

November 6, 1975

the party, may grant such equitable relief as it deems appropriate, including granting an injunction against future violations of this section, or ordering the agency to make available to the public the transcript or electronic recording of any portion of a meeting improperly closed to the public. Except to the extent provided in subsection (h) of this section, nothing in this section confers jurisdiction on any district court to set aside or invalidate any agency action taken or discussed at an agency meeting out of which the violation of this section arose.

(h) Any Federal court otherwise authorized by law to review agency action may, at the application of any person properly participating in the proceeding pursuant to other applicable law, inquire into violations by the agency of the requirements of this section, and afford any such relief as it deems appropriate.

(i) The court may assess against any party reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by any other party who substantially prevails in any action brought in accordance with the provisions of subsection (f), (g), or (h) of this section. Costs may be assessed against an individual member of an agency only in the case where the court finds such agency member has intentionally and repeatedly violated this section, or against the plaintiff where the court finds that the suit was initiated by the plaintiff for frivolous or dilatory purposes. In the case of apportionment of costs against an agency, the costs may be assessed by the court against the United States.

(j) The agencies subject to the requirements of this section shall annually report to Congress regarding their compliance with such requirements, including a tabulation of the total number of agency meetings open to the public, the total number of meetings closed to the public, the reasons for closing such meetings, and a description of any litigation brought against the agency under this section.

Sec. 5. (a) Section 557 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) In any agency proceeding which is subject to subsection (a) of this section, except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law—

"(1) no interested person outside the agency shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the proceeding, an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding;

"(2) no member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made to an interested person outside the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding;

"(3) a member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of such proceeding who receives, or who makes, a communication in violation of this subsection, shall place on the public record of the proceeding:

"(A) written communications transmitted in violation of this subsection;

"(B) memorandums stating the substance of all oral communications occurring in violation of this subsection; and

"(C) responses to the materials described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this subsection;

"(4) upon receipt of a communication knowingly made by a party, or which was knowingly caused to be made by a party in violation of this subsection; the agency, administrative law judge, or other employee presiding at the hearing may, to the extent consistent with the interests of justice and the policy of the underlying statutes, require the person or party to show cause why his claim or interest in the proceeding should not be dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected by virtue of such violation;

"(5) the prohibitions of this subsection shall apply at such time as the agency may designate, but in no case shall they apply later than the time at which a proceeding is noticed for hearing unless the person responsible for the communication has knowledge that it will be noticed, in which case the prohibitions shall apply at the time of his acquisition of such knowledge."

(b) Section 551 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (12);

(2) by striking out the "act." at the end of paragraph (13) and inserting in lieu thereof "act; and"

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(14) 'ex parte communication' means an oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is not given."

(c) Section 556(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting between the third and fourth sentences thereof the following new sentence: "The agency may to the extent consistent with the interests of justice and the policy of the underlying statutes administered by the agency, consider a violation of section 557(d) of this title sufficient grounds for a decision adverse to a party who has knowingly committed such violation or knowingly caused such violation to occur."

Sec. 6. (a) Except as specifically provided by section 4, nothing in section 4 confers any additional rights on any person, or limits the present rights of any such person, to inspect or copy, under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, any documents or other written material within the possession of any agency. In the case of any request made pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code, to copy or inspect the transcripts or electronic recordings described in section 4(e), the provisions of this Act shall govern whether such transcripts or electronic recordings shall be made available in accordance with such request. The requirements of chapter 33 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to the transcripts and electronic recordings described in section 4(e). This Act does not authorize any information to be withheld from Congress.

(b) Nothing in section 4 authorizes any agency to withhold from any individual any record including transcripts or electronic recordings required by this Act, which is otherwise accessible to that individual under section 552a of title 5, United States Code.

Sec. 7. The provisions of this Act shall become effective one hundred and eighty days after the date on which this Act is enacted, except that the provisions of section 4 requiring the issuance of regulations to implement such section shall become effective upon enactment.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to make any necessary technical and clerical corrections in the engrossment of S. 5.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FORD). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I call up my amendment amending the title to S. 5 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Amend the title to read as follows: An act to provide that meeting of Government agencies shall be open to the public and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the title amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.
So the title to S. 5 was thus amended.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS, 1976

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 428, H.R. 10029.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 10029) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, and the period ending September 30, 1976, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 10029) which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on this bill, H.R. 10029, is limited to 1 hour to be equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leaders, or their designees, with 1 hour on any amendment in the first degree and 30 minutes on any amendment in the second degree, debatable motion, appeal, or point of order.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my staff member, Barry Pinnolis be permitted privilege of the floor during consideration of this bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee counsel, Mr. Rexroad, be allowed the privilege of the floor during consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum, without the time being taken out of either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum be rescinded.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I present today for the consideration of the Senate H.R. 10029, together with the report from the Committee on Appropriations, No. 94-442, making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976 and for the period ending September 30, 1976 and for other purposes.

It is not my intention in presenting this bill to give detailed figures concerning each line item. The line item breakdown and explanation are contained in the report which has been placed on each Senator's desk.

Before going into the recommendations of the Committee on Appropriations, I will briefly summarize the pertinent facts pertaining to the bill.

The amount of the fiscal year 1976 budget estimate as presented to the Senate was \$4,109,020,000. The amount of the bill as passed by the House was \$3,518,723,000. The committee is presenting for consideration of the Senate today a bill amounting to \$3,660,295,000. This is an increase of \$141,572,000 over the amount passed by the House. However, the bill as presented today is \$448,725,000 below the fiscal year 1976 budget estimate. Consideration should be given to the fact that \$1,300,000,000 of this bill is family housing and of that amount approximately \$1,000,000,000 is fixed charges. In actuality, this bill today for construction line items amounts to approximately \$2 billion. Thus, I can say that the reduction in the military construction bill, and I mean line item projects, amounts to approximately 17 percent. I do not believe that any other appropriation bill in fiscal year 1976 has been reduced to this degree.

The committee held extensive hearings with the military departments and the Department of Defense concerning their construction project requests. Approximately 700 different line items were considered. The committee made some rather large reductions in certain line items which I will detail later in my presentation.

As pointed out last year in the presentation of the fiscal year 1975 military construction bill, the reduction in the number of men under arms and major realignments in the Army, Navy, and Air Force bases continues to create uncertainty. The defense all-volunteer force concept continues to cause a large outlay of dollars in the construction program, particularly, in the barracks and "things for people" area. This bill contains large amounts for each of the services for either new troop housing or for the upgrading of substandard barracks complexes.

The committee's recommendations for each of the military services and the Department of Defense are as follows:

Department of the Army, \$812,942,000. This is an increase of \$24,605,000 over

the amount of \$788,337,000 approved by the House and a decrease of \$144,958,000 in the budget estimate of \$957,900,000. The committee recommends approval of \$37,100,000 for the budget transition period.

Department of the Navy, \$799,326,000. This is an increase of \$70,599,000 over the \$728,727,000 approved by the House and a decrease of \$54,674,000 from the budget estimate of \$854,000,000. The committee has recommended \$17,200,000, the requested budget amount for the transition period.

Department of the Air Force, \$553,700,000. This is an increase of \$12,421,000 over the \$541,279,000 allowed by the House and a decrease of \$149,900,000 from the budget estimate of \$703,600,000. The committee recommends \$14,000,000, the amount requested for the transition period.

Army National Guard, \$62,700,000, and \$1,500,000 for the budget transition period.

Army Reserve, \$50,300,000, and \$2,500,000 for the budget transition period.

Naval Reserve, \$36,400,000, and \$400,000 for the budget transition period.

Air Force Reserve, \$18,000,000, and \$1 million for the budget transition period.

Air National Guard, \$63 million, and \$1 million for the budget transition period.

Department of Defense agencies, \$39,300,000. This is \$102,200,000 below the budget estimate of \$141,500,000 and \$20 million above the House allowance.

Family housing, \$1,332,244,000. This is \$3,007,000 above the budget estimate of \$1,329,237,000 and is \$12,382,000 above the House allowance.

ARMY

The priority element for the Army continues to be bachelor housing projects. Since the fiscal year 1972 program, the Army has launched housing improvements on a large scale and has obtained approval of \$937 million to construct or modernize barracks housing spaces. Today approximately 45 percent of the Army's soldiers are living in modernized or new quarters. The Army states that when completed, the remaining barracks projects approved by Congress in the fiscal year 1972 through fiscal year 1975 programs, together with the German offset programs, will be able to accommodate about three-fourths of all bachelor personnel in good housing. The fiscal year request provides for the construction of 17,733 new bachelor enlisted spaces and 126 bachelor officer spaces as well as modernization of 9,062 existing bachelor enlisted spaces. The Army has placed great emphasis on installations in the United States that support the division station and the one-station training concept. The Army states that upon completion of the projects requested in this year's program, adequate quarters will be available for approximately 80 percent of the Army's bachelor personnel.

Fiscal year 1976 marks the Army's second major increment of projects in the accelerated health facilities modernization program. The \$105,413,000 in this year's construction bill accounts for

about 13 percent of the Army's total construction program including our projects for additions and alterations to hospitals in the United States and the construction of dental clinics at eight major installations.

The Army has requested approximately \$13 million to provide community support facilities. This is about the same as approved in the fiscal year 1975 program. The major portion of the program this year is to provide improved dependent schools in Germany. Also included are chapels and recreation centers and outdoor athletic facilities in the United States.

For many years, the Army has suffered from a shortage of adequate maintenance facilities and the Army this year is spending \$43 million to help improve its maintenance situation. This amount is about double what the Army has requested in previous years. The money appropriated in this year's bill will provide for unit level maintenance shops for technical equipment at eight major installations as well as aircraft maintenance facilities that will provide direct and general aircraft maintenance support for a five-State area.

The Army has asked for approximately \$59 million to update its supply facilities. This figure is more than double the fiscal year 1975 request. Other important projects for supply facilities include the improvement of supply and storage facilities at five installations in the United States and one in Germany.

This year's bill provides for 10 projects at six Army installations and includes instrumentation and test facilities. Of special interest is a project at Aberdeen Proving Ground which must be built to meet the requirements of the Federal animal welfare laws. The committee has included an important aeromedical research facility at Fort Rucker, Ala.

The Army has requested approximately \$135 million for projects in the utilities class, primarily for pollution control and energy conservation programs. The moneys will be spent to improve water systems at five installations, electrical power improvements at five installations, central energy plant improvements at two installations, utility expansion at two installations, road improvements, and for the upgrading of a sewage plant project. The Army also has approximately \$5 million in this bill for water pollution control.

In summary, the Army program for fiscal year 1976 is molded to continue the Army's efforts in improving the lot of the soldier by placing emphasis on bachelor housing, dining facilities and medical facilities. This construction bill will go a long way toward supporting the 16-division force and for the urgent needs for energy conservation and shortcomings in nuclear weapons security.

NAVY

As is the case with the Army, the Navy continues to place great emphasis on bachelor housing and community facilities. The Navy has requested \$72 million in this year's program or approximately 11 percent of its total program

for bachelor housing and community facilities. This year's program will provide new spaces for 5,471 bachelor enlisted and about 132 bachelor officers. The modernization program in this year's bill will provide 325 spaces for bachelor enlisted personnel.

The two largest elements in the Navy's program this year are the request of \$100 million for the redevelopment and replacement of the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Md. In addition in this year's program, there is \$64,900,000 to complete the construction of the Uniformed Services Medical University also located at Bethesda. Then, in addition, the Navy is requesting some \$185 million for the Trident submarine construction at Bangor, Wash. The committee believes that the request for the Trident construction at Bangor, Wash., can be reduced by approximately \$20 million because the Navy admits that it cannot use this money in fiscal year 1976. The committee did restore \$50 million of the House cut that will enable the Navy to start construction on a drydock for the Trident program.

Included in this bill is \$13.8 million for Diego Garcia. The question of Diego Garcia was discussed quite at length in the committee and on a record vote the decision was made to appropriate the money. This additional money for Diego Garcia will allow for the construction of fuel storage, ammunition storage, personnel support facilities, and airfield support facilities.

The Navy continues to upgrade its operational facilities. However, this is one of the largest deficiencies to be found in the Navy's capital structure program. The Navy has allocated approximately \$66 million or 8 percent of this year's program to provide airfield pavements, communication buildings, piers, mooring for a floating drydock and dredging. During the hearings, the Navy indicated that in fiscal year 1977, they hope to increase substantially their request for money to support operational facilities.

In the field of energy conservation and pollution projects, the Navy is asking for \$29 million. The Navy pointed out that in the fiscal year 1977 program, a significant increase can be expected. Most of this year's program is allocated to the abatement of air and water pollution. The main thrust of the program is to comply with Federal and local standards.

There were a number of substantial additions inserted by the committee to this year's Navy program to take care of deficiencies at Portsmouth Naval Yard, Kittery, Maine, a new project support facility at Newport, R.I., and to build a road extension at the Naval Station, Charleston, S.C., to eliminate a hazardous condition when loading ammunition. The committee did add \$3,356,000 for the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Hawaii, to provide for a machine shop modernization. Also, due to a deficiency in planning and design money, the committee added \$9 million, and \$4,200,000 to take

care of a deficiency in the access road fund.

AIR FORCE

The committee recommends an appropriation for the Air Force of \$553,700,000. This is a rather drastic reduction from the budget request of \$703,600,000. The largest reduction in the Air Force account was made in the aircraft shelters for Europe. In fact, the committee approved only \$53 million for aircraft shelters in Europe and it is felt that these shelters will be adequate to protect our fighter aircraft. The committee did not agree to the additional shelters because it was felt that, together with the shelters already appropriated for, there would be no need to appropriate money for shelters which would be used for airplanes after hostilities started. Furthermore, I must point out that all shelters over the \$53 million figure would not be eligible for NATO funding and it has been the policy of the committee since the Congress initially approved aircraft protective shelter program for Europe that these shelters be eligible for NATO recoupment to the U.S. Government for most of the funds expended.

The Air Force in its 1976 program has placed a very heavy emphasis on measures to reduce energy consumption. The Air Force declares its objective "is to reduce facility energy requirements to the lowest practical level consistent with the proper readiness of our military forces." A very important part of the Air Force program to facilitate energy conservation efforts is the increasing use of aircraft flight simulators. Substantial fuel savings will accrue by performing a major part of air crew checkout and proficiency in flight simulators instead of operational aircraft. There is contained in this bill a number of facilities to house flight simulators.

The Air Force is charged with the security program for nuclear weapons. The Air Force has placed on a high priority its nuclear security program in fiscal year 1976. The Committee has recommended in this bill \$13.5 million for projects to specifically correct them most critical deficiencies. The Air Force states that this \$13.5 million is only the downpayment on a large program that could amount to as much as \$50 million.

Medical facilities encompass a large portion of the Air Force budget request for 1976. The medical request consists of four projects totaling \$154.6 million. The hospitals at Keesler Air Force Base, Miss., and Lackland Air Force Base, Tex., will be rehabilitated. Specific demands of modern technology have caused the present size and configuration of these hospitals to be completely inadequate. These hospitals are in the military service medical teaching program and will have to be upgraded to meet national medical standards.

