## THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

# FACULTY OF ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

# COMP7404 Computational Intelligence and Machine Learning

Date: May 23, 2016 Time: 6:30pm - 8:30pm

Only approved calculators as announced by the Examinations Secretary can be used in this examination. It is the candidates' responsibility to ensure that their calculator operates satisfactorily, and candidates must record the name and type of the calculator used on the front page of the examination script.

Calculator Brand:	_ Calculator Model:	
Write your University No. on every page.		

Answer all six questions in the space provided.

Special Note: Candidates are permitted to bring to the examination ONE sheet of A4-sized paper with printed or written notes on both sides.

Question No.	Weight (in %)	Your Mark (in %)
1	18	:
2	18	
3	14	
4	20	
5	22	
6	8	
Total	100	

For an $\epsilon$	te / False Questions each True / False question, circle the correct answer and optionally also provide explanation. A correct answer is worth 1 mark, a missing answer is worth 0 ks and a wrong answer with no explanation is worth -1 marks.
(a)	[True or False] The heuristic $h(n) = 0$ is admissible for every search problem.
(b)	[True or False] The heuristic $h(n) = 1$ is admissible for every search problem.
	[True of Passe] The neutrance $n(n) = 1$ is admissible for every search problem.
(c)	[True or False] The heuristic $h(n) = c(n)$ , where $c(n)$ is the true cheapest cost to get from the node $n$ to a goal state, is admissible for every search problem.
(d)	[True or False] Uniform-cost search will never expand more nodes than A*-search.
(e)	[True or False] Depth-first search will always expand more nodes than breadth-first search for the same search problem.
(f)	[True or False] Alpha-beta pruning prunes the same number of subtrees independent of the order in which successor states are expanded.

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
[True or False] The starting position for chess has a value of either 1 (white wins), -1 (black wins), or 0 (draw).  [True or False] Assume $Agent\ 1$ has a utility function $U_1$ and $Agent\ 2$ has utility function $U_2$ . If $U_1=k_1U_2+k_2$ with $k_1>0, k_2>0$ then $Agent\ 1$ and $Agent\ 2$ have the same preferences.  [True or False] Assume $A\succ B,\ D\succ A,\ B\succ L$ , where $L=[0.5,C;0.5,D]$ . With rational preferences it follows that $B\succ C$ .  [True or False] If the policy as converged in value iteration, the values mushave converged as well.  [True or False] If the values have converged in value iteration, the policy mushave converged as well.		
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(m)	[ $True$ or $False$ ] For an MDP if we just change the reward function $R$ the optimal policy is guaranteed to remain the same.
(n)	[True or False] If the only difference between two MDPs is the value of the discount factor then they must have the same optimal policy.
(o)	[True or False] For an infinite horizon MDP with finite number of states and
(0)	actions with a discount factor $\gamma$ , with $0 < \gamma < 1$ , policy iteration is guaranteed to converge.
	· ·
(p)	[True or False] Q-Learning can learn the optimal Q-function Q* without ever executing the optimal policy.
(p)	[True or False] If an MDP as a transition model T that assigns non-zero probability for all tuples $T(s,a,s')$ then Q-Learning will fail.
(r)	[True or False] Q-learning is only guaranteed to converge to the optimal q-values if the underlying MDP is deterministic.

### 2. Search


(a) Consider the following search graph. A is the start state and F is the goal state. Assume that children are added to the frontier in alphabetical order.




i.	Write down the order	in	which	states	will	be	explored	by	depth-first	tree
	search. (4 marks)		- A							

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
ii. Write down the order in which states will be explored by breadth-first tree search. (4 marks)




iii. Write down the order in which states will be explored by uniform-cost graph search. If there is a tie use last-in first-out. (4 marks)



(b) Consider the following maze in which the *Start* block is located at (0, 2), and the *Goal* block at (4, 3). The agent can move vertical and horizontal. Assume that children are added to the frontier in the following order: North, East, South, West. Dark blocks represent a wall through which the agent cannot move.



Solve the maze using the  $A^*$  graph search algorithm. Use the Manhattan distance as the heuristic function. Write down the explored set in the state-explored order. If there is a tie use *last-in first-out*. (6 marks)




### 3. Adversarial Search

For each of the following minimax game trees, fill in the leaf nodes with 0 or 1 as utility values. For the first tree fill in the leaves so that as many leaves will be pruned by alpha-beta as possible. For the second tree fill in the leaves so that no leaves are pruned. (14 marks)


### Assume:

- (a) left to right traversal while pruning, and
- (b) leaf values are drawn from  $[-\infty, \infty]$ .



