Permalink
Browse files

[3.3] bpo-22928: Disabled HTTP header injections in http.client. (#2817)

Original patch by Demian Brecht..
(cherry picked from commit a112a8a)
  • Loading branch information...
serhiy-storchaka authored and ned-deily committed Jul 26, 2017
1 parent 8fbdab5 commit 8e88f6b5e2a35ee458c161aa3f2b7f1f17fb45d1
Showing with 95 additions and 0 deletions.
  1. +37 −0 Lib/http/client.py
  2. +56 −0 Lib/test/test_httplib.py
  3. +2 −0 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2017-07-25-15-48-29.bpo-22928.LCRp8D.rst
View
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
import email.message
import io
import os
import re
import socket
import collections
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
@@ -216,6 +217,34 @@
_MAXLINE = 65536
_MAXHEADERS = 100
# Header name/value ABNF (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2)
#
# VCHAR = %x21-7E
# obs-text = %x80-FF
# header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
# field-name = token
# field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
# field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
# field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
#
# obs-fold = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
# ; obsolete line folding
# ; see Section 3.2.4
# token = 1*tchar
#
# tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
# / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
# / DIGIT / ALPHA
# ; any VCHAR, except delimiters
#
# VCHAR defined in http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234#appendix-B.1
# the patterns for both name and value are more leniant than RFC
# definitions to allow for backwards compatibility
_is_legal_header_name = re.compile(rb'[^:\s][^:\r\n]*\Z').match
_is_illegal_header_value = re.compile(rb'\n(?![ \t])|\r(?![ \t\n])').search
class HTTPMessage(email.message.Message):
# XXX The only usage of this method is in
@@ -1035,12 +1064,20 @@ def putheader(self, header, *values):
if hasattr(header, 'encode'):
header = header.encode('ascii')
if not _is_legal_header_name(header):
raise ValueError('Invalid header name %r' % (header,))
values = list(values)
for i, one_value in enumerate(values):
if hasattr(one_value, 'encode'):
values[i] = one_value.encode('latin-1')
elif isinstance(one_value, int):
values[i] = str(one_value).encode('ascii')
if _is_illegal_header_value(values[i]):
raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (values[i],))
value = b'\r\n\t'.join(values)
header = header + b': ' + value
self._output(header)
View
@@ -134,6 +134,33 @@ def test_putheader(self):
conn.putheader('Content-length', 42)
self.assertIn(b'Content-length: 42', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Foo', ' bar ')
self.assertIn(b'Foo: bar ', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Bar', '\tbaz\t')
self.assertIn(b'Bar: \tbaz\t', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Authorization', 'Bearer mytoken')
self.assertIn(b'Authorization: Bearer mytoken', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('IterHeader', 'IterA', 'IterB')
self.assertIn(b'IterHeader: IterA\r\n\tIterB', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('LatinHeader', b'\xFF')
self.assertIn(b'LatinHeader: \xFF', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Utf8Header', b'\xc3\x80')
self.assertIn(b'Utf8Header: \xc3\x80', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('C1-Control', b'next\x85line')
self.assertIn(b'C1-Control: next\x85line', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Embedded-Fold-Space', 'is\r\n allowed')
self.assertIn(b'Embedded-Fold-Space: is\r\n allowed', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Embedded-Fold-Tab', 'is\r\n\tallowed')
self.assertIn(b'Embedded-Fold-Tab: is\r\n\tallowed', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('Key Space', 'value')
self.assertIn(b'Key Space: value', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader('KeySpace ', 'value')
self.assertIn(b'KeySpace : value', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader(b'Nonbreak\xa0Space', 'value')
self.assertIn(b'Nonbreak\xa0Space: value', conn._buffer)
conn.putheader(b'\xa0NonbreakSpace', 'value')
self.assertIn(b'\xa0NonbreakSpace: value', conn._buffer)
def test_ipv6host_header(self):
# Default host header on IPv6 transaction should wrapped by [] if
# its actual IPv6 address
@@ -153,6 +180,35 @@ def test_ipv6host_header(self):
conn.request('GET', '/foo')
self.assertTrue(sock.data.startswith(expected))
def test_invalid_headers(self):
conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
conn.sock = FakeSocket('')
conn.putrequest('GET', '/')
# http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2.4, whitespace is no
# longer allowed in header names
cases = (
(b'Invalid\r\nName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'Invalid\rName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'Invalid\nName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'\r\nInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'\rInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'\nInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
(b' InvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'\tInvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'Invalid:Name', b'ValidValue'),
(b':InvalidName', b'ValidValue'),
(b'ValidName', b'Invalid\r\nValue'),
(b'ValidName', b'Invalid\rValue'),
(b'ValidName', b'Invalid\nValue'),
(b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\r\n'),
(b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\r'),
(b'ValidName', b'InvalidValue\n'),
)
for name, value in cases:
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Invalid header'):
conn.putheader(name, value)
class BasicTest(TestCase):
def test_status_lines(self):
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Disabled HTTP header injections in http.client. Original patch by Demian
Brecht.

0 comments on commit 8e88f6b

Please sign in to comment.