

Def 1 UK - US

London - 4060
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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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SECRET LONDON 4060

Info

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ With concurrence of DDO, UK
☒ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown

EO 12356, Sec 1.3 (a) (

FPO/HDR by R44K

1966 NOV 16

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STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of
after

EO 12958, 25X

IPS/CR/IR by WEP

Date: 3/28/97

LINDIS

1. FOLLOWING ARE MAJOR TOPICS COVERED IN CONVERSATION NOV 15 BETWEEN JEFFREY KITCHEN, ACCOMPANIED BY POLMIL COUNSELOR, AND ARTHUR (HEAD, DEFENSE DEPT - FONOFF):

A. LIBYA. ARTHUR SAID UK PLANNED TO BEGIN RUNDOWN OF CYPRUS STOCKPILE ON 1 JAN BUT WOULD HAVE TO TOUCH BASE FIRST WITH MAKARIOS, SINCE RUNDOWN WOULD PPUT 3,000 CYPRIOTS OUT OF WORK. RUNDOWN WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY MARCH. UK FORCE OF 1-1/3 BATTALIONS WOULD BE REMOVED BY END OF AUG AND TOTAL OF POUNDS 3 MILLION FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVING WOULD BE REALIZED. ARTHUR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO US FOR ITS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE AVAILABLE C-130'S ON CONTINGENCY BASIS, SINCE THIS WAS FACTOR WHICH PERMITTED IMPLEMENTATION OF CYPRUS WITHDRAWAL.

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ARTHUR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT CONTINGENCY AIRLIFT PLAN WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN EUCOM AND LATTER HAD NOT YET FORWARDED RECOMMENDATION TO PENTAGON. HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD FROM UK EMBASSY WASH PENTAGON POSITION WAS THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO MAKE JOINT PLANS DESIGNATING DEPOTS IN UK. WHILE UK WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SUCH PLANS, IT WOULD SUFFICE TO HAVE AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING THAT US AIRCRAFT WOULD COME TO DESIGNATED AIR FIELDS IN UK IN EVENT CONTINGENCY PLANS HAD TO BE ACTIVATED, AND THAT IN EFFECT US WOULD ACCEPT UNILATERAL UK PLAN. KITCHEN UNDERTOOK TO INQUIRE INTO STATUS OF THIS MATTER. ARTHUR CONFIRMED KITCHEN UNDERSTANDING THAT US AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ADDITIVE, AND WOULD BE CALLED UPON ONLY TO FILL GAPS REMAINING AFTER UK MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AIRLIFT HAD BEEN USED TO MAXIMUM. ARTHUR SAID UK PLANNED TO CALL ON US ONLY IF UK WERE "SUNK" AND THEN ONLY UP TO WORST CASE OF 200-ODD SORTIES WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3

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By ARM/AL Date 4/10/97

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-2- London 4060, November 16

*Def 15 8.2 - US
for Def 15 8.2 - UK*

B. BIOT. KITCHEN HOPED THAT UK'S ALDABRA ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US SHORTLY (LONDON 3156). HE PROPOSED, AND ARTHUR AGREED, THAT USAF AND RAF WORK CLOSELY AND DIRECTLY TOGETHER AFTER BASIC AGREEMENT CONCLUDED. COL STUBBS OF US DEL WAS SEEING RAF THIS AFTERNOON. WITH

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RESPECT TO DIEGO GARCIA, KITCHEN SAID THAT US FELT IT HAD BEEN BETTER TO EASE OFF ON CONDUCTING DEFINITIVE ENGINEERING SURVEY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE LAND ACQUISITION PROBLEM. HE RECALLED UK OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSEL WAS TO VISIT AREA IN LATE SPRING AND SAID WE WOULD ACCEPT UK'S INVITATION TO PUT 5-6 US NAVAL PERSONNEL ON BOARD FOR SURVEY. HE RECOUNTED THAT SECDEF HAD TENTATIVELY APPROVED US NAVY PLANS TO INSTALL US FACILITIES WITH QUICK EXPANSION CAPABILITIES, INCLUDING RUNWAYS, COMMUNICATIONS, DREDGING AND TANK FARM, BUT FINANCING NOT APPROVED. HE SUGGESTED THAT US TEAM COME TO LONDON FOR DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH ROYAL NAVY IN JAN/FEB. CINCUSNAVEUR WOULD BE US AGENT FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS. DESPITE FACT US PROJECT HAD NOT BEEN FINANCED, LARGELY BECAUSE OF VIETNAM REQUIREMENTS, HE FELT THAT NEVERTHELESS TIME WOULD BE WELL USED. ARTHUR SAID THAT GOVERNOR OF SYCHELLES AS GOVERNOR DESIGNATE OF BIOT, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED WITHIN PAST WEEK TO PROCEED TO ENACT LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING LAND ACQUISITION. THE INTENTION WAS TO BEGIN BUYING OPERATIONS IN JAN. KITCHEN INQUIRED WHETHER ROYAL NAVY INTEREST IN DIEGO GARCIA LIKELY TO REVIVE UNDER INFLUENCE OF US INTEREST.

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ARTHUR THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE CASE. ALTHOUGH INTEREST MAY REMAIN ESSENTIALLY MARGINAL FOR PERIOD OF NEXT FEW YEARS IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO INCREASE AFTER THAT. HE ADDED THAT MOST OFFICIALS IN WHITEHALL WERE CONVINCED THAT UK COULD NOT STAY IN SINGAPORE FOR MORE THAN A FEW YEARS.

*US thinks +
wants UK to
Jan 806*

C. ADEN. KITCHEN INQUIRED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF BRITISH RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION TO GET OUT OF ADEN AS OF JANUARY 1, 1968. ARTHUR INDICATED THAT JAN 1 WAS ONLY A PLANNING DATE AND THAT IN FACT DEPARTURE MIGHT BE DELAYED FOR A FEW MONTHS BUT THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO INCLINATION TO RECONSIDER BASIC DECISION. AS OF NOW IT IS FIRM UK INTENTION, "COME HELL OR HIGH WATER," TO GET OUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER INDEPENDENCE WAS ACHIEVED. IT WOULD TAKE EARTHQUAKE TO CHANGE THIS. IT WAS STILL A QUESTION

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-3- London 4060, November 16

WHETHER INDEPENDENCE COULD IN FACT BE ACHIEVED BY THAT DATE BUT PROBABILITY IS UK WOULD LOWER ITS STANDARDS RADICALLY AND GET OUT EVEN IF SITUATION WAS UNSTABLE AND IT LOOKED LIKE GOVT WOULD COLLAPSE THE NEXT DAY. KITCHEN NOTED WASH CONCERNS RE SITUATION IN MIDEAST AREA, ACCOMPANIED BY INCREASING SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA AND ALGERIA. HE FELT IT WOULD BE

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WORTH LOOKING VERY HARD AT UK'S DEFENSE REVIEW DECISION ON ADEN. ARTHUR SAID SOME ELEMENTS IN WHITEHALL WOULD WELCOME STRONG US REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, IN FEB 1965 WHEN UK HAD REVIEWED ITS DEFENSE REVIEW DECISIONS WITH US, US HAD ARGUED HARD AGAINST CUTS EITHER IN FAR EAST OR IN EUROPE BUT HAD "SCARCELY BATTED AN EYELASH OVER ADEN" THIS HAD NOT GONE UNOBSERVED. THERE WAS A FAIR AMOUNT OF FEELING IN WHITEHALL THAT DEFENSE REVIEW DECISIONS TO STAY EAST OF SUEZ BUT TO GET OUT OF MIDEAST HAD BEEN A MISTAKE, SINCE THERE WERE NO ALTERNATIVES TO UK PRESENCE IN MIDEAST WHILE EAST OF SUEZ UK PRESENCE MADE LITTLE MATERIAL DIFFERENCE. HOWEVER, US PRESSURES FOR UK TO STAY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN EUROPE CONTINUED AND BRITAIN "COULD NOT STAY EVERYWHERE." THEREFORE HE COULD HARDLY SEE MINISTERS GOING BACK ON ADEN DECISIONS. IF US WERE REALLY WORRIED ABOUT SITUATION THEY SHOULD TELL NASSER, WHOM WAS SOURCE OF THE TROUBLE IN SOUTH ARABIA, TO LAY OFF. THIS IS THE ANSWER THAT FONSEC WOULD GIVE TO ANY US REPRESENTATIONS. ARTHUR NOTED THAT BASIC PROBLEM IN BRITAIN WAS THAT ARABS, LIKE FRANCO, HAD NO FRIENDS OR LOBBY IN EITHER PARTY, WHILE BOTH EUROPEANS AND ASIANS DID.

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2. COMMENT: CONVERSATION FOLLOWED PRODUCTIVE SESSION BY US-UK TEAMS NEGOTIATING FINAL AGREEMENT FOR US ACCESS TO BIOT ISLANDS AND WAS FRANK AND FORTHRIGHT.

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