diff --git a/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md b/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
index df4be04f69..c356c036bb 100644
--- a/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
+++ b/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
@@ -1388,20 +1388,6 @@ attacker cannot forge them.  Put together, these defenses limit the level of
 amplification.
 
 
-## Peer Denial of Service {#useless}
-
-QUIC, TLS, and HTTP/2 all contain messages that have legitimate uses in some
-contexts, but that can be abused to cause a peer to expend processing resources
-without having any observable impact on the state of the connection.  If
-processing is disproportionately large in comparison to the observable effects
-on bandwidth or state, then this could allow a malicious peer to exhaust
-processing capacity without consequence.
-
-While there are legitimate uses for some redundant packets, implementations
-SHOULD track redundant packets and treat excessive volumes of any non-productive
-packets as indicative of an attack.
-
-
 ## Header Protection Analysis {#header-protect-analysis}
 
 Header protection relies on the packet protection AEAD being a pseudorandom
diff --git a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
index cb3f8c522d..a9007be3b5 100644
--- a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
+++ b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
@@ -5442,6 +5442,7 @@ server to send an initial congestion window's worth of data towards the victim.
 Servers SHOULD provide mitigations for this attack by limiting the usage and
 lifetime of address validation tokens (see {{validate-future}}).
 
+
 ## Optimistic ACK Attack
 
 An endpoint that acknowledges packets it has not received might cause a
@@ -5512,6 +5513,26 @@ effect of the stream commitment attack.  However, setting the limit too low
 could affect performance when applications expect to open large number of
 streams.
 
+
+## Peer Denial of Service {#useless}
+
+QUIC and TLS both contain messages that have legitimate uses in some contexts,
+but that can be abused to cause a peer to expend processing resources without
+having any observable impact on the state of the connection.
+
+Messages can also be used to change and revert state in small or inconsequential
+ways, such as by sending small increments to flow control limits.
+
+If processing costs are disproportionately large in comparison to bandwidth
+consumption or effect on state, then this could allow a malicious peer to
+exhaust processing capacity.
+
+While there are legitimate uses for all messages, implementations SHOULD track
+cost of processing relative to progress and treat excessive quantities of any
+non-productive packets as indicative of an attack.  Endpoints MAY respond to
+this condition with a connection error, or by dropping packets.
+
+
 ## Explicit Congestion Notification Attacks {#security-ecn}
 
 An on-path attacker could manipulate the value of ECN codepoints in the IP
@@ -5525,6 +5546,7 @@ the original to be successful in this attack.  Therefore, QUIC endpoints ignore
 the ECN codepoint field on an IP packet unless at least one QUIC packet in that
 IP packet is successfully processed; see {{ecn}}.
 
+
 ## Stateless Reset Oracle {#reset-oracle}
 
 Stateless resets create a possible denial of service attack analogous to a TCP
@@ -5549,6 +5571,7 @@ correct instance, it is better to send a stateless reset than wait for
 connections to time out.  However, this is acceptable only if the routing cannot
 be influenced by an attacker.
 
+
 ## Version Downgrade {#version-downgrade}
 
 This document defines QUIC Version Negotiation packets {{version-negotiation}},
@@ -5559,6 +5582,7 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.
 
+
 ## Targeted Attacks by Routing
 
 Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection
@@ -5568,6 +5592,7 @@ SHOULD NOT be used by themselves to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing
 decisions are made independently of client-selected values; a Source Connection
 ID can be selected to route later packets to the same server.
 
+
 # IANA Considerations
 
 ## QUIC Transport Parameter Registry {#iana-transport-parameters}
@@ -5622,6 +5647,7 @@ The initial contents of this registry are shown in {{iana-tp-table}}.
 | 0x000e | active_connection_id_limit  | {{transport-parameter-definitions}} |
 {: #iana-tp-table title="Initial QUIC Transport Parameters Entries"}
 
+
 ## QUIC Frame Type Registry {#iana-frames}
 
 IANA \[SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Frame Types" under a