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Published in:
Studies in English Literature

Publication date:
2011

Document version:
Final published version

SEL 51, 4 (Autumn 2011): 747–763
ISSN 0039-3657

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During the last thirty years or so, critics have generally portrayed the relationship between pedagogy and power as problematic. The philosophical stance underlying such criticism contends that pedagogical relationships oftentimes "cover up" sets of power relations that are variously termed "insidious," "unbalanced," or otherwise undesirable; thus, the responsibility of the critic is to demystify the relationship and reveal the power relations *as* power relations.[1] This view of the relationship between pedagogy and power draws heavily on Michel Foucault's analysis of education in *Discipline and Punish*, where he claims, "A relation of surveillance, defined and regulated, is inscribed at the heart of the practice of teaching, not as an additional or adjacent part, but as a mechanism that is inherent to it and which increases its efficiency."[2]

In a concurrent and interdependent development, analyses of sexual and romantic relationships in pedagogical settings increasingly accept a similar picture of power differentials.[3] This stance parallels the analysis of pedagogical relations more generally: just as the critical goal was to demystify pedagogy to uncover power relations, so one must demystify romance and find the worrisome distribution of power relations underneath. Moreover, this position entails the conclusion that pedagogical relationships and romantic relationships are mutually exclusive; after all, if loving relationships cannot involve a power differential, then no pedagogical relationship can ever be a loving relationship.

This is not at all how interpretations of Jane Austen's fiction have tended to portray pedagogy. With varying degrees of sophis-

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tication, critics have often pointed to the fact that Austen's novels are generally stories about a man correcting a girl's erring nature: they are narratives of a girl who starts out badly but who, through the ministrations of some warm-hearted moral pedagogue, returns to the correct path and conveniently falls in love with her teacher. Far from preventing love, such interpretations often see a pedagogical relationship as an essential element to love. This view, which I will refer to as the "pedagogical" theory of Austen's fiction, has a long history in Austen scholarship; indeed, Richard Simpson advanced a version of it in an 1870 review.[4] Other proponents include Lionel Trilling, who argues that Austen "was committed to the ideal of 'intelligent love,' according to which the deepest and truest relationship that can exist between human beings is pedagogic," and Juliet McMaster, who says that for Austen, "the pedagogic relationship is not parasitic but symbiotic, a relationship that is mutual and joyful: it blesseth him that gives, and him that takes."[5]

Furthermore, despite the recent prominence of demystification theories of pedagogy, the "problem" of pedagogical power does not appear to impress some contemporary Austen critics, who more or less dismiss the argument that the pedagogical relationship is a power relationship. Instead, such critics contend, the pedagogical relationship is relevant for its moral benefits, insofar as Austen's heroes and heroines must achieve a certain moral maturity before they are capable of love. As Anne Ruderman puts it, "Being able to control one's desires, to take pleasure in principled behavior, is a precondition for being capable of loving deeply, [Austen's] novels show. Love is not the vehicle for moral education, but is more like the reward for it."[6] The implication seems to be that Austen's teachers are almost pure conduits of moral knowledge; as Simpson puts it, "Miss Austen seems to be saturated with the Platonic idea that the giving and receiving of knowledge, the active foundation of another's character, is the truest and strongest foundation of love."[7] This is close to the polar opposite of the demystification theory; here, pedagogy does not prevent love but is in fact essential to it.

There is thus an interpretive issue and a philosophical issue. On the one hand, one wonders if the pedagogical theory fails to appreciate the insights of demystification theories and thus overlooks power dynamics in Austen it might otherwise have seen. On the other hand, it might turn out that the pedagogical theory of Austen's fiction has something correct about pedagogy more generally, and that contrary to the demystification theory, peda-

gogy is indeed compatible with love. When we read Austen with an eye toward pedagogical power, however, we find not only that the standard pedagogical theory is inadequate for understanding Austen but also that Austen disagrees in significant ways with the demystification theory. In this essay, I will argue that, for Austen, a teacher's power over a student is not irrelevant, as the pedagogical theory implies, but is in fact a deeply important element in the process that produces genuine love. Moreover, this distinguishes Austen from the demystification theory of pedagogy. Although Austen's novels suggest that the pedagogical relationship is a power relationship, her novels do not suggest that this aspect of pedagogy precludes loving relationships—in fact, it enables them.

Part of the reason why the pedagogical theory has been so prevalent in Austen criticism, I think, is that Austen's best and most interesting novels involve a strong heroine and a power differential that on the surface appears equal. When considering the pedagogical relationship between Mr. Knightley and Emma, for instance, it is not difficult to see why the pedagogical theory is compelling: it is hard to deny that Emma is a better person at the end of the novel than she is at the beginning, and although she accepts Mr. Knightley as a mentor in some sense, the novel leaves the reader with the impression that the Knightleys' marriage is a relationship of equals. Emphasizing *Emma* or *Pride and Prejudice* as Austen's quintessential pedagogical narratives, however, avoids the unbalanced power differentials in Austen's other pedagogical novels. Moreover, Austen's unbalanced relationships ultimately force a reconsideration of the power dynamics in the pedagogical relationships that initially appear balanced and equal. In order to emphasize the power in Austen's pedagogical relationships and reconsider the connections between power, pedagogy, and love, I begin my analysis by considering scenes from the two Austen novels involving pedagogical narratives with weak heroines, *Mansfield Park* and *Northanger Abbey*.

I

Near the end of *Mansfield Park*, the reader finds Mary Crawford reminiscing about putting on the play *Lovers' Vows* and the influence she had over Edmund, who played the part of her lover, during the play. She tells Fanny, "If I had the power of recalling any one week of existence, it should be that week, that acting week. Say what you would, Fanny, it should be *that*; for I never knew such exquisite happiness in any other."[8] So far, so good:

it seems entirely plausible to conclude that Mary was happy because the man she wanted to be her lover was pretending to be so. But then Mary goes on: "His sturdy spirit to bend as it did! Oh! it was sweet beyond expression."[9] This significant moment reveals that Mary's pleasure in the memory has very little to do with receiving the apparent love of Edmund and everything to do with the subversion of his will. She has dominated him, bent him into doing something he did not wish to do, and this relationship of domination and submission is "sweet beyond expression."

One might initially suspect this moment is a criticism of Mary Crawford and part of the reason why Edmund's break with Mary appears as a narrative victory. A broader view of Austen's pedagogical narratives, however, reveals that taking pleasure in domination is not, for Austen, wrong. Indeed, hidden in Austen's important pedagogical relationships—Knightley-Emma, Tilney-Catherine, even Edmund-Fanny—is the fact that the teacher enjoys the teaching. These relationships are pleasurable not only because the student will become a certain kind of person, one who is suited to the teacher's needs, but also because shaping other persons to control the type of subjects they become is in Austen's novels an inherently pleasurable act. The difference between Mary Crawford and other Austen heroines is not as great as it first appears, and moreover this difference does not lie in the locus of pleasure. If Mary is different from Austen's pedagogical heroines, her difference does not lie in her manner when she is a pedagogue but rather in her incapacity to take the inferior role as a student.

Northanger Abbey demonstrates that antagonists such as Mary Crawford are not the only Austen characters who take pleasure in domination. While on a trip to the Bath countryside, Henry Tilney engages Catherine Morland in a discussion of the picturesque. The narrator informs us that Catherine was ashamed she could not participate in the discussion, but then goes on to say this is "[a] misplaced shame. Where people wish to attach, they should always be ignorant. To come with a well-informed mind, is to come with an inability of administering to the vanity of others, which a sensible person would always wish to avoid. A woman especially, if she [has] the misfortune of knowing any thing, should conceal it as well as she can."[10] This passage implies that knowledge is pleasurable because it complements our vanity; in other words, we enjoy knowing things because it enables us to feel superior to someone else. Moreover, there is not, apparently, a commensurate pleasure in mutual acknowledgment of equal

knowledge; this is the reason why women receive advice to feign ignorance. Knowledge is pleasurable because it creates relationships of superiority, which are in fact the primary source of the pleasure that appears in knowledge.

As the scene indicates, pleasure does not lie merely in the awareness of one's superior knowledge but importantly in the experience of teaching; in other words, the pleasure of superiority inheres in the pleasure of pedagogy. Henry offers an impromptu lecture on the picturesque, which, the narrator tells us, had a profound effect upon his student: "[Catherine] soon began to see beauty in every thing admired by [Henry], and her attention was so earnest, that he became perfectly satisfied of her having a great deal of natural taste."[11] As the passage sarcastically implies, conveying information is in fact unnecessary for teaching to be pleasurable. Catherine has not learned anything about the picturesque but is merely parroting Henry. No genuine learning has occurred; Catherine has merely confirmed Henry as a superior, someone who knows more than she does, and he has accepted her as student or inferior. If romantic pedagogy is pleasurable, it is not so because one lover conveys information to another lover. Rather, the pleasure lies in the mutual acceptance of a certain type of dominant/submissive relationship, which in this case renders the actual transmission of knowledge secondary.

