

## Homework 2.b Solutions

- **Group Members:** Yu Wang(wangy52 661834351)
- **Collaborators:** no

### Problem 1

(a)

$$Y_A = \alpha^{X_A} \mod q = 7^5 \mod 71 = 51 \quad (1-1)$$

(b)

$$Y_B = \alpha^{X_B} \mod q = 7^{12} \mod 71 = 4 \quad (1-2)$$

(c)

The shared secret key  $K_{AB}$  is

$$K_{AB} = Y_B^{X_A} \mod q = Y_A^{X_B} \mod q = 4^5 \mod 71 = 51^1 2 \mod 71 = 30 \quad (1-3)$$

(d)

Sending  $y = x^\alpha \mod q$  is a bad idea because the adversary who knows  $y$ ,  $\alpha$  and  $q$  can compute the private key  $x$  using the following method:

$$\begin{aligned} x &= y^{-\alpha} \mod q \\ &= 1 \cdot y^{-\alpha} \mod q \\ &= y^{\phi(q)} \cdot y^{-\alpha} \mod q \\ &= y^{q-1-\alpha} \mod q \end{aligned} \quad (1-4)$$

For example, choose  $x = 5$ ,  $\alpha = 7$  and  $q = 71$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} y &= x^\alpha \mod q = 5^7 \mod 71 = 25 \\ y^{q-1-\alpha} \mod q &= 25^{71-1-7} \mod 71 = 25^{63} \mod 71 = 5 = x \end{aligned} \quad (1-5)$$

In conclusion, the user's private key is not protected.

## Problem 2

(a)

Mallory wants to fraud Bob to add a valid signature on a fraudulent message  $m'$ . The original message is  $m$ . Mallory first generates a large set of messages  $\{M\}$  from  $m$  such that each message in  $\{M\}$  looks the same as  $m$ . Then, he generates another big set of messages  $\{M'\}$  such that the message in  $\{M'\}$  are distorted. Applying the hashing function  $H$  to all the elements in both  $\{M\}$  and  $\{M'\}$  and find a pair of two messages  $m$  and  $m'$  such that:

$$m \in M, m' \in M', H(m) = H(m'). \quad (2-1)$$

Mallory sends  $m$  to Bob and gets a valid signature, then he attaches the acquired signature on the fraudulent message  $m'$ . Now a valid signature with fraudulent message is generated successfully.

(b)

Assume the hash value is uniformly distributed in  $\{0, 2^{64} - 1\}$ . Denote the number of messages in  $\{M\}$  and  $\{M'\}$  are  $N_M$  and  $N_{M'}$  respectively. Use indicator function  $\mathbb{1}[H(m_i) = H(m'_j)]$  to show whether the hash value of  $m_i \in \{M\}$  equals the hash value of  $m'_j \in \{M'\}$ . The probability that  $H(m_i) = H(m'_j)$  is

$$Pr[H(m_i) = H(m'_j)] = 1/2^{64}. \quad (2-2)$$

On average, the number of pairs of messages  $(m_i, m'_j)$  which has hash collision, i.e.  $H(m_i) = H(m'_j)$ , is

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Number of collisions}] = \mathbb{E}\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{N_M} \sum_{j=1}^{N_{M'}} \mathbb{1}[H(m_i) = H(m'_j)]\right\} \quad (2-3)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{N_M} \sum_{j=1}^{N_{M'}} \mathbb{E}\{\mathbb{1}[H(m_i) = H(m'_j)]\} \quad (2-4)$$

$$= N_M \cdot N_{M'} \cdot 1/2^{64}. \quad (2-5)$$

If we want the number of collisions on average to be greater than 1, we should have  $N_M \cdot N_{M'} \geq 2^{64}$ . If we also require  $N_M + N_{M'}$  to be as small as possible, then the optimal solution is

$$N_M = N_{M'} = \sqrt{2^{64}} = 2^{32}. \quad (2-6)$$

So the number of bits, including  $M$  - bit messages and their hashes, are

$$N_M \cdot (M + 64) + N_{M'} \cdot (M + 64) = 2^{33}(M + 64). \quad (2-7)$$

(c)

