

# Towards Structured Use of Bayesian Sequential Monitoring in Clinical Trials

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## Abstract

The text of your abstract. 200 or fewer words.

*Keywords:* 3 to 6 keywords, that do not appear in the title

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# 1 Introduction

Things to discuss:

- 21<sup>st</sup> Century Cures Act (MATT)
- PDUFA VI reauthorization (MATT)
- Expansive work already done on sequential monitoring (EVAN – draft on 6/21)
  1. Foundational Bayesian sequential monitoring Cornfield (1966*a*) Cornfield (1966*b*) Neyman & Greenhouse (1967).
  2. Further development Freedman & Spiegelhalter (1989) Freedman & Spiegelhalter (1992) Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) Spiegelhalter et al. (1994) Fayers et al. (1997).
  3. Need to go further, and mention work on 3-arm Bayesian trials.
- Our majors contribution (EVAN – as early as possible in introduction without having the flow appear weird – draft on 6/21)
- Outline for the remaining section of the paper (EVAN – draft on 6/21)

# 2 Methods

As you introduce ideas that come from or extend other ideas in the literature, cite the relevant literature.

## 2.1 Monitoring versus Estimation Priors (EVAN – draft on 6/21)

### 2.1.1 Bayesian hypothesis testing based on posterior probabilities

The Bayesian framework allows direct inference on a parameter of interest through specification of a model for the data generating mechanism and prior distributions for unknown quantities. Let  $\mathbf{D}$  be a random variable representing the data collected in the trial with density  $p(\mathbf{D}|\theta, \psi)$  where  $\theta$  and  $\psi$  are the unknown quantities. Let  $\theta$  be the parameter of interest and  $\psi$  be the unknown quantities that are not of primary importance (i.e. “nuisance parameters”). Define the sample spaces for the unknown quantities as  $\theta \in \Theta$  and  $\psi \in \Psi$ . Suppose the hypotheses under consideration are  $H_0 : \theta \in \Theta_{H_0}$  versus  $H_1 : \theta \in \Theta_{H_1}$ , where  $\Theta = \Theta_{H_0} \cup \Theta_{H_1}$  and  $\Theta_{H_0} \cap \Theta_{H_1} = \emptyset$ . These hypotheses are adjudicated based on posterior probabilities of  $\theta$  by evaluating  $P(\theta \in \Theta_{H_i}|\mathbf{D}) = \int_{\Theta_{H_i}} p(\theta|\mathbf{D})d\theta$  for  $i \in \{0, 1\}$ , where  $p(\theta|\mathbf{D}) = \int_{\Psi} p(\theta, \psi|\mathbf{D})d\psi$ . Define  $\delta$  as a threshold for *a compelling level of evidence* as it relates to  $\theta$ . We say that an individual is “all but convinced” that  $H_i$  is true given the observed data if  $P(\theta \in \Theta_i|\mathbf{D}) \geq \delta$   $i \in \{1, 2\}$ . The quantity  $1 - \delta$  reflects *residual uncertainty* of  $H_i$  being true relative to the competing hypothesis. For example, an individual would be “all but convinced” of the truth of the alternative hypothesis if  $P(\theta \in \Theta_{H_1}|\mathbf{D}) \geq \delta$ .

The posterior distribution of  $\theta$  depends on the choice of prior distribution  $\pi(\theta, \psi)$ , since  $p(\theta, \psi|\mathbf{D}) = p(\mathbf{D}|\theta, \psi)\pi(\theta, \psi)/p(\mathbf{D})$  by Bayes rule. The specification of the prior distribution depends on the research objective. An *inference prior* is a prior that is used when the research objective is to make final analysis after data collection is complete. A *monitoring prior* is a prior that is used when the research objective is monitor enrollment with an eye towards early termination.

It has been said that ‘the purpose of a trial is to collect data that bring to conclusive

consensus at termination opinions that had been diverse and indecisive at the outset' (Kass and Greenhouse (1989)). These opinions manifest as priors  $\pi(\theta, \psi)$  for which their relation to  $P(\theta \in \Theta_i | \pi(\theta, \psi))$   $i \in \{0, 1\}$  is examined (note this quantity does not depend on the data  $\mathbf{D}$  and therefore reflect a-priori opinion). A skeptical prior is an informative or subjective prior that gives substantial preference to  $H_0$  such that it is "all but convinced" that  $H_0$  is true a-priori. This prior  $\pi_S(\theta, \psi) \equiv \pi_S$  has the property that  $P(\theta \in \Theta_0 | \pi_S) \geq \delta$  (equivalently  $P(\theta \in \Theta_1 | \pi_S) < 1 - \delta$ ). For example, if  $\delta = 0.95$ , then this choice of skeptical prior places 95% prior probability that  $\theta \in \Theta_0$ . An enthusiastic prior  $\pi_E(\theta, \psi) \equiv \pi_E$  similarly gives preference to  $H_1$  through the property that  $P(\theta \in \Theta_1 | \pi_E) \geq \delta$  (equivalently  $P(\theta \in \Theta_0 | \pi_E) < 1 - \delta$ ). For purposes of interpretation, a *skeptical person* is someone whose a-priori opinions of  $\theta$  are reflected through a skeptical prior and a *enthuastic person* is someone whose a-priori opinions of  $\theta$  are reflected through an ethuastic prior.