#### 4. Utilities


Pacman is buying a raffle ticket (a raffle ticket is a type of gambling ticket) from the ghost ticket vendor. There are two ticket types: A and B, but there are multiple specific tickets of each type. Pacman buys a ticket type, but the ghost will then choose which specific ticket Pacman will receive. Pacman's utility for a given raffle ticket is equal to the utility of the lottery of outcomes for that raffle ticket. For example, ticket  $R_{A,2}$  corresponds to a lottery with equal chances of yielding 10 and 0, and so  $U(R_{A,2}) = U([0.5, 10; 0.5, 0])$ . Pacman, being a rational agent, wants to maximize his expected utility, but the ghost may have other goals! The outcomes are illustrated below.



- (a) Let Pacman's utility for money be U(m) = m.
  - i. What are the utilities to Pacman of each raffle ticket? (4 marks)



ii. Which raffle ticket will Pacman receive under optimal play if the ghost is trying to minimize Pacman's utility (and Pacman knows the ghost is doing so)? (2 marks)



iii. What is the equivalent monetary value of raffle ticket  $R_{B,2}$ ? (2 marks)

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ii.	The ghost is still trying to minimize Pacman's utility, but the Ghost mis takenly thinks that Pacman's utility is given by $U(m) = m$ , and Pacmais aware of this flaw in the ghost's model. Which raffle ticket will Pacmaireceive? (2 marks)
iii.	What is the equivalent monetary value of raffle ticket $R_{B,2}$ ? (2 marks)
and reg	Eman has a raffle ticket with distribution $[0.5, \$100; 0.5, \$0]$ . A ghost insurate dealer offers Pacman an insurance policy where Pacman will get \$10 ardless of what the outcome of the ticket is. If Pacman's utility for mone $U(m) = \sqrt{m}$ , what is the maximum amount of money Pacman would pathis insurance? (4 marks)

#### 5. Markov Decision Processes

Consider an MDP with transitional model and reward function as follows.

s	a	s'	T(s,a,s')	R(s,a,s')
Ā	1	A	0	8
Α	1	В	1	2
Α	2	A	1	1
Α	2	$\mathbf{B}$	0	2
A	3	A	0.5	4
A	3	В	0.5	2
В	1	Α	0.5	10
В	1	В	0.5	8
В	2	A	1	0
В	2	В	0	4
В	3	Α	0.5	2
В	3	В	0.5	4

Assume a discount factor of  $\gamma = 0.5$ .

(a) Calculate the following values of the MDP (18 marks):

$$V_0^*(A) = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$$

$$V_0^*(B) = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$$

$$Q_1^*(A,1) =$$
\_\_\_\_\_\_

$$Q_1^*(A,2) =$$
\_\_\_\_\_\_

$$Q_1^*(A,3) =$$
\_\_\_\_\_\_

$$Q_1^*(B,1) =$$
\_\_\_\_\_

$$Q_1^*(B,2) =$$

$$Q_1^*(B,3) =$$
\_\_\_\_\_

 $V_1^*(A) = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ 

 $V_1^*(B) = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ 

 $Q_2^*(A,1) =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_

 $Q_2^*(A,2) =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_

 $Q_2^*(A,3) =$ \_\_\_\_\_

 $Q_2^*(B,1) =$ \_\_\_\_\_

 $Q_2^*(B,2) =$ \_\_\_\_\_

 $Q_2^*(B,3) =$ \_\_\_\_\_

 $V_2^*(A) =$ \_\_\_\_\_\_

 $V_2^*(B) = \underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ 

(b) Let  $\pi_i^*(s)$  be the optimal action in state s with i time steps to go. Fill in the following table with values for  $\pi_i^*(s)$ . (4 marks)

S	$\pi_1^*(s)$	$\pi_2^*(s)$
A		
В		

#### 6. Reinforcement Learning

Consider an MDP with three states, A, B and C; and two actions CW and CCW. We do not know the transition function or the reward function for the MDP, but instead, we are given samples of what an agent actually experiences when it interacts with the environment (although, we do know that we do not remain in the same state after taking an action). In this problem, instead of first estimating the transition and reward functions, we will directly estimate the Q function using Qlearning. Assume, the discount factor,  $\gamma = 0.25$  and the step size for Q-learning,  $\alpha = 0.75$ . Let the current Q function, Q(s, a), be

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc} & A & B & C \\ \hline CW & 0.3 & -0.5 & -2.5 \\ CCW & 0.0 & -1.3 & -1.9 \\ \end{array}$$

The agent encounters the following samples

$$\begin{array}{c|ccccc} s & a & s' & r \\ \hline A & CCW & C & 9.0 \\ B & CW & A & 1.0 \\ \end{array}$$

Process the samples given above and write down all Q-values of the three states after both samples have been accounted for. (8 marks)

END OF PAPER

Please be reminded to write your university number on every page.

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