The Air Force is continuing its dormitory modernization program and presently the Air Force reports that a large percentage of its dormitories now meet Department of Defense established

standards. It is the goal of the Air Force to completely eradicate all substandard dormitories within the Air Force.

The Air Force is spending approximately \$10 million for pollution abatement projects in this bill. For 7 years, the Air Force has been pursuing an aggressive program to come into compliance with existing environmental protection standards, both State and Federal. The Air Force declares that it is their goal to completely eliminate pollutant discharge into the Nation's waters by 1985.

The Air Force is continuing the upgrading of its maintenance facilities and, in particular, the modernization of the Air Force's logistics command depot facilities. The sum of \$18 million has been recommended for depot facilities in this bill.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

For the Department of Defense, the committee is recommending an appropriation of \$39,300,000. This is \$102 million below the budget estimate of \$141 million. The most important project that the committee is recommending for the Department of Defense agencies is \$20 million for the Defense Nuclear Agency. The \$20 million is appropriated to the Agency to clean up the Enewetak Atoll. The native people were removed from the island in the early 1950's to make way for nuclear testing. Strong pleas have been made by the native people to return to their island and the U.S. Government owes a moral obligation as well as a legal obligation to restore to these people their homeland.

RESERVE FORCES

For the Army National Guard, the committee approved \$62,700,000 and approval was given for the Army Reserve in the amount of \$50,300,000, the budget estimate. The committee recommends approval of the requested \$1,500,000 for the Army National Guard and \$2,500,000 for the Army Reserve for the budget transition period.

For the Naval Reserve, the committee recommends an appropriation of \$36,400,000, the same amount as the budget estimate. The committee recommends approval of \$400,000, the amount requested by the Naval Reserve for the budget transition period.

For the Air Force Reserve, the committee recommends an appropriation of \$18,000,000. The committee recommends approval of the requested \$1,000,000 for the budget transition period.

For the Air National Guard, the committee recommends an appropriation of \$63,000,000. The committee recommends approval of the requested \$1,000,000 for the budget transition period.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be included in the record a comparative statement of the appropriations for the fiscal year 1976 and the estimates and amounts recommended in the bill.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1975 AND BUDGET ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL FOR 1976

Agency and item	New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1975	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1976/transition	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in House bill	Recommended by Senate committee	Increase (+) or decrease (-), Senate bill compared with—		
					Appropriations, new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1975	Budget estimates, new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1976	House bill, new (obligational) authority
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Military construction, Army	\$656,825,000	\$957,900,000	\$788,337,000	\$812,942,000	+\$156,117,000	-\$144,958,000	+\$24,605,000
Transition period	37,100,000	37,100,000	37,100,000	37,100,000			0
Military construction, Navy	606,376,000	854,000,000	728,727,000	799,326,000	+192,950,000	-54,674,000	+70,599,000
Transition period	17,200,000	17,200,000	17,200,000	17,200,000			0
Military construction, Air Force	456,439,000	703,600,000	541,279,000	553,700,000	+97,261,000	-149,900,000	+12,421,000
Transition period	14,000,000	14,000,000	14,000,000	14,000,000			0
Military construction, Defense agencies	31,260,000	141,500,000	19,300,000	39,300,000	+8,040,000	-102,200,000	+20,000,000
Transition period	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000			0
Transfer, not to exceed	(20,000,000)	(20,000,000)	(20,000,000)	(20,000,000)	0	0	0
Transition period							0
Military construction, Army National Guard	59,000,000	62,700,000	62,700,000	62,700,000	+3,700,000		00
Transition period	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000			00
Military construction, Air National Guard	35,500,000	63,000,000	63,000,000	63,000,000	+27,500,000	0	0
Transition period	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000			0
Military construction, Army Reserve	43,700,000	50,300,000	50,300,000	50,300,000	+5,600,000	0	0
Transition period	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000			0
Military construction, Naval Reserve	22,135,000	36,400,000	34,835,000	36,400,000	+14,265,000	0	+1,565,000
Transition period	400,000	400,000	400,000	400,000			0
Military construction, Air Force Reserve	16,000,000	18,000,000	18,000,000	18,000,000	+2,000,000	0	0
Transition period	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000			0
Total, military construction	1,927,235,000	2,887,400,000	2,306,478,000	2,435,668,000	+508,433,000	-451,732,000	+129,190,000
Transition period	75,700,000	75,700,000	75,700,000	75,700,000			0
Family housing, Defense	1,255,984,000	1,329,237,000	1,319,862,000	1,332,244,000	+76,620,000	+3,007,000	+12,382,000
Transition period	310,639,000	310,639,000	310,639,000	310,639,000			0
Portion applied to debt reduction	-103,430,000	-107,617,000	-107,617,000	-107,617,000	-4,187,000	0	0
Transition period	-27,239,000	-27,239,000	-27,239,000	-27,239,000			0
Subtotal, family housing	1,152,554,000	1,221,620,000	1,212,245,000	1,224,627,000	+72,073,000	+3,007,000	+12,382,000
Transition period	283,400,000	283,400,000	283,400,000	283,400,000			0
Homeowners assistance fund, Defense	5,000,000				-5,000,000		
Transition period							
Grand total, new budget (obligational) authority	3,084,789,000	4,109,020,000	3,518,723,000	3,660,295,000	+575,506,000	-448,725,000	+141,572,000
Transition period	359,100,000	359,100,000	359,100,000	359,100,000			0

¹ Includes \$10,194,000 appropriated in 2d Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1975 (Public Law 94-32).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this completes my statement. I would be most pleased to answer any questions Senators may have concerning specific construction programs or projects in their States.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc and that the bill as thus amended be considered as original text and that no points of order be considered as waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee amendments, agreed to en bloc, are as follows:

On page 2, in line 7, strike out "\$788,337,000" and insert "\$812,942,000".

On page 2, in line 20, strike out "\$728,727,000" and insert "\$799,326,000".

On page 3, in line 7, strike out "\$541,279,000" and insert "\$553,700,000".

On page 3, in line 20, strike out "\$19,300,000" and insert "\$39,300,000".

On page 5, in line 20, strike out "\$34,835,000" and insert "\$36,400,000".

On page 6, in line 18, strike out "\$1,319,862,000" and insert "\$1,332,244,000".

On page 6, in line 23, strike out "\$83,318,000" and insert "\$95,700,000".

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the bill which the Appropriations Committee has brought before the Senate represents a reasoned approach to meeting the construction needs of the Armed Services and Defense agencies, while being mindful of the budgetary constraints under which we are operating.

As the Budget Committee combined the military construction bill with the Department of Defense Appropriations, we have been given no specific target for this bill. We are some \$141.5 million over the House-passed level, but \$448.7 million below the budget request.

Our committee has agreed with the House in deleting several sizeable projects. One of these is the Army's request for a reception station at Fort Benning, Ga., which would be required to implement the one station training concept. As the Army's evaluation of this experimental program is not yet complete, we felt that this sizeable construction item could be delayed pending a more complete analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the OST program. We have also cut some \$9 million from the Air Force request which would have been used to build dormitories for airmen stationed at Galena AFB, Alaska. There is no question that his project is urgently needed—the existing facilities are woefully inadequate, and there is no available housing in the Indian community of Galena. Yet, the costs associated with this project are more than three times the national average. This is due, in large part, to the impact of the Trans-Alaska pipeline project and construction costs in my State.

The Senate committee recommends reinstatement of the \$20 million cut by the House for the cleanup of Eniwetok Atoll. At the time we moved the residents of Eniwetok so the United States could use the area for testing nuclear weapons, our Government promised that we would return Atoll to a habitable state and in 1972 reaffirmed this decision. It is a somewhat costly project, and we do not yet have a final estimate of the total costs. However, we do have a definite obligation to these people and the committee feels most strongly that the cleanup effort should begin immediately. The committee is also concerned with the Government's responsibility to Americans

who have been adversely affected by weapons testing and war debris. Situations similar to those at Eniwetok exist on the Island of Kahoolawe in Hawaii and on the Aleutian Islands in Alaska.

In the committee report we have requested that the Department of Defense investigate the feasibility and costs associated with restoring these two areas to a habitable condition. Findings of this study are to be reported to the Congress within 1 year.

Both the House and committee version of the military construction bill contain \$64 million to complete construction of the Uniformed Services Medical University which is located in proximity to Bethesda Naval Hospital. Graduates of the university incur a 7-year obligation for active service. It is anticipated that this longer period of active service will result in a much higher retention rate than is presently the case under the scholarship plan.

No doubt the most controversial item contained in our bill is the \$13.8 million for construction of a naval support facility on Diego Garcia. On this question I respectfully differ with our distinguished chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. MANSFIELD. Years ago we agreed not to be the instigator of military buildup in the Indian Ocean.

The first increment of construction funds was requested by the Navy in 1970. The authorizing committees and House Appropriations Committee approved this request but it was denied in the Senate. In conference, the House re-ceded. The next year the Navy reduced the scope of the original request from a logistical support facility to a "limited communications facility." This was ap-

proved, and the communications project is essentially complete.

Last year, as you will recall, the Armed Services Committees in authorizing \$14.8 million for the first increment of construction added a special provision to the bill requiring that the President certify that the construction of the Diego Garcia facility was essential to the national interest of the United States. In this year's hearings the Secretary of Defense testified to a Soviet buildup at Berbera in Somalia which was confirmed by onsite inspection by members of the Appropriations Committee. The certification required of the President was transmitted to Congress on May 12, 1975.

In the following 60 days of continuous session, neither House adopted a resolution disapproving such a project. Now, as far as I am concerned there should be no further debate on this issue. Let me quote from the Appropriations Committee conference report of last year.

The conferees agreed to delete all funds specifically earmarked for the construction of facilities on Diego Garcia; however, that action was agreed upon with the clear understanding that if neither House adopts a resolution of disapproval, in accordance with the provisions of section 613 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975, for the construction of any facility requested for Diego Garcia, any construction funds available to the Navy and the Air Force in the appropriations act may be utilized by the Navy and the Air Force to carry out the construction project."

The administration has fully met all requirements which we stipulated with regard to Diego Garcia. The Congress did not meet its own requirement of a resolution of disapproval within the timeframe which we ourselves set. We should, therefore, proceed immediately to get this essential project underway.

I would also remind my colleagues of our vital economic interest in oil shipped from the Persian Gulf. We must be in a position to maintain our rights to navigate freely on the high seas. Our credibility depends on the ability of our military forces to function efficiently and effectively in a wide range of circumstances. Presently, our logistic facility closest to the Indian Ocean is 4,000 miles away. If we are to maintain flexibility and responsiveness, the only alternative to a support facility at Diego Garcia would be an inefficient and costly increase in naval tankers and other mobile logistics forces.

A distinction must be drawn between facilities and force presence. The proposed construction would enhance our capability to provide support to U.S. forces operating in the area; however, there is no intention to permanently station operational units on Diego Garcia. If the request is approved for this year and next year, the facility would have the capability to support 600 permanent personnel—hardly enough to be called a third ocean navy.

The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has grown slowly but steadily since March of 1968. They now maintain a task force of 15 to 20 ships, half of which can be classified as combatants.

Most of us are familiar with the writings of Sergei Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, regarding the Russian efforts to rival the United States in potential capacity to control the world's oceans. I find it most significant that Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., in both his introduction and conclusion to the book, took notice of the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Admiral Zumwalt states that the peacetime mission of the Soviet Navy has three facets:

First. To counterbalance the influence which the United States derives from its overseas naval forces by deploying Soviet forces in close proximity and in configurations which implicitly threaten preemption of U.S. capabilities;

Second. To solidify the image of the Soviet Union as a superpower with global interests, capable of employing military power anywhere those interests may require; and

Third. To exert pressures in support of Soviet political goals in areas of particular importance to the U.S.S.R.

The growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is an illustration of this. Here, the Soviet Navy supports a variety of political objectives, including isolation of the People's Republic of China; the encouragement of radical nationalistic regimes along the Arabian peninsula and the East African littoral; and the enhancement of Soviet influence with the oil importing nations who cannot help but observe that Soviet capabilities to operate along the critical Indian Ocean routes—which at any one time contain 50 percent of the seaborn oil in transit in the world—imply an ability to jeopardize their own economic viability, should the Soviets choose to do so. The logistics infrastructure of the Soviet Union around the Indian Ocean is capable of supporting a much larger presence than is currently there.

I expect that other Senators will wish to be heard on this question, but I would hope that it can be resolved without extended debate as we have had the question thoroughly discussed previously in this Chamber.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Mr. MANSFIELD for the effort he has put into this bill and for his fairness in listening to all points of view on controversial items.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

The bill is open to amendment.

AMENDMENT NO. 1054

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 10, between lines 21 and 22, insert a new section as follows:

Sec. 112. None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used prior to July 1, 1976, for the purpose of carrying out any military construction project on the island of Diego Garcia.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, this bill contains \$13.8 million in funds for military construction on the island of Diego

Garcia. My amendment would defer—not cut—use of those funds until next July 1.

My purpose in offering this amendment, No. 1054, is not to repeat the debate on the merits of expanding our military installations on that island. We had that debate last July, as the distinguished Senator from Alaska has noted. Although I still believe that it is unwise to proceed with this project, my amendment is directed simply to the scheduling of construction.

Both supporters and opponents of this project have found common ground on the principle that negotiations should be attempted with the Soviet Union on the question of mutual arms restraint and limitations in the Indian Ocean.

This hope was expressed in the Senate Armed Services Committee's own report on September 5, 1974, though that view was ignored by the executive branch.

The desirability of negotiations was expressed in the July 28 debate on this subject, and the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) offered a separate resolution to that effect.

The Senate itself has already gone on record, in the Kennedy amendment to the State Department authorization bill, in favor of mutual arms restraint and calling on the President to report his efforts in this regard.

Despite these clear indications of congressional sentiment, the executive branch has consciously chosen not to make any approach to the Soviet Union on this issue. The last time the subject was even broached was in 1971.

If the détente which has supposedly flowered since then has any meaning—and I would agree that there is some serious question about this whole area—it should at least permit or if the President were to determine that we were to complete construction as part of a mutual agreement, discussions about mutual arms restraint in the distant reaches of the Indian Ocean.

The purpose of my amendment is merely to allow a few months for those talks to get going, a few months in which we would demonstrate our willingness to show restraint.

Until now, the executive branch has been unwilling to negotiate and unwilling to show any restraint. As a result, the United States has borne the brunt of criticism from other nations of the Indian Ocean area concerning this project.

A good faith effort at negotiations, coupled with visible restraint in our base construction, could help shift the onus for great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, while this amendment is intended to provide an opportunity for negotiations, it cannot require those negotiations. But I want the legislative history to be clear.

Nor does this amendment deny construction funds. The base expansion project could still proceed after July 1, 1976—unless, of course, the Congress or the President chose to halt further construction as part of a mutual agreement.

Mr. President, I also want to make clear that initial construction using fis-

cal 1975 funds totaling \$14.8 million can still proceed. The funds that we debated and approved in July—money which we are not contesting here, and of course, has already been determined by Congress to be made available to the executive—will provide a pier and it will provide two-thirds completion of the fuel storage program. The finished project will involve a 28-day supply. We have testimony from the Navy that the utilization of the funds already approved will provide 21 of those 28 days without any additional requirement for funds that is included in the fiscal year 1976 request.

The available funds will also provide, an extension of the runway.

Those facilities will be usable on completion, regardless of fiscal year 1976 funding. They are authorized and will be in place regardless of the 1976 funding. The modest amount in phase two of this expansion program will only permit the completion of some relatively gold-plated aspects of that facility. For example, we have 1,100 people there now in temporary housing. Some of this money would go to permanent housing, for an estimated 580 people.

Mr. President, this effort at negotiations is particularly urgent now because of the diplomatic backlash which has occurred following the Senate's vote last July 28, which we predicted during the course of that debate.

Somalia, which had been receptive to the suggestion of a U.S. naval visit, whose President came to our President in the fall of 1974 and gave an official invitation to the U.S. Navy to visit Somalia, followed with suggestions for specific dates in June of 1975. Now, as a result of the debate and the action by the U.S. Senate, that U.S. naval port visit is no longer on. Such a visit may have been a way of reducing Somalia's current dependence on the Soviet Union, and that opportunity for the U.S. Navy to show the flag was lost. They have deferred any scheduling of such a visit because the atmosphere after the debate this summer was not conducive to a friendly visit by the U.S. Navy.

Second, several officials of other nations publicly reiterated their opposition to the proposed U.S. base expansion: the Indonesian Foreign Minister on August 1; the Indian Foreign Minister on numerous occasions; the Australian and Malaysian Prime Ministers on October 17, just a few days ago.

Some 82 nations attending the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries in Lima, Peru, adopted a resolution on August 30, following the Senate debates, which "condemns the maintenance and expansion of foreign and imperialist military bases such as Diego Garcia as well as the continuing escalation of great powers' military rivalry and tension in the Indian Ocean, contrary to the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland states and of the international community."

And then last week, according to the Baltimore Sun, delegates to the British Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, meeting in New Delhi, devoted all of their working sessions on the first day of the conference to discussion of the

tension generated by the U.S. decision to go ahead with the Diego Garcia base.

This diplomatic backlash was predictable and avoidable.

It was unavoidable after the actions we took this summer. In my judgment, Mr. President, we can still recoup our standing if we defer the base expansion for a few months and proceed affirmatively to seek mutual arms limitations with the Soviet Union.

Another factor contributing to this outpouring of criticism was the series of recent disclosures about how the United States acquired this base in the first place.

In response to a Senate-approved amendment requiring a report on this subject, the State and Defense Departments submitted a report on October 10. This report reveals for the first time, officially, by our Government:

The 1966 United States-United Kingdom agreement granting base rights included secret provisions requiring the removal of local residents and compensating—secretly—the British for up to \$14 million in acquisition expenses. This was never submitted to the Congress for approval.

It was never publicly acknowledged, and, in fact, the public official record of that agreement says that the base rights would be acquired by the U.S. Government at no expense at all.

These provisions were not even fully reported to Congress, Mr. President. I was 10 years on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. I am now on the Senate Committee on Armed Services. If there is one lament I hear, day after day, in these corridors, it is "They never listen to us; they never pay any attention to us. We make these requests and we ask for these reports and we require consultation, and they ignore us."

Mr. President, I say why should they not?

Why should they not ignore us when we make these specific requests and directives such as included by the Armed Services Committee in its report saying that the President should go forward and explore the diplomatic opportunity for negotiations before coming back here, and the State Department arrogantly disregards that express directive, and comes back here and says, "We did not pick up the phone."

You will recall when Secretary Rusk used to say, "If they want to negotiate all they have to do is pick up the phone."

The phone is ringing. They do not even pick up the phone when Congress gives them an express directive to do so. Then when they come back here, arrogantly and in obvious disregard of congressional intent, we go around saying, "Let us do whatever you want us to do, and we are awfully sorry if it inconveniences you all, but we really feel it is important to exercise congressional oversight. But if you want to have a secret deal, if you want to have a coverup, if you want to move people in violation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, go ahead and do it."

We in Congress are saying in effect to the executive branch we agree with you. America does not stand for anything

but power. We do not care anything about the sensibilities of the people in that area. You are charged with the foreign policy and the diplomacy of this country, but if you do not do it we do not care. Do not talk before we build. We do not have to be responsive and at all concerned about the heartfelt beliefs and opinions of mankind in that area despite how counterproductive and costly it is going to be to our true national interests if we continue to act this way.

The executive branch says "We will cut a secret deal unknown to Congress. We will then come up to Congress and we will publicly testify. We will say that one of the attractive features of this base location is that there are no people on it even though we moved them off."

For 2 years, Mr. President, we had a parade of witnesses from the Department of Defense and the State Department coming before committees of this Congress and uniformly saying that, "One of the attractive things about this base to all you elected representatives of the American people is there are no people there, and we are not going to get involved in any of these difficult diplomatic problems that characterize some of our base agreements and understandings elsewhere."

What they did not honestly tell the people and tell Congress is that they made a secret deal in 1966 with the British; worse than a secret deal, they put out a public document that was misleading, and they went ahead and privately made a deal to move these people against their will, some of whom had been on those islands for five generations, to Mauritius, and they falsely told them that when they got to Mauritius they were going to have new homes and jobs. None of them left willingly. They were sent there and right now, today, as this Senate in all of its affluences debates this issue, those people are living in abject misery and poverty, in degradation and human despair. And we get one of the sanitized, incredible statements from the State Department which says, "It is the British responsibility."

Well, if the moral reach and the conscience of this country is not any stronger than that kind of insensitive, callous, arrogant statement, then America has lost a lot more than a base opportunity in the Indian Ocean. It has lost its moral credibility, what it stands for in terms of human decency in the world community.

Now, Mr. President, the former inhabitants of Diego Garcia were evicted against their will; \$14 million was secretly promised by discounting the R. & D. on Polaris missiles sold to the British. Those people went into a sewer, and God knows which politicians' pockets got lined, and today those former inhabitants have never received their promised land, and they have never received the necessary resettlement assistance.

These recent disclosures only compound the problems for American policy in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, we have time to try to repair the damage to the U.S. position if we adopt this amendment.

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MS. A. 1.21, Part 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

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There is no real urgency to this fiscal 1976 money. There is no urgency to this money. The money we have already appropriated this summer has not even begun to be obligated by the Navy. We are not talking about cutting funds. We are talking about deferring them until July 1.

Let us make the overture on negotiations. If the Soviet Union stubbornly refuses to negotiate in good faith, build this base. But then we are going to build it with a burden on them. Then we are going to build it, having demonstrated to all these littoral area and hinterland states that America made that good-faith effort to avoid another insane super power arms race in the Indian Ocean, one of the few places on Earth that has been relatively spared this kind of mad competition which only increases the likelihood of war and damages our true national security interest in continuing our current access to ports in that whole area.

Mr. President, the fiscal 1975 construction funds were delayed 5 months by the President before he certified the base as necessary. In the more than 3 months since the Senate action freed fiscal 1975 funds, the Navy has yet to obligate funds for this project. In other words, the construction requested for this fiscal year is already more than 10 months behind schedule, and they cannot possibly use this money. It only makes good sound fiscal sense in the interest of the American taxpayer to wait until July 1, in the hope that some of this money may not be necessary. Or it can be used as a bargaining chip and leverage to complete that construction if the Soviet Union does not demonstrate any mutual interest in arms restraint.

Now, Mr. President, in view of these facts, and in recognition of the importance of trying to avoid a costly naval arms race in the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union, this amendment is a modest effort to encourage those much-needed negotiations and to get the State Department to do what it was told to do by Congress on repeated occasions, and through deceit, through deception and through arrogance it heretofore has refused to carry out that expressed will of this Congress.

Mr. President, it is not my purpose to try to undo what has been done. Congress has duly approved the base expansion, as the Senator from Alaska has stated, and while I opposed it with all the strength at my command last summer, I do not now question the decision.

The case I am making this afternoon is that since authorization of the base expansion was approved, further information has come to light that does place a new focus on Diego Garcia in the context of our long-range foreign policy objectives as a people and as a Nation. And, as a consequence, I deeply believe that a delay of a few months in the further expansion of this base is in the national interest, properly defined.

There is a larger issue at stake than the expansion of an island base in the Indian Ocean. It is this: If we are ever to slow down the snowballing arms race, the first principle of our foreign and defense policy must be to try the option of

diplomacy before we proceed with force; and at a time when détente would appear to be the keystone of our foreign policy, it is absolutely incredible to me that this administration disdains even to try to test the Soviets out regarding mutual arms restraint in this presently stable area of the world.

As a result, Mr. President, we see the military actually shaping our foreign policy, with the State Department in the typical role of ex post facto rationalization of the die that has already been cast.

Mr. President, I believe this is the kind of determinism that must be rejected if we are ever to be liberated from the treadmill of astronomic escalation of the international arms race.

Mr. President, I urge favorable action on the amendment.

Mr. President, I discussed the matter of the relocation of the former residents of Diego Garcia in greater detail on Tuesday before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House International Relations Committee. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my statement at that time be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN CULVER

I appreciate and welcome this invitation to appear before this distinguished subcommittee to discuss the matter of Diego Garcia, and in particular the treatment given the former inhabitants of that small atoll in the Indian Ocean.

I have joined with many of my colleagues in the Senate to oppose construction of a major U.S. military installation on Diego Garcia. The arguments we have stated previously have been strengthened, in my judgment, by the disclosures of recent weeks.

When this issue was considered by the Senate in July, under provisions of law making approval of the base expansion contingent upon Presidential certification of necessity and Congressional acceptance, we argued as follows:

1. Diplomacy should be tried first. Specifically, the United States should seek discussions with the Soviet Union on mutual naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

Inexplicably, no approach to the Russians on this subject had been made since 1971. This fact was admitted last year in testimony before Congressman Hamilton's subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, and again repeated before the Senate Armed Services Committee this year. No effort was made in the intervening months to try this diplomatic approach, despite the Senate Armed Services Committee's specific request.

When other Senators and I raised this matter with Soviet officials during interparliamentary meetings in Moscow in July, we were given reason to believe that the Soviet Union might respond favorably to an American initiative to seek means of reducing tension in the Indian Ocean. Senators Hart of Colorado, Leahy of Vermont, and I offered the specific suggestion of seeking a bilateral understanding to limit ship-day deployments in that region.

Despite those indications and other Congressional urgings for negotiations, the State Department rejected the suggestion and relied instead on the old bargaining chip argument—that we should build our base first, and then talk about talking.

We are still at an impasse on negotiations. Nothing is being done to avert a costly super power arms race in the Indian Ocean, which according to defense analysts at the Brook-

ings Institution could lead to a 3-ocean U.S. Navy, at a cost of \$5 to \$8 billion in new procurement and \$800 million per year in increased operating costs.

Surely diplomacy should be tried before we are caught up in such an arms race.

2. Our second major argument, Mr. Chairman, was that the proposed Diego Garcia base was not necessary or urgent for military reasons at the present time, thus allowing an opportunity for negotiations.

Without going into elaborate detail, the simple fact is that—notwithstanding increased Soviet naval presence and the limited facilities at Berbera, the United States can easily deploy vastly superior firepower. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Noyes so admitted to this Subcommittee on June 5.

The fact is undeniable because we have giant aircraft carriers and the USSR at present has none. The U.S. Enterprise, for example, carries over 60 planes, many with an effective radius of over 700 miles. The Russians cannot match that kind of firepower.

And whether or not we build a base at Diego Garcia, we can still maintain tactical military superiority in the Indian Ocean.

3. Our third argument was that the proposed base expansion ran the risk of alienating the nations along the Indian Ocean littoral, which have been vocal and adamant against this base. No nation of the area had gone on record favoring such a U.S. base. On the contrary, all have supported repeated United Nations efforts in the so-called Zone of Peace resolutions to forestall great power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

We believe that proceeding with base expansion, in the face of such opposition and without having made a good faith effort at negotiations, might well jeopardize U.S. policy in that area. We seek friendly relations with those countries. American ships currently have access to some 36 ports for refueling.

If we proceed in arrogant disregard of the views of those nations, we may well find that access denied, particularly when it might be most needed.

Already we are suffering from a diplomatic backlash as a result of the Senate's vote permitting a go-ahead on Diego Garcia construction.

Somalia, which had been receptive to the suggestion of a U.S. naval port visit, perhaps as a way of reducing its current dependence on the Soviet Union, deferred any scheduling of such a visit because the atmosphere after the debate earlier this summer was not conducive to a friendly visit.

Only last week, delegates to the British Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, meeting in New Delhi, criticized the U.S. base expansion plan. According to the Baltimore Sun, "The opening day (of the Conference) devoted all its working sessions to discussion of the tension that is being generated because of the American decision to go ahead, in spite of opposition from all littoral and hinterland countries." The headline read: "U.S. Draws Fire on New Naval Base."

Mr. Chairman, this backlash was predictable and avoidable. We can still recoup some of our standing if we proceed affirmatively to seek mutual arms limitations, and especially if we defer base expansion for a few months until diplomacy has been tried, which would possibly obviate the need for the base.

In the meantime, we face renewed criticism because of disclosures about the acquisition of base rights on Diego Garcia.

Early in September, the Washington Post's African correspondent, David Ottaway, visited Mauritius and discovered a colony of former residents of Diego Garcia who are now living in what he called "abject poverty." He also revealed that these people had been forced to move from their homes

in order to make way for the planned U.S. base, and were then not provided promised assistance for relocation and reestablishment.

No witness in any of the 1974 or 1975 appearances before Congress mentioned that there had been inhabitants living on the island, some for generations.

In fact, Congressman Hamilton's Subcommittee was told just the opposite last year, when a State Department witness testified on March 6:

"...the nature of the island itself, which is a rather small piece of land, is also fortuitous in that it has no local population whatsoever so we have a minimal degree of the sort of political problems that are sometimes associated with establishing a facility of this sort."

The only other references were to Diego Garcia as "uninhabited."

My staff went back and discovered obscure references in classified documents given to Congress in the early 1970's, when people were still living there, but even these called the residents "rotating contract personnel," thus clearly implying only temporary residence.

Mr. Chairman, that testimony was either based on ignorance or was deliberately misleading. In either case, the Congress was denied full and accurate information about this major military initiative.

When the Pentagon proved slow to provide full details on the eviction of the former inhabitants of Diego Garcia, I introduced an amendment, adopted by the Senate requiring a full report.

Pending disposition of that amendment in conference, the State and Defense Departments provided, on October 10, a 9-page "Report on the Resettlement of Inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago." This report was apparently intended to respond to the Congressional demand for background information.

Mr. Chairman, I would request that a copy of this report be included in the hearing record at this point.

