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| /* Library which manipulates firewall rules. Version 0.1. */ | |
| /* Architecture of firewall rules is as follows: | |
| * | |
| * Chains go INPUT, FORWARD, OUTPUT then user chains. | |
| * Each user chain starts with an ERROR node. | |
| * Every chain ends with an unconditional jump: a RETURN for user chains, | |
| * and a POLICY for built-ins. | |
| */ | |
| /* (C)1999 Paul ``Rusty'' Russell - Placed under the GNU GPL (See | |
| COPYING for details). */ | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <errno.h> | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <unistd.h> | |
| #ifdef DEBUG_CONNTRACK | |
| #define inline | |
| #endif | |
| #if !defined(__GLIBC__) || (__GLIBC__ < 2) | |
| typedef unsigned int socklen_t; | |
| #endif | |
| #include "libiptc/libiptc.h" | |
| #define IP_VERSION 4 | |
| #define IP_OFFSET 0x1FFF | |
| #define HOOK_PRE_ROUTING NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING | |
| #define HOOK_LOCAL_IN NF_IP_LOCAL_IN | |
| #define HOOK_FORWARD NF_IP_FORWARD | |
| #define HOOK_LOCAL_OUT NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT | |
| #define HOOK_POST_ROUTING NF_IP_POST_ROUTING | |
| #define STRUCT_ENTRY_TARGET struct xt_entry_target | |
| #define STRUCT_ENTRY struct ipt_entry | |
| #define STRUCT_ENTRY_MATCH struct xt_entry_match | |
| #define STRUCT_GETINFO struct ipt_getinfo | |
| #define STRUCT_GET_ENTRIES struct ipt_get_entries | |
| #define STRUCT_COUNTERS struct xt_counters | |
| #define STRUCT_COUNTERS_INFO struct xt_counters_info | |
| #define STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET struct xt_standard_target | |
| #define STRUCT_REPLACE struct ipt_replace | |
| #define ENTRY_ITERATE IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE | |
| #define TABLE_MAXNAMELEN XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN | |
| #define FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN XT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN | |
| #define GET_TARGET ipt_get_target | |
| #define ERROR_TARGET XT_ERROR_TARGET | |
| #define NUMHOOKS NF_IP_NUMHOOKS | |
| #define IPT_CHAINLABEL xt_chainlabel | |
| #define TC_DUMP_ENTRIES dump_entries | |
| #define TC_IS_CHAIN iptc_is_chain | |
| #define TC_FIRST_CHAIN iptc_first_chain | |
| #define TC_NEXT_CHAIN iptc_next_chain | |
| #define TC_FIRST_RULE iptc_first_rule | |
| #define TC_NEXT_RULE iptc_next_rule | |
| #define TC_GET_TARGET iptc_get_target | |
| #define TC_BUILTIN iptc_builtin | |
| #define TC_GET_POLICY iptc_get_policy | |
| #define TC_INSERT_ENTRY iptc_insert_entry | |
| #define TC_REPLACE_ENTRY iptc_replace_entry | |
| #define TC_APPEND_ENTRY iptc_append_entry | |
| #define TC_CHECK_ENTRY iptc_check_entry | |
| #define TC_DELETE_ENTRY iptc_delete_entry | |
| #define TC_DELETE_NUM_ENTRY iptc_delete_num_entry | |
| #define TC_FLUSH_ENTRIES iptc_flush_entries | |
| #define TC_ZERO_ENTRIES iptc_zero_entries | |
| #define TC_READ_COUNTER iptc_read_counter | |
| #define TC_ZERO_COUNTER iptc_zero_counter | |
| #define TC_SET_COUNTER iptc_set_counter | |
| #define TC_CREATE_CHAIN iptc_create_chain | |
| #define TC_GET_REFERENCES iptc_get_references | |
| #define TC_DELETE_CHAIN iptc_delete_chain | |
| #define TC_RENAME_CHAIN iptc_rename_chain | |
| #define TC_SET_POLICY iptc_set_policy | |
| #define TC_GET_RAW_SOCKET iptc_get_raw_socket | |
| #define TC_INIT iptc_init | |
| #define TC_FREE iptc_free | |
| #define TC_COMMIT iptc_commit | |
| #define TC_STRERROR iptc_strerror | |
| #define TC_NUM_RULES iptc_num_rules | |
| #define TC_GET_RULE iptc_get_rule | |
| #define TC_OPS iptc_ops | |
| #define TC_AF AF_INET | |
| #define TC_IPPROTO IPPROTO_IP | |
| #define SO_SET_REPLACE IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE | |
| #define SO_SET_ADD_COUNTERS IPT_SO_SET_ADD_COUNTERS | |
| #define SO_GET_INFO IPT_SO_GET_INFO | |
| #define SO_GET_ENTRIES IPT_SO_GET_ENTRIES | |
| #define SO_GET_VERSION IPT_SO_GET_VERSION | |
| #define STANDARD_TARGET XT_STANDARD_TARGET | |
| #define LABEL_RETURN IPTC_LABEL_RETURN | |
| #define LABEL_ACCEPT IPTC_LABEL_ACCEPT | |
| #define LABEL_DROP IPTC_LABEL_DROP | |
| #define LABEL_QUEUE IPTC_LABEL_QUEUE | |
| #define ALIGN XT_ALIGN | |
| #define RETURN XT_RETURN | |
| #include "libiptc.c" | |
| #define IP_PARTS_NATIVE(n) \ | |
| (unsigned int)((n)>>24)&0xFF, \ | |
| (unsigned int)((n)>>16)&0xFF, \ | |
| (unsigned int)((n)>>8)&0xFF, \ | |
| (unsigned int)((n)&0xFF) | |
| #define IP_PARTS(n) IP_PARTS_NATIVE(ntohl(n)) | |
| static int | |
| dump_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct xtc_handle *const handle) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| STRUCT_ENTRY_TARGET *t; | |
| printf("Entry %u (%lu):\n", iptcb_entry2index(handle, e), | |
| iptcb_entry2offset(handle, e)); | |
| printf("SRC IP: %u.%u.%u.%u/%u.%u.%u.%u\n", | |
| IP_PARTS(e->ip.src.s_addr),IP_PARTS(e->ip.smsk.s_addr)); | |
| printf("DST IP: %u.%u.%u.%u/%u.%u.%u.%u\n", | |
| IP_PARTS(e->ip.dst.s_addr),IP_PARTS(e->ip.dmsk.s_addr)); | |
| printf("Interface: `%s'/", e->ip.iniface); | |
| for (i = 0; i < IFNAMSIZ; i++) | |
| printf("%c", e->ip.iniface_mask[i] ? 'X' : '.'); | |
| printf("to `%s'/", e->ip.outiface); | |
| for (i = 0; i < IFNAMSIZ; i++) | |
| printf("%c", e->ip.outiface_mask[i] ? 'X' : '.'); | |
| printf("\nProtocol: %u\n", e->ip.proto); | |
| printf("Flags: %02X\n", e->ip.flags); | |
| printf("Invflags: %02X\n", e->ip.invflags); | |
| printf("Counters: %llu packets, %llu bytes\n", | |
| (unsigned long long)e->counters.pcnt, (unsigned long long)e->counters.bcnt); | |
| printf("Cache: %08X\n", e->nfcache); | |
| IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, print_match); | |
| t = GET_TARGET(e); | |
| printf("Target name: `%s' [%u]\n", t->u.user.name, t->u.target_size); | |
| if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) { | |
| const unsigned char *data = t->data; | |
| int pos = *(const int *)data; | |
| if (pos < 0) | |
| printf("verdict=%s\n", | |
| pos == -NF_ACCEPT-1 ? "NF_ACCEPT" | |
| : pos == -NF_DROP-1 ? "NF_DROP" | |
| : pos == -NF_QUEUE-1 ? "NF_QUEUE" | |
| : pos == RETURN ? "RETURN" | |
| : "UNKNOWN"); | |
| else | |
| printf("verdict=%u\n", pos); | |
| } else if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) | |
| printf("error=`%s'\n", t->data); | |
| printf("\n"); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static unsigned char * | |
| is_same(const STRUCT_ENTRY *a, const STRUCT_ENTRY *b, unsigned char *matchmask) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int i; | |
| unsigned char *mptr; | |
| /* Always compare head structures: ignore mask here. */ | |
| if (a->ip.src.s_addr != b->ip.src.s_addr | |
| || a->ip.dst.s_addr != b->ip.dst.s_addr | |
| || a->ip.smsk.s_addr != b->ip.smsk.s_addr | |
| || a->ip.dmsk.s_addr != b->ip.dmsk.s_addr | |
| || a->ip.proto != b->ip.proto | |
| || a->ip.flags != b->ip.flags | |
| || a->ip.invflags != b->ip.invflags) | |
| return NULL; | |
| for (i = 0; i < IFNAMSIZ; i++) { | |
| if (a->ip.iniface_mask[i] != b->ip.iniface_mask[i]) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if ((a->ip.iniface[i] & a->ip.iniface_mask[i]) | |
| != (b->ip.iniface[i] & b->ip.iniface_mask[i])) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (a->ip.outiface_mask[i] != b->ip.outiface_mask[i]) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if ((a->ip.outiface[i] & a->ip.outiface_mask[i]) | |
| != (b->ip.outiface[i] & b->ip.outiface_mask[i])) | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (a->target_offset != b->target_offset | |
| || a->next_offset != b->next_offset) | |
| return NULL; | |
| mptr = matchmask + sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY); | |
| if (IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(a, match_different, a->elems, b->elems, &mptr)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| mptr += XT_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)); | |
| return mptr; | |
| } | |
| #if 0 | |
| /***************************** DEBUGGING ********************************/ | |
| static inline int | |
| unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sizeof(*ip)/sizeof(uint32_t); i++) | |
| if (((uint32_t *)ip)[i]) | |
| return 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static inline int | |
| check_match(const STRUCT_ENTRY_MATCH *m, unsigned int *off) | |
| { | |
| assert(m->u.match_size >= sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY_MATCH)); | |
| assert(ALIGN(m->u.match_size) == m->u.match_size); | |
| (*off) += m->u.match_size; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static inline int | |
