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COMMITTEE PRINT

SELECTED MATERIAL ON DIEGO GARCIA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE



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(III)

MEMORANDUM OF THE CHAIRMAN

To the Members of the Committee on Armed Services:

Senator Mansfield's Senate Resolution 160, disapproving of the construction at Diego Garcia, has been referred to this Committee. Our action must be completed by June 18, 1975.

At my request, the staff has prepared this document in an attempt to cover the issues, both pro and con, to assist the Committee in its deliberations. This is by no means an all inclusive document, but I think it fairly presents both sides of the story.

We will hold hearings on the subject and develop the arguments to the extent that time will allow.

Our action on this issue may greatly affect the future role of this Nation in international affairs, particularly in the Indian Ocean.

JOHN C. STENNIS, Chairman.

(1)

BACKGROUND

General

Diego Garcia is an atoll located within the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles due south of the tip of India. The heavily vegetated island consists of 6,700 acres with average elevations from three to seven feet. It is horseshoe-shaped with a forty mile perimeter. The enclosed lagoon is 5½ miles wide by 13 miles long, with depths ranging from 30 to 100 feet. Annual rainfall is approximately 100 inches. The island has no indigenous population.

Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago belong to a group of islands in the Indian Ocean, collectively known as the British Indian Ocean Territory over which the United Kingdom exercises sovereignty. The United States is specifically authorized to use Diego Garcia under the terms of two Agreements, executed on December 30, 1966, "to meet the needs of both Governments for defense," and on October 24, 1972, more specifically to agree "to the construction of a limited naval communications facility . . .".


History of U.S. Presence

The United States began negotiation with the British Government in 1966 for a lease to establish a communications station and an operational base on Diego Garcia. This base was to be an austere logistical support activity which would serve mainly as a refueling stop for units operating in the Indian Ocean. These negotiations were consummated in the 1966 Agreement mentioned above which granted the United States base rights for a period of 50 years with an option to renew for 20 years.

A request for the first increment of construction funds to provide the proposed logistical facility was submitted by the Navy to the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1970 construction request. This request was approved by the House and the Senate in the authorizing legislation. The House Appropriations Committee also approved the appropriation of funds for the facility, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not and the funding was deleted by the Appropriations conference. The arguments offered by the Senate Appropriation Committee for withholding Diego Garcia construction funds were essentially the same as they are today.

In Fiscal Year 1971, the Navy again asked for funds for Diego Garcia, but reduced the scope to a "limited communications facility." This request was approved by Congress and the construction for the communications facility is essentially complete.

(2)



INDIAN OCEAN AREA

Recent Legislative History

The Navy renewed its efforts to get Congressional approval to build a fleet support facility by requesting \$29 million in the Fiscal Year 1974 Supplemental Authorization Bill. The \$29 million would provide facilities with a capacity to support a carrier task force. The Supplemental request was approved by the House, disapproved by the Senate, and deferred without prejudice by the joint conferees, anticipating a more complete examination of the request with the Fiscal Year 1975 Bill.

The Fiscal Year 1975 Construction Authorization Bill as submitted by the Administration contained \$29 million for the Navy and \$3.3 million for the Air Force to construct the Diego Garcia logistical facility. The House Armed Services Committee approved the request as submitted and the Senate Armed Services Committee reduced the Navy authorization to \$14.8 million, left the Air Force authorization at \$3.3 million, and inserted qualifying language in its Committee Report as follows:

(Ref., p. 7, Senate Report No. 93-1136 accompanying H.R. 16136.)

After careful consideration of the many factors involved and thorough debate, the Committee approved \$14,802,000 as a first increment of the Navy's requirement, and the \$3.3 million requested by the Air Force.

At the same time, the Committee included Section 612 in the bill to preclude the obligation of any of these funds until the President of the United States has advised the Congress in writing that he has evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for these facilities and has certified that this construction is essential to the national interest. Such certification must be submitted to the Congress and approved by both Houses of Congress. This will assure the opportunity for full debate on the expansion at Diego Garcia as a policy matter, and in light of the most recent circumstances.

Because of the importance and complexity of the issues raised by Diego Garcia, the Committee felt that it was important for the new Administration to make a full reevaluation of this matter. It is the hope of the Committee that such an evaluation would include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interest in the area of the Indian Ocean.

The joint conference agreed to authorize \$14.8 million for the Navy and \$3.3 million for the Air Force with the following qualifying language which appears in Public Law 93-552:

SEC. 613. (a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act with respect to any construction project at Diego Garcia may be obligated unless—

(1) the President has (A) advised the Congress in writing that all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia have been evaluated by him, and (B) certified to the Congress in writing that the construction of any such project is essential to the national interest of the United States;

(2) 60 days of continuous session of the Congress have expired following the date on which certification with respect to such project is received by the Congress, and

(3) neither House of Congress has adopted, within such 60-day period, a resolution disapproving such project.

(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 60-day period.

(2) For purposes of this section, "resolution" means a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12.", the first and second blanks being filled with the name of the resolving House and the third blank being filled with the appropriate date.

(c) Subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section are enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the Senate in the case of resolutions described by subsection (b)(2) of this section; and they supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change such rules at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

(d) A resolution with respect to a proposed construction project of the island of Diego Garcia shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(e)(1) If the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate to which a resolution with respect to a proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia has been referred has not reported such resolution at the end of 20 calendar days after its introduction, not counting any day which is excluded under subsection (b)(1) of this section, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration of any other resolution introduced with respect to the same proposed construction project which has been referred to the committee, except that no motion to discharge shall be in order after the committee has reported a resolution of disapproval with respect to the same proposed construction project.

(2) A motion to discharge under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be made only by a Senator favoring the resolution, is privileged, and debate thereon shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution, the time to be divided in the Senate equally between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(f)(1) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consideration of a resolution shall be privileged. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(2) Debate in the Senate on a resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with a resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of a resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.

(4) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a resolution, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a resolution is in order in the Senate.

The joint conference of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees took the following action:

The conferees agreed to delete all funds specifically earmarked for the construction of facilities on Diego Garcia; however, that action was agreed upon with the clear understanding that if neither House adopts a resolution of disapproval, in accordance with the provisions of section 613 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975, for the construction of any facility requested for Diego Garcia, any construction funds available to the Navy and the Air Force in the appropriations act may be utilized by the Navy and the Air Force to carry out the construction project.

The Fiscal Year 1976 Military Construction Authorization request contains an additional \$13.8 million as the second increment of the Navy expansion effort. The Senate Armed Services Committee retained that authorization contingent upon the action taken by the Congress as required by the 1975 Military Construction Act.

On May 12, 1975, President Ford sent the certification required by the Fiscal Year 1975 Act. That certification reads as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with section 613(a)(1)(A) of the Military Construction Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-552), I have evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia. On the basis of this evaluation and in accordance with section 613(a)(1)(B), I hereby certify that the construction of such facilities is essential to the national interest of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 12, 1975.

On May 19, 1975, Senator Mansfield introduced Senate Resolution 160 disapproving the construction at Diego Garcia. This resolution was referred to the Armed Services Committee which has until June 18, 1975 to act on the Resolution in accordance with the provisions of the Fiscal Year 1975 Military Construction Act.

Administration's Request

Today Diego Garcia exists as a limited communications station. It has an 8,000 foot runway and a dredged turning basin in the lagoon to permit logistical support of the communications station. At the present time there are about 430 U.S. personnel regularly assigned to the communications site. The British maintain a contingent of approximately 20 military on the island representing the Government of the United Kingdom.

Listed below are the projects by Fiscal Year by sponsoring Service that the Department of Defense proposes for Diego Garcia:

<i>Service/Project</i>	<i>Fiscal year 1975</i>	<i>Cost in thousands</i>
Navy:		
POL storage (320,000 barrels)	\$5,492	
Pier	4,000	
Runway extension/parking apron	3,500	
Powerplant expansion	1,165	
Substation	292	
Subsistence building addition	393	
Subtotal	<u>14,802</u>	
Air Force:		
Aircraft parking area (25,000 sq yds)	1,000	
POL storage, JP-4 (160,000 barrels)	1,800	
Open ammunition protective storage	500	
Subtotal	<u>3,300</u>	
Total, fiscal year 1975	<u>18,102</u>	


Navy:	<i>Fiscal year 1976</i>	
POL storage (160,000)	1,530	
Powerplant expansion	1,254	
Aircraft parking apron/runway extension	1,173	
Hangar	572	
Operation building addition	265	
Airfield transit storage	160	
BEQ—277 men	4,325	
BOQ—32 men	1,550	
Ready issue ammunition magazine	251	
Cold storage	531	
General warehouse	713	
Receiver building addition	149	
Amphibious vehicle hardstand	46	
Aircraft arresting gear	245	
Utilities distribution system	927	
Radio and TV station	109	
Total, fiscal year 1976	<u>13,800</u>	

Fiscal year 1977

Navy: Various facilities ¹ (total, fiscal year 1977)	5,900
Grand total	<u>37,802</u>

¹ The precise facilities to be constructed have not been determined but for the most part they are troop support facilities (such as; chapel, club, recreational facilities, hobby shop, theater, library, etc.) that would be required to support the communications site even if there were no expansion.

In essence, the Administration would like for Diego Garcia to serve as an outpost base where ships may perform limited in-port upkeep, receive periodic repair services from a tender and receive critical supplies via Air Force airlift. Diego Garcia would also serve as a base for patrol aircraft providing air surveillance support to the ships in the Indian Ocean. This expansion in capability would increase the number of personnel permanently assigned to about 600.



The major planned improvements are:

(1) An anchorage which is capable of mooring a six-ship carrier task force. This will require lagoon dredging with the anchorage sized to permit ship to ship transfer of explosive ordnance.

(2) A fuel and general purpose pier capable of loading and unloading a 180,000 barrel tanker in 24 hours.

(3) Fuel storage capacity of 640,000 barrels. This storage is sufficient to support short notice deployment of forces in the Indian Ocean until a tanker pipeline independent of Middle East sources can be established; or support deployment of reinforcements in the event of hostilities until pipelines can be increased; and provide accessible fuel support to combat forces to accommodate unforeseen fluctuations in fuel availability. The capacity planned would sustain a typical Indian Ocean carrier task force for about 28 days. There is also some provision for Air Force contingency needs.

(4) Improvements to the existing runway which will permit aerial resupply for the task group, basing of patrol aircraft and recovery of tactical jet aircraft in emergencies. A 4,000-foot extension (providing a total runway length of 12,000 feet) will provide for the safe recovery of tactical jet aircraft under a range of adverse conditions and will accommodate KC-135 resupply and refueling aircraft.

(5) Aircraft maintenance capability to include a maintenance hangar, parking area, and an aircraft wash rack.

(6) Ammunition storage capacity to handle anti-submarine warfare and other ordnance as well as some open storage for contingency munitions.

(7) Additional aircraft parking apron to accommodate an additional C-141 (two can be accommodated now), four anti-submarine aircraft, one carrier command and control aircraft, and twenty carrier tactical aircraft. There will also be 25,000 square yards for Air Force contingencies.

(8) Other airfield improvements to include an addition to the operations building to handle the patrol mission, an air cargo transit shed and a fire station.

(9) Additions to the personnel support complex in the form of another 277-man bachelor enlisted quarters, a 32-man bachelor officer's quarters, and an addition to the dining facility.

(10) Additional general storage capability.

(11) Power plant expansion adding two 1200 KW diesel electric generators to accommodate the added load (there are five 1200 KW generators there now).

U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENT

As mentioned previously, the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia is specifically covered in two Agreements with the United Kingdom. The first, executed in 1966, is a general agreement that the U.S. may use the island for defense purposes. The 1972 agreement is quite specific on the scope and purpose of the limited communications station.

Negotiations were begun with the British in February 1974, to derive a new Agreement that would specifically cover the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. These negotiations resulted in agreed ad referendum texts of an exchange of notes that would supersede the Diego Garcia Agreement 1972, together with a supplementary exchange of letters concerning planned construction, and a service level implementing arrangement. Shortly after ad referendum agreement was reached, the Labor Party formed a new government in the United Kingdom. Following the completion of the British Defense Review on December 3, 1974, Mr. Roy Mason, United Kingdom Minister of Defense, as part of his statement before Parliament, said,

Given the effects of these decisions in the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet Naval presence there, we have decided to agree to proposals from the United States Government for a relatively modest expansion of the facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia which they enjoy, jointly with us, under an existing Agreement with Her Majesty's Government. Their use of the facilities other than for routine purposes would however be a matter of joint decision of the two Governments. We and the United States Government have also agreed to pursue consultations with the aim of developing realistic progress towards arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.

However, the ad referendum agreement has not been signed and probably will not be signed until the United States Congress completes action on this issue.

Position of Nations in the Indian Ocean Area

In hearings before the full Senate Armed Services Committee on March 12, 1974, Deputy Secretary Clements was asked by Senator Symington to provide for the record a "country-by-country analysis" of the position of the littoral nations regarding the proposed U.S. expansion of Diego Garcia. The results of that analysis follows:

LITTORAL AREA

Senator SYMINGTON. There are several things I would like to have submitted for the record for further study: The ports in the Indian Ocean that are available for the Soviets to operate from and those available to the Untied States, whether we use them or not. A country-by-country analysis of the littoral nations as to their relationship to the Soviets and the United States and their reaction to a substantial increase in United States and/or Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

Will you supply that for the record?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

To date there has been very little reaction to the Soviet Indian Ocean presence by any of the littoral states—either publicly or privately. One of the effects of recent U.S. activity in the area has been to draw attention of the littoral nations to the considerable Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and the realization that the United States was not the only major power whose interests are reflected in the form of military deployments, has served in a number of cases to temper the nature of the littoral response. The regional nations which care deeply about the issue are those most committed to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal. Otherwise, the reactions of the littoral states have been relatively mild. Many nations have remained essentially mute on the issue, either because they do not consider their own interests engaged or because they side strongly with one side or the other but wish to avoid antagonizing their World neighbors. The following country-by-country analysis was prepared by the Department of State and reflects as accurately as possible for the purposes of an open hearing the position each littoral nation has taken in response to U.S. naval deployments and the proposal to expand the facility at Diego Garcia.

SURVEY OF OPINION IN LITTORAL STATES TOWARD DIEGO GARCIA PROPOSAL

South Africa.—Balanced reporting in the press, occasional editorials welcoming the decision of the U.S. to maintain a presence there as long as the Soviet Union has decided to do so. Official reaction "welcomed the [U.S. decision] with satisfaction."

Malawi.—No significant press reports or editorials, official reaction was highly favorable.

Madagascar.—Press reporting has been on the whole negative, but has noted that it was the U.S. which moved after the Soviet presence became apparent. Officially, Diego Garcia was described as "purely a US/UK affair", but Madagascar felt it had to protest; it has "tried to be even-handed."

Tanzania.—Press reporting has been a bit negative, although mentioning Soviet presence. The GOT seeks an Indian Ocean "free of great power rivalry", but the highest level has told us privately it "understands" the U.S. position and implied sympathetic understanding.

Kenya.—Editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from great power arms races. The press has deplored expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities, but there has been no significant official reaction.

Somalia.—Press reporting has been critical, but restrained. Government reaction has been official silence.

Ethiopia.—No editorials, and very little press reporting, mostly of a factual, non-polemical quality. No official Ethiopian comment, but we have been told by a high official that the IEG shares our concern over Soviet expansion in the area.

Zambia.—No reactions, press or official.

Uganda.—No reaction, press or official.

Sudan.—No reaction, press or official.

Egypt.—No reaction, press or official.

Saudi Arabia.—No press reaction, comment from Embassy was that there was not likely to be any official reaction.

Yemen.—No press reaction; mid-level government reaction was confined to the one word "good."

Aden.—No press or official reaction.

Oman.—No public or official comment in Oman.

Abu Dhabi.—No public or private comment, but our Embassy reports that local attitudes were "relaxed and probably favorable."

Kuwait.—No public or private reaction to our Diego Garcia proposals.

Iran.—Press reaction has been balanced, but expressed the desire that a great power arms race in the area be avoided. There has been no official Iranian position, but our Embassy believes the GOI would not object unless pressed for a public position; if it were, it might have to express public regrets.

Pakistan.—Press reporting has been balanced. The GOP has supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone, but it worried about Soviet intentions, and taken no public position. Privately, it has welcomed our proposed presence.

Nepal.—No significant press reporting; a high Nepalese official described Diego Garcia as "not a live issue" to our Ambassador.

India.—Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Singh have been critical of the US Diego Garcia proposals, both publicly and privately. They have called for restraint by both the Soviet Union and the US, and strongly supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Press coverage has been more or less uniformly critical.

Bangladesh.—Press reaction has been critical, and Mujib has referred to Diego Garcia as "a threat to peace. Those who speak of world peace now build military bases in an area which should be a zone of peace." Our Embassy considered his and other official reaction to have been relatively mild and intended for public consumption, and said the GOBD has taken our Diego Garcia proposals in stride.

Burma.—There has been no significant press commentary, and given general Burmese reticence to discuss Indian Ocean matters, the Embassy does not expect any official position to emerge.

Ceylon.—Press reporting has been balanced, remarking on the Soviet presence, but has still been largely opposed. The GSL has told our Embassy they did not want to take a public stand, but have backed the Indian Ocean Peace Zone and feel committed to it. There has been an exchange of correspondence between the two governments in which Sri Lanka called for restraint and an avoidance of an arms race in the Indian Ocean.

Maldives.—Press and political reaction has been critical. Prime Minister Rangoolam has spoken out against the Diego Garcia proposals, saying Mauritius did not wish "nuclear warfare introduced into what should be a zone of peace."

Thailand.—Press reaction has been critical both of US Diego Garcia proposals and of the Thai involvement in them (use of Thai facilities for staging to Diego); official reaction has been ambivalent, with Diego described as "both good and bad." Thailand subscribes to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposals, but has told us that if the Russians are going to be there, the US should too.

Malaysia.—Press reaction has been unfavorable, GOM government officials have expressed regret at our proposals and reaffirmed that Malaysia subscribes to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

Singapore.—Press reaction has been balanced, but the Government of Singapore has expressed approval at the highest level.

Indonesia.—Press editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from rivalry among the Great Powers, and supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. The highest levels of government have told us they regretted our proposals to build a facility at Diego, but that as long as the Soviet Union was in the area, the U.S. should be too, and Indonesia had no objections.

Australia.—Press reaction has been largely critical, with some balanced exceptions. The Labor Government has been outspokenly critical, and offered to support any efforts by the new British Labor Government to halt the project. Only the minuscule Liberal Party has publicly supported Diego Garcia.

New Zealand.—Press reaction has been modest and balanced; both Prime Minister Kirk and other officials have told our Embassy they "understand" the U.S. position, and agree that the USSR cannot be left alone in the area, but subscribe to the principles of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

Following the President's certification on May 12, 1975, the State Department again canvassed its embassies with the following results:

Australia.—Unfavorable, but not strident; supports Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ); supports US-USSR talks on mutual restrain.

Bahrain.—Nothing specific, but generally supports IOPZ.

Bangladesh.—Unfavorable; supports IOPZ.

Burma.—No reaction.

Egypt.—Position against military bases in Indian Ocean only mentioned once, in communiqué after late May visit by Indian Foreign Minister.

Ethiopia.—Nothing since new government last September.

India.—Very unfavorable; strong support for IOPZ.

Indonesia.—Unfavorable, but moderate.

Iran.—Favorable, but qualified, i.e., since Soviets are there, U.S. should balance, but Shah wants littorals to assure regional security in longer term.

Kenya.—Balanced since does not single out U.S. or U.S.S.R. for criticism; pro-IOPZ

Kuwait.—Unfavorable, in context of IOPZ.

Malagasy Republic.—Unfavorable, pro-IOPZ.

Malaysia.—Unfavorable; pro-IOPZ.

Maldives.—Unknown; pro-IOPZ.

Mauritius.—Unfavorable; strongly pro-IOPZ.

Mozambique.—Unknown.

Oman.—None.

Pakistan.—Balanced; opposes foreign bases on its own territory, but says it is in no position to tell major powers what to do in Indian Ocean area.

Qatar.—No known public stance.

Saudia Arabia.—None known.

Singapore.—Balanced; wants no one to dominate area.

Somalia.—Sharply unfavorable, pro-IOPZ; usually subsumed under "imperialist threats."

South Africa.—None known.

Sri Lanka.—Unfavorable, but somewhat muted; IOPZ originator.

Sudan.—Unknown; assumed unfavorable.

Tanzania.—Unfavorable.

Thailand.—Unknown; new government has other problems; would probably be unfavorable.

United Arab Emirates.—None known.

Yemen Arab Republic.—None known; discreet silence.

Summary (29 countries)

Favorable—None.

Balanced—4 (Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, Singapore).

Unfavorable—12.

Unknown—13.

SECTION III

Letters for

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., February 16, 1974.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your January 29 request for additional information on the proposed expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia.

As you noted, the present facility on Diego Garcia was established to provide an important link in our worldwide naval communications system. Diego Garcia has proved its worth many times, most recently in providing necessary communications relay during the deployment of additional ships into the Indian Ocean area. The Diego Garcia communications facility was not, of course, designed to provide a capability for sustained logistics support for U.S. forces operating in that region.

However, changing circumstances now indicate that we should—in our interest—have the ability to operate routinely on a sustained basis in the Indian Ocean and its environs. The principal changes are:

the growing Soviet naval and air presence and capability in the region;

the probable opening of the Suez Canal permitting the Soviets the opportunity to augment their forces in the Indian Ocean from the Black Sea rather than from their Pacific Fleet, thereby saving about 18 days transit time; and

the re-emphasized importance of the concentration of critically important oil routes both around the Horn of the U.S. and to Europe as well as across the Indian Ocean to Japan.

Existing operations in the Indian Ocean must now be supported through rights obtained from littoral states or inefficiently from more distant locations. Inadequate support facilities now limit our ability to demonstrate national interest in this area through routine presence and operations.

We are convinced that it is imperative for the U.S. to maintain a balance in the Indian Ocean area vis-a-vis the Soviets. This balance will, among other things, signal the Soviets our intention to continue to play a role in the area, to stand by our friends, and to deter any threats to the shipping routes over which so much of the industrialized world's oil flows.

Regarding our projected or planned activity levels in the Indian Ocean for the next five to ten years, the answer depends in part on Soviet actions. At this time, we see a need to be able to augment our naval forces there somewhat more frequently than in the past in order

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to offset growing Soviet influence. Our presence is not to be tied to a narrow military mission, but rather, it is intended as tangible evidence of our interest—a mutual interest with our allies and the states of the region—in security and stability in the Indian Ocean.

In this context, we do not see expanding the Diego Garcia facilities as an event which drives our foreign policy. A more accurate view is that a perception of clear deficiencies in U.S. military capabilities in the region could cause us to lose political and diplomatic influence to the Soviets by default. Therefore, a support facility in the Indian Ocean is in response to our actual foreign policy needs rather than being a potential motivator of policy.

Without overstating our case, we believe the matter of developing the Diego Garcia communications facility into a capable yet relatively modest support complex carries a sufficient degree of urgency that it deserves being addressed as part of the FY 1974 Budget Readiness Supplemental. Hopefully, with prompt Congressional action we will be able to save some six to eight months time toward completing this effort—time which could be important, considering the likely opening soon of the Suez Canal. Proper authorizing legislation under the Military Construction Act will, of course, be sought.

The fact sheet enclosed with our earