DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY 2023

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November 20, 2023

PLAN

- We review several approaches to debt sustainability analysis.
- Can the government service its debt?
- Is the outstanding public debt and its projected path consistent with those of the government's revenues and expenditures?



DEBT TO OUTPUT RATIO

The government static budget constraint is

$$B_t = (1 + r_t)B_{t-1} + G_t - T_t.$$

where B_{t-1} is the market value of all outstanding debt (all maturities), G_t is nominal government spending (net of interest expenses), T_t is nominal tax revenue, and r_t is net return on government debt.

We abstract from money growth.

DEBT TO OUTPUT RATIO

Divide by nominal GDP Y_t and rearrange to get

$$\frac{B_t}{\gamma_t} = (1+r_t)\frac{B_{t-1}}{\gamma_{t-1}}\frac{\gamma_{t-1}}{\gamma_t} + \frac{G_t}{\gamma_t} - \frac{T_t}{\gamma_t}.$$

Define

$$R_{t-j,t} := \prod_{k=1}^{J} \left(1 + r_{t-j+k} \right),$$

the cumulative return on debt from t - j to t.

Define

$$X_{t-j,t} := \prod_{k=1}^{j} \frac{Y_{t-j+k}}{Y_{t-j+k-1}},$$

the cumulative gross rate of GDP from t - j to t.

DEBT TO OUTPUT RATIO

- For simplicity assume $B_0 = 0$.
- We can write the debt to output ratio as

$$\frac{B_t}{Y_t} = \sum_{j=0}^t \frac{G_{t-j} - T_{t-j}}{Y_{t-j}} \frac{R_{t-j,t}}{X_{t-j,t}}$$

- Debt to output ratio today is determined by:
 - 1. The past primary deficits to GDP ratios;
 - 2. The past returns on debt;
 - 3. The past growth rates of (nominal) GDP.
- We saw a similar decomposition when we discussed Hall and Sargent (it was more detailed there).

- A version of the formula is often used to assess debt sustainability –
 "whether the government can service its debt".
- Warning: this is about the future, not the present. The fact that people
 use the formula to assess the current situation is often a red flag!
- Classic debt sustainability analysis looks at the "long run".
- Assume that the economy is in a steady state with a constant growth rate of GDP X, an constant rate of return R and a constant primary deficit to GDP ratio.
- What is the debt to output ratio consistent witht the above?
- If the observed current debt to output ratio is below this level, the debt is sustainable.

- Classic debt sustainability analysis usually analyzed determinisic setups (or perfect foresight).
- In these setups, the appropriate R is the risk-free rate, R^f .
- Assuming the above, the formula in the steady state becomes

$$\frac{B}{Y} = \frac{G - T}{Y} \frac{X}{X - R^f}.$$

• For simplicity define x := X - 1 and $r^f := R^f - 1$ so we have

$$\frac{B}{Y} = \frac{G - T}{Y} \frac{1 + x}{x - r^f}.$$

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
- Example: the Treaty of Maastricht set the limit of the debt to output ratio at 60% and the deficit to output ratio at 3%. What must be the growth rate of GDP and the risk-free rate for this to be sustainable?
- We get $\frac{1+x}{x-r^f}$ = 20, for small x we have $x \approx r^f + 0.005$, so the economy has to grow at 0.5% above the risk-free rate per year for the debt at the limit to be sustainable with the largest allowed deficit.
- If the actual growth rate is lower, the debt to output ratio will be larger,
 even if the deficit is at the limit.

$$\frac{B}{Y} = \frac{G - T}{Y} \frac{1 + x}{x - r^f}$$

- The key role of $x r^f$.
- Depending on the sign of $x r^f$ the you require either surpluses or deficits to keep the debt to output ratio constant.
 - If $x < r^f$ you need surpluses.
 - If $x > r^f$ you can have deficits.
- A big "r versus g" debate (we have x instead of g).

- If $x > r^f$ it seems there is no fiscal cost to debt.
- Blanchard (2019) argues that $x > r^f$ is a norm, not an exception.
- But what is r^f? How to measure it? Blanchard (2019) looks at the
 1-year US Treasury bill rate, the 10-year US Treasury bond rate, adjusts
 for various maturities...
- Note: it does not necessarily mean that it is optimal to have deficits.

