How the Nature of Political Preferences Shapes the Efficiency of Majority Rule Voting

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Introduction

Introduction

► Todorov et al. (2005)



Political Preferences and Ideal Points

Downs (1957)

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Majority Voting and Social Welfare

Hastie and Kameda (2005)

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Voter Utilities and Majority Voting

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Simulation Results

DeScioli & Kraft

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Oprea et al. (2007)

Voter Utilities and Majority Voting

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Conclusion

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Voter Utilities and Majority Voting

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Appendix ●○

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Appendix