Mansfield Park and *Northanger Abbey* indicate Austen's awareness of both the power relations inherent in the pedagogical relationship and the pleasure that accompanies domination. Moreover, the power and pleasure that occur in teaching apparently do not prevent the pedagogical relationship from becoming a loving relationship—*Northanger Abbey* ends with Catherine and Henry in love. The standard pedagogical theory in this case seems inadequate, as it leaves us with little to say about power and pleasure, and it becomes clear that the demystification theory and the broader philosophical analysis of pedagogy and love differ from Austen's stance. In order to get a sense of how Austen's views might interact with philosophical analyses of pedagogical romances, we must first consider the relevant theoretical background relating to the demystification theory, pedagogy, and love.

II

Foucault tells us that power is omnipresent "not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next,

at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another."[12] In other words, nothing is "outside" of power, not because some central, all-powerful entity controls everything but rather because each subject exists in certain relations to every other subject, and the relationships between these points of subjectivity constitute power.

The demystification theory overlooks a major implication of this view, namely, that it is not necessarily a critique of pedagogy to point out that it is a relationship of power. As Foucault puts it in an interview, "[L]et us take sexual or amorous relationships: to wield power over the other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be reversed is not evil; it's a part of love, of passion and sexual pleasure. And let us take, as another example … the pedagogical institution. I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more than others in a specific game of truth, tells those others what to do, teaches them, and transmits knowledge and techniques."[13] In short, the fact that both love and pedagogy depend on power relations is not an objection to them: power is not intrinsically evil.[14]

In addition, it is worth paying close attention to Foucault's emphasis on situation reversals in amorous relationships: the claim seems to be that part of what makes power acceptable—indeed, desirable—in a love relationship is the continuing possibility that the power relation might be inverted, as the inferior partner of the relation suddenly becomes the superior partner. Although it might be initially unclear why Foucault would think such reversals are important, I will demonstrate that Austen's novels provide an answer to this question while offering depictions of such power reversals that both concord with and force a modification to Foucault's account.

Austen's depictions, however, also parallel certain aspects of G. W. F. Hegel's analysis of power, which differs from Foucault's in several important ways. Perhaps most significantly, Hegel emphasizes the subjective experience of power; somewhat surprisingly, despite his penetrating analysis of the role of power in subject formation, Foucault rarely talks about this fact from the point of view of the subject actually experiencing power. In Hegel's view of the development of self-consciousness, we begin in a state of believed "omnipotence," where evidence of agency appears insofar as we dominate the world that stands against us.[15] In other words, when I encounter the world, I understand it as initially existing opposed to my will; I then attempt to subordinate everything in my world to my desires. Thus, when I first encounter another

person—the oppositional other, so to speak—I begin by imposing my will on him. This gives rise to the well-known Lord-Bondsman (or Master-Slave) dialectic, and Hegel's writings suggest it is an essential moment in the development of subjectivity.[16] Although one can only become fully self-conscious by first acknowledging someone else as self-conscious and then being acknowledged as self-conscious by her, it is only possible to discover this after attempting to satisfy the need for recognition through domination and failing. Such failure is inevitable, Hegel contends, because a dominated subject can never reflect genuine self-consciousness.

This subjective analysis of power is, to a certain extent, compatible with Foucault: the Lord-Bondsman dialectic could be part of what it means to say that power produces subjects. However, it differs from Foucault's picture insofar as for Hegel, a state of consciousness that is independent of power is a distinct possibility and, in fact, a goal. The possibility of such a state becomes clear when we place the dialectic in the broader movement of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where eventually the experiencing self-consciousness moves past the pattern of dominance and submission in the Lord-Bondsman dialectic and ultimately achieves a state of self-conscious freedom. In this sense, then, Hegel does not accept the claim that there is no "outside" to power. More specifically, for Hegel, there is a point from which we can look back upon the power dynamic of the Lord-Bondsman and understand ourselves to be outside of that sort of power. For Foucault, clearly, this is not the case.

