# Protect your environment

- MFA is not a silver bullet – but still important
  - e.g. against password spraying or password breaches
- Additionally, to MFA: Enable conditional access, identity protection policies, and configure lockout policies
- Block legacy authentication & MFA mechanisms
- Educate your users
  - Don't stay “always logged in”
  - Delete your cookies when your session closes



# Monitor alerts in your XDR and/or SIEM solution

- For Example
  - Risky Users
  - Anomalous Tokens
  - Stolen session cookie was used
- Look for anomalies, e.g.
  - Suspicious Sign-In patterns (Different Location, User Agent, ISP, Tor,...)
  - Unusual MS Graph or mailbox activities
- Suspicious PowerShell activities
  - Headless browser usage where it's not expected
  - Cookie or sessionStorage/localStorage Access and/or extraction



# Look for suspicious Sign In Patterns

## KQL Starter Snippet

```
SigninLogs
| where ResultType == 0 // successful sign-in
| where AuthenticationDetails has "MFA" // MFA was used
| summarize
    Count = count(),
    DistinctIPs = dcount(IPAddress),
    DistinctUserAgents = dcount(UserAgent),
    FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
    LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
    by UserPrincipalName, SessionId, AppDisplayName, AppId, ResourceDisplayName,
ResourceIdentity
| where DistinctIPs > 1 or DistinctUserAgents > 1
| order by LastSeen desc
```

*Feel free to adjust and improve, depending  
on your environment...*



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Thank you!



# Q&A

15 minutes



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