THE POLITICS.

BOOK I.

Ed. Bekker, 1252 a. EVERY state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. I. 1. The state being the highest community aims at the highest good.

2 Now there is an erroneous opinion[a] that a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. Plato treated the difference between household, royal, and political rule as a difference only of degree.

3 But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method[b] which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must But it is really a difference in kind, as will be clear if we resolve the state into its elements.

[a] Cp. Plato Politicus, 258 E foll.

[b] Cp. c. 8. § 1.

I. 1. therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see [a]in what they differ from one another, and whether any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different kinds of rule[a].

2. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place (1) there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,—

(1) Union of male and female.

(2) Of ruler and subject.

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1252b.

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'It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians[b];'

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

The family the first stage of society.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right when he says,— 5

'First house and wife and an ox for the plough[c],'

[a] Or, with Bernays, 'how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.'

[b] Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.

[c] Op. et Di. 405.

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's every day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard' [ὁμοσιπύους], and by Epimenides the Cretan, '[a] companions of the manger[a]' [ὁμοκάπους]. But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the
6 village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be 'suckled with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed
7 because they were of the same blood. As Homer says [of the Cyclopes]:—

I. 2.

The village the next.

'Each one gives law to his children and to his wives[b].'

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.

8 When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family.

The city or state the third and highest.

[a] Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) ὁμοκάπνους, 'companions of the hearth.'

[b] Od. ix. 114, quoted by Plato Laws, iii. 680, and in N. Eth. x. 9. § 13.

I. 2. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, 9
and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. 1253a.

The state exists by nature.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the

'Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,'

whom Homer[a] denounces—the outcast who is a lover of 10
war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone.

Man, having the gift of speech and the sense of right and wrong, is by nature a political animal.

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain[b], and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech[c]. And whereas mere 11
sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a 12
characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

The whole is prior to the part, the state to the family and individual.

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity 13
prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The 14
proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must

[a] Il. ix. 63. [b] Cp. c. 8. § 12. [c] Cp. vii. 13. § 12.

15 be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he 16 is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just [a], is the principle of order in political society. I. 2.

Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state, we must speak of the 1253 b. [b] management of the household [b]. The parts of the household are the persons who compose it, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its least elements; and the first and least parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three 2 relations is and ought to be:—I mean the relation of master and servant, of husband and wife, and thirdly of parent and child. [I say *γαμική* and *τεκνοποιητική*, there being no words for the two latter notions which ade- 3 quately represent them.] And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us. 3. The family or household. Its parts.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some 4 better theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, Master and slave.

[a] Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. § 4.

[b] Reading with the MSS. *οἰκονομίας*.

I. 3. and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset[a], are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.

4. Property includes instruments lifeless and living.

Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now, instruments are of various sorts; 2
some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument, which takes precedence of all other

The slave is a living instrument.

instruments. For if every instrument could accom- 3
plish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet[b],

'of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;'

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be drawn: the in- 1254a. 4
struments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something

[a] Plato in Pol. 258 E foll., referred to already in c. 1. § 2.
[b] Hom. Il. xviii. 376.

else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action [for he ministers to his master's life]. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's and yet a man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to belong to another who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

I. 4. His master's life is a life of action, to which he ministers.

6 Who is the slave by nature?

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?

5. Is there a slave by nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule, and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

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And whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects, that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects—for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts. The work is better which is executed by better workmen; and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work. In all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of

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I. 5. the universe; even in things which have no life, there is a ruling principle, as [a]in musical harmony[a]. But we are wandering from the subject. We will, therefore, restrict ourselves to the living creature which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule 1254 b. over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. First then we may observe in living creatures 6 both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals as well as of 7 men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such 8 a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is 9 another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, reason, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend

Everywhere in nature there is the distinction of higher and lower, of ruler and ruled.

[a] Or, 'of harmony [in music].'

V. 5. And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down.

Revolutions in democracies are caused by demagogues, as at

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public they stir up the people against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At

Cos,

Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At

Rhodes,

Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and

Heraclea,

put down the democracy[a]. The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to

Megara,

the democracy. Much in the same manner the democracy at Megara[b] was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging and

Cyme.

defeating the people, established an oligarchy. The same thing happened with the democracy of Cyme which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favour with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine;—either they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate[c].

[a] Cp. supra c. 3. § 4. [b] Cp. c. 3. § 5, and iv. 15. § 15.
[c] Cp. infra c. 8. § 20.

V. 5.

Demagogues old and new.

6 Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient
7 tyrants were originally demagogues[a]. They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the
8 contrary are few and slight. Formerly tyrannies were more common than they now are, because great power was often placed in the hands of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters[b]. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work; and their
9 chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain[c], and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he found by the river side where they
10 had put them to graze. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for where there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above
11 the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.

Of old, great magistrates became tyrants, as at Miletus;

military leaders, like Peisistratus, Theagenes,

Dionysius,

These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.

[a] Cp. c. 10. § 4; Plato Rep. viii. 565 D.

[b] Cp. infra c. 10. § 5.

[c] See Herod. i. 59.

V. 6. There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies [one coming from without, the other from within the government]: (1) First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. 1305 b.

Revolutions in oligarchies arise (1) outside the governing class when they are (a) oppressive, (b) exclusive,

But revolutions which commence outside the governing 2
class may be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at Massalia and Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government 3
created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in some places father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy under- 4
went a considerable change. For the notables fell out among themselves, because only a few shared in the government; there existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son could not hold office together, and, if there were several brothers, only the eldest was admitted. The people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. The city of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and 5
ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the government.

