SpanDex: Secure Password Tracking for Android

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foursquare
YouTube


foursquare
YouTube
me@gmail.com
••••••••

Facebook

Yahoo!

BoA

DropBox

FriendCaster

imo.com

mint.com

Real Sync

Where do your passwords go?

Phishing apps

Fake NetFlix app
From Malware Genome Project

Sends passwords to
http://erofolio.no-ip.biz/login.php

Phishing apps

Wroba (Korean malware)

Svpeng (Russian malware)

https://blog.malwarebytes.org/mobile-2/2013/10/trojan-looks-to-wrob-android-users/
http://securelist.com/blog/research/57301/the-android-trojan-svpeng-now-capable-of-mobile-phishing/

“Let’s use taint tracking!”

General approach

1. **Tag password as entered**

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ScreenPass [MobiSys '13]
Spoof-resistant UI for entering passwords



General approach

1. Tag password as entered
2. **Track tags as app runs**
3. **Inspect output tags**

TaintDroid [OSDI '10] tracks how data flows through Android apps

Taint-tracking basics

`c ← a op b` `taint(c) ← taint(a) ∪ taint(b)`

Each variable has a label/tag;
Labels reflect data dependencies

Taint-tracking basics

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

Taint-tracking basics

`c ← a op b` `taint(c) ← taint(a) ∪ taint(b)`

`setTaint(a,t)` `taint(a) ← {t}`

`c = a + b` `taint(c) ← {t} ∪ {} = {t}`

Explicit flow
Directly transfers information from source to destination

Taint-tracking basics

```
c ← a op b
```

$taint(c) \leftarrow taint(a) \cup taint(b)$

```
setTaint(a,t)
```

$taint(a) \leftarrow \{t\}$

```
c = a + b
```

$taint(c) \leftarrow \{t\} \cup \{\} = \{t\}$

```
if (c == 0)
  s = 1
```

Implicit flow
Information transferred via control flow

Tracking implicit flows is (really) hard.

Taint the PC



```
if (s == 0) {
   x = a
} else {
   y = b
}
output x
output y
```

$taint(PC_{curr}) \leftarrow taint(s) \cup taint(PC_{prev})$

$taint(x) \leftarrow taint(a) \cup taint(PC_{curr})$

$taint(PC_{curr}) \leftarrow taint(PC_{prev})$

Tainting the PC captures Information flow into x

Taint the PC

```
if (s == 0) {
   x = a
} else {
   y = b
}
output x
output y
```

$taint(PC_{curr}) \leftarrow taint(s) \cup taint(PC_{prev})$

$taint(x) \leftarrow taint(a) \cup taint(PC_{curr})$

$taint(PC_{curr}) \leftarrow taint(PC_{prev})$

Problem: y contains same secret information as x, even though it wasn't updated

Bigger problem: overtainting

```
if (s == 0) {
   // complex block of code
      .
}
```

Condition may reveal very little secret information

Taint tags updated as if objects contain all secret information

Not much information transferred to a large number of objects.

Problem: overtainting



TaintDroid
(explicit flows)

TaintDroid ++
(explicit flows, tainted PC)

Problem: overtainting



TaintDroid
(explicit flows)

TaintDroid ++
(explicit flows, tainted PC)

Key observation



Our solution: SpanDex

- **Tracks implicit flows within Dalvik VM**
  - Can compute a ***useful*** upper bound on info leaks
- **Leverages key properties of passwords**
  - Short strings
  - Never displayed on screen
  - Limited local processing

SpanDex overview

1. **Initialize possibility set (p-set) for taint source**
   - [32, 126] for each password character
2. **Record operations performed on tainted data**
   - Operations recorded in **Operation DAG (op-DAG)**
3. **Update p-set when involved in branch condition**
   - op-DAG + branch conditions → CSP
4. **Guarantee for untainted outputs**
   - Leak at most as much info as reflected in p-sets
   - Allows for rich set of policies for limiting leaks

High-level example

```
// password input 'P'
initPset(c, PASSWORD)
// end password input

if (c >= 'A' &&
    c <= 'Z')
  lc = c + 32

if (lc == 'p')
  output "value was P"
```

High-level example



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

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if (lc == 'p')
  output "value was P"
```

```
INIT_PSET(c,[32,126])
```

p-set: [32, 126]

size: 95

High-level example

```
// password input 'P'
initPset(c, PASSWORD)
// end password input

if (c >= 'A' &&
    c <= 'Z')
  lc = c + 32

if (lc == 'p')
  output "value was P"
```

```
INIT_PSET(c,[32,126])

LOG_CMP(c>=65, T)
```

p-set: [65, 126]

size: 62

High-level example

```
// password input 'P'
initPset(c, PASSWORD)
// end password input

if (c >= 'A' &&
    c <= 'Z')
  lc = c + 32

if (lc == 'p')
  output "value was P"
```



```
INIT_PSET(c,[32,126])

LOG_CMP(c>=65, T)
LOG_CMP(c<=90, T)
```

p-set: [65, 90]

size: 26 (uppercase letters)

High-level example

