diff --git a/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md b/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
index 90e9c245e2..7bce443909 100644
--- a/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
+++ b/draft-ietf-quic-tls.md
@@ -1186,17 +1186,23 @@ obtained from protected messages, information obtained from less reliable
 sources can be discarded.
 
 
-### WINDOW_UPDATE Frames
+### Updates to Data and Stream Limits
 
-`WINDOW_UPDATE` frames MUST NOT be sent unprotected.
+`MAX_DATA`, `MAX_STREAM_DATA`, `BLOCKED`, `STREAM_BLOCKED`, and `MAX_STREAM_ID`
+frames MUST NOT be sent unprotected.
 
-Though data is exchanged on stream 1, the initial flow control window is
-sufficiently large to allow the TLS handshake to complete.  This limits the
-maximum size of the TLS handshake and would prevent a server or client from
-using an abnormally large certificate chain.
+Though data is exchanged on stream 1, the initial flow control window on that
+stream is sufficiently large to allow the TLS handshake to complete.  This
+limits the maximum size of the TLS handshake and would prevent a server or
+client from using an abnormally large certificate chain.
 
 Stream 1 is exempt from the connection-level flow control window.
 
+Consequently, there is no need to signal being blocked on flow control.
+
+Similarly, there is no need to increase the number of allowed streams until the
+handshake completes.
+
 
 ### Denial of Service with Unprotected Packets
 
diff --git a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
index bc13a10251..724489153f 100644
--- a/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
+++ b/draft-ietf-quic-transport.md
@@ -2785,12 +2785,13 @@ involve sending small amounts of data, gradually opening flow control windows in
 order to control the sender rate, or manufacturing ACK frames that simulate a
 high loss rate.
 
-QUIC deployments SHOULD provide mitigations of the Slowloris attacks, such as
+QUIC deployments SHOULD provide mitigations for the Slowloris attacks, such as
 increasing the maximum number of clients the server will allow, limiting the
 number of connections a single IP address is allowed to make, imposing
 restrictions on the minimum transfer speed a connection is allowed to have, and
 restricting the length of time an endpoint is allowed to stay connected.
 
+
 ## Stream Fragmentation and Reassembly Attacks
 
 An adversarial endpoint might intentionally fragment the data on stream buffers