Hey Stefan,

p.1. "probability update" should be "probability updating", right?

p.3. Again, "update" should be "updating"? Is "gain" the right word in the paragraph "Against the tide . . . "? Do you mean "that one would not appeal to information not implied by the evidence", or something like that? Why does "Bayes' theorem [work] because it conforms to MAXNET"? Bayes theorem is just a consequence of the probability calculus and I'm guessing so is MAXNET?

p.4. "Updating" not "update". Explain what you mean by 'full employment' and 'objective updating' in THIS paper - don't make the reader do extra work. Explain the distinction and *then* say for more details, turn to Lukits 2013. That paragraph in general needs to be re-written. Also, why all this talk about the "genius" of a scientist? It sounds a bit too over the top.

p.5. What are the functions $m(E)$, $b(E)$ supposed to do; are they unconditional probabilities or measures? What is the function u, a measure? Don't make your reader do more work than they have to! In equation (3), what is the right arrow ($\rightarrow$), the material conditional or logical consequence? Your sentence, "Now we judge" is awkward, what do you mean? Are we actually representing our judgments by Q or are we seeing whether (5) actually holds of Q? I think you want to use a different verb. The last sentence doesn't make any sense.

p.6. Wait, why is Wagner seen as an "anti-Bayesian"? The probability kinematics after all, at least á la Jeffrey, is still a sort of Bayesianism (about our inductive judgments, that is). Also are equations (1-6) what you are referring to by a Bayesian approach combined with MAXENT? (because of equations 1-2?) What "ad-hockery" are you (or better: Jaynes) talking about? Is "absurd" the right word to describe Wagner's argument? Also, explain that b refers to a *function* not a *constant* in the Wagner quote, as you cite it on page 8.

p.7. Hmm, what frequentist bias? Maybe you should clarify this earlier in the section with a sentence or two? The terms "diction" and "possessed" aren't very clear here, re-write. I have no idea why the marginals P_Ω and P_Θ "[betray] Wagner's frequentist convictions." Why can't P be understood as a subjective probability (e.g. $P_{\Omega=\omega_1}(-) = P(-|\omega_1)$)? Maybe you have a very narrow sense of Bayesian-ism in mind? Explain.

pg.8. The difference between Q_m and $Q_{w/m}$ is really clear here.

pg.9. Why not make boxes for your toy example? In fact, it seems like you should get rid of your more complicated example and start with

the example on page 9. I tried to sit down and use equation (6) to get your answers, but I must be doing something wrong. This is exactly where you should be as clear as possible. I don't get your point about "Wagner's core mistake". True, Bayesians can assign subjective evaluations to these prior joint distribution. But they don't *have* to set the distribution to the values you give on the top of pg. 10. That is, the subjective Bayesian ADDS information to the setup by assuming her subjective assignments are correct, right? So its *not* the case that all Bayesians agree that all well-defined events have prior probabilities, but that an agent can *assign* subjective values as their priors. At least that's what Jeffrey would say, right? I REALLY wish there was a worked out toy example using all the equations 1-6 so I could understand what's going on. At this point I'm lost.

pg.10-11. I really wish you would give the details for the simple 2×2 problem. Avoid language like "final blow".

I'll leave section 5 to Paul for now. Maybe you can walk me through it when I understand the first half of the paper.