# **DEBT SUSTAINABILITY II**

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### **VALUATION APPROACH**

- Today we will look at debt sustainability from a different perspective: asset pricing.
- Idea: use tools from asset pricing to value government debt.

### **VALUATION APPROACH**

We go back to the budget constraint and solve it forward as

$$B_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{j=1}^{T} M_{t,t+j} (T_{t+j} - G_{t+j}) + \mathbb{E}_{t} M_{t,t+T} B_{t+T}$$

· We obtained the standard IGBC if


$$\lim_{T\to\infty} \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+T} B_{t+T} = 0.$$

- The IGBC implies that a higher debt-to-output ratio today can be attributed to higher expected future primary surpluses (cash flows) or lower expected future returns (discount rates).
- The counterpart of the Campbell-Shiller expression for the log of the price-to-dividend ratio in the stock market.

#### VALUATION APPROACH

- Cochrane (2011) shows that discount rate variation is the main driver of stock valuation ratios.
- Cochrane (2019): half of the variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio to variation in future primary surpluses and half to varying discount rates.
- Jiang et al. (2021) conclude no statistical evidence of a discount rate or cash flow channel.
- Fluctuation in the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t predict fluctuations in the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t + T.
- Jiang et al. argue the differences result from small sample bias.

- Jiang et al. in a series of recent papers propose a new approach to debt sustainability analysis.
- Suppose an investor buys the entire stock of government debt and participates in all new issuances.
- How much would that investor be willing to pay for the debt?
- Cash flow is  $\{T_t G_t\}$ .
- Use tools from asset pricing to answer this question.
- The price will depend on the riskiness of the cash flows.



- Before we talk about Jiang et al., let's review some asset pricing basics.
- The general idea dates back to Lucas (1978) who considers asset prices in a general equilibrium model.
- An asset is a claim on a stream of prospective payments.
- Consider an economy with i = 1, ..., N assets.
- Each of this assets has an associated stream of real dividends  $\left\{d_{i,t}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ .
- Assume the representative investor maximizes  $\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$ .
- Let  $p_{i,t}$  be the price of asset i at time t (in goods).

For each asset the investor holds, the optimality condition is:

$$p_{i,t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} (p_{i,t+1} + d_{i,t+1}).$$

- This is the consumption-based asset pricing equation.
- · We can slightly rearrange it as

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} \frac{p_{i,t+1} + d_{i,t+1}}{p_{i,t}}.$$

• Here  $R_{i,t,t+1} := \frac{p_{i,t+1} + d_{i,t+1}}{p_{i,t}}$  is the (gross) rate of return on asset i from t to t+1.

- Define  $M_{t,t+1} := \beta \frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)}$ ; we call it the stochastic discount factor (SDF).
- We can write the asset pricing equation for each asset as

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1} R_{i,t,t+1}.$$

• The risk-free rate is defined as  $R_{t,t+1}^f$  that satisfies

$$1=R_{t,t+1}^f\mathbb{E}_t\,M_{t,t+1}.$$

Sometimes you will see the asset pricing equation written as

$$v_{i,t} = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1} \frac{d_{i,t+1}}{d_t} (1 + v_{i,t+1}).$$

- Here  $v_{i,t} := \frac{p_{i,t}}{d_t}$  is the price-dividend ratio of asset *i* at time *t*.
- This form is useful when we want to think of an asset that has an ever increasing stream of dividends.

• Generally  $\mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1} R_{i,t,t+1} \neq \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_t R_{i,t,t+1}$ , and we have

$$\mathbb{E}_{t} M_{t,t+1} R_{i,t,t+1} = \mathbb{E}_{t} M_{t,t+1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{t} R_{i,t,t+1} + \operatorname{cov}_{t} \left( M_{t,t+1}, R_{i,t,t+1} \right).$$

• This allows us to write the asset pricing equation as

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_t R_{i,t,t+1} + \operatorname{cov}_t (M_{t,t+1}, R_{i,t,t+1}).$$

