

Comparative study of Post-Quantum Key-Exchange Mechanisms and its implementations

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Contents

PQ algorithms chosen for standardization by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)

The base idea

Comparison and visualization

Key exchange mechanism

Sharing a secret between two parties without revealing the secret to any third parties

- Two most widespread algorithms used
RSA and **Diffie-Hellman**

- Elliptic Curve Cryptography -

ECDH → Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

ECDHE → (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral)

The Quantum Threat

Difficult problems

- Integer Factorization, Discrete Logarithm
- Shor algorithm → 1994
Factorization in polynomial time
- Grover's search algorithm → 1996
Search for an element in \sqrt{N} steps for total N elements

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Quantum-safe mathematical techniques

- Lattices
- Error correcting codes
- Multivariate equations
- Supersingular elliptic curve isogenies

NIST initiated a process to evaluate and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms

Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization

Quantum-safe mathematical techniques

- PQCrypto 2016, Deadline - end of 2017
- 23 signature schemes and 59 PKE/KEM schemes

Finalists

- **Lattice-based:** CRYSTALS-Kyber, NTRU Prime, FrodoKEM
- **Code-based:** BIKE, Classic McEliece, HQC

PQC Standardization - NIST Security Levels

- Each algorithm has different parameters
- Different security levels

Levels	Definition, as least as hard to break as ...
1	To recover the key of AES-128 by exhaustive search
2	To find a collision in SHA-256 by exhaustive search
3	To recover the key of AES-192 by exhaustive search
4	To find a collision in SHA-384 by exhaustive search
5	To recover the key of AES-256 by exhaustive search

Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization


Quantum-safe mathematical techniques

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Finalists


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Lattice-based Cryptography - Lattices




- **Infinite set of points** generated by addition, subtraction of vectors
- Same lattice can be generated by different '**basis**'

Lattice-based Cryptography - Lattices



- Some problems are hard... given a bad basis

Lattice-based Cryptography - Lattices




- Some problems are hard... given a bad basis
- But easy with good basis

Lattice-based Cryptography - Lattices

$$3x - 2y + 1z = 5$$

$$4x + 3y - 3z = 1$$

$$-6x + 4y - 7z = 3$$



$$\begin{array}{c} x \\ \downarrow \\ \begin{bmatrix} 3 & -2 & 1 & | & 5 \\ 4 & 3 & -3 & | & 1 \\ -6 & 4 & -7 & | & 3 \end{bmatrix} \end{array}$$

Note: The matrix above is a simplified representation of the augmented matrix shown in the image. The image shows a 3x4 matrix with columns labeled x, y, z, and c. The values are: Row 1: 3, -2, 1, 5; Row 2: 4, 3, -3, 1; Row 3: -6, 4, -7, 3. The columns are color-coded: x (blue), y (red), z (green), c (purple).

$$A * \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{t} \Rightarrow \text{Gaussian elimination}$$

$$A * \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{t} \Rightarrow \text{Reduction to lattice hard problem}$$

Learning with errors problem

Diagram illustrating the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem:

A box labeled **A** points to a matrix of random values:

random $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^{7 \times 4}$			
4	1	11	10
5	5	9	5
3	9	0	10
1	3	3	2
12	7	3	4
6	5	11	4
3	3	5	0

This matrix is multiplied (\times) by a secret vector:

secret $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^{4 \times 1}$


The result is added (+) to a small noise vector:

small noise $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^{7 \times 1}$

The final result is a vector t in $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^{7 \times 1}$:


$\mathbb{Z}_{13}^{7 \times 1}$
4
7
2
11
5
12
8

- $A * s = t \Rightarrow$ Gaussian elimination
- $A * \underline{s} + \underline{e} = t \Rightarrow$ Reduction to lattice hard problem



Large structure! Can use polynomials for fast multiplication

Module learning with errors problem




every matrix entry is a polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^n + 1)$

- $A * s = t \Rightarrow$ Gaussian elimination
- $A * \underline{s} + \underline{e} = t \Rightarrow$ Reduction to lattice hard problem


Polynomials for fast multiplication \rightarrow Fast Fourier Transform

Module learning with errors problem




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Polynomials for fast multiplication \rightarrow Fast Fourier Transform

Ring-LWE



4	1	11	10
3	4	1	11
2	3	4	1
12	2	3	4
9	12	2	3
10	9	12	2
11	10	9	12

$q = 13$

degree is at most 3

Ring elements $r \in R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$:

- ▶ Coefficients integers modulo q
- ▶ Degree at most $n - 1$ i.e.
 $r = r_0 + r_1 \cdot X + \dots + r_{n-1} \cdot X^{n-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$
- ▶ Coefficient Embedding $r = (r_0, \dots, r_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$

$$4 + 1x + 11x^2 + 10x^3$$
$$(4 + 1x + 11x^2 + 10x^3) \cdot x$$

$$4x + 1x^2 + 11x^3 + 10x^4 \mod x^4 + 1$$

$$-10 \mod 13 = 3$$

Crystal KYBER and NTRU

- **LWE** works with vectors of integers
- **RING LWE** works with polynomials
- **Module LWE** works with vectors of polynomials

KYBER works with **Module LWE** – $\mathbb{Z}_q(X)/(X^n + 1)$

NTRU Prime – $\mathbb{Z}_q(X)/(X^n - x - 1)$

Nth degree TRUncated polynomial ring

Methodology

A KEM offers three functions:

$(pk, sk) = \text{KEM_KeyGen}()$

- outputs public and private key

$(ct, ss) = \text{KEM_Encrypt}(pk)$

- generates a random value ss and encrypts it to ct using the public key pk

$(ss) = \text{KEM_Decrypt}(sk, ct)$

- decrypts ciphertext ct to plaintext ss using private key sk

Methodology

$(pk, sk) = \text{KEM_KeyGen}()$

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→ Space

→ Performance



Running the algorithms locally

KEM Details:

Name: Kyber512

Version: <https://github.com/pq-crystals/kyber/commit/74cad307858b61e434490c75f812cb9b9ef7279b>

Claimed NIST level: 1

Is IND-CCA: true

Length public key (bytes): 800

Length secret key (bytes): 1632

Length ciphertext (bytes): 768

Length shared secret (bytes): 32

Client public key:

3E 23 92 76 30 3A C5 92 ... D9 A5 70 84 42 77 12 39

It took 1716026 nanosecs to generate the key pair.

It took 447834 nanosecs to encapsulate the secret.

It took 49322 nanosecs to decapsulate the secret.

Client shared secret:


BB 4B ED 55 89 CD 27 39 ... C7 96 A6 65 B5 CA A0 AD

Server shared secret:


BB 4B ED 55 89 CD 27 39 ... C7 96 A6 65 B5 CA A0 AD

Shared secrets coincide? true

Space requirements



Performance



Code-based cryptography

Hardness of **decoding randomly generated linear codes**

Code-based cryptography

Hardness of decoding randomly generated linear codes

Error correcting codes → Hamming Code

Original Message:

0010 1100

$$x = a \oplus b \oplus d$$

$$y = a \oplus c \oplus d$$


$$z = b \oplus c \oplus d$$

a b c d x y z

Hamming Code:

0010011 1100011

Code-based cryptography




G' is a generator matrix that helps create codeword

→ Has a decoding algorithm

Code-based cryptography

G' is a generator matrix





$S \rightarrow$ invertible matrix

$P \rightarrow$ permutation matrix


Code-based cryptography

G' is a generator matrix



Code-based cryptography

G' is a generator matrix



Code-based cryptography

Main idea:

Error correcting code with fast, efficient decoding algorithm


Hamming code

4-bit messages \rightarrow 7-bit codewords

- **Classic McEliece** \Rightarrow Binary Gappa Code
- **BIKE** \Rightarrow QC-MDPC (Quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check)


Code-based cryptography

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
Code-based cryptography

- **Classic McEliece** \Rightarrow Binary Gappa Code
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Code-based cryptography

- Classic McEliece \Rightarrow Binary Gappa Code
- **BIKE** \Rightarrow QC-MDPC (Quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check)



Code-based cryptography

Classic McEliece

- Fast encapsulation and decapsulation
- Smallest ciphertext among all NIST submissions

But...

$$G' = S * G * P$$

VERY large public-key sizes


Introduced in **1978**

Classic McEliece is used in the PQ-WireGuard

Code-based cryptography


BIKE (Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation)

- Smallest ciphertext
- Smaller public-key size 5122 bytes
- Not CCA-secure 1357824 bytes in Classic McEliece





SIZE IN BYTES

Public Key Secret Key Ciphertext



Performance





Wrapping it up

- NIST has chosen KYBER for standardisation
- Others are kept as alternatives

Being implemented

- WireGuard VPN
- TLS
- IPSec
- OpenSSH 9.0 has NTRU implemented