From b2baaad92f5a0351ae09ca831025920f26090fa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Thomson Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 12:33:14 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] Pad to at least 1200 bytes Closes #2167. --- draft-ietf-quic-transport.md | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md index 358fa99d60..1a3bb83b14 100644 --- a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md +++ b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md @@ -1539,10 +1539,10 @@ magnitude of any amplification attack that can be mounted using spoofed source addresses. In determining this limit, servers only count the size of successfully processed packets. -Clients MUST pad UDP datagrams that contain only Initial packets to 1200 bytes. -Once a client has received an acknowledgment for a Handshake packet it MAY send -smaller datagrams. Sending padded datagrams ensures that the server is not -overly constrained by the amplification restriction. +Clients MUST pad UDP datagrams that contain only Initial packets to at least +1200 bytes. Once a client has received an acknowledgment for a Handshake packet +it MAY send smaller datagrams. Sending padded datagrams ensures that the server +is not overly constrained by the amplification restriction. In order to prevent a handshake deadlock as a result of the server being unable to send, clients SHOULD send a packet upon a handshake timeout, as described in