• Use  $1 = R_{t,t+1}^f \mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1}$  to write

$$\mathbb{E}_{t} R_{i,t,t+1} = R_{t,t+1}^{f} - \frac{\text{cov}_{t} (M_{t,t+1}, R_{i,t,t+1})}{\mathbb{E}_{t} M_{t,t+1}}.$$

The formula

$$\mathbb{E}_{t} R_{i,t,t+1} = R_{t,t+1}^{f} - \frac{\operatorname{cov}_{t} (M_{t,t+1}, R_{i,t,t+1})}{\mathbb{E}_{t} M_{t,t+1}}.$$

tells us that the expected return on asset *i* is the risk-free rate plus a risk premium.

- The risk premium depends on the covariance between the SDF and the return on asset i.
- When the covariance is negative (SDF is low when the return is high), the risk premium is positive.
- When the covariance is positive (SDF is high when the return is high), the risk premium is negative.

• Consider a basic example: let  $u(c) = \ln c$ . We have

$$M_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}}.$$

- The SDF is high when  $c_{t+1}$  is low.
- If the asset has a low return when  $c_{t+1}$  is low, the covariance is negative and the risk premium is positive.
- This is because the asset is risky it does not pay much when you need it the most.

We sometimes write the formula as

$$\mathbb{E}_{t} R_{i,t,t+1} = R_{t,t+1}^{f} - \frac{\text{cov}_{t} \left( M_{t,t+1}, R_{i,t,t+1} \right)}{\text{var}_{t} M_{t,t+1}} \times \frac{\text{var}_{t} M_{t,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_{t} M_{t,t+1}}.$$

- There are two terms:
  - 1. The first term is the risk exposure it is the covariance between the SDF and the return on asset *i* divided by the variance of the SDF.
  - 2. The second term is the price of risk it is the variance of the SDF divided by the expected value of the SDF. It does not depend on the asset.

We have

$$\mathbb{E}_t R_{i,t,t+1} = R_{t,t+1}^f + \beta_{i,t} \lambda_t.$$

- $\beta_t^i$  is the risk exposure of asset i,  $\beta_{i,t} := -\frac{\text{cov}_t(M_{t,t+1},R_{i,t,t+1})}{\text{var}_t M_{t,t+1}}$
- Note: do not confuse  $\beta_{i,t}$  with  $\beta$ , the discount factor.
- $\lambda_t$  is the price of risk,  $\lambda_t := \frac{\operatorname{var}_t M_{t,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t M_{t,t+1}}$ .
- Risk premium is the product of the risk exposure and the price of risk.

- So far we assumed that the SDF results from the optimization problem of the representative agent.
- (Some) SDF exists under much weaker conditions: it is enough that there is no arbitrage.
- Once we have a SDF, we can use it to price assets.
- This is the approach of Jiang et al. (2021).

• Return to the formulation of the valuation problem:

$$B_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \left( T_{t+j} - G_{t+j} \right)$$

- Here we understand everything as nominal and  $M_{t,t+j}$  is the SDF used to price nominal claims.
- Jiang et al. call the right hand side the fiscal capacity of the government.

- To simplify the notation, define  $S_{t+j} := T_{t+j} G_{t+j}$ , the primary surplus at time t+j.
- Rewrite the formula as

$$\begin{split} B_t &= E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} S_{t+j} \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \left( E_t M_{t,t+j} \cdot E_t S_{t+j} \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \operatorname{cov}_t \left( M_{t,t+j}, S_{t+j} \right) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \left( E_t M_{t,t+j} \cdot E_t S_{t+j} \right) \\ &+ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \operatorname{cov}_t \left( M_{t,t+j}, T_{t+j} \right) - \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \operatorname{cov}_t \left( M_{t,t+j}, G_{t+j} \right). \end{split}$$

- Fiscal capacity depends on three terms:
  - $\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (E_t M_{t,t+j} \cdot E_t S_{t+j})$  the expected value of future primary surpluses discounted by the risk-free rate.
  - $-\sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \text{cov}_t (M_{t,t+j}, T_{t+j})$  the covariance between the SDF and future taxes.
  - $\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \text{cov}_t (M_{t,t+j}, G_{t+j})$  the covariance between the SDF and future government spending.