Hegel's analysis of power produces, in turn, an account of love that differs significantly from Foucault's, insofar as one of the states where subjects can move "outside" of power relations is love. For Hegel, when we are in love, "we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human being should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains his self-awareness only by regarding the other as other."[17] In this complex passage, Hegel argues that if I am in love, I do not experience the other's demands on me as constraints to my freedom but rather as elements constitutive of myself as a free being. By taking their ends as my ends, by willing the other as a part of myself, I experience their requests as demands. Importantly, however, these demands gain their force not from the power of an oppositional other, as is the case in the Lord-Bondsman dialectic, but because I willingly grant the beloved other's ends the status of demands upon me. This differs

significantly from a Foucaultian picture: not only would Foucault disagree with the notion of a loving relationship as somehow external to power relations but he would also, I think, disagree with Hegel's notion that freedom-in-determinacy in love is qualitatively different than other relationships.

Jessica Benjamin's blend of Hegelian philosophy and psychoanalysis offers us an elaborated version of this picture. For Benjamin, following Sigmund Freud and Hegel, infants are born without knowing their need for others; she claims that "the self begins in a state of 'omnipotence' (Everything is an extension of me and my power)."[18] Initially, parents confirm this by striving to satisfy the infant's every need—in other words, developing infants experience the world as conforming to their desires for it. Eventually, however, they come to desire recognition, and this, unfortunately, is something that an entirely submissive world cannot give them. In Benjamin's terms, the infant seeks to confirm its omnipotence "in its encounter with the other, who, it now sees, is like itself. But it cannot do so, for to affirm itself it must acknowledge the other, and to acknowledge the other would be to deny the absoluteness of the self. The need for recognition entails this fundamental paradox: at the very moment of realizing our own independence, we are dependent on another to recognize it" (p. 33).

Benjamin draws on Hegel for an analysis of this "need for recognition"; in order to achieve selfhood, the infant requires a state of "mutual recognition" with the parent, where both parties recognize and are recognized by the other. Parents reach this state, Benjamin suggests, by demonstrating to the infant that they are not merely instruments of the infant's will, but are in fact independent subjects. Only once infants have come to see their parents as subjects in their own right will the parents' recognition mean anything. Moreover, although the initial process of striving for mutual recognition must occur between infant and parent, Benjamin implies that such a process also lies at the heart of romantic-sexual relationships: "The capacity to enter into states in which distinctness and union are reconciled underlies the most intense experience of adult erotic life … Thus early experiences of mutual recognition already prefigure the dynamics of erotic life" (p. 29). For Benjamin, intense eroticism is inextricably connected to a state of mutual recognition between two subjects.

Within this context, the appearance of sadomasochistic relationships takes on a complex psychological dimension: the desire to dominate the other arises from an initial denial of the

dependence on the other. For Benjamin and Hegel, the Lord is eventually compelled into mutual recognition; although the Lords do not want to recognize their Bondsmen, they must do so after realizing that their lordship can never satisfy their need for recognition. Inevitably, they realize they must recognize the oppositional other as other, but only after they have tried and failed to achieve self-consciousness by dominating the other. Benjamin writes, "When the subject abandons the project of absolute independence or control, he does so unwillingly, with a persistent, if unconscious, wish to fulfill the old omnipotence fantasy" (p. 54).

The dominant-submissive relationship cannot sustain itself, since both parties want more than the relationship can give them. The master cannot recognize the other as an equal, since to do so would give up the position of domination. Because he cannot so recognize the other, he can never receive the recognition he craves. Furthermore, as the submissive party becomes more and more a mere extension of the master's will, she becomes less and less interesting to the master, until the relationship ends in abandonment.[19] This is a relationship based entirely on "complementarity," to use Benjamin's phrase, insofar as the submissive party exists entirely to complement the dominant party by fulfilling her needs (pp. 82, 65, and 73–4). Just as the parent-child relationship based entirely on satisfaction of the child's needs inevitably fails both parties, so too the erotic or romantic relationship of complementarity must fail.

When we consider Austen in this context, it becomes clear that her pedagogical relationships are in fact complex psychological interactions with dominant and submissive partners. Indeed, if we understand Austen's pedagogical relationships as a kind of sadomasochism, then the philosophical accounts can explain why teachers teach and students learn, what happens when these relationships invert, and what it means when a teacher and a student fall in love. Nevertheless, in thinking through the relationships between Foucault, Hegel, Benjamin, and Austen, it becomes clear that Austen's account differs in important respects from both the Foucaultian line and the Hegel-Benjamin view. Austen offers a different explanation of lovers' reasons for abandoning psychological omnipotence; moreover, Austen's depiction of the reversal of power relations in love implies a different conception of power.

