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Fix handling of signals generated by page faults #6

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markjdb
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@markjdb markjdb commented Feb 9, 2021

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This reverts commit 63d5d4f.

It broke the JIT compiler in libpcre.  qemu mprotect()s pages containing
translated code to PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC and relies on SIGSEGV delivery
to detect writes and upgrade protections appropriately.

On amd64 such a signal gives TRAP_sig(mc) == 0xc == T_PAGEFLT.  In
particular, on FreeBSD this is not the hardware vector number but rather
an arbitrary kernel identifier, so we do need FreeBSD-specific code
here.

Fixes qemu-bsd-user#5 and https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=253335
The modified check is looking at the trap number delivered with a
SIGSEGV.  We want to intercept page faults (T_PAGEFLT == 0xc).  The
value of 0xe is used on other platforms because it represents the
hardware vector number for page faults.  Here we were checking for
T_PAGEFLT and T_ALIGNFLT, but the latter makes no sense.
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rbgarga commented Feb 9, 2021

This patch fixes #5

@@ -274,7 +274,12 @@ int cpu_signal_handler(int host_signum, void *pinfo,

pc = PC_sig(uc);
return handle_cpu_signal(pc, info,
TRAP_sig(uc) == 0xe ? (ERROR_sig(uc) >> 1) & 1 : 0,
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)
TRAP_sig(uc) == 0xc
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Why not use T_PAGEFLT?

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Mostly because we share this block with Dragonfly and I don't have a way to test there. If we don't care about keeping these changes buildable there then it should be fine to use the named constant.

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Right now, we only care about FreeBSD. However, this is in the qemu equivalent of MI code, so maybe this approach is right.

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bsdimp commented Feb 9, 2021

Generally, I think this is good. Asking why the hard-coded constant rather than the thing we have a #define for... may be it's too hard to include the headers for this...

@bsdimp bsdimp merged commit e517636 into qemu-bsd-user:bsd-user-rebase-3.1 Feb 9, 2021
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bsdimp commented Feb 9, 2021

I'm happy, since Kyle has approved, I landed.

qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
We can't know the caller read enough data in the memory pointed
by ext_hdr to cast it as a ip6_ext_hdr_routing.
Declare rt_hdr on the stack and fill it again from the iovec.

Since we already checked there is enough data in the iovec buffer,
simply add an assert() call to consume the bytes_read variable.

This fix a 2 bytes buffer overrun in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr() reported
by QEMU fuzzer:

  $ cat << EOF | ./qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -accel qtest -monitor none \
    -serial none -nographic -qtest stdio
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe1020000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0x25 0x1 0x86
  write 0x26 0x1 0xdd
  write 0x4f 0x1 0x2b
  write 0xe1020030 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe102003a 0x2 0x0807
  write 0xe1020048 0x4 0x12077cdd
  write 0xe1020400 0x4 0xba077cdd
  write 0xe1020420 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe1020428 0x4 0x3509d807
  write 0xe1020438 0x1 0xe2
  EOF
  =================================================================
  ==2859770==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdef904902 at pc 0x561ceefa78de bp 0x7ffdef904820 sp 0x7ffdef904818
  READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdef904902 thread T0
      #0 0x561ceefa78dd in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr net/eth.c:410:17
      #1 0x561ceefa41fb in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:532:17
      #2 0x561cef7de639 in net_tx_pkt_parse_headers hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:228:14
      #3 0x561cef7dbef4 in net_tx_pkt_parse hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:273:9
      #4 0x561ceec29f22 in e1000e_process_tx_desc hw/net/e1000e_core.c:730:29
      #5 0x561ceec28eac in e1000e_start_xmit hw/net/e1000e_core.c:927:9
      #6 0x561ceec1baab in e1000e_set_tdt hw/net/e1000e_core.c:2444:9
      #7 0x561ceebf300e in e1000e_core_write hw/net/e1000e_core.c:3256:9
      #8 0x561cef3cd4cd in e1000e_mmio_write hw/net/e1000e.c:110:5

  Address 0x7ffdef904902 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 34 in frame
      #0 0x561ceefa320f in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:486

    This frame has 1 object(s):
      [32, 34) 'ext_hdr' (line 487) <== Memory access at offset 34 overflows this variable
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
        (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow net/eth.c:410:17 in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x10003df188d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  =>0x10003df18920:[02]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack right redzone:     f3
  ==2859770==ABORTING

Add the corresponding qtest case with the fuzzer reproducer.

FWIW GCC 11 similarly reported:

  net/eth.c: In function 'eth_parse_ipv6_hdr':
  net/eth.c:410:15: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |          ~~~~~^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:410:38: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |                                 ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1879531
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reported-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Fixes: eb70002 ("net_pkt: Extend packet abstraction as required by e1000e functionality")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
Incoming enabled bitmaps are busy, because we do
bdrv_dirty_bitmap_create_successor() for them. But disabled bitmaps
being migrated are not marked busy, and user can remove them during the
incoming migration. Then we may crash in cancel_incoming_locked() when
try to remove the bitmap that was already removed by user, like this:

 #0  qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5593d88c50d1, file=0x559680554b20
   "../block/dirty-bitmap.c", line=64) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:77
 #1  bdrv_dirty_bitmaps_lock (bs=0x5593d88c0ee9)
   at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:64
 #2  bdrv_release_dirty_bitmap (bitmap=0x5596810e9570)
   at ../block/dirty-bitmap.c:362
 #3  cancel_incoming_locked (s=0x559680be8208 <dbm_state+40>)
   at ../migration/block-dirty-bitmap.c:918
 #4  dirty_bitmap_load (f=0x559681d02b10, opaque=0x559680be81e0
   <dbm_state>, version_id=1) at ../migration/block-dirty-bitmap.c:1194
 #5  vmstate_load (f=0x559681d02b10, se=0x559680fb5810)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:908
 #6  qemu_loadvm_section_part_end (f=0x559681d02b10,
   mis=0x559680fb4a30) at ../migration/savevm.c:2473
 #7  qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x559681d02b10, mis=0x559680fb4a30)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:2626
 #8  postcopy_ram_listen_thread (opaque=0x0)
   at ../migration/savevm.c:1871
 #9  qemu_thread_start (args=0x5596817ccd10)
   at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:521
 #10 start_thread () at /lib64/libpthread.so.0
 #11 clone () at /lib64/libc.so.6

Note bs pointer taken from bitmap: it's definitely bad aligned. That's
because we are in use after free, bitmap is already freed.

So, let's make disabled bitmaps (being migrated) busy during incoming
migration.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210322094906.5079-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
When building with --enable-sanitizers we get:

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x5618479ec7cf in malloc (qemu-system-aarch64+0x233b7cf)
      #1 0x7f675745f958 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58958)
      #2 0x561847f02ca2 in usb_packet_init hw/usb/core.c:531:5
      #3 0x561848df4df4 in usb_ehci_init hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c:2575:5
      #4 0x561847c119ac in ehci_sysbus_init hw/usb/hcd-ehci-sysbus.c:73:5
      #5 0x56184a5bdab8 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:375:9
      #6 0x56184a5bd955 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:371:9
      #7 0x56184a5a2bda in object_initialize_with_type qom/object.c:517:5
      #8 0x56184a5a24d5 in object_initialize qom/object.c:536:5
      #9 0x56184a5a2f6c in object_initialize_child_with_propsv qom/object.c:566:5
      #10 0x56184a5a2e60 in object_initialize_child_with_props qom/object.c:549:10
      #11 0x56184a5a3a1e in object_initialize_child_internal qom/object.c:603:5
      #12 0x561849542d18 in npcm7xx_init hw/arm/npcm7xx.c:427:5

Similarly to commit d710e1e ("usb: ehci: fix memory leak in
ehci"), fix by calling usb_ehci_finalize() to free the USBPacket.

Fixes: 7341ea0
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210323183701.281152-1-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
When building with --enable-sanitizers we get:

  Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x5618479ec7cf in malloc (qemu-system-aarch64+0x233b7cf)
      #1 0x7f675745f958 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58958)
      #2 0x561847c2dcc9 in xlnx_dp_init hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:1259:5
      #3 0x56184a5bdab8 in object_init_with_type qom/object.c:375:9
      #4 0x56184a5a2bda in object_initialize_with_type qom/object.c:517:5
      #5 0x56184a5a24d5 in object_initialize qom/object.c:536:5
      #6 0x56184a5a2f6c in object_initialize_child_with_propsv qom/object.c:566:5
      #7 0x56184a5a2e60 in object_initialize_child_with_props qom/object.c:549:10
      #8 0x56184a5a3a1e in object_initialize_child_internal qom/object.c:603:5
      #9 0x5618495aa431 in xlnx_zynqmp_init hw/arm/xlnx-zynqmp.c:273:5

The RX/TX FIFOs are created in xlnx_dp_init(), add xlnx_dp_finalize()
to destroy them.

Fixes: 58ac482 ("introduce xlnx-dp")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-id: 20210323182958.277654-1-f4bug@amsat.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 14, 2021
g_hash_table_add always retains ownership of the pointer passed in as
the key. Its return status merely indicates whether the added entry was
new, or replaced an existing entry. Thus key must never be freed after
this method returns.

Spotted by ASAN:

==2407186==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x6020003ac4f0 at pc 0x7ffff766659c bp 0x7fffffffd1d0 sp 0x7fffffffc980
READ of size 1 at 0x6020003ac4f0 thread T0
    #0 0x7ffff766659b  (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0x8a59b)
    #1 0x7ffff6bfa843 in g_str_equal ../glib/ghash.c:2303
    #2 0x7ffff6bf8167 in g_hash_table_lookup_node ../glib/ghash.c:493
    #3 0x7ffff6bf9b78 in g_hash_table_insert_internal ../glib/ghash.c:1598
    #4 0x7ffff6bf9c32 in g_hash_table_add ../glib/ghash.c:1689
    #5 0x5555596caad4 in module_load_one ../util/module.c:233
    #6 0x5555596ca949 in module_load_one ../util/module.c:225
    #7 0x5555596ca949 in module_load_one ../util/module.c:225
    #8 0x5555596cbdf4 in module_load_qom_all ../util/module.c:349

Typical C bug...

Fixes: 9062912 ("module: use g_hash_table_add()")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210316134456.3243102-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2021
OSS-Fuzz found sending illegal addresses when querying the write
protection bits triggers the assertion added in commit 84816fb
("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group"):

  qemu-fuzz-i386-target-generic-fuzz-sdhci-v3: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: uint32_t sd_wpbits(SDState *, uint64_t):
  Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed.
  #3 0x7f62a8b22c91 in __assert_fail
  #4 0x5569adcec405 in sd_wpbits hw/sd/sd.c:824:9
  #5 0x5569adce5f6d in sd_normal_command hw/sd/sd.c:1389:38
  #6 0x5569adce3870 in sd_do_command hw/sd/sd.c:1737:17
  #7 0x5569adcf1566 in sdbus_do_command hw/sd/core.c:100:16
  #8 0x5569adcfc192 in sdhci_send_command hw/sd/sdhci.c:337:12
  #9 0x5569adcfa3a3 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1186:9
  #10 0x5569adfb3447 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5

It is legal for the CMD30 to query for out-of-range addresses.
Such invalid addresses are simply ignored in the response (write
protection bits set to 0).