Mr. Chairman, this report generally confirms the press reports which have come out in recent weeks and reveals that the whole base acquisition and the accompanying depopulation of Diego Garcia was tarnished by secret agreements withheld from the appropriate committees of the Congress.

In barest outline, the facts are these:

In 1964, approximately 1,000 people lived in the Chagos Archipelago, of whom nearly 500 were on Diego Garcia, where they were engaged in the production of copra and other coconut products.

Of these people on Diego Garcia, about half were considered "Ilois"—that is, those native or otherwise closely oriented to the Islands rather than to Mauritius or the Seychelles.

In 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom signed an executive agreement granting American military base rights for 50 years.

One of the provisions of this public agreement requires consultation on "administrative measures" to enable the island to be used for defense purpose. In fact, those measures were to be the de-population of the Island.

Another provision, paragraph (4), says quite explicitly: "The required sites shall be made available to the United States authorities without charge."

In fact, the accompanying secret agreements provided that the United States would compensate Britain for acquisition expenses by waiving due as surcharges for research and development of the British-purchased Polaris Missile System. The U.S. Government promised to bear half the cost, up to \$14 million, by such waivers.

There is no record that the Congress was told of these secret arrangements in 1966. The earliest notification, which was sparse and vague, came in the Spring of 1969, by which time over \$9 million in surcharges had been waived. Even so, the State Department report mentions only House Appropriations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees as recipients of this information. Omitted from the select list were: House Foreign Affairs; Senate Appropriations; and House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

While the Congress was left in the dark, the local inhabitants were evicted and relocated on Mauritius. Some of this was accomplished gradually between 1965 and 1971 by refusals to renew work contracts. During 1971-73, the remaining residents were given Hobson's choice of leaving—or staying and starving.

The next sad chapter of this story took place in Mauritius, where the Diego Garcians were kept together, poorly housed, denied the promised land and money to start a new life.

The State Department report washes its hands of this problem and places all responsibility for the people on the United Kingdom. Whether or not that may be true in a legal sense, I believe that we cannot so lightly dismiss America's role and responsibility in these events.

Simply put, these people were evicted from their homes only when and because the United States wanted to build a military base.

We add nothing to our moral stature as a nation by trying to sidestep all responsibility for these people. We should be pressing, aggressively, for prompt action by the governments concerned, either to return these people to some nearby islands or to provide them the homes and livelihood once promised them on Mauritius.

Mr. Chairman, we still have an opportunity to turn back from our base expansion program by deferring further expenditures until diplomacy has been tried.

The recent disclosures about the origins of this base only serve to strengthen the case against construction.

As the Washington Post put it in a September 11 editorial: "The dubious case for planting an American base and fleet in the Indian Ocean has been rendered practically indefensible by disclosure of how the site got to be the 'uninhabited'—and therefore politically uncomplicated—place which its United States government sponsors repeatedly proclaimed it to be."

Mr. Chairman, Diego Garcia has a symbolic importance in the context of our foreign policy objectives far beyond the immediate issue of expanding a naval base to accommodate carrier task forces.

The military expansionists in our Defense and State Departments push on inexorably like a giant bulldozer, oblivious to diplomatic options, oblivious to violations of human rights, oblivious to the strong objections of nations friendly to us, oblivious to the clear risk of inciting a new super-power arms competition in a comparatively stable area of the world.

What happens is the means become the end and military expansionism, in effect, assumes command of our foreign policy with diplomacy in the role of *ex post facto* rationalization.

This is the true lesson and portent of Diego Garcia.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CULVER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes or as much time as I may desire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Iowa for laying before the Senate the facts as they exist concerning the acquisition of Diego Garcia and the fact that just within the past several months additional information comes forth which was withheld from the Congress during all those years, not beginning in 1971, but going back into the early 1960's.

I should point out that the justification for the building of an "austere communications facility" on Diego Garcia was because we were being forced out of Kagnow, a communications station in Ethiopia on the African mainland.

Finally, because of this factor, we did agree to create an austere communications facility only at Diego Garcia.

But Kagnow is still in operation as a communications center; Asmara in Eritrea is still in operation as a communications center. As Senators will recall from reading the newspapers, four enlisted men from the Kagnow communications station have been captured and are being held by guerrillas in Eritrea, or at least the Eritrean part of Ethiopia.

I have noticed that whenever Diego Garcia is mentioned the word "oil" crops up—"oil"—and what this means is that we are in a position to become directly involved in the affairs of the Middle East, just as we did when we voted to send 200 technicians to patrol the Sinai between the Egyptian and the Israeli armed forces.

Yes, oil is a very important word. A very important fact, in my opinion, in considering the situation in the Middle East and what we are doing to make sure that we protect the sea lanes leading to oil, even though none of the oil-producing countries—none of them—none of the oil-producing countries are in favor of our establishing a base of any kind at Diego Garcia. But oil crops up all the time.

And do we remember the implied threats by members of this administration earlier this year that under certain circumstances there could be an intervention in the oil-producing nations of the Middle East?

Yes, they were mentioned by one, two, three of the highest officials in this administration and the language was not only implicit, but very plain.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 3 minutes have expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Three more.

Now we find that we are going far beyond an austere communications facility, going into a new ocean, undertaking a process which is going to cost us not tens of millions, not hundreds of millions, but, in my opinion, before we are through, billions of dollars.

And the cry is raised, "Well, our nearest base is 4,000 miles eastward at Subic Bay in the Philippines."

What of it?

We have the facility to transport our ships into various parts of the Indian Ocean, if need be. But do we need a naval installation there which could well get

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us into trouble, get us involved in another war and get us directly involved in the affairs of the Middle East, which is the cockpit of the world?

I wonder if we will ever learn or are we going to pile mistake on mistake on mistake?

Was not one Vietnam one too many?

Who do we think we are, with a population of 215 million people, rapidly becoming a have-not nation, over \$1/2 trillion in debt; who do we think we are to patrol all the oceans of the world?

We have not got the manpower, we have not got the resources, and I would hope that for a change, every now and again, we would stop, look, and listen—to use the old railroad sign—before we give the Pentagon all these sums which they want to go ahead to do what they want in any part of the world.

I am afraid that all to often we have said, "Yes, sir," too many times without thinking through the factors inherent in a situation and I am afraid if we keep up on this basis that the result economically and otherwise will be, indeed, drastic for this country.

I command the distinguished Senator from Iowa and I certainly will support his amendment, although I would like to support an amendment which would knock out Diego Garcia completely.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STEVENS. I will yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we have been on this subject of Diego Garcia for many, many years. Not just through the Nixon administration, or the Ford administration, but actually starting back in the Kennedy administration and the Johnson administration.

I want to go back a bit in history on this and recall that a little over 100 years ago we acquired Alaska and set up the machinery to acquire Hawaii.

We probably heard on the floors of both Houses the same type of criticism, although I do not think as violently anti-military as we are hearing in this discussion. But the value of these two acquisitions was demonstrated when the Pacific became our focal point of foreign policy, and, by the way, it still is, because with the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, even though that nearly destroyed it, we were able to have a base of operations in that strategic area of the world.

Now, getting over to the Indian Ocean, I think we can recognize that it is the most strategic point of the whole world. It has always been a peaceful ocean and it should remain a peaceful ocean.

We have from time to time had our naval presence felt there, merely by sailing parts of the fleet over from Subic Bay, but the Soviets have changed that.

I would like to think of being able to sit down and negotiate with the Soviets on arms reduction. I would hope the day would come when they would agree to multilateral arms reduction. But, Mr. President, they have not talked about it yet. In fact, I believe of 51 or 52 agreements we have made with the Soviets, they have violated all but one.

I would go into any discussion with them in a very apprehensive way.

I do not represent the thought that we want to have a confrontation with the Soviets in the Indian Ocean and neither do I subscribe to the idea that we leave the Indian Ocean to the Soviets—and anyone who thinks that they are not moving in that direction just does not understand the whole situation in that ocean.

The great interest of the Shah of Iran is not necessarily on our side, per se, but it is to protect that part of the world against encroachment of the Soviets. One possibility that he sees is the agreement of Afghanistan to build a highway or railroads toward the Indian Ocean and the possibility that Pakistan, although we do not think so, but Pakistan might go along with that agreement and then we would find the Soviets with railroad and highway access to the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues that a relatively few years ago we had a large number of ports available to us around the periphery of Africa. We have lost 16 of them and those still available to us are not deep water ports and they are hardly ports of protection.

So the question comes to me with the Indian Ocean, in my opinion the strategic center of the world—and I might say not for oil, I would say this was necessary if we had never heard of oil, if the Middle East did not produce oil—we have to keep the four lanes open.

One of the great theories advanced from time to time by the strategists in the Navy, and this is backed up by strategic reviews around the world, is called the theory of the straits. It argues that the country that can control Gibraltar, control Suez, control Malacca, and those are the straits we are interested in, and control the Panama Canal, can control the ocean travel of the entire world.

Now we see a situation in the Mediterranean where I think we are safe in assuming that the Soviets could run us out of the Mediterranean not with any easy effort but because of the land-based airfields they have acquired around the periphery of the Mediterranean. It would make it almost impossible for our fleets to stay there, making the closing of Gibraltar and the Suez a relatively easy task.

Nobody is going to argue that the Panama Canal is defensible. That can be closed any number of ways quickly.

The Straits of Malacca, then, remain about the only strait where we have the possibility of it remaining open to us so the United States and our allies can have free access to the oceans of the world. Once the Soviets decide to close that very narrow, very shallow Strait of Malacca, then we are going to be denied ocean traffic. I do not care whether it is oil, cotton, or what it is, it will work to the economic disadvantage of the United States and will, as it has always done, cause a war. There have been more wars caused by economic situations than by anything else that has come to my observation in the years that I have studied this.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DURKIN). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Two more minutes, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I do not think this is a wise amendment. It is a continuing effort to stop the construction of Diego Garcia. I think the Senate and the other body have taken care of that. We voted for it. They wanted to delay the expenditures of funds.

In all probability, they will be delayed without amendment. As the Senator from Iowa points out, we are behind in our contracting down there. But, Mr. President, this base, to me, is merely an insurance base, as Hawaii proved to be, as Alaska proved to be, in the new strategic center of the world, just as the Pacific Ocean has been and is now and probably for some years will remain a strategic center. So, Mr. President, I am hopeful that we can once again make up our minds that Diego Garcia is going to be an acquisition of ours that is going to be developed by us.

I might close by saying that the cost of sailing our fleets from Subic Bay through the straits into the Indian Ocean will very quickly pay for whatever this base in the Indian Ocean might cost.

I thank my friend from Alaska.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. I yield such time as the Senator from Oklahoma desires.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, once again the Senate is considering the matter of the construction of a modest naval facility on the island of Diego Garcia located in the Indian Ocean.

This subject was thoroughly debated on this floor in July when the Senate defeated Senate Resolution 160. Since that time opponents of the construction of facilities on Diego Garcia have attempted to cloud the basic issue of the need for the facility with the collateral issues of, "How the deal was made with Great Britain to fund the project," and "How the resettlement of the natives on Diego Garcia was carried out."

Those may be important points; I certainly believe that the tactic used by the Johnson administration in establishing the U.S. funding for Diego Garcia was deplorable, and probably illegal. It circumvented the legal process of congressional authorization and appropriation even though some Members of Congress had been advised concerning it. This is an issue that must be dealt with by the Congress to prevent future dealings of a like nature by the executive branch. But, I want to stress that this issue has nothing to do with the need for Diego Garcia.

On that point, Mr. President, I would like to point out that I do have a letter which is classified because of other material in it, a letter from then Secretary of Defense Laird to Senator SYMINGTON, which goes into the matter of the funding program and the type of payment that was going to be made.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BARTLETT. I yield.

Mr. CULVER. I think the significant point should be mentioned, and I assume the Senator from Oklahoma will agree, that at the time that notification was given on a highly selective and careful basis to a few members of just two committees of the Congress, of the \$14 million involved, \$9 million in secret payments had already been expended between the period 1966 and 1969. So it was a belated notification.

Mr. BARTLETT. As I said to the distinguished Senator from Iowa, I think this was probably illegal, it was deplorable, and I am opposed to it. I think it is an issue that must be dealt with by the Congress to prevent future dealings of such a like nature by the executive branch.

But I want to stress that this issue has absolutely nothing to do with the need for Diego Garcia. It has nothing to do with whether or not it is important to our national security.

The problem of the evacuation and resettlement of the few natives located on Diego Garcia is a difficult one. At the time that the resettlement effort was being carried out, the United States had no input into the process. The United States paid for its share of the expense involved in the resettlement; and so far as U.S. officials had knowledge, the resettlement was proceeding as planned. Great Britain has publicly acknowledged the responsibility for resettlement as being her own and not the United States. Likewise, the Government of Mauritius has publicly stated that money for the resettlement was being held in trust and that resettlement plans were being studied prior to implementation. This, of course, was a delay, and I think it is, again, a deplorable delay.

It is my understanding that a renewed effort is now being made to settle the Diego Garcians on another island that has a copra plantation.

Again, I want to stress that this issue has nothing to do with the actual need for Diego Garcia.

Mr. President, the United States is a moral nation; and I believe that the executive branch of our Government should, to the best of its ability, make certain that the resettlement effort is continuing and will come to fruition. I believe, also, that a report to the Congress should be prepared outlining the steps that have been taken, and are continuing, in the resettlement program.

If the Senator from Iowa is interested in pursuing both of these issues, the Senator from Oklahoma will certainly join him. I would be very interested in finding out, because I have made some inquiries, whether there has been other funding of a similar nature in the Johnson administration or in any succeeding administrations, and if this could continue into the future.

I would be happy to join him in trying to make certain that this could not happen again and that there could not be a bypassing of Congress.

I do stress this is a completely separate issue and has nothing to do with whether or not we proceed with the construction of Diego Garcia.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I have

a short statement I wish to make. How long does the Senator plan to continue?

Mr. BARTLETT. I will be just a short time.

Mr. FORD. Will the Senator from Oklahoma yield briefly for a question or two?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

Mr. FORD. The Senator made the statement that the United States had no input in the securing of Diego Garcia. Would it be the opinion of the Senator that if we are putting millions of dollars into that particular island through discounts of military equipment to the United Kingdom, the United States would have some input into the decision? Does the Senator believe we knew what was going on in our various departments?

Mr. BARTLETT. I believe if the Senator will read my statement as it will be in the RECORD we did not have the control in the resettlement program. This was a responsibility of Great Britain. We were interested in the resettlement program and we are making our payments for the costs that were incurred by Great Britain in this whole program, some \$14 million that we agreed to pay. This was a responsibility that we were exercising as roughly one-half of the total cost.

Mr. FORD. Would the Senator agree, though, that since we had the debate on the original resolution, new facts have been injected into this arena that were not known to Senators at that time, and that perhaps we should take another look at it, since we are not spending the money, and it is not being required? We are 10 months behind; what is wrong with delaying it until July 1976?

