A Design Proposal for a New Secure Repository for the Dutch Police Internet Forensics

Secure Software Development

MSc Cyber Security

Group One

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4 July 2022

Introduction

This design document discusses the system requirements, security challenges and design of a new secure repository for the Dutch Police Internet Forensics organisation.

Web Application Functionality

- Provides latest cybersecurity news, alerts, allowing subscriptions.
- Allows organisations to register, report, and manage security incidents.
- Allows individuals to register, report and manage GDPR breaches.




Figure 1: UML activity diagram demonstrating user/organisation registration/login process.




Figure 2: UML sequence diagram representing user/organisation login/registration process using Django MVT architecture.




Figure 3: UML class diagram demonstrating main classes and attributes.

System Requirements & Assumptions

To meet the needs of the Dutch Police Internet Forensics, the system design should incorporate the following:

- System will act as an evidence repository for primarily unstructured data related to forensic investigations (Kebande et. al., 2021).
- As of 2013, the organisation had 9,500 staff (Hillenius, Gijs, 2013). The system may additionally need to be accessed by other law enforcement organisations.
- The system must meet all applicable privacy and security regulations (e.g., GDPR).
- The system should implement Forensics as a Service (FaaS) to take advantage of cloud-based, elastic CPU and storage capabilities (Nanda & Hansen, 2016).

Design Decisions, Tools, and Libraries

- Python 3.10 and Django 4.0.5 open-source framework (Ghimire, 2020) will be used.
- Djago's serverless SQL database SQLite is to be utilised (Tiwari et. al., 2019).
 See Appendix A.
- Passwords will be hashed and salted using SHA512 and the Python Secrets
 module for generating a secure random salt (Al Farawn et. al., 2019). The
 hash will be iterated 100 times to increase unhashing time (Ji et. al., 2017).
 Database to store salted hash passwords.

- Traffic between database and web application will be communicated over HTTPS (Kamanin, 2021).
- The Django-cryptography symmetric encryption package (PyPI, 2022) will be used to encrypt sensitive user data.
- User interface to be developed with HTML and CSS stylesheets (Tiwari et. al., 2019).
- Code will be improved with Python linters (Pyling, Pyflakes) (Farah, 2014).

Security Challenges

Relevant vulnerability identification and mitigation are based on OWASP's Top 10 (2021a) framework.

Table 1: Security vulnerabilities and mitigations.

OWASP Category	Vulnerability Mitigation
A01:2021-Broken	Install Django session framework, enable user
Access Control	authentication tools (Holovaty & Kaplan-Moss, 2009).
A02:2021-Cryptographic	Encrypt sensitive data, proper key management
Failures	(Mattsson, 2005).
A03:2021-Injection	Validate user input, use regex patterns (Aborujilah,
	2022). Restrict field length to only what is necessary
	(Holovaty & Kaplan-Moss, 2009).
A04:2021-Insecure	Website URLs won't pass sensitive user data, e.g.,
Design	user ID (Holovaty & Kaplan-Moss, 2009).

A05:2021-Security	Build a minimalist platform (no unnecessary features,
Misconfiguration	components, samples, documentation) (OWASP,
	2021c).
A06:2021-Vulnerable	Use dependency checkers to check for
and Outdated	outdated/vulnerable components (Maier et. al., 2019).
Components	
A07:2021-Identification	Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (Ometov et.al.,
and Authentication	2018).
Failures	
A08:2021-Software and	Verify software/data sources via digital signatures
Data Integrity Failures	(OWASP, 2021e).
A09:2021-Security	Log login, access control, and server-side input
Logging and Monitoring	validation failures with adequate user context and hold
Failures	for enough time to allow forensic analysis (OWASP,
	2021d).
A10:2021-Server-Side	Do not send raw responses to clients and enable
Request Forgery (SSRF)	authentication on all services (Zlojic, 2022).

Architectural and design patterns, SDLC approaches

 The Django MVT pattern to be used for the request routing separation from the user interface (Holovaty & Kaplan-Moss, 2009).

- Object oriented paradigm will be implemented to construct code elements (Rumbaugh et. al., 2003).
- A secure Scrum SDLC will be used:
 - Requirements/Design phases to include security requirements
 - Implementation stage backlog to include security issues
 - Verification phase to cover security testing (Maier et. al., 2017).

Conclusion

This design document includes system requirements and assumptions for a prototype of the Dutch Police Internet Forensics web application. Security challenges alongside mitigation techniques are identified and highlighted in Table 1. The web application will use these techniques to mitigate its potential vulnerabilities. Design decisions are related to the production of the prototype and certain aspects of the design must be revisited before releasing the application to the public.

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Appendix

Appendix A - Data dictionary

Application database

	Field	Туре	Null	Default
organisation	orgName	varchar(60)	No	
	orgHouseNo	varchar(4)	No	
	orgStreet	varchar(100)	No	
	orgTown	varchar(60)	No	
	orgCountry	varchar(60)	No	
	orgPostCode	varchar(9)	No	
	orgKvkNo	varchar(8)	Yes	NULL
	orgSectorId	int(3)	Yes	-1
	orgEmail	varchar(254)	No	
	orgPhoneNo	int(15)	Yes	NULL
	registeredOn	timestamp	No	

organisationSector	sectorName	varchar(30)	No	
person	firstName	varchar(35)	No	
	lastName	varchar(35)	No	
	houseNo	varchar(4)	No	
	street	varchar(100)	No	
	town	varchar(60)	No	
	country	varchar(60)	No	
	postCode	varchar(9)	No	
	email	varchar(254)	No	
	phoneNo	int(15)	Yes	NULL
	registeredOn	timestamp	No	
cyberAdvice	adviceDescription	varchar(256)	No	
	adviceContent	text(max)	No	
organisationIncident	orgld	int(11)	No	
	incidentSummary	varchar(1000)	No	
	requiresFollowUp	int(1)	No	0
	internalIncidentId	varchar(30)	Yes	NULL
	internalInvestigation	varchar(1000)	No	

	impactId	int(11)	No	
	impactDescription	varchar(1000)	No	
	currentStateId	int(11)	No	
	othersNotified	varchar(1000)	No	
	dateOfIncident	date	No	
	timeOfIncident	time	No	
	createdDate	timestamp	No	
gdprDataBreach	personId	int(11)	No	
	dataBreachDetails	varchar(1000)	No	
	responsibleParty	varchar(1000)	No	
	othersNotified	int(1)	No	
	dateBreachNoticed	date	No	
impact	impact	varchar(30)	No	
currentState	currentState	varchar(30)	No	
newsletter	userld	int(11)	Yes	NULL
	email	varchar(254)	Yes	NULL
	subscribedOn	timestamp	No	
	unsubscribedOn	int(1)	Yes	NULL

cyberAlert	alertTitle	varchar(60)	No	
	alertDescription	text	No	

Hashed passwords database

hashedPerson	personId	int(11)	No	
	password	varchar(128)	No	
hashedOrganisation	organisationId	int(11)	No	
	password	varchar(128)	No	