In commit 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal
group") we misplaced the assertion *before* we test the address is
in range. Move it *after*.

Include the qtest reproducer provided by Alexander Bulekov:

  $ make check-qtest-i386
  ...
  Running test qtest-i386/fuzz-sdcard-test
  qemu-system-i386: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: sd_wpbits: Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: OSS-Fuzz (Issue 29225)
Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Fixes: 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/495
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210802235524.3417739-3-f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 4, 2021
To: <quintela@redhat.com>, <dgilbert@redhat.com>, <qemu-devel@nongnu.org>
CC: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2021 22:05:51 +0800 (5 weeks, 4 days, 17 hours ago)

multifd with unsupported protocol will cause a segment fault.
(gdb) bt
 #0  0x0000563b4a93faf8 in socket_connect (addr=0x0, errp=0x7f7f02675410) at ../util/qemu-sockets.c:1190
 #1 0x0000563b4a797a03 in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync
(ioc=0x563b4d16e8c0, addr=0x0, errp=0x7f7f02675410) at
../io/channel-socket.c:145
 #2  0x0000563b4a797abf in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker (task=0x563b4cd86c30, opaque=0x0) at ../io/channel-socket.c:168
 #3  0x0000563b4a792631 in qio_task_thread_worker (opaque=0x563b4cd86c30) at ../io/task.c:124
 #4  0x0000563b4a91da69 in qemu_thread_start (args=0x563b4c44bb80) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:541
 #5  0x00007f7fe9b5b3f9 in ?? ()
 #6  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

It's enough to check migrate_multifd_is_allowed() in multifd cleanup() and
multifd setup() though there are so many other places using migrate_use_multifd().

Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2022
This patch fixed as follows:
    Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f34ee738d80 (LWP 11212)):
    #0 __pthread_clockjoin_ex (threadid=139847152957184, thread_return=0x7f30b1febf30, clockid=<optimized out>, abstime=<optimized out>, block=<optimized out>) at pthread_join_common.c:145
    #1 0x0000563401998e36 in qemu_thread_join (thread=0x563402d66610) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:587
    #2 0x00005634017a79fa in process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:502
    #3 0x00005634019b59c9 in coroutine_trampoline (i0=63395504, i1=22068) at util/coroutine-ucontext.c:115
    #4 0x00007f34ef860660 in ?? () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/__start_context.S:91 from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
    #5 0x00007f30b21ee730 in ?? ()
    #6 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

    Thread 13 (Thread 0x7f30b3dff700 (LWP 11747)):
    #0  __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x56340218ffa0 <qemu_global_mutex>, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52
    #1  0x00007f34efa000a3 in _GI__pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x56340218ffa0 <qemu_global_mutex>) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80
    #2  0x0000563401997f99 in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x56340218ffa0 <qemu_global_mutex>, file=0x563401b7a80e "migration/colo.c", line=806) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:78
    #3  0x0000563401407144 in qemu_mutex_lock_iothread_impl (file=0x563401b7a80e "migration/colo.c", line=806) at /home/workspace/colo-qemu/cpus.c:1899
    #4  0x00005634017ba8e8 in colo_process_incoming_thread (opaque=0x563402d664c0) at migration/colo.c:806
    #5  0x0000563401998b72 in qemu_thread_start (args=0x5634039f8370) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519
    #6  0x00007f34ef9fd609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477
    #7  0x00007f34ef924293 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95

    The QEMU main thread is holding the lock:
    (gdb) p qemu_global_mutex
    $1 = {lock = {_data = {lock = 2, __count = 0, __owner = 11212, __nusers = 9, __kind = 0, __spins = 0, __elision = 0, __list = {_prev = 0x0, __next = 0x0}},
     __size = "\002\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\314+\000\000\t", '\000' <repeats 26 times>, __align = 2}, file = 0x563401c07e4b "util/main-loop.c", line = 240,
    initialized = true}

>From the call trace, we can see it is a deadlock bug. and the QEMU main thread holds the global mutex to wait until the COLO thread ends. and the colo thread
wants to acquire the global mutex, which will cause a deadlock. So, we should release the qemu_global_mutex before waiting colo thread ends.

Signed-off-by: Lei Rao <lei.rao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 6, 2022
If asked for DMA request and no data is available, simply wait
for data to be queued, do not abort. This fixes:

  $ cat << EOF | \
    qemu-system-i386 -nographic -M q35,accel=qtest -serial none \
      -monitor none -qtest stdio -trace lsi* \
      -drive if=none,id=drive0,file=null-co://,file.read-zeroes=on,format=raw \
      -device lsi53c895a,id=scsi0 -device scsi-hd,drive=drive0,bus=scsi0.0,channel=0,scsi-id=0,lun=0
  lsi_reset Reset
  lsi_reg_write Write reg DSP2 0x2e = 0xff
  lsi_reg_write Write reg DSP3 0x2f = 0xff
  lsi_execute_script SCRIPTS dsp=0xffff0000 opcode 0x184a3900 arg 0x4a8b2d75
  qemu-system-i386: hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c:624: lsi_do_dma: Assertion `s->current' failed.

  (gdb) bt
  #5  0x00007ffff4e8a3a6 in __GI___assert_fail
      (assertion=0x5555560accbc "s->current", file=0x5555560acc28 "hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c", line=624, function=0x5555560adb18 "lsi_do_dma") at assert.c:101
  #6  0x0000555555aa33b9 in lsi_do_dma (s=0x555557805ac0, out=1) at hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c:624
  #7  0x0000555555aa5042 in lsi_execute_script (s=0x555557805ac0) at hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c:1250
  #8  0x0000555555aa757a in lsi_reg_writeb (s=0x555557805ac0, offset=47, val=255 '\377') at hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c:1984
  #9  0x0000555555aa875b in lsi_mmio_write (opaque=0x555557805ac0, addr=47, val=255, size=1) at hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c:2095

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vadim Rozenfeld <vrozenfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jérôme Poulin <jeromepoulin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Ruhr-University <bugs-syssec@rub.de>
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Cheolwoo Myung <cwmyung@snu.ac.kr>
Fixes: b96a0da ("lsi: move dma_len+dma_buf into lsi_request")
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/697510
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1905521
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1908515
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/84
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/305
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/552
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211123111732.83137-2-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 4, 2022
When closing the QEMU Gtk display window, it can occasionaly warn:
qemu-system-x86_64: Gtk: gtk_clipboard_set_with_data: assertion 'targets != NULL' failed

#3  0x00007ffff4f02f22 in gtk_clipboard_set_with_data (clipboard=<optimized out>, targets=<optimized out>, n_targets=<optimized out>, get_func=<optimized out>, clear_func=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at /usr/src/debug/gtk3-3.24.30-4.fc35.x86_64/gtk/gtkclipboard.c:672
#4  0x00007ffff552cd75 in gd_clipboard_update_info (gd=0x5555579a9e00, info=0x555557ba4b50) at ../ui/gtk-clipboard.c:98
#5  0x00007ffff552ce00 in gd_clipboard_notify (notifier=0x5555579aaba8, data=0x7fffffffd720) at ../ui/gtk-clipboard.c:128
#6  0x000055555603e0ff in notifier_list_notify (list=0x555556657470 <clipboard_notifiers>, data=0x7fffffffd720) at ../util/notify.c:39
#7  0x000055555594e8e0 in qemu_clipboard_update (info=0x555557ba4b50) at ../ui/clipboard.c:54
#8  0x000055555594e840 in qemu_clipboard_peer_release (peer=0x55555684a5b0, selection=QEMU_CLIPBOARD_SELECTION_PRIMARY) at ../ui/clipboard.c:40
#9  0x000055555594e786 in qemu_clipboard_peer_unregister (peer=0x55555684a5b0) at ../ui/clipboard.c:19
#10 0x000055555595f044 in vdagent_disconnect (vd=0x55555684a400) at ../ui/vdagent.c:852
#11 0x000055555595f262 in vdagent_chr_fini (obj=0x55555684a400) at ../ui/vdagent.c:908

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211216083233.1166504-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 28, 2022
The "Interrupt Cause" register (VMXNET3_REG_ICR) is read-only.
Write accesses are ignored. Log them with as LOG_GUEST_ERROR
instead of aborting:

  [R +0.239743] writeq 0xe0002031 0x46291a5a55460800
  ERROR:hw/net/vmxnet3.c:1819:vmxnet3_io_bar1_write: code should not be reached
  Thread 1 "qemu-system-i38" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
  (gdb) bt
  #3  0x74c397d3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
  #4  0x76d3cd4c in g_assertion_message (domain=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, line=<optimized out>, func=<optimized out>, message=<optimized out>) at ../glib/gtestutils.c:3223
  #5  0x76d9d45f in g_assertion_message_expr
      (domain=0x0, file=0x59fc2e53 "hw/net/vmxnet3.c", line=1819, func=0x59fc11e0 <__func__.vmxnet3_io_bar1_write> "vmxnet3_io_bar1_write", expr=<optimized out>)
      at ../glib/gtestutils.c:3249
  #6  0x57e80a3a in vmxnet3_io_bar1_write (opaque=0x62814100, addr=56, val=70, size=4) at hw/net/vmxnet3.c:1819
  #7  0x58c2d894 in memory_region_write_accessor (mr=0x62816b90, addr=56, value=0x7fff9450, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at softmmu/memory.c:492
  #8  0x58c2d1d2 in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=56, value=0x7fff9450, size=1, access_size_min=4, access_size_max=4, access_fn=
      0x58c2d290 <memory_region_write_accessor>, mr=0x62816b90, attrs=...) at softmmu/memory.c:554
  #9  0x58c2bae7 in memory_region_dispatch_write (mr=0x62816b90, addr=56, data=70, op=MO_8, attrs=...) at softmmu/memory.c:1504
  #10 0x58bfd034 in flatview_write_continue (fv=0x606000181700, addr=0xe0002038, attrs=..., ptr=0x7fffb9e0, len=1, addr1=56, l=1, mr=0x62816b90)
      at softmmu/physmem.c:2782
  #11 0x58beba00 in flatview_write (fv=0x606000181700, addr=0xe0002031, attrs=..., buf=0x7fffb9e0, len=8) at softmmu/physmem.c:2822
  #12 0x58beb589 in address_space_write (as=0x608000015f20, addr=0xe0002031, attrs=..., buf=0x7fffb9e0, len=8) at softmmu/physmem.c:2914

