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
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Jeremy L. Bass, Perforce Pro Se 1515 21st Ave Lewiston, ID 83501-3926 Ph: 208-549-9584 Quantum.J.L.Bass@RAWdeal.io



IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR NEZ PERCE COUNTY DIANE ASH

DPW Enterprises LLC and Mountain Prime 2018 LLC,

Plaintiff.

VS.

Jeremy L. Bass, Dwayne Pike, and Current occupant, and Unknown Parties in Possession of the real property commonly known as 1515 21st Avenue, Lewiston, Idaho 83501

Defendants.

Case No. CV35-24-1063

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION

DEMAND FOR JURY

COMES NOW the Defendant Jeremy L. Bass, (hereinafter "Defendant Bass"), Perforce Pro Se, and hereby upon the Honorable Court's granting of MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION would submit this MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION. This submission provides detailed legal authorities that are directly relevant to the core issues concerning the validity of the trustee's sale and the limitations of good faith purchaser protections under Idaho law. Additional arguments are not intended, only clarification in regard to the question of authority. These authorities clarify the protections afforded by Idaho Code § 45-1508 and how those protections apply—or do not apply—under the specific circumstances found in Defendant Bass' case.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the basis that they are entitled to possession of the property located at 1515 21st Avenue, Lewiston, ID 83501, following an attempted trustee's sale from a non-judicial foreclosure. The Trustee's sale is a publicly held auction, with the one in contention having been held on February 29th, 2024, on the front steps of the Nez Perce County Court House.

Plaintiffs, styling themselves as bona fide purchasers for value of Defendant Bass' property and averring that said acquisition was in good faith, sought to avail themselves of the narrow and

 specific conditions required to gain the sweeping and unassailable immunity afforded to such purchasers under *Idaho Code § 45-1508*. In stark contrast, Defendant Bass has mounted a formidable challenge to the trustee's sale, casting a pall over the process by impugning the integrity of and had alleged a multitude of procedural and substantive improprieties that fatally compromise the auctions validity.

Defendant Bass categorically rejected the validity of the sale, asserting that the purported transfer of title is *void ab initio* as the process was fundamentally flawed with pervasive irregularities. He highlighted, *inter alia*, collusion and misconduct among involved parties, evidenced by improper conduct tainting both the preparatory and execution stages, and the conspicuous absence of a legitimate default.

II. SUPPLEMENTAL CASE LAW

1. Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enter., 170 Idaho 649 (2022)

Explanation of Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enter.:

In *Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enter.*, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether an auctioneer's on-site imposition of specific payment terms—such as requiring cashier's checks payable to the trustee directly—could legally restrict a bidder from participating. The case clarified the discretionary authority of trustees to set payment terms, while emphasizing that these terms must align with *Idaho Code § 45-1506*'s purpose of promoting fair trade and transparency. The Court highlighted that on-site terms must be reasonable, yet it did not endorse practices that could unfairly limit competitive bidding or violate the Sherman Act's principles of fair commerce in public auctions.

Key Facts of the Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016. LLC Case:

- **Foreclosure Sale:** Breckenridge attended a foreclosure auction with cashier's checks made payable to an affiliate rather than to the trustee, Weinstein & Riley, P.S.
- **Auctioneer's Terms:** At the start of the auction, the trustee specified that only checks payable directly to Weinstein & Riley, P.S. would be accepted.

- Opportunity to Comply: The trustee allowed Breckenridge a one-hour delay to secure checks compliant with the on-site payment terms. Despite this time allowance, Breckenridge failed to procure compliant checks within the hour.
- Bid Rejection and Award: With Breckenridge unable to present checks payable to the trustee, the trustee rejected Breckenridge's bid, awarding the property to Cornerstone, the only bidder meeting the payment requirement.
- Claims by Breckenridge: Breckenridge argued that the lack of advance notice of the
 payment terms violated *Idaho Code § 45-1506* and principles of fair trade. The claims
 included negligence, negligence per se, estoppel, and demands for equitable remedies,
 asserting that the terms were unfairly restrictive.

Court's Decision:

- **Summary Judgment Partially Affirmed:** The Court affirmed that the trustee acted within their rights under Idaho law, upholding the discretion to impose reasonable payment terms at the time of sale without advance notice.
- Rejection of Bid Justified: The Court concluded that no statutory requirement mandates preauction disclosure of specific payment terms, meaning the auctioneer's decision to specify acceptable payment formats on-site was legally permissible.
- Attorney Fees Decision Reversed: The appellate court found that the district court's award
 of attorney fees to Cornerstone and Wally was inappropriate, as Breckenridge's complaint
 did not establish a direct commercial relationship with the defendants.

Application to Defendant Bass' Case:

The only procedural similarity between *Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC* and Defendant Bass' case is the presence of printed checks; however, Breckenridge's checks did not specify exact bid amounts, as they were to be filled in if Breckenridge won the bid. The issue in Breckenridge was centered on the form of payment rather than on any prearranged bid amounts.

The Idaho Supreme Court's ruling does not authorize trustees to guide bidders in placing precise bids nor to engage in pre-auction coordination regarding bid amounts.

Importantly, Plaintiffs in Bass' case arrived with printed checks that matched the final bid amount exactly, down to the cent—confirming the Plaintiff's statement of pre-auction coordination. This precise pre-calculation of amounts, absent in Breckenridge, raises questions about trustee involvement and procedural fairness in Bass' case.

Unlike in Breckenridge, where the auctioneer allowed a one-hour correction period for Breckenridge to obtain a properly payable check, no such leniency or standard practice was extended here, leaving Defendant Bass the choice to participate in an auction he knew to be rigged making him party to the collusion, or stand his ground, provide his due diligence to minimize damage in case of innocent buyers and document the whole process but not place a bid.

Key Legal Points from Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC:

1. Trustee Authority Over Payment Requirements:

While trustees have the authority to impose on-site payment conditions, these
must be reasonable and non-restrictive regarding fair access. Breckenridge
established that conditions set on-site must align with the principle of
competitive fairness. Bass' case reaffirms the holding that at the time of the
auction, terms may be provided, but not ahead of the auction that is not already
noticed.

2. Absence of Permission for Pre-Arranged Bid Amounts:

Breckenridge's checks involved only payee discrepancies, with amounts left unspecified,
distinguishing it from Bass' case where pre-determined bid amounts were confirmed to be
printed on checks. The Idaho Supreme Court in Breckenridge did not address nor permit
practices allowing trustees to coordinate exact bidding amounts, thus preventing use of
Breckenridge as authority for such actions.

3. Inapplicability as a Sherman Act Exception:

The ruling in Breckenridge does not support an exception to Sherman Act principles
concerning fair bidding practices in public auctions. Rather, it reaffirmed Idaho Code's
guidelines for fair competition and transparency in foreclosure auctions. Using

 Breckenridge to justify pre-arranged amounts conflicts with this intention, as it would favor collusion over open market principles. Bass' case thus raised issues of potential Sherman Act violations in relation to trustee involvement.

Conclusion:

Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enter. provides no basis for allowing trustees to engage in bid pre-arrangements or to restrict access by specifying exact bid amounts. The Court's decision affirms trustee discretion in a manner consistent with Idaho Code § 45-1506, but does not create exceptions for practices compromising competitive bidding integrity. In Defendant Bass' case, the issue of pre-arranged bid amounts on Plaintiffs' checks suggested trustee misconduct that violated both Idaho foreclosure standards and the Sherman Act, confirmed in writing, warranting reconsideration or invalidation of the sale.

2. Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 574 B.R. 184 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2017)

"The buyer protections afforded by *Idaho Code § 45-1508* apply only to sales challenged for a failure to comply with the procedural provisions of *Idaho Code § 45-1506*. *Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 59 P.3d 308, 313 (Idaho 2002)*. And good faith purchasers are not insulated against every claim or reason for voiding a foreclosure sale. See, e.g., *Taylor, 59 P.3d at 313* (holding that *Idaho Code § 45-1508* does not apply to a foreclosure sale that was void for a lack of default at the time of the sale)." —*Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Baker), 574 B.R. 184, 191 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2017)*

Explanation of Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC

In *Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC*, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho thoroughly examined the scope of protections provided to good faith purchasers under *Idaho Code § 45-1508*. Specifically, the court clarified that these protections are limited to sales challenged for procedural defects. The decision also emphasized that the statute does not shield purchasers from all claims or grounds for invalidating a sale, particularly when the sale itself was void due to substantive defects, such as the absence of a valid default.

