Skip to content
Permalink
Browse files

Merge pull request #4124 from pblottiere/security

add unit tests for sql injection
  • Loading branch information
rldhont committed Mar 6, 2017
2 parents b9a0ba1 + 3807936 commit 9bb7681b8678b93212acfdfd5a70ca360c4ca4ae
@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ IF (WITH_SERVER)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsServer test_qgsserver.py)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsServerSettings test_qgsserver_settings.py)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsServerProjectUtils test_qgsserver_projectutils.py)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsServerSecurity test_qgsserver_security.py)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsServerAccessControl test_qgsserver_accesscontrol.py)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsServerWFST test_qgsserver_wfst.py)
ADD_PYTHON_TEST(PyQgsOfflineEditingWFS test_offline_editing_wfs.py)
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""QGIS Unit tests for server security.
.. note:: This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
"""
__author__ = 'Paul Blottiere'
__date__ = '31/01/2017'
__copyright__ = 'Copyright 2017, The QGIS Project'
# This will get replaced with a git SHA1 when you do a git archive
__revision__ = '$Format:%H$'

from qgis.utils import spatialite_connect
import os
import time
import urllib.parse
from shutil import copyfile
from qgis.core import QgsApplication
from qgis.server import QgsServer
from qgis.testing import unittest
from utilities import unitTestDataPath


class TestQgsServerSecurity(unittest.TestCase):

@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.testdatapath = unitTestDataPath('qgis_server_security') + '/'
cls.db = os.path.join(cls.testdatapath, 'db.sqlite')
cls.db_clone = os.path.join(cls.testdatapath, 'db_clone.sqlite')
cls.project = os.path.join(cls.testdatapath, 'project.qgs')
cls.app = QgsApplication([], False)

@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls):
cls.app.exitQgis()
try:
os.remove(cls.db_clone)
except OSError:
pass

def setUp(self):
self.server = QgsServer()
copyfile(self.db, self.db_clone)

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_and_based_blind(self):
"""
And-based blind attack to check the kind of database currently used (if
the result is valid for the point nammed 'b', then sqlite_version()
function exist).
But does not work because of the whitelist.
If you remove the safety check, this is a valid injection.
"""

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'b'"
injection_sql = ") and (select sqlite_version()"

query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(query)

self.assertFalse(b"name = 'b'" in d)

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_time_based_blind(self):
"""
Time-based blind to check the current version of database. If the
server is too long to respond, then we have the answer!
But it does not work because of the whitelist.
If you remove the safety check, this is a valid injection.
"""

# first step, retrieve the version of sqlite by a regular way
conn = spatialite_connect(self.db_clone)
cur = conn.cursor()
sql = "select sqlite_version()"
sqlite_version = ''
for row in cur.execute(sql):
sqlite_version = row[0]
conn.close()

# second step, check the time of response for an invalid version
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'b'"
injection_sql = ") and (select case sqlite_version() when '0.0.0' then substr(upper(hex(randomblob(99999999))),0,1) end)--"

query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)
start = time.time()
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(query)
duration_invalid_version = time.time() - start

# third step, check the time of response for a valid version
# maximum: several seconds
injection_sql = ") and (select case sqlite_version() when '{0}' then substr(upper(hex(randomblob(99999999))),0,1) end)--".format(sqlite_version)

query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)
start = time.time()
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(query)
duration_valid_version = time.time() - start

# compare duration. On my computer when safety check is deactivated:
# duration_invalid_version: 0.012360334396362305
# duration_valid_version: 2.8810460567474365
self.assertAlmostEqual(duration_valid_version, duration_invalid_version, delta=0.5)

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_stacked(self):
"""
The aim is to execute some staked queries. Here the 'drop' function is
used but it could be done with create, insert, ...
But the filter string is split thanks to the semicolon so it seems
totally ignored whatever the query is (even without the safety check).
"""

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'fake'"
injection_sql = "); drop table point"

query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(query)

self.assertTrue(self.is_point_table_still_exist())

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_union_0(self):
"""
The aim is to retrieve name of tables within the database (like
'SpatialIndex').
But the whitelist blocks this request because of invalid tokens.
If you remove the safety check, this is a valid injection.
"""

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'fake'"
injection_sql = ") union select 1,1,name,1,1 from sqlite_master where type = \"table\" order by name--"

query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(query)

self.assertFalse(b'SpatialIndex' in d)

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_union_1(self):
"""
The aim is to retrieve data from an excluded layer.
But the whitelist blocks this request because of invalid tokens.
If you remove the safety check, this is a valid injection.
"""

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'fake'"
injection_sql = ") union select 1,1,* from aoi--"

query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(query)

self.assertFalse(b'private_value' in d)

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_unicode(self):
"""
The aim is to send some invalid token in unicode to bypass the
whitelist.
But unicode is interpreted and checked by the safety function.
"""

# %3B -> semicolon
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'fake %3B'"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_patternmatching(self):
"""
The aim is to retrieve the table's name thanks to pattern matching.
If you remove the safety check, this is a valid injection.
"""

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'b'"
injection_sql = "or ( select name from sqlite_master where type='table' and name like '{0}') != ''"
query = "{0} {1}".format(filter_sql, injection_sql)

# there's no table named as 'az%'
name = "az%"
sql = query.format(name)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(sql)
# self.assertTrue(b"name = 'b'" in d) #true if sanity check deactivated
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

# a table named as 'ao%' exist
name = "ao%"
sql = query.format(name)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(sql)
# self.assertTrue(b"name = 'a'" in d) #true if sanity check deactivated
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

# a table named as 'aoi' exist
name = "aoi"
sql = query.format(name)
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(sql)
# self.assertTrue(b"name = 'a'" in d) #true if sanity check deactivated
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

def test_wms_getfeatureinfo_filter_whitelist(self):
"""
The aim is to check that some tokens cannot pass the safety check
whatever their positions in the filter string.
"""

# create
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a'create"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a' create"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

# invalid token and escape single quote
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a\\'create"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

# drop
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a' drop"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

# select
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a' select"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

# comments
filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a' #"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

filter_sql = "point:\"name\" = 'a' -"
d, h = self.handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(filter_sql)
self.assertTrue(self.check_service_exception_report(d))

def test_wfs_getfeature_filter_stacked(self):
"""
The aim is to execute some staked queries within the 'Literal'
and 'PropertyName' field. Here the 'drop' function is used but it
could be done with create, insert, ...
But due to the implementation, these filters are not resolved on
database side but in server side with QgsExpression. So, there's no
'WHERE' clause and the query never reach the database. By the way,
it's exactly the same thing whatever the kind of attacks and for
the EXP_FILTER parameter too (filter described with QgsExpression).
It's typically the kind of SQL injection which has been fixed in
mapserver several years ago:
https://trac.osgeo.org/mapserver/ticket/3874
"""

# ogc:Literal / ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo
literal = "4')); drop table point --"
filter_xml = "<ogc:Filter%20xmlns:ogc=\"http://www.opengis.net/ogc\"><ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo><ogc:PropertyName>pkuid</ogc:PropertyName><ogc:Literal>{0}</ogc:Literal></ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo></ogc:Filter>".format(literal)
self.handle_request_wfs_getfeature_filter(filter_xml)
self.assertTrue(self.is_point_table_still_exist())

# ogc:Literal / ogc:PropertyIsLike
literal = "4')); drop table point --"
filter_xml = "<ogc:Filter%20xmlns:ogc=\"http://www.opengis.net/ogc\"><ogc:PropertyIsLike><ogc:PropertyName>pkuid</ogc:PropertyName><ogc:Literal>{0}</ogc:Literal></ogc:PropertyIsLike></ogc:Filter>".format(literal)
self.handle_request_wfs_getfeature_filter(filter_xml)
self.assertTrue(self.is_point_table_still_exist())

# ogc:PropertyName / ogc:PropertyIsLike
propname = "name = 'a')); drop table point --"
filter_xml = "<ogc:Filter%20xmlns:ogc=\"http://www.opengis.net/ogc\"><ogc:PropertyIsLike><ogc:PropertyName>{0}</ogc:PropertyName><ogc:Literal>4</ogc:Literal></ogc:PropertyIsLike></ogc:Filter>".format(propname)
self.handle_request_wfs_getfeature_filter(filter_xml)
self.assertTrue(self.is_point_table_still_exist())

def test_wms_getmap_sld_stacked(self):
"""
The aim is to execute some staked queries within the 'Literal'
and 'PropertyName' field. Here the 'drop' function is used but it
could be done with create, insert, ...
However it's not working because special characters are duplicated. For
example, with 'Literal' as "4')); drop table point --", the underlying
query is:
SELECT .... AND (("pkuid" = '4'')); drop table point --'))
"""

literal = "4')); drop table point --"
sld = "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><StyledLayerDescriptor xmlns=\"http://www.opengis.net/sld\" xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" xmlns:ogc=\"http://www.opengis.net/ogc\" xsi:schemaLocation=\"http://www.opengis.net/sld http://schemas.opengis.net/sld/1.1.0/StyledLayerDescriptor.xsd\" version=\"1.1.0\" xmlns:se=\"http://www.opengis.net/se\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\"> <NamedLayer> <se:Name>point</se:Name> <UserStyle> <se:Name>point</se:Name> <se:FeatureTypeStyle> <se:Rule> <se:Name>Single symbol</se:Name> <ogc:Filter xmlns:ogc=\"http://www.opengis.net/ogc\"> <ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo> <ogc:PropertyName>pkuid</ogc:PropertyName> <ogc:Literal>{0}</ogc:Literal> </ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo> </ogc:Filter> <se:PointSymbolizer> <se:Graphic> <se:Mark> <se:WellKnownName>circle</se:WellKnownName> <se:Fill><se:SvgParameter name=\"fill\">5e86a1</se:SvgParameter></se:Fill><se:Stroke><se:SvgParameter name=\"stroke\">000000</se:SvgParameter></se:Stroke></se:Mark><se:Size>7</se:Size></se:Graphic></se:PointSymbolizer></se:Rule></se:FeatureTypeStyle></UserStyle></NamedLayer></StyledLayerDescriptor>".format(literal)
self.handle_request_wms_getmap(sld)
self.assertTrue(self.is_point_table_still_exist())

def check_service_exception_report(self, d):
"""
Return True if a ServiceExceptionReport is raised, False otherwise
"""

if b'<ServiceExceptionReport' in d:
return True
else:
return False

def handle_request_wfs_getfeature_filter(self, filter_xml):
qs = "&".join(["%s=%s" % i for i in list({
"MAP": urllib.parse.quote(self.project),
"SERVICE": "WFS",
"VERSION": "1.1.1",
"REQUEST": "GetFeature",
"TYPENAME": "point",
"STYLES": "",
"CRS": "EPSG:32613",
"FILTER": filter_xml}.items())])

return self.server.handleRequest(qs)

def handle_request_wms_getfeatureinfo(self, filter_sql):
qs = "&".join(["%s=%s" % i for i in list({
"MAP": urllib.parse.quote(self.project),
"SERVICE": "WMS",
"VERSION": "1.1.1",
"REQUEST": "GetFeatureInfo",
"QUERY_LAYERS": "point",
"LAYERS": "point",
"STYLES": "",
"FORMAT": "image/png",
"HEIGHT": "500",
"WIDTH": "500",
"BBOX": "606171,4822867,612834,4827375",
"CRS": "EPSG:32613",
"FILTER": filter_sql}.items())])

return self._result(self.server.handleRequest(qs))

def handle_request_wms_getmap(self, sld):
qs = "&".join(["%s=%s" % i for i in list({
"MAP": urllib.parse.quote(self.project),
"SERVICE": "WMS",
"VERSION": "1.0.0",
"REQUEST": "GetMap",
"QUERY_LAYERS": "point",
"LAYERS": "point",
"STYLES": "",
"FORMAT": "image/png",
"HEIGHT": "500",
"WIDTH": "500",
"BBOX": "606171,4822867,612834,4827375",
"CRS": "EPSG:32613",
"SLD": sld}.items())])

return self._result(self.server.handleRequest(qs))

def is_point_table_still_exist(self):
conn = spatialite_connect(self.db_clone)
cur = conn.cursor()
sql = "select * from point"
point_table_exist = True
try:
cur.execute(sql)
except:
point_table_exist = False
conn.close()

return point_table_exist

def _result(self, data):
headers = {}
for line in data[0].decode('UTF-8').split("\n"):
if line != "":
header = line.split(":")
self.assertEqual(len(header), 2, line)
headers[str(header[0])] = str(header[1]).strip()

return data[1], headers


if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()
Binary file not shown.

0 comments on commit 9bb7681

Please sign in to comment.
You can’t perform that action at this time.