Reported-by: Dike <dike199774@qq.com>
Reported-by: Duhao <504224090@qq.com>
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2032932
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 28, 2022
e.g.
1109 15:16:20.151506 Uninitialized bytes in ioctl_common_pre at offset 0 inside [0x7ffc516af9b8, 4)
 1109 15:16:20.151659 ==588974==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
 1109 15:16:20.312923     #0 0x5639b88acb21 in tap_probe_vnet_hdr_len third_party/qemu/net/tap-linux.c:183:9
 1109 15:16:20.312952     #1 0x5639b88afd66 in net_tap_fd_init third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:409:9
 1109 15:16:20.312954     #2 0x5639b88b2d1b in net_init_tap_one third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:681:19
 1109 15:16:20.312956     #3 0x5639b88b16a8 in net_init_tap third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:912:13
 1109 15:16:20.312957     #4 0x5639b8890175 in net_client_init1 third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1110:9
 1109 15:16:20.312958     #5 0x5639b888f912 in net_client_init third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1208:15
 1109 15:16:20.312960     #6 0x5639b8894aa5 in net_param_nic third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1588:11
 1109 15:16:20.312961     #7 0x5639b900cd18 in qemu_opts_foreach third_party/qemu/util/qemu-option.c:1135:14
 1109 15:16:20.312962     #8 0x5639b889393c in net_init_clients third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1612:9
 1109 15:16:20.312964     #9 0x5639b717aaf3 in qemu_create_late_backends third_party/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1962:5
 1109 15:16:20.312965     #10 0x5639b717aaf3 in qemu_init third_party/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:3694:5
 1109 15:16:20.312967     #11 0x5639b71083b8 in main third_party/qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5
 1109 15:16:20.312968     #12 0x7f464de1d8d2 in __libc_start_main (/usr/grte/v5/lib64/libc.so.6+0x628d2)
 1109 15:16:20.312969     #13 0x5639b6bbd389 in _start /usr/grte/v5/debug-src/src/csu/../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:120
 1109 15:16:20.312970
 1109 15:16:20.312975   Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
 1109 15:16:20.313393     #0 0x5639b88acbee in tap_probe_vnet_hdr_len third_party/qemu/net/tap-linux.c
 1109 15:16:20.313396     #1 0x5639b88afd66 in net_tap_fd_init third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:409:9
 1109 15:16:20.313398     #2 0x5639b88b2d1b in net_init_tap_one third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:681:19
 1109 15:16:20.313399     #3 0x5639b88b16a8 in net_init_tap third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:912:13
 1109 15:16:20.313400     #4 0x5639b8890175 in net_client_init1 third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1110:9
 1109 15:16:20.313401     #5 0x5639b888f912 in net_client_init third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1208:15
 1109 15:16:20.313403     #6 0x5639b8894aa5 in net_param_nic third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1588:11
 1109 15:16:20.313404     #7 0x5639b900cd18 in qemu_opts_foreach third_party/qemu/util/qemu-option.c:1135:14
 1109 15:16:20.313405     #8 0x5639b889393c in net_init_clients third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1612:9
 1109 15:16:20.313407     #9 0x5639b717aaf3 in qemu_create_late_backends third_party/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1962:5
 1109 15:16:20.313408     #10 0x5639b717aaf3 in qemu_init third_party/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:3694:5
 1109 15:16:20.313409     #11 0x5639b71083b8 in main third_party/qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5
 1109 15:16:20.313410     #12 0x7f464de1d8d2 in __libc_start_main (/usr/grte/v5/lib64/libc.so.6+0x628d2)
 1109 15:16:20.313412     #13 0x5639b6bbd389 in _start /usr/grte/v5/debug-src/src/csu/../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:120
 1109 15:16:20.313413
 1109 15:16:20.313417   Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
 1109 15:16:20.313791     #0 0x5639b88affbd in net_tap_fd_init third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:400:26
 1109 15:16:20.313826     #1 0x5639b88b2d1b in net_init_tap_one third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:681:19
 1109 15:16:20.313829     #2 0x5639b88b16a8 in net_init_tap third_party/qemu/net/tap.c:912:13
 1109 15:16:20.313831     #3 0x5639b8890175 in net_client_init1 third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1110:9
 1109 15:16:20.313836     #4 0x5639b888f912 in net_client_init third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1208:15
 1109 15:16:20.313838     #5 0x5639b8894aa5 in net_param_nic third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1588:11
 1109 15:16:20.313839     #6 0x5639b900cd18 in qemu_opts_foreach third_party/qemu/util/qemu-option.c:1135:14
 1109 15:16:20.313841     #7 0x5639b889393c in net_init_clients third_party/qemu/net/net.c:1612:9
 1109 15:16:20.313843     #8 0x5639b717aaf3 in qemu_create_late_backends third_party/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1962:5
 1109 15:16:20.313844     #9 0x5639b717aaf3 in qemu_init third_party/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:3694:5
 1109 15:16:20.313845     #10 0x5639b71083b8 in main third_party/qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5
 1109 15:16:20.313846     #11 0x7f464de1d8d2 in __libc_start_main (/usr/grte/v5/lib64/libc.so.6+0x628d2)
 1109 15:16:20.313847     #12 0x5639b6bbd389 in _start /usr/grte/v5/debug-src/src/csu/../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:120
 1109 15:16:20.313849
 1109 15:16:20.313851   Uninitialized value was created by an allocation of 'ifr' in the stack frame of function 'tap_probe_vnet_hdr'
 1109 15:16:20.313855     #0 0x5639b88ac680 in tap_probe_vnet_hdr third_party/qemu/net/tap-linux.c:151
 1109 15:16:20.313856
 1109 15:16:20.313878 SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value third_party/qemu/net/tap-linux.c:183:9 in tap_probe_vnet_hdr_len

Fixes: dc69004 ("net: move tap_probe_vnet_hdr() to tap-linux.c")
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <wuhaotsh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Venture <venture@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Foley <pefoley@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 7, 2022
Add the reproducer from https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/339

Without the previous commit, when running 'make check-qtest-i386'
with QEMU configured with '--enable-sanitizers' we get:

  ==4028352==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x619000062a00 at pc 0x5626d03c491a bp 0x7ffdb4199410 sp 0x7ffdb4198bc0
  READ of size 786432 at 0x619000062a00 thread T0
      #0 0x5626d03c4919 in __asan_memcpy (qemu-system-i386+0x1e65919)
      #1 0x5626d1c023cc in flatview_write_continue softmmu/physmem.c:2787:13
      #2 0x5626d1bf0c0f in flatview_write softmmu/physmem.c:2822:14
      #3 0x5626d1bf0798 in address_space_write softmmu/physmem.c:2914:18
      #4 0x5626d1bf0f37 in address_space_rw softmmu/physmem.c:2924:16
      #5 0x5626d1bf14c8 in cpu_physical_memory_rw softmmu/physmem.c:2933:5
      #6 0x5626d0bd5649 in cpu_physical_memory_write include/exec/cpu-common.h:82:5
      #7 0x5626d0bd0a07 in i8257_dma_write_memory hw/dma/i8257.c:452:9
      #8 0x5626d09f825d in fdctrl_transfer_handler hw/block/fdc.c:1616:13
      #9 0x5626d0a048b4 in fdctrl_start_transfer hw/block/fdc.c:1539:13
      #10 0x5626d09f4c3e in fdctrl_write_data hw/block/fdc.c:2266:13
      #11 0x5626d09f22f7 in fdctrl_write hw/block/fdc.c:829:9
      #12 0x5626d1c20bc5 in portio_write softmmu/ioport.c:207:17

  0x619000062a00 is located 0 bytes to the right of 512-byte region [0x619000062800,0x619000062a00)
  allocated by thread T0 here:
      #0 0x5626d03c66ec in posix_memalign (qemu-system-i386+0x1e676ec)
      #1 0x5626d2b988d4 in qemu_try_memalign util/oslib-posix.c:210:11
      #2 0x5626d2b98b0c in qemu_memalign util/oslib-posix.c:226:27
      #3 0x5626d09fbaf0 in fdctrl_realize_common hw/block/fdc.c:2341:20
      #4 0x5626d0a150ed in isabus_fdc_realize hw/block/fdc-isa.c:113:5
      #5 0x5626d2367935 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:531:13

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (qemu-system-i386+0x1e65919) in __asan_memcpy
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0c32800044f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c3280004500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c3280004510: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c3280004520: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0c3280004530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  =>0x0c3280004540:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c3280004550: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c3280004560: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c3280004570: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c3280004580: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    0x0c3280004590: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Heap left redzone:       fa
    Freed heap region:       fd
  ==4028352==ABORTING

[ kwolf: Added snapshot=on to prevent write file lock failure ]

Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 17, 2022
the code in pcibus_get_fw_dev_path contained the potential for a
stack buffer overflow of 1 byte, potentially writing to the stack an
extra NUL byte.

This overflow could happen if the PCI slot is >= 0x10000000,
and the PCI function is >= 0x10000000, due to the size parameter
of snprintf being incorrectly calculated in the call:

    if (PCI_FUNC(d->devfn))
        snprintf(path + off, sizeof(path) + off, ",%x", PCI_FUNC(d->devfn));

since the off obtained from a previous call to snprintf is added
instead of subtracted from the total available size of the buffer.

Without the accurate size guard from snprintf, we end up writing in the
worst case:

name (32) + "@" (1) + SLOT (8) + "," (1) + FUNC (8) + term NUL (1) = 51 bytes

In order to provide something more robust, replace all of the code in
pcibus_get_fw_dev_path with a single call to g_strdup_printf,
so there is no need to rely on manual calculations.

Found by compiling QEMU with FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 as the error:

*** buffer overflow detected ***: terminated

Thread 1 "qemu-system-x86" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
[Switching to Thread 0x7ffff642c380 (LWP 121307)]
0x00007ffff71ff55c in __pthread_kill_implementation () from /lib64/libc.so.6
(gdb) bt
 #0  0x00007ffff71ff55c in __pthread_kill_implementation () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #1  0x00007ffff71ac6f6 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #2  0x00007ffff7195814 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #3  0x00007ffff71f279e in __libc_message () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #4  0x00007ffff729767a in __fortify_fail () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #5  0x00007ffff7295c36 in  () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #6  0x00007ffff72957f5 in __snprintf_chk () at /lib64/libc.so.6
 #7  0x0000555555b1c1fd in pcibus_get_fw_dev_path ()
 #8  0x0000555555f2bde4 in qdev_get_fw_dev_path_helper.constprop ()
 #9  0x0000555555f2bd86 in qdev_get_fw_dev_path_helper.constprop ()
 #10 0x00005555559a6e5d in get_boot_device_path ()
 #11 0x00005555559a712c in get_boot_devices_list ()
 #12 0x0000555555b1a3d0 in fw_cfg_machine_reset ()
 #13 0x0000555555bf4c2d in pc_machine_reset ()
 #14 0x0000555555c66988 in qemu_system_reset ()
 #15 0x0000555555a6dff6 in qdev_machine_creation_done ()
 #16 0x0000555555c79186 in qmp_x_exit_preconfig.part ()
 #17 0x0000555555c7b459 in qemu_init ()
 #18 0x0000555555960a29 in main ()

Found-by: Dario Faggioli <Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Found-by: Martin Liška <martin.liska@suse.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20220531114707.18830-1-cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <ani@anisinha.ca>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 8, 2023
There is such error info when running linux kernel:
    tcg_handle_interrupt: assertion failed: (qemu_mutex_iothread_locked()).
    calling stack:
    #0 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
    #1 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
    #2 in g_assertion_message_expr.cold () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
    #3 in g_assertion_message_expr () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
    #4 in tcg_handle_interrupt (cpu=0x632000030800, mask=2) at ../accel/tcg/tcg-accel-ops.c:79
    #5 in cpu_interrupt (cpu=0x632000030800, mask=2) at ../softmmu/cpus.c:248
    #6 in loongarch_cpu_set_irq (opaque=0x632000030800, irq=11, level=0)
       at ../target/loongarch/cpu.c:100
    #7 in helper_csrwr_ticlr (env=0x632000039440, val=1) at ../target/loongarch/csr_helper.c:85
    #8 in code_gen_buffer ()
    #9 in cpu_tb_exec (cpu=0x632000030800, itb=0x7fff946ac280, tb_exit=0x7ffe4fcb6c30)
       at ../accel/tcg/cpu-exec.c:358

Add mutex iothread lock around loongarch_cpu_set_irq in csrwr_ticlr() to
fix the bug.

Signed-off-by: Xiaojuan Yang <yangxiaojuan@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20220701093407.2150607-10-yangxiaojuan@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
Fix warnings such:

  disas/nanomips.c:3251:64: warning: format specifies type 'char *' but the argument has type 'int64' (aka 'long long') [-Wformat]
    return img_format("CACHE 0x%" PRIx64 ", %s(%s)", op_value, s_value, rs);
                                            ~~                 ^~~~~~~
                                            %lld

To avoid crashes such (kernel from commit f375ad6):

  $ qemu-system-mipsel -cpu I7200 -d in_asm -kernel generic_nano32r6el_page4k
  ...
  ----------------
  IN: __bzero
  0x805c6084:  20c4 6950      ADDU r13, a0, a2
  0x805c6088:  9089           ADDIU a0, 1
  Process 70261 stopped
  * thread #6, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xfffffffffffffff0)
      frame #0: 0x00000001bfe38864 libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_strlen + 4
  libsystem_platform.dylib`:
  ->  0x1bfe38864 <+4>:  ldr    q0, [x1]
      0x1bfe38868 <+8>:  adr    x3, #-0xc8                ; ___lldb_unnamed_symbol314
      0x1bfe3886c <+12>: ldr    q2, [x3], #0x10
      0x1bfe38870 <+16>: and    x2, x0, #0xf
  Target 0: (qemu-system-mipsel) stopped.
  (lldb) bt
  * thread #6, stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xfffffffffffffff0)
    * frame #0: 0x00000001bfe38864 libsystem_platform.dylib`_platform_strlen + 4
      frame #1: 0x00000001bfce76a0 libsystem_c.dylib`__vfprintf + 4544
      frame #2: 0x00000001bfd158b4 libsystem_c.dylib`_vasprintf + 280
      frame #3: 0x0000000101c22fb0 libglib-2.0.0.dylib`g_vasprintf + 28
      frame #4: 0x0000000101bfb7d8 libglib-2.0.0.dylib`g_strdup_vprintf + 32
      frame #5: 0x000000010000fb70 qemu-system-mipsel`img_format(format=<unavailable>) at nanomips.c:103:14 [opt]
      frame #6: 0x0000000100018868 qemu-system-mipsel`SB_S9_(instruction=<unavailable>, info=<unavailable>) at nanomips.c:12616:12 [opt]
      frame #7: 0x000000010000f90c qemu-system-mipsel`print_insn_nanomips at nanomips.c:589:28 [opt]

Fixes: 4066c15 ("disas/nanomips: Remove IMMEDIATE functions")
Reported-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20221101114458.25756-2-philmd@linaro.org>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2023
This leakage can be seen through test-io-channel-tls:

$ ../configure --target-list=aarch64-softmmu --enable-sanitizers
$ make ./tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls
$ ./tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls

Indirect leak of 104 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f81d1725808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144
    #1 0x7f81d135ae98 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57e98)
    #2 0x55616c5d4c1b in object_new_with_propv ../qom/object.c:795
    #3 0x55616c5d4a83 in object_new_with_props ../qom/object.c:768
    #4 0x55616c5c5415 in test_tls_creds_create ../tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls.c:70
    #5 0x55616c5c5a6b in test_io_channel_tls ../tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls.c:158
    #6 0x7f81d137d58d  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7a58d)

Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f81d1725a06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153
    #1 0x7f81d1472a20 in gnutls_dh_params_init (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgnutls.so.30+0x46a20)
    #2 0x55616c6485ff in qcrypto_tls_creds_x509_load ../crypto/tlscredsx509.c:634
    #3 0x55616c648ba2 in qcrypto_tls_creds_x509_complete ../crypto/tlscredsx509.c:694
    #4 0x55616c5e1fea in user_creatable_complete ../qom/object_interfaces.c:28
    #5 0x55616c5d4c8c in object_new_with_propv ../qom/object.c:807
    #6 0x55616c5d4a83 in object_new_with_props ../qom/object.c:768
    #7 0x55616c5c5415 in test_tls_creds_create ../tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls.c:70
    #8 0x55616c5c5a6b in test_io_channel_tls ../tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls.c:158
    #9 0x7f81d137d58d  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7a58d)

...

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 49143 byte(s) leaked in 184 allocation(s).

The docs for `g_source_add_child_source(source, child_source)` says
"source will hold a reference on child_source while child_source is
attached to it." Therefore, we should unreference the child source at
`qio_channel_tls_read_watch()` after attaching it to `source`. With this
change, ./tests/unit/test-io-channel-tls shows no leakages.

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Matheus Tavares Bernardino <quic_mathbern@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2023
xbzrle_encode_buffer_avx512() checks for overflows too scarcely in its
outer loop, causing out-of-bounds writes:

$ ../configure --target-list=aarch64-softmmu --enable-sanitizers --enable-avx512bw
$ make tests/unit/test-xbzrle && ./tests/unit/test-xbzrle

==5518==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x62100000b100 at pc 0x561109a7714d bp 0x7ffed712a440 sp 0x7ffed712a430
WRITE of size 1 at 0x62100000b100 thread T0
    #0 0x561109a7714c in uleb128_encode_small ../util/cutils.c:831
    #1 0x561109b67f6a in xbzrle_encode_buffer_avx512 ../migration/xbzrle.c:275
    #2 0x5611099a7428 in test_encode_decode_overflow ../tests/unit/test-xbzrle.c:153
    #3 0x7fb2fb65a58d  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7a58d)
    #4 0x7fb2fb65a333  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7a333)
    #5 0x7fb2fb65aa79 in g_test_run_suite (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7aa79)
    #6 0x7fb2fb65aa94 in g_test_run (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x7aa94)
    #7 0x5611099a3a23 in main ../tests/unit/test-xbzrle.c:218
    #8 0x7fb2fa78c082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082)
    #9 0x5611099a608d in _start (/qemu/build/tests/unit/test-xbzrle+0x28408d)

0x62100000b100 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [0x62100000a100,0x62100000b100)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fb2fb823a06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153
    #1 0x7fb2fb637ef0 in g_malloc0 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x57ef0)

Fix that by performing the overflow check in the inner loop, instead.

Signed-off-by: Matheus Tavares Bernardino <quic_mathbern@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2023
For ex, when resetting the xlnx-zcu102 machine:

(lldb) bt
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason =
EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0x50)
   * frame #0: 0x10020a740 gd_vc_send_chars(vc=0x000000000) at
gtk.c:1759:41 [opt]
     frame #1: 0x100636264 qemu_chr_fe_accept_input(be=<unavailable>) at
char-fe.c:159:9 [opt]
     frame #2: 0x1000608e0 cadence_uart_reset_hold [inlined]
uart_rx_reset(s=0x10810a960) at cadence_uart.c:158:5 [opt]
     frame #3: 0x1000608d4 cadence_uart_reset_hold(obj=0x10810a960) at
cadence_uart.c:530:5 [opt]
     frame #4: 0x100580ab4 resettable_phase_hold(obj=0x10810a960,
opaque=0x000000000, type=<unavailable>) at resettable.c:0 [opt]
     frame #5: 0x10057d1b0 bus_reset_child_foreach(obj=<unavailable>,
cb=(resettable_phase_hold at resettable.c:162), opaque=0x000000000,
type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at bus.c:97:13 [opt]
     frame #6: 0x1005809f8 resettable_phase_hold [inlined]
resettable_child_foreach(rc=0x000060000332d2c0, obj=0x0000600002c1c180,
cb=<unavailable>, opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at
resettable.c:96:9 [opt]
     frame #7: 0x1005809d8 resettable_phase_hold(obj=0x0000600002c1c180,
opaque=0x000000000, type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:173:5 [opt]
     frame #8: 0x1005803a0
resettable_assert_reset(obj=0x0000600002c1c180, type=<unavailable>) at
resettable.c:60:5 [opt]
     frame #9: 0x10058027c resettable_reset(obj=0x0000600002c1c180,
type=RESET_TYPE_COLD) at resettable.c:45:5 [opt]

While the chardev is created early, the VirtualConsole is associated
after, during qemu_init_displays().

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230220072251.3385878-1-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2023
blk_get_geometry() eventually calls bdrv_nb_sectors(), which is a
co_wrapper_mixed_bdrv_rdlock. This means that when it is called from
coroutine context, it already assume to have the graph locked.

However, virtio_blk_sect_range_ok() in block/export/virtio-blk-handler.c
(used by vhost-user-blk and VDUSE exports) runs in a coroutine, but
doesn't take the graph lock - blk_*() functions are generally expected
to do that internally. This causes an assertion failure when accessing
an export for the first time if it runs in an iothread.

This is an example of the crash:

  $ ./storage-daemon/qemu-storage-daemon --object iothread,id=th0 --blockdev file,filename=/home/kwolf/images/hd.img,node-name=disk --export vhost-user-blk,addr.type=unix,addr.path=/tmp/vhost.sock,node-name=disk,id=exp0,iothread=th0
  qemu-storage-daemon: ../block/graph-lock.c:268: void assert_bdrv_graph_readable(void): Assertion `qemu_in_main_thread() || reader_count()' failed.