(2) within the governing class from several causes.

(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue 6
is of two sorts: either (1) he practises upon the oligarchs themselves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at

(a) Demagogues who practise either upon

V. 6. garchy is created within the original one, that is to 11
say, when the whole governing body is small and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at Elis the governing body was a small senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because, although in number ninety, the senators were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedaemonian elders.

Dangers from mercenaries; Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in peace; 12
in war because, not being able to trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make themselves into a company of tyrants[a]. Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government be-

from faction, which leaves the state at the mercy of the army; cause their services are necessary to them. And in time 13
of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defence of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two factions who often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa when Simos and the Aleuadae had the government, and at Abydos in the

from private quarrels; days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions 14
also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned[b] some instances; another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a marriage. A revo- 15
lution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon Eurytion, and at Thebes 1306b.
upon Archias; for their enemies were jealous of them and

and excessive despotism. so had them pilloried in the agora. Many oligarchies 16
have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class taking offence at their excessive despotism; for example, the oligarchy at Cnidus and at Chios.

[a] *δυναστεία.* [b] Cp. c. 4. §§ 5–7.

V. 6. Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or other magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification, often occur by accident. The qualification may have been originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as large, and then everybody participates in every office; this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies.

Accidental change of qualification.

We must remark generally, both of democracies and oligarchies, that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class; I mean to say, from those forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely.

Changes in states may be of degree as well as of kind.

7. In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only share in the honours of the state; a cause which has been already shown to affect oligarchies; for an aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, is the government of a few, although the few are the virtuous and not the wealthy; hence the two are often confounded. And revolutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when the majority of the people are high-spirited, and have a notion that they are as good as their rulers. Thus at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae, who were the [illegitimate] sons of the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to colonize Tarentum. Again, revolutions occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonoured by those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta: or, when a brave man is excluded from the honours of the state, like Cinadon, who conspired against the Spartans under

Causes of revolution in aristocracies:
(1) jealousy,
(2) pride of a class,
(3) dishonour to high-spirited men,

V. 7. (4) extremes of wealth and poverty,

Agesilaus; or, again, when some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the Messenian War; this is proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, en- 4
titled 'Good Order;' for he speaks of certain citizens 1307a.
who were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land. Again, revolutions arise when an individual who is great, and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as at Lacedaemon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or like Hanno at Carthage.

(5) ambition of great men,

(6) when the elements of the state are ill-compounded.

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are com- 5
monly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially democracy and oligarchy. For to combine these is the endeavour of constitutional governments; and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim [a], but differ 6
from polities by the addition of virtue; hence some of them are more and some less permanent. Those which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy constitutional governments. And therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal they are contented. But the rich, if the government gives them power, are 7
apt to be insolent and avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy, an oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aris- 8
tocracy may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the constitution to take an opposite form.

Constitutional governments safer than aristocracies, because they rest on a broader basis.

The change may be in either direction.

[a] Cp. iv. c. 7.

In like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own. V. 7.

9 What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii[a], where the qualification for office, though at first high, was reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. The notables had previously acquired the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land. Encroachments of the notables at Thurii;

10 Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where property has passed into few hands[b], the notables can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage connexion with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy. and at Lacedaemon.

11 I have already remarked that in all states revolutions 1307 b. are occasioned by trifles[c]. In aristocracies, above all, they are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving up some part of the constitution, and so with greater ease the government change something else which is a little more important, until they have under- Revolutions are occasioned by trifles and begin imperceptibly.

12 mined the whole fabric of the state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should only be re-elected after an interval of five years, and some high-spirited young men who were popular with the soldiers of the guard, despising the magistrates and thinking that they would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to Illustration from Thurii.

13 elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charge

[a] Cp. c. 3. § 12. [b] Cp. ii. 9. § 14. [c] c. 4. § 1.

1308 a. not rely upon the political devices of which I have already spoken[a], invented only to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, not from any inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the leading spirits among them[b]. They should never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honour, or the common people in a matter of money; and they should treat one another and their

6 fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic institutions are useful; for example, the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have already

7 remarked[c]. The short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them[d].

8 States are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand the state. Wherefore the ruler who has a care of the state should invent terrors, and bring distant dangers near, in order

V. 8. beginnings of change and not trust to political tricks.

The people should be well treated.

Among equals there should be equality and therefore offices should be held by many persons for a short time only.

A common fear may unite a state.

[a] Cp. iv. 13. § 1.
[b] vi. 7. § 4.
[c] Supra c. 6. § 6.
[d] Cp. c. 5. § 6.

V. 8. that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like sentinels in a night-watch, never relax their attention. He 9
The quarrels of the notables are to be repressed. should endeavour too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from being drawn in. No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil[a], but only the true statesman.

The census should be periodically revised. As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitu- 10 tional governments[b] by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the census but only out of the increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually, and in larger cities every third or fifth year. 1308b. If the whole is many times greater or many times less than when the rates were fixed at the previous census, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. Where in 11 the absence of any such provision the standard is raised, a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; where the standard is lowered, constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy.

No individual should be too powerful. It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy[c], and 12 every other form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honour for a long time rather than great honour for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honours which are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he and his followers should be sent out of the

[a] Cp. c. 4. §§ 1–3. [b] Cp. c. 3. § 8; c. 6. §§ 16–18.
[c] Or, adding *καὶ μοναρχίᾳ*, 'monarchy,' with many MSS. and Bekker's first edition.