The use of monitoring based on changing the opinion of skeptical and enthusiastic priors has been described as overcoming a handicap (Freedman & Spiegelhalter (1989)) and providing a brake (Fayers et al. (1997)) on the premature termination of trials, or constructing "an adversary who will need to be disilusioned by the data to stop further experimentation" (Spiegelhalter et al. (1994)). Early termination of the trial is appropriate if diverse prior opinions about  $\theta$  would be in agreement given the interm data. It is then reasonable to stop data collection if, upon seeing the data, a *skeptical person* changes their opinion to be "all but convinced" that  $H_1$  is true ( $P(\theta \in \Theta_1 | \mathbf{D}, \pi_S) \geq \delta$ ), or an *enthuastic person* becomes "all but convinced" that  $H_1$  is false ( $P(\theta \in \Theta_0 | \mathbf{D}, \pi_E) \geq \delta$ ).

Final inference on  $\theta$  is made once enrollment is stopped based on the monitoring priors or at the planned end of the trial. An inference prior is often non-informative or objective in the sense that it does not show preference to  $H_0$  or  $H_1$ . This prior  $\pi_I(\theta, \psi) \equiv \pi_I$  has

the property that  $P(\theta \in \Theta_0|\pi_I) \approx P(\theta \in \Theta_1|\pi_I)$ . We propose use of a mixture prior constructed from the monitoring process as the inference prior:

$$\pi_I = \omega \times \pi_S + (1 - \omega) \times \pi_E$$

for  $\omega \in [0, 1]$ . Choosing  $\omega = 1/2$  corresponds to an agnostic inference prior. Choosing  $\omega$  based on posterior model probabilities of the null and alternative hypothesis yields  $\omega = p(\mathbf{D}|\pi_S)/(p(\mathbf{D}|\pi_S) + p(\mathbf{D}|\pi_E))$ . All relevant information about  $\theta$  can be derived from its posterior distribution with an inference prior (e.g. posterior mean, credible intervals). Define  $p(\mathbf{D}|\pi) = \int L(\theta|\mathbf{D})\pi(\theta)d\theta$  to be the marginal likelihood for the data given the prior  $\pi$ . The posterior mean using the inference prior will be a two-part mixture of the posterior means using the skeptical and enthusiastic priors:

$$E(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \pi_I) = \omega \times E(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \pi_S) + (1 - \omega) \times E(\theta|\mathbf{D}, \pi_E).$$

### 2.1.2 Default parameterization of monitoring priors for common designs

Define prior distribution as  $\pi(\theta|\lambda)$  where  $\lambda$  is a vector of hyperparameters.

Skeptical prior might be centered around the clinical inferiority boundary. Enthusiastic prior might be centered around clinical superiority boundary. Variance based on tail area considerations, or by matching the skeptical prior variance.

Reference prior attempts to express no particular opinion about the treatment's merit.

## 2.2 Futility Monitoring Using Probability of Success (EVAN – draft on 6/21)

- Futility monitoring using POS is about stopping early when there is a high likelihood of a study being inconclusive at the end of the study.

- Since the final analysis uses the *Inference* prior, POS should be based on the inference prior.
- Develop the framework for POS and show how it is a weighted average POS based on the skeptical and enthusiastic priors.

As an alternative strategy to futility analysis, one can monitor the probability of success (POS) for the trial. The probability of getting a convincing result at the end of the trial can be computed using the interim data. Let  $p(\theta|D, \pi_I)$  denote the posterior distribution for  $\theta$  based on the inference prior  $\pi_I$  and the current data  $D$ . Let  $\omega$  denote the POS which is given as follows:

$$\omega = E[1\{P(\theta \in \Theta_1|D_1, D, \pi_S) \geq 1 - \delta\}]$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to the posterior predictive distribution  $p(D_1)$  for future data  $D_1$  (ongoing + subjects yet to enroll):

$$p(D_1) = \int p(D_1|\theta) \times \pi(\theta|D)d\theta.$$

One may stop the enrollment if  $\omega$  is sufficiently small (i.e.,  $\omega < 0.05$ ).

Stochastic curtailment in frequentist setting.

### 3 Examples – (EVAN)

#### 3.1 Single-Arm Oncology Proof-of-Activity Trial w/ Binary Endpoint

For example, consider testing the hypothesis  $H_0 : \theta \leq \theta_0$  versus  $H_1 : \theta > \theta_0$  where  $\theta$  is a treatment effect of interest. Suppose an effect  $\theta_1 > \theta_0$  is thought to be highly clinically

relevant and plausible given what limited data is available. Consider a clinical trial with a single analysis and fixed sample size chosen that there is a high probability of proving  $H_1$  when  $\theta = \theta_1$ . A standard Bayesian decision rule would reject  $H_0$  when  $P(\theta > \theta_0|D) \geq 0.95$  which will result in a type one error rate of 0.05 (approximately) if  $\theta = \theta_0$  when the analysis prior is non-informative (a so-called reference or flat prior).

### **3.2 Parallel Two-Group Superiority Trial /w Continuous Binary Endpoint**

### **3.3 Three-Arm, Placebo Controlled Non-Inferiority Trial w/ Continuous Endpoint**

## **4 Discussion – (MATT/EVAN)**

## SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

### 5 BibTeX

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