


# Authenticated Data Structures for Blockchain

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Hash function:  $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^L$



# Difference?

## Collisions!

**A collision is  $H(x) = H(y)$ , for  $x \neq y$**

- For a standard hash functions, collisions are okay (should be minimized, but aviolation is about efficiency usually)
- For a cryptographic hash function, finding collision should be impossible even for an active attacker!

# Formal Definition

- A game between a challenger and an adversary
- Adversary is not limited except of a computational class of algorithms used by him (usually probabilistic polynomial-time)
- **No polynomially bound Adversary can win the game with non-negligible probability**

# Formal Definition

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# Hash Function: Formal Definition

$s \leftarrow \text{Gen}(L)$

$H^s(x): \{0,1\}^L$

Collision-resistance game H-Coll:

1.  $s \leftarrow \text{Gen}(L)$


2. Adversary:  $x, x'$

3. If  $H^s(x) = H^s(x')$  &  $x \neq x'$  return 1 else 0

For any PPT adversary,  **$\Pr[\text{H-Coll}(L)] \leq \text{negl}(L)$**

# Hash Function: Construction

## The Merkle-Damgard iterated construction



Given  $h: T \times X \rightarrow T$  (compression function)

we obtain  $H: X^{\leq L} \rightarrow T$ .  $H_i$  - chaining variables

PB: padding block


1000...0 || msg len

64 bits

If no space for PB  
add another block

# HashChain


An alternative of a linked list:






# Merkle Tree

An alternative of an ideally balanced tree, log-sized proofs:




# Merkle (Membership) Proof



# Merkle Tree in Bitcoin

Not so ideal input:



# Problems With Bitcoin's Tree (1/2)

- Repeating leafs → repeating proofs!

## **Merkle.cpp:**

“WARNING! If you're reading this because you're learning about crypto and/or designing a new system that will use merkle trees, keep in mind that the following merkle tree algorithm has a serious flaw related to duplicate txids, resulting in a vulnerability (CVE-2012-2459).”

# Problems With Bitcoin's Tree (2/2)

- No number of elements or height of a tree included.
- Merkle tree is not collision-resistant then
- Probably not a problem for Bitcoin, due to constraints on a leaf, but don't use Bitcoin's tree in your projects!
- If you want to avoid passing a number of elements (or a height) along with the root hash, use **domain separation**.



# Merkle Tree

- For a static unordered set
- Simple, but easy to get wrong

# Going further


- Dynamic structures
- Ordered key  $\rightarrow$  value structures
- Non-membership proofs
- Efficient

# Authenticated Skiplist





# AVL Tree



Questions?