

# Inferring a Status Network of Wikipedia Editors

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# Outline

Motivation

Method

Results

Applications

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# Motivation

- ▶ How is team **structure** related to team **performance**?

## Previous Work

- ▶ *Cummings and Cross* 2003 — Reply networks of work groups in a Fortune 500 telecommunications firm

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- ▶ *Brandes et al.* 2009 — Wikipedia edit network: who supports or opposes whose edits

# Our Contribution

- ▶ How is the **balance of status** in a team related to **performance**?

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# Method

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- ▶ Construct a **status network** for each team


# Method

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- ▶ Call a team **productive** if it works on a “featured” or “good” article
- ▶ Construct a **status network** for each team
- ▶ See if these networks are systematically different between productive and regular teams


# Method

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# Status Networks




# Status Networks



- ▶ X has rated B positively, **so B is higher status than average**, so A is more likely to rate B positively than he is to rate a random user positively


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


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
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
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  - ▶ Receptive model
- ▶ (*Leskovec et al. 2010*)

# Status Networks



# Ingredients for a Status Network

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- ▶ Signed directed edges represent status ratings

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- ▶ Triangles should follow generative and receptive predictions

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- ▶ RfA voting network (*11,381 nodes, 189,001 edges*)



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
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# Coordination


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- ▶  $C(a, b) = P(E_{u_a \rightarrow u_b} | E_{u_b}) - P(E_{u_a \rightarrow u_b})$
- ▶ Can we take  $C(a, b)$  as the weight of the edge from  $a$  to  $b$ ?

## Extending the Model



- ▶ X has rated B positively, **so B is higher status than average**, so A is more likely to rate B positively than he is to rate a random user positively


## Extending the Model



- ▶ X has rated B *higher than X rates people on average*, so **B is higher status than average**, so A should rate B *higher than A rates people on average*




## Extending the Model



- ▶ X has rated B *higher than X rates people on average*, so **B is higher status than average**, so A should rate B *higher than A rates people on average*
- ▶ A has received a positive rating from X, so **A is higher status than average**, so B is less likely to receive a positive rating from A than he is to receive a positive rating from a random user

## Extending the Model



- ▶ X has rated B *higher than X rates people on average*, so **B is higher status than average**, so A should rate B *higher than A rates people on average*
- ▶ A has received a *higher score from X than A receives from people on average*, so **A is higher status than average**, so B should receive a *lower score from A than B receives from people on average*

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
# RfA Voting Network

- ▶ Generative model: 12/16 predictions correct
- ▶ Receptive model: 12/16 predictions correct

# Coordination Network

- ▶ Generative model: 12/16 predictions correct
- ▶ Receptive model: 14/16 predictions correct

# Mistakes



# Coordination Network (No Admins)

- ▶ Generative model: 11/16 predictions correct
- ▶ Receptive model: 14/16 predictions correct

# Coordination Network (No Admins)

- ▶ Generative model: 11/16 predictions correct
- ▶ Receptive model: 14/16 predictions correct
- ▶ There's an implicit status hierarchy among users!



# Official vs Unofficial Status

- ▶ Next steps: look at both networks together to understand the interplay between *de jure* and *de facto* status

# Combined Model

- ▶ Should evaluate generative and receptive model together

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- ▶ Each triangle in the network falls under two triangle types (one for each model), giving 64 cases

# Combined Model

## Coordination

- ▶ 34 cases follow the generative and receptive predictions
- ▶ 11 cases follow just the generative prediction
- ▶ 15 cases follow just the generative prediction
- ▶ 4 cases follow neither prediction

# Combined Model

## Coordination — Random Baseline

- ▶ 16 cases follow the generative and receptive predictions
- ▶ 14 cases follow just the generative prediction
- ▶ 17 cases follow just the generative prediction
- ▶ 17 cases follow neither prediction

# Combined Model

## Voting

- ▶ 40 cases follow the generative and receptive predictions
- ▶ 9 cases follow just the generative prediction
- ▶ 8 cases follow just the generative prediction
- ▶ 7 cases follow neither prediction

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- ▶ How is  $a$ 's coordination level toward  $b$  influenced by  $a$ 's neighbors in the network?
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
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- ▶  $f(a, b) = d(a) - \frac{1}{|N|} \sum_{n \in N} d(n)$  where  $N$  is the set of people  $n$  for whom  $C(n, b)$  is defined and  $d(x) = C(x, b) - \text{generative baseline}(x)$

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
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- ▶ Does  $f$  tend to increase as the proportion of  $a$ 's neighbors who support  $b$  increases?

# Homophily — Coordination



- Regression line:  $y = 0.0074x - 0.0023$ ,  $r = 0.54$ , slope  $\neq 0$  with  $p = 1.4 * 10^{-8}$

# Homophily — Voting



- ▶ Regression line:  $y = 0.23x - 0.16$ ,  $r = 0.77$ , slope  $\neq 0$  with  $p = 1.4 * 10^{-20}$

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# Team Performance — Coordination

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- ▶ (Differences are significant with  $p \ll 0.001$ )

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# Team Performance — Coordination

## Coordination Network

- ▶ Generative model: in 10/16 triangle types, the “surprise” of the predicted edge is significantly different between productive and non-productive teams
  - ▶ **Surprise:** (Signed) number of standard deviations by which the observed weight of the edge differs from the expected weight
- ▶ Receptive model: in 7/16 triangle types, the “surprise” of the predicted edge is significantly different between productive and non-productive teams


# Team Performance — Voting

## Voting Network


- ▶ Generative model: in 11/16 triangle types, the “surprise” of the predicted edge is significantly different between productive and non-productive teams
- ▶ Receptive model: in 9/16 triangle types, the “surprise” of the predicted edge is significantly different between productive and non-productive teams

# Team Performance — Voting


- Treat the voting network as a **social balance network**




triad  $T_3$



triad  $T_1$




triad  $T_2$




triad  $T_0$

# Team Performance — Voting


- ▶ We find that the proportion of each triad type is closer to random in productive teams compared to non-productive teams




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# Next Steps

- ▶ Compare coordination and voting networks, relate to team performance

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- ▶ Track the progress of a team over time

Thanks for a great summer!

Thoughts and suggestions?