The BotBuster Universe

Lynnette Hui Xian Ng

The CMU centers for:

Informed DEmocracy And Social cyber-security

Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems





Carnegie Mellon University


What is a Bot?







LLM ChatBot




Social Media Bot



What are social media bots?

□ Social Media Bot, or Bot, *noun*.

A programmable account that automatically carries out a series of mechanics on social media platforms





Why do we care about Bots?

- Bots actively participate in information campaigns, drawing attention to their cause
- Inauthentic account detection (bot) is crucial to social media analysis because:
 - ☐ Find mis/dis-information narratives
 - ☐ Study conversation manipulation
 - □ Characterize information operations
 - Identify coordinated behavior



Bots are more active than humans

- ■Bot posts 2x more than humans
- ■Bot posts resonate ~1.16x more
- ■Bot posts are engaged with for up to \sim 6.89x

Ng, **Lynnette Hui Xian**, Wenqi Zhou, and Kathleen M. Carley. "Exploring Cognitive Bias Triggers in COVID-19 Misinformation Tweets: A Bot vs. Human Perspective." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.07293* (2024).



Social Media Bots influence our digital conversations








Bots affect businesses

Bots affect elections

Bots affect entertainment





Bots can pressure you to change your stance






Where are Bots found?








What do Bots speak?






What do bots speak?





Why are Bots successful?

Bots use more triggers of cognitive biases in their posts




Judgment by Representativeness	The similarity between two groups represent the de-
	gree which one is representative of the other
Homophily Bias	Increased acceptance of a message if it is shared to
	the same community
Authority Bias	Perception that message is credible if it is from rep-
	utable sources
Judgment by Availability	An event is judged likely if it is easy to imagine or
	memorable
Availability Cascade	Collective belief gains more plausibility through in-
	creased repetition
Illusory Truth Effect	Tendency to believe in a story more easily when it is
	repeated multiple times
Affect Bias	Emotions rather than information have a dispropor-
	tionate effect on judgment
Negativity Bias	Higher belief in negative than positive news
Judgment by Anchoring	Where an anchor is used as an approximation to-
	wards the judgment
Cognitive Dissonance	Tendency to avoid having conflicting beliefs and at-
	titudes
Confirmation Bias	Favor information that conforms and strengthen
	prior beliefs

Ng, **Lynnette Hui Xian**, Wenqi Zhou, and Kathleen M. Carley. "Exploring Cognitive Bias Triggers in COVID-19 Misinformation Tweets: A Bot vs. Human Perspective." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.07293* (2024).



Why are Bots successful?

- Bots use more triggers of cognitive biases in their posts
- Resulting in increased engagement




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The BotBuster Universe

Also available in a postcard!
Come get one!

(While stock lasts)





The BotBuster Algorithm

- Multi-platform mixture-of-experts bot detection algorithm
- □ Twitter (X), Reddit, Instagram, Telegram




Figure 1: Diagram of the BotBuster Architecture.

Ng, **Lynnette Hui Xian**, and Kathleen M. Carley. "Botbuster: Multi-platform bot detection using a mixture of experts." In *Proceedings of the international AAAI conference on web and social media*, vol. 17, pp. 686-697. 2023.



The BotBuster Algorithm

- Each data field is trained/tested by a separate expert
- Expert predictions are aggregated together to form final prediction
- Handles incomplete data
 - Expert is not activated and probability is based on remaining fields
 - ☐ Can analyze 100% of the dataset



Bot Detection Algorithms are constantly being improved

- Because bot detection is a hard problem
 - Bots and humans are very similar
 - Bots get more similar to humans over time
 - Who copied who?

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
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 $Figure \ 5; Change \ in \ linguistic \ features \ over \ years \ of \ bot \ datasets. \ ^*\ denotes \ significant \ difference \ (p < 0.05) \ between \ bot/human \ bot/huma$



Tiny-BotBuster

■ Better, smaller and faster




Ng, Lynnette Hui Xian, Mihovil Bartulovic and Kathleen M. Carley. "Tiny-BotBuster: Identifying Automated Political Coordination in Digital Campaigns" In *Proceedings of the international AAAI conference on web and social media*, vol. 17, pp. 686-697. 2023.



Tiny-BotBuster

■ Better, smaller and faster




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What value is a Bot?


- Bot detection algorithms return a value between [0, 1]
- Represents probability of the user being a bot
- □ But...
- What probability is a good threshold?
 - What is a good threshold for a consistent score?
 - What is a minimum number of tweets for a consistent score?





Bot Detection Thresholds

- □ Large-scale longitudinal analysis of tweets and probability scores
- A good threshold is 0.70
- Minimally requires 20 tweets for a stable score



Ng, **Lynnette Hui Xian**, Dawn C. Robertson, and Kathleen M. Carley. "Stabilizing a supervised bot detection algorithm: How much data is needed for consistent predictions?." *Online Social Networks and Media* 28 (2022): 100198.




BotBuster Telegram

- □ Perception-based bot detection algorithm
 - Relies mostly on the text posted
 - Mimics how human users determine bots: i.e., through visible information (texts)
- Works with 73% accuracy
- Examples of bot-like messages/ users
 - Copying & pasting links in multiple messages, where bulk of the links are same except for URL parameters and query strings
 - Posting exact same links
 - Repeating same messages multiple time
 - □ Capital letters & same number of exclamation marks for message sent ("THAT'S RIGHT, THANK YOU!!!"
 - Repetitive and short messages ("Inbox me please")



BotBuster Telegram

- Disinformation spread in COVID data
- Bot users essential in sustaining conversations
- Human users crucial in forwarding disinformation



Cyborgs

- □ Half-human, half-bots
 - ☐ Appears as bot in one timeframe, appears as humans in another
 - Controlled by human operators in some instances, and automated scripts in others
- Used by activists and influential people
- Used for strategic communication purposes



Cyborgs

- Identified with two key properties:
- □ (1) Changes in bot classification output
 - ☐ Frequent flipping of bot classification agent, thus changing their bot/human labels from timeframe to timeframe
 - ☐ At least 3 flips
- □ (2) Difference in bot-likeness scores that provide definitive bot/human classification
 - □ Large difference in bot likelihood scores between flips
 - □ >= 0.10 change



Cyborgs

- Lower proportion suspended
- □ Demonstrates ability to evade detection, or the awareness of the platform


	Coronavir	us dataset		US Elections dataset		
	Bot	Cyborg	Human	Bot	Cyborg	Human
Proportion suspended (%)			19.5	76.9	49.2	19.9
Avg length of acct (days)	2751± 1226	3663± 1141	2901± 1294	2643± 1304	3437± 1173	2715± 1255
<i>p</i> -value of ANOVA for length of acct	3.452 ×10 ^{−5}			3.79×10 ⁻¹⁴²		
Graph of length of accounts against user type	2000 - 10		7x + 4017.96 (p = 0.23)	6000 - (2,5000 - (2,5000 - (2,5000 - (2,5000 - (3,5000 - (4,5000 - (4,		70x + 3653.52 (p = 0.39)




Repeater, Amplifier Bots

- □ Repeater bots: Sharing same message multiple times
- Amplifier bots: Excessive retweets of specific accounts
 - Source bots: reply on other bots for retweet amplification
 - Overt amplifier bots: retweet isolated repeater bots
 - □ Periphery amplifier bots: round-robin scheme to promote the same accounts
 - □ Covert amplifier bots: conceal their bot-iness

Repeater, Amplifier Bots





Coordinated Bots

- □ Coordinated groups of user accounts work together in online social media
 - ☐ Can manipulate online discourse
- Ways to coordinate group online
 - Semantic: common hashtags, common phrases, common text
 - □ Social: common @mentions, common user tags
 - □ Referral: common URLs




Coordinated Bots

- Combined Synchronized Index
 - ☐ Separates events, pairs of actors based on extent of synchronicity
 - Will be demonstrated later
- Identification of common online actions (e.g., hashtags, retweets, mentions)
 that are synchronous in time
- Bots are active participants in political/social activism discussions, synchronize to prop up messages
- Bot-Human pair have highest synchronization index
 - □ Bots can have an effect on human users, and possibly manipulate their opinions



Coordinated Bots






Social Influence and Bots

- Social influence: a user can be influenced by
 - Endogenous (innate static variables)
 - Exogeneous (influences from other neighboring users)
- Characterizes change of an individual's stances in a complex social environment towards a topic
- Study social influence through phenomenon of flipping stance towards covid vaccine
- Bots require less influence to flip
 - Fewer neighbors in opposite stances
 - ☐ Less conviction, more desire to fit in




Social Influence and Bots

Bots



Humans




Carnegie Mellon University

Information Maneuvers

	Manipulating the narrative			Manipulating the social network		
Positive	Engage	Messages that bring up a related but relevant topic	Back	Actions that increase the importance of the opinion leader or create a new opinion leader		
	Explain	Messages that provides details on or elaborate the topic	Build	Actions that create a group or the appearance of a group		
	Excite	messages that elicit a positive emotion such as joy or excitement	Bridge	Actions that build a connection between two or more groups		
	Enhance	Messages that encourage the topic-group to continue with the topic	Boost	Actions that grow the size of the group or make it appear that it has grown		
Negative	Dismiss	Messages about why the topic is not important	Neutralize	Actions decrease the importance of the opinion leader		
	Distort	Messages that alter the main message of the topic	Nuke	Actions that lead to a group being dismantled or breaking up, or appearing to be broken up		
	Dismay	Messages that elicit a negative emotion such as sadness or anger	Narrow	Actions that lead to a group becoming sequestered from other groups or marginalized		
	Distract	Discussion about a totally different topic and irrelevant	Neglect	Actions that reduce the size of the group or make it appear that the group has grown smaller		

Information Maneuvers



A

Bot discovery through hashtag hijacking


Bots use much more information maneuvers

Results in network polarisation



Simulating bad bot behavior


- Agent-Based Simulation Model
 - Orange/ Red Ghosts: Humans/ Bots
 - Blue / Red Fishys: Information / Disinformation
- Research Questions:
 - What proportions of bots make a conspiracy society?
 - ☐ [Inoculation] What probability of resistant to fishy color change makes a society resistant to conspiracies?
 - ☐ [Fact-Checkers] What proportion of fact checkers required to keep a society from being a conspiracy society?
 - ☐ [Flood with good info] What proportion of good humans required to keep society from being conspiracy society?






Simulating bad bot behavior

- What proportions of bots make a conspiracy society?
- Without any interventions, everyone eventually becomes converted









Simulating bad bot behavior

- □ [Inoculation] What probability of resistant to fishy color change makes a society resistant to conspiracies?
- Regardless of how resistant you are, you will get converted if the bad guys are persistent enough











Simulating bad bot behavior


- □ [Fact-Checkers] What proportion of fact checkers required to keep a society from being a conspiracy society?
 - □ Fact-Checkers will flip red fishys to blue fishys if they land on it
- ☐ If the ratio of fact-checkers:bad guys = 2/3, a conspiracy society will not form




















Simulating bad bot behavior

- □ [Flood with good info] What proportion of good humans required to keep society from being conspiracy society?
 - ☐ Good people will add more good information to the space.
 - ☐ If the square is overwhelmed by good info, it is considered a good info square
- Flooding with good info can reverse a conspiracy society











Applications of Social Media Bot Detection

- Bot Activity in Elections
- Bot Activity in Digital Diplomacy



Bot Activity in Elections

- Are the bot activity in both elections the same?
 - Proportion of Bots
 - Narratives of Bots

US Elections	Singapore Elections
3 Nov 2020	10 July 2020


Ng, Lynnette Hui Xian, and Kathleen M. Carley. "Assembling a multi-platform ensemble social bot detector with applications to US 2020 elections." *Social Network Analysis and Mining* 14, no. 1 (2024): 45.

Uyheng, Joshua, **Lynnette Hui Xian Ng,** and Kathleen M. Carley. "Active, aggressive, but to little avail: characterizing bot activity during the 2020 Singaporean elections." *Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory* 27, no. 3 (2021): 324-342.




Bot Activity in Elections – United States





~30% of bot users across Reddit & Twitter

Narratives




Echoed dis/misinformation narratives of voter fraud

Bots disseminate disinformation, humans advocate for action



Bot Activity in Elections – Singapore


Proportion



~30% of bot users across Reddit & Twitter

Bot activity about the same in 2015 and 2020

Narratives



Common hashtags used between bots & humans but


Different specialized hashtags


- Bots: un-trustworthiness of elections
- ☐ Humans: mainstream topics



Bot Activity in Elections

United States	Singapore
Active bot activity	Active bot activity
~30% users are bots	~30% users are bots
Bots disseminate disinformation on voter fraud	Bots share messages on the untrustworthiness of elections
Humans advocate for action	Humans talk about mainstream topics







Digital Diplomacy

- ☐ The story of the 2023 US-China balloon incident
- □ Is the Bot activity similar with the US-affiliated and China-affiliated bots?










- Proportion of users affiliated with each region on Twitter
- Proportion of bots are higher compared to the other events
 - Bots are active, leverage on highprofile events


PROPORTION OF TYPES OF USERS






- Types of Bots are present in all regions
 - ☐ General bots
 - News Bots
 - Bridging Bots


PROPORTION OF TYPES OF USERS




PROPORTION OF TYPES OF BOTS



- Users affiliated with US & China in different clusters
- General bots cluster together
- News bots dispersed
- Bridging bots straddle US & China-affiliated clusters



- Themes are region-specific, not type specific
- US-affiliated: spatial location of balloon, possible surveillance properties
- China-affiliated: worry of escalation of war and sanctions
- Rest of world-affiliated: aliens and UFOs




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Armies of bots battled on Twitter over Chinese spy balloon incident. Around 35 per cent of users geotagged as located in the US exhibited bot-like behaviour, while 65 per cent were believed to be human. In China, the proportions were reversed: 64 per cent were bots and 36 per cent were humans.





90% of Instagram comments I see are by bots and I can't be proven wrong.

₁↑₁ Share



someone should do a study on the comments section on most canadian news outlets. like ctv etc. i swear there must be a ton of bots on there. i looked through a few of the commenters accounts and they're all empty youtube channels or they follow the same channels, or there are reposted videos. tons of them very similar to each other.



Reply





Armies of bots battled on Twitter over Chinese spy balloon incident. Around 35 per cent of users geotagged as located in the US exhibited bot-like behaviour, while 65 per cent were believed to be human. In China, the proportions were reversed: 64 per cent were bots and 36 per cent were humans.





Carnegie Mellon University

Hands on Section

Lynnette Hui Xian Ng, Jeffery Reminga

The CMU centers for:

Informed DEmocracy And Social cyber-security

Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems





Carnegie Mellon University

Objectives

- □ Understand the differences between network positions, coordination activity and information maneuvers of bot and human accounts
- ☐ Use ORA to perform these investigations
- ■We are using Twitter data about COVID from Jan 2021





NetMapper & BotBuster UI

- □Running NetMapper to extract CUES attributes from tweet texts
 - □<explain cues>
- □Running BotBuster UI to identify if the user is likely to be a bot or not
 - ■BotBuster uses a mixture-of-experts machine learning model to identify the user based on data pillars like username, screenname etc
- ☐ Import information into ORA



NetMapper & BotBuster UI







Step 1: Import DyXML data

- ☐ Take DyXML data and drag into ORA
- ☐ How many Agents and Tweets do you get?




Step 2: Transform Bot Probability Score

- ☐ Find the probability attribute
- ☐ Transform the attribute
 - ☐ Transform attribute > Recode
 - ■Attribute: probability
 - $\square > 0.7 = > True$
 - \square <0.7 => False
 - ☐ Create new attribute > is_bot
- ☐ How many bots are there?
- ☐ How many not-bots are there?



Step 3: Visualize the All-Communication Network

- □Click on Visualize > Agent x Agent All Communication
- □Color nodes by bot or not
- ☐ How many clusters do you see?
- ■What patterns do you see?
- □ Do you see similar clusters / patterns in other networks?





Step 4: Locate Groups Report

- ☐ Run the Locate Groups report
- ☐ How many groups do you get?
- Are there any characteristics to the groups?



Step 5: Run Coordination Analysis Report

- ■Which users coordinate the most?
- ■What dimensions are they coordinating the most?



Step 6: Run BEND Report

- □Run BEND report > Split by group is_bot
- ■Which BEND maneuver is most used?
- □ Do bots or humans use more BEND maneuvers?
- ☐ Are there any patterns in the usage of BEND Maneuvers?



For More Information

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- ☐ Twitter: @IDeaSCMU
- ☐ YouTube: <u>IDeaS Center</u>
- Email-Distro Lists