RATES IN THE US



Source: Blanchard (2019)

- It only defines what long-run debt is for a given long-run primary balance (or vice versa) if stationarity holds, or defines lower bounds on the short-run dynamics of the primary balance.
- It does not connect the outstanding initial debt of a particular period with the steady state.
- There might be multiple paths of debt that do not violate the intertemporal government budget constraint (IGBC), some of them can even go to infinity (but slowly enough)!
- IGBC: the value of debt is equal to the present discounted value of future primary surpluses.

INTERTEMPORAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET

CONSTRAINT

IGBC

- We used the government budget constraint by going back in time.
- We can also solve it forward the valuation approach, the market value of government debt is determined by the discounted value of future government surpluses.
- This idea is often used in finance (e.g., Campbell and Shiller 1988).
- Allows us to think seriously about risk and asset pricing.

IGBC

We want to write something like

$$D_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \left(T_{t+j} - G_{t+j} \right)$$

- We call $M_{t,t+j}$ the stochastic discount factor (SDF).
- It reflects how holders of government debt value discount future cash flows.
- Generally it is a function of the state of the economy at time t and t + j.
 Recall the first order condition for the household problem in the models we saw.
- We call the formula above the intertemporal government budget constraint IGBC.

DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

- We can say that debt is sustainable if and only if the IGBC holds.
- Problem: this condition is about the entire future.
- Solution (?): use forecasts of future taxes and spending to compute the present value of future surpluses. Some early papers did this, but they used risk-free rates.
- Valid if one of these conditions holds:
 - 1. There is perfect foresight;
 - 2. Investors are risk-neutral;
 - 3. Primary surpluses do not covary with the SDF.

- Recall the Barro (1979) tax smoothing model debt was a random walk, yet the IGBC held.
- Not even debt (or debt to GDP) going to infinity means that the IGBC does not hold, it has to go to infinity slowly enough.
- Bohn (1998): see if the government does something that guarantees the IGBC holds, investigate the fiscal reaction function.
- Allows to sidestep the problem of forecasting future taxes and spending and choosing the correct discount rate.
- Sufficient condition: IGBC might also hold if it violated, but if it is satisfied, IGBC holds for sure.

Linear reaction function:


$$\frac{T_t - G_t}{Y_t} = \rho \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + Z_t + \epsilon_t$$

- The left hand side is primary surplus.
- Z_t is a vector of exogenous variables that affect the primary surplus.
- Check if ρ > 0 raise surplus if debt is high.
- If $\rho > 0$, then the IGBC holds even if it is below the interest rate (net of x).


- If $\rho > 0$, the IGBC holds for any initial level of debt.
- This analysis works also for r x = 0 there was division by zero in the classic analysis.
- If $r x > \rho > 0$, debt explodes, but the IGBC still holds (under certain conditions: see Bohn 2007).

- Bohn (1998) estimates ρ for the US in 1916-1995.
- He includes the level of temporary government spending and business cycle indicator in Z_t .
- He find a positive value of ρ , around 0.05 for the entire sample.





(b) With adjustment for temporary spending and output fluctuations



Primary Surplus versus Initial Debt

The graph shows the privately held government debt/GDP at the start of a period on the horizontal axis against the primary budget surplus/GDP on the vertical axis, for 1916-1995, (a) shows raw data, and (b) shows the adjusted surplus, as explained in the text.

Source: Bohn (1998)