Mr. BARTLETT. Absolutely not. This matter has been delayed already. It is important that the people of little nations know we are concerned in this area, and we are concerned about our national interests.

Mr. FORD. We keep compounding our problems as all these new situations develop. As we debate this situation of Diego Garcia, all these new problems come up. Why not just wait until July 1 of next year?

Mr. BARTLETT. I am sorry, but my time is limited and I would like to complete my statement. We have already been delaying, and there is no sense in delaying any further, and giving the impression we have no interest in our national security and no interest in the Indian Ocean area. There have been a lot of changes since the vote in July, and since the time I was in Somalia in July. There is now approximately 8,000 feet of a big airstrip that will eventually be 14,000 feet in length, or so, when completed. The POL strip we tentatively identified at the airstrip is now definitely identified from other observations.

The question now before us is to delay the construction of the facilities on Diego Garcia to allow time for negotiations with the Soviet Union relating to the Indian Ocean.

The United States initially responded favorably to the Soviet Union in 1971 to discuss the Indian Ocean situation in order to downplay any military presence in that area. The Soviets have shown no interest in unilaterally re-

straining its military presence in the Indian Ocean; but on the contrary, they secretly expanded their capabilities in Somalia. This critical area lies along the very vital oil routes of the world with the great exportation from the Middle East countries to the Pacific Ocean countries and the United States.

There has been additional buildup in Somalia that has taken place since that time by the Soviets, and the capacity available to them is greater today. In addition to this activity—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Who yields time?

Mr. BARTLETT. I have 1 more minute, Mr. President. I would like to say that it is my understanding that the Navy has information to show that the Soviets have increased their number of combatant ships, that one nuclear submarine armed with missiles and three guided missile destroyers are now part of the 20-ship group that is in the Indian Ocean area.

I think we are kidding ourselves if we believe in any way a delay to negotiate will strengthen our position. If we delay for the purpose of negotiating with the Soviets, we will be pointing out to them that we are weak, that we are not interested in this area, and we know from past experience that we are not going to be successful. They are continuing their buildup, and why we should decrease ours I do not know.

It is my opinion that a delay in finalizing the Diego Garcia construction pending negotiations with the Soviet Union would not be in our best interest. Without any stretch of the imagination, it is obvious that a delay would be very lengthy and would only put us further behind in capability in the vital Indian Ocean area.

In order to properly negotiate limitations by the two superpowers, a position of parity must be achieved from which to negotiate. Experience has shown that one cannot negotiate from a position of weakness, and that would be the situation without a U.S. presence in the area. It is obvious that a delay is in the Soviet's best interest and to their advantage. The Soviets have made a quantum jump ahead of the United States with the reopening of the Suez Canal, at the same time leaving us in the distant rear. The longer we delay in reaching a balance of power, the more difficult it will become, because with each passing day we find ourselves farther behind. Once a balance is restored, then proper and deliberate negotiations can begin.

Equally important, I believe, is that if the United States delays or is indecisive in its position on Diego Garcia it could be interpreted by the neutral nations of the Indian Ocean, as well as other countries around the world, as a sign of weakness, or worse, as a sign of disinterest.

It raises the question, "If the United States does not defend its own vital interest, how can we even expect them to help us in the defense of ours?"

The administration proposed the modest expansion of Diego Garcia and came to the Congress for authorization

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and funding for that project. The President has certified, as required by Congress, to the fact that the Diego Garcia facilities are in the national interest. Moreover, the United States needs Diego Garcia regardless of what capabilities the Soviet Union may have in the Indian Ocean. It is an independent issue from negotiations with the Soviets relating to naval restraint. It is not "trade bait" or a bargaining chip in negotiations. It is a facility needed to help our Navy operate for an extended period of time in the Indian Ocean if necessary in order to protect our own interests in that area. The issue of Diego Garcia simply stated, is the efficient operation of our Navy in the Indian Ocean. It is a support facility, modest in size and incapable of further expansion for increased military activity.

The need for the facility has been established. We have had Presidential certification to the need for the facilities; we have debated the issue during consideration of the military construction authorization bill; we debated it during consideration of the Mansfield resolution; the House voted to appropriate the requested funding; and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and full committee has considered this matter—now we have it before us again.

Now is not the time to weaken our resolve to maintain stability in a very vital area of the world, but rather we should strengthen it by approving without delay the funding for these facilities.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I intend to vote for the amendment offered by my good friend from Iowa (Mr. CULVER) in the hope that it will lead to a serious negotiation with the Soviet Union aimed at an agreement that would require that the Soviets withdraw from its facilities in and around the Indian Ocean. The United States ought to put such a proposal to the Soviets, offering, in return, that we refrain from any further buildup at Diego Garcia. If we have not had a positive response from the Soviets by July 1, 1976, the use of funds appropriated by this act could proceed.

In my judgment, Mr. President, it is important to make clear that what is at issue is a rapid negotiation leading to a clear and final conclusion over the next 7 months, not a long and dragged out negotiation that leaves the issue of the Soviet presence affecting the Indian Ocean in an inconclusive state on July 1, 1976. We should, I believe, make at least one serious effort to obtain an agreement. That has been the consistent advice of the Congress.

And may I say, Mr. President, I was the one who initiated that suggestion. It was contained in our report on the military construction bill at the outset. The problem has been that the request of Congress and the advice of Congress has been consistently ignored by the executive branch. Now, that is a fact. Passage of this amendment will put both the administration and the Soviets on notice that the Congress desires a stabilizing agreement—not a decade or a year from now but by July 1, 1976.

Mr. President, I compliment my good

friend from Iowa for the spirit in which he has offered this amendment, in an effort to get negotiations under way that have never started. They have never undertaken the negotiations which we requested. I put the blame on the executive for that, because at least they could make a good faith effort, and I cannot understand why they have failed to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 3 minutes have expired.

Mr. JACKSON. One minute.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield the Senator such time as he may require.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. CULVER. I thank the Senator for yielding, and also wish to commend him for his longstanding efforts in this area. He is correct when he suggests that this is an effort to continue the work he so ably commenced as a member of the committee, and that his suggestion was so arrogantly disregarded by the administration.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator. I would say his amendment is a reasonable one. If there is a good faith attempt here on the part of the administration, we will know about it, but there has been none to date. I think that is regrettable. It should have been done, and I cannot understand why it was not done.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield to me?

Mr. STEVENS. How much time does the Senator need?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Five minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. I yield the Senator 5 minutes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the best thing that can be said about this amendment is that it is not as bad as that which we originally started with, which was to keep us all the way out of Diego Garcia. That was the move back prior to this summer, when the question was, should we get into the Indian Ocean, and the counterargument was that the Russians were not in the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, we sent a delegation over there from the Military Construction Subcommittee, and we found the Russians had not only been at Berbera and Somalia, but they had built a base, they are building housing, they are storing rockets, they have a communications facility there which controls the whole half of the globe that surrounds the area of the littoral. So, Mr. President, the Russians are there.

The question is not whether or not we should get into Diego Garcia. We are in fact in Diego Garcia. The question is not whether or not we should have ships in the Indian Ocean. We have ships that ply seas on a fairly regular basis, and no one suggests we should not have them there.

The question rather is, should we improve our facility? Not station troops, but improve our facility at Diego Garcia by lengthening the airstrip, putting in a POL facility, and putting in repair facilities.

Mr. President, the simple fact is that our ships in the Indian Ocean must travel

4,000 miles to Subic Bay in order to be refueled. They are going to be in the Indian Ocean anyway. Do we build a storage facility for gasoline and diesel oil, or do we require them to go all the long way back to Subic Bay?

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSTON. On the Senator's time. If I have some time at the end, I will be glad to yield.

Mr. President, on the question of negotiations, I will agree that if we were both at square 1, both the United States and Russia, and the question was whether or not we were both simultaneously going to do the same thing, then we ought to stop, we ought to delay, and we ought to negotiate. But, Mr. President, they are there in Berbera. Just how innocent or how stupid do we look, to say we are going to stop building a POL facility while the Russians have rockets, have barracks, have ships calling on a regular basis, and have a communications facility that controls half the world?

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield on my time?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Let me say this. If the facts that the Senator describes were indeed the case, I would be terrified. But that does not happen to be the case.

The facts right now today are that in the Indian Ocean the Soviet naval presence is not equal to the French. The French and British together are bigger than the Soviets. The number of ship days by the Soviets today in the Indian Ocean this year is at an annual rate less than last year, and it is as low as it has ever been since 1971. That is ship days.

Second, we have not only the base at Bahrain, we have the base at Diego Garcia. This is not some fiction. This is a fact.

These funds we are talking about deferring here do not go to the issue at all of whether we are going to build the base. We are building it. We have already put \$63 million in there. We have a communications facility there that is better than the one right now in Berbera. Hogwash—that we have all this loss of strength.

We have been in the Indian Ocean this year, and my office checked with the Navy this morning—this is on my time—we checked with the Navy this morning, and the U.S. Navy has already been in there 4 months this year.

Every time we put the U.S. carrier *Enterprise* in there with 60 airplanes on it, $7\frac{1}{2}$ tons of ordnance on each plane, it just washes all that Soviet presence out of the water. The CIA report to us last July was that the Soviets had one diesel submarine in their configuration. They were not configured in such a way to represent a threat to the oil lines.

What do we have right now in progress in Diego Garcia and how does it compare to Berbera?

What we are talking about doing in Diego Garcia is three things: We are talking about digging a deeper port so we can tie up our aircraft carriers. The

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Soviet Union does not even have an operational aircraft carrier. It does not have one. We have 13, and the people in these galleries are paying \$1.2 billion a copy for them.

Now, we are looking for an enemy to fight with. Each of those 60 airplanes can fly 700 miles. Count them. That is 700 miles ranges per airplane.

All these great supporters of the Pentagon keep walking around wringing their hands telling the world, "How weak we are."

The Senator better believe we are strong. I am trying with this amendment to prove that we are not stupid.

But I was greatly assured with the wisdom and support of the Senator from the State of Washington, who is not known as particularly naive about the Soviet threat.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CULVER. Not at this point.

As to Diego Garcia right now, these funds that we voted on—we have already put \$63 million in; put \$14 million more in July—we are not touching those funds. We are talking about \$13.8 million more right now.

With the \$63 million we put in, with the \$14 million in addition, what do we have? As the Senator knows, we have 1,100 personnel out there right now in temporary quarters.

Does the Senator know that that \$14 million in July will complete the runway, a bigger and better runway than they have at Berbera? Does the Senator know the port will be deeper? Does the Senator know that as to POL storage they are planning a 28-day capability—let me tell the Senator something. Aside from the fact that a nuclear aircraft carrier does not need any of this, except for the planes, when we put this \$14 million on top of the \$63 million, we will have a storage capability in Diego Garcia right away for 21 out of 28 days; 21 out of 28 days, and that storage capacity is about four times as big as the one in Berbera.

Let me tell the Senator what else we have. We have every single country in the littoral area states and everyone in the hinterland states hating America's guts for going forward with this.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CULVER. No.

We have 18 countries today with 36 ports that will welcome the American fleet. How many of those are going to shut down those ports, if we continue in such arrogant, insensitive disregard of the heartfelt opinions of mankind?

Anyone who does not think America is strong does not know anything. I do not have any illusions about the Soviet Union. The Senator from Louisiana does not have to tell me how big, tough, and rough they are. No one need doubt me in terms of the degree of realism I possess about that threat.

What am I saying here? I am saying, as a Member of Congress for 11 years, I am sick and tired of being lied to and deceived by the executive branch of this Government.

I walk around these cloakrooms and

these corridors, and I hear all of the Senators say: "They never tell us the truth. They do not tell us what they are doing. They want us to spend money and ratify, and then they do not tell us. There is no congressional accountability. They do not respect us."

Why should they? Here we have this flagrant case of outright lies, deceptions, and secret agreements. In 1966 our Government, without the Senator's authority or the people he represented, sat down and in a sneaky secret deal with Great Britain said: "Look; we want those islands."

That was before anyone could find Berbera on the map.

That is the biggest phony I have heard.

The Joint Chiefs have wanted Diego Garcia since the 1950's. Dr. Schlesinger himself, 2 months ago, said:

Berbera does not make the difference. We want it anyway.

At least he is honest. He is honest.

Our officials sat down with the British and they said: "Look; you have got a bunch of natives on those islands. You have got a lot of poor natives. The fact that they have been there five generations does not bother us. We are a superpower. We are a superpower. We do not care about those poor people who work in the copra plantations. We are the big U.S.A."

So they said to the British: "It is embarrassing for us to move them."

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CULVER. Not at this time.

So they said to the British: "It is embarrassing for us to move those people off. We do not want the blood on our hands. You people are used to handling these touchy deals with natives. Figure out a scheme. Move these people out, and we will bankroll you with American taxpayers' dollars, without authority of the Congress of the United States. We will help pay for it."

So they went to these people, 500 of them, on that island. They put out a public agreement that did not even have the integrity, the decency, and the honesty to mention how many people were there. They put out a public agreement that said, "We are going to get those islands without any cost to ourselves."

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CULVER. No, not at this point.

"Without any cost to ourselves."

And we go ahead, and we say that we will discount the R. & D. charges on Polaris missiles—\$14 million, a wink and a nod, and they started giving money.

They went to those people and they said: "Do you want to move off this island?"

And the people said: "No, no, we do not want to move."

They did not want to move any more than the people who live in Louisiana want to move out of Louisiana, and, like the people that the Senator represents, some of them have been there for five generations, and they love that place.

They gave them a Hobson's choice.

They said: "Either you move or you will starve to death."

"You move or you starve to death"—that is what they told those poor people, and then they gave \$1.4 million of the \$14 million to the Mauritian Government, and they said: "You take them. They are messy. They are in the way. We have got to clear this land for another base."

They took the \$1.4 million, they took those poor, pathetic people, and they put them in a stinking slum.

When Senators go home to Chevy Chase, they go back to that hotel. When Senators go out here to the Senate restaurant and have a steak, they are starving to death.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CULVER. They came and petitioned finally, and they said, "This is an obscenity, this is an outrage." The world community still has a conscience, and I hope and pray my country has a semblance of one. It stinks, and the State Department, on the occasion of our Bicentennial, comes forward with the most incredible white paper and says, "It is a British problem." It is a British problem. We worked out the deal. We funded it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time of the Senator from Iowa has expired.

Mr. CULVER. I say that whether we like it or not, the moral responsibility is clearly America's on this one, and the question is whether we have the integrity to recognize it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I thought I had yielded for a question. If that was a question, the answer is, "No."

[Laughter.]

Mr. President, I have just as much conscience and just as much feeling for the natives who are now on Mauritius as I think anybody in this Chamber has; but that has about as much to do with whether we should put a POL facility in the port at Diego Garcia as the way we treated the American Indian does have with what we should do with this year's budget. It is totally irrelevant. It does not have a thing in the world to do with it.