- In the risk free world, the first term is the only one that matters.
- In the risk free world, fiscal capacity is determined only by the ability to generate current and future surpluses.
- The second and the third term reflect the riskiness of the surplus process.
- If taxes are high when the SDF is low, the second term lowers the fiscal capacity.
- If government spending is low when the SDF is low, the third term lowers the fiscal capacity.
- Tax revenue is usually procyclical, government spending is usually countercyclical this lowers the fiscal capacity.

- This suggests that the fiscal capacity is most likely lower than the expected value of future primary surpluses discounted by the risk-free rate.
- By how much?
- Jiang et al. (2021) quantify this for the US. They find that the second and the third term matter quantitatively.
- Is there a way to increase the fiscal capacity by financial engineering?
- This would require insuring bondholders against the risk of future taxes and spending. Is it feasible?
- We now follow Jiang et al. (2023) to illustrate it.

- $\circ$  For simplicity assume that taxes to GDP  $\tau$  and government spending to GDP  $\gamma$  are constant.
- GDP growth is risky, i.i.d. with a mean of x and volatility of  $\sigma$ .
- Let  $P_t^T$  and  $P_t^G$  denote the present value of future tax revenues and government spending:

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^T &= \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} T_{t+j} = \tau \, \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} Y_{t+j} \\ P_t^G &= \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} G_{t+j} = \gamma \, \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} Y_{t+j}. \end{aligned}$$

• Given the simplifying assumptions, debt to GDP ratio is:

$$\frac{B}{Y} = \frac{\tau - \gamma}{r^f + \text{risk premium on GDP } - x}.$$

• Notice no time subscripts: this is because of the i.i.d. on growth rates assumption + constant ratios  $\tau$ ,  $\gamma$ .

- Consider the following parametrization:
  - Taxes to GDP,  $\tau$  are 25%.
  - Government spending to GDP,  $\gamma$  is 22.5%.
  - Risk-free rate  $r^f$  is 1.5%.
  - Mean GDP growth rate x is 2%.
  - GDP risk premium is 3%.
  - Initial GDP is 10 trillion.
- Risk premium on GDP is GDP volatility times the price of risk (3 times 1)
- Stock market acts as a levered claim to the aggregate: the GDP risk premium equals the unlevered equity risk premium.

- The value of the claim to GDP is  $10 \cdot \frac{1}{0.015 + 0.03 0.02} = 400$  trillion.
- The claim on the stream of surpluses is worth  $10 \cdot \frac{0.25 0.225}{0.015 + 0.03 0.02} = 10$  trillion.
- Fiscal capacity of this economy is 10 trillion.
- It equals 100% of (initial) GDP.
- If we evaluated it using the risk-free rate (net of growth), we would get infinity.

- The claim on surpluses is the claim on taxes net of the claim on government spending.
- The government cost of funding  $r_B$  can be written as

$$r_B = r_T \frac{P^T}{Y} \frac{Y}{B} - r_G \frac{P^G}{Y} \frac{Y}{B}.$$

• The risk exposure  $\beta$ , the covariance of a return with the SDF divided by the variance of the SDF is

$$\beta_B = \beta_T \frac{P^T}{V} \frac{Y}{B} - \beta_G \frac{P^G}{V} \frac{Y}{B}.$$

The formula

$$\beta_B = \beta_T \frac{P^T}{Y} \frac{Y}{B} - \beta_G \frac{P^G}{Y} \frac{Y}{B}$$

show that holding the risk exposure of gov. spending constant, if the government insures taxpayers (higher  $\beta_T$ ) – lower tax payment in high marginal utility state – there is less insurance of bondholders (higher  $\beta_B$ ).

- In this example tax revenue and government purchases are proportional to GDP.
- The risk exposure of tax revenue is  $\beta_T = \beta_{GDP}$ .
- The risk exposure of government spending is  $\beta_G = \beta_{GDP}$ .
- Normalize  $\beta_{GDP} = 1$ .
- We have

$$\beta_{B} = \beta_{T} \frac{P^{T}}{Y} \frac{Y}{B} - \beta_{G} \frac{P^{G}}{Y} \frac{Y}{B}$$
$$= \frac{100}{10} - \frac{90}{10} = 1$$

Tax and spending claims are equally risky, but government debt has a positive beta of 1.

- Investors who buy the government debt portfolio are net long a claim to output.
- The output risk in spending does not fully offset the output risk in tax revenue.
- Debt is a constant fraction of GDP, it inherits the risk properties of the GDP claim.
- The government's interest payments are as risky as GDP, because they are a constant fraction of GDP.

- Usually  $\beta_T > \beta_Y > \beta_G$ .
- This is because tax revenue is more volatile than GDP, and GDP is more volatile than government spending.
- This means that the average tax revenue to output has to be higher to support the same amount of debt.
- See Jiang et al. (2020) for a quantitative analysis.

- Using the risk-free rate to evaluate the fiscal capacity of the government is misleading.
- It requires that the risk exposure of the government debt,  $\beta_B$ , is zero.
- For that to be true we need

$$\beta_T = \left(\frac{P^T}{Y}\frac{Y}{B}\right)^{-1} \left(\frac{P^G}{Y}\frac{Y}{B}\right) \beta_G$$
$$= \frac{P^G}{P^G + B} \beta_G$$

which is lower than  $\beta_G$  if debt is positive.

- Go back to our example:  $\beta_G = 1$ ,  $P^G/Y = 90$ , B/Y = 1.
- We need  $\beta_T = 0.9$  to insure bondholders.
- We had  $r^f = 1.5\%$  and risk premium on GDP of 3%.
- This meant that  $r_Y = r^f + RP = 4.5\%$ .
- We have  $r_T = 1.5\% + 0.9 \cdot 3\% = 4.2\%$ .
- The lower risk premium for the tax process reflects the fact that the tax rate is counter-cyclical.

- What is the average tax revenue to output needed to sustain the debt?
- Recall that  $\frac{B}{V} = 100\%$ ,  $\frac{P^G}{V} = 9$ .
- We will use the formula

$$\frac{B}{Y} = \frac{T}{Y} \frac{P^T}{T} - \frac{P^G}{Y}$$

We now have

$$\frac{P^T}{T} = \frac{1}{r_T - x} = \frac{1}{0.042 - 0.2} = 45.45.$$

so 
$$\frac{T}{V} = 10/45.45 = 0.22$$
.

• The average tax revenue to output ratio is 22%.

- The previous example shows that the government can on average run a deficit of 0.5% of GDP.
- This is because the government provides insurance to bondholders by delivering positive surpluses when GDP growth is lower than average.
- Bondholders pay an insurance premium of 0.5% of GDP to receive relatively larger surplus payments when their marginal utility is high.
- But providing insurance is costly it requires the government to have surpluses in recessions. Less room for output stabilization.

#### **CONVENIENCE YIELDS**

- Sometimes government debt is more valuable than the sum of its discounted cash flows.
- This is because it provides liquidity and safety to investors.
- Similar to cash: we hold it although it has a negative real return, because we need it for transations.
- We call the difference between the return on debt and the risk free rate the convenience yield of government debt.
- Think of it as of some extra benefit that makes investors willing to hold government debt despite low returns.

#### **CONVENIENCE YIELDS**

- The convenience yield is nonnegligible, especially for the US.
- Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) estimate convenience yield of 73 basis points per annum on average between 1926 and 2008 in the US.
- This is an important source of seignorage for the US government (0.25% of GDP).
- The convenience yield depends on debt to GDP ratio.

## **CONVENIENCE YIELDS**




Fig. 1.—Corporate bond spread and government debt. The figure plots the Aaa-Treasury corporate bond spread (yaxis) against the debt-to-GDP ratio (xaxis) on the basis of annual observations from 1919 to 2008. The corporate bond spread is the difference between the percentage yield on Moody's Aaa long-maturity bond index and the percentage yield on long-maturity Treasury bonds.

