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ui/vnc: limit client_cut_text msg payload size
currently a malicious client could define a payload
size of 2^32 - 1 bytes and send up to that size of
data to the vnc server. The server would allocated
that amount of memory which could easily create an
out of memory condition.

This patch limits the payload size to 1MB max.

Please note that client_cut_text messages are currently
silently ignored.

Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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plieven authored and kraxel committed Jul 1, 2014
1 parent b3959ef commit f9a70e7
Showing 1 changed file with 10 additions and 3 deletions.
13 changes: 10 additions & 3 deletions ui/vnc.c
Expand Up @@ -2165,13 +2165,20 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
pointer_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4));
break;
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_CUT_TEXT:
if (len == 1)
if (len == 1) {
return 8;

}
if (len == 8) {
uint32_t dlen = read_u32(data, 4);
if (dlen > 0)
if (dlen > (1 << 20)) {
error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes"
" which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen);
vnc_client_error(vs);
break;
}
if (dlen > 0) {
return 8 + dlen;
}
}

client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);
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