The theoretical goal here, then, is something like what Shoshana Felman calls "implication." Following Felman, I wish to think of philosophy and literature as complementary enterprises:

"each one finding itself enlightened, informed, but also affected, displaced, by the other."[20] To put it another way, the philosophical theories will help illuminate Austen's novels; however, in the process of illumination, the novels will force a reconsideration of the theories themselves. Indeed, although *Pride and Prejudice* might initially appear as the pedagogical novel in which Austen deals least with power, given the seeming equivalence of its central lovers, reading it in the context of the philosophical theories I have outlined demonstrates the novel's sophisticated depiction and analysis of pedagogical power and its relationship to love.

III

At the beginning of *Pride and Prejudice*, both Elizabeth Bennet and Fitzwilliam Darcy are omnipotent in Benjamin's sense of the term, since for both characters the external world is an extension of their will. Darcy's omnipotence is clear in the scenes at Netherfield: his advice controls Mr. Bingley's actions, and Miss Bingley instantly accedes to Darcy's wishes (both stated and anticipated). Although Elizabeth's control is more subtle, in part because she is nominally subordinate to her parents, her authority manifests itself in her relationship with her father. Mr. Bennet generally defers to Elizabeth's advice and feels compelled to apologize to her when he does not. In the one instance where Mrs. Bennet consciously opposes Elizabeth (the reaction to Mr. Collins's proposal), Elizabeth wins without much of a fight. Neither Elizabeth nor Darcy thus finds in their world someone who successfully opposes their will.

This changes, of course, when Elizabeth and Darcy meet each other. The encounter with Elizabeth, an other who will not succumb to his will, fascinates Darcy; although he thinks "her manners were not those of the fashionable world, he [is] caught by their easy playfulness."[21] This "easy playfulness," insofar as it hints at her refusal to conform to Darcy's norms, indicates Elizabeth's status as an oppositional other. Miss Bingley notices Elizabeth's oppositional nature, too, when she tells Darcy that he should "endeavor to check that little something, bordering on conceit and impertinence, which your lady possesses" (p. 51), but what Miss Bingley misses is that this "little something" is precisely what fascinates Darcy. Elizabeth's initial interest in Darcy is a good deal less apparent; in fact, she finds him initially repulsive, and her subsequent moral analysis confirms his repugnancy. Nevertheless, no other character in the novel evokes Elizabeth's

considerable abilities in castigation to the degree that Darcy does, despite a number of candidates who might deserve such treatment. One suspects this is because Darcy is, initially, an enigma to Elizabeth—in other words, an oppositional other.

Both Elizabeth and Darcy, after their initial confrontation, try to dominate each other, an action that would negate the "otherness" of the opposing person by making him or her part of the controlled world. Given his wealth and prestige, Darcy attempts to control Elizabeth by affixing her status as his social and financial inferior. In his marriage proposal, he emphasizes Elizabeth's lower status; as the narrator tells us, "His sense of her inferiority—of its being a degradation … were dwelt on with a warmth which seemed due to the consequence he was wounding, [*sic*] but was very unlikely to recommend his suit" (p. 185). Elizabeth's power over Darcy is less susceptible to easy articulation but no less effective for all that: in the first half of the novel, she is his moral and conversational superior. Her conversational superiority appears first at a dance. Initially, the two remain silent, but Elizabeth decides to speak, since, as the narrator tells us, "it would be the greater punishment to her partner to oblige him to talk, [so] she made some slight observation on the dance. He replied, and was silent again. After a pause of some minutes she addressed him a second time with 'It is *your* turn to say something now, Mr. Darcy—*I* talked about the dance, and *you* ought to make some kind of remark on the size of the room, or the number of couples.' He smiled, and assured her that whatever she wished him to say should be said" (p. 90). Here, we see Elizabeth controlling the conversation: Darcy both speaks and remains silent as a result of her wishes. Though Darcy passively resists the conversation by remaining silent after his first remark, her second address operates in such a way that he cannot help but respond—indeed, he smiles at the manner in which she controls his response.

