CYBER FORENSICS CS6004

Syllabus

UNIT I NETWORK LAYER SECURITY & TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY

UNIT II E-MAIL SECURITY & FIREWALLS

UNIT III INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER FORENSICS

UNIT IV EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND FORENSICS TOOLS

UNIT V ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION

UNIT I

NETWORK LAYER SECURITY

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TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY

Network layer security:

- •IPSec Protocol
- •IP Authentication Header
- •IP ESP
- •Key Management Protocol for IPSec


Transport layer Security:

- SSL protocol
- Cryptographic Computations
- TLS Protocol


Network Layer Security: IPSec Protocol

IPSec Protocol Documents
Security Associations (SAs)
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

- Designed to protect communication
- It is a set of security extensions
- Developed by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)
- It provides privacy and authentication services at the IP layer by using modern cryptography



- Operates in a host or a security gateway environment
- The protection offered is based on requirements defined by a Security Policy Database (SPD)
- SPD is established and maintained by a user or system administrator



- Network Layer / IP Layer IP datagram is protected using IPSec protocol
- Two main transformation of IPSec
 - Authentication Header (AH)
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
- AH and ESP –protocols provide
 - Connectionless integrity accuracy
 - Data origin authentication
 - Confidentiality privacy
 - Anti-replay service intercept and insert packets
 - Access control
- AH and ESP may be applied alone or in combination
- They are configured in a data structure called a Security Association (SA)

- Two modes of operations
- Transport mode
 - Provides Peer to Peer communication security (between host)
 - Provides protection for upper-layer protocol data units (PDUs)
 - TCP packet
 - UDP segment
 - Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packet
 - Data protected but header left in clear

Tunnel mode

- Used by network routers to protect IP datagram's passing across insecure network
- Provides protection for entire IP datagram's
- Add new header for next hop
- Good for VPNs, gateway to gateway security


IPSec Modes of Operation

Original IP Datagram

IP	TCP	Data
Header	Header	

• Transport Mode: protect the upper layer protocols


Transport Mode protected packet



protected

Tunnel Mode: protect the entire IP payload

Tunnel Mode protected packet



protected

IPSec Modes of Operation-AH


Transport Packet layout

IP Header AH Header Payload (TCP, UDP, etc)


Tunnel Packet layout

IP Header	AH Header	IP Header	Payload (TCP. UDP,etc)

Transport Mode




Tunnel Mode



IPSec Modes of Operation - ESP


Transport Packet layout



- Modular design
- Algorithm independent
 - Permits selection of different sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the implementation
 - Standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitate interoperability in the global Internet
- Standard algorithms + IPSec traffic protection + key management protocols - deploy high-quality cryptographic security technology at Internet layer
- Provides high-quality security for Internet traffic

- IP Security Document Roadmap RFC 2411 by IETF -November 1998
- IPSec protocols is divided into seven groups
- Seven-group documents describes the set of IPSec protocols
 - Architecture
 - ESP
 - AH
 - Encryption algorithm
 - Authentication algorithm
 - Key management
 - DOI: Domain of Interpretation

IPSec Protocol Documents / Architecture



Architecture:

- Main document
- Covers the general concepts, security requirements, definitions and mechanisms defining IPSec technology

ESP:

- Covers the packet format
- General issues related to the use of the ESP for packet encryption and optional authentication
- Contains default values
- Dictates some of the values in the Domain of Interpretation (DOI)

• AH:

- Covers the packet format
- General issue related to the use of AH for packet authentication
- Contains default values such as the default padding contents
- Dictates some of the values in the DOI document

- Encryption algorithm:
 - Describe how various encryption algorithms are used for ESP
 - Specifically:
 - Specification of the key sizes and strengths for each algorithm
 - Any available estimates on performance of each algorithm
 - General information on how this encryption algorithm is to be used in ESP
 - Features of encryption algorithm
 - Provide input to the DOI
- Authentication algorithm:
 - Describe how various authentication algorithms are used for AH and for the authentication option of ESP
 - Specifically:
 - Specification of operating parameters such as number of rounds and input or output block format
 - Implicit and explicit padding requirements of this algorithm
 - Identification of optional parameters/methods of operation
 - Defaults and mandatory ranges of the algorithm
 - Comparison criteria for the algorithm
 - Method for verifying

- Key management:
 - Describe key management schemes
 - Provide certain values for the DOI
 - Currently the key management represents the Oakley, ISAKMP
- DOI:
 - Contains values needed for the other documents to relate each other
 - These include identifiers for approved encryption and authentication algorithms
 - Operational parameters such as key lifetime

- RFC 1825
- Before sending data, a virtual connection is established from sending entity to receiving entity
- Called "security association (SA)"
 - SAs are simplex: for only one direction
 - One for inbound traffic
 - One for outbound traffic
 - A minimum of two SAs are required for a single IPSec connection
- Both sending and receiving entities maintain state information about the SA
- AH and ESP make use of SAs

- An SA is uniquely identified by three parameters
 - 1. Security Parameters Index (SPI)
 - 2. IP Destination Address
 - 3. Security Protocol Identifier
- 1. Security Parameters Index (SPI):
 - Assigned to each SA
 - Needed to identify an SA
 - Sender to communicate with a receiver, must know the SPI value for a particular SA
 - The SPI is carried in AH and ESP headers
 - Receiver identify a SA by the combination of SPI and destination address
 - SPI values are not globally specified

