A Simple Bitcoin Market Model v1.1

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Table of Content

Executive Summary

The network fixes the production price c(t) of the bitcoin (BTC)

$$c(t) \approx \mu \, H_{R(t)}/B_R \;\; in \; \$/BTC$$

H_R is the quantity of hashes needed for the production of B_R (12,5 BTC in 2017) bitcoins.
µ is a physical factor (in \$/TH) relying on the rig technology.

$$\mu = (R_A/\beta + 8.760 \, P_E \, E_C)/31.536.000 \;\; in \; \$/TH$$

R_A =Rig Amortization (in \$/year/rig)   600
P_E = Power Efficiency (in Joule per Giga Hash per second) 0,1
E_C = Energy Cost (in \$/KWh)   0,15
B_R = Block Reward (in BTC)   12,5
H_R =HashRate x 600s = 12 10^6 x 600 (in Tera Hash)   7,2 10^9
β = The number of hashes produced by a rig (in THs)   14
m = The *Market Valorization Factor*   1
$1/\lambda$ = The *Market Time Constant*   174 days
$1/k$ = 1/(*Market Incitement Factor*) = m β µ $1/\lambda$ = profit/ λ   1163 \$

$$h(t) = \beta \, r(t) \;\; in \; Tera \; Hash \; per \; second - THs$$

where r(t) is the number of rigs, h(t) the hashrate i.e. the number of hashes produced by the rigs' park every second. The market valorization v(t) is defined as:

$$v(t) = m \, c(t) \; , in \; \$/BTC$$

Where m is the *market valorization factor*. The market price is:

$$p(t) = c(t)(1 + m) \;\; , in \; \$/BTC \; with \; m \geq -1$$

The rigs make money if the market valorization factor (m) is positive. The profit in \$, per rig and per second is:

$$profit = m \, \beta \, \mu \;\; , in \; \$/s$$

We assume that the number of rigs r(t) increases with the miners' gain g(t) (expressed in $) according to a constant k ≥ 0 factor .

$$r(t) - r(to) = k\left(g(t) - g(to)\right) \ , k \ in \ \$^{-1}$$

Where k is the *market incitement factor*. We deduce from these hypothesizes that the number of rigs increases/decreases exponentially according to the sign of m. $1/\lambda$ is the *market constant time*.

$$r(t) = r(to) \ e^{\lambda \ (t-to)}$$

with $\lambda = k \ m \ \beta \ \mu = k \ profit \ , in \ s^{-1}$

Furthermore when the valorization m is positive the hashrate h(t), the cost c(t), the market price p(t), and the valorization v(t) increase exponentially.

$$h(t) = h(to) \ e^{\lambda \ (t-to)}$$
$$c(t) = c(to) \ e^{\lambda \ (t-to)}$$
$$p(t) = (1 + m) \ c(to) \ e^{\lambda \ (t-to)}$$
$$v(t) = m \ c(to) \ e^{\lambda \ (t-to)}$$

When the valorization m is negative, the rigs lose money, their number decreases; λ is negative, and consequently the hashrate decreases. The network lowers the production price c(t). The market price p(t) decreases until the valorization becomes positive again.

The growth limit is induced by the energy consumption, which relies on the rigs number. At this point the k factor will be null, implying a null value of λ, and therefore :

$$r(t) = r(to)$$
$$h(t) = h(to)$$
$$c(t) = c(to)$$
$$p(t) = (1 + m(t)) \ c(to)$$
$$v(t) = m(t) \ c(to)$$

The bitcoin production rate

The bitcoin production rate is a constant (for example 12,5 BTC every 10 minutes), the number b(t) of bitcoins increases linearly with the time.

$$b(t) - b(to) = \alpha(t - to)$$

$$(1) \quad \frac{db}{dt} = \alpha \text{ in BTC/s}$$

For example:
$\alpha = 12,5 \text{ BTC} / 600s = 2,083 \cdot 10^{-2} \text{ BTC/s}$

The hash rate

The hash rate h(t) (in THs = *Tera Hash per second*) is proportional to the number of rigs r(t).

$$(2) \quad h(t) = \beta \, r(t) \text{ in THs}$$

for example $\beta = 14$ THs (figure from the AntminerS9 rig)

The production cost

The production cost c(t) (in $/BTC) is proportional to the hash rate h(t).

$$(3) \quad c(t) = \gamma \, h(t) \quad \text{in \$/BTC}$$

(3a) $\gamma = (R_A \, \beta + 8{,}76 \cdot 10^3 P_E \, E_C) / BTC\_Year$ in \$/BTC /THs

R_A = Rig amortization ($/year/rig)
P_E = Power Efficiency (Joule per Giga Hash per second)
E_C = Energy Cost ($/KWh)
B_R = Block Reward (BTC)
BTC_year = number of bitcoins produced per year