| check_entry(const STRUCT_ENTRY *e, unsigned int *i, unsigned int *off, | |
| unsigned int user_offset, int *was_return, | |
| struct xtc_handle *h) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int toff; | |
| STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET *t; | |
| assert(e->target_offset >= sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY)); | |
| assert(e->next_offset >= e->target_offset | |
| + sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY_TARGET)); | |
| toff = sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY); | |
| IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, check_match, &toff); | |
| assert(toff == e->target_offset); | |
| t = (STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET *) | |
| GET_TARGET((STRUCT_ENTRY *)e); | |
| /* next_offset will have to be multiple of entry alignment. */ | |
| assert(e->next_offset == ALIGN(e->next_offset)); | |
| assert(e->target_offset == ALIGN(e->target_offset)); | |
| assert(t->target.u.target_size == ALIGN(t->target.u.target_size)); | |
| assert(!TC_IS_CHAIN(t->target.u.user.name, h)); | |
| if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) { | |
| assert(t->target.u.target_size | |
| == ALIGN(sizeof(STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET))); | |
| assert(t->verdict == -NF_DROP-1 | |
| || t->verdict == -NF_ACCEPT-1 | |
| || t->verdict == RETURN | |
| || t->verdict < (int)h->entries->size); | |
| if (t->verdict >= 0) { | |
| STRUCT_ENTRY *te = get_entry(h, t->verdict); | |
| int idx; | |
| idx = iptcb_entry2index(h, te); | |
| assert(strcmp(GET_TARGET(te)->u.user.name, | |
| XT_ERROR_TARGET) | |
| != 0); | |
| assert(te != e); | |
| /* Prior node must be error node, or this node. */ | |
| assert(t->verdict == iptcb_entry2offset(h, e)+e->next_offset | |
| || strcmp(GET_TARGET(index2entry(h, idx-1)) | |
| ->u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) | |
| == 0); | |
| } | |
| if (t->verdict == RETURN | |
| && unconditional(&e->ip) | |
| && e->target_offset == sizeof(*e)) | |
| *was_return = 1; | |
| else | |
| *was_return = 0; | |
| } else if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) { | |
| assert(t->target.u.target_size | |
| == ALIGN(sizeof(struct ipt_error_target))); | |
| /* If this is in user area, previous must have been return */ | |
| if (*off > user_offset) | |
| assert(*was_return); | |
| *was_return = 0; | |
| } | |
| else *was_return = 0; | |
| if (*off == user_offset) | |
| assert(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0); | |
| (*off) += e->next_offset; | |
| (*i)++; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef IPTC_DEBUG | |
| /* Do every conceivable sanity check on the handle */ | |
| static void | |
| do_check(struct xtc_handle *h, unsigned int line) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int i, n; | |
| unsigned int user_offset; /* Offset of first user chain */ | |
| int was_return; | |
| assert(h->changed == 0 || h->changed == 1); | |
| if (strcmp(h->info.name, "filter") == 0) { | |
| assert(h->info.valid_hooks | |
| == (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_FORWARD | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT)); | |
| /* Hooks should be first three */ | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_IN] == 0); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, 0); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_FORWARD] == n); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT] == n); | |
| user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT]; | |
| } else if (strcmp(h->info.name, "nat") == 0) { | |
| assert((h->info.valid_hooks | |
| == (1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_POST_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT)) || | |
| (h->info.valid_hooks | |
| == (1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_POST_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT))); | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING] == 0); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, 0); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_POST_ROUTING] == n); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT] == n); | |
| user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT]; | |
