


EAS 5830: BLOCKCHAINS

Choosing Block Producers in PoS Systems

Dr. Brett Hemenway Falk

Bitcoin

- Chance of becoming block producer is proportional to hash power
- Anyone can try to produce a block
- A bitcoin block is only “valid” if its hash is less than a “target” value



Lottery-based leader election

Leader election in Proof of Stake

- Chance of becoming leader is proportional to stake
 - ["Follow the Satoshi"](#)
 - Enumerate all minted coins (in the order they were minted)
 - Generate a pseudorandom number between 1 and the total number of coins
 - The owner of that coin gets to be the next block producer
 - **Caveat: generating randomness on the blockchain is hard**

Method 1: Hashing

- Hash the previous block
 - $H(B^{r-1})$ looks “random”


Method 1: Hashing

- Hash the previous block
 - $H(B^{r-1})$ looks “random”

Problem: Susceptible to “grinding” attacks


- Attacker can insert transactions into blocks to ensure $H(B^{r-1})$ chooses a coin they own
- Similar attacks on related deterministic schemes

Method 2: Commit-Reveal



- Stakers all submit a random value to the blockchain
 - Alice submits a
 - Bob submits b
 - Charlie submits c
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- If even one of a, b, c was uniformly random, then so is the sum

Method 2: Commit-Reveal




- Stakers all submit a random

Problem:
Charlie waits until he sees a
and b , then chooses c .


- If even one of a, b, c was uniformly random, then so is the sum

Method 2: Commit-Reveal



- Stakers Commit to their random values
- Once all commitments are recorded on chain Stakers Decommit
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- If even one of a, b, c was uniformly random, then so is the sum

Method 2: Commit-Reveal




To commit:

$\text{Com}(a) = H(a, r)$ for
some random r

To decommit:
Reveal a, r


- Stakers Commit to their random values
- Once all commitments are recorded on chain Stakers Decommit
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- If even one of a, b, c was uniformly random, then so is the sum

Method 2: Commit-Reveal



- Stakers Commit to their random values
- Once all commitments are recorded on chain Stakers Decommit
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- If even one of a, b, c was uniformly random, then so is the sum


Method 2: Commit-Reveal



Method 3: Verifiable Delay Functions (VDFs)


- What if you had a function, F , with the properties:
 - Delay: It takes at least 30 seconds to evaluate $F()$ using the best hardware
 - Verifiable: Given x and y , you can check whether $F(x) = y$ almost instantly
- This solves the decommitment problem

Method 3: VDFs



- Stakers post their randomness on chain.
- Once the block is finalized, everyone begins computing $F(a+b+c)$.
- When computation is finished, $F(a+b+c)$ is posted on chain

Method 3: VDFs



Method 3: VDFs




- Ethereum block
- Even if Charlie and b, he can't compute $F(a+b+c)$ before

Problem:
It's hard to get timing right
What if new hardware comes out
that can compute $F()$ in 1s?

ers post their randomness
chain.
the block is finalized,
one begins computing
 $F(a+b+c)$.
n computation is finished,
 $F(a+b+c)$ is posted on chain




Method 4: Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)




- Stakers post a Verification Key for a VRF
 - This is usually just the same PK for their signature scheme
- Stakers submit their VRF applied to the previous block
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- Publishing VKs effectively commits stakers to their inputs

Method 4: Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)




Method 4: Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)




- Stakers post a Verification Key for a VRF
 - This is usually just the same PK for their signature scheme
- Stakers submit their VRF applied to the previous block
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- Publishing VKs effectively commits stakers to their inputs

Method 4: Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)



- Stakers post a Verification Key for a VRF
 - This is usually just the same PK for their signature scheme
- Stakers submit their VRF applied to the previous block
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- Publishing VKs effectively commits stakers to their inputs

Method 4: Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)





Widely used

- [Ethereum](#)
- [Algorand](#)
- [Cardano](#)
- [Polkadot](#)

- Stakers post a Verification Key for a VRF
 - This is usually just the same PK for their signature scheme
- Stakers submit their VRF applied to the previous block
- Randomness is $a + b + c$
- Publishing VKs effectively commits stakers to their inputs

Method 4: Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs)






Voting-based leader election

Voting for block producers

- Stakeholders cast stake-weighted votes to elect a committee
 - Sometimes called “delegation”
- Committee members take turns proposing blocks
- Committee runs a classical (permissioned) consensus algorithm to certify blocks
 - [PBFT](#)
 - [Tendermint](#)
 - [CometBFT](#)
 - [Clique](#)
 - [Aura](#)
 - [Hotstuff](#)
 - Consensus succeeds as long as 2/3rds of the committee is “honest”



Validator churn

- o Election-based systems have validator sets that tend to ossify
 - On the Cosmos Hub only [top 180](#) validators (by stake) participate
 - Thorchain forces “[churn](#)”
- o Lottery-based systems can pull in validators with lower stake