  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00007ffff6eafe5c in __pthread_kill_implementation () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff6e5fa76 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00007ffff6e497fc in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #3  0x00007ffff6e4971b in __assert_fail_base.cold () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #4  0x00007ffff6e58656 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #5  0x00005555556337a3 in assert_bdrv_graph_readable () at ../block/graph-lock.c:268
  #6  0x00005555555fd5a2 in bdrv_co_nb_sectors (bs=0x5555564c5ef0) at ../block.c:5847
  #7  0x00005555555ee949 in bdrv_nb_sectors (bs=0x5555564c5ef0) at block/block-gen.c:256
  #8  0x00005555555fd6b9 in bdrv_get_geometry (bs=0x5555564c5ef0, nb_sectors_ptr=0x7fffef7fedd0) at ../block.c:5884
  #9  0x000055555562ad6d in blk_get_geometry (blk=0x5555564cb200, nb_sectors_ptr=0x7fffef7fedd0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1624
  #10 0x00005555555ddb74 in virtio_blk_sect_range_ok (blk=0x5555564cb200, block_size=512, sector=0, size=512) at ../block/export/virtio-blk-handler.c:44
  #11 0x00005555555dd80d in virtio_blk_process_req (handler=0x5555564cbb98, in_iov=0x7fffe8003830, out_iov=0x7fffe8003860, in_num=1, out_num=0) at ../block/export/virtio-blk-handler.c:189
  #12 0x00005555555dd546 in vu_blk_virtio_process_req (opaque=0x7fffe8003800) at ../block/export/vhost-user-blk-server.c:66
  #13 0x00005555557bf4a1 in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-402635264, i1=32767) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177
  #14 0x00007ffff6e75c20 in ?? () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #15 0x00007fffefffa870 in ?? ()
  #16 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

Fix this by creating a new blk_co_get_geometry() that takes the lock,
and changing blk_get_geometry() to be a co_wrapper_mixed around it.

To make the resulting code cleaner, virtio-blk-handler.c can directly
call the coroutine version now (though that wouldn't be necessary for
fixing the bug, taking the lock in blk_co_get_geometry() is what fixes
it).

Fixes: 8ab8140
Reported-by: Lukáš Doktor <ldoktor@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230327113959.60071-1-kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 27, 2023
in order to avoid requests being stuck in a BlockBackend's request
queue during cleanup. Having such requests can lead to a deadlock [0]
with a virtio-scsi-pci device using iothread that's busy with IO when
initiating a shutdown with QMP 'quit'.

There is a race where such a queued request can continue sometime
(maybe after bdrv_child_free()?) during bdrv_root_unref_child() [1].
The completion will hold the AioContext lock and wait for the BQL
during SCSI completion, but the main thread will hold the BQL and
wait for the AioContext as part of bdrv_root_unref_child(), leading to
the deadlock [0].

[0]:

> Thread 3 (Thread 0x7f3bbd87b700 (LWP 135952) "qemu-system-x86"):
> #0  __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x564183365f00 <qemu_global_mutex>, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52
> #1  0x00007f3bc1c0d843 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x564183365f00 <qemu_global_mutex>) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:80
> #2  0x0000564182939f2e in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x564183365f00 <qemu_global_mutex>, file=0x564182b7f774 "../softmmu/physmem.c", line=2593) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:94
> #3  0x000056418247cc2a in qemu_mutex_lock_iothread_impl (file=0x564182b7f774 "../softmmu/physmem.c", line=2593) at ../softmmu/cpus.c:504
> #4  0x00005641826d5325 in prepare_mmio_access (mr=0x5641856148a0) at ../softmmu/physmem.c:2593
> #5  0x00005641826d6fe7 in address_space_stl_internal (as=0x56418679b310, addr=4276113408, val=16418, attrs=..., result=0x0, endian=DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN) at /home/febner/repos/qemu/memory_ldst.c.inc:318
> #6  0x00005641826d7154 in address_space_stl_le (as=0x56418679b310, addr=4276113408, val=16418, attrs=..., result=0x0) at /home/febner/repos/qemu/memory_ldst.c.inc:357
> #7  0x0000564182374b07 in pci_msi_trigger (dev=0x56418679b0d0, msg=...) at ../hw/pci/pci.c:359
> #8  0x000056418237118b in msi_send_message (dev=0x56418679b0d0, msg=...) at ../hw/pci/msi.c:379
> #9  0x0000564182372c10 in msix_notify (dev=0x56418679b0d0, vector=8) at ../hw/pci/msix.c:542
> #10 0x000056418243719c in virtio_pci_notify (d=0x56418679b0d0, vector=8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:77
> #11 0x00005641826933b0 in virtio_notify_vector (vdev=0x5641867a34a0, vector=8) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:1985
> #12 0x00005641826948d6 in virtio_irq (vq=0x5641867ac078) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2461
> #13 0x0000564182694978 in virtio_notify (vdev=0x5641867a34a0, vq=0x5641867ac078) at ../hw/virtio/virtio.c:2473
> #14 0x0000564182665b83 in virtio_scsi_complete_req (req=0x7f3bb000e5d0) at ../hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:115
> #15 0x00005641826670ce in virtio_scsi_complete_cmd_req (req=0x7f3bb000e5d0) at ../hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:641
> #16 0x000056418266736b in virtio_scsi_command_complete (r=0x7f3bb0010560, resid=0) at ../hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:712
> #17 0x000056418239aac6 in scsi_req_complete (req=0x7f3bb0010560, status=2) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c:1526
> #18 0x000056418239e090 in scsi_handle_rw_error (r=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123, acct_failed=false) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:242
> #19 0x000056418239e13f in scsi_disk_req_check_error (r=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123, acct_failed=false) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:265
> #20 0x000056418239e482 in scsi_dma_complete_noio (r=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:340
> #21 0x000056418239e5d9 in scsi_dma_complete (opaque=0x7f3bb0010560, ret=-123) at ../hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:371
> #22 0x00005641824809ad in dma_complete (dbs=0x7f3bb000d9d0, ret=-123) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:107
> #23 0x0000564182480a72 in dma_blk_cb (opaque=0x7f3bb000d9d0, ret=-123) at ../softmmu/dma-helpers.c:127
> #24 0x00005641827bf78a in blk_aio_complete (acb=0x7f3bb00021a0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1563
> #25 0x00005641827bfa5e in blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x7f3bb00021a0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1630
> #26 0x000056418295638a in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-1342102448, i1=32571) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177
> #27 0x00007f3bc0caed40 in ?? () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
> #28 0x00007f3bbd8757f0 in ?? ()
> #29 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
>
> Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f3bbe3e9280 (LWP 135944) "qemu-system-x86"):
> #0  __lll_lock_wait (futex=futex@entry=0x5641856f2a00, private=0) at lowlevellock.c:52
> #1  0x00007f3bc1c0d8d1 in __GI___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=0x5641856f2a00) at ../nptl/pthread_mutex_lock.c:115
> #2  0x0000564182939f2e in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5641856f2a00, file=0x564182c0e319 "../util/async.c", line=728) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:94
> #3  0x000056418293a140 in qemu_rec_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x5641856f2a00, file=0x564182c0e319 "../util/async.c", line=728) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:149
> #4  0x00005641829532d5 in aio_context_acquire (ctx=0x5641856f29a0) at ../util/async.c:728
> #5  0x000056418279d5df in bdrv_set_aio_context_commit (opaque=0x5641856e6e50) at ../block.c:7493
> #6  0x000056418294e288 in tran_commit (tran=0x56418630bfe0) at ../util/transactions.c:87
> #7  0x000056418279d880 in bdrv_try_change_aio_context (bs=0x5641856f7130, ctx=0x56418548f810, ignore_child=0x0, errp=0x0) at ../block.c:7626
> #8  0x0000564182793f39 in bdrv_root_unref_child (child=0x5641856f47d0) at ../block.c:3242
> #9  0x00005641827be137 in blk_remove_bs (blk=0x564185709880) at ../block/block-backend.c:914
> #10 0x00005641827bd689 in blk_remove_all_bs () at ../block/block-backend.c:583
> #11 0x0000564182798699 in bdrv_close_all () at ../block.c:5117
> #12 0x000056418248a5b2 in qemu_cleanup () at ../softmmu/runstate.c:821
> #13 0x0000564182738603 in qemu_default_main () at ../softmmu/main.c:38
> #14 0x0000564182738631 in main (argc=30, argv=0x7ffd675a8a48) at ../softmmu/main.c:48
>
> (gdb) p *((QemuMutex*)0x5641856f2a00)
> $1 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 2, __owner = 135952, ...
> (gdb) p *((QemuMutex*)0x564183365f00)
> $2 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 0, __owner = 135944, ...

[1]:

> Thread 1 "qemu-system-x86" hit Breakpoint 5, bdrv_drain_all_end () at ../block/io.c:551
> #0  bdrv_drain_all_end () at ../block/io.c:551
> #1  0x00005569810f0376 in bdrv_graph_wrlock (bs=0x0) at ../block/graph-lock.c:156
> #2  0x00005569810bd3e0 in bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=0x556982e2d7d0, new_bs=0x0) at ../block.c:2897
> #3  0x00005569810bdef2 in bdrv_root_unref_child (child=0x556982e2d7d0) at ../block.c:3227
> #4  0x00005569810e8137 in blk_remove_bs (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:914
> #5  0x00005569810e7689 in blk_remove_all_bs () at ../block/block-backend.c:583
> #6  0x00005569810c2699 in bdrv_close_all () at ../block.c:5117
> #7  0x0000556980db45b2 in qemu_cleanup () at ../softmmu/runstate.c:821
> #8  0x0000556981062603 in qemu_default_main () at ../softmmu/main.c:38
> #9  0x0000556981062631 in main (argc=30, argv=0x7ffd7a82a418) at ../softmmu/main.c:48
> [Switching to Thread 0x7fe76dab2700 (LWP 103649)]
>
> Thread 3 "qemu-system-x86" hit Breakpoint 4, blk_inc_in_flight (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:1505
> #0  blk_inc_in_flight (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:1505
> #1  0x00005569810e8f36 in blk_wait_while_drained (blk=0x556982e42880) at ../block/block-backend.c:1312
> #2  0x00005569810e9231 in blk_co_do_pwritev_part (blk=0x556982e42880, offset=3422961664, bytes=4096, qiov=0x556983028060, qiov_offset=0, flags=0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1402
> #3  0x00005569810e9a4b in blk_aio_write_entry (opaque=0x556982e2cfa0) at ../block/block-backend.c:1628
> #4  0x000055698128038a in coroutine_trampoline (i0=-2090057872, i1=21865) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:177
> #5  0x00007fe770f50d40 in ?? () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
> #6  0x00007ffd7a829570 in ?? ()
> #7  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Message-ID: <20230706131418.423713-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 12, 2023
virtio_load() as a whole should run in coroutine context because it
reads from the migration stream and we don't want this to block.

However, it calls virtio_set_features_nocheck() and devices don't
expect their .set_features callback to run in a coroutine and therefore
call functions that may not be called in coroutine context. To fix this,
drop out of coroutine context for calling virtio_set_features_nocheck().

Without this fix, the following crash was reported:

  #0  __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44
  #1  0x00007efc738c05d3 in __pthread_kill_internal (signo=6, threadid=<optimized out>) at pthread_kill.c:78
  #2  0x00007efc73873d26 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/raise.c:26
  #3  0x00007efc738477f3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79
  #4  0x00007efc7384771b in __assert_fail_base (fmt=0x7efc739dbcb8 "", assertion=assertion@entry=0x560aebfbf5cf "!qemu_in_coroutine()",
     file=file@entry=0x560aebfcd2d4 "../block/graph-lock.c", line=line@entry=275, function=function@entry=0x560aebfcd34d "void bdrv_graph_rdlock_main_loop(void)") at assert.c:92
  #5  0x00007efc7386ccc6 in __assert_fail (assertion=0x560aebfbf5cf "!qemu_in_coroutine()", file=0x560aebfcd2d4 "../block/graph-lock.c", line=275,
     function=0x560aebfcd34d "void bdrv_graph_rdlock_main_loop(void)") at assert.c:101
  #6  0x0000560aebcd8dd6 in bdrv_register_buf ()
  #7  0x0000560aeb97ed97 in ram_block_added.llvm ()
  #8  0x0000560aebb8303f in ram_block_add.llvm ()
  #9  0x0000560aebb834fa in qemu_ram_alloc_internal.llvm ()
  #10 0x0000560aebb2ac98 in vfio_region_mmap ()
  #11 0x0000560aebb3ea0f in vfio_bars_register ()
  #12 0x0000560aebb3c628 in vfio_realize ()
  #13 0x0000560aeb90f0c2 in pci_qdev_realize ()
  #14 0x0000560aebc40305 in device_set_realized ()
  #15 0x0000560aebc48e07 in property_set_bool.llvm ()
  #16 0x0000560aebc46582 in object_property_set ()
  #17 0x0000560aebc4cd58 in object_property_set_qobject ()
  #18 0x0000560aebc46ba7 in object_property_set_bool ()
  #19 0x0000560aeb98b3ca in qdev_device_add_from_qdict ()
  #20 0x0000560aebb1fbaf in virtio_net_set_features ()
  #21 0x0000560aebb46b51 in virtio_set_features_nocheck ()
  #22 0x0000560aebb47107 in virtio_load ()
  #23 0x0000560aeb9ae7ce in vmstate_load_state ()
  #24 0x0000560aeb9d2ee9 in qemu_loadvm_state_main ()
  #25 0x0000560aeb9d45e1 in qemu_loadvm_state ()
  #26 0x0000560aeb9bc32c in process_incoming_migration_co.llvm ()
  #27 0x0000560aebeace56 in coroutine_trampoline.llvm ()

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-832
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20230905145002.46391-3-kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 22, 2024
For multi-bytes commands, our implementation uses the @data_start
and @data_offset fields to track byte access. We initialize the
command start/offset in buffer once. Malicious guest might abuse
by switching command while staying in the 'transfer' state, switching
command buffer size, and our implementation can access out of buffer
boundary. For example, CMD17 (READ_SINGLE_BLOCK) allows to read up to
512 bytes, and CMD13 (SEND_STATUS) up to 64 bytes. By switching from
CMD17 to CMD13 (see reproducer below), bytes [64-511] are out of the
'status' buffer.

Our implementation return R0 status code for unexpected commands.
Such in-transaction command switch is unexpected and returns R0.
This is a good place to reset the start/offset fields to avoid
malicious accesses.

Can be reproduced running:

  $ export UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
  $ cat << EOF | qemu-system-i386 \
                     -display none -nographic \
                     -machine accel=qtest -m 512M \
                     -nodefaults \
                     -device sdhci-pci,sd-spec-version=3 \
                     -device sd-card,drive=mydrive \
                     -drive if=none,index=0,file=null-co://,format=raw,id=mydrive \
                     -qtest stdio -trace sd\* -trace -sdbus_read
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x02
  write 0xe000002c 0x1 0x05
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x37
  write 0xe000000a 0x1 0x01
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x29
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x02
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x03
  write 0xe000000c 0x1 0x32
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x06
  write 0xe0000005 0x1 0x01
  write 0xe0000007 0x1 0x01
  write 0xe0000003 0x1 0x00
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x11
  write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x01
  write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x02
  write 0xe000000f 0x1 0x0d
  write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x01
  write 0xe000002a 0x1 0x02
  EOF
  hw/sd/sd.c:1984:15: runtime error: index 256 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t [64]'
  #0 sd_read_byte hw/sd/sd.c:1984:15
  #1 sdbus_read_data hw/sd/core.c:157:23
  #2 sdhci_read_block_from_card hw/sd/sdhci.c:423:9
  #3 sdhci_blkgap_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1074:13
  #4 sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1195:13
  #5 memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5
  #6 access_with_adjusted_size softmmu/memory.c:554:18
  #7 memory_region_dispatch_write softmmu/memory.c
  #8 flatview_write_continue softmmu/physmem.c:2778:23
  #9 flatview_write softmmu/physmem.c:2818:14
  #10 address_space_write softmmu/physmem.c:2910:18
  SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior hw/sd/sd.c:1984:15

Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/487
Buglink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=36240
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20240408141717.66154-2-philmd@linaro.org>
bsdimp pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 22, 2024
ASan detected a global-buffer-overflow error in the aspeed_gpio_read()
function. This issue occurred when reading beyond the bounds of the
reg_table.

To enhance the safety and maintainability of the Aspeed GPIO code, this commit
introduces a reg_table_count member to the AspeedGPIOClass structure. This
change ensures that the size of the GPIO register table is explicitly tracked
and initialized, reducing the risk of errors if new register tables are
introduced in the future.

Reproducer:
cat << EOF | qemu-system-aarch64 -display none \
-machine accel=qtest, -m 512M -machine ast1030-evb -qtest stdio
readq 0x7e780272
EOF

ASAN log indicating the issue:
==2602930==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x55a5da29e128 at pc 0x55a5d700dc62 bp 0x7fff096c4e90 sp 0x7fff096c4e88
READ of size 2 at 0x55a5da29e128 thread T0
    #0 0x55a5d700dc61 in aspeed_gpio_read hw/gpio/aspeed_gpio.c:564:14
    #1 0x55a5d933f3ab in memory_region_read_accessor system/memory.c:445:11
    #2 0x55a5d92fba40 in access_with_adjusted_size system/memory.c:573:18
    #3 0x55a5d92f842c in memory_region_dispatch_read1 system/memory.c:1426:16
    #4 0x55a5d92f7b68 in memory_region_dispatch_read system/memory.c:1459:9
    #5 0x55a5d9376ad1 in flatview_read_continue_step system/physmem.c:2836:18
    #6 0x55a5d9376399 in flatview_read_continue system/physmem.c:2877:19
    #7 0x55a5d93775b8 in flatview_read system/physmem.c:2907:12

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2355
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@codeconstruct.com.au>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
When the creds->username property is set we allocate memory
for it in qcrypto_tls_creds_psk_prop_set_username(), but
we never free this when the QCryptoTLSCredsPSK is destroyed.
Free the memory in finalize.

This fixes a LeakSanitizer complaint in migration-test:

$ (cd build/asan; ASAN_OPTIONS="fast_unwind_on_malloc=0" QTEST_QEMU_BINARY=./qemu-system-x86_64 ./tests/qtest/migration-test --tap -k -p /x86_64/migration/precopy/unix/tls/psk)

=================================================================
==3867512==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x5624e5c99dee in malloc (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x218edee) (BuildId: a9e623fa1009a9435c0142c037cd7b8c1ad04ce3)
    #1 0x7fb199ae9738 in g_malloc debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmem.c:128:13
    #2 0x7fb199afe583 in g_strdup debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gstrfuncs.c:361:17
    #3 0x5624e82ea919 in qcrypto_tls_creds_psk_prop_set_username /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../crypto/tlscredspsk.c:255:23
    #4 0x5624e812c6b5 in property_set_str /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object.c:2277:5
    #5 0x5624e8125ce5 in object_property_set /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object.c:1463:5
    #6 0x5624e8136e7c in object_set_properties_from_qdict /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object_interfaces.c:55:14
    #7 0x5624e81372d2 in user_creatable_add_type /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object_interfaces.c:112:5
    #8 0x5624e8137964 in user_creatable_add_qapi /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/object_interfaces.c:157:11
    #9 0x5624e891ba3c in qmp_object_add /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:227:5
    #10 0x5624e8af9118 in qmp_marshal_object_add /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qapi/qapi-commands-qom.c:337:5
    #11 0x5624e8bd1d49 in do_qmp_dispatch_bh /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:128:5
    #12 0x5624e8cb2531 in aio_bh_call /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/async.c:171:5
    #13 0x5624e8cb340c in aio_bh_poll /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/async.c:218:13
    #14 0x5624e8c0be98 in aio_dispatch /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/aio-posix.c:423:5
    #15 0x5624e8cba3ce in aio_ctx_dispatch /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/async.c:360:5
    #16 0x7fb199ae0d3a in g_main_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:3419:28
    #17 0x7fb199ae0d3a in g_main_context_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:4137:7
    #18 0x5624e8cbe1d9 in glib_pollfds_poll /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/main-loop.c:287:9
    #19 0x5624e8cbcb13 in os_host_main_loop_wait /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/main-loop.c:310:5
    #20 0x5624e8cbc6dc in main_loop_wait /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../util/main-loop.c:589:11
    #21 0x5624e6f3f917 in qemu_main_loop /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../system/runstate.c:801:9
    #22 0x5624e893379c in qemu_default_main /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../system/main.c:37:14
    #23 0x5624e89337e7 in main /mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../system/main.c:48:12
    #24 0x7fb197972d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
    #25 0x7fb197972e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
    #26 0x5624e5c16fa4 in _start (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x210bfa4) (BuildId: a9e623fa1009a9435c0142c037cd7b8c1ad04ce3)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 5 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240819145021.38524-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
In multifd_recv_setup() we allocate (among other things)
 * a MultiFDRecvData struct to multifd_recv_state::data
 * a MultiFDRecvData struct to each multfd_recv_state->params[i].data

(Then during execution we might swap these pointers around.)

