INTRO TO DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS 2023

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A TYPICAL PROBLEM

Many problems seen in economics have a common structure:

- We observe the current state X_t at time t.
- We choose an action A_t at time t.
- We get a reward R_t at time t.
- The state progresses to X_{t+1} at time t + 1.

If the largest possible t is $T < \infty$, then we have a finite horizon problem.

Otherwise we have an infinite horizon problem.

EXAMPLE

Consider a problem of a firm that produces a good. The firm wants to maximize the expected present discounted value of profits:

$$\mathbb{E}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)\pi_{t}$$

- X_t is the current state of the firm. It can be the current level of capital, the current level of inventory, prices set by competitors...
- A_t is the action taken by the firm. It can be the level of production, the level of future inventory, the price of the good...
- R_t is the reward. Here it is the profit of the firm, π_t .
- X_{t+1} is the state of the firm in the next period. It can depend on the current state X_t and the action A_t taken.

EXAMPLE

- This is potentially an extremely complicated problem.
- For example: the state can include the demand for the good and it could be random.
- Find actions for all possible future states...
- We will learn tools that can help us solve such problems.

PLAN

- Today we will study an example: McCall's job search model (1970).
- Exposition based on Stachurski and Sargent (2023).
- Next time: more general theory of dynamic programming.



TWO-PERIOD PROBLEM

- An unemployed agent receives a job offer at wage W_t .
- She can either accept the offer or reject it.
- If she accepts, she gets this wage permenantly.
- If she rejects, she gets unemployment benefit c.
- Wage offers are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and nonnegative, with distribution φ:
 - $W \subset \mathbb{R}_+$ is a finite set of possible wages.
 - ϕ : W → [0, 1] is a probability mass function, ϕ (w) is the probability of getting a wage w.
- The agent is risk-neutral and impatient. The utility of getting y tomorrow is βy , with $\beta \in (0, 1)$.

TWO-PERIOD PROBLEM

- The agent lives for two periods and starts unemployed
- The question is: is it better to accept or wait for a better offer?
- What is the lowest wage that the agent should accept?
- We will start analyzing the problem by looking at the second period,
 t = 2: backward induction.

PERIOD T=1

- Suppose the agent is unemployed at t = 2.
- She gets a wage offer W₂.
- She can either accept or reject the offer.
- · Since this is the last period of her life, she will accept if and only if

$$W_2 \ge c$$
.

PERIOD T=2

- The agent gets a wage offer W_1 .
- She can either (a) accept and get W_1 forever, or (b) reject and get c in period t = 1 and then get the maximum of W_2 and c in period t = 2.
- The utility of (a) is $W_1 + \beta W_1$. We call it the stopping value.
- The utility of (b) is $h_1 := c + \beta \mathbb{E} \max \{W_2, c\}$. We call it the continuation value.

$$h_1 = c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} \max v_2(w') \phi(w'), \quad v_2(w') := \max \{w', c\}$$

 The agent will accept if and only if the stopping value is greater than the continuation value:

$$W_1 + \beta W_1 \ge h_1.$$

VALUE FUNCTION

- The key object in dynamic programming is the value function.
- It is a function that maps the state to the maximum expected present discounted value of future rewards.
- In our example, the state is the time *t* and the wage offer *w*.
- v₂(w) is the value function at time t = 2 and wage w: the largest possible reward that the agent can get if she starts unemployed at t = 2 and gets a wage offer w.
- The time 1 value function is

$$v_1(w) := \max \left\{ w + \beta w, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v_2(w') \varphi(w') \right\}.$$

TWO-PERIOD EXAMPLE

- This particular problem is easy to solve.
- Accept if

$$w \ge \frac{h_1}{1+\beta}$$

so the value function is

$$v_1(w) = \begin{cases} (1+\beta) w & \text{if } w \ge \frac{h_1}{1+\beta} \\ h_1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- In context of this example, we call $w^* := \frac{h_1}{1+\beta}$ the reservation wage.
- We see that since h₁ is increasing in c, the reservation wage is higher when the unemployment benefit is higher.

THREE-PERIOD EXAMPLE

- Extend the model by one period, t = 0.
- The value function at t = 0 is

$$v_0(w) \coloneqq \max \left\{ w + \beta w + \beta^2 w, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v_1\big(w'\big) \varphi\big(w'\big) \right\}.$$

where the formula for v_1 is from the previous slide.

- Key insight: at *t* = 0 it is like a two-period problem.
- All information about the future is summarized in the value function at t = 1.
- This is the standard approach: convert a complicated dynamic optimization problem into a sequence of two-period problems.

BELLMAN EQUATION

Recall we had

$$\begin{split} v_2(w) &= \max\{w,c\} \\ v_1(w) &= \max\left\{w + \beta w, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v_2(w') \phi(w')\right\} \\ v_0(w) &= \max\left\{w + \beta w + \beta^2 w, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v_1(w') \phi(w')\right\}. \end{split}$$

- The recursive relationships between the value functions are called the Bellman equations.
- Warning: these equations are (in general) functional equations. We need to find functions, not numbers. Here it is easy: we have a finite set of possible wages – treat functions as vectors.

- The three-period problem is also easy to solve.
- In fact, we can use the same approach (backward induction) as before for any finite horizon problem.
- What if the horizon is infinite? We no longer have the terminal period.
- Dynamic programming makes this problem tractable.

The objective function is

$$\mathbb{E}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}R_{t},$$

where $R_t \in \{c, W_t\}$.

- Let $\beta \in (0, 1)$ be the discount factor. c > 0.
- The wage process satisfies $(W_t)_{t\geq 0}\stackrel{iid}{\sim} \phi$ where $\phi\in \mathcal{D}(W)$ and $W\subset \mathbb{R}_+$ with $|W|<\infty$.
- For any finite or countable set F, $\mathcal{D}(F)$ is the set of distributions on F.

- What is stopping value?
- If the worker accepts wage w she gets

$$w + \beta w + \beta^2 w + \beta^3 w + \dots = \frac{w}{1 - \beta}.$$

- What is the continuation value?
- If the worker rejects wage w she gets

$$c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v(w') \varphi(w').$$

note that the value function is the same in all periods – there is always infinite remaining future.

Bellman equation is:

$$v(w) = \max \left\{ \frac{w}{1-\beta}, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v(w') \phi(w') \right\}.$$

- Principle of optimality, Bellman (1960): An optimal policy has the
 property that whatever the initial state and the initial decisions it must
 constitute an optimal policy with regards to the state resulting from the
 first decision.
- This is not that trivial, we will return to it (and prove it!) later.
- Intepretation: value function satisfies the Bellman equation.

CHALLENGE

Bellman equation is:

$$v(w) = \max \left\{ \frac{w}{1-\beta}, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v(w') \phi(w') \right\}.$$

- Once we have v(w) we can characterize the optimal choice of the agent.
- Q: how to find v(w)? It is a function!
- O: is there a solution?
- Q: is the solution unique?
- Q: what are the properties of the solution?
- A: we will learn how to answer these questions.

APPROACH I

- This particular problem is relatively easy.
- Recall how we defined the continuation value:

$$h^* \coloneqq c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} \max \left\{ \frac{w'}{1 - \beta}, h^* \right\} \phi(w')$$

We can write the value function as

$$v(w) = \max\left\{\frac{w}{1-\beta}, h^*\right\}.$$

- Key: h* is a scalar, not a function. When would is break down?
- Find h^* directly, by solving the equation numerically.
- Then use h* to get the value function.

APPROACH I

Algorithm Solving for *v* directly

- 1: procedure MCCALL
- 2: $k \leftarrow 1, \epsilon \leftarrow \tau + 1, h_k \leftarrow c$
- 3: while $\epsilon > \tau$ do
- 4: $h_{k+1} \leftarrow c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} \max \left\{ \frac{w'}{1-\beta}, h_k \right\} \Phi(w')$
- 5: $\epsilon \leftarrow |h_{k+1} h_k|, k \leftarrow k + 1$
- 6: end while
- 7: **for** $w \in W$ **do**
- 8: $v(w) \leftarrow \max\left\{\frac{w}{1-\beta}, h_k\right\}$
- 9: end for
- 10: end procedure

APPROACH II

- We know how to solve a finite horizon problem backward induction.
- Maybe we can get an approximate solution to the infinite horizon problem by considering a finite horizon problem with a very large number of periods?
- We will prove that it actually works.

MATHEMATICAL DETOUR: BANACH'S CONTRACTION MAPPING THEOREM

EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS

- Before solving any problem it is useful to know if there is a solution at all.
- We will use a powerful theorem that will help us answer this question.
- First we introduce a concept of a fixed point.
- Let *U* be any nonempty set. We call *T* a self-map on *U* if $T: U \rightarrow U$.
- For a self-map T on U, we say that a point $u^* \in U$ is a fixed point of T if $Tu^* = u^*$.