R_A = 600 $/year, AntminerS9 1800 $, with 3 years amortization,
P_E = 0,1 J/GHs, AntminerS9, (0,1 Joule per Giga Hash per second).
E_C = 0,15 $/KWh
B_R = 12,5 BTC block reward every 10 minutes
BTC_year = B_R x 144 x 365 = = 12.5 x 144 x 365

$\gamma = (600/14 + 8{,}76 \cdot 10^3$ x 0,1 x 0,15) / (12.5 x 144 x 365)
$\gamma = (42{,}9 + 131{,}4) / 657000 = 2{,}7 \cdot 10^{-4}$ $/BTC /THs

For example with a hash rate of $12 \cdot 10^6$ THs the cost per bitcoin is :
c(t) = $2{,}7 \cdot 10^{-4}$ x $12 \cdot 10^6$ = 3240 $ / BTC

Remark1: Defining the μ constant

$$(3b) \; \gamma = (R_A/\beta + 8{,}76 \cdot 10^3 \, P_E \, E_C) / (\alpha \, 31{,}536 \cdot 10^6)$$

$$(3c) \; \gamma = \mu / \alpha$$

$$(3d) \; \mu = (R_A/\beta + 8{,}76 \cdot 10^3 \, P_E \, E_C) / 31{,}536 \cdot 10^6$$

$$(3e) \; c(t) = \mu \, h(t) / \alpha$$

For example:

μ = $(42{,}9 + 131{,}4) / 31{,}536 \cdot 10^6 = 5{,}53 \cdot 10^{-6}$

The network fixes a given quantity of hashes H_R in order to release B_R bitcoins.

When $\int_{to}^{t} h(t)dt = H_R$ the network creates B_R bitcoins.

And the approximate α value is : $\alpha \approx B_R/(t - to) = B_R/\Delta T$

Let's assume a small variation of h(t) around t :

$$H_R \approx h(t)\,\Delta T$$

$$(3f)\ c(t) \approx \mu\,H_R/B_R$$

$$(3g)\ c(t) \approx \mu\,h(t)\,\Delta T/B_R \approx \mu\,h(t)/\alpha$$

For small variation of the hashrate, we assume the equation (3e) remains valid.

Market Price and Valorization

The market price p(t) is equal to the sum of production cost (ct) and the market valorization v(t).

$$(4)\ p(t) = c(t) + v(t) \ \text{ in } \$/\text{BTC}$$

We assume that the market valorization v(t) is proportional to the cost c(t):

$$(5)\ v(t) = m\,c(t) \ \text{ in } \$/\text{BTC}$$

Where m is the *market valorization factor*. From(4)(5)

$$(5a)\ p(t) = c(t)\,(1 + m) \text{ in } \$/\text{BTC}$$

m is usually positive, but a negative value could be possible with the constraint m >= -1

From the bitcoin price history let's assume m=1 (i.e. the valorization is equal to the cost).

For example with a hash rate of $12 \ 10^6$ THs the valorization per bitcoin is :

v(t) = m c(t) = 3240 \$ / BTC, and p(t) = 6480\$

Number of rigs

We can write the miners' gain dg (\$) during a time dt as :

$$(6) \ dg = v(t) \ db \quad \text{in \$}$$

And therefore :

$$(7) \frac{dg}{dt} = v(t) \ \frac{db}{dt} = \alpha \ v(t)$$

We assume that the interest for mining is proportional to the miners' gain g(t), which implies an increase of rigs.

$$(7a) \ r(t) - r(to) = \ k(g(t) - g(to))$$

$$(8) \frac{dr}{dg} = k \quad \text{in \$}^{-1}$$

Where k is a positive constant, the *market incitement factor* (k>=0).

The variation of r is negative if the variation of g is negative.

When $\Delta g = 1/k$ \$, a new rig ($\Delta r = 1$) is added to the bitcoin network.

From (8) and (7) we get

$$(9) \quad \frac{dr}{dt} = k \; \frac{dg}{dt} = k \; \alpha \; v(t)$$

and thereafter from (5) (3) (2)

$$(10) \quad \frac{dr}{dt} = k \; \alpha \; \beta \; \gamma \; m \; r(t)$$

The Bitcoin Market

This relation (9) works even if α is not constant :

$$(10a) \; \frac{dr}{dt} = k \; \beta \; \alpha(t) \; \gamma(t) \; m \; r(t) \; = \; k \; \beta \; \mu \; m \; r(t)$$

let's define:

$$(10b) \; \lambda \; = \; k \; \alpha \; \beta \; \gamma \; m \quad \text{in s}^{-1}$$

$$(10c) \; \lambda \; = \; m \; k \; \beta \; \mu \quad \text{in s}^{-1}$$

$$(10e) \; \frac{dr}{dt} = \lambda \; r(t)$$

The λ parameter is not dependant from α (bitcoin rate production, i.e. the block mining rate).

