

QVAULT

Security Assessment and Code Audit



Mundus

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Rev 1

INTRODUCTION

The QVAULT Smart Contract's changes focus on updating several different types of proposals, each with its own cost and voting requirements. Below are how they work

- ❖ QCAP general proposal: electing team members, no impact on QCAP's investment
- ❖ Quorum requirement: adjustments to the quorum requirement
- ❖ IPO Participation: Investors cast votes to determine their investment amount in an IPO. QVAULT computes a weighted average, proportional to the number of \$QCAP tokens held by each investor. Proposals are limited by the total Qubic amount available within the smart contract.
- ❖ QEarn participation: after a proposal gets approval, QVAULT locks a capital amount for a set period. Upon return, only the earned interest is distributed as revenue; the original capital remains in the QVAULT.
- ❖ Fundraising Proposal: If a proposal, such as the sale of assets, is approved, QVAULT will facilitate the sale of those tokens. The Qubic raised from this type of proposal will not be considered revenue and, therefore, should not be distributed.
- ❖ Marketplace proposal: a proposal, such as the sale of assets, is approved, the user receives payment. If not, or if QVAULT lacks sufficient funds, the assets are returned to the user.
 - An example selling assets: 10 Quottery and 1 Qx for 10B \$Qubic and 10,000 \$QCAP
- ❖ Allocation percentage: a proposal can change revenue allocation percentages, but the QVAULT revenue share is permanently fixed at 3%. The team's 2% fee will be zeroed out on January 1, 2027, and those funds will be reallocated to revenue distribution.
- ❖ Fund management: IPOs have the highest priority, followed by the marketplace, and then QEarn.

AUDIT PROCESS

Following considerations have been tested and reviewed by Mundus team:

- Reviewing google test files that are written by SC developer.
- Trying several attack vectors to exploit the SC.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review.

RESULTS

We identified a range of security issues in our assessment, from critical to minor. We recommend fixing them to meet security standards and best practices.

OVERVIEW

1. Project name: **QVAULT**
2. Platform: **QUBIC SC system**
3. Is new SC deployment: **NO**
4. Is upgraded SC: **YES**
5. Project size: Large
6. List of github commits to review: <https://github.com/qubic/core/pull/365/commits>

RESULTS SUMMARY

Total Issues	25
Critical	0
Major	2
Medium	12
Minor	11

AUDIT SCOPE

Filename	SHA	Latest commit
QVault.h	f63a680737e7bdf9b9990b0d967bb02c4a597427	fix: removed QPI::QpiContext
contract_qvault.cpp (gtest)	5d0070041a02590faec73a06cff73dde45b850b4	fix: removed :: which it is restricted in development of qubic smart contract

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ID	Title	Category	Severity
QVAULT-01	Numerous problems were identified in the current <code>voteInProposal</code> procedure's implementation	Logic	Major
QVAULT-02	Centralization issue	Logic	Major
QVAULT-03	Not expandable size when QUBIC SC expanding	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-04	The API call needs a check to see if it failed or succeeded	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-05	Not verify that the number of stakers is within the accepted range	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-06	Verify input amount for <code>unStake</code> procedure	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-07	Invocators with QVAULT shares can vote regardless of voting power	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-08	Incorrect updates if not verify input <code>proposalType</code>	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-09	Lack of a return code and unvalidated input <code>proposalId</code>	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-10	Found several issues with <code>getIdentitiesHvVtPw</code>	Logic	Medium

QVAULT-11	Found two issues with getQcapBurntAmountInLastEpoches	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-12	The temporary counter was not initialized	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-13	Found several issues with getAmountForQearnInUpcomingEpoch	Logic	Medium
QVAULT-14	Avoid hardcoded numbers	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-15	Make a definition MAX_URLS_COUNT	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-16	Make a definition MIN_VOTING_POWER	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-17	Make definitions for proposal results	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-18	Limit proposals not verified	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-19	Port utility functions into QVAULT	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-20	Make a definition for allocation percentages	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-21	Make definition for maximum of countOfVote	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-22	Lack of a returnCode for getStakedAmountAndVotingPower	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-23	Lack of a returnCode for ppCreationPower	Logic	Minor
QVAULT-24	Verify the amount before transferring	Logic	Minor

FINDINGS

QVAULT-01 Numerous problems were identified in the current voteInProposal procedure's implementation

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:1508-1673
- ❖ Description: Numerous problems were identified in the current voteInProposal procedure's implementation.
 - The proposalId is a 0-based index. Therefore, the check should be `input.proposalId >= QVAULT_MAX_NUMBER_OF_PROPOSAL`.
 - `input.proposalId`: based on `input.proposalType`, retrieve the total number of proposals. Verify that `input.proposalId` is within the valid range (i.e., less than the total number of proposals). Failure to do so may lead to unexpected results in subsequent calls to `get(input.proposalId)`.
 - The existing case for `locals._r` has not been initialized, which could lead to nondeterministic checks at lines 1526 or 1531.
 - `locals.countOfVote` and `locals.newVoteList`: if lines 1515 or 1417 return false, unexpected results will occur because they have not been initialized.
 - Signed/unsigned mismatch at some += operations
 - `numberOfYes += locals.numberOfYes,`
 - `numberOfNo += locals.numberOfNo,`
 - `totalWeight +=`
 - Lines 1583 & 1601 & 1667: To enhance code clarity, need to add more comments indicating that an invocator can only vote for a single proposal.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-02 Centralization issue

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h
- ❖ Description: **adminAddress**, is hardcoded, cannot be changed by shareholders. If the admin's private key is compromised, a huge amount of assets will be lost. If the private key holder cannot be reached, all administrator functions will become inaccessible.
- ❖ Recommendation:
 - Consider multi-sig approach and locking administrative abilities N days after being changed.
 - Consider adding voting mechanism for QCAP holders to change the **adminAddress**

QVAULT-03 Not expandable size when QUBIC SC expanding

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:383, 384, 555, 556
- ❖ Description: Numbers are hardcoded, not expandable size when QUBIC SC expanding
- ❖ Recommendation: Make a definition for `1048576` then multiply X_MULTIPLIER.