• We need to modify the IGBC to account for the convenience yield.

$$B_{t} = \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} \left( T_{t+j} - G_{t+j} \right) + \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j} B_{t+j} \left( 1 - e^{-\delta_{t+j}} \right)$$

• The new term  $K_{t+j} := B_{t+j} \left( 1 - e^{-\delta_{t+j}} \right)$  represents the seignorage revenue from issuing debt.

- Return to the example with  $\beta_T = \beta_G = \beta_Y = 1$ , but consider convenience yields.
- Previously we said that the risk-free rate is equal to interest rate on treasuries, 1.5%.
- If the convenience yield is 0.73%, the true risk-free rate is higher: 2.23%.
- The PDV of surpluses is

$$\frac{0.25 - 0.225}{0.0523 - 0.02} = 77\%$$
 of GDP.

- The PDV of seignorage will depend on  $\beta_K$  and the convenience yield.
- Set the convenience yield to 0.73%.

• If  $\beta_K = 1$  (seignorage varies proportionally with GDP), then  $r_K = 0.523$  and the PDV of seignorage is

$$\frac{0.0073}{0.0523 - 0.02} = 23\% \text{ of GDP}.$$

- This means that fiscal capacity is 100% of GDP.
- Two counteracting forces:
  - 1. Convenience yield generates seignorage.
  - 2. For a given interest rate, convenience yield means that the true risk-free rate is higher this lowers the fiscal capacity.
- Extra surplus increases fiscal capacity by less than without the convenience yield.


- Most likely  $\beta_K < 1$ .
- In the short run, convenience yields can be counter-cyclical (flight to safety).
- This increases the seignorage term, without affecting the risk-free rate.
- Lowering  $\beta_K$  to 0.584, increases fiscal capacity to 114% of GDP.

- Jiang et al. use two approaches to estimate the fiscal capacity of the US.
- In the first approach they Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections of tax revenue and non-interest spending for the next 31 years (2022-2052).
- CBO also forecasts interest rates and GDP.
- At the end of the projection horizon debt to GDP is 185%.

- Given  $r^f = 1.5\%$ , the risk premium on GDP to 3% and the average growth rate 2%, annual surpluses would have to be 4.625% of GDP since 2052 to sustain debt to GDP of 185%.
- The present value of that is 35.2 trillion.
- The present value of the surpluses between 2022 and 2052 is -21.1 trillion (negative).
- The fiscal capacity in 2022 is 35.2-21.1 trillion = 14.1 trillion.
- This is 8.2 trillion below the 22.3 trillion in debt outstanding at the end of 2021.

- This is already a generous estimate of the fiscal capacity.
- It assumes that the government can start running surpluses in 2052.
- It assumes acyclicality of taxes and spending.
- Another problem: duration mismatch.
- Surpluses are far in the future, fiscal capacity sensitive to small changes in the risk-free rate.

- The second approach: create forecast of cash flows using a VAR model.
- The model captures the cyclicality of tax and spending ratios.
- It captures multiple aggregate sources of risk: inflation, interest rates, the price-to-dividend ra- tio in the stock market, and shocks to tax and spending rates.
- They calculate total fiscal capacity in two ways: (a) assume the discount rates are the same for taxes and spending, (b) model the SDF.



Source: Jiang et al. (2023)

# **BOND VALUATION PUZZLE**

- These estimates suggest a much lower fiscal capacity than the market value of outstanding debt.
- Possible explanations:
  - Convenience yields?
  - Bubble?
  - Global safe asset supplier?
  - Mispricing?
  - Fiscal correction?
  - Large-scale asset purchases and financial repression?

## **BOND VALUATION PUZZLE**

- Similar calculations for other countries suggest that the US is an outlier.
- For example, for the UK after World War 2 fiscal capacity was 82% of GDP, but the debt to GDP ratio was 53%.
- It was different in 1729-1946 when fiscal capacity was 68% of GDP, but the debt to GDP ratio was 87%.
- Developing countries: procyclical surpluses, debt prices react strongly to funamentals (unlike the US).