FIXED POINT

- Some examples of fixed points:
 - $-U=\mathbb{R}$, T(u)=2u+3. Then $u^*=-3$ is a fixed point of T.
 - *U* = [0, 1], T(u) = u. Then every u ∈ U is a fixed point of T.
 - $-U=\mathbb{R}$, T(u)=u+1. There is no fixed point of T.
- Global stability: a self-map T on U is globally stable on U if T has a unique fixed point u^* in U and $T^k u \to u^*$ for all $u \in U$.

METRIC SPACE

- A metric space is a set U, together with a metric (distance function) ρ , $\rho: U \times U \to \mathbb{R}$, such that for all $u, v, w \in U$:
 - $\rho(u, v)$ ≥ 0 (nonnegativity), with equality if and only if u = v.
 - $\rho(u, v) = \rho(v, u)$ (symmetry).
 - $\rho(u, v)$ ≤ $\rho(u, w)$ + $\rho(w, v)$ (triangle inequality).

METRIC SPACE

- Convergence: a sequence $\{x_n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ in U converges to $x \in U$, if for each $\epsilon > 0$, there exists N_{ϵ} such that $\rho(x_n, n) < \epsilon, \forall n \geq N_{\epsilon}$.
- Cauchy sequence: A sequence $\{x_n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ in U is Cauchy if for each $\epsilon > 0$, there exists N_{ϵ} such that $\rho(x_n, x_m) < \epsilon, \forall n, m \ge N_{\epsilon}$.
- Complete metric space: A metric space (U, ρ) is complete if every
 Cauchy sequence in U converges to an element in U.
- Example: \mathbb{R} with $\rho(u, v) = |u v|$ is a complete metric space.

NORMED VECTOR SPACE

- A normed vector space is a vector space V over \mathbb{R} or \mathbb{C} together with a norm $\|\cdot\|$, $\|\cdot\|: V \to \mathbb{R}$, such that for all $u, v \in V$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ or \mathbb{C} :
 - ||u|| ≥ 0 (nonnegativity), with equality if and only if u = 0.
 - $-\|\alpha u\| = |\alpha| \|u\|$ (absolute homogeneity).
 - ||u + v|| ≤ ||u|| + ||v|| (triangle inequality).
- Some norms: $||u||_1 = \sum_{i=1}^n |u_i|$ (Manhattan), $||u||_2 = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n u_i^2\right)^{1/2}$ (Euclidean), $||u||_{\infty} = \max_{i=1,...,n} |u_i|$ (supremum).
- We will only focus on real vector spaces.
- A normed vector space is a metric space with $\rho(u, v) = ||u v||$.
- A complete normed vector space is called a Banach space.

NORMED VECTOR SPACE

Let X ⊆ ℝⁿ be a nonempty set, let C(X) be the set of bounded continuous functions on X with the supremum norm,
 || f ||_∞ = sup_{X∈X} | f(x)|. Then C is a Banach space (complete normed vector space).

CONTRACTION

• Let (U, ρ) be a metric space and T a self-map on U. T is a contraction mapping (with modulus λ) if for some $\lambda \in (0, 1)$

$$\rho(Tu, Tv) \le \lambda \rho(u, v)$$
, for all $u, v \in U$.

• If *T* is a contraction on *U*, then *T* is uniformly continuous on *U*.

BANACH'S CONTRACTION MAPPING THEOREM

Theorem (Banach's contraction mapping theorem)

If (U, ρ) is a complete metric space and a self-map T is a contraction mapping with modulus λ , then:

- T has a unique fixed point u* in U, and
- for any $u_0 \in U$, $\rho\left(T^k u_0, u^*\right) \leq \lambda^k \rho(u_0, u^*)$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$.

