```
A Not-So Fuzzy Art
```

"Better to have fuzzed and lost than to have never fuzzed at all"

```
DCD __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry - 0×10
; DATA XREF: __libc_csu_i
DCD __frame_dummy_init_array_entry - 0×104E0
; DATA XREF: __libc_csu_i
```

```
EXPORT __libc_csu_fini ; DATA_XREF: _start+10^
```

Goal

- Make the fuzzy idea of fuzzing more concrete
- Teach you about some fuzzing tools / techniques
- Reassure you that fuzzing is a useful art

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Where do we start?

```
$ while :; do
timeout 5 ./program < /dev/urandom;
done
```

Where do we start?

```
$afl-fuzz -i inputs
          -o outputs
             ./program
```

BX LR End of function __libc_csu_fini 4

Where do we end?

- A hypervisor with COW memory to save and restore the entire OS state (and device drivers) to roll back time for each test case
- Per-block VM-exits as coverage indicators

Not so black-and-white

- Ok well, let's take a step back
- Do you have source?
 - No? Ok not the end of the world, we do this everyday
 - Yes? Lovely, that'll make this easier (hopefully)

```
Binary-only Fuzzing
          "Live or die by your coverage" or
                "Can I even run this?"
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```

- Relevant especially to CTF
- AFL havoc mode or radamsa just won't cut it
 - Don't have benefit of afl-gcc
 - At the very least, need a strong input corpus

- You need some kind of instrumentation!
 - Block/branch/path coverage metrics
 - memcmp(), strcmp()
 - Symbolic execution
- Emulation or static binary rewriting

- Emulation and dynamic binary instrumentation are tractable but slow
- Static binary instrumentation is difficult but fast
 - Most solutions require private pdb's (Vulcan, Syzygy)

- Emulation and dynamic binary instrumentation are tractable but slow
- Static binary instrumentation is difficult but fast
 - Most solutions require private pdb's (Vulcan, Syzygy)
- Hardware acceleration? Intel PT

Fuzzing "BC"

- Emphasis on black box fuzzing
- Extremely smart mutation engines, so we never
 - "waste" a mutation

Age of Enlightenment

- History of modern fuzzing begins with AFL
- Key concepts:
 - Compiler instrumentation-guided
 - Coverage informs input generation

Case Study: Radamsa

```
csu_init ; DATA XREF: _start+1A↑o
; .text:init↑o

PUSH.W {R3-R9,LR}

MOV R7, R0

LDR R6, =(__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_
MOV R8, R1

LDR R5. =( frame_dummv_init_array_en

MOV R9, R2

ADD R6, PC ; __do_global_dtors_aux_f

BLX ,init_proc
```

```
piazzt@DESKTOP-IERJHAA: ~/radamsa
piazzt@DESKTOP-IERJHAA:~/radamsa$ wget -q https://www.w3schools.com/XML/simple.xml -O- |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<breakfast menu>
  <name><food>
   <name>Belgian Waffles</name>
   <price>$5.95</price>
   <description>Two of our famous Belgian Waffles with plenty of real maple syrup</description>
   <calories>650</calories>
  </food></name>
  <food>
   <name>Strawberry Belgian Waffles</name>
   <price>$7.95</price>
   <description>Light Belgian waffles covered with strawberries and whipped cream</description>
   <calories>900</calories>
  </food>
```

```
EXPORT __libc_csu_fini
__libc_csu_fini ; DATA_XR
```

Case Study: Radamsa

- More sophisticated mutations, XML-like inputs aware
- No harness
- No feedback

```
$ gzip -c /bin/bash > sample.gz
$ while true; do radamsa sample.gz | gzip -d > /dev/null; done
```

```
american fuzzy lop 0.47b (readpng)
process timing
                                                         overall results
       run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 4 min, 43 sec
                                                         cycles done : 0
  last new path: 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 26 sec
                                                         total paths: 195
last uniq crash : none seen yet
                                                        uniq crashes: 0
 last uniq hang: 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 51 sec
                                                          uniq hangs: 1
cycle progress
                                        map coverage
now processing : 38 (19.49%)
                                          map density: 1217 (7.43%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
                                       count coverage : 2.55 bits/tuple
                                       findings in depth —
stage progress
now trying : interest 32/8
                                       favored paths : 128 (65.64%)
stage execs : 0/9990 (0.00%)
                                        new edges on: 85 (43.59%)
total execs : 654k
                                       total crashes: 0 (0 unique)
exec speed : 2306/sec
                                         total hangs : 1 (1 unique)
fuzzing strategy yields
                                                        path geometry
 bit flips: 88/14.4k, 6/14.4k, 6/14.4k
                                                         levels: 3
byte flips : 0/1804, 0/1786, 1/1750 arithmetics : 31/126k, 3/45.6k, 1/17.8k
                                                        pending: 178
                                                       pend fav : 114
known ints: 1/15.8k, 4/65.8k, 6/78.2k
                                                       imported: 0
      havoc: 34/254k, 0/0
                                                       variable: 0
       trim : 2876 B/931 (61.45% gain)
                                                         latent: 0
```

- Huge emphasis on file format fuzzing
- Heavy binary-based mutations
 - Sequential bit/byte flips, random stepover
 - Incs/decs of varying bitwidths
 - Boundary values

Probably unhelpful for most menu-based CTF challenges...

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- "Coverage-guided Fuzzing"
 - Associate each input with its corresponding coverage bitmap
 - Save inputs that have unique coverage to corpus
 - Mutator draws from corpus

- Employs compiler or Qemu instrumentation to compute "path coverage"
- Saves coverage as 4k bitmap

```
cur_location = (block_address >> 4) ^ (block_address << 8);
shared_mem[cur_location ^ prev_location]++;
prev_location = cur_location >> 1;
```

 In general: coverage can be anything from edge or basic blocker counters, to wrapping compare / memcmp instructions

- Coverage informs the mutator about inputs interesting to this target
 - Typically Block/Path coverage
- We probably haven't scratched the surface of instrumentation

Source Instrumentation

- Other kinds of instrumentation to aid fuzzing:
 - ASAN
 - UBSAN
 - TSAN
- Source pretty much required for these

Binary Instrumentation

- AFL-Qemu As accurate as qemu, as slow as qemu
- AFL-Pin/honggfuzz-pin As fast as your CPU, as slow as your disassembler
- WinAFL DynamoRIO, Windows only
- These are just off the shelf tools

Binary Instrumentation

- mesos-style¹ A mix of both; Temporary breakpoints that are removed after each hit.
 - Block coverage only (currently)
- Snapshot fuzzing Emulated

More non-source fuzzing


- If a bug doesn't crash does it make a sound?
- Poor man's alternative to clang sanitizers:
 - Page Heap
 - Application Verifier
 - LibDislocator
 - DrMemory
- Binpatching...?:'()

A Case Study: RealWorldCTF

Fuzzing Counter-Strike: Global Offensive maps files with AFL

Aug 26, 2018 • By niklasb

RealWorldCTF 2018 had a really fun challenge called "P90 Rush B", an allusion to a desparate tactic employed in the Valve game "Counter-Strike: Global Offensive". It was about finding and exploiting a bug in the map file loader used by a CS:GO server. During the CTF, I exploited a stack buffer overflow that was later described well in a writeup by another team.



A Case Study: RealWorldCTF

- CSGO Map File Format Fuzzing (niklasb) https://phoenhex.re/2018-08-26/csgo-fuzzing-bsp
- Literally dlopen'd csgo engine and repeatedly called the CModelLoader::GetModelForName and had AFL+Qemu do the rest

A Case Study: RealWorldCTF

- Not always that easy, sometimes the input is not just a binary blob
 - Prefer not to waste mutations...
 - Write a generator or stamp in magic values by hand after some REing

```
Modern Techniques
                 The Future is Now
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```

Emulation

- Environment can be completely specified
 - In-vitro
 - You specify the environment (hooks)
- Can instrument programs via hooks


```
cur_location = (block_address >> 4) ^ (block_address << 8);
shared_mem[cur_location ^ prev_location]++;
prev_location = cur_location >> 1;
```

Emulation

- Qemu linux i386 user:
 - Library dependencies (need correct ld.so)
 - Unsupported system calls (sys_memfd_create, etc)
- Emulating from the first instruction is a pain
 - Hold this thought...

Emulation







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Snapshot Fuzzing

- Start emulation from a "snapshot" in time
 - Completely repeatable continued executions
- Perfect state restoration
 - *cough* AFL forking-server mode
 - *cough* WinAFL
- No source required

Snapshot Fuzzing

- "Human in the loop"
 - a. Fuzz for a while
 - b. Analyze coverage
 - i. Take new snapshot
 - ii. Or update mutator/generator
 - c. Repeat

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Snapshot Restore

 Optimized snapshot restore ensures we spend more time fuzzing and less time loading all program state into the emulator

Snapshot Restore

- 1. Dirty page tracking only restore pages that have been written to
- 2. Abuse COW pages using OS facilities
 - a. AFL-forkserver mode
 - b. Can easily do this with file-backed pages and unicorn

Snapshotting (usermode)

- Userland snapshots don't have a kernel (core dump, minidump)
 - Sockets
 - Files
 - Registry
- Implement a "mock OS"

Snapshotting (reduced kernel)

- Full kernel+usermode memory snapshot, but no device state
- Able to run a few syscalls accurately

Snapshotting (full system)

- Entire CPU and device state is captured
- a. la. VMWare/Bochs snapshots
 - Cache reads, throw away writes to disk
 - State of networking stack?

Snapshotting (full system)

- Device restoration is expensive and hard to do deterministically
- Emulating a full system (i.e. up to the snapshot point) takes forever

Snapshotting (full system)

Make full-system snapshotting fast: throw a

hypervisor into bochs?


```
And the formation of the control of
```

Snapshot Fuzzing

- (Almost) no tools for this
- Can somewhat replicate with off-the-shelf tools
 - AFL and honggfuzz fork-server
 - LibFuzzer
 - Need to walk up to the desired state often

Snapshot Fuzzing

Hopefully some are released soon ;-)



We've built tools for fuzzing based on emulation of a process snapshot captured via minidump. We're considering open sourcing the tool, and I'm curious about interest level from the rest of the world. (1/3)

9:29 AM - 14 Feb 2019



"These go to 11"

Hypervisor Snapshot Fuzzing

- Not for the faint of heart
 - Maximum performance
 - Extreme effort
- Fun application of snapshot fuzzing!

https://github.com/gamozolabs/falkervisor_grilled_cheese

Hypervisor Snapshot Fuzzing

- Load full memory dump into address space of VM
 - + mesos-style coverage using vmexits
 - + fast snapshot restore using COW memory

Hypervisor Snapshot Fuzzing (Activities of Snapshot Fuzzing State Company)



CUSTON HYPERVISOR

MIMP

Hypervisor Snapshot Fuzzing

```
// Run the hypervisor until exit, returning the exit context
pub fn run(&mut self) -> WHV RUN VP EXIT CONTEXT {
    let mut context: WHV RUN VP EXIT CONTEXT =
        unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
   let res = unsafe { WHvRunVirtualProcessor(self.partition, 0,
        &mut context as *mut WHV RUN VP EXIT CONTEXT as *mut c void,
        std::mem::size of val(&context) as u32) };
    assert!(res == 0, "WHvRunVirtualProcessor() error: {:#x}", res);
    // Mark that memory may be dirty
    self.memory dirty = true;
    context
```

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EXPORT __libc_csu_fin

```
Source-Based Fuzzing
```

For Real People Doing Real Things and Not CTFs Not CTFs Not CTFs

```
off_104FC DCD _do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry - 0×10
; DATA XREF: _libc_csu_i
off_10500 DCD _frame_dummy_init_array_entry - 0×104E0
; DATA XREF: _libc_csu_i
```

```
EXPORT __libc_csu_fini
__libc_csu_fini ; DATA XREF: _start+101
_____; _text.off_1039840
```

RPISEC - 05/04/2019 pwndevils ; End of function _

- The compiler is your friend, let it help you
- So step 1: Instrumentation
 - GCC has gcov
 - LLVM+Clang have SanitizerCoverage
 - AFL has a similar compiler pass
 - Build your own birdfeeder

- Step 2: Harness the code you want to target
 - Either embed a harness in the codebase, and behave like
 AFL's forkserver
 - Simple python harness will do to delivery fuzz test case to program

- Step 3: Work on your mutator / fuzz test case generator
 - Do this as appropriate when coverage shows deficiencies
 - Will find much deeper bugs

283 try { for(var index=0; index < 7; index++){ someArray1[index] = someArray1.entries(); } } catch (e) { }
284 try { for(var index=0; index < 8; index++){ someArray1[index] = someArray1.join("iRq"); } } catch (e) { }

```
try { someTypedArray1.reduce(function(acc, cval, c index, c array) { try{ c array[c index] = c array.reduce((acc, cval, c index, c array) => { try{
   y.lastIndexOf(new Object(), -32760);c_array[c_index] = c_array.filter((arg) => { return (arg == new Object()) }); } catch(e){ } });c_array.reverse()
267 try { someRegex1[Symbol.search]("WUtazcQunqxEnKAbPkeIfNoQnSpOwQULMUoDVf") } catch (e) { }
         someSet1.entries() } catch (e) { }
         someWeakSet1.delete(function() {}) } catch (e) { }
270 try { Object.getOwnPropertyNames(someWeakSet1) } catch (e) { }
         someString1.hasOwnProperty("toString") } catch (e) { }
         for (var element in someObject1) { try{ someObject1[element] = someObject1[element].concat(); } catch(e) { } } } catch (e) { }
   try { someTypedArray1 = new Uint16Array(someArrayBuffer1, 114) } catch (e) { }
         someIntlNumberFormat1.formatToParts(+17064) } catch (e) { }
   try { Math.sinh(11582) } catch (e) { }
276 try { someWeakSet1.add(someTypedArray1) } catch (e) { }
   try { someDataView1.getFloat64(250, false) } catch (e) { }
278 try { Intl.NumberFormat.supportedLocalesOf("fi-FI") } catch (e) { }
   try { someArray1[0] = someRegex1.test(String.fromCodePoint(669014) + "prAmHEKKXgdQBgytdTnyQnd") } catch (e) { }
280 try { someWeakSet1.delete(someObject1) } catch (e) { }
281 try {    Intl.DateTimeFormat.supportedLocalesOf("ar-LB-u-hc-h11-nu-beng") } catch (e) { }
282 try { Intl.NumberFormat.supportedLocalesOf("es-PA-u-nu-kali") } catch (e) { }
```

```
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```

Effective Mutation

- Don't need neural networks or genetic mutations really
 - Just take an input that you know has caused coverage,
 and add it to your corpus
 - If a mutation on that test case causes new coverage, add it to corpus

LibFuzzer

- LLVM Fuzzer
- Can combine the LLVM Sanitizers for an excellent in-memory coverage based fuzzer
- No processes spawning, no recv() calls, less transitions away from the code you want to target

LibFuzzer

- Implements techniques already described
 - SanitizerCoverage module increments into a per-module bitmap (edge coverage)
 - Table of recent comparisons to record literal cmp's
- Ultimately very fast, and very precise

LibFuzzer Example

```
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) {
  uint8 t Uncompressed[100];
  size t UncompressedLen = sizeof(Uncompressed);
  if (Z OK != uncompress(Uncompressed, &UncompressedLen, Data, Size))
    return 0;
  if (UncompressedLen < 2) return 0;</pre>
  if (Uncompressed[0] == 'F' && Uncompressed[1] == 'U')
    abort(); // Boom
  return 0;
```

LibFuzzer Example

```
EXPORT __tlbc_csu_init ; DATA XREF: _start+1Ato ; .text:initto ; .text:initto PUSH.W {R3-R9,LR} MOV R7, R0 LDR R6, =(__do_global_dtors_aux_fini MOV R8, R1
```

59

```
extern "C" size_t LLVMFuzzerCustomMutator(uint8_t *Data, size_t Size,
                                          size_t MaxSize, unsigned int Seed) {
  uint8 t Uncompressed[100];
  size t UncompressedLen = sizeof(Uncompressed);
  size t CompressedLen = MaxSize;
  if (Z OK != uncompress(Uncompressed, &UncompressedLen, Data, Size)) {
    // The data didn't uncompress. Return a dummy...
  UncompressedLen =
      LLVMFuzzerMutate(Uncompressed, UncompressedLen, sizeof(Uncompressed));
  if (Z OK != compress(Data, &CompressedLen, Uncompressed, UncompressedLen))
    return 0;
  return CompressedLen;
```

If all you have is a hammer...

- LibFuzzer has mostly a binary-file format esque mutator (understandable)
- To get around this, generate a grammar that maps raw bytes -> your input structure and mutate that
- LibProtobuf-Mutator makes this faster

```
; .text:initfo
{R3-R9,LR}
R7, R0
R6, =(__do_global_dtors_aux_fini
R8, R1
R5. =( frame dummy init array_e
R9, R2
R6, PC ; __do_global_dtors_aux_
.init_proc
```

Structure-aware fuzzing for Clang and LLVM with

pwndevils

<u>libprotobuf-mutator</u>

Protobuf syntax:

```
message Person {
  required string name = 1;
  required int32 id = 2;
  optional string email = 3;
}
```

- 1. Define proto that "looks like" C/C++ AST
- 2. Map arbitrary byte array -> libprotobuf
- 3. Mutate protobuffer object with LPM
- 4. Turn protobuf into C-like syntax
- 5. Run test case

clang-proto-fuzzer trophies

null deref in llvm::ScalarEvolution::getMulExpr

```
void foo(int *a) {
  while (1) {
    a[60] = ((1 + a[60]) + a[0]);
    while ((a[60] + a[0])) {
        a[0] = (a[0] + 1);
    }
  }
}
```

Lexer

Û

Parser



Optimizer



Code Gen

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```
; DATA XREF: _start+1Ato
; .text:initfo

{R3-R9,LR}
R7, R0
R6, =(__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_
R8, R1
R5. =( frame dummv init array_en
R9, R2
R6, PC ; __do_global_dtors_aux_f
.init_proc
```

Related: <u>Attacking Chrome IPC: Reliably finding</u>

```
bugs to escape the Chrome sandbox
```

Sanitizers

- ASAN, UBSAN, MSAN, TSAN, COVSAN
- Runtime checking for memory corruption, undefined behavior, race conditions, uninitialized memory, etc
- You want these.

Address Sanitizer

- Catches buffer-out-of-bounds accesses (reads and writes)
- Usually the go-to as the bare minimum for the bugs you probably want anyways

Ripping Out Code

- May be useful to just rip out the function
 - Definitely perf to gain
- Don't jump through hurdles to get to vulnerable functions
- Make sure to keep the same assumptions as it would have in the original program

Documenting the source(??)

- Add assumptions that aren't enforced as runtime asserts
- Log state to check for invalid transitions
- Harden the source as you fuzz it

Big Questions (1)

- How do I improve fuzzing performance?
 - Remove syscalls? Seriously, all of them
 - Skip code that you don't care about... (easier said than done of course)

Big Questions (2)

- At what point does my mutator output this?
 - Useful for scenarios like JS engines
 - Can design a fuzzer after-the-fact to find this bug, and hope it finds new bugs. Chicken-And-Egg problem

Fuzzing as Exploit Assistance

- Can't find a good primitive? Search space is relatively small?
- Let fuzzer run with crashing input and analyze the different crashes
- Cross fingers and pray for rip = 0x41414141

Fuzzing as Exploit Assistance

- Chainsawing is smarter:
 - Write a harness to trigger different allocations
 - Groom LFH, different bucket sizes, different objects, etc
 - Trigger bug at end
 - Cross fingers and pray for deref *0x41414141

Fuzzing Take-Away

- Make every mutation count
- Make every iteration fast, only run the code you want to target, don't waste cpu cycles
- But before you hyper-optimize, get your dumb fuzzer up and running.
 - It doesn't cost you anything!