But in multifd_recv_cleanup() we free multifd_recv_state->data
in multifd_recv_cleanup_state() but we don't ever free the
multifd_recv_state->params[i].data. This results in a memory
leak reported by LeakSanitizer:

(cd build/asan && \
   ASAN_OPTIONS="fast_unwind_on_malloc=0:strip_path_prefix=/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/../../" \
   QTEST_QEMU_BINARY=./qemu-system-x86_64 \
   ./tests/qtest/migration-test --tap -k -p /x86_64/migration/multifd/file/mapped-ram )
[...]
Direct leak of 72 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x561cc0afcfd8 in __interceptor_calloc (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x218efd8) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)
    #1 0x7f89d37acc50 in g_malloc0 debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmem.c:161:13
    #2 0x561cc1e9c83c in multifd_recv_setup migration/multifd.c:1606:19
    #3 0x561cc1e68618 in migration_ioc_process_incoming migration/migration.c:972:9
    #4 0x561cc1e3ac59 in migration_channel_process_incoming migration/channel.c:45:9
    #5 0x561cc1e4fa0b in file_accept_incoming_migration migration/file.c:132:5
    #6 0x561cc30f2c0c in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch io/channel-watch.c:84:12
    #7 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:3419:28
    #8 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_context_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:4137:7
    #9 0x561cc3b21659 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:287:9
    #10 0x561cc3b1ff93 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:310:5
    #11 0x561cc3b1fb5c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:589:11
    #12 0x561cc1da2917 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:801:9
    #13 0x561cc3796c1c in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14
    #14 0x561cc3796c67 in main system/main.c:48:12
    #15 0x7f89d163bd8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
    #16 0x7f89d163be3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
    #17 0x561cc0a79fa4 in _start (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x210bfa4) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)

Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x561cc0afcfd8 in __interceptor_calloc (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x218efd8) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)
    #1 0x7f89d37acc50 in g_malloc0 debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmem.c:161:13
    #2 0x561cc1e9bed9 in multifd_recv_setup migration/multifd.c:1588:32
    #3 0x561cc1e68618 in migration_ioc_process_incoming migration/migration.c:972:9
    #4 0x561cc1e3ac59 in migration_channel_process_incoming migration/channel.c:45:9
    #5 0x561cc1e4fa0b in file_accept_incoming_migration migration/file.c:132:5
    #6 0x561cc30f2c0c in qio_channel_fd_source_dispatch io/channel-watch.c:84:12
    #7 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:3419:28
    #8 0x7f89d37a3c43 in g_main_context_dispatch debian/build/deb/../../../glib/gmain.c:4137:7
    #9 0x561cc3b21659 in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:287:9
    #10 0x561cc3b1ff93 in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:310:5
    #11 0x561cc3b1fb5c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:589:11
    #12 0x561cc1da2917 in qemu_main_loop system/runstate.c:801:9
    #13 0x561cc3796c1c in qemu_default_main system/main.c:37:14
    #14 0x561cc3796c67 in main system/main.c:48:12
    #15 0x7f89d163bd8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
    #16 0x7f89d163be3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
    #17 0x561cc0a79fa4 in _start (/mnt/nvmedisk/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/asan/qemu-system-x86_64+0x210bfa4) (BuildId: be72e086d4e47b172b0a72779972213fd9916466)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 96 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s).

Free the params[i].data too.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: d117ed0 ("migration/multifd: Allow receiving pages without packets")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
Allow overlapping request by removing the assert that made it
impossible. There are only two callers:

1. block_copy_task_create()

It already asserts the very same condition before calling
reqlist_init_req().

2. cbw_snapshot_read_lock()

There is no need to have read requests be non-overlapping in
copy-before-write when used for snapshot-access. In fact, there was no
protection against two callers of cbw_snapshot_read_lock() calling
reqlist_init_req() with overlapping ranges and this could lead to an
assertion failure [1].

In particular, with the reproducer script below [0], two
cbw_co_snapshot_block_status() callers could race, with the second
calling reqlist_init_req() before the first one finishes and removes
its conflicting request.

[0]:

> #!/bin/bash -e
> dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/disk.raw bs=1M count=1024
> ./qemu-img create /tmp/fleecing.raw -f raw 1G
> (
> ./qemu-system-x86_64 --qmp stdio \
> --blockdev raw,node-name=node0,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/disk.raw \
> --blockdev raw,node-name=node1,file.driver=file,file.filename=/tmp/fleecing.raw \
> <<EOF
> {"execute": "qmp_capabilities"}
> {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "copy-before-write", "file": "node0", "target": "node1", "node-name": "node3" } }
> {"execute": "blockdev-add", "arguments": { "driver": "snapshot-access", "file": "node3", "node-name": "snap0" } }
> {"execute": "nbd-server-start", "arguments": {"addr": { "type": "unix", "data": { "path": "/tmp/nbd.socket" } } } }
> {"execute": "block-export-add", "arguments": {"id": "exp0", "node-name": "snap0", "type": "nbd", "name": "exp0"}}
> EOF
> ) &
> sleep 5
> while true; do
> ./qemu-nbd -d /dev/nbd0
> ./qemu-nbd -c /dev/nbd0 nbd:unix:/tmp/nbd.socket:exportname=exp0 -f raw -r
> nbdinfo --map 'nbd+unix:///exp0?socket=/tmp/nbd.socket'
> done

[1]:

> #5  0x000071e5f0088eb2 in __GI___assert_fail (...) at ./assert/assert.c:101
> #6  0x0000615285438017 in reqlist_init_req (...) at ../block/reqlist.c:23
> #7  0x00006152853e2d98 in cbw_snapshot_read_lock (...) at ../block/copy-before-write.c:237
> #8  0x00006152853e3068 in cbw_co_snapshot_block_status (...) at ../block/copy-before-write.c:304
> #9  0x00006152853f4d22 in bdrv_co_snapshot_block_status (...) at ../block/io.c:3726
> #10 0x000061528543a63e in snapshot_access_co_block_status (...) at ../block/snapshot-access.c:48
> #11 0x00006152853f1a0a in bdrv_co_do_block_status (...) at ../block/io.c:2474
> #12 0x00006152853f2016 in bdrv_co_common_block_status_above (...) at ../block/io.c:2652
> #13 0x00006152853f22cf in bdrv_co_block_status_above (...) at ../block/io.c:2732
> #14 0x00006152853d9a86 in blk_co_block_status_above (...) at ../block/block-backend.c:1473
> #15 0x000061528538da6c in blockstatus_to_extents (...) at ../nbd/server.c:2374
> #16 0x000061528538deb1 in nbd_co_send_block_status (...) at ../nbd/server.c:2481
> #17 0x000061528538f424 in nbd_handle_request (...) at ../nbd/server.c:2978
> #18 0x000061528538f906 in nbd_trip (...) at ../nbd/server.c:3121
> #19 0x00006152855a7caf in coroutine_trampoline (...) at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:175

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Suggested-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Message-Id: <20240712140716.517911-1-f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
When SET_STREAM_FORMAT is called, we should clear the existing setup.

Factor out common function to close a stream.

Direct leak of 144 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f91d38f7350 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xf7350) (BuildId: a4ad7eb954b390cf00f07fa10952988a41d9fc7a)
    #1 0x7f91d2ab7871 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x64871) (BuildId: 36b60dbd02e796145a982d0151ce37202ec05649)
    #2 0x562fa2f447ee in timer_new_full /home/elmarco/src/qemu/include/qemu/timer.h:538
    #3 0x562fa2f4486f in timer_new /home/elmarco/src/qemu/include/qemu/timer.h:559
    #4 0x562fa2f448a9 in timer_new_ns /home/elmarco/src/qemu/include/qemu/timer.h:577
    #5 0x562fa2f47955 in hda_audio_setup ../hw/audio/hda-codec.c:490
    #6 0x562fa2f4897e in hda_audio_command ../hw/audio/hda-codec.c:605

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Message-ID: <20241008125028.1177932-3-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
In regime_is_user() we assert if we're passed an ARMMMUIdx_E10_*
mmuidx value. This used to make sense because we only used this
function in ptw.c and would never use it on this kind of stage 1+2
mmuidx, only for an individual stage 1 or stage 2 mmuidx.

However, when we implemented FEAT_E0PD we added a callsite in
aa64_va_parameters(), which means this can now be called for
stage 1+2 mmuidx values if the guest sets the TCG_ELX.{E0PD0,E0PD1}
bits to enable use of the feature. This will then result in
an assertion failure later, for instance on a TLBI operation:

#6  0x00007ffff6d0e70f in g_assertion_message_expr
    (domain=0x0, file=0x55555676eeba "../../target/arm/internals.h", line=978, func=0x555556771d48 <__func__.5> "regime_is_user", expr=<optimised out>)
    at ../../../glib/gtestutils.c:3279
#7  0x0000555555f286d2 in regime_is_user (env=0x555557f2fe00, mmu_idx=ARMMMUIdx_E10_0) at ../../target/arm/internals.h:978
#8  0x0000555555f3e31c in aa64_va_parameters (env=0x555557f2fe00, va=18446744073709551615, mmu_idx=ARMMMUIdx_E10_0, data=true, el1_is_aa32=false)
    at ../../target/arm/helper.c:12048
#9  0x0000555555f3163b in tlbi_aa64_get_range (env=0x555557f2fe00, mmuidx=ARMMMUIdx_E10_0, value=106721347371041) at ../../target/arm/helper.c:5214
#10 0x0000555555f317e8 in do_rvae_write (env=0x555557f2fe00, value=106721347371041, idxmap=21, synced=true) at ../../target/arm/helper.c:5260
#11 0x0000555555f31925 in tlbi_aa64_rvae1is_write (env=0x555557f2fe00, ri=0x555557fbeae0, value=106721347371041) at ../../target/arm/helper.c:5302
#12 0x0000555556036f8f in helper_set_cp_reg64 (env=0x555557f2fe00, rip=0x555557fbeae0, value=106721347371041) at ../../target/arm/tcg/op_helper.c:965

Since we do know whether these mmuidx values are for usermode
or not, we can easily make regime_is_user() handle them:
ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 is user, and the other two are not.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: e4c93e4 ("target/arm: Implement FEAT_E0PD")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20241017172331.822587-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
qemu-bsd-user pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2024
qemu-ga on a NetBSD -current VM terminates with a SIGSEGV upon receiving
'guest-set-time' command...

Core was generated by `qemu-ga'.
Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
#0  0x000000000cd37a40 in ga_pipe_read_str (fd=fd@entry=0xffffff922a20, str=str@entry=0xffffff922a18)
    at ../qga/commands-posix.c:88
88	        *str[len] = '\0';
[Current thread is 1 (process 1112)]
(gdb) bt
#0  0x000000000cd37a40 in ga_pipe_read_str (fd=fd@entry=0xffffff922a20, str=str@entry=0xffffff922a18)
    at ../qga/commands-posix.c:88
#1  0x000000000cd37b60 in ga_run_command (argv=argv@entry=0xffffff922a90,
    action=action@entry=0xcda34b8 "set hardware clock to system time", errp=errp@entry=0xffffff922a70, in_str=0x0)
    at ../qga/commands-posix.c:164
#2  0x000000000cd380c4 in qmp_guest_set_time (has_time=<optimized out>, time_ns=<optimized out>,
    errp=errp@entry=0xffffff922ad0) at ../qga/commands-posix.c:304
#3  0x000000000cd253d8 in qmp_marshal_guest_set_time (args=<optimized out>, ret=<optimized out>, errp=0xffffff922b48)
    at qga/qga-qapi-commands.c:193
#4  0x000000000cd4e71c in qmp_dispatch (cmds=cmds@entry=0xcdf5b18 <ga_commands>, request=request@entry=0xf3c711a4b000,
    allow_oob=allow_oob@entry=false, cur_mon=cur_mon@entry=0x0) at ../qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:220
#5  0x000000000cd36524 in process_event (opaque=0xf3c711a79000, obj=0xf3c711a4b000, err=0x0) at ../qga/main.c:677
#6  0x000000000cd526f0 in json_message_process_token (lexer=lexer@entry=0xf3c711a79018, input=0xf3c712072480,
    type=type@entry=JSON_RCURLY, x=28, y=1) at ../qobject/json-streamer.c:99
#7  0x000000000cd93860 in json_lexer_feed_char (lexer=lexer@entry=0xf3c711a79018, ch=125 '}', flush=flush@entry=false)
    at ../qobject/json-lexer.c:313
#8  0x000000000cd93a00 in json_lexer_feed (lexer=lexer@entry=0xf3c711a79018,
    buffer=buffer@entry=0xffffff922d10 "{\"execute\":\"guest-set-time\"}\n", size=<optimized out>)
    at ../qobject/json-lexer.c:350
#9  0x000000000cd5290c in json_message_parser_feed (parser=parser@entry=0xf3c711a79000,
    buffer=buffer@entry=0xffffff922d10 "{\"execute\":\"guest-set-time\"}\n", size=<optimized out>)
    at ../qobject/json-streamer.c:121
#10 0x000000000cd361fc in channel_event_cb (condition=<optimized out>, data=0xf3c711a79000) at ../qga/main.c:703
#11 0x000000000cd3710c in ga_channel_client_event (channel=<optimized out>, condition=<optimized out>, data=0xf3c711b2d300)
    at ../qga/channel-posix.c:94
#12 0x0000f3c7120d9bec in g_main_dispatch () from /usr/pkg/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0
#13 0x0000f3c7120dd25c in g_main_context_iterate_unlocked.constprop () from /usr/pkg/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0
#14 0x0000f3c7120ddbf0 in g_main_loop_run () from /usr/pkg/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0
#15 0x000000000cda00d8 in run_agent_once (s=0xf3c711a79000) at ../qga/main.c:1522
#16 run_agent (s=0xf3c711a79000) at ../qga/main.c:1559
#17 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at ../qga/main.c:1671
(gdb)