BANACH'S CONTRACTION MAPPING THEOREM

• By the contraction property of *T* we have:

$$\rho(u_2, u_1) = \rho(Tu_1, Tu_0) \le \lambda \rho(u_1, u_0).$$

By induction:

$$\rho(u_{k+1}, u_k) \le \lambda^k \rho(u_1, u_0), n = 1, 2, \dots$$

Using it and the triangle inequality, for m > n

$$\rho(u_{m}, u_{n}) \leq \rho(u_{m}, u_{m-1}) + \rho(u_{m-1}, u_{m-2}) + \dots + \rho(u_{n+1}, u_{n})$$

$$\leq \left[\lambda^{m-1} + \lambda^{m-2} + \dots + \lambda^{n}\right] \rho(u_{1}, u_{0})$$

$$\leq \frac{\lambda^{n}}{1 - \lambda} \rho(u_{1}, u_{0}).$$

PROOF

From

$$\rho(u_{k+1}, u_k) \le \frac{\lambda^k}{1 - \lambda} \rho(u_1, u_0)$$

we see that $\{u_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ is a Cauchy sequence.

- Since *U* is complete, $\{u_k\}_{k=0}^{\infty}$ converges to some $u^* \in U$.
- We now show that u^* is a fixed point of T. For all n and all $u_0 \in U$,

$$\begin{split} \rho\big(Tu^*, u^*\big) & \leq \rho\big(Tu^*, T^n u_0\big) + \rho\big(T^n u_0, u^*\big) \\ & \leq \lambda \rho\Big(u^*, T^{n-1} u_0\Big) + \rho\big(T^n u_0, u^*\big). \end{split}$$

• By the previous result both terms on the right hand side go to 0 as $n \to \infty$.

PROOF

- We need to show there is no other \hat{u} such that $T\hat{u} = \hat{u}$.
- Suppose there is such $\hat{u} \neq u^*$. Take $\rho(\hat{u}, u^*) = \delta > 0$ Then

$$\delta = \rho \left(u^*, \hat{u} \right) = \rho \left(\mathcal{T} u^*, \mathcal{T} \hat{u} \right) \leq \lambda \rho \left(u^*, \hat{u} \right) = \lambda \delta.$$

but $\delta \leq \delta \lambda$ cannot hold because $\lambda < 1!$

PROOF

• To prove "for any $u_0 \in U$, $\rho\left(T^k u_0, u^*\right) \le \lambda^k \rho(u_0, u^*)$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ " notice that for any $n \ge 1$:

$$\rho\left(T^{k}u_{0},u^{*}\right)=\rho\left(T\left(T^{k-1}u_{0}\right),Tu^{*}\right)\leq\lambda\rho\left(T^{k-1}u_{0},u^{*}\right).$$

We can also show that

$$\rho\left(T^{k}u_{0}, u^{*}\right) \leq \frac{1}{1-\lambda}\rho\left(T^{k}u_{0}, T^{k-1}u_{0}\right).$$

BANACH'S CONTRACTION MAPPING THEOREM

- Banach's contraction mapping theorem is a very powerful result.
- First, we can use it to show that a unique solution exists (fixed point).
- Second, it gives us a way to find the fixed point we can iterate the contraction mapping (successive approximation / fixed point iteration)
- It proves that the fixed point iteration converges. It also gives us a bound on the rate of convergence (λ , the modulus of contraction).
- We often use it to prove the existence of a solution to a functional equation or to find a stationary distribution.

AN EXAMPLE

- Let $U = \mathbb{R}$ and $||\cdot|| = |\cdot|$, and T be a self-map on U defined by T(u) = 0.5u + 3.
- U with $\rho(u, v) = |u v|$ is a Banach space.
- We have

$$\rho(T(u), T(v)) = |T(u) - T(v)|$$

$$= |0.5u + 3 - 0.5v - 3|$$

$$= 0.5 \cdot |u - v|$$

$$= 0.5 \cdot \rho(u, v).$$

so *T* is a contraction with modulus $\lambda = 0.5$.

• By the CMT, there exists a unique fixed point of T on U: $u^* = 6$.

AN EXAMPLE

- Let $U = \mathbb{R}$ and $||\cdot|| = |\cdot|$, and T be a self-map on U defined by T(u) = 0.5u + 3.
- U with $\rho(u, v) = |u v|$ is a Banach space.
- We have

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$$= 0.5 \cdot |u - v|$$

$$= 0.5 \cdot \rho(u, v).$$

so *T* is a contraction with modulus $\lambda = 0.5$.

• By the CMT, there exists a unique fixed point of T on U: $u^* = 6$.

AN EXAMPLE

- Another application: Picard-Lindelöf theorem.
- Suppose we have an initival value problem:

$$y'(t) = f(t, y(t)), y(t_0) = y_0.$$

• If $f(t, \cdot)$ is continuous and bounded and $f(t, \cdot)$ is Lipschitz continuous in y with Lipschitz constant L for every $t \in [t_0 - \alpha, t_0 + \alpha]$, then there exists a unique solution to the problem in the neighborhood of t_0 .