Elizabeth's moral superiority appears in her rejection of Darcy's marriage proposal. Famously, she tells him, "[Y]our arrogance, your conceit, and your selfish disdain of the feelings of others, were such as to form that ground-work of disapprobation, on which succeeding events have built so immovable a dislike; and I had not known you a month before I felt that you were the last man in the world whom I could ever be prevailed on to marry" (p. 188). While the substance of Elizabeth's criticism of Darcy is important, more significant is Elizabeth's willingness to criticize a man who has just proposed to her, presumably in dramatic violation of precisely the codes of conduct she believes Darcy to

have violated. Apparently, since Darcy has long since departed the realm of polite behavior, Elizabeth may follow him and still maintain her position as his moral superior. This harangue reveals Elizabeth's attempt to assert her moral superiority and thus locate Darcy as a moral inferior. In the proposal scene, we find both Darcy and Elizabeth attempting to use their superiority to define and control the other. In his proposal, Darcy asserts his social and financial superiority; in her rejection, Elizabeth asserts her moral and conversational superiority.

Neither Elizabeth nor Darcy, however, succumbs to the other's attempt at domination—and it is here that Austen's account diverges from the Hegel/Benjamin narrative. For Hegel and Benjamin, the Lord ultimately gives up his belief in omnipotence because he perceives that it can never fulfill his need for recognition. For Benjamin, the sadomasochistic relationship inevitably ends in abandonment, since the sadist craves more recognition than the masochist can provide. This, however, is not what is going on in Austen. Elizabeth and Darcy have not dominated an "other" and then become dissatisfied; rather, their attempts at domination have each been frustrated. To a certain extent, we can read this as Austen asking, "What happens if the Lord's attempt to control the Bondsman fails?"

For Austen, whether the romantic narrative succeeds depends on the characters' reactions to this moment. In successful romantic narratives, the characters reconcile by mutually succumbing to the superiority of the former inferior or oppositional other; in unsuccessful narratives, one or both of the characters maintain belief in omnipotence. The characters demonstrate their succumbing by granting the other the status of teacher. Both Elizabeth and Darcy go through this process. After reading Darcy's letter to her explaining himself, Elizabeth becomes painfully aware that her moral superiority has dissipated. Not only has Darcy acted a good deal better than she originally believed, but also she has done him a disservice, one that actually renders her inferior: "I, who have prided myself on my discernment!—I, who have valued myself on my abilities! … How humiliating is this discovery!—Yet, how just a humiliation! … Till this moment, I never knew myself" (pp. 201–2). As Elizabeth's self-castigation makes clear, she has come to see that Darcy was neither as bad as she thought nor was she herself as good as she previously believed.

Although we do not see Darcy's moment of realization, he describes its effects to Elizabeth later when he says, "You taught me a lesson, hard indeed at first, but most advantageous. By you,

I was properly humbled. I came to you without a doubt of my reception. You showed me how insufficient were all my pretensions to please a woman worthy of being pleased" (p. 349). For Darcy, this is an educational realization: he learned his "lesson" entirely because the one woman in his life who could teach him, the woman whom he recognized as a superior or a "woman worthy of being pleased," taught the lesson. Though Elizabeth does not call Darcy her teacher as explicitly as he does her, that both characters recognize each other as teachers is apparent in the scenes at Pemberley, when both characters are anxious to demonstrate that they have learned what the other tried to teach. Darcy wants to show that he was listening to her criticism of his marriage proposal and general demeanor; as he puts it later, "I hoped to obtain your forgiveness, to lessen your ill opinion, by letting you see that your reproofs had been attended to" (pp. 349–50). Elizabeth, on the other hand, indicates that she is mindful of his good behavior in the past, which she initially misjudged—a judgment that he corrected by teaching her. Moreover, she is now grateful for his polite behavior: "She respected, she esteemed, she was grateful to him, she felt a real interest in his welfare" (p. 253). Psychologically, both characters are revealing to each other their knowledge that the other is like them. By submitting as a student to the other as teacher, both Elizabeth and Darcy indicate their recognition of the other as a subject independent of their will.

This process of submission sets the stage for Benjamin's mutual recognition and the highly charged love that accompanies it, although it has not come about in the way Benjamin depicted.[22] When Mr. Bennet tells Elizabeth, "I know your disposition, Lizzy. I know that you could be neither happy nor respectable, unless you truly esteemed your husband; unless you looked up to him as a superior," we know he is right (p. 356). By acknowledging Darcy as her teacher and consenting to learn from him, Elizabeth understands Darcy as having the capacity to be her superior; he simultaneously acknowledges that she has the same capacity. Having asserted themselves over the other and then submitted to that other—by teaching and consenting to be taught—Elizabeth and Darcy have achieved a state where each recognizes and is recognized by the other.