The commandline options used on the host machine...
qemu-system-aarch64 \
   -machine type=virt,pflash0=rom \
   -m 8G \
   -cpu host \
   -smp 8 \
   -accel hvf \
   -device virtio-net-pci,netdev=unet \
   -device virtio-blk-pci,drive=hd \
   -drive file=netbsd.qcow2,if=none,id=hd \
   -netdev user,id=unet,hostfwd=tcp::2223-:22 \
   -object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom,id=viornd0 \
   -device virtio-rng-pci,rng=viornd0 \
   -serial mon:stdio \
   -display none \
   -blockdev node-name=rom,driver=file,filename=/opt/homebrew/Cellar/qemu/9.0.2/share/qemu/edk2-aarch64-code.fd,read-only=true \
   -chardev socket,path=/tmp/qga_netbsd.sock,server=on,wait=off,id=qga0 \
   -device virtio-serial \
   -device virtconsole,chardev=qga0,name=org.qemu.guest_agent.0

This patch rectifies the operator precedence while assigning the NUL
terminator.

Fixes: c3f32c1

Signed-off-by: Sunil Nimmagadda <sunil@nimmagadda.net>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/m15xppk9qg.fsf@nimmagadda.net
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
sobomax added a commit to sobomax/qemu-bsd-user-l4b that referenced this pull request Dec 22, 2024
and initialize before we proceed. This prevent a rate race
condition with user-mode qemu, where qemu might fork faster
and somehow loose rcu thread in the process.

1561208 pts/1    Sl     0:04 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/bin/make -f Makefile.inc1 BWPHASE=everything DESTDIR=/usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp all
1561319 pts/1    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /bin/sh -e
1561368 pts/1    Sl     0:02 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/bin/make all DIRPRFX=usr.sbin/
1617939 pts/1    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /bin/sh -e
1617978 pts/1    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/bin/make all DIRPRFX=usr.sbin/traceroute/
1618067 pts/1    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /bin/sh -ev
1618094 pts/1    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp/legacy/usr/sbin/head -1 /usr/src/contrib/traceroute/VERSION
1618095 pts/1    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp/legacy/usr/sbin/sed -e s/.*/char version[] = "&";/
1618113 pts/1    S      0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp/legacy/usr/sbin/head -1 /usr/src/contrib/traceroute/VERSION

(base) sshrpc@inferner-xlg-01:~/qemu-bsd-user-l4b/build$ sudo gdb qemu-x86_64 1618113
(gdb) bt
~#0  0x00007a91b70515b0 in __lll_lock_wait ()
~#1  0x00007a91b7056541 in pthread_mutex_lock ()
~#2  0x00007a91b6fab6d8 in qemu_mutex_lock_impl (mutex=0x7a91b72396a8 <rcu_sync_lock>, file=0x7a91b71223fd "../util/rcu.c", line=440) at ../util/qemu-thread-posix.c:94
~qemu-bsd-user#3  0x00007a91b6fadf8c in rcu_init_lock () at ../util/rcu.c:440
~qemu-bsd-user#4  0x00007a91b708d98f in __run_prefork_handlers ()
~qemu-bsd-user#5  0x00007a91b708c231 in fork ()
~qemu-bsd-user#6  0x00007a91b6f4f84e in do_freebsd_fork (cpu_env=0x555578908980) at ../bsd-user/linux/os-proc.h:223
~qemu-bsd-user#7  0x00007a91b6f4e62b in freebsd_syscall (cpu_env=0x555578908980, num=2, arg1=1, arg2=536870913, arg3=0, arg4=140737471561192, arg5=20047, arg7=0, arg8=0, arg6=<optimized out>) at ../bsd-user/linux/os-syscall.c:492
~qemu-bsd-user#8  do_freebsd_syscall (cpu_env=0x555578908980, num=2, arg1=1, arg2=536870913, arg3=0, arg4=140737471561192, arg5=20047, arg6=10470879232, arg7=0, arg8=0) at ../bsd-user/linux/os-syscall.c:1904
~qemu-bsd-user#9  0x00007a91b6f44022 in target_cpu_loop (env=0x555578908980) at ../bsd-user/x86_64/target_arch_cpu.h:131
~qemu-bsd-user#10 cpu_loop (env=0x555578908980) at ../bsd-user/main.c:160
~qemu-bsd-user#11 0x00007a91b6f49491 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at ../bsd-user/main.c:689
(gdb) info threads
  Id   Target Id              Frame
* 1    process 1618113 "head" 0x00007a91b70515b0 in __lll_lock_wait ()
(gdb) up

Note, we are in __run_prefork_handlers, but the rcu thread is not running.
Also, the lock points to some intermediary process 1618100 which is not
present, which suggests it was some kind of chain.

(gdb) print *mutex
$1 = {lock = {__data = {__lock = 2, __count = 0, __owner = 1618100, __nusers = 1, __kind = 0, __spins = 0, __elision = 0, __list = {__prev = 0x0, __next = 0x0}},
    __size = "\002\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\264\260\030\000\001", '\000' <repeats 26 times>, __align = 2}, initialized = true}
sobomax added a commit to sobomax/qemu-bsd-user-l4b that referenced this pull request Dec 25, 2024
into the RCU. This ensures that the worker thread has proper
chance to register itself. The previous change would make it
more stable, but it seems it can still fail:

3640249 pts/4    Sl     0:04 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/bin/make -f Makefile.inc1 BWPHASE=everything DESTDIR=/usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp all
3640361 pts/4    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /bin/sh -e
3640400 pts/4    Sl     0:02 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/bin/make all DIRPRFX=usr.sbin/
3693361 pts/4    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /bin/sh -e
3693395 pts/4    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/bin/make all DIRPRFX=usr.sbin/traceroute/
3693468 pts/4    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /bin/sh -ev
3693525 pts/4    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp/legacy/usr/sbin/head -1 /usr/src/contrib/traceroute/VERSION
3693526 pts/4    Sl     0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp/legacy/usr/sbin/sed -e s/.*/char version[] = "&";/
3693548 pts/4    S      0:00 /tmp/q.fbsd /usr/obj/usr/src/amd64.amd64/tmp/legacy/usr/sbin/head -1 /usr/src/contrib/traceroute/VERSION
3782853 pts/0    S+     0:00 grep --color=auto q.fbs
(base) sshrpc@inferner-xlg-01:~/qemu-bsd-user-l4b/build$ sudo gdb ./qemu-x86_64 3693548
0x000078f8d871478b in __lll_lock_wait_private ()
(gdb) info threads
  Id   Target Id              Frame
* 1    process 3693548 "head" 0x000078f8d871478b in __lll_lock_wait_private ()
(gdb) bt
~#0  0x000078f8d871478b in __lll_lock_wait_private ()
~#1  0x000078f8d8720ad0 in malloc ()
~#2  0x000078f8d86929da in g_malloc ()
~qemu-bsd-user#3  0x000078f8d86a99ae in g_tree_insert_internal ()
~qemu-bsd-user#4  0x000078f8d85fc5bf in q_tree_insert (tree=0x78f8d88f01e0 <main_arena>, key=0x78f8c01252e0, value=0x78f8c01252c0) at /home/sshrpc/qemu-bsd-user-l4b/include/qemu/qtree.h:138
~qemu-bsd-user#5  tcg_tb_insert (tb=0x78f8c01252c0) at ../tcg/region.c:229
~qemu-bsd-user#6  tb_gen_code (cpu=0x5555866c71d0, pc=<optimized out>, cs_base=<optimized out>, flags=<optimized out>, cflags=<optimized out>) at ../accel/tcg/translate-all.c:545
~qemu-bsd-user#7  0x000078f8d85f12da in cpu_exec_loop (cpu=0x5555866c71d0, sc=<optimized out>) at ../accel/tcg/cpu-exec.c:993
~qemu-bsd-user#8  0x000078f8d85f0ede in cpu_exec_setjmp (cpu=0x5555866c71d0, sc=<optimized out>) at ../accel/tcg/cpu-exec.c:1039
~qemu-bsd-user#9  0x000078f8d860699a in cpu_exec (cpu=0x5555866c71d0) at ../accel/tcg/cpu-exec.c:1065
~qemu-bsd-user#10 target_cpu_loop (env=0x5555866c9980) at ../bsd-user/x86_64/target_arch_cpu.h:123
~qemu-bsd-user#11 cpu_loop (env=0x5555866c9980) at ../bsd-user/main.c:160
~qemu-bsd-user#12 0x000078f8d860c5b1 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at ../bsd-user/main.c:689
(gdb) up
~#1  0x000078f8d8720ad0 in malloc ()
(gdb)
~#2  0x000078f8d86929da in g_malloc ()
(gdb)
~qemu-bsd-user#3  0x000078f8d86a99ae in g_tree_insert_internal ()
(gdb)
~qemu-bsd-user#4  0x000078f8d85fc5bf in q_tree_insert (tree=0x78f8d88f01e0 <main_arena>, key=0x78f8c01252e0, value=0x78f8c01252c0) at /home/sshrpc/qemu-bsd-user-l4b/include/qemu/qtree.h:138
138         g_tree_insert(tree, key, value);
(gdb) print tree
$1 = (QTree *) 0x78f8d88f01e0 <main_arena>
(gdb) up
~qemu-bsd-user#5  tcg_tb_insert (tb=0x78f8c01252c0) at ../tcg/region.c:229
229         q_tree_insert(rt->tree, &tb->tc, tb);
(gdb)
~qemu-bsd-user#6  tb_gen_code (cpu=0x5555866c71d0, pc=<optimized out>, cs_base=<optimized out>, flags=<optimized out>, cflags=<optimized out>) at ../accel/tcg/translate-all.c:545
545         tcg_tb_insert(tb);
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