BELLMAN EQUATION

We want to solve the Bellman equation:

$$v(w) = \max \left\{ \frac{w}{1-\beta}, c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v(w') \phi(w') \right\}.$$

• Introduce a Bellman operator defined at $v \in \mathbb{R}^W$ as

$$(Tv)(w) := \max \left\{ \frac{w}{1-\beta}, c+\beta \sum_{w' \in W} v(w') \phi(w') \right\}.$$

- Note: here we treat v as a vector, not a function. We can do it, because
 W is finite.
- Let $V := \mathbb{R}_+^W$ and let $\|\cdot\|_{\infty}$ be the supremum norm. Note that V with this norm is a Banach space.

BELLMAN EQUATION

Notice that

$$|\max\{a,x\} - \max\{a,y\}| \le |x-y|$$
 for all $a,x,y \in \mathbb{R}$.

• Take any $f, g \in V$ and fix any $w \in W$. Use the above to get

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \left(T \, f \right) \left(w \right) - \left(T g \right) \left(w \right) \right| & \leq \beta \, \left| \sum_{w' \in W} \left[\, f \left(w' \right) - g \left(w' \right) \right] \, \varphi \left(w' \right) \right| \\ & \leq \beta \, \left\| \, f - g \right\|_{\infty} \end{aligned}$$

Take the supremum over w to get

$$||Tf - Tg||_{\infty} \leq \beta ||f - g||_{\infty}$$
.

• This proves T is a contraction with modulus β .

BELLMAN EQUATION

- There exists a unique fixed point v^* of T in V.
- The fixed point of the Bellman operator solves the Bellman equation.
- The solution to the Bellman equation is a fixed point of the Bellman operator.
- We can obtain v* by iterating the Bellman operator:

$$v_{k+1} = Tv_k, \quad k = 0, 1, \dots$$

• We can start with any $v_0 \in V$.

APPROACH II

Algorithm Value function iteration

- 1: procedure VFI
- 2: $k \leftarrow 1, \epsilon \leftarrow \tau + 1, v_k \leftarrow v_{init}$
- 3: **while** $\epsilon > \tau$ **do**
- 4: **for** $W \in W$ **do**
- 5: $v_{k+1}(w) \leftarrow (Tv_k)(w)$
- 6: end for
- 7: $\epsilon \leftarrow \|v_{k+1} v_k\|_{\infty}, k \leftarrow k+1$
- 8: end while
- 9: end procedure

OPTIMAL CHOICES

- Once we have v^* we can characterize the optimal choice of the agent.
- We can calculate the continuation value h*:

$$h^* = c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v^*(w') \phi(w').$$

- Reject the offer if $w/(1 \beta) < h^*$, accept otherwise.
- Denote rejection given wage W_t as $A_t = 0$ and acceptance as $A_t = 1$.

OPTIMAL CHOICES

- Let $A_t = \sigma_t(W_t)$ be the optimal choice of the agent at time t given wage offer W_t .
- We call σ_t the (time t) policy function.
- In this particular case the policy function is

$$\sigma_t(w) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \frac{w}{1-\beta} \ge h^* \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- The policy function here depends only on the current state (wage).
- We call such a policy function (depending on the current state only)
 Markov policy.

OPTIMAL CHOICES

- A policy is an "instruction manual" for the agent: what to do in each state.
- For an agent following $\sigma \in \Sigma$, if the current wage offer is w, the agent will responds with $\sigma(w) \in \{0,1\}$.
- For each $v \in V$, a v greedy policy is a $\sigma \in \Sigma$ satisfying

$$\sigma(w) = \mathbb{1}\left\{\frac{w}{1-\beta} \ge c + \beta \sum_{w' \in W} v(w') \varphi(w')\right\} \quad \text{for all } w \in W.$$

- The recommendation is: adopt a v* greedy policy (notice the superscript!).
- This is a restatement of Bellman's principle of optimality.

LOOKING FORWARD

- Here we have a finite state space we can treat *v* as a vector.
- We only used a fraction of the power of dynamic programming...
- What if we move away from finite state and action spaces?
- What are the conditions under which the Bellman operator is a contraction? Is there an easy way to check it?
- Does the principle of optimality hold in general?