Although it might initially appear that Benjamin and Austen agree on the importance of mutual recognition in sexual relationships, it is worth noting that Benjamin's "argument" for mutual recognition in relationships depends upon its erotic effects, while Austen emphasizes the connections between mutual recognition

and love. For Austen, although Darcy and Elizabeth are certainly sexually attracted to each other, mutual recognition becomes necessary not because it makes the relationship more erotic, but because, in some sense, it enables love. This, I think, is part of the reason why Austen's novels often depict a lover's "openness" as a virtue.

Just as Austen's depiction parallels Benjamin's account in certain respects while differing in others, Austen's view both concords with and diverges from Foucault's. As the importance of the moment of *anagnorisis* makes clear, Austen certainly thinks that the possibility of reversing power relations is important for love; however, her novels provide an account of such reversals that differs in important ways from Foucault's picture. Foucault's analysis of love implies that during the state of love itself, the power relations could reverse: "let us take sexual or amorous relationships: to wield power over the other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be reversed is not evil."[23] Although there are reversals within the loving relationship in Austen's novels, the most significant reversals are part of the process that precedes and produces love.

This implies another distinction between Austen and Foucault, insofar as for Austen, the state of love is in some important sense outside of power. Thus, Austen's account of love ends up looking most similar to Hegel's, though not identical. We should recall that, for Hegel, love consists of a state in which I will the other as part of myself and take the other's ends and desires as my ends and desires. When the beloved party makes a demand upon me, what gives it the force of a demand is not the beloved party's power as an oppositional and superior other but rather the fact that I have willed her as a part of myself. To put it another way, love is a state where two formerly oppositional subjects have both ceded to each other the power to make demands. Similarly, for Austen, the state of love consists of two formerly omnipotent teachers who have ceded to each other the power to teach, or willed each other as teachers: although Elizabeth and Darcy still have things to teach each other, what gives each character the force of a teacher is not the power of an other, but the fact that each has willingly granted to the other the role of pedagogue.

Elizabeth confirms this change in the nature of their relationship near the end of the novel, when she decides against teasing Darcy about his treatment of Bingley. The narrator tells us, "she checked herself. She remembered that he had yet to learn to be laught [*sic*] at, and it was rather too early to begin" (p. 351).

Here, Elizabeth realizes that if she were to tease him, and thus teach Darcy to be laughed at, her power as a teacher would not arise from Darcy, but from her stance as an oppositional other. Because such a stance is not compatible with love, she decides to let the lesson wait until Darcy is ready for it—in other words, when the force of the lesson will arise from him and not from her.

IV

Let us return to the original pedagogical theory of Austen's fiction and the demystification theory of pedagogy. It should be clear that although Austen's pedagogues and mentors may be important for the lessons they provide, they are just as important for the power positions they create and occupy. As I hope my readings make clear, when Austen's heroes learn a lesson, it has as much to do with acknowledging someone else as a teacher and oneself as a student as it does with the content of education. It is also now possible to see why teaching is pleasurable in Austen's novels: when one teaches, the act of dominating reestablishes one's status as an independent subject. Finally, this analysis of pedagogical power dynamics clarifies why Austen's students, both male and female, must learn before they can love: the act of acknowledging someone else as teacher, as dominant, is essential to mutual recognition. Far from preventing romantic relationships, the fact that pedagogical relationships are power relationships is essential, for only through the inversion of the power relationship and the subsequent achievement of mutual recognition can the pedagogical relationship become a loving relationship.

It is worth considering what implications this has for the demystification critique of pedagogical romances. One significant conclusion is that the existence of a power differential in a relationship is not a sufficient reason to say it is not a loving relationship: one would have to investigate the power dynamics and determine whether it was a relationship of mutual recognition. If both parties agree to submit to the other in some sense, then the power dynamics do not preclude the possibility of love. Indeed, this view has the support of common sense; after all, there are many instances of loving relationships with superiors and inferiors, and the demystification account of pedagogical romances leaves us with little to say about such relationships. Perhaps, in the last analysis, this conclusion is not so surprising; common sense tells us that Austen probably knows more about love than either Foucault or Hegel.

NOTES

I wish to thank Garrett Bredeson, Courtney Morris, Marcus Bullock, and, especially, Jane Gallop, who all read and commented extensively on various drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank my nuclear and extended family, many of who discussed the key ideas of the paper with me at one time or another and offered emotional support throughout the writing process.