Therefore :

$$(11) \; r(t) = r(to) \; e^{\lambda \, (t - to)}$$
$$(12) \; h(t) = h(to) \; e^{\lambda \, (t - to)}$$
$$(13) \; c(t) = c(to) \; e^{\lambda \, (t - to)}$$
$$(14) \; p(t) = (1 + m) \; c(to) \; e^{\lambda \, (t - to)}$$
$$(15) \; v(t) = m \; c(to) \; e^{\lambda \, (t - to)}$$

Growth Limit

We believe that the growth limit is induced by the energy consumption, which relies on the rigs number.

At this point the k factor will be null, implying a null value of λ, and therefore :

$$r(t) = r(to)$$
$$h(t) = h(to)$$
$$c(t) = c(to)$$
$$p(t) = (1 + m(t))\, c(to)$$
$$v(t) = m(t)\, c(to)$$

Negative valorization

(16) $$v(t) = m\, c(to)\, e^{\lambda\,(t-to)}$$

When the valorization v(t) is negative (m $<$0) the λ parameter is negative. The number of working rigs decreases, and so the mining costs. The block mining rate decreases. Therefore after a few 1/λ the valorization reaches a null value, the system crashes. Likely the bitcoin network will fix a difficulty and therefore a hash rate leading to a null valorization (m=0) before the crash.
We obviously believe that m is not a constant over the time, m(t) = f(t).

The Rig profit

Given h(t) and p(t) we can retrieve:

$$c(t) = \gamma\, h(t)$$
$$v(t) = p(t) - \gamma\, h(t) = m\, c(t)$$
$$r(t) = \frac{1}{\beta}\, h(t)$$

The profit per rig remains constant v(t)/r(t) = constant (in \$/BTC).

$$(17)\ v(t)/r(t) \;=\; m\,\beta\,\gamma$$

The profit per rig in \$

The profit in \$ per rig and per year is written as:

$$(18)\ BTC\_Year\ v(t)/r(t) \;=\; m\,\beta\,(R_A/\beta \;+\; 8{,}76\ 10^3\ P_E\ E_C)$$

For example :
BTC_Year $v(t)/r(t) = 14 \times (42{,}9+131{,}4) = 2440$ \$ /rig/year

Estimation of the k factor

Every $\tau = \ln(2)/\lambda$ the profit doubles

Let's assume $\tau = 4\ months$ (x8 every year)

$\lambda = 0{,}7 / (3600 \times 24 \times 365/3) = 6{,}66\ 10^{-8}$

$$k = \frac{\lambda}{\alpha\,\beta\,\gamma\,m} = 6{,}66\ 10^{-8} / (2{,}083\ 10^{-2} \times 14 \times 2{,}7\ 10^{-4} \times 1)$$

$k = 8{,}46\ 10^{-4}$ \$$^{-1}$

One rig is added to the bitcoin network every (1/k) 1182 \$ profit

If we assume k is a constant
$1/\lambda = 1/\ m\ k\ \alpha\ \beta\ \gamma = 174$ days / m

A miner keep bitcoin strategy

A rig produces $\alpha/r(t)$ bitcoin per second.
The benefit (in \$/s) is $m/(1+m)\ p(t)\ \alpha/r(t)$
The benefit in BTC/s is $m/(1+m)\ \alpha/r(t)$

If the miner keeps the benefit in bitcoin, it will benefit from the market price increase. His benefit after a time T is therefore :

$$(19) \; b(T) = p(t) \; \frac{m}{m+1} \; \alpha \int_0^T 1/r(t) dt$$

$$(20) \; b(T) = \frac{p(to)}{r(to)} \frac{m}{1+m} \alpha \; \lambda^{-1} \left(e^{\lambda T} - 1\right)$$

For example :
r(to) = h(t0)/14 = $12 \; 10^6$ /14 = 860,000 rigs
p(to) = 6480 \$
$1/\lambda$ = 174 days
α = 657000/365 days

$$b(T(days)) = p(to) \frac{m}{1+m} 0{,}37 \left(e^{T/174} - 1\right)$$

Non constant valorization

From (10):

$$(21) \; \frac{dr}{r(t)} = k \; \beta \; \mu \; m(t)$$

And therefore:

$$(22) \; \frac{r(t)}{r(to)} = e^{k\beta\mu \int_{to}^t m(t)dt} \; , m(t) \geq -1, k\beta\mu \; constant$$

Checking the profit rig lemma

From (7) and (15), we get:

$$\int_{to}^{t} dg = g(t) - g(to) = \alpha \int_{to}^{t} v(t)dt$$

$$g(t) - g(to) = \frac{\alpha}{\lambda} v(to) \left(e^{\lambda(t-to)} - 1 \right)$$

From (11) :

$$g(t) - g(to) = \frac{\alpha}{\lambda} \frac{v(to)}{r(to)} (r(t) - r(to))$$

From (5) (3) (2)

$$v(to) = m \beta \gamma r(to)$$

Therefore from (10)

$$g(t) - g(to) = \frac{m \alpha \beta \gamma}{\lambda} (r(t) - r(to))$$

$$g(t) - g(to) = \frac{1}{k} (r(t) - r(to))$$

$$r(t) - r(to) = k(g(t) - g(to))$$

Which gives again (8)