TABLE I
DETERMINANTS OF THE BUDGET SURPLUS

Sample	Constant	<i>G</i> VAR	YVAR	d_t	R 2	σ	DИ
(1) 1916–1995	-0.019	-0.776	-1.450	0.054	0.936	0.014	1.4
	(-5.424)	(-33.001)	(-3.628)	(6.048)			
		[-20.874]		[3.787]			
(2) 1920-1995 excl							
1940–1947	-0.009	-0.551	-1.906	0.028	0.618	0.011	1.4
	(-2.030)	(-4.034)	(-4.666)	(2.701)			
	[-2.155]	[-3.721]	[-4.296]	[2.491]			
(3) 1916–1983	-0.018	-0.782	-1.414	0.054	0.942	0.014	1.5
	(-4.903)	(-31.667)	(-3.360)	(5.996)			
	[-3.958]	[-20.943]	[-4.004]	[4.076]			
(4) 1920-1982 excl							
1940–1947	-0.008	-0.520	-1.912	0.030	0.630	0.011	1.5
	(-1.710)	(-3.612)	(-4.441)	(2.815)			
	[-1.932]	[-3.272]	[-3.959]	[2.856]			
(5) 1948–1995	-0.015	-0.593	-2.139	0.037	0.651	0.010	1.5
	(-3.536)	(-4.182)	(-4.361)	(3.589)			
	[-3.496]	[-3.701]	[-3.757]	[2.821]			
(6) 1960–1984	-0.013	-0.410	-2.051	0.044	0.724	0.007	1.4
	(-2.110)	(-2.173)	(-4.174)	(2.028)			
	[-2.174]	[-2.281]	[-3.391]	[2.587]			

The variable d_t is the privately held debtGDP at the start of the year. GVAR and TVAR are measures of temporary government spending and of eyclical variations in output, respectively, from Barro [1986a], All estimates are OLS with annual data; () = ordinary-stratistics; [1] = heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics (computed with Newey-West lag window of size 1); σ = standard error, DW = Drabin-Watson statistic

Source: Bohn (1998)

FISCAL REACTION FUNCTIONS

- Bohn (2008) extends the analysis to 1793-2003.
- $\, \cdot \,$ He finds that ρ > 0.1, more than twice as large as in the previous study.
- Mendoza and Ostry (2008) study fiscal reaction functions for a panel of multiple countries – similar results.
- Ghosh et al. (2013) show that ρ is much lower at high levels of debt.
- D'Erasmo et al. (2016):
 - primary balance adjustment in the US after 2008 was too large to be explained by the fiscal reaction function;
 - 2. adjustment is slower than before (structural break);
 - 3. nevertheless, with the estimated ρ , the IGBC holds.

FISCAL REACTION FUNCTIONS

- Leeper (2017) warns against using surplus-debt regressions to assess debt sustainability.
- For the estimator of ρ to be consistent, we must have

$$\mathbb{E}\left(\epsilon_t \mid \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}}\right) = 0.$$

- 1. This means that shocks at t-1 that affect debt-output ratio in must not affect ϵ_t .
- 2. This means that the debt-output ratio cannot depend on the expectation of ϵ_t .
- Since the value of debt depends on the expected value of future surpluses, this is a strong assumption: ϵ_t could be serially correlated.



VALUATION APPROACH

We go back to the budget constraint and solve it forward as

$$D_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^T M_{t,t+j} \left(T_{t+j} - G_{t+j} \right) + \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+T} D_{t+T}$$

· We obtained the standard IGBC if

$$\lim_{T\to\infty} \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+T} D_{t+T} = 0.$$

- The IGBC implies that a higher debt-to-output ratio today can be attributed to higher ex- pected future primary surpluses (cash flows) or lower expected future returns (discount rates).
- The counterpart of the Campbell-Shiller expression for the log of the price-to-dividend ratio in the stock market.

VALUATION APPROACH

- Cochrane (2011) shows that discount rate variation is the main driver of stock valuation ratios.
- Cochrane (2019): half of the variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio to variation in future primary surpluses and half to varying discount rates.
- Jiang et al. (2021) conclude no statistical evidence of a discount rate or cash flow channel.
- Fluctuation in the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t predict fluctuations in the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t + T.
- Jiang et al. argue the differences result from small sample bias.

FISCAL CAPACITY

- Jiang et al. in a series of recent papers propose a new approach to debt sustainability analysis.
- Suppose an investor buys the entire stock of government debt and participates in all new issuances.
- How much would that investor be willing to pay for the debt?
- Cash flow is $\{T_t G_t\}$.
- Use tools from asset pricing to answer this question.
- The price will depend on the riskiness of the cash flows.

FISCAL CAPACITY

• To be continued...