2. IP Destination Address:

- Address of the destination endpoint of the SA
- Destination endpoint may be an end-user system or a network system such as a firewall or router
- Unicast addresses are only allowed by IPSec

3. Security Protocol Identifier:

This identifier indicates whether the association is an AH or ESP security association

- Two nominal databases
 - Security Policy Database (SPD)
 - Security Association Database (SAD)
 - Info in SPD indicates "what" to do with arriving datagram
 - specifies the policies that is to applied on all IP traffic
 (inbound or outbound, from host or security gateways)
 - Info in the SAD indicates "how" to do it

Security Policy Database (SPD)

- Essential element of SA processing
- Contains an ordered list of policy entries
- Specifies what services are to be offered to IP datagrams (use IPSec)
- Specifies what fashion (IPsec protocols, modes and algorithms to be employed)
- Policy decision on which SA to apply can be made on IP addresses (source or destination), protocol type or IP Header
- Used to control the flow of all traffic (inbound and outbound) through an IPsec system, including security and key management traffic (i.e. ISAKMP)
- Database specifies types of packets
 - to be dropped
 - to be forwarded or accepted under IPSec protection
 - to be forwarded or accepted without IPSec protection
 - to be encrypted or integrity protected

Security Association Database (SAD)

- Endpoint holds state of its SAs in a SAD
- Helps in locating SA during processing
- While sending IPSec datagram, SAD is accessed to determine what SA to apply for process datagram
- When IPSec datagram arrives, the SPI in IPSec datagram is examined and indexes SAD with SPI, and processes datagram accordingly
- SA database at transmitter and receiver holds
 - cryptographic key
 - cryptographic algorithm
 - security services (e.g. encryption and/or integrity)
 - SPI
 - sequence number and ID of other end
- SPI (security Parameter Index) + destination address uniquely identifies
 SA in database
- SPI of received packet tells where to look for info required to process packet

Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

- HMAC is a secret-key authentication algorithm
- HMAC provides a data integrity check and data origin authentication for packets sent between two parties
- Generates Message Authentication Code (MAC)
- Based on a secret key Shared between the client and server
- Keys are used for computation and verification of MAC
- Any iterative hash function can be used— HMAC, MD5, SHA-1, and RIPEMD-160
- Hash function module is replaced by any new , faster and secure hash function
- MD5 has been recently shown to be vulnerable to collision search attacks
- SHA-1 appears to be a cryptographically stronger function.

Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

- Strength of HMAC depends
 - Strength of hash function
 - The size of its hash output
 - The size and quality of the key

Requires


- H Cryptographic hash function
 - Iterating compression function on data blocks
- K Secret key any length up to b = 512 bits
- b Block length
- H Length of hash values
 - 16 bytes or 128 bits for MD5
 - 20 bytes or 160 bits for SHA-1
- M is the message to be authenticated


To compute HMAC over the message, the HMAC equation is expressed as follows:

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HMAC = H[(K \oplus opad) | H[(K \oplus ipad) | M]]
```

- where
 - ipad = 00110110(0x36) repeated 64 times (512 bits)
 - opad = 01011100(0x5c) repeated 64 times (512 bits)
 - ipad is inner padding
 - opad is outer padding

HMAC






The following explains the HMAC equation:

- 1. Append zeros to the end of K to create a b-byte string (i.e. if K = 160 bits in length and b = 512 bits, then K will be appended with 352 zero bits or 44 zero bytes 0x00)
- 2. XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) *K with ipad to produce the b-bit block computed in* step 1
- 3. Append *M* to the b-byte string resulting from step 2.
- 4. Apply *H* to the stream generated in step 3
- 5. XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) *K with opad to produce the b-byte string computed in* step 1
- 6. Append the hash result *H from step 4 to the b-byte string resulting from step 5*
- 7. Apply H to the stream generated in step 6 and output the result

Alternative

- 1. Append zeros to K to create a b-bit string K, where b = 512 bits
- 2. XOR K (padding with zero) with ipad to produce the b-bit block
- 3. Apply the compression function $f(IV, K \oplus ipad)$ to produce (IV)i = 128 bits
- 4. Compute the hash code h with (IV)i and Mi
- 5. Raise the hash value computed from step 4 to a b-bit string
- 6. XOR *K* (padded with zeros) with opad to produce the *b-bit* block
- 7. Apply the compression function $f(IV, K' \oplus opad)$ to produce (IV)0 = 128 bits
- 8. Compute the HMAC with (IV)o and the raised hash value resulting from step 5. operation

Alternative HMAC



Summary

- IPSec Protocol Documents
 - Architecture
 - ESP
 - AH
 - Encryption algorithm
 - Authentication algorithm
 - Key management
 - DOI : Domain of Interpretation
- Security Associations (SAs)
 - Security Policy Database (SPD)
 - Security Association Database (SAD)
- Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
 - $\quad \mathsf{HMAC} = \mathsf{H}[\ (\mathsf{K} \bigoplus \mathsf{opad})\ |\ |\ \mathsf{H}[\ (\mathsf{K} \bigoplus \mathsf{ipad})\ |\ |\ \mathsf{M}]\]$