The number of seconds is

$$\frac{N_M + N_{M'}}{2^{20} \text{ hashes/second}} = \frac{2^{32} + 2^{32}}{2^{20}} = 2^{13} \text{ seconds} \approx 2.27 \text{ hours}. \quad (2-8)$$

(d)

When 128-bit hash is used, the probability of having a collision is

$$Pr[H(m_i) = H(m'_j)] = 1/2^{128}. \quad (2-9)$$

Then the number of collisions between  $\{M\}$  and  $\{M'\}$  is

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{Number of collisions}] = N_M \cdot N_{M'} \cdot 1/2^{128}. \quad (2-10)$$

The optimal solutions to  $N_M$  and  $N_{M'}$  are

$$N_M = N_{M'} = \sqrt{2^{128}} = 2^{64}. \quad (2-11)$$

Then the required size of memory is

$$N_M \cdot (M + 128) + N_{M'} \cdot (M + 128) = 2^{65}(M + 128). \quad (2-12)$$

The amount of time required is

$$\frac{N_M + N_{M'}}{2^{20} \text{ hashes/second}} = \frac{2^{64} + 2^{64}}{2^{20}} = 2^{45} \text{ seconds} \approx 1.12 \times 10^7 \text{ years}. \quad (2-13)$$

### Problem 3

- Encrypt  $P$

1. Compute set  $T$

For  $t_i \in T$  and  $s_i \in S$  where  $i = 1, 2, \dots, 8$ ,

$$t_i = a \cdot s_i \mod p. \quad (3-1)$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} t_1 &= a \cdot s_1 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 5 \mod 1999 = 1097 \\ t_2 &= a \cdot s_2 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 9 \mod 1999 = 1175 \\ t_3 &= a \cdot s_3 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 21 \mod 1999 = 1409 \\ t_4 &= a \cdot s_4 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 45 \mod 1999 = 1877 \\ t_5 &= a \cdot s_5 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 103 \mod 1999 = 1009 \\ t_6 &= a \cdot s_6 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 215 \mod 1999 = 1194 \\ t_7 &= a \cdot s_7 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 450 \mod 1999 = 779 \\ t_8 &= a \cdot s_8 \mod p = 1019 \cdot 946 \mod 1999 = 456 \end{aligned} \quad (3-2)$$

2. Compute Ciphertext  $Y$

Ciphertext  $Y$  is

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= \sum_{i=1}^8 p_i \cdot t_i \mod p \\ &= 0 \cdot 1097 + 1 \cdot 1175 + 0 \cdot 1409 + 1 \cdot 1877 + 0 \cdot 1009 + 1 \cdot 1194 + 1 \cdot 779 + 1 \cdot 456 \\ &= 5481 \mod 1999 = 1483 \end{aligned} \quad (3-3)$$

- Decrypt  $Y$

1. Compute  $Z$

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= a^{-1}Y \mod p \\ &= 1589 \cdot 1483 \mod 1999 \\ &= 1665 \end{aligned} \quad (3-4)$$

2. Use Greedy Algorithm to Solve  $P$  based on  $(S, Z)$  Start from the largest element to the smallest.

$$\begin{aligned}
s_8 = 946 < Z = 1665 & \Rightarrow p_8 = 1. Z = Z - s_8 = 719. \\
s_7 = 450 < Z = 719, & \Rightarrow p_7 = 1. Z = Z - s_7 = 269. \\
s_6 = 215 < Z = 269, & \Rightarrow p_6 = 1. Z = Z - s_6 = 54. \\
s_5 = 103 > Z = 54, & \Rightarrow p_5 = 0. \\
s_4 = 45 < Z = 54, & \Rightarrow p_4 = 1. Z = Z - s_4 = 9. \\
s_3 = 21 > Z = 9, & \Rightarrow p_3 = 0. \\
s_2 = 9 = Z = 9, & \Rightarrow p_2 = 1. Z = Z - s_2 = 0. \\
s_1 = 5 > Z = 0, & \Rightarrow p_1 = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{3-5}$$

So the decrypted plaintext  $\hat{P} = [p_1, p_2, \dots, p_8] = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1]$  which equals  $P$ .