[1] For critical studies that analyze the power structures constituting the pedagogical relationship in this way, see Jane Tompkins, "Pedagogy of the Distressed," *CE* 52, 6 (October 1990): 653–60, 654; Deborah Klein, "Iago Lives in the Panopticon; or, Teaching Resistance, Granting Respect," *CE* 62, 2 (November 1999): 169–91; and Mary Schmelzer, "Panopticism and Postmodern Pedagogy," in *Foucault and the Critique of Institutions*, ed. John Caputo and Mark Yount (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 127–36. For "insidious," see *Re-theorizing Discipline in Education: Problems, Politics, and Possibilities*, by Zsuzsa Millei, Tom G. Griffiths, and Robert John Parkes (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), p. 39. For "unbalanced" see Alecia Youngblood Jackson, "Multiple Annies: Feminist Postructural Theory and the Making of a Teacher," *Journal of Teacher Education* 52, 5 (2001): 386–97, 390.

[2] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1995), p. 176.

[3] This understanding of romantic relationships has a history independent of Foucaultian analyses of power; specifically, the critique of the power dynamics that underlie romantic relationships has a number of connections to feminist critiques, particularly Kate Millett's landmark *Sexual Politics* (New York: Ballantine, 1970), esp. p. 23. For a critique of this view of pedagogy and romantic relationships, see Jane Gallop, "Resisting Reasonableness," *CritI* 25, 3 (Spring 1999): 599–609.

[4] Richard Simpson, 1870 review, qtd. in B. C. Southam, ed., *Jane Austen: The Critical Heritage 1811–1870* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968): 241–65, 246.

[5] Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity* (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), p. 82; Juliet McMaster, *Jane Austen on Love* (Victoria BC: Univ. of Victoria Press, 1978), p. 45.

[6] Anne Ruderman, "Moral Education in Jane Austen's *Emma*," in *Poets, Princes, and Private Citizens: Literary Alternatives to Postmodern Politics*, ed. Joseph M. Knippenberg and Peter Augustine Lawler (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), pp. 271–88, 277.

[7] Simpson, qtd. in Southam, p. 244.

[8] Austen, *Mansfield Park*, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (New York: Penguin, 1996), p. 297.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Austen, *Northanger Abbey*, ed. Marilyn Butler (New York: Penguin, 1995), p. 99.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, 3 vols., trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 1:93.

[13] Foucault, "The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom," in *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Hurley (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 281–301, 298–9.

[14] Later in the interview, Foucault explains the conditions in which pedagogical relationships are troubling: "The problem in such practices where power—which is not in itself a bad thing—must inevitably come into play is knowing how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected to the arbitrary and unnecessary authority of a teacher" ("Ethics," p. 299). I think this response is fascinating but problematic. On the one hand, the notion of "domination" as describing the problematic kinds of power relations gives Foucault a way to talk about the power relations that seem intuitively wrong—for instance, slavery. On the other hand, I am not sure that Foucault's account provides grounds for preferring one distribution of power relations to another, and thus I am skeptical that Foucault can justify his desire to eliminate relationships of domination.

[15] G. W. F. Hegel does not himself use the term "omnipotence." I use it following Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 33: For Hegel, as for classical psychoanalysis, the self begins in a state of "omnipotence." Subsequent references to *The Bonds of Love* are from this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text by page number. For another reading of Hegel that uses the term this way, see Dean Moyar and Michael Quante, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), p. 85.

[16] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 111–9.

[17] Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), p. 42.

[18] Benjamin, p. 33.

[19] It is worth pointing out that the needs of Benjamin's sadist, whereby he must be continually overcoming the resistance of the submissive party, parallel the needs of Hegel's Lord. Just as the masochist becomes uninteresting to the sadist once resistance ends, leading to the sadist's need to find someone else to overcome, so Hegel's Lord must continually be searching out the other in order to overcome it, since once something becomes merely an extension of his will, it can no longer satisfy him. See Benjamin, pp. 65–6; for instance, "the exhaustion of satisfaction that occurs when all resistance is vanquished."

[20] Shoshana Felman, "To Open the Question," in "Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise," special issue, *YFS* 55/56 (1977): 5–10, 9.

[21] Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, ed. Vivien Jones (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 24. Subsequent references to *Pride and Prejudice* are from this edition and will appear parenthetically in the text by page number.

[22] Although Austen's depiction does not parallel Benjamin's analysis of love, it seems as though it might parallel the account Benjamin would give of infant development. The process where power relationships reversed and inverted that Benjamin imagined as crucial to infant development seems to me fairly close to Austen's depiction of the relationship between Elizabeth and Darcy.

[23] Foucault, "Ethics," pp. 298–9.