| if (h->info.valid_hooks & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)) { | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_IN] == n); | |
| user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_IN]; | |
| } | |
| } else if (strcmp(h->info.name, "mangle") == 0) { | |
| /* This code is getting ugly because linux < 2.4.18-pre6 had | |
| * two mangle hooks, linux >= 2.4.18-pre6 has five mangle hooks | |
| * */ | |
| assert((h->info.valid_hooks | |
| == (1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT)) || | |
| (h->info.valid_hooks | |
| == (1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_FORWARD | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_POST_ROUTING))); | |
| /* Hooks should be first five */ | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING] == 0); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, 0); | |
| if (h->info.valid_hooks & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)) { | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_IN] == n); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| } | |
| if (h->info.valid_hooks & (1 << NF_IP_FORWARD)) { | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_FORWARD] == n); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| } | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT] == n); | |
| user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT]; | |
| if (h->info.valid_hooks & (1 << NF_IP_POST_ROUTING)) { | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_POST_ROUTING] == n); | |
| user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_POST_ROUTING]; | |
| } | |
| } else if (strcmp(h->info.name, "raw") == 0) { | |
| assert(h->info.valid_hooks | |
| == (1 << NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING | |
| | 1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT)); | |
| /* Hooks should be first three */ | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING] == 0); | |
| n = get_chain_end(h, n); | |
| n += get_entry(h, n)->next_offset; | |
| assert(h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT] == n); | |
| user_offset = h->info.hook_entry[NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT]; | |
| } else { | |
| fprintf(stderr, "Unknown table `%s'\n", h->info.name); | |
| abort(); | |
| } | |
| /* User chain == end of last builtin + policy entry */ | |
| user_offset = get_chain_end(h, user_offset); | |
| user_offset += get_entry(h, user_offset)->next_offset; | |
| /* Overflows should be end of entry chains, and unconditional | |
| policy nodes. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < NUMHOOKS; i++) { | |
| STRUCT_ENTRY *e; | |
| STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET *t; | |
| if (!(h->info.valid_hooks & (1 << i))) | |
| continue; | |
| assert(h->info.underflow[i] | |
| == get_chain_end(h, h->info.hook_entry[i])); | |
| e = get_entry(h, get_chain_end(h, h->info.hook_entry[i])); | |
| assert(unconditional(&e->ip)); | |
| assert(e->target_offset == sizeof(*e)); | |
| t = (STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET *)GET_TARGET(e); | |
| assert(t->target.u.target_size == ALIGN(sizeof(*t))); | |
| assert(e->next_offset == sizeof(*e) + ALIGN(sizeof(*t))); | |
| assert(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, STANDARD_TARGET)==0); | |
| assert(t->verdict == -NF_DROP-1 || t->verdict == -NF_ACCEPT-1); | |
| /* Hooks and underflows must be valid entries */ | |
| entry2index(h, get_entry(h, h->info.hook_entry[i])); | |
| entry2index(h, get_entry(h, h->info.underflow[i])); | |
| } | |
| assert(h->info.size | |
| >= h->info.num_entries * (sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY) | |
| +sizeof(STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET))); | |
| assert(h->entries.size | |
| >= (h->new_number | |
| * (sizeof(STRUCT_ENTRY) | |
| + sizeof(STRUCT_STANDARD_TARGET)))); | |
| assert(strcmp(h->info.name, h->entries.name) == 0); | |
| i = 0; n = 0; | |
| was_return = 0; | |
| /* Check all the entries. */ | |
| ENTRY_ITERATE(h->entries.entrytable, h->entries.size, | |
| check_entry, &i, &n, user_offset, &was_return, h); | |
| assert(i == h->new_number); | |
| assert(n == h->entries.size); | |
| /* Final entry must be error node */ | |
| assert(strcmp(GET_TARGET(index2entry(h, h->new_number-1)) | |
| ->u.user.name, | |
| ERROR_TARGET) == 0); | |
| } | |
| #endif /*IPTC_DEBUG*/ | |
| #endif |