

The Lessons of Log4shell

Preparing for the Next Zero-Day

Hello World



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Agenda

00

The Silver Bullet

01

Lesson 1

02

Lesson 2

03

Lesson 3

This is not a utopian talk with magic solutions



Lesson 1: The Bad News

With 40% of Log4j Downloads Still Vulnerable, Security Retrofitting Needs to Be Full-Time Job



Log4j flaw: Why it will still be causing problems a decade from now

Log4Shell ain't over until it's over, warns the US review board tasked with investigating the critical Apache Log4J flaw known as Log4Shell.



Written by Liam Tynes, Contributing Writer on July 15, 2022



Mark Chmarny (He/Him) • Following

Product, Infra & DevEx at Cruise

4mo • 🌐



29% of Log4j consumption worldwide STILL uses versions that are known to be vulnerable (source: [Sonatype](#))

WE ARE NEVER EVER EVER


GETTING RID OF LOG4SHELL

Lesson 2:

What We Don't Know


Hidden Risk in the Software Supply Chain

Risk in the Software Supply Chain



Free is Just the Tip of the Iceberg: Open Source Library System Software

Lori Bowen Ayre
lori.ayre@galecia.com
METRO Webinar
October 6, 2009



An iceberg floating in the ocean. The tip of the iceberg is above the water line, and the much larger base is submerged. A white semi-circular shape is drawn on the submerged part of the iceberg. A yellow bracket on the right side of the iceberg spans from the tip down to the submerged part. The sky is blue with some clouds, and the water is a deep blue.

**Direct
Dependencies**

**Transitive
Dependencies**

Attackers are
targeting here

This metaphor...

- You've seen this iceberg metaphor. I've used this metaphor 100 times, I've criticized this metaphor.
- This is an OLD metaphor
- Things have changed a lot but we're still thinking about old systems
- <https://www.slideshare.net/loriayre/open-source-library-system-software-free-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg>
- They're attacking the bottom now - that's a supply chain attack
- But really, the top isn't "your code" - the top is your direct dependencies, bottom is transitive
- You can only directly control what's at the top
- They're attacking the whole iceberg, but you probably only know about the stuff at the top


WHY Don't We Know?

- Explosion of Open Source
- Transitive Dependencies


The Result:



Number of NPM packages



Number of NEW packages




Open source is huge

- NPM introduced 2010
- 32 million packages (as of March 2023)
- Approx. 1,000,000 new packages **per month**
- That's just NPM!

Q12 Estimate how many hours you personally have spent to date on each of the following activities.

Answered: 195 Skipped: 15




If We Knew...

- People spent insane amounts of time just finding log4j, because nobody knew where (or even if) it was hiding
- Knowing = Faster Remediation
- SBOMs help, a LOT, but...
 - They aren't a silver bullet
 - Scanners aren't perfect (e.g. can't penetrate binary blobs, cf. OpenSSL3.)
 - Not all SBOMs are equal
 - SBOMs aren't ubiquitous (yet) (producers aren't reliably supplying them)
 - SBOMs are more accurate and useful when producers/maintainers generate them BUT something is better than nothing
 - SBOM management is hard
 - Any SBOM generated before an actual build is suspect (transitive deps)
 - SBOM Everywhere: <https://github.com/ossf/sbom-everywhere>
 - I don't know what the end game is but generating them is better than nothing, figure out the details later



interactive: bit.ly/3h1IYPs



David McCandless, Swarna Maslekar
Information is Beautiful

sources: bleeping computer, zdnet, forbes, BBC
& other news reports // 23rd June 2021

The predictable consequence

- Ransomware has exploded along with transitive dependencies and open source in general
- I don't believe in coincidences

Lesson 3:

The Other Thing

We Don't Know



Paul Novarese (He/Him) · You

Software Supply Chain Security at Anchore

1yr · Edited ·



The [#log4j](#) debacle is going to have ramifications far beyond the vulnerability itself. There has been a lot of inertia in how issues are evaluated and classified, how information about those issues is disseminated, and how organizations respond to them, and [#log4shell](#) has exposed a lot of these problems. This will be a catalyst for a lot of changes that are way overdue.



April King

@CubicleApril



The fact that there are almost 10,000 CVEs with the same CVSS score as the Log4j vulnerability suggests to me that maybe the scale should be logarithmic.

6:26 PM · Dec 11, 2021 · Twitter for iPhone


71 Retweets **6** Quote Tweets **736** Likes

OK, If Not CVSS, Then What?