```
// password input 'P'
initPset(c, PASSWORD)
// end password input

if (c >= 'A' &&
    c <= 'Z')
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if (lc == 'p')
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

```
INIT_PSET(c,[32,126])

LOG_CMP(c>=65, T)
LOG_CMP(c<=90, T)
LOG_OP(lc=c+32)
```

p-set: [65, 90]

size: 26 (uppercase letters)

High-level example

```
// password input 'P'
initPset(c, PASSWORD)
// end password input

if (c >= 'A' &&
    c <= 'Z')
  lc = c + 32

if (lc == 'p')
  output "value was P"
```

```
INIT_PSET(c,[32,126])

LOG_CMP(c>=65, T)
LOG_CMP(c<=90, T)
LOG_OP(lc=c+32)

LOG_CMP(lc=='p', T)
```

p-set: [80]

size: 1 ('P')

High-level example

```
// password input 'P'
initPset(c, PASSWORD)
// end password input

if (c >= 'A' &&
    c <= 'Z')
  lc = c + 32

if (lc == 'p')
  output "value was P"
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

```
INIT_PSET(c,[32,126])

LOG_CMP(c>=65, T)
LOG_CMP(c<=90, T)
LOG_OP(lc=c+32)

LOG_CMP(lc=='p', T)
```

p-set: [80]

size: 1 ('P')

Lower-level example

Explicit flows create new op-DAG nodes

```
0000: mov v1, v0       // v0, v1 label=N0
0002: add v2, v1, 3     // v2's label=N1
0004: add v2, v2, 2     // v2's label=N2
0006: sub v3, 6, v2     // v3's label=N3
0008: add v2, v2, 7     // v2's label=N4
000a: const/16 v4, 122 // v4's label=0
000c: if-le v3, v4, 0016
000e: ...
```

Conditional branches require solving CSP to update p-set(s)

Labels point to op-DAG nodes



Lower-level example

```
0000: mov v1, v0      // v0, v1 label=N0
0002: add v2, v1, 3     // v2's label=N1
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0006: sub v3, 6, v2     // v3's label=N3
0008: add v2, v2, 7     // v2's label=N4
000a: const/16 v4, 122 // v4's label=0
000c: if-le v3, v4, 0016
000e: ...
```

CSP solver traverses op-DAG back to root →
v0 + 6 - 2 – 3 <= 122



Other considerations

- **CSPs may hard to solve**
  - CSP may involve multiple sources (e.g., pw chars)
  - CSP may involve complex operations (e.g., bitwise)
  - We see this in crypto and string-encoding libraries
- **Solution**
  - Define a set of trusted runtime libraries
  - No CSP-solving internally
  - Taint all trusted-lib outputs
  - Ban complex operations in untrust[illegible]ode
- **More details in paper**

Constrains how apps operate on secret data (e.g., must use trusted crypto lib)

SpanDex evaluation

- What is SpanDex's runtime overhead?
- What p-sets do we observe in real apps?
- How well does SpanDex protect passwords?

SpanDex evaluation

- What is SpanDex's runtime overhead?
- How do apps update p-sets?
- How well does SpanDex protect passwords?

Attacker model



Attack simulation

- **Assume attacker learns each character's type**
  - Lower case (a-z) or
  - Upper case (A-Z) or
  - Numeric (0-9) or
  - Special (!@#$ …)
- **How many guesses would attacker need?**
  - Assume online querying
  - Hope that number of guesses is large

Attack simulation

- **Dataset**
  - DB of 131 million unique passwords
  - Collected from a variety of well known leaks
- **Procedure**
  - For each password, P, in DB
  - Generate rule describing each char's type
  - **Match set** := set of passwords that match P's length, char types
  - Match set is set of all possible passwords that could be P
  - Want to know, for each P, how large is its match set?

Match-set size distribution



Interesting implication of attacker model: longer passwords are less secure

Match-set size distribution



Uniform password usage



Bad Zipf-like password usage



Better Zipf-like password usage



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

Related work

- **Dynamic tracking for implicit flows**
  - Dytan [Clause '07], DTA++ [Kang '11]
- **Quantifying revealed info**
  - FlowCheck [McCamant '08]
- **Process-level tracking**
  - Asbestos [Efstathopoulos '05],
    HiStar [Zeldovich '06], Flume [Krohn '07]
- **Symbolic execution**

SpanDex

- **p-sets give upper bound on implicit leaks**
  - Can track in real-time
  - Rich policy possibilities
- **Useful under specific conditions**
  - We haven't "solved" the implicit-flow problem
  - Requires simple processing of secret data
- **Future**
  - Can look at other types (e.g., CCNs, SSNs)
  - Runtime CSPs limitations may be useful

Runtime performance

- **Runtime overhead, no sensitive data:**
  - **16% vs 10% for TaintDroid**
- **Time to handle branch on sensitive data:**
  - < 0.1ms for logs up to 100 arith. Ops
  - Log length in practice: avg: 2 ops, max: 93 ops
  - Rate of tainted branches: ~100s/min
  - **Expect to spend a few ms per sec updating p-sets**

Summary: can track p-sets in real-time