QVAULT-04 The API call needs a check to see if it failed or succeeded

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:696, 754, 1762
- ❖ Description: The API call needs a check to see if it failed or succeeded.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-05 Not verify that the number of stakers is within the accepted range.

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:710
- ❖ Description: Check for limitations before increasing the numberOfStaker.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-06 Verify input amount for unStake procedure

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:740
- ❖ Description: Need to check input.amount > 0 to avoid spamming
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-07 Invocators with QVAULT shares can vote regardless of voting power

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:800, 884, 980, 1088, 1185, 1388
- ❖ Description: An invocator can still vote or submit a proposal, even without sufficient voting power, if they possess QVAULT share(s). Therefore, it is necessary to first check the numberOfShares() at pointed positions above to avoid missing cases.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-08 Incorrect updates if not verify input proposalType

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:1509
- ❖ Description: At the beginning of the procedure, input.proposalType must be validated to ensure it falls within the valid range. Failure to do so will result in incorrect updates to state.vote and state.countOfVote when combined with randomized result of locals.statusOfProposal (It was observed that locals.statusOfProposal lacks initialization).
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-09 Lack of a return code and unvalidated input proposalId

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:1920, 1949, 1978, 2007, 2036, 2065, 2094
- ❖ Description: Requires to verify input proposalId falls within the acceptable range (number of proposals) and add a returnCode.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-10 Found several issues with getIdentitiesHvVtPw

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:2135-2150
- ❖ Description: getIdentitiesHvVtPw presented several issues
 - lacks of a returnCode for output
 - not check input.count is valid
 - not reset/empty output (idList & amountList) at begin of function
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-11 Found two issues with getQcapBurntAmountInLastEpoches

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:2250-2260
- ❖ Description: getQcapBurntAmountInLastEpoches presented two issues
 - lacks of a returnCode for output
 - not reset/empty/initialize output.burntAmount
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-12 The temporary counter was not initialized

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:2491, 2504
- ❖ Description: The variable locals.count is used before it has been initialized.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-13 Found several issues with getAmountForQearnInUpcomingEpoch

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:2544-2554
- ❖ Description: getAmountForQearnInUpcomingEpoch presented two issues
 - lacks of a returnCode for output
 - not reset/empty/initialize output.amount
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-14 Avoid hardcoded numbers

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:651, 652
- ❖ Description: Make definitions for minQuorumRq/maxQuorumRq instead of hardcoded numbers
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-15 Make a definition MAX_URLS_COUNT

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:153, 173, ...
- ❖ Description: Make a definition MAX_URLS_COUNT and use it instead of hardcoded 256 everywhere
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-16 Make a definition MIN_VOTING_POWER

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:795. 879. 975. 1083. 1179. 1382. 2192
- ❖ Description: Make a definition MIN_VOTING_POWER then using it instead of hardcoded 10000 everywhere
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-17 Make definitions for proposal results

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:662, 849, 933, 1029, 1133, 1272, 1337, 1467, 1745, 2550, 2635, 2647, 2660, 2811, 2815, 2819, 2842, 2846, 2850, 2870, 2892. 2896, 2900, 2964, 2968, 2972, 3024, 3028, 3032, 3033, 3042, ...
- ❖ Description: Make definitions for proposal results instead of hard-coded values. Currently, the proposal result is hardcoded as: 0=passed, 1=rejected, 2=insufficient quorum, 3=insufficient funds, 4=insufficient QCAP.
- ❖ Recommendation: Consider adding another number for the new proposal's result. Currently, it's 4, this number is labeled as insufficient QCAP.

QVAULT-18 Limit proposals not verified

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:851, 937, 1035, 1143, 1278, 1345, 1474
- ❖ Description: Check to maximum number of proposals before add
- ❖ Recommendation: Add a check at the begin of procedure

QVAULT-19 Port utility functions into QVAULT

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:1208, 1209, 1411, 1412, 1704, 1705, 3034, 3035, 3084, 3085
- ❖ Description: Port these utility functions into QVAULT, so that if they are removed or changed from outside then QVAULT's logic will not be impacted.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-20 Make a definition for allocation percentages

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:1432
- ❖ Description: Make a definition instead of hardcoded number 970; and also add comment `Validates allocation percentages sum to 970 (per mille)`.
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-21 Make definition for maximum of countOfVote

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:555, 1526
- ❖ Description: Make definition for maximum of countOfVote = 16
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-22 Lack of a returnCode for getStakedAmountAndVotingPower

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:1874
- ❖ Description: Lack of a returnCode for getStakedAmountAndVotingPower
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-23 Lack of a returnCode for ppCreationPower

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:2186-2214
- ❖ Description: Lack of a returnCode for ppCreationPower
 - not found any staker address
 - not enough power voting
 - not enough number of shares
- ❖ Recommendation:

QVAULT-24 Verify the amount before transferring

- ❖ File(s) affected: QVault.h:2789, 2797
- ❖ Description: Verify the amount > 0 before calling qpi.transfer, as well as handling the transfer result. The transfer system may not function as anticipated (e.g., due to a dust attack); therefore, the SC should always handle it.
- ❖ Recommendation: