

How the Nature of Political Preferences Shapes the Efficiency of Majority Rule Voting

Peter DeScioli Patrick Kraft

Center for Behavioral Political Economy

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Stony Brook University

Introduction

- ▶ Todorov et al. (2005)

Political Preferences and Ideal Points

Downs (1957)

Majority Voting and Social Welfare

Hastie and Kameda (2005)

Oprea et al. (2007)

References

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- Hastie, Reid and Tatsuya Kameda. 2005. "The robust beauty of majority rules in group decisions." *Psychological review* 112(2):494.
- Oprea, Ryan D, Vernon L Smith and Abel M Winn. 2007. "A compensation election for binary social choice." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 104(3):1093–1096.
- Todorov, Alexander, Anesu N Mandisodza, Amir Goren and Crystal C Hall. 2005. "Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes." *Science* 308(5728):1623–1626.