- GHSA's (more transparent than CVEs)
- CISA KEV
- EPSS
- GitHub Insights and other project health metrics
 - This is (currently) a very manual process
 - But it's getting a lot easier
 - Project health isn't **directly** about safety
 - What happens when it hits the fan?

An Example Project
Health Metric:

Number of
Maintainers



Recap, Notes, &c.

Recap

- Log4Shell is Radioactive, Immortal
- We Don't Know What's In Our Own Software
- We Must Get Better Guidance
- How Software Gets Made is Different Now
- We Have a Lot of Eggs in GitHub's Basket
- Think about Risk in the General Case

Footnotes

Slide 6 (Log4Shell will still be causing problems a decade from now):

<https://www.zdnet.com/article/log4j-flaw-why-it-will-still-be-causing-problems-a-decade-from-now/>

Slide 6 (40% of Log4j downloads still vulnerable):

<https://securityintelligence.com/articles/log4j-downloads-vulnerable/>

Slide 10 (possible origin of the iceberg):

<https://www.slideshare.net/loriayre/open-source-library-system-software-free-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg>

Slides 12,13, 22 (Open Source is Bigger Than You Can Imagine):

<https://anchore.com/blog/open-source-is-bigger-than-you-imagine/>

Slide 14 (log4j survey etc):

<https://anchore.com/log4j/>

Slide 18:

<https://twitter.com/CubicleApril/status/1469825942684160004>

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/novarese_log4j-log4shell-activity-6876206319238463488-8bEA

Reading List

GitHub Advisory Database:

<https://github.com/advisories>

GitHub Insights:

<https://docs.github.com/en/issues/planning-and-tracking-with-projects/viewing-insights-from-your-project/about-insights-for-projects>

CVEs CWEs CVSS and It's Discontents

<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cves-cwes-cvss-its-discontents-sherif-mansour>

Open Source Security Podcast Episode 392 – Curl and the calamity of CVE

<https://opensourcesecurity.io/2023/09/10/episode-392-curl-and-the-calamity-of-cve/>

My previous DevOpsDays 2022 talk (Learn From Log4Shell):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PINtIL_oN0k

<https://github.com/pynovarese/2022-devopsdays>

Probably Don't Rely on EPSS Yet

<https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/probably-dont-rely-on-epss-yet/>

CVE-2020-19909 is everything that is wrong with CVEs

<https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2023/08/26/cve-2020-19909-is-everything-that-is-wrong-with-cves/>

CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability Catalog

<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>

Exploit Prediction Scoring System

<https://www.first.org/epss/>

Do SBOMS Need VEX?

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/aph10_sbom-software-supply-chain-security-vex-activity-7108017924384137216-VARV/

Log4Shell Reading List

Dealing with log4shell (detection, mitigation, workarounds):

<https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2021/12/14/dealing-with-log4shell-aka-cve-2021-44228-aka-the-log4j-version-2/>

Keeping up with log4shell (post mortem)

<https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2021/12/16/keeping-up-with-log4shell-aka-cve-2021-44228-aka-the-log4j-version-2/>

Mysterious tweet hinting at the exploit:

<https://twitter.com/sirifu4k1/status/1468951859381485573>

Another mysterious tweet:

<https://twitter.com/CattusGlavo/status/1469010118163374089>

“THE” pull request:

<https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608>

Cloudflare digs for evidence of pre-disclosure exploits in the wild:

<https://twitter.com/eastdakota/status/1469800951351427073>

SBOM Takeaways

00

SBOMs enable continuous, automated security/compliance checks, reduce time spent identifying and remediating issues

01

SBOMs improve a lot of things but do not solve every problem you have

02

Log4j is extremely easy to find, OpenSSL 3 is often obscured

03

SBOMs are more effective when created by maintainers rather than consumers, but something is better than nothing

SBOM Reading List

Making Better SBOMs: <https://kccncna2022.sched.com/event/182GT/> – <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=earq775L4fc>

Reflections on Trusting Trust: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf

Generate sboms with syft and jenkins: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMLveJ_TxAs

Profound Podcast – Episode 10 (John Willis and Josh Corman):

<https://www.buzzsprout.com/1758599/8761108-profound-dr-deming-episode-10-josh-corman-captain-america>

GitHub Self-Service SBOMs: <https://github.blog/2023-03-28-introducing-self-service-sboms/>

Q&A

Download Syft

<https://github.com/anchore/syft>

Download Grype

<https://github.com/anchore/grype>

Let us know if you like it by giving us a star on GitHub

Get an invite to our open source community Slack at
<https://anchore.com/slack/>

These slides and lab examples archived here:

<https://github.com/pvnovarese/2023-09-lessons-of-log4shell>