

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX B [2/64]

The Political Effect of increased American defence participation in the Indian Ocean on the countries of the periphery and the political presentation to be made by the U.K. and U.S. Authorities

Introduction

"Increased American participation is likely to mean:-

- (a) Periodic visits into the area of an American carrier force (say once every six months). This force is likely to sail from the Pacific through the Singapore or Malacca Straits, and to visit Diego Suarez, Aden and the Gulf of Oman (and probably Mombasa) on the initial visit and possibly Karachi and an Indian port, Malaysia and Indonesia. Subsequent visits will depend on circumstances.
- (b) The installation of a few communications and other technical facilities on British possessions (e.g. most probably in the Chagos Archipelago).
- (c) The possible development of an "austere base" - i.e. airstrip, anchorage, oil depot, on one or more islands under U.K. control.

2. Paragraph (a) above is more likely to attract publicity than (b) or (c). Our line, agreed with the Americans, might be "this is not provocative; this is an area where the British have always provided the major Western presence; now here is a sign of Western solidarity, and of an increasingly solid Western military guarantee behind the various Western treaty commitments (CENTO, SEATO etc.).

COUNTRY BY COUNTRY ASSESSMENT OF REACTIONS TO
INCREASED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN
AREA AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.K./U.S. ACTION IN
EACH CASE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 05-30

By isl, NARA, Date 12-1-05~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The following assessment and recommendations for action have been agreed by the U.K. and U.S. delegations during their talks in London from February 25 to 27, 1964

IRAN

Reaction

Would welcome Naval task force deployment; no problems with technical facilities; would welcome austere base. Grateful for support and for presence in Indian Ocean.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Make the most of the "support for CENTO and for Iran" theme.

IRAQ

Reaction

Reaction largely dependent on volume of communist - neutralist propaganda, and on state of Arab-U.S. relations. Mildly suspicious but not deeply interested.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Diplomatic explanation of any major visits to the Gulf by U.S. representative in Baghdad portray increased U.S. presence as not directed against any state, available for help in natural disasters, potential support for countries menaced by CHICOM expansionist efforts.

U.A.R.

Reaction

As for Iraq, but quick to seize on any tactlessness in presentation for anti-West propaganda.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

As for Iraq.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

SUDAN

Reaction

Not interested.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

If Sudanese inquire, use line recommended for Iraq.

ETHIOPIA

Reaction

Interested, probably welcoming attitude.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Careful presentation through U.S./U.K. diplomatic channels. Line similar to that for Iraq, adding that presence will make for greater stability in the area.

PERSIAN GULF GENERAL

Reaction

Take note that U.S. appear to be backing up British policies - grateful for this.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.K. primary responsibility.

KUWAIT

Reaction

As for Persian Gulf.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. will explain locally before task force enters area. U.K. will support as necessary.

SAUDI ARABIA

Reaction

While public attitude would be constricted by pan-Arab and pan-African feeling, would welcome task force. Have no problems with technical facilities and generally would be pleased with increased U.S. presence.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. should explain with attention directed to increased ability to contribute to stability of area.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

SOMALI REPUBLIC

Reaction

Government position opposed; possible that pro-Western element may be encouraged.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. should do their best with diplomatic presentation along lines for IRAQ, but without reference to CHICOM threat.

EAST AFRICA
(Kenya, Uganda,
Tanganyika)

Reaction

Perhaps less influenced than formerly by pan-African line, which is likely to allege that cold war is being brought into Indian Ocean. But with tactful presentation, with particular note of friendly intentions, might welcome privately increased presence, and would probably welcome benefits of occasional visits. Probably apprehensions that increased U.S. presence might adversely affect their desires for neutralist position.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Great care with presentation and timing of any visits. U.S. must make approaches but U.K. would welcome prior consultation over method and timing.

ZANZIBAR

Reaction

Likely to be distinctly adverse and would not welcome naval visits.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

As above, but more difficult to prevent loud protests.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

MADAGASCAR

Reaction

Has requested task force visit. Likely to welcome future visits and increased U.S. military presence.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. to confirm when task force schedule clear.

SOUTH AFRICA

Reaction

Welcome.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

None at present. (U.S. not presently considering sending this task force to South Africa.)

South-East Asia

BURMA

Reaction

Publicly highly suspicious; danger of protests if not carefully handled. Private satisfaction that Western strength increased in area vis-a-vis Chinese.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Careful presentation, stressing non-aggressive intention.

MALAYSIA

Reaction

Pleased, provided the carrier force does not visit Indonesia, but might reluctantly accept such a visit anyhow, dependent on the circumstances at the time. No problems with technical facilities; would welcome increased U.S. presence as backing up U.K.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. responsibility to clear visits with Malaysians; dependent on task force schedule and influenced by reactions of India, Pakistan, Indonesia. U.S. will keep U.K. informed on political and military levels.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

INDONESIA

Reaction

Probably reluctant to have task force visit Indonesia. Particularly suspicious if carrier force visits Malaysia. Opposed to any increased U.S. military presence in "Indonesian Ocean".

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. responsibility.

THAILAND

Reaction

Welcome support for SEATO.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Plug this for all that it is worth.

INDIA

Reaction

Any increase in U.S. military presence likely to provide adverse press and Governmental reaction. Intensity of this reaction will be conditioned by internal domestic factors - non-alignment needs, and whether CHICOMS threatening. In last event Indians could almost welcome presence. No great problems with technical facilities.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

Careful presentation before taking any action. U.S. responsibility to obtain clearance for visits.

PAKISTAN

Reaction

Indifferent to technical facilities; probably would accept task force visits, although not happy about it. Would accept increased U.S. presence but public attitude would be dependent on state of Indo-Pakistan, CHICOM and U.S.-U.K./Pakistan relations and on Afro-Asian reactions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-7-

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. responsibility. Careful presentation of political and further military benefits of task force and increased U.S. presence, particularly to Ayub. U.K. would welcome being kept closely informed and would support if necessary.

CHINA

Reaction

Strongly hostile obviously; possibilities for anti-American exploitation dependent on reactions of other countries.

Action by
U.S./U.K.

No initiative by either U.K. or U.S.

CEYLON

Reaction

Except for communication facility, Government and public reactions hostile. Will be strongly opposed to any increased U.S. military presence. No visits by task force expected to be allowed (particularly due to Ceylon's denial of visits of "ships with nuclear weapons or equipment for nuclear warfare").

Action by
U.S./U.K.

U.S. responsibility. U.K. would welcome being kept informed.

Conclusion

Although increased American participation will be welcome to several countries in the area, it will provoke suspicion and criticism in several others whose hostility will be exploited by the Chinese Communists. The critics are likely to be more vocal than the supporters of this development. Every effort should be made to reduce this reaction to the minimum by careful advance explanations to the countries in the area.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~