Key Facts of the Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC Case:

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- The homeowner (Baker) held a mortgage serviced by Nationstar Mortgage.
- Nationstar initiated a non-judicial foreclosure sale in accordance with Idaho law.
- Baker contested the foreclosure, arguing that there was no default on the mortgage loan at the time of the sale.
- The property was subsequently sold to a third-party buyer at the foreclosure sale.
- The buyer sought protection as a good faith purchaser under *Idaho Code § 45-1508*,
 which generally insulates buyers from certain defects in the foreclosure process.

Court's Decision:

- The court ruled that the protections under *Idaho Code § 45-1508* apply only to
 procedural defects and do not extend to substantive defects, such as when there is a
 lack of default or the improper execution of the auction as examples.
- Idaho Code § 45-1508 does not protect purchasers from all claims against or reasons for voiding a sale.
- Specifically, *Idaho Code § 45-1508* does not apply when a foreclosure sale is void because of the absence of a valid default at the time of sale.
- The court held that the foreclosure sale was void due to the lack of default, and the buyer could not claim protections as a good faith purchaser under *Idaho Code § 45-*1508.

Application to Defendant Bass' Case:

The parallels between *Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC* and the current case are striking. Plaintiffs claimed protection as good faith purchasers under *Idaho Code § 45-1508*, arguing that the trustee's sale must be upheld despite Defendant Bass' objections. However, Baker establishes that these protections do not extend to substantive defects such as the lack of a valid default or fraud. Defendant Bass has consistently maintained that the foreclosure sale was void because it was conducted under improper conduct, including collusion, marred the auction process, and without a valid default.

Key Legal Points from Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC:

1. Limitations of Good Faith Purchaser Protections:

- Idaho Code § 45-1508 provides protections to purchasers in foreclosure sales only
 when the sale is challenged for procedural defects. It does not insulate buyers from
 the consequences of substantive defects.
- In *Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC*, the absence of a valid default rendered the sale void, and the protections of § 45-1508 were deemed inapplicable.
- In Defendant Bass' case, the presence of collusion or lack of a valid default at the time
 of the foreclosure sale each on their own are substantive defects that renders the sale
 void.

2. Void Sales Due to Substantive Defects:

- Foreclosure sales conducted with the presence of collusion or without a valid default
 are void, not merely voidable. This distinction is critical, as a void sale has no legal
 effect and cannot confer valid title on a purchaser.
- Defendant Bass argued that the trustee's sale in this case was void due to a
 substantive defect: rigging the auction, and the lack of a valid default. Therefore,
 Plaintiffs cannot claim to have acquired valid title, and their reliance on good faith
 purchaser protections is misplaced.

3. Bidder's Involvement in Rigging the Auction:

• Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC the court underscores that protections afforded to purchasers under Idaho Code § 45-1508 do not extend to sales voided due to substantive defects. Specifically, while § 45-1508 provides that "failure to give notice to any of such persons by mailing, personal service, posting or publication in accordance with section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so notified nor as to any such persons having actual knowledge of the sale," it also clarifies that "any failure to comply with the provisions of section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value." However, the court in Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC makes clear that these protections apply only to procedural defects outlined in § 45-1506 and do not shield a purchaser from substantive issues—such as fraud or the absence of a valid

default—that render a sale void. Thus, when a sale is void on substantive grounds, the good-faith purchaser protections under *Idaho Code § 45-1508* are unavailable.

In this case, Defendant Bass alleged that the bidder (Plaintiffs), the trustees, and other named parties engaged in improper conduct by coordinating before the auction—an admission of coordination by Plaintiffs (DPW Enterprises Dec., Wangsgard, ¶¶3-4, Oct. 18, 2024) that further substantiates collusion. Such misconduct constitutes a substantive defect that voids the foreclosure sale.

Conclusion:

Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC is directly applicable to Defendant Bass' case, as it underscores that *Idaho Code § 45-1508* does not protect purchasers from substantive defects, such as the absence of a valid default. Plaintiffs' claim to good faith purchaser protections must fail because the trustee's sale was void, and without valid title, they cannot maintain an ejectment action.

3. *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co., 123 Idaho 674, 851 P.2d 970 (1993)*Explanation of *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.*:

In *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co., 123 Idaho 674, 851 P.2d 970 (1993)*, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the rights of mortgagees and lienholders in foreclosure sales. This case underscores that junior lienholders lose their security interest in a foreclosure sale of senior liens, but it also emphasizes that foreclosure sales must be based on a valid default to properly extinguish these interests.

Key Facts of the Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co. Case:

- Idaho Power held a second mortgage on a property with a debt that was not yet due.
- The senior lienholder, Benj. Houseman Company, initiated foreclosure due to default on senior debt.
- The property was sold to a third-party purchaser for less than fair market value.
- Idaho Power, not involved in the sale, later pursued the debt, claiming its security interest was extinguished improperly.

Court's Decision:

- The court held that Idaho Power retained the right to collect its debt after the sale, even though its security interest was extinguished.
- It emphasized that while a foreclosure sale extinguishes junior liens, it does not eliminate the debtor's personal obligation to repay the loan.
- Importantly, a mortgagee can pursue debt collection even after a senior lien foreclosure extinguishes the security interest if the mortgage was rendered valueless.

Application to Defendant Bass' Case:

The relevance of *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.* to Defendant Bass' case lies in its insistence on a valid default as the basis for any foreclosure sale. Defendant Bass asserted that the public auction was improperly initiated without a valid default due to part performance of a binding verbal agreement, which took it out of default when the transfer of responsibilities commenced rendering it void under Idaho law. Additionally, Bass also argued that the Plaintiffs' conduct during the auction influenced the sale outcome, as the property was sold for less than fair market value—similar to the undervalued sale noted in *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.*

Key Legal Points from Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.:

- 1. Mortgagee's Right to Collect Debt Despite Loss of Security Interest:
 - Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co. establishes that a mortgagee can pursue the underlying debt if the security interest is extinguished improperly.
 - In Defendant Bass' case, it was put to the court that the trustee's sale should be
 considered void due to improper conduct and the lack of a valid default, meaning that
 Plaintiffs cannot rely on the sale to extinguish Defendant Bass' rights or obligations
 regarding the property.
- 2. Improper Foreclosure Actions:
 - The court's decision in *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.* emphasizes that
 foreclosure sales must be based on a valid default and conducted according to proper
 & legal procedures to extinguish parties' rights.

• Defendant Bass asserted that the trustee's sale in this case was conducted without a valid default and was tainted by collusion and improper conduct, which violates the principles established in *Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.*

3. Sale for Less Than Fair Market Value:

In Idaho Power, the property was sold for less than its fair market value, which was
one of the issues raised by the junior lienholder. Similarly, in Defendant Bass' case,
the bidder's conduct during the auction affected the fairness and legality of the
sale, resulting in the property being sold under improper conditions.

Conclusion:

Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co. supports Defendant Bass' position that the trustee's sale was improperly conducted and, therefore, void. The improper conduct surrounding the sale and lack of a valid default each could render sale invalid, justifying Defendant Bass' challenge to the Plaintiffs' claim to the property.

4. Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 59 P.3d 308 (2002)

Explanation of Taylor v. Just:

In *Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 59 P.3d 308 (2002)*, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the consequences of a foreclosure sale that failed to comply with the statutory requirements set forth in *Idaho Code § 45-1505(2)*. The Court determined that when a foreclosure sale does not meet the statutory criteria, it is void ab initio, meaning it has no legal effect from its inception. This decision is directly relevant to cases where substantive defects in the foreclosure process render the sale invalid and the purchaser's claim to the property cannot be upheld.

Key Facts of the Case:

- A foreclosure sale took place after the homeowner defaulted on a deed of trust.
- The foreclosure sale did not comply with the statutory requirements under *Idaho Code §* 45-1505(2).
- Specifically, the sale suffered from procedural defects that were significant enough to invalidate it.

 A bidder at the foreclosure sale sought to assert rights as a good faith purchaser for value, claiming legitimate ownership despite the defects in the sale process.

Court's Decision:

- The Idaho Supreme Court determined that the foreclosure sale was void due to its failure to comply with the statutory requirements of *Idaho Code § 45-1505(2)*.
- As a result of this non-compliance, the bidder did not acquire valid title to the property.
- The Court held that the bidder could not claim to be a good faith purchaser for value because the sale was void ab initio (from the beginning).
- Without valid title, the bidder could not avail themselves of the protections provided to good faith purchasers under Idaho law.

Application to Defendant Bass' Case:

The decision in *Taylor v. Just* is highly relevant to Defendant Bass' opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs in this case claimed they were entitled to possession of the property as good faith purchasers, despite Defendant Bass' arguments regarding defects in the foreclosure process. However, *Taylor v. Just* makes clear that a foreclosure sale that fails to comply with statutory requirements is void from the outset, meaning no valid title passes to the purchaser. Defendant Bass argued that the foreclosure sale in this case was marred by both procedural and substantive defects, including non-compliance with statutory requirements and bidder collusion, which renders the sale void and precludes Plaintiffs from claiming title.

Key Legal Points from Taylor v. Just:

- 1. Void Sale Due to Non-Compliance with Statutory Requirements:
 - Taylor v. Just establishes that a foreclosure sale that does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements set forth in Idaho Code § 45-1505 I s void.
 - In Defendant Bass' case, the foreclosure sale is void due to procedural
 irregularities and statutory non-compliance, including the improper handling of the
 auction process and the involvement of the trustee and bidder in collusion.

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 Because the sale was void ab initio, Plaintiffs cannot claim to have acquired valid title, and any attempt to rely on good faith purchaser protections is without merit.

2. Good Faith Purchaser Status:

- In Taylor v. Just, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that good faith purchaser protections do not apply when the foreclosure sale is void due to statutory noncompliance.
- Plaintiffs' claim to good faith purchaser status in Defendant Bass' case is similarly unsupported because the sale itself was invalid. Without valid title, the protections afforded to good faith purchasers under Idaho law are inapplicable.

3. Impact on Ejectment Proceedings:

- Since the foreclosure sale in *Taylor v. Just* was found to be void, the purchaser could not claim ownership of the property and was not entitled to possession.
- Likewise, in Defendant Bass' case, the Plaintiffs' claim to possession is based on a
 void sale. As such, Plaintiffs lack standing to maintain an ejectment action against
 Defendant Bass because they did not acquire valid title through the defective
 foreclosure sale.

Legal Principles Highlighted:

- Statutory Compliance and Validity of Foreclosure Sales:
 - o Foreclosure sales must strictly adhere to the statutory requirements outlined in *Idaho Code § 45–1505* to be valid.
 - A failure to comply with these statutory provisions renders the sale void ab initio,
 meaning it has no legal effect and cannot transfer valid title to the purchaser.

Void vs. Voidable Sales:

- A void sale is invalid from the outset and confers no legal rights on the purchaser,
 while a voidable sale is valid until it is annulled but can be challenged on certain grounds.
- o In Defendant Bass' case, the sale is void because of the procedural and substantive defects in the foreclosure process.

- Good Faith Purchaser Protections:
 - o The Idaho Supreme Court in *Taylor v. Just* held that the protections afforded to good faith purchasers under Idaho law do not apply when the sale is void due to non-compliance with statutory procedures.
 - o Plaintiffs cannot claim the protections of a good faith purchaser in this case because the sale was not conducted in accordance with *Idaho Code § 45-1505*.

Conclusion:

Taylor v. Just is directly applicable to the present case and supports Defendant Bass' position that the foreclosure sale is void due to statutory non-compliance and bidder misconduct. As a result, Plaintiffs did not acquire valid title to the property, and their claim to possession must fail. The principles established in *Taylor v. Just* make clear that Plaintiffs cannot claim to be good faith purchasers, and their attempt to eject Defendant Bass from the property is without legal basis.

- 5. Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 211 P.3d 106 (2009)
 - "Idaho Code § 45-1508 does not require that the grantor to a deed of trust demonstrate harm resulting from an irregularity in the foreclosure sale in order to have the sale set aside. The district court cannot impose this additional requirement under the statute, thereby increasing the plaintiff's burden, just because it does not agree with the result." Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 505, 211 P.3d 106, 114 (2009)
 - "A trust deed must be foreclosed in the manner set forth in I.C. § 45-1506, which requires in part that '[t]he purchaser at the sale shall forthwith pay the price bid and upon receipt of payment the trustee shall execute and deliver the trustee's deed to such purchaser ' I.C. § 45-1506(9)." Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 503, 211 P.3d 106, 112 (2009)
 - "The sale is final once the trustee accepts the bid as payment in full unless there are
 issues surrounding the notice of the sale (which are admittedly not present in this case).
 This interpretation promotes the legislature's interest in preserving the finality of title to
 real property. In addition, our interpretation does not deprive trust deed grantors of a

statutory remedy in cases such as this where the trustee wrongfully accepts a credit bid as payment in full." – *Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 504, 211 P.3d 106, 113 (2009)*Strict Compliance and Material Irregularities:

The Idaho Supreme Court, in *Spencer v. Jameson*, highlighted that non-judicial foreclosure statutes require strict adherence. Material irregularities in the foreclosure process can serve as grounds to set aside the sale, regardless of whether harm to the grantor is demonstrated. This principle is underscored in *Idaho Code § 45-1506*, where failure to comply with statutory requirements may invalidate a sale if procedural irregularities are significant, even if the buyer acts in good faith.

Explanation of Spencer v. Jameson:

In *Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 211 P.3d 106 (2009)*, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether a grantor must demonstrate actual harm resulting from irregularities in the foreclosure process to set aside a sale. The Court held that Idaho Code § 45-1506 imposes no such requirement; any material irregularity alone is sufficient to invalidate the sale. This decision is significant for understanding the standard for contesting foreclosure sales in Idaho, clarifying that homeowner rights to challenge defective foreclosures do not hinge on proving harm.

Key Facts of the Spencer v. Jameson Case:

- David Spencer (the grantor) executed a deed of trust on his property to secure a loan.
- After Spencer's default, the trustee initiated a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
- Spencer alleged irregularities in the foreclosure, notably concerning notice of sale requirements.
- The district court required Spencer to prove actual harm from these irregularities to set aside the sale.
- Spencer appealed, arguing that the district court improperly increased his burden by requiring harm.

Court's Decision:

- The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court, ruling that Idaho Code § 45-1506
 does not require a grantor to demonstrate harm from irregularities in foreclosure to
 set aside the sale.
- The Court stressed that non-judicial foreclosure statutes require strict adherence, and any significant irregularity in the process justifies setting aside the sale.
- The decision emphasizes that the trustee's compliance with statutory procedures,
 rather than the grantor's injury, is central.

Application to Defendant Bass' Case:

Spencer v. Jameson is directly applicable to Defendant Bass' argument that the foreclosure sale should be set aside due to procedural and substantive irregularities, including collusion and manipulation of the auction process. In this case, the Plaintiffs have attempted to downplay the significance of these irregularities, suggesting that Defendant Bass cannot demonstrate harm sufficient to invalidate the sale. However, Spencer makes it clear that Idaho law does not require Defendant Bass to prove harm; the mere existence of material irregularities in the foreclosure process is sufficient to justify setting aside the sale.

Key Legal Points from Spencer v. Jameson:

- 1. No Requirement to Prove Actual Harm:
 - Spencer v. Jameson holds that a grantor does not need to prove that they suffered
 actual harm as a result of procedural defects in the foreclosure process.
 - In Defendant Bass' case, Plaintiffs cannot argue that Defendant Bass must demonstrate harm in order to challenge the sale. The focus should be on whether the foreclosure process complied with Idaho's statutory requirements, which Defendant Bass argued it did not.
- 2. Material Irregularities in the Foreclosure Process:
 - Spencer v. Jameson emphasizes that strict compliance with non-judicial foreclosure statutes is required, and any material irregularity can serve as grounds for setting aside the sale.

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 Defendant Bass has presented evidence of multiple irregularities in the foreclosure process, including the involvement of the bidder in rigging the auction, and procedural defects in the trustee's handling of the sale. These irregularities are sufficient to invalidate the sale under Spencer.

3. Trustee's Duty to Comply with Statutory Requirements:

- The trustee's duty to strictly adhere to the statutory requirements of *Idaho Code §*45-1506 is a central theme in *Spencer v. Jameson*.
- In this case, Defendant Bass asserted that the trustee failed to comply with these requirements, and as a result, the foreclosure sale is void. Under *Spencer v*. *Jameson*, the sale must be set aside due to these material deviations from the statutory procedures.

Legal Principles Highlighted:

- Strict Compliance with Statutory Requirements:
 - o Idaho law requires strict compliance with the procedures outlined in the nonjudicial foreclosure statutes. Any material irregularities—such as collusion, inadequate notice, or procedural defects—are grounds to set aside a sale.
 - o In Defendant Bass' case, the numerous irregularities in the foreclosure process render the sale void and justify setting it aside.

• No Requirement to Demonstrate Harm:

- o The Idaho Supreme Court in *Spencer v. Jameson* made it clear that grantors do not need to show that they suffered actual harm in order to challenge a defective foreclosure sale.
- Defendant Bass' challenge to the foreclosure sale does not require him to demonstrate harm; the material irregularities alone are sufficient to invalidate the sale.

Conclusion:

Spencer v. Jameson is directly applicable to Defendant Bass' case and supports the argument that the foreclosure sale must be set aside due to the procedural and

substantive irregularities in the process. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in *Spencer v. Jameson* makes clear that the existence of material irregularities is sufficient to justify setting aside a foreclosure sale, and Plaintiffs cannot demand that Defendant Bass prove harm in order to challenge the sale. The foreclosure process in this case was marred by significant irregularities, and under *Spencer v. Jameson*, the sale is void.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the supplemental case law discussed above, Defendant Bass respectfully submits that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied. Procedural and substantive defects, including the lack of a valid default, collusion between the bidder and the trustee, and violations of statutory requirements, marred the foreclosure sale in question. These defects render the sale void under Idaho law, and Plaintiffs cannot claim to be good faith purchasers entitled to possession of the property.

The cases of *Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC, Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co., Taylor v. Just, and Spencer v. Jameson* all support Defendant Bass' position that the foreclosure sale was void and that Plaintiffs did not acquire valid title to the property with no new arguments added. Accordingly, the Court should set aside the foreclosure sale and deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Dated this <u>6th</u> day of November 2024. Respectfully submitted, Jeremy L. Bass Defendant/ Perforce Pro Se

Signature

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING			
I certify that I have sent by en RECONSIDERATION to Plaintiffs and Co-Defi		first-class mail this MEMORANDUM IN onsole on November 6 th . 2024. at the f	
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Email: lewis@hwmlawfirm.com	[~]	Ken Nagy	
Postal: Lewis N. Stoddard, Bar No. 7766 Halliday, Watkins & Mann, P.C.	LJ	Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc. Email: kennagy@idaholegalaid.org	[/]
376 East 400 South, Suite 300		Counsel for Dwayne Pike	
Salt Lake City, UT 84111		1 B	
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT	JENNIE COMM. #	20190100	
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personally appeared <u>Jeremy Bass</u> ,	known to	, before me, the undersigned Notary	s subscribed
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User Name: Jeremy Bass Date and Time: Wednesday, November 6, 2024 7:22:00 AM PST Job Number: 237933963

Document (1)

1. Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enter. Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016., LLC v. Wally Enterprises, Inc.

Search Type: Natural Language

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170 Idaho 649, *649; 516 P.3d 73, **73; 2022 Ida, LEXIS 96, ***1

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary ment > Burdens of Proof > Scintilla Rule

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary
Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Burdens of Proof > Movant Persuasion & Proof

HN2 Summary Judgment, Entitlement as Matter

The Supreme Court of Idaho employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on summary judgment motions. Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/j.chm/nc/10.1007 standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on roduce admissible evidence to support the facts. Idebe R Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment is improper it reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genui-issue of material fact for the purposes of summary ludament.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

HN3 & Standards of Review, De Novo Review

The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review of questions of law, which includes whether the district court correctly determined that a case is based on a commercial transaction for the purpose of <u>Ideho Code S</u> (2-120/3)

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

HN4131 Legislation, Interpretation

If the statute is not ambiguous, the Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. The idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that where statutory tanguage is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for and other extrusts evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Ambiguity occurs where reasonable minds might differ as to interpretations. However, ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing interpretations to the court.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Briefs

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability of Lower Court Decisions > Preservation for Review

HN5 Appeals, Appellate Briefs

The Idaho Supreme Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an concritinity to respond in the respondent's brief

Governments > Courts > Rule Application &

HN6 2 Courts, Rule Application & Interpretation

In the context of the timing of a search, there are few circumstances in which rigid rules are proper.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other Security Instruments > Definitions & Interocetation

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreclosure

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Judicial

HIME Mortgages & Other Security Instruments, Definitions & Interpretation

The whole premise of Idaho Code 6 45-15/6/9) is to

Orted As of November 6, 2024 3:22 PM Z

Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enter.

Supreme Court of Idaho August 22, 2022, Filed Docket Nos. 48489 & 48703

BRECKENRIDGE PROPERTY FUND 2016, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALLY ENTERPRISES, INC., a Kansas corporation dba WE SERVE IDAHO; WEINSTEIN & RILEY, P.S., a Washington professional corporation: CORNERSTONE PROPERTIES LLC an Idaho limited liability company Defendants-Respondents, and JOHN DOES 1-10, and CORPORATIONS XYZ, Defendants, CORNERSTONE PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Cross-Claimant, v. WEINSTEIN & RILEY, P.S., a Washington professional corporation, Cross-Defendant,

Prior History: [***1] Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonneville County, Bruce L. Pickett, District Judge.

Disposition: The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Core Terms

district court, bid, commercial transaction, auction, attorney's fees, conditions, notice, gravamen, negligence per se, bidder, argues, court's decision. summary ludgment, estoppel, lawsuit, purchaser, parties, checks, trust deed, announced, award of attorney's fees, highest bidder, foreclosure, conce complied, binding, equitable estoppol, terms of the sale, prevailing party, form of payment

Case Summary

HOLDINGS: [1]-In a suit concerning the legality of an auctioneer providing the terms of sale at the time of the foreclosure sale, including acceptable methods of payment, without providing earlier notice to potential bidders, the printed conditions of the foreclosure sale were binding on plaintiff when announced by the auctioneer, whether it knew of the conditions

Reporter
170 (adnot 64): 516 P.3d 73 **: 2022 Ida. LEXIS 96 **: 2022 WL 3581124
2023 (WL 3581124 | Deformation on the plantiff of the plantiff alloged no other fallure in relation to the pre-sale

District court affirmed in part and vacated in part.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Pretrial Judgments > Judgment on Pleadings

Judgment > Motions for Summary ment > Notice Requirement

HN1[2] Pretrial Judgments, Judgment

After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. <u>Idaho R. CN. P.</u> 12(c). On such a motion, if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motio one for summary judgment under kitche R. Chy P. 56 where all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion. *(Subs. R. Ch. P. 12(d.)*. A judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as a ruling on summary judgment.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law > Genuine

Jeremy Bass

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170 Idaho 649, *649; 516 P.3d 73, **73; 2022 Ida. LEXIS 96, ***1

ensure immediate closure to resolve the uncertain HN17 Dutles & Powers, Sales ensure immediate closure to resolve the uncertain status of the property, indeed, the nature of these proceedings is that of expediency, which is why, unlike its judicial foreclosure counterpart that permits a one-year right to redemption, a deed of trust affords a creditor the right to nonjudicial foreclosure and a shorter creation the right to nonjunical torecosure and a shorter 120-day period of cure. That said, the procedures to foreclose on trust deeds outside of the judicial process provide the express-lane alternative to foreclosure in the

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

HN6 21 Legislation, interpretation

No matter how other courts have interpreted forthwith, the idaho Supreme Court must give the word its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and, if that definition is unambiguous, the Court does not construe it, but simply

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreclosure

HN9(1) Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

Before the auction begins, trustees can impose reasonable restrictions on the acceptable forms of payment in which a bid can be made at a trustee's sale.

Real Property Law > Priorities & Recording > Elements > Bona Fide Purchasers

HN10021 Elements, Bons Fide Purchasers

A trustee's sale to a good-faith purchaser for vi final, despite a violation of <u>isaho Code § 45-1506</u>.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > ... > Trustees > Duties &

Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of

Discussing the sale of property at a trustee's sale, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained the sale is final once the trustee accepts the bid as payment in full unless there are issues surrounding the notice of the sale. This finality, echood in <u>ideho Code § 45-1508</u>, refers to actual notice, and it serves the legislature's interest in preserving the finality of title to real property. As for <u>Idaho Code 5 45-1508</u>, it is more reasonable to infer that the legislature did not intend for a sale to be set aside once the trustee accepts the credit bid as payment in full. As a result, the sale is finel once the trustee accepts the bid as payment in full unless there are issues surrounding the notice of the sale.

Torts > ... > Proof > Violations of Law > Ordinances

Torts > ... > Proof > Violations of Law > Rules &

Torts > ... > Proof > Violations of Law > Statutes

Torts > ... > Proof > Violations of Law > Standards

Torts > ... > Proof > Violations of Law > Safety

HN12 4 Violations of Law, Ordinances

show common law negligence, a party must prove a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty: (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Self-evident in the formulation of these elements is that a party cannot be held liable for these elements is that a party cannot be hold liable for negligence when there was no legal duty imposed under the circumstances. In Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se. Establishing negligence per se through a violation of a statute or regulation conclusively establishes the first two elements of a cause of action in neolitionce. negligence.

Civil Procedure > ... > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Affirmative Defenses > Estoppel



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1. Spencer v. Jameson Client/Matter -None Search Terms: Search Type: Natural Language Narrowed by:

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147 Idaho 497, *497; 211 P.3d 106, **108; 2009 Ida, LEXIS 96, ***1

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Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

HN1(초) Appellate Review, Standards of Review

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, an appellate court applies the same standard of review as was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Judgment > Entitlement Law > Appropriateness

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, <a href="https://dx.cir.cl/b.fs/cir.cl/b.f

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

HN3 1 Appellate Review, Standards of Review

An appellate court reviewing a grant of summary judgment liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper.

Real Property Law > Mobilehomes & Mobilehome Parks > General Overview

HN4 Real Property Law, Mobilehomes & addi

Unon manufacture, a mobile home is a movable chattel upon manufacture, a mouse none is a moveme creater and characterized as personal property. Once a mobile home is affixed to land it is converted to real property. tdeho Code Ann. § 55-101. Accordingly, a mob may be considered either real property or personal property under Idaho law.

Real Property Law > Financing > Mortgages & Other Security Instruments > Definitions &

HNS & Mortgages & Other Security Instruments, Definitions & Interpretation

A deed of trust, by definition, is limited to the conveyance of real property. <u>Atthic Code Ann. S 45-152(20)</u>.

Real Property Law > General Overview

HN6(≛) Real Property Law

The Idaho Legislature has defined "real property" under The Idaho Legistature has defined 'real property under Title 55, Chapter 1, which governs property and ownership, as follows: 1. Lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and water rights, and mining claims, both load and placer. 2. That which is affixed to land. 3. That which is appurtenant to land. Idaho Code Ann. § 55-

Real Property Law > Fixtures & Improvements > Fixture Characteristics

Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreclosure

HN7(2) Fixtures & Improvements, Fixture

A deed of trust is limited to the conveyance of real A deed of trust is limited to the conveyance of real property. Ident Code An 3 45-150/20. Accordingly, that which is land, affixed to the land, or apputenant to the land, and falls within the parameters of the real property described in the deed, is conveyed under the doed of trust. Ident Code Aug. 6 45-150/20. provides Caution As of: October 28, 2024 1:13 PM Z

Spencer v. Jameson

Supreme Court of Idaho June 16, 2009, Filed

Docket No. 34517, 2009 Opinion No. 85

Reporter 147 Idaho 497 *; 211 P.3d 106 **; 2009 Ida. LEXIS 96 ***

LAWRENCE SPENCER Plaintif-Annellant v DEE LAWRENCE SPERCER, Haman-Appealars, V. DEE JAMESON, an Individual, DAVIDSON TRUST CO., Custodian for IRA/SEP Account No. 68-0811-30, and JAMES A. RAEON, Successor Trustoe, Defendants-

Subsequent History: Released for Publication July 8, 2009.

Prior History: [***1] Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenal County, Hon. Lansing D. Haynes, District Judge.

Disposition: District court order granting summary ludgment, reversed.

Core Terms

trust deed, bid, mobile home, credit bid, attorney's fees, sales, real property, district court, summary judgment, purchaser, proceeds, Parcel, excess of the amount. parciases, proceeds, Pares, excess of the amount amount owing, secured note, time of sale, foreclos holder, recorded, non-judicial, argues, prevailing p price bid, surplus, foreclosure sale, conveyed, expended, grantor, secured obligation, affixed

Case Summary

Descentived Doctors

Plaintiff borrower filed suit against defendant lenders in the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of table District Court in the Prists Joinean Usand, State of Idaho, Kootenal County, claiming irregularities in two non-judicial foreclosure sales and seeking to set them aside or recover a monetary surplus under <u>Idaho Code</u> <u>Ace</u> <u>§ 4.5-1.562</u>, The district court granted summary judgment for the lenders. The borrower appealed.

The court reversed the district court's award of summary judgment for the lender and remanded for a determination of the amount of sale proceeds to be distributed along with who was entitled to such proceeds under <u>(salin Coste Ann. & 46-1507</u>. The court awarded the borrower court costs, but not attorney fees, on

The borrower executed promissory notes in favor of the lender, secured by two deeds of trust. The borrower later defaulted. The trustee sold the deeds at non-judicial foreclosure sales. The borrower argued that a mobile home was personal properly rather than real property and should not have been transferred to the trustee. He also argued that the lender submitted bids in

excess of the amounts owed on the notes and that he

was entitled to the surplus proceeds. The court held that

was entitled to the surplus proceeds. The court held that the mobile home was affixed to the land at the time of sale and, therefore, was read property under <u>(Satho Cook Acm. \$ 55-101</u> and properly transferred to the trustee under <u>(Idho Cook Acm. \$ 45-160/21</u>). Because the lender bid in excess of the amount of credit available to it under one of the deeds of trust, it did not pay the price owing before the trustee executed the Trustee's Deed as required by <u>(Satho Cook Acm. \$ 45-156/CP)</u> however, it was unnecessary to set aside the sale. The court found that thore were proceeds from the sales that went bevond the expenses of the sales.

sales that went beyond the expenses of the sales and the trust deed obligations, and the trial court was required to distribute the excess under <u>Idulino Code Ann.</u> § 45-15/27.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary

Jeremy Bass

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147 Idaho 497, *497; 211 P.3d 106, **106; 2009 Ida. LEXIS 96, ***1

transferred to the trustee for purposes of non-judicial

Real Property Law > Fixtures & vements > Fixture Characteristics

HNB(초) Fixtures & Improvements, Fixture

When faced with the issue of fixture, courts apply three openeral tests: (1) Actual or constructive annexation to the reality; (2) Appropriation to the use of that part of the reality to which it is connected; and (3) Intention of the party so annexing to make the article a permanent accession to the realty.

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreclosure

HN9[2] Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

A trust deed must be foreclosed in the manner set forth In <u>takka Code Ann \$ 45-1566</u>, which requires in part that the purchaser at the sale shall forthwith pay the price bid and upon receipt of payment the trustee shall execute and deliver the trustee's deed to such purchaser. <u>Idaho Code Ann. 6</u>.45-1506(9).

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreciosus

HN10[2] Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

A credit bid in a foreclosure sale made by the lender A crodit bid in a foredosure sale made by the lender holding the note is the equivalent of a cash sale and, therefore, satisfies the statutory requirements for purchasing real property at a trustor's sale under <u>fabric Code Apr. 8.45-1506(2)</u>. However, there is a limitation on credit bids: the holder of a deod of trust note credit must bid in all or part of the amount owing pursuant to the note at the time of sale.

Real Property

Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of

HN11|2 | Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

Property may only be transferred to the trustee for purposes of non-judicial foredosure pursuant to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/j.com/n.com

Real Property

Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreclosure

HN12(2) Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

See kisho Code Ann. \$ 45-1508.

Real Property
Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of
Sale Foreclosure

HN13[1] Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

ting subsections (9) and (10) of Idano Code Ann. S 45-1500 in their entirety, it is more reasonable to infer that the legislature did not intend for a non-judicial foreclosure sale to be set aside once the trustee accepts the credit bid as payment in full.

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of Sale Foreclosure

HN143 Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale

See (datho Code Ann. 6 45-1506(9).

Real Property
Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Private Power of
Sale Foreclosure

HN15 | Foreclosures, Private Power of Sale



Date and Time: Friday, October 25, 2024 3:16:00 □PM PDT Job Number: 237024656

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138 Idaho 137, *137; 59 P.3d 308, **308; 2002 Ida, LEXIS 178, ***1

Judgment > Motions for Summary Judgment > General Overview

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law > General Overview

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > General Overview

HN1 2 Standards of Review, De Novo Review

In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, the appellate court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the rd are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Summary judgment is appropriate if the ple depositions, and admissions on file, together to affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which the appellate court exercises

Real Property
Law > Financing > Foreclosures > General

HN2 Financing, Foreclosures

Litatio Codu § 45-15/15/2) (1997) grants authority to foreclose a deed of trust by nonjudicial sale. It provides, foreclose a deed of trust by nontputicial sale, it provides, The trustee may foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale under this act if there is a default by the grantor owing an obligation the performance of which is secured by the trust deed. The statute requires that the default exist at the time of the sale. It states that the trustee may foreclose a trust doed if there "is" a default by the grantor, not if there "has been" a default by the grantor.

Contracts Law > Contract Internetation > Intent

Contracts Law > Contract Interpretation > General

HN3(2) Contract Interpretation, Intent

A contract must be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties. In order to ascertain that intent, the contract must be construed as a whole. If a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law, and the meaning of the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract's own words.

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > ... > Private Trusts Characteristics > Trustees > General Overview

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > General

Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Trusts > General

HN43 Private Trusts Characteristics, Trustees

idaho Code 6 45-1506 (1997) provides that the trustee

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > General

HNSE Financing, Foreclosures

idaho Code § 45-1506(1.2) gives the grantor the right to cure a default by paying those sums within 115 days after the recording of the notice of default. The statute simply grants a right to cure within 115 days after the recording of the notice of default and specifies how a grantor can exercise that right. It does not purport to timit the right of the grantor and beneficiary to come to eir own agreement to cure a default.

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures > General

HNG Financing, Foreclosures

See Idaho Code \$ 45-1503 (1997).

Caution
As of: October 25, 2024 10:16 PM Z

Taylor v. Just

Supreme Court of Idaho November 22, 2002, Filed Docket No. 28105, 2002 Opinion No. 131

Reporter 138 Idaho 137 *; 59 P.3d 308 **; 2002 Ida, LEXIS 178 ***

JAMES L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. CHARLES C. JUST, in his capacity as Trustee; FAIRBANKS CAPITAL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; RONALD DALE RUSH and TERILYN ANN RUSH, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants-

Subsequent History: [***1] Released for Publication December 16, 2002.

Prior History: Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County, Hon. Sergio A. Gutierrez, District Judge.

Disposition: The judgment of the district court is

Core Terms

attorney's fees, terms, void, promissory note, modified

default, trust deed, district court, cure, foreclosure sale, real property, notice, summary judgment, foreclose, execute, grantor, Lender, good faith purchaser, foreclosure, purchaser, deliver, deed, parties

Case Summary

Procedural Posture

Real Property

HN7(2) Financing, Foreclosures

Real Property Law > Priorities &

The District Court of the Third Judicial District. State of Idaho, Canyon County, granted judgment in favor of appelloe trustee under a deed of trust to execute and deliver a trustee's deed to appellant highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. The bidder appealed.

The district court stated that a breach of contract cause of action would not lie and ordered the trustee to execute and deliver the trustee's deed to the bidder. The bidder argued that the trial court erred. The app

Law > Financing > Foreclosures > General Overview

By its terms <u>idato Code § 45-1506</u> only applies to sales challenged because of a failure to comply with the provisions of <u>idatic Code § 45-1508</u> (1997).

Contracts Law > Personal Property > Bona Fide

Recording > Elements > Bona Fide Purchasers

Real Property Law > Deeds > General Overview

The doctrine of bona fide purchaser is peculiarly available for purposes of defense. This defense can be maintained only in favor of a title, though it may be defective, which a bona fide purchaser has, and it is not

defective, which a bons fide purchaser has, and it is not available for the purpose of creating a title. Where the title to tand passes, though obtained by fraud, and the deod is therefore voidable, one who purchases from the grantee in good faith, and without notice, will be protected, because he had a title which he could and did

convey, but when the deed was never in fact delivered.

grantee can convey no title for the protection ch the plea of a bona fide purchaser can be invoke

HN6 2 Personal Property, Bona Fide Purchasers

court found that the agreement cured the default court found that the agreement cured the defaut because under the agreement, there were no longer any sums past due. Because at the time of the sale there was no default in the performance of any obligations secured by the deed of frust, the foredosure sale was void. https://doi.org/10.1008/j.che/s/3-55-5596ff did not purport to limit the right of the grantor and beneficiary to come to their own agreement to cure a default. The foredosure sale was with fee faiture to complete with interest Costs/3-55-5596. was void for faiture to comply with <u>foure Code 5 45-155952</u>). The bidder was not a good faith purchaser for value because he did not acquire till to the real property. Because the foreclosure sale was void, the property, secause the forecourse sale was void, the alloged contract was likewise void. The alloged contract would circumvent the statutory requirement that a deed of trust can be foreclosed only if there is a default in an obligation the performance of which is socured by the deed of trust. The trustee was entitled to an award of a

The judgment was reversed.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of w > De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary Judgment > General Overview

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary
Judgment > Appellate Review > General Overview

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary
Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

Civil Procedure > ... > Summary

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138 Idaho 137, *137; 59 P.3d 308, **308; 2002 Ida, LEXIS 178, ***1

Civil Procedure > ... > Attorney Fees & Expenses > Basis of Recovery > Statutory Awards

HN10(2) Attorney Fees & Expenses, Resso

idatio Code \$ 12-1/0(3) provides, in any civil action to recover in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by taw, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attempt's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. The statute defines the term "commercial transaction" to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. Idatio Code \$ 12-12/(3) (1998).

Counsel: Mark L. Clark, Nampa, for appellants.

White Peterson Morrow Gigray Rossman Nye & Rossman, Nampa, for respondent. Kevin E. Dinius argued.

Judges: EISMANN, Justice. Chief Justice TROUT, and Justices SCHROEDER, WALTERS, and KIDWELL CONCUR.

Opinion by: EISMANN

Opinion

["309] ["138] EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment ordering the trustee under a deed of trust to execute and deliver a trustee's deed to the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. Prior to the sale, the grantor and beneficiary had entored into an agreement resolving the default. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court because the sale was void and the trustee cannot be required to execute and default a trustee.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 1998, Ronald and Tenlyn Rush executed a deed of trust on their residence to secure payment of a promissory note in the sum of \$ 37,000. The defendant Fairbanks Capital Corporation (Fairbanks Capital) later [""10] [""15] acquired the interest of the beneficiary [""2] under that doed of trust. The Rushes failed to make the monthly payments that came due

Contracts Law > ... > Affirmative Defenses > Fraud & Miscenesentation > General Overview

HN9[&] Affirmative Defenses, Fraud Misrepresentation

A void contract cannot be enforced.

Civil Procedure > ... > Costs & Attorney Fees > Attorney Fees & Expenses > Reasonable

Civil Procedure > ... > Costs & Attorney Fees > Attorney Fees & Expenses > General



User Name: Jeremy Bass

Date and Time: Monday, October 28, 2024 6:15:00 AM PDT

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123 Idaho 674, *674; 851 P.2d 970, **970; 1993 Ida, LEXIS 100, ***1

Ellis, Brown and Sheils, Chtd., of Boise, for plaintiffident. Martin T. Neils argued.

Judges: Johnson, Justice. McDevitt, C.J., Bistline and Trout, JJ., and Judd, J., Pro Tem, concur.

Opinion by: JOHNSON

Opinion

[*674] [*970] This is a collection case. We hold that a mortgagee is not precluded from suing to collect the entire debt secured by a mortgage where the debt was ontitue out secured by a montaging where the beat was not due and where there was no basis to foreclose the mortgage at the time the property was sold to a third party by the trustee of prior deeds of trust for less than the fair market value of the property.

THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

On May 12, 1981, The Zachreson Company (Zachreson) entered into elaven weatherization agreements with Idaho Power Company. Each agreement required idaho Power to weatherize a agreement required loans Power to weathers a building owned by Zachreson. Zachreson agreed to pay for this work on July [***2] 12, 1991, or whenever the weathertzed property was transferred, whichever occurred first. Zachreson agreed to pay a total of \$ 17,651.76. Idaho Power did not require Zachreson to

To secure payment, Zachreson gave Idaho Power a mortgage on each of the eleven properties. Each of the eleven mortgages was subject to one or the other of two senior deeds of trust. In 1988, the trustee of the two senior deeds of trust. In 1993, the trustee of the two senior deeds of trust instituted non-judical foredosure proceedings on all eleven parcels. The trustee gave train Power ontice of the foredosure sales, but Idaho Power did not participate in any of the sales. The sales took place on July 5, 1988.

The successful bids at the foreclosure sales totaled \$ 455,679.57. The fair market value of the property sold was at least [*875] \$ 495,000.00. According to these figures, which are not disputed on appeal, the fair

Counsel: Lojek, Gabbert & Strother, Chtd., of Boise, for defendant-eppellant. Jeffrey A. Strother argued. market value of the property exceeded the total of the amount secured by the senior deeds of trust and the debt secured by Idaho Power's mortgages.

> The Benj. Houseman Company (Houseman) is the successor in interest to Zachreson. Neither Zachreson nor Houseman ever paid any part of the \$ 17.651.76 nor Houseman ever paid any part of the \$ 17.551.76 own to klaho Power. E⁺⁺3 klaho Power sued Houseman for the amount Zachreson agreed to pay for the weathertzation. The trial court granted summary judgment to klaho Power, rejecting Houseman's arguments that the single-action statute (½C, § 6-701) and the statute (mining deficiency judgments in mortgage foreclosures (½C, § 6-703) barred klaho Power's action. Houseman appealed.

> NEITHER <u>I.C. § 5-101</u> NOR <u>I.C. § 6-108</u> BAR IDAHO POWER'S ACTION.

Houseman asserts that <u>IC §§ 5-101</u> and <u>6-103</u> bar Idaho Power's right to recover from Houseman. We

The two statutes upon which Houseman promises its appeal provide:

es provided to the proceedings in foreclosure — Effect of foreclosure on holder of unrecorded iten. — There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. In such action the court may, by its judgment, direct a sale of the incumbered property (or so much thereof as may be necessary) and the application of the proceeds of the sale to the payment of the costs of the court and the expenses of the sale, and the amount due to the plaintiff; and sales [**4] of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages. estate under judgments of foreclosure of morte estate under judgments of roreclosure or mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in the case of sales under execution; (and if it appear from the sheriff's return that the proceeds are insufficient, and a balance still remains due, judgment can then be docketed for such balance against the defendant or defendants personally liable for the debt), and it becomes a lien on the real estate of such judgment debtor, as in other cases on which execution may

mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or having a

Caution
As of: October 28, 2024 1:15 PM Z

Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co.

Supreme Court of Idaho April 29, 1993; April 29, 1993, Filed No. 20083, 1993 Opinion No. 46

Reporter 123 Idaho 674 *; 851 P.2d 970 **; 1993 Ida. LEXIS 100 ***

IDAHO POWER COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent v. The REN I HOUSEMAN COMPANY, Successor in Interest to the Zachreson Company, Defendant-Appellant

Subsequent History: [***1] Released for Publication May 21, 1993.

Prior History: Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. George D. Carey, District Judge.

Appeal from summary judgment.

Disposition: Affirmed

Ccre Terms

mortgage, foreclosu re, senior deed, wea proceedings, sales, deficiency judgment, fair market value, agree to pay, real estate, conveyance, forecto costs, mortgage foreclosure, mortgaged property, foreclosure sale, summary judgment, debt secured, trustee sale, no right, unrecorded, mortgagee,

Case Summary

Defendant mortgagor challenged the judgment of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District (Idano), which granted summary judgment in favor of plantiff mortgages, power company, in the mortgages action for the amount that the mortgage's predecessor agreed to pay for weathertzation of buildings.

The mortgagee obtained a mortgage on each of eleven A mortgagee may bring a direct action on a debt properties of the mortgager's predecessor as security secured by the mortgage, if the mortgage is valueless.

for payment for weatherization. The trustee of the two senior deeds of trust to which the montgages were subject instituted foreclosure proceeding and sold all the subject instituted foredosure proceeding and soid as use property. The mortgagee filed an action against the mortgager for the amount due on the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee. On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, it held that the mortgagee was not precluded from suing to collect the debt secured by the rigage where the debt was not due and where there morgage where the cent was not due and where there was no basis to foreclose the mortgage at the time the property was sold to the third party by the trustee for less than the fair market value. The court noted that the mortgages had no right to foredose its mortgages before the trustee sold the property and no right to redeem the property from the purchaser at the foreclosure sale pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1509. The court concluded that once the mortgage became valueless the mortgagee had the right to file the direct action on the debt secured by the mortgage.

The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee in the mortgagee's action for the amount that the mortgager's predecessor agreed to pay for the weatherization of buildings.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Law > Financing > Foreclosures > Gener Overview

HN1 2 Financing, Foreclosures

Page 3 of 3

123 Idaho 674, *675; 851 P.2d 970, **970; 1993 Ida, LEXIS 100, ***4

n, which conveyance or lien does not _______ End of Documer ann america, which conveyance or lieft does not appear of record in the proper office at the commencement of the action, need be made a party to such action; and the judgment therein rendered, and the proceedings therein had, are as conclusive against the party holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had been nade a party to the action.

6-108. Deficiency Judge have jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment in any case involving a foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount greater than the difference between the mortgage [***] indebtedness, as determined by the decree, plus costs of foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable value of the mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the decree upon the taking of

Neither of these statutes applies to this case. Under the terms of the mortgages, Zachreson's obligation to Idaho Power did not become due until the property was sold by the trustee of the senior deeds of trust. Therefore, by the trustee of the senior deeds of trust. Therefore, idaho Power had no right to foreclose its mortgages before the trustee sold the property. The sales by the trustee foreclosed and terminated all interest Idaho Power had in the property, and Idaho Power had no right to redeem the property from the purchaser at the right to redeem the property main the possesses at the trustee's sales. <u>I.C. 6. 45-1508</u>. Idaho Power's mortgage lien on the property became valueless at the time of the trustee's sale. <u>Warner v. Bockstahler.</u> 48 kfsno.419.423.263.P.862.863 (1929).

HN1(4) A mortgagee may bring a direct action on a debt secured by the mortgage, if the mortgage is valueless. Clark v. f*6761 24 kinho 142, 152, 132 P. 735, 738 (1913).

m

CONCLUSION.

We [***6] affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Idaho Power

We award costs to idaho Power on appeal, together with attorney fees pursuant to LC. 6 12-120/3).



User Name: Jeremy Bass

Date and Time: Monday, October 28, 2024 4:00:00 EAM PDT

Inh Number 237112123

Document (1)

1. Baker v. Nationster Morto. LLC (In re Beker)

Client/Matter: -None-Search Terms:

Search Type: Natural Language Narrowed by:

Content Type

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574 B.R. 184, *184; 2017 Bankr, LEXIS 2110, **2110

ng a motion to dismiss, it may consider exhibits attached to, and documents incorporated by reference in, the complaint.

Bankruptcy Law > ... > Avoidance > Fraudulent

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures HN3[3] Fraudulent Transfers, Elements

11 U.S.C.S. § 5-18(n)(1) empowers a trustee to avoid the involunity transfer of an interest of the plaintiff in property made within two years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition if the plaintiff was insolvent on the bankuptory petition if the plaintiff was insolvent on the date that the transfer was made and she received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer. § <u>C450.017(18)</u> The term "transfer" is defined in the U.S. Bankuptory Code to include the kind of involuntary transfer of a debtor's interest that occurs via a trustee's sale to foreclose a creditor's deed of trust a truster's sale to foreclose a croditor's deed of trust lien. 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(54(C)-(D). While § <u>5.58</u> expressly bestows this avoidance power on the trustee, under §§ <u>522(d)</u> and (<u>m)</u>, a debtor may assert a claim to avoid a transfer of otherwise exempt property if the transfer was not voluntary, the debtor did not conceal the property, and if the trustee does not attempt to avoid the transfer.

Bankruptcy Low > Case Administration > Commencement of Case

HN4 2 Case Administration, Commencement of

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvent" as a financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of property that may be exempted from property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.S. \$552. 11 U.S.C.S. \$ 101(32)(A).

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Enforcement & Execution > Fraudulent Transfers

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures

Evidence > Inferences &

Presumptions > Presumptions > Particula

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Presumptions > Rebuttal of Presumptions

HNS(\$) Enforcement & Execution, Fraudulent Transfers

A prepetition mortgage foreclosure sale conducted in A perpetution included in accordance with state law conclusively establishes that the price obtained at that sale was for reasonably equivalent value. A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the foreclosure sale was not a fraudulent conveyance so long as all the requirements. of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with. A trustee's sale may be set aside only if there was an irregularity in the conduct of the sale that would permit judicial invalidation of the sale under applicable state judicial invalidation of the sale under applicable state law. Even if there was such an irrogularity, and the presumption is therefore inapplicable, the transfer to the defendant resulting from the trustee's sale may only be avoided by a plaintiff if the price received at the sale was not reasonably equivalent to the price that would have been received if the foreclosure sale had

Bankruptcy Law > ... > Avoidance > Froudulent Transfers > Elements

<u>HNS</u>্ঠা Fraudulent Transfers, Elementa

While former 11 U.S.C.S \$ 548(3)(2)(A) has been renumbered to \$ 548(a)(1)(B), its substance remains materially the same.

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures

HN7(2) Financing, Foreclosures

idaho Code Ann. tit. 45, ch. 15 governs the foreclosure of trust deeds. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 45-1501-45-1515. Idaho Coda Ann. § 45-1506 describes the manner in which a trust deed is to be foreclosed. But idano Code Ann. § 45-1502 specifies that any failure to comply with the provisions of § 45-1505 shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value at or after such sale.

As of: October 28, 2024 11:00 AM Z

Baker v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Baker)

United States Bankruntov Court for the District of Idaho July 28, 2017, Decided

inkruptcy Case No. 17-00044-JDP, Adv. Proceeding No. 17-06010-JDP

Reporter 574 B.R. 184 *; 2017 Bankr, LEXIS 2110 **

In Re: Teresa A. Baker, Debtor. Toresa A. Baker, Plaintiff, vs. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC and Duke Partners II. LLC. Defendant

Core Terms

foreclosure sale, trustee sale, postpone, equivalent value, insolvent, alleges, argues, fails, deed, motion to dismiss, schedules, bankruptcy petition, bankruptcy case, title company, foreclosure, purchaser, reasons,

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Ptaintiff sufficiently alloged that sho was insolvent at the time of the transfer for \$1.U.S.C.S.S.545 purposes; [2]-Even if defendant purchased the property for \$ 140.282, and plaintiff did not know if defendant know of the postponement of the sale or communicated with the mortgagee before the sale, under \$330.000 for \$2.51500, and failure by the mortgagee to comply with \$150.000 for \$1.5150.000 for easonably equivalent value; [3]-Even if the mortgagee's misrepresentations provided a basis to set aside the sale to defendant, plaintiff did not compare the sale to defendant, plaintiff did not compare the sale point to the value she would have received at properly sale to detendant, plantum did not compare the sale price to the value she would have received at properly conducted foreclosure sale; [4]-Plantiff falled to state a claim under 11 U.S.C.S. 5 544(b)(1) as defendant was a

Motion to dismiss granted, in part, and denied, in part

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Bankruptcy Law > Procedural Matters > Adversary Proceedings > Dismissal of Adversary Proceedings

Civil Procedure > ... > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Motions to Dismiss > Failure to State

HN1(2) Adversary Proceedings, Dismissal of Adversary Proceedings

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), made applicable in adversary proceedings by Fed R Banks, P. 7012(h) allows motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The bankruptcy court has explained the standard for its consideration of such a motion as follows: The numose of such a motion is to test a claim's legal sufficiency. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must plead sufficient facts, which when accepted as true, support a claim that is plausible on its face. A claim is plausible so long as it is peacase on as sace. A ceam is peasured so long as it is based on a conjuntable logal theory and has sufficiently alleged facts to support that theory. Under Rule 12(b)(b), the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.

Civil Procedure > ... > Responses > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Motions to Dismiss

HNZ(\$) Defenses, Demurrers & Objections, Motions to Dismiss

A judge ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. While the court generally can not consider extraneous materials when

574 B.R. 184, *184; 2017 Bankr, LEXIS 2110, **2110.

Page 3 of 9

Real Property Law > Financing > Foreclosures

HN8 | Financing, Foreclosures

The buyer protections afforded by Island Code Ann § 45-1563 apply only to sales challenged for a faiture to comply with the procedural provisions of Island Code Ann § 45-1569. And good faith purchasers are not insulated against every claim or reason for voiding a forectiosure sale Satific. 45-1568 does not apply to a forectiosure sale that was void for a lack of default at the

Bankruptcy Law > ... > Avoidance > Prepetition Transfers > Voidable Transfers

HN9[2] Prepetition Transfers, Voldable Transfers

Under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(b)(1), a trustee may avoid any prebankruptcy transfer that a creditor holding an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case could have voided under applicable taw. § 5:4(h)(1). The pres of fraud alone does not render the foreclosure sale bona fide purchaser void.

Bankruptcy Law > Procedural Matters > Adversary

Civil Procedure > ... > Pleadings > Amendment of Pleadings > Leave of Court

Evidence a Informace & Presumptions > Presumptions > Particular

Bankruptcy Law > Procedural Matters > Adversary Proceedings > Dismissal of Adversary Proceedings

<u>HN10[</u> Procedural Matters, Adversary dings

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(e)(2), made applicable to an adversary proceeding by Fod R Banks P. 7015, provides that the court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires. In the Ninth Circuit, this policy is to be applied with extreme liberality. Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Forman factors, there exists a presumption under <u>Rick</u> <u>15(a)</u> in favor of granting leave to amend. The Forman factors include undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motives

on the part of the movant, repeated failures to cure difficiencies through earlier allowed amondments, undue prejudice to opposing parties, and furtiffy. Additionally, dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendm

Counsel: [**1] For Plaintiff: Patrick Geile, FOLEY FREEMAN, PLLC, Meridian, Idaho.

For Duke Partners II, LLC, Defendant: James Colborn. NEAL COLBORN, PLLC, Boise Idaho

dges: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States ruptcy Judge.

Opinion by: Jim D. Pappas

Opinion

[*188] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On May 2, 2017, defendant Duke Partners II, LLC ("Defendant") filed a motion to dismiss this adversary ndant") filed a motion to dismiss this adversary eding under Civil Rule 12(b)(6)* for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 8. Plaintiff Toresa A. Baker ("Plaintiff"), the chapter 13 debtor in this bankruptcy case, opposes the motion. Dkt. No. 13.

On June 6, 2017, the Court conducted a hearing on June 6, 2017, the Court considered a nating concerning the motion at which the parties presented oral argument and responded to questions of the Court. Minute Entry, Did. No. 14. Following the hearing, the parties fited supplemental briefing. Did. Nos. 18, 19, Having taken the issues under advisement, considered the pleadings, briefs, and arguments of counsel, as well as the applicable law, this Memorandum sets forth the rt's findings, conclusions, and reasons for its ostition of the motion. <u>Rules 7052</u>.

*Unless otherwise indicated, all chepter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all Rule references are to the FoCotal Refus of 1532, all Rule references are to the FoCotal Refus of 1532-1502, and all Chel Rule references are to the Focotal Rules of Cost Procedure. Rules