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**SECRET** ECJE-S 09254 REFERENCE: JCS 7229, J-5 SENDS,  
062239Z JUNE 67. SUBJECT: PROPOSED NAVAL FACILITY DIEGO  
GARCIA (S).

1. REFERENCE PART 1A: THIS HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERS IT DESIRABLE  
FOR THE US TO HAVE THE ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF AN UNENCUMBERED  
MILITARY AIRFIELD/PORT FACILITY AVAILABLE IN THE NORTHERN INDIAN  
OCEAN AREA. WE CANNOT COMMENT USEFULLY CONCERNING WHETHER THIS  
SHOULD BE DIEGO GARCIA VICE OTHER POSSIBLE LOCATIONS; HOWEVER,  
THE AVAILABILITY OF MILITARY FACILITIES IN THIS GENERAL AREA  
ENHANCES OUR POSTURE FOR RESPONDING TO CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS  
THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE-EAST/SOUTH ASIA AND MAY OFFER A FACILITY  
FOR ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO COVER THE GAP WHICH EXISTS IN THIS  
VAST AREA. THE REMOTE  
LOCATION OF THIS ISLAND IS OFFSET BY THE RELATIVE LACK OF  
POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED. CURRENT  
LIMITATIONS ON THE FLEXIBILITY AND SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONS IN  
THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL AREAS AND THE MIDDLE-EAST HIGHLIGHTS  
THE DESIRABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF ACCESS. CERTAINLY,  
THIS HEADQUARTERS WOULD RECOMMEND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY FACILITY  
IN A MANNER PROVIDING ENROUTE AND STAGING SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY  
FUNCTIONS OF ALL THE SERVICES.

2. REFERENCE PART 1B: WE DO NOT RECOMMEND THE US PROCEED WITH-  
OUT UK SHARING A REASONABLE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND

ACT...J5-7

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-8 J4-3 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9

ASD/IL-4 ASD/PA-1 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-6 CSSG-1

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OPERATING COSTS OF SUCH A FACILITY. PRESIMABLY THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR A BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA WOULD BE CREATED BY THE UK; THUS, THE CONTINUED UK PRESENCE IN THIS ENDEAVOR AND IN THE GENERAL INDIAN OCEAN AREA IS DESIRABLE FOR WELL KNOWN REASONS. THEIR TRADITIONAL INTEREST, INFLUENCE, AND POLITICAL TIES WITH THE AREA MAKE IT INCUMBENT UPON US NOT TO FACILITATE THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE AREA BY ASSUMING FULL US COSTING OF SUCH A FACILITY.

3. THIS HEADQUARTERS DEFERS TO OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR COMPREHENSIVE COMMAND ORIENTED RATIONALE OUTLINED IN PARA II OF REFERENCE. GP 4.

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