I am glad I yielded to the Senator, because it puts in very stark contrast what this whole question is. The Senator really does not want, as I understand it, to delay until July. What he really wants—and I respect him for wanting this, and I know he is sincere—is that we not go into Diego Garcia. Nobody is talking about negotiating with the Soviets and getting them out of the Indian Ocean.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am afraid to, because of the last time I yielded, and my time is limited.

Mr. PASTORE. I am not going to make a political speech. I am going to try to get this into proper perspective.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator from Louisiana made a statement that the Senator from Iowa is opposed to Diego Garcia, to begin with. I wanted to ask him a question, and he refused to yield.

He has an amendment that defers the payment, or the spending of this money, until July of 1976, on the premise that we should negotiate with the Russians to see whether or not we can reach an agreement with reference to the Indian Ocean. What I want to ask the Senator—and I think we should know the answer—is this. In the event that we do delay this until July of 1976—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator from Louisiana have expired. The Senator from Alaska has 8 minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield 2 or 3 minutes on the bill at this time.

Mr. PASTORE. If we defer the spending of this money until July of 1976, my question is this: If we do not reach an agreement with the Russians, then is the Senator from Iowa for the building of the fuel depot at Diego Garcia?

Mr. CULVER. Yes.

Mr. PASTORE. That answers the question of the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I understand that it is only delay; and if the whole question here is whether we should delay or not, it is not going to kill the country to delay, frankly.

But that is not really the question. The question is whether we should improve the facilities in Diego Garcia, be prudent in the way we spend our money, or whether we should require our ships to go 4,000 miles back to Subic Bay. You may have the POL there now, but you cannot get your ships in, to get into the port.

Mr. President, to hear my good friend the Senator from Iowa speak—and I hate to oppose him on this matter; I know he is sincere—one would think that we had a whole flotilla at Diego Garcia, ready to attack the Soviet Union, and that if we do not stop it at this moment, we are going to have world war III. That is not the question.

The Soviets are already in the Indian Ocean. They went in there secretly, installed these facilities, storing rockets. We know they are storing rockets. We have pictures of it. We know they have troops in the barracks there. We tried to get in there and could not get in when we sent our delegation there.

All we want to do is to take a small atoll and not quarter huge numbers of troops, not send the Marines in, but simply dig the port a little deeper, put a bigger POL facility in, lengthen the existing strip. What is wrong with that? That is not an act of war. That is not a blockade.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEVENS. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, when this matter first came up back in June, I did not find myself in total agreement with the Senator from Iowa, and I am not in total agreement with him as yet.

I still am of the opinion, as I wrote in additional views that were published in the committee report at that time, that I believed that the Diego Garcia

facility was justified as a logistical convenience for the operation of our Navy in the area when they went into the area.

I have listened with interest today to a review of the arguments made at that time, particularly with regard to negotiations with the Russians. Let me take care of that aspect of it first.

I have discussed this matter with the State Department and the Defense Department, and I am of the opinion that it is unlikely that there is going to be any breakthrough in negotiations with the Russians as to limiting naval presence in the Indian Ocean. I believe—and our best information seems to be—that they are going to continue to exert their presence into the Indian Ocean.

Mr. President, it seems to me that this is a very prudent thing to do.

One final word, and I will yield back the remainder of my time.

We have been told that the states on the littoral hate our guts, that we are going counter to the heartfelt opinion of mankind. That is not my information. My information is that many of the states on the littoral would like both the Soviet Union and the United States out of the Indian Ocean. They are not officially going to invite us in. But so long as the Soviet Union is there, many of these Arab States, which are much better friends of the United States than of the Soviet Union, want the United States to be in the Indian Ocean and to have a presence there. I think the State Department will confirm that. I do not think it can be done officially, but I believe that is a fact.

I hope this motion will be defeated.

Their continued building of ships—carriers now, not just helicopter carriers but carriers of regular aircraft with longer ranges—indicates that they expect in the future to try to extend their presence to areas of the world where they have not really had much of a presence before, and the Indian Ocean certainly is one of them.

However, I am going to support the Senator from Iowa today in his amendment because of a number of factors. In my additional views at the time we discussed this originally, I pointed out that I thought that while it was justified as a logistical convenience and would be economical and I felt it need not be provocative, I was afraid that it signaled a new policy, under which the United States was going to take the leadership or the dominance of the nations of the free world and a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. I indicated that I thought a dominance or at least a major capability of the free world in that area was extremely important because of the oil lifelines that are involved for the rest of the world. I think that is still true.

What I pointed out at that time was that I was afraid that our taking on this base responsibility put us in that dominant position where our interests are not nearly so much involved as those of the British or of the French, both of whom have had naval squadrons in the Indian Ocean far larger than any Russian presence. Either one of them has been larger, and the number of ship days has been

larger than a Russian presence has been in the past. I am not saying that that is going to be true in the future. I doubt that it will be true, when the Russians expand their naval capability, as they intend to do.

The Japanese have a great stake in the area. Something like 80 percent of their petroleum supplies come from this area of the world.

What I am saying is that there are dangers in today's climate, and what I said then is still true. There are great dangers, in today's climate, in the United States extending its presence in a leadership capacity into areas where it is going to be charged with colonialism or neocolonialism, where it is taking on the burdens of international relations in these areas and taking the burden of the diplomatic and military responsibility off those who should be assuming it—our allies.

I believe they can and should assume it. They have indicated no unwillingness to do so. So far as I know—this suggestion was made then and it was thrown to the winds—there has been no attempt by our State Department or our Defense Department to pursue that suggestion, to see if we could get the French or the British to take the leadership in that area.

So I am for putting a delay on this, to try to put some emphasis on it again, that this is what should be done. This is the direction in which we should be going, so far as this situation is concerned.

I have another reason, a personal reason. Perhaps it is not a good reason, in the long run, for our national interest, to delay. But if Congress is to have the facts on such matters laid before it, we should at least adopt this amendment and bring home to the Defense Department and the State Department that we mean business, when they come in and make representations to us—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Until the time on the amendment has expired, this amendment will not be in order.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, it is an amendment to an amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Until the time on the amendment has expired, this amendment is not in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be allowed to be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Without objection, the amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 1, line 2, strike "July 1" and insert in lieu thereof "July 2".

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I shall defer calling up this amendment until the time expires.

Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield some additional time to me?

Mr. STEVENS. How much time does the Senator want?

Mr. TAFT. How much time remains? Mr. STEVENS. I have other commitments and I shall have to yield time on the bill.

Mr. TAFT. I appreciate that. The reason I propose the amendment is that under the rules, I understand I shall get additional time on this amendment as soon as the time has expired.

Mr. STEVENS. How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. TAFT. Three minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. I yield 3 minutes on the bill.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, the reason I feel strongly on this is that since the time the matter was debated, the entire question of the natives of this island has come up. It was reported on in great detail in a Washington Post article of September 9, and another Washington Post article of September 10. As far as I know, the facts set out therein have never been denied by anyone. There is a Washington Post editorial, also, of September 11. I ask unanimous consent to have them all printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1975]

BRITAIN SAYS ISLANDERS WERE MOVED

(By Edward D. Nossiter)

LONDON, September 9.—The British government tonight acknowledged that it had emptied Diego Garcia of people in 1965 by closing down the island's chief source of employment, a copra processing plant.

A Foreign Office spokesman confirmed that about 1,000 islanders were induced to leave to convert Diego Garcia into a naval base, as reported by The Washington Post yesterday. The Indian Ocean Island currently houses a British-American communications center, a move that caused heated debate and controversy before gaining congressional approval.

Officials here stressed that Britain gave Mauritius, where the Diego Garcians were forced to go, about \$1.4 million to resettle the refugees. There was no indication, however, that London made any attempt to learn how the money was spent or what had happened to the islanders.

The Diego Garcians on Mauritius are living in poverty and suffer a high rate of unemployment. Officials were unable to comment on the Post's report that islanders now in Mauritius had been forbidden to return to their former homes.

The British government is reluctant to describe its measures as "forced evacuation." That, a spokesman said, was a matter of interpretation. He preferred to say that the islanders felt they had no option because there was no work.

A private company, it was explained, had been running the copra plant until 1965. The British government then bought the plant to make way for the base. Officials observed that the factory needed extensive investment, but did not claim that the decision to shut down the plant was made on economic grounds primarily.

The spokesman observed that the Mauritius government had accepted the \$1.4 million as a full and final discharge of Britain's obligation to the displaced islanders. The Diego Garcians say they have seen little of this money.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1975]

ISLANDERS WERE EVICTED FOR U.S. BASE

(By David B. Ottaway)

PORT LOUIS, MAURITIUS, September 8.—More than a thousand inhabitants of the In-

dian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which the Pentagon told Congress was virtually uninhabited, were forcibly removed before 1972 to make way for a controversial American naval base there.

The islanders are now living in abject poverty here in Mauritius, more than a thousand miles away, and have been petitioning the British and American embassies as well as the Mauritian government for help. But Washington has rejected all responsibility for their plight, and London has placed the onus on Mauritius, which already faces serious economic problems.

Diego Garcia and other islands in the Chagos group, 1,000 miles south of India's southern tip, were part of the British colony of Mauritius before Mauritius became independent.

Britain leased Diego Garcia to the United States in 1966, and the Defense Department now plans to expand its naval and air base facilities there. The proposal has aroused controversy in Congress and elsewhere because of its implications for an enlarged U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Britain gave the Mauritian government about \$1.4 million in 1972 to provide housing, social services and other resettlement assistance for the displaced Diego Garcians, but they say little of his money ever reached them.

One American relief organization attempted in 1972 to raise the issue of United States "co-responsibility" for the fate of the Diego Garcians, but the State Department replied that their problems are strictly the concern of Britain and Mauritius, and not in any way those of the United States.

The organization has thus been obliged to try to help the Diego Garcians without assistance from the U.S. government.

Almost nothing has been written, outside Mauritius itself, about the fate of the island's hapless residents. The few Western press reports that have touched on the former inhabitants have generally described them as "transient laborers" from Mauritius numbering only a few hundred.

But interviews here with several dozen Diego Garcians and others familiar with their plight revealed that there were once more than 300 families—between 1,200 and 1,400 people—living on Diego Garcia and two neighboring islets, many of them third-and even fourth-generation inhabitants.

Almost a decade ago, Britain began quietly evacuating the islanders to make way for future British and American naval, air and communications facilities, and the last Diego Garcians were ordered off the island by late 1971.

This allowed the Pentagon to tell Congress during the heated debate over the base that Diego Garcia was virtually uninhabited and that creation of the base would not cause any indigenous political problems.

But one old man, who said he was part of the final evacuation, recalled being told by an unidentified American official: "If you don't leave you won't be fed any longer."

And the plight of the Diego Garcians is a political issue in Mauritius, where opposition groups charge that the transplanted population has been neglected and uncompensated for its losses.

In the last year, the Diego Garcians have organized and have asked Britain and the United States to press the Mauritian government to provide them with housing, land, jobs and other facilities to start a new life.

About six months ago, they drew up a formal petition and presented it to the British embassy, with copies delivered to the American embassy, Mauritian Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, and several opposition leaders. They also discussed their plight with U.S. embassy officials on several occasions.

[A spokesman for the State Department in Washington said that he was not aware

of any petition and that the department is not considering any action "at this time." A British Embassy spokesman said the embassy here "has no knowledge" of the situation. He noted that if such an approach had been made in Mauritius, the matter would normally be taken up with the Commonwealth office in London.]

The petition is primarily a plea for help, but it also expresses the Diego Garcians' feelings about being summarily tossed off their island to make way for a military base.

"We the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands—Diego Garcia, Peros Banhos and Salomon—have been uprooted from those islands because the Mauritian government sold the islands to the British government to build a base," the petition begins.

"Our ancestors were slaves on those islands, but we know that we are the heirs of those islands. Although we were poor there, we were not dying of hunger. We were living free . . . Here in Mauritius when animals are debarked, an enclosure with water and grass is prepared for them. But we, being mini-slaves, we don't get anybody to help us. We are at a loss, not knowing what to do."

The document goes on to ask for a meeting with British embassy officials to explain their problems in detail.

"We (want to) let the British government know how many people have died through sorrow, poverty, and lack of food and care," it says. "We have at least 40 persons who have died."

It ends with an appeal to Britain to get the Mauritian government to provide them with plots of land, a house for each family and jobs, and says that if these facilities are not forthcoming, "It is preferable that we be sent back to our islands."

But the British reportedly told the islanders to address their petition to the Mauritian government, and the Diego Garcians are still waiting for assistance from some quarter while struggling to survive as best they can.

The conditions under which the islanders left Diego Garcia and their present difficulties were detailed by some of the former inhabitants in interviews at several of their homes in Roche Bois, suburb of Port Louis, where many of them now live.

One of the principal leaders is Christian Ramdas, 41, who was born on the island as were his parents, grandmother and most of his children. He said he went on vacation to Mauritius in 1965 shortly after Diego Garcia and the other islands in the Chagos group were formally split off from Mauritius to form part of the separate British Indian Ocean Territory, and was not allowed to return.

The three islands' former inhabitants, who are mostly Indo-Mauritian and speak a French dialect, originally went to the Chagos as workers on coconut plantations owned by Mauritians or by companies based on the British Seychelles Islands.

Working conditions on the Chagos Islands appear to have been close to those of slavery. The plantation workers were given food, housing and the equivalent of about \$4 a month to buy clothes, tea and coffee from the company store.

Yet there was apparently a certain security on Diego Garcia which they obviously miss here on Mauritius.

"The life was easy, very easy," according to Ramdas.

"We had animals and raised chickens," said a young woman who has found work here as a maid. "We could fish off the island and we didn't need a lot of clothes."

On Mauritius, the Diego Garcians seem lost souls, living for the first time in a money economy where rent, food and clothing are priced far above their meager incomes and where they are either unsuited for the available jobs or discriminated against by employers who favor local Mauritians.

Although they apparently got along on about \$4 a month in the Chagos, they say a

family can hardly make ends meet on Mauritius with \$65 a month.

A recent private survey of the Diego Garcians found that only 17 per cent of family heads had full-time jobs, 33 per cent were unemployed and 50 per cent worked part time.

Unskilled and uneducated, most "ilois" (French for islanders), as the Diego Garcians are called here, seem doomed to find only menial jobs, unless the local government undertakes some kind of special retraining program for them.

A Mauritian government spokesman said that two plots of land had been bought for housing sites but that the Diego Garcians themselves had rejected the idea of living in separate cities and wanted individual homes in locations of their own choosing.

Some of the men, such as Ramdas, would like to return to Diego Garcia to work on the American base and look after the church and cemetery where their relatives are buried. "We asked the U.S. Embassy to allow some of us to go back there, but there has been no reply," Ramdas said.

In the first British-American agreement concerning Diego Garcia, signed in December 1966, some consideration was given to employing "workers from Mauritius and Seychelles to the maximum extent practicable consistent with United States policies, requirements and schedules." But no specific mention was made of taking on the former inhabitants as workers.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1975]

THE DIEGO GARCIA

The dubious case for planting an American base and fleet in the Indian Ocean has been rendered practically indefensible by disclosure of how the site got to be the "uninhabited"—and therefore politically uncomplicated—place which its United States government sponsors repeatedly proclaimed it to be. It got that way, we are now told in a dispatch from Washington Post correspondent David Ottawa, only because virtually all of the 1,200 or 1,400 residents of Diego Garcia and its two neighbor islets were *forcibly* removed to Mauritius 1,000 miles away to make way for the base. One of several dozen former Garcians interviewed by Mr. Ottawa recalls being told by an American who participated in the evacuation: "If you don't leave you won't be fed any longer." Since their removal, the Diego Garcians have lived in poverty and neglect in Mauritius, futilely petitioning the Mauritian, British and American governments for relief or return.

Granted, a lot went wrong in the world in the years, 1966-72, in which this act of mass kidnapping took place. But it takes a very jaded observer not to be repelled by the sordidness of it all. First, there was the complicity of the British lessors and American lessees in solving the politically inconvenient problem of people on Diego Garcia by uprooting them from their homes and traditional ways. One wonders what strategic rationale was concocted inside the bureaucracy to justify the transfer of these few people who had gotten in the way of the cold war juggernaut. Then, there was through the years, on both sides of the Atlantic, a highly effective coverup, facilitated no doubt by the fact that the Diego Garcians in their poverty and their remoteness had scant recourse. Finally, there were the constant affirmations by the Pentagon that the lack of people on Diego Garcia was precisely one of those characteristics that made the island an appropriate place for a "modest" facility in the Indian Ocean.

Only last summer did the Congress vote the funds to start building an air base and carrier task force facility on the island. It did so only after a two-or-three-year-long debate over whether an American military

presence in the Indian Ocean would unnecessarily antagonize the riparian states, provoke the Russians into a more intensive Indian Ocean naval competition, and fuel a naval arms race; or whether such a presence was justified in order to "stabilize" a region rendered increasingly sensitive by the oil tankers that ply its waters and by hints of Soviet interest in it. In the end, it took a full-scale Pentagon campaign to play up the existence of a new Soviet naval facility in the Somali Republic to persuade a reluctant Congress that the United States should build its own base in Diego Garcia. There is little evidence that Congress realized that it was committing itself not simply to the current costs of the base (measured in millions of dollars) but to the future costs of the fleet (billions) that is meant to be permanently deployed there when it is built. Congressional efforts to induce the administration to negotiate limits on naval deployment with the Soviet Union were brushed aside with the retort, by one high State Department official, that the United States did not have to "tug its forelock" and petition Moscow to remove the American Navy from the Indian Ocean.

The strategic case for a base on Diego Garcia was always a close question, one which its sponsors never made particularly well. But it is not a close question at all that the people of Diego Garcia were treated in a shameful way and that they should not be allowed to languish now in the miserable condition to which high strategy unfeelingly consigned them. For the United States government to keep on insisting that it has no responsibility for the people displaced by its lease on Diego Garcia is intolerable. At the very least, Congress should review the issue to ensure fair treatment to the forgotten people of the island.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, what I have been talking about is that the Department of Defense and the Department of State, in their testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, repeated to us very clearly and succinctly, and without any elaboration whatsoever, the fact that there was no native population on this island. According to the Department of Defense, that was one of the great advantages of Diego Garcia. The Post reports, if they are true—and I assume that they are, because there has been no denial of them and we now find admissions in the press that certain American charitable agencies went into this back in 1972 and it is well known—the Department of Defense or the State Department or both have been guilty of either gross deception or grosser ignorance. The forcible removal of an entire population is not the same as finding a place unpopulated to begin with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator 3 minutes on the bill.

Mr. TAFT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, it is not the same thing as finding a place that is unpopulated to begin with. If the Department of Defense or the Department of State were aware that the population was removed when they told Congress the island was unpopulated, then they attempted to deceive the Congress and the committee in what I think is a very reprehensible manner. If, on the other hand, they did not know the population had been removed, they had not done their homework. There is every evidence that they did, because when they went in in 1966, the

British were in the process of removing the entire population and that seems to be the agreement from the entire beginning.

I think it immediately opens us further to what I have been talking about, charges of neocolonialism of the most reprehensible sort, a charge that those critics of the United States, the Soviet Union, will not be slow to make.

Even if Great Britain is solely responsible for the evacuation, the United States, by its participation in the scheme, will share in the blame. Charges of this sort carry great weight among the people of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, and, if the charges are proven true, the American image will be tarnished.

If the charges are proven true, our image, I believe, is bound to be tarnished by it.

I think, therefore, that the delay proposed by those backing this amendment is most appropriate at this point. I hope that the time will be used during this period to investigate the possibility of working out joint arrangements with our allies, the French and the British, so that they take the leadership in this entire area and that we, in the meanwhile, do explore—although I think it is going to be futile—with the Russians the question of whether or not there might be some possibility of limiting expansion of naval presence by the respective powers in this particular area.

I call attention, particularly, to the New Republic article on March 9, 1974, which indicated that—

In fact Communist party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev made a speech in June 1971 proposing an arms limitation, in the Indian Ocean, and this was accompanied by some informal probes by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin at the State Department. The then-Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, in turn asked what Moscow had in mind. Some say the Soviets made no response and showed no further interest. Others say that the US query was "not very strenuous." The Pentagon says the navy historically has opposed any limitation to its freedom to roam.

I do not know whether that is the case or not, but certainly a delay of 6 months, as the Senator from Iowa has pointed out, it is not going to delay the current ongoing project of construction in the Diego Garcia area. But a delay of 6 months, I think, would lead to some questioning by Congress of what I think are some very important principles on what is going to be future action in this area.

Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.

The amendment was withdrawn.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I inquire of the Senator from South Carolina how much time he desires

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I should say about 7 minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. I yield him that time.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I join with the able Senator from Alaska in his opposition to this amendment. I think if we had any doubts at all about this question, the report of the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma should settle those doubts in favor of voting against this amendment.

Mr. President, indecision brings trouble, and if we pass this amendment today, there is going to be a question in the minds of people of other countries and leaders of the world as to whether we really mean business. I think it would be a great mistake to delay this matter, because delay will indicate in the minds of others that we do have indecision.

I think we can all agree that ours is a maritime nation, heavily dependent upon raw materials from around the world to feed the enormous appetite of our great economy.

Our economy, despite the rigors of depressions, wars, inflation, and recessions, has been the backbone of our progress. This has been possible to a degree because the imports we need, especially oil, has had our naval power as the guarantor in satisfying our maritime needs.

Diego Garcia does not represent the birth of some recent idea to project naval power into a distant area. It reflects the consummation of well-thought-out plans which we expect of the Department of Defense.

The thinking in relation to Diego Garcia goes back to 1959. At that time, Navy planning recognized the need to assure the early availability of minimum logistic facilities which would be required for support of naval forces that might be deployed to the Indian Ocean. The requirement consisted of suitable anchorage and a refueling station, hopefully under U.S. control.

By 1961, our British allies were talking about a possible withdrawal of their presence from east of Aden. This focused planning implementation on the Indian Ocean because it meant that we might not be assured of the availability of allied support facilities if we needed them. Therefore, the Navy identified a need to assure the availability of Diego Garcia as a contingency support base.

By 1965, the Navy stated a firm requirement for a communications station at Diego Garcia. Furthermore, the island remained in planning consideration should future naval operations require its expanded use.

In June of 1968, the Secretary of Defense approved the Diego Garcia concept in principle and directed the Navy to submit its figures for inclusion in the fiscal year 1970 budget. That proposal, which dates back to calendar year 1969, called for an austere facility at Diego Garcia composed of an anchorage suitable for a carrier task group, an 8,000 foot airstrip for logistic support, fuel storage of approximately 415,000 barrels, and communications support.

LIMITED SUPPORT NEEDED

Admiral Moorer, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Committee on Armed Services in March of 1974 that the objective for Diego Garcia was simply to acquire a limited support capability for forces that we might choose to send into the area. It was his opinion, and one I support, that it is in the interest of the United States to have the flexibility for operations in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia will provide that.

Admiral Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, during the same period when

hearings were being held on the 1974 supplemental budget requests said, and I quote:

If we are to have any reasonable contingency capability for the deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area, we must have the rudiments of a logistics support facility in the area.

Now, many voices are begging restraint in the Indian Ocean—the same voices, I fear, that would be the loudest in criticism if there had been no planning and we were suddenly faced with a crisis in the area. Much has been said about arms limitations and peace zones.

First, let me address the latter. Proposals for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean are superficially attractive. Peace is what we are striving for everywhere—neither the Indian Ocean nor the countries which border it have any corner on that desire. We seek to enforce the freedom of the seas, not bind ourselves, or others, to accept a legal regime imposed by a regional group of states, which restricts navigation on the high seas. The United States just cannot accept that premise.

I do not feel the advocates of an Indian Ocean zone of peace fully realize the undesirable precedent for similar proposals elsewhere. It would offer no significant cost savings while limiting U.S. presence in a critical area. Furthermore, it would act to the advantage of the Soviets since their overland access to the Indian Ocean would not be affected and their quick transit through the Suez Canal has already been demonstrated.

ARMS LIMITATION

Now the other point—arms limitations. We have not observed any particular restraint or positive effort on behalf of the Soviets for arms control measures in the Indian Ocean. While we are being mesmerized by the attitudes of détente, there are rumblings about Soviet irregularities in the arms limitations agreements already in being—I am referring here to the SALT agreements. Let me make this point. The United States cannot be placed in a position where Soviet dilatory negotiating procedures could deprive us of badly needed facilities on Diego Garcia at a time when our vital and legitimate interests could some day be jeopardized. Even if we were to assume that the Soviets would act in good faith, the very difficult and technical negotiations would be apt to be very protracted.

I cannot argue with the personal convictions of those opposing Diego Garcia, but, when presented with the facts, there is clear evidence of a compelling need for approval of the expansion project. In this respect, some have questioned our vital interests in the Indian Ocean. I am already on record as to the importance of guaranteeing the supply of oil that passes through that area. At the same time, we have long-term interests in seeing that the Indian Ocean area remains a peaceful and stable region so that we are not forced someday to send our Armed Forces there in anger. None of us want that and those of us who support Diego Garcia have military interposition as the farthest thing from our minds.

Our interests must be protected, yet

the vitality of our interests means that they must be credible and that the United States will become involved to assure their fruition. But our presence and interested involvement does not mean military intervention. The Navy has been and will continue to be one of the best instruments to represent our continued interests around the world.

The basic justification of Navy mobile forces is that we can get them promptly to the scene of trouble and sustain them there. The U.S. Navy is in the Indian Ocean in support of our friends in the Middle East and to provide for the security of our own sea lines of communication. We will be there to provide presence to our friends whether or not the Soviet Navy is in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy looks upon the Indian Ocean as a transit route between its European and Pacific fleets. Further, the Soviet Union needs forces in the Indian Ocean to provide presence in support of its clients on the Indian Ocean littoral and to enhance the security of its own sea lines of communication. The Berbera facilities cannot be viewed lightly. Thus, both the United States and Soviet Navies will be in the Indian Ocean whether or not the other nation's forces are there.

We know there are political ways that oil can be cut off; there are also military ways. We ought to be very sure that we have the capability to prevent those military ways from coming to pass and if we have that capability, we are much less likely to see political interference. The one flows from the other.

Diego Garcia provides assurance that our Navy will be better able to meet any future emergencies with what is on hand. In the meantime, it is a very modest premium to insure against some future need.

Mr. President, I hope this matter will not be delayed, and I hope this amendment will be defeated.

I ask unanimous consent that a "Dear Colleague" letter dated November 6, 1975, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., Nov. 6, 1975.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: When the Military Construction Appropriations bill (H.R. 10029) is considered today it is anticipated that amendments may be offered either reducing or delaying the funding for construction at Diego Garcia. I personally urge that you support the position of the Appropriations Committee on this bill which would appropriate \$13.8 million to proceed with the second increment of construction at Diego Garcia.

The \$18 million already approved in the FY 1975 bill for Diego Garcia is presently in the process of being obligated. There is nothing to be gained by delaying the second increment in this appropriation.

As you well know, the Diego Garcia project has been an issue for several years and a special provision was enacted which permitted the Senate to determine in a separate vote whether the construction at Diego Garcia should proceed. The Senate decided as a policy matter that Diego Garcia construction should move forward when the Senate this past July by a vote of 53-43 disapproved the proposed Resolution of Disapproval. The full Appropriations Committee recently reaffirmed

November 6, 1975

the Senate policy when it approved the \$13.8 million as a second construction increment.

The basic question is whether the United States needs this facility. There have been no recent facts which would detract from this need. On the contrary, the need is even greater in view of the oil problem and the continuing sensitivity of the Middle East area.

I am hopeful that the problem of the former inhabitants can be satisfactorily resolved but to delay the funds for the second increment for this or any other reason will only result in additional cost.

Sincerely,

JOHN C. STENNIS.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment has expired. The Senator from Alaska has 13 minutes remaining on the bill; the Senator from Montana has 14 minutes on the bill.

Mr. STEVENS. I shall just take 2 minutes from the time on the bill.

Mr. President, I have enjoyed the expression of opinions on both sides. I think the unfortunate part of it is that Congress never instructed the President to proceed in the way we are now going to give him 7 months to proceed. The money we previously appropriated will run out on December 1. I am informed there are 550 Seabees out there on Diego Garcia; that they have an 8-month rotation schedule; that this delay of 7 months will cause a complete turnover in the work force out there.

I do not know, I have not been able to quantify it yet the effect of the delay, but it is clear to me that Congress asked the President to certify whether or not the project was in the interests of the United States. That certification was made, the resolution of disapproval was rejected, and the money that we previously appropriated has been committed.

If we delay the commitment of these funds, what we are going to have is about a seven-eighths complete facility that cannot be used. I do not know what you have got to negotiate with the Soviets on.

I am informed the Soviets are, in fact, already at the Port of Aden; they are at Um Qasr, but they deny—

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEVENS. On the Senator's time, my friend, when I finish. They deny they are at Berbera. They deny they are in this area at all, so how can you negotiate with people who deny they are there?

Under the circumstances, I really feel the problem is solely a question of should we defer the funds. There is no question of whether we should appropriate the funds. The Senator from Iowa merely wants to delay the expenditure of those funds which, to me, is an uneconomic request and, for that reason, I disagree.

I would add one thing: I am rather amazed—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.

Mr. STEVENS. I will take 1 more minute.

I am amazed at the deception that took place in 1966. I am amazed at the total lack of candor through the period

from 1966 to 1969. But I interpret my friends from Iowa as accusing this administration of deception when that deception took place before the change of administrations in 1968.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEVENS. Just a second and I shall yield the floor.

Under the circumstances, I believe we should go into this whole matter thoroughly as to the people who were there and what happened to them, what our responsibility might be. But again I say we should spend the money and keep the schedule going as we agreed in July of this year.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CULVER. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. CULVER. First of all, with regard to the deception and its partisan burden-sharing, there is enough deception in this situation to more than go around. No one has a monopoly on honesty and integrity when it comes to the Diego Garcia question. It has been fraught with deception and misrepresentation from the time of its inception until today.

It was fraught with it in 1966 when this ill-conceived scheme was hatched originally, and every single day our Government has touched it our real security interests have continued to be corrupted.

Now, from 1966 to 1969, as the Senator from Alaska says, we put \$9 million under the table and we have not seen where it has gone except we have seen the misery of the poor people who supposedly were the beneficiaries of this secret deal.

In 1969, when we did have a change of administration, we had a very, very careful selective notice slipped through the transom in the dark of night, one sparse letter, carefully conceived to divulge as little as possible about the true facts, with no general notice and, as far as we can tell, it went to one House committee and one Senate Member, and it said, "We have been paying some money on this." It did not give all the facts, and it did not say that \$9 million had already been expended.

Now, what about more recently? Well, the Senator from Alaska is misinformed, and I regret very much to have to inform him, that in 1974 when I sat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee—and I have reviewed all the testimony—we had department witnesses come before us and say that one of the beautiful attractions of this island is "There ain't no people there."

As the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) has repeatedly mentioned, in 1975, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, we had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say it, come before this Congress and said it was uninhabited.

Why did he not tell us that there were no people there because we forced them to leave their island against their will, some after five generations on that is-

land, by giving them the Hobson's choice of leaving or starving to death, and moved them into squalor in slums on Mauritius? That is where they are. That is why Diego Garcia is now "uninhabited."

Those are the facts. This is not a partisan issue, it is an institutional issue. It is a question of integrity; it is a question of honesty; above all, it is a question of morality and responsibility. We just cheapen the issue when we start talking about petty considerations of whose administration, at what point in time. They both stink. The short answer is they both stink.

The Senator says if we pass this deferral of \$13.8 million, they are going to end up with a pathetic facility half-built. Nonsense. Our office talked with the U.S. Navy today. What do they tell us? They have already spent \$63 million and have the best communication facility in the whole Indian Ocean area, including Berbera.

The money we spent, appropriated last July, what does that do? That completes over two-thirds of the storage facility for the POL dump. With that money alone, not this money for fiscal 1976, but with the money already appropriated in July, it will give us a storage capability of 21 out of the 28 days they want to get—21 days; not to mention the fact that we have got nuclear aircraft carriers out there which do not need it.

Finally, the only thing that it will not have is that 1-week additional supply, some aprons on the runway—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CULVER. And some permanent housing frills for the personnel who are already there in temporary housing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment—

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I cannot let that stand. I have to answer my good friend.

It is not true we have a responsibility for these people. They are now, even according to the Post article, making about 10 times to 15 times more than they made before. They are in abject poverty, that is true, but these workers were on the copra farms. We had nothing to do with that.

The agreement, as I understand—I do not like the fact it was not disclosed—but the agreement was that the British would handle the relationship to the indigenous population and the testimony before the committees was that there was no indigenous population.

It was not that there were no people there. There was no indigenous population—and there is none. There are no people that would call this home.

Under the circumstances—and I again say that the Senator is entitled to his opinion about not having them there—but we will end up with Diego Garcia unusable in the event of an embargo between now and July 1.

I want the Senate to remember where we got where we are, because we are not going to be able to use it, contrary to

what the Senator says, that facility is not usable until this money is obligated that we have in this bill.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEVENS. Just a second.

The Senator is wrong, he is absolutely wrong when he says it is a usable facility. It is a usable communications facility, and until we complete this, according to my information, if that is true, and there is an embargo between now and July 1, all the Navy vessels that go there will have to go back to Subic Bay, as they did in the last embargo, to refuel.

The cost of that for one session alone was over the amount of money we are talking about right now; \$14 million is about what it takes to finish the facility—and I stand to be corrected if I am wrong, but that is my understanding—and if the Senator believes we can use that facility without this money, I am badly informed, because it is my understanding that we cannot use it in the 21 out of the 28 days he is talking about.

Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEVENS. On the Senator's time, I do not have any.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FANNIN). Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CULVER. During the last oil embargo, I would like to advise the Senator from Alaska, they did not have Diego Garcia. We did not have it, and do you know what we had in place of it? At that time we still had friendly countries who made available different ports to permit us to refuel at so we could meet the threat in the Middle East.

The question I would ask the Senator is, in view of the action by the non-aligned countries, by the littoral area States, by the events of the Commonwealth Conference last week in New Delhi, where they spent a whole day's working sessions criticizing America's decision to go ahead with Diego Garcia of last July, how many of those ports does the Senator think will be open by the time of the next embargo?

None of them?

We have a 30-day-at-sea capability now. All we want is another 30 days. So we do not have to go into any of these 36 ports in 18 countries for refueling for 60 days.

So we are building this POL dump and the fact is that the Navy has told us, and I must say if the Senator has become misinformed, it will not be the first time in the history of this matter. The Navy told us as recently as this morning that when we take the money appropriated already last July, added to what they already have, if we do not appropriate one single dime ever in subsequent appropriations, that will permit them to complete what? A POL dump that would give them 21 days right now—not 28, admittedly not 28, just 21.

With this additional money it will give them those 5 or 6 days.

What else will we give them? An apron on the airstrip.

What else will we give them? Well, the officers' quarters will be built, they will be fancy, because we have 1,100 Americans there in just temporary quarters. We want a more fancy presence. We will build a hangar.

But if we did not appropriate one more dime, they will have a bigger, better facility there than there is at Berbera now. This POL depot that we are talking about is three or four times as big as the one the Soviets are building in Berbera.

This does not deny us the money to go ahead. This just defers the expenditure of the money. It does not cut the money out. It does not make it unavailable, and if they make a good faith effort at negotiations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. CULVER. They can spend the money and go ahead.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute on the bill.

Mr. President, the states in the littoral will pretty well break down as to whether they are pro-Soviet or pro-United States in their attitude as to whether we should build the base. About 10 say—privately, to be sure—"go ahead." The others say "No" and it is just a question of whether they are pro-Soviet or pro-United States.

The question of the natives in Mauritius has nothing to do with this—and I think we ought to put the admirals in jail or at least keep them from getting promoted. If we adopt this amendment it will not bring the natives back, and that is beside the point.

The question is on our presence in the Indian Ocean.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Where all our oil comes from in the Middle East.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED ON
AMENDMENT NO. 1054

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we are reopening the question of Diego Garcia that we felt had been laid to rest with the 53-to-43 vote on section 160, July 28, 1975. On the basis of a story that appeared in the Washington Post on September 9, 1975, I feel that the Senate should again review the Diego Garcia question. Subsequent to the story, the Appropriations Committee repeatedly asked the Department of Defense and the Department of State for the true facts concerning the people who lived on Diego Garcia and adjoining islands before the United Kingdom and the United States signed an agreement to turn Diego Garcia over to the United States for use as a naval base.

After much prodding, we received a document which contained information that was certainly never known before by the members of the Appropriations Committee and I would like to quote this to you:

The United States agreed to share in the costs of creating the British Indian Ocean Territory, including compensation to Mauritius and the Seychelles, purchase of privately owned land, and resettlement of migratory workers in the event land was required for military uses. Accordingly, the US agreed in a confidential exchange to fund half of the

total costs of establishing the territory, to a maximum of \$14 million, by waiving to that extent the 5% research and development surcharges accruing in connection with US purchase of the Polaris missile system. The informal funding arrangement was desired by both governments; the Executive Branch wished to avoid seeking appropriations for a project which had not materialized at that time.

Since 1969, I have been closely associated with the question of Diego Garcia and this is the first time that this information has ever been known to me. I had the clerk of the Military Construction Subcommittee search through all of our files to see if, by chance, this information had ever been furnished to the committee and there is nothing in the committee files which indicates that the U.S. Government had engaged in such an agreement with the United Kingdom.

Further, the subcommittee was given information, that Diego Garcia was an uninhabited island, never giving the background on the people who inhabited the island. Now, we find out from the Washington Post story and a story that appeared in the London Times that these people have inhabited Diego Garcia for two to three generations and that the last of the people were moved from the island in 1972.

The people removed from the island have been living on the Island of Mauritius in a state of deepest poverty, even though the United States and the United Kingdom jointly contributed \$1,400,000 to the Mauritian Government for relief and relocation of all people who had worked or lived in the Chagos Archipelago. We find that, to date, the people of Diego Garcia have received \$1,000 in resettlement costs from the Mauritian Government. According to information furnished me, the Mauritian Government acknowledged that the 1973 payment represented a full and final discharge of British obligations in this regard and accepted complete responsibility for the people involved.

But in my judgment, the United States has a moral obligation in seeing that the people who were removed from Diego Garcia are provided a decent place to live and compensated for having to give up their livelihood and their living space.

Mr. President, before I finish I would like to review briefly some of the arguments against the United States siting a naval base on Diego Garcia:

First. In my judgment, this base will lead ultimately to the United States having to support a three-ocean Navy.

Second. This will be an immensely expensive undertaking. Even though the Navy and the Air Force contend that it will only cost \$35 million in construction money, information available to me indicates that the cost in construction and equipment will run approximately \$200 million.

Third. The nations surrounding the littoral of the Indian Ocean have repeatedly stated that they did not want the United States building a naval base on Diego Garcia. In spite of these protests by 30 nations in the Indian Ocean area, the United States has decided to go ahead with the building of the base.

Fourth. The proponents of the Diego Garcia proposal have stated that this will

November 6, 1975

protect the U.S. ocean tanker sea lanes, it was demonstrated in the Yom Kippur war of 1973 that the United States was shut off from oil in the Arab countries.

Fifth, I contend that the building of this naval base on Diego Garcia will lead to an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area.

In closing, I believe that the Department of Defense and the State Department were less than candid with the Congress in this matter.

Mr. President, it is high time that this practice of not thoroughly informing the Congress on problems that concern national security policy should stop and I know of no better place to begin than with this question of Diego Garcia.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER), to suspend funds for the U.S. base on the Island of Diego Garcia until July 1, 1976.

I believe that Senator CULVER has made a persuasive case for his amendment; and he is to be commended for his leadership on this issue during the last several months.

As we go beyond the Vietnam era, re-examine our interests in the outside world, and seek to define new directions for U.S. foreign policy, it is important for us to proceed cautiously before undertaking new commitments or new deployments of U.S. forces abroad.

This amendment goes right to the heart of this concern. It is an effort to give us time to stop and think before embarking on a significant expansion of the base at Diego Garcia. Many of us in this Chamber believe that the arguments against this expansion are overwhelming on their own merits. Even more, we are concerned that no constructive efforts have been made by the administration to forestall a major new arms race within the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean.

Last year, the Congress suspended the authorization of funds for the Diego Garcia base, pending Presidential certification—and congressional approval of that certification—that this base is truly in the national interest.

At the same time, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended that the administration provide "a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union, mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the area of the Indian Ocean."

This approach was also supported by the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, all 29 of which have supported repeated calls of the U.N. General Assembly to try making this part of the world a "zone of peace."

When the President earlier this year sent us his certification of the Diego Garcia base, and we debated it here, it became clear that the administration had chosen not to follow the advice of the Armed Services Committee. It simply ignored an avenue of action that could help forestall an escalation of naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, to the ultimate benefit of no nation. As

the Washington Post reported, one "high State Department" official said that the United States did not have to "tug its forelock and petition Moscow to remove the American Navy from the Indian Ocean."

Clearly, Mr. President, that was a distortion of the sane and sensible efforts in the Senate to encourage the President to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union before proceeding with the Diego Garcia base. And just as clearly, the administration distorted the record in telling us in the Congress that the island was uninhabited: it was, indeed, uninhabited, but only because we had worked with the British Government to remove the people who lived there, financing that callous act through a secret and highly questionable offset of finance charges incurred by the British Government for purchase of Polaris missiles and related equipment.

Earlier this year, I joined with my distinguished colleagues from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) and California (Mr. CRANSTON) in introducing an amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the President should seek to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union "as rapidly as possible" to seek mutual restraint in Indian Ocean naval deployments. That amendment was passed by the Senate as part of the international relations authorization bill, which is now in conference. It is my hope that the Senate conferees will insist on its inclusion in the final bill, as a direct expression of congressional opinion along the same lines advocated today by Senator CULVER.

Mr. President, we do not know whether the Soviet Union will join us in negotiations on limiting arms and forces in the Indian Ocean area. But we cannot answer that question unless we try. How often are we told by the administration that negotiations will not work—without the slightest effort on its part to test that proposition? It is following the same approach with regard to the sale of arms to the states of the neighboring Persian Gulf—again arguing that there is no point in negotiating with arms buyers and sellers. And again it refuses to try.

Are we to allow our policy in that part of the world to be dominated by this approach—by this cavalier refusal to follow the lead of the Congress? Can an executive-legislative partnership in foreign policy mean anything, if our judgment is to be ignored?

Mr. President, for all these reasons, I support the amendment offered by Senator CULVER, and urge its adoption by the Senate, as evidence of our positive intent to seek arms control instead of arms anarchy in an important area of the world.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Iowa.

The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), and the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) is absent on official business.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. GARN) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 51, nays 44, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 473 Leg.]

YEAS—51

Abourezk	Hatfield	Muskie
Biden	Hathaway	Nelson
Brooke	Hollings	Pastore
Bumpers	Huddleston	Pearson
Burdick	Humphrey	Pell
Case	Inouye	Proxmire
Church	Jackson	Randolph
Clark	Kennedy	Ribicoff
Cranston	Leahy	Scott,
Culver	Long	William L.
Durkin	Magnuson	Sparkman
Eagleton	Mansfield	Stevenson
Ford	Mathias	Symington
Glenn	McGovern	Taft
Gravel	McIntyre	Tunney
Hart, Gary	Mondale	Williams
Hart, Philip A.	Montoya	
Haskell	Moss	

NAYS—44

Allen	Domenici	Morgan
Baker	Eastland	Nunn
Bartlett	Fannin	Packwood
Beall	Fong	Roth
Belmon	Goldwater	Schweiker
Bentsen	Griffin	Scott, Hugh
Brock	Hansen	Stafford
Buckley	Helms	Stennis
Byrd,	Hruska	Stevens
Harry F., Jr.	Javits	Stone
Byrd, Robert C.	Johnston	Talmadge
Cannon	Laxalt	Thurmond
Chiles	McClelan	Tower
Curtis	McClure	Weicker
Dole	McGee	Young

NOT VOTING—5

Bayh	Hartke	Percy
Garn	Metcalfe	

So Mr. CULVER's amendment (No. 1054) was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. JACKSON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I call up an amendment which I have at the desk, and ask that it be reported.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCLELLAN). The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 2, line 21, after the period insert the following: "None of the funds appropriated in this act shall be used for the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences."

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The Senator will not proceed until order is restored. Senators engaged in conversations will please remove them to the cloakroom. Senators will please clear the well.

The Senator from Kentucky may proceed.

Mr. FORD. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I offer this amendment today because I believe that we need a strong national defense, but we do not need wasteful spending by the military. I believe that over a long period of time,