

EAS 5830: BLOCKCHAINS

Avalanche

Dr. Brett Hemenway Falk

← **Tweet**



Emin Gün Sirer ▲ ✓
@el33th4xor



Someone dropped this paper on IPFS and some IRC channels yesterday. It describes a new family of consensus protocols that combines the best of Nakamoto consensus with the best of classical consensus. Huge breakthrough:
ipfs.io/ipfs/QmUy4jh5m...

7:58 AM · May 17, 2018 · Twitter for Android

433 Retweets **70** Quote Tweets **1,274** Likes

Snowflake to Avalanche: A Novel Metastable Consensus Protocol Family for Cryptocurrencies

Team Rocket[†]
t-rocket@protonmail.com

Revision: 05/16/2018 21:51:26 UTC

**Ava
Labs.**

\$ FUNDING ROUND

Series A - Ava Labs

Summary



Overview



Organization Name



Ava Labs

Announced Date

Feb 1, 2019

Funding Type

Series A

Funding Stage

Early Stage Venture

Money Raised

\$6M

Computer Science > Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing

[Submitted on 21 Jun 2019 (v1), last revised 24 Aug 2020 (this version, v2)]

Scalable and Probabilistic Leaderless BFT Consensus through Metastability

Team Rocket, Maofan Yin, Kevin Sekniqi, Robbert van Renesse, Emin Gün Sirer

FUNDING

Avalanche developer raising \$350 million at \$5.25 billion valuation: report



by Yogita Khatri

April 14, 2022, 3:43AM EDT · 1 min read


Avalanche

- P-Chain
 - Platform chain
- X-Chain
 - Exchange chain
- C-Chain
 - Contract chain (EVM compatible)
- Anyone can create a new subnet



EVM Compatibility

- Avalanche C-Chain is EVM compatible
- Ethereum DeFi projects can easily re-deploy on Avalanche
 - [Aave](#)
 - [Curve](#)
- Native DeFi like [TraderJoe](#)
- [Avalanche bridge](#) makes it easy to send assets from Ethereum



Scalability

Scalability

- Two main metrics:
 - Transactions Per Second (TPS)
 - $(\text{Transactions per Block}) * (\text{Blocks per Second})$
 - Time to Finality (TTF)
- TTF may be longer than block production time
 - Block time can be lower than TTF
 - Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Polkadot produce blocks “optimistically,” so block time is lower than TTF
- TPS is an average, so it’s possible to have high TPS, but long TTF
 - Enormous blocks produced infrequently could lead to high TPS but long TTF




Avalanche is the **fastest smart contracts platform** in the blockchain industry, as measured by time-to-finality.



SnowTrace: Avalanche C-Chain Blockchain Explorer Average Block Time Chart




Source: snowtrace.io
Click and drag in the plot area to zoom in




Solana Block Times

Live Cluster Stats	
Slot	 134,398,884
Block height	121,799,963
Cluster time	May 19, 2022 at 12:22:24 Coordinated Universal Time
Slot time (1min average)	674ms
Slot time (1hr average)	997ms
Epoch	 311
Epoch progress	10.9%
Epoch time remaining (approx.)	~4d 10h 39m

Algorand Block Times




Osmosis (Cosmos) Block Times



Ethereum Block Times





- o ETH 2 Target TTF: 14 Minutes (or 6 minutes)

 Most recent epochs View more

Epoch	Time	Final	Eligible (ETH)	Voted
230,659	5 mins ago	No	Calculating...	Calculating...
230,658	11 mins ago	No	26,015,432	<u>25,090,933</u> (96.45%)
230,657	18 mins ago	No	26,015,048	<u>25,933,205</u> (99.69%)
230,656	24 mins ago	Yes	26,014,664	<u>25,931,285</u> (99.68%)
230,655	30 mins ago	Yes	26,014,280	<u>25,933,941</u> (99.69%)
230,654	37 mins ago	Yes	26,013,896	<u>25,930,389</u> (99.68%)

Polkadot Block Times


- o Target TTF: 12-60 seconds

Block# 10,372,628	47 secs ago	
Includes 3 Extrinsic 16 Event		
Block# 10,372,627	53 secs ago	
Includes 3 Extrinsic 18 Event		
Block# 10,372,626	59 secs ago	
Includes 3 Extrinsic 18 Event		
Block# 10,372,625	1 min ago	
Includes 2 Extrinsic 12 Event		

Cardano


Latest Blocks							
EPOCH	SLOT	BLOCK	CREATED AT	TRANSACTIONS	OUTPUT (★)	SIZE (BYTES)	CREATED BY
437	103831556	9322926	2023/09/22 15:50:47	8	47943.241854	23609	1af3ab3
437	103831545	9322925	2023/09/22 15:50:36	4	296042.950021	16224	22cfa3b
437	103831539	9322924	2023/09/22 15:50:30	42	515825.85181	53883	6d9ce53
437	103831520	9322923	2023/09/22 15:50:11	25	947936.251996	87114	7d7ac07
437	103831415	9322922	2023/09/22 15:48:26	0	0	4	9924e7d
437	103831402	9322921	2023/09/22 15:48:13	31	4648487.63299	54798	0338d4f
437	103831347	9322920	2023/09/22 15:47:18	2	1394.159974	14321	1596878
437	103831340	9322919	2023/09/22 15:47:11	10	4237486.101504	31318	397f04e
437	103831325	9322918	2023/09/22 15:46:56	5	1196.898728	16439	03fbee9
437	103831315	9322917	2023/09/22 15:46:46	1	1806.054868	893	ed40b0a

True finality takes 36 hours




Consensus

Snowball Consensus



1. Ask k random nodes their preference
2. If at least α give same response
 - a. Count consecutive successes
3. If less than α give same response, reset count
4. If successive count exceeds β , finalize

Snowball Consensus




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Suppose:

$k = 3$

$\alpha = 2$


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
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
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
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
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
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Suppose:
 $k = 3$
 $\alpha = 2$

Snowball Consensus



Count = 2

If $\beta = 1$,
stop here

1. Ask k random nodes their preference
2. If at least α give same response
 - a. Count consecutive successes
3. If less than α give same response, reset count
4. If successive count exceeds β , finalize

Suppose:

$k = 3$

$\alpha = 2$

Snowball Consensus

```
preference := blue
consecutiveSuccesses := 0
while not decided:
    ask k random people their preference
    if  $\geq \alpha$  give the same response:
        preference := response with  $\geq \alpha$ 
        if preference == old preference:
            consecutiveSuccesses++
        else:
            consecutiveSuccesses = 1
    else:
        consecutiveSuccesses = 0
    if consecutiveSuccesses  $> \beta$ :
        decide(preference)
```

Parameters:

k - number of nodes to sample
 α - number needed to change your mind
 β - number of rounds of consistency before finality


Avalanche consensus

In practice:

- $k = 20$ (Number of nodes to query)
- $\alpha = 14$ (Threshold of responses needed to change your view)
- $\beta = 20$ (Number of consistent rounds before finalizing)

Proof of Stake

To make this proof of stake, each node selects its random sample weighted by validator stake



Penn
Engineering

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