From 818b6c4799888e21636380df48fe3dbb7e7bf675 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Thomson Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 09:57:35 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] Mike's suggestions --- draft-ietf-quic-transport.md | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md index c5fb403859..3f2a892456 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md +++ b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md @@ -2961,18 +2961,18 @@ A stateless reset is not appropriate for indicating errors in active connections. An endpoint that wishes to communicate a fatal connection error MUST use a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it is able. -To support this process, an endpoint can issue a stateless reset token, which -is a 16 byte value that is hard to guess. If that endpoint sends a stateless -reset, a UDP datagram that ends in the stateless reset token, the recipient -will immediately end the connection. +To support this process, an endpoint issues a stateless reset token, which is a +16 byte value that is hard to guess. If that endpoint sends a stateless reset, +a UDP datagram that ends in the stateless reset token, the recipient will +immediately end the connection. A stateless reset token is issued by including the value in the Stateless Reset Token field of a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame. Servers can also issue a stateless_reset_token transport parameter during the handshake that applies to the connection ID that it selected during the handshake; clients cannot use this transport parameter because their transport parameters do not have -confidentiality protection. These tokens are protected by encryption, so only -client and server know their value. Tokens are invalidated when their +confidentiality protection. These exchanges are protected by encryption, so +only client and server know their value. Tokens are invalidated when their associated connection ID is retired via a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame ({{frame-retire-connection-id}}).