From 557ba59d13de919d04b3fd4cdef8634f7d4b3348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Murray Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2023 09:30:12 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] Include further builtins --- Tests/test_imagemath.py | 5 +++++ docs/releasenotes/10.2.0.rst | 9 ++++++--- src/PIL/ImageMath.py | 2 +- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Tests/test_imagemath.py b/Tests/test_imagemath.py index 9a0326ece3b..9281de6f66a 100644 --- a/Tests/test_imagemath.py +++ b/Tests/test_imagemath.py @@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ def test_prevent_double_underscores(): ImageMath.eval("1", {"__": None}) +def test_prevent_builtins(): + with pytest.raises(ValueError): + ImageMath.eval("(lambda: exec('exit()'))()", {"exec": None}) + + def test_logical(): assert pixel(ImageMath.eval("not A", images)) == 0 assert pixel(ImageMath.eval("A and B", images)) == "L 2" diff --git a/docs/releasenotes/10.2.0.rst b/docs/releasenotes/10.2.0.rst index 9883f10baf3..ade152fcd59 100644 --- a/docs/releasenotes/10.2.0.rst +++ b/docs/releasenotes/10.2.0.rst @@ -62,10 +62,13 @@ output only the quantization and Huffman tables for the image. Security ======== -TODO -^^^^ +Restricted environment keys for ImageMath.eval +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -TODO +:cve:`2023-50447`: If an attacker has control over the keys passed to the +``environment`` argument of :py:meth:`PIL.ImageMath.eval`, they may be able to execute +arbitrary code. To prevent this, keys matching the names of builtins and keys +containing double underscores will now raise a :py:exc:`ValueError`. Other Changes ============= diff --git a/src/PIL/ImageMath.py b/src/PIL/ImageMath.py index fd7d78d4583..b77f4bce567 100644 --- a/src/PIL/ImageMath.py +++ b/src/PIL/ImageMath.py @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ def eval(expression, _dict={}, **kw): # build execution namespace args = ops.copy() for k in list(_dict.keys()) + list(kw.keys()): - if "__" in k or hasattr(__builtins__, k): + if "__" in k or hasattr(builtins, k): msg = f"'{k}' not allowed" raise ValueError(msg)