

# Alternative Mining, Bitcoin Applications, and Altcoins

50.037 Blockchain Technology  
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# **Alternative Mining**

# PoW in Bitcoin

- Reminder: PoW is needed to protect from Sybil attacks
  - In permissionless system such a protection has to be resource-based
- Based on H()
- Energy consuming
- Useless
- Easy to optimize (ASIC)
- Can we introduce mining with some better properties?
  - Bitcoin is hard to change but other systems could benefit

# Requirements

- Quick to verify: every full node validates solutions
- Adjustable difficulty: {in,de}creasing network capabilities
- Fair: finding solutions should be proportional to resources invested
  - Progress free: finding solutions should be independent (probability)
  - Memoryless process: finding time forms exponential distribution
- $\text{SHA256}(\text{SHA256}(.)) < \text{TARGET}$  satisfies them

# ASIC-Resistant Mining

- Why ASIC-resistant mining?
  - Ideally, we would mine with CPUs (ASIC makes it worthless)
  - Mining is getting professional and concentrated
    - High entry barrier
  - Energy consumption
  - (There are also arguments against: it is proven/secure, it is always possible to specialize hardware, ...)
- Design mining such that ASICs are unprofitable
  - Such that general-purpose computers can compete
    - (1 computer/CPU: 1 vote)

# Memory-Hard Mining

- Memory-hard mining
  - Instead of a lot CPU time, require a large amount of memory
- Memory-bound mining
  - (another concept) where memory access time is important
- Combination of memory-hard and memory-bound mining
- More challenging to build ASICs that need to compute something + access memory
  - SHA256 is not memory hard

# scrypt

- ASIC-resistance hash functions is not a new problem
  - Password hashing and cracking resistance

```
1 def scrypt(N, seed):
2     V = [0] * N // initialize memory buffer of length N

        // Fill up memory buffer with pseudorandom data
3     V[0] = seed
4     for i = 1 to N:
5         V[i] = SHA-256(V[i-1])

        // Access memory buffer in a pseudorandom order
6     X = SHA-256(V[N-1])
7     for i = 1 to N:
8         j = X % N // Choose a random index based on X
9         X = SHA-256(X ^ V[j]) // Update X based on this index

10    return X
```

# scrypt

- scrypt with memory is  $O(N)$ , without  $O(N^2)$
- Some time-memory trade-offs still possible
- Verification cost
  - For large N (should be large), the verification requires significant memory
    - SPV clients may be too resource constraint
- With low N, ASICs can be built
- Used in practice
  - Other cryptocurrencies
- Other approaches (different than scrypt): Cuckoo Cycle, X11, ...

# Proof of Useful Work

- Natural Goal: get something useful from mining computations
- Still should meet the requirements
  - Quick verification, Adjustable, and Fair
- Previous distributed computing projects
  - Difficult to employ as cryptocurrency mining

Project	Founded	Goal	Impact
Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search	1996	Finding large Mersenne primes	Found the new “largest prime number” twelve straight times, including $2^{57885161} - 1$
distributed.net	1997	Cryptographic brute-force demos	First successful public brute-force of a 64-bit cryptographic key
SETI@home	1999	Identifying signs of extraterrestrial life	Largest project to date with over 5 million participants
Folding@home	2000	Atomic-level simulations of protein folding	Greatest computing capacity of any volunteer computing project. More than 118 scientific papers.

# Primecoin


- Cunningham chains
  - $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k$  such that  $p_i = 2p_{i-1} + 1$
  - The longest known chain has 19 primes, conjectured (not proven) that there is a chain for any  $k$
- Mining requires three parameters  $m, n, k$ 
  - For the previous block hash  $x$ , take  $m$  bits of  $x$  and consider any  $k$ -long chain in which the first prime in the chain is an  $n$ -bit prime and has the same  $m$  leading bits as  $x$
  - Increasing  $n$  increases difficulty linearly, increasing  $k$  increases difficulty exponentially,  $m$  should be large enough such that precomputing values is infeasible
- Deployed in Primecoin (the longest Cunningham chain found)
- Is that really useful?

# Permacoin and Proof Of Storage

- Instead of computing extensively, prove that you are storing some dataset
  - If the dataset is useful then miners' equipment is useful
- F is a large file that everyone agrees it is worth archiving
  - Libraries, experimental data, web archive, ...
  - Miners could collectively archive it by storing its portions
- Not everyone has to store it, but everyone has to make sure that some data belongs to F

# Permacoin and Proof Of Storage

- Each miner stores a random subset  $F_M$  of  $F$ 
  - A miner from hash of its public key  $K_M$  generates a  $k_1$ -long list of blocks  $F_M$  (note that this list is pseudorandom), download, and store them
- With the previous block hash  $x$ , the miner chooses nonce and hashes it to generate a  $k_2$ -long ( $k_2 < k_1$ ) subset  $F_{M,n}$  of  $F_M$
- If  $H(F_{M,n} \parallel n) < \text{TARGET}$ , then this is a valid solution and can be propagated
  - Presence proofs for blocks are propagated too
- Verify: a)  $F_{M,n}$  is correctly derived from  $K_M$  and nonce, b) each block of  $F_{M,n}$  is part of  $F$ , c)  $H(F_{M,n} \parallel n) < \text{TARGET}$



# Mining Misc.

- Proof-of-X (mainly, resource-based)
- Many ideas around
  - Proof of Luck, Proof of Elapsed Time, Proof of DoS, ...
- Proof of Stake (will discuss later)
  - Why to *vote* with resources and not just stakes?
- Nonoutsourceable mining

# Bitcoin Applications

# Cryptocurrency

- Monetary (token) transfers


- Electronic cash?



- Electronic gold?

- Settlement system?

	Value of transaction per card in U.S. dollars
American Express	141
MasterCard	80
Visa	81
JCB	73



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# Append-only Log

- Nice properties
  - Append-only by design, Transparent, Available, Censorship resistant, ...
- Timestamping
  - Documents, certificates, predictions, results, notes, ...
  - How to prove that you knew  $x$  at given point of time?
    - Commitments: publish  $H(r||x)$  for a random  $r$ , and reveal  $r||x$  later
    - Why Bitcoin helps? Block number, timestamps, no trusted party, ..
- Encoding
  - P2PKH (20 bytes only, a hack), OP\_RETURN (220 bytes)
- Illicit Content

# Predictions & Commitments



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
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# Catena

- Efficient Non-equivocation via Bitcoin
  - [people.csail.mit.edu/alinush/papers/catena-sp2017.pdf](http://people.csail.mit.edu/alinush/papers/catena-sp2017.pdf)



# Other Applications

- Overlay currencies
  - Just use Bitcoin as an append-only log and implement any rules on the top of it
- Smart property
  - Transactions are traceable, can that be helpful?
- Colored coins
  - Associate coins with some metadata (*color*)
  - Metadata can be authenticated (signed)

# Other Applications

- Public randomness
  - How to generate public (trustworthy) randomness?
  - Many applications, from lotteries to cryptographic protocols
- Secure multiparty computations
  - The scripting language allows to build secure protocols
- Prediction markets
- ...

# Example: Coin Flipping Online

## Round 1:

Each party picks a large random string — Alice picks  $x$ , Bob picks  $y$ , and Carol picks  $z$ .

The parties publish  $H(x)$ ,  $H(y)$ ,  $H(z)$  respectively.

Each party checks that  $H(x)$ ,  $H(y)$ ,  $H(z)$  are all distinct values (otherwise aborts the protocol).

## Round 2:

The three parties reveal their values,  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$ .

Each party checks that the revealed values agree with the hashes published in Round 1.

The outcome is  $(x + y + z) \% 3$ .

What if someone does not reveal their commitment?

Alice can make a *timed commitment* with a bond spendable to Bob if

- it is signed by Alice & Bob
- or, only but Alice but revealing  $x$  (the input)

Then they create a time locked transaction (`nLockTime`) paying the bond to Bob after some time  $t$

```
scriptPubKey:  
    OP_IF  
        <AlicePubKey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY <BobPubKey> OP_CHECKSIG  
    OP_ELSE  
        <AlicePubKey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY OP_HASH <H(x)> OP_EQUAL  
    OP_ENDIF
```

scriptSig for Case 1:

```
<BobSignature> <AliceSignature> 0
```


scriptSig for Case 2:

```
x <AliceSignature> 1
```

# Altcoins

# Altcoins

- Alternative cryptocurrencies
  - Unclear what is (not) an altcoin
  - Improve Bitcoin, give new properties or functionalities, scams, ...
  - Ecosystem is quite complex, how to do initial allocation, ...





Cryptocurrencies: 2042 • Markets: 14470

 CoinMarketCap



# *namecoin*

- Recap: distributed naming is hard
- Namecoin
  - The first altcoin ever
  - Replace centralized DNS
- Bitcoin's fork
  - With name management
    - New opcodes: NAME\_NEW, NAME\_FIRSTUPDATE, NAME\_UPDATE, ...
  - Did not get a significant adoption






- Bitcoin's fork aiming for efficiency
  - Block every 2.5 minutes
  - Uses scrypt in its PoW algorithms
- The first altcoin that is still popular

#	Name	Market Cap
1	Bitcoin	\$114,109,570,816
2	Ethereum	\$23,045,368,843
3	XRP	\$19,273,020,265
4	Bitcoin Cash	\$9,028,576,137
5	EOS	\$5,209,127,736
6	Stellar	\$4,548,889,354
7	<u>Litecoin</u>	\$3,391,550,735



# DOGECOIN

- Litecoin's fork
  - Introduced as a joke
  - Quickly got popularity
  - Fundraising projects



# Misc.

- Indicators: market cap, mining power, adoption, ...

- Bitcoin - Altcoin interactions

- Altcoin infanticide


- Merge Mining

- Design an altcoin that uses Bitcoin's mining

- Put hash pointers to the altcoin in the Bitcoin blockchain

- Coinbase transaction

- Multiple benefits



# Reading

- Textbook 8, 9, 10
- ... and inline references