Demystifying Fuzzing

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Hi! I'm Nat!

- Blockchain Security Engineer at Trail of Bits
- I figure out where things can break
- Fell down the rabbit hole in 2017
- Former smart contract developer & blockchain professor
- Author of solc-select
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Agenda

- **Defining Invariants**
- **Writing properties**
- **Fuzzing!**
- ***Finding fun bugs***

Fuzzing

- **Define assumptions meant to hold true**
- **Exploration of contracts with randomized arguments**
- **Checks dangerous contract states**

What's an invariant?

- **"Invariant Testing" = "Property Testing"**
- **System properties that should always be true**

invariant adjective

Save Word

in·vari·ant | \ (ˌ)in-ˈver-ē-ənt \

Definition of *invariant*

: CONSTANT, UNCHANGING

specifically : unchanged by specified mathematical or physical operations or transformations

// invariant factor

Fuzzing is Easy!

```
for value in [0, 255] {
    call function;
    if invariant is broken {
        profit
    }
}
```

But It's Also Hard!

- Even with constraint smart contracts, astronomical search space
- What if the invariant is only broken for a single, unique input?
- Multiple accounts/contracts interacting with each other?

Echidna


Echidna
Smart Contract
contract Token{
mapping(..) balances;
function transfer(...){
...
}
}
Property
balance[msg.sender] < totalSupply
Generate randomly transactions
transfer(1, 100);...
transferFrom(1, 1, 10); ...
...
Transactions breaking the property

How do I start?

1. **Identify your properties in English**
2. **Convert your properties to code**
3. **Run Echidna**
4. **FIND BUGS**

1: Identify your Invariants

IN ENGLISH WORDS.

Invariants

- They’re everywhere!
- Token Invariants
- Mathematical invariants

Token Invariants – Total Supply

User balance never exceeds total supply

Token Invariants – Transfer

Users cannot transfer more than they own

Mathematical Invariant – Association

$$1 + 2 = 3$$

$$2 + 1 = 3$$

Mathematical Invariant – Identity

$$1 * 2 = 2$$

$$0 + x = x$$

Mathematical Invariant – Addition / Subtraction

$$x + 5 - 5 = x$$

2: Convert into Code

IT'S EASIER THAN IT SOUNDS.

Token Invariants – Total Supply

```
function assert_total_supply() public {
    assert(balances[msg.sender] <= totalSupply);
}
```

Mathematical Invariant – Association

```
function assert_association(uint256 x1, uint256 x2, uint256 x3)
public {
    uint256 lhs = (x1 + x2) + x2;
    uint256 rhs = x1 + (x2 + x3);
    assert(lhs == rhs);
}
```

Mathematical Invariant – Identity

```
function assert_identity(uint256 x) public {
    uint256 lhs = x + 0;
    uint256 rhs = x;
    assert(lhs == rhs);
}
```

Mathematical Invariant – Addition / Subtraction

```
function assert_add_subtract(uint256 x, uint256 y) public {
    uint256 lhs = x + y - y;
    uint256 rhs = x;
    assert(lhs == rhs);
}
```

Example - rmm-core

Liquidity Pools

- **Allocate assets into the pool**
- **Remove assets from the pool**
- **Swap assets**

Liquidity Pools

- **Initial pool balance: x**
- **Deposit: 5**
- **Withdraw: 5**



What value do you expect the pool balance to be?

Allocate/Remove Functions

```
function allocate(
    Data storage reserve,
    uint256 delRisky,
    uint256 delStable,
    uint256 delLiquidity,
    uint32 blockTimestamp
) internal {
    update(reserve, blockTimestamp);
    reserve.reserveRisky += delRisky.toUint128();
    reserve.reserveStable += delStable.toUint128();
    reserve.liquidity += delLiquidity.toUint128();
}
```

```
function remove(
    Data storage reserve,
    uint256 delRisky,
    uint256 delStable,
    uint256 delLiquidity,
    uint32 blockTimestamp
) internal {
    update(reserve, blockTimestamp);
    reserve.reserveRisky -= delRisky.toUint128();
    reserve.reserveStable -= delStable.toUint128();
    reserve.liquidity -= delLiquidity.toUint128();
}
```

What should the test do?

1. **Start with initial reserve and liquidity balance**
2. **Allocate funds into the system**
3. **Remove funds from the system**
4. **Balance before and after transactions should be equal**

Invariant Test

```
function check_allocate_remove_inverses(
    uint256 randomId,
    uint256 intendedLiquidity,
    bool fromMargin
) public {
    AllocateCall memory allocate;
    allocate.poolId = Addresses.retrieve_created_pool(randomId);
    retrieve_current_pool_data(allocate.poolId, true);
    intendedLiquidity = E2E_Helper.one_to_max_uint64(intendedLiquidity);
    allocate.delRisky = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveRisky) / precall.reserve.liquidity;
    allocate.delStable = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveStable) / precall.reserve.liquidity;

    uint256 delLiquidity = allocate_helper(allocate);

    // these are calculated the amount returned when remove is called
    (uint256 removeRisky, uint256 removeStable) = remove_should_succeed(allocate.poolId, delLiquidity);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delRisky, removeRisky);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delStable, removeStable);

    assert(allocate.delRisky == removeRisky);
    assert(allocate.delStable == removeStable);
    assert(intendedLiquidity == delLiquidity);
}
```

Step 1

Invariant Test

```
function check_allocate_remove_inverses(
    uint256 randomId,
    uint256 intendedLiquidity,
    bool fromMargin
) public {
    AllocateCall memory allocate;
    allocate.poolId = Addresses.retrieve_created_pool(randomId);
    retrieve_current_pool_data(allocate.poolId, true);
    intendedLiquidity = E2E_Helper.one_to_max_uint64(intendedLiquidity);
    allocate.delRisky = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveRisky) / precall.reserve.liquidity;
    allocate.delStable = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveStable) / precall.reserve.liquidity;

    uint256 delLiquidity = allocate_helper(allocate);

    // these are calculated the amount returned when remove is called
    (uint256 removeRisky, uint256 removeStable) = remove_should_succeed(allocate.poolId, delLiquidity);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delRisky, removeRisky);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delStable, removeStable);

    assert(allocate.delRisky == removeRisky);
    assert(allocate.delStable == removeStable);
    assert(intendedLiquidity == delLiquidity);
}
```

Step 2

Invariant Test

```
function check_allocate_remove_inverses(
    uint256 randomId,
    uint256 intendedLiquidity,
    bool fromMargin
) public {
    AllocateCall memory allocate;
    allocate.poolId = Addresses.retrieve_created_pool(randomId);
    retrieve_current_pool_data(allocate.poolId, true);
    intendedLiquidity = E2E_Helper.one_to_max_uint64(intendedLiquidity);
    allocate.delRisky = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveRisky) / precall.reserve.liquidity;
    allocate.delStable = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveStable) / precall.reserve.liquidity;

    uint256 delLiquidity = allocate_helper(allocate);

    // these are calculated the amount returned when remove is called
    (uint256 removeRisky, uint256 removeStable) = remove_should_succeed(allocate.poolId, delLiquidity);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delRisky, removeRisky);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delStable, removeStable);

    assert(allocate.delRisky == removeRisky);
    assert(allocate.delStable == removeStable);
    assert(intendedLiquidity == delLiquidity);
}
```

Step 3

Invariant Test

```
function check_allocate_remove_inverses(
    uint256 randomId,
    uint256 intendedLiquidity,
    bool fromMargin
) public {
    AllocateCall memory allocate;
    allocate.poolId = Addresses.retrieve_created_pool(randomId);
    retrieve_current_pool_data(allocate.poolId, true);
    intendedLiquidity = E2E_Helper.one_to_max_uint64(intendedLiquidity);
    allocate.delRisky = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveRisky) / precall.reserve.liquidity;
    allocate.delStable = (intendedLiquidity * precall.reserve.reserveStable) / precall.reserve.liquidity;

    uint256 delLiquidity = allocate_helper(allocate);

    // these are calculated the amount returned when remove is called
    (uint256 removeRisky, uint256 removeStable) = remove_should_succeed(allocate.poolId, delLiquidity);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delRisky, removeRisky);
    emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delStable, removeStable);

    assert(allocate.delRisky == removeRisky);
    assert(allocate.delStable == removeStable);
    assert(intendedLiquidity == delLiquidity);
}
```

Step 4

Echidna Results

```
check_allocate_remove_inverses(uint256,uint256,bool): failed!💥
  Call sequence:
    create_new_pool_should_not_revert(113263940847354084267525170308314,0,12,58,414705177,292070354338709387317704910944590379491006113120533898160371690233992451740) from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000020000 Gas: 0xbebc20
    check_allocate_remove_inverses(513288669432172152578276403318402760987129411133329015270396,675391606931488162786753316903883654910567233327356334685,false) from: 0x1E2F9E10D02a6b8F8f69fcBf515e75039D2EA30d

Event sequence: Panic(1), Transfer(6361150874), Transfer(64302260917206574294870), AllocateMarginBalance(0, 0, 6361150874, 64302260917206574294870), Transfer(6361150874), Transfer(64302260917206574294870), Allocate(6361150874, 6430226091720657429487 0), Remove(6361150873, 6430226091528653264736 7), AllocateRemoveDifference(6361150874, 6361150873), AllocateRemoveDifference (64302260917206574294870, 6430226091528653264736 7)
```

Events

```
emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delRisky, removeRisky);
emit AllocateRemoveDifference(allocate.delStable, removeStable);
```

Event Results

	Amount allocated	**Amount removed**	**Delta**
Token 1	6361150874	6361150873	1

Event Results

	Amount allocated	**Amount removed**	**Delta**
Token 1	6361150874	6361150873	1
Token 2	64,302,260,917,206,574,294,870	643022609152865326 47367	1,920,041,647,503

What does it mean?

- **Adding and removing funds are not exact inverses**
- **Users will actually receive 1,920,041,647,503 *less***

Why is there a delta?

```
function allocate(
    Data storage reserve,
    uint256 delRisky,
    uint256 delStable,
    uint256 delLiquidity,
    uint32 blockTimestamp
) internal {
    update(reserve, blockTimestamp);
    reserve.reserveRisky += delRisky.toUint128();
    reserve.reserveStable += delStable.toUint128();
    reserve.liquidity += delLiquidity.toUint128();
}
```

```
function remove(
    Data storage reserve,
    uint256 delRisky,
    uint256 delStable,
    uint256 delLiquidity,
    uint32 blockTimestamp
) internal {
    update(reserve, blockTimestamp);
    reserve.reserveRisky -= delRisky.toUint128();
    reserve.reserveStable -= delStable.toUint128();
    reserve.liquidity -= delLiquidity.toUint128();
}
```

`toUint128()`

Why is `toUint128()` important?

- **Converts `FixedPoint 64x64` to `uint128`**
- **Truncates numbers too large**
- **Used in *both* allocation and removal functions**

With that in mind….

```
function allocate(
    Data storage reserve,
    uint256 delRisky,
    uint256 delStable,
    uint256 delLiquidity,
    uint32 blockTimestamp
) internal {
    update(reserve, blockTimestamp);
    reserve.reserveRisky += delRisky.toUint128();
    reserve.reserveStable += delStable.toUint128();
    reserve.liquidity += delLiquidity.toUint128();
}
```

```
function remove(
    Data storage reserve,
    uint256 delRisky,
    uint256 delStable,
    uint256 delLiquidity,
    uint32 blockTimestamp
) internal {
    update(reserve, blockTimestamp);
    reserve.reserveRisky -= delRisky.toUint128();
    reserve.reserveStable -= delStable.toUint128();
    reserve.liquidity -= delLiquidity.toUint128();
}
```

How can it be fixed?

It can't, but….it can be *mitigated*

- **Defining an acceptable delta**
- **Round in a direction to benefit a pool**

Only the tip of the iceberg...

- **Access Controls**
- **Correct Bookkeeping**
- **Token balances**
- **Differential Fuzzing**

What next?

- Talk to us!
- Go through Echidna tutorials on building-secure-contracts
- Use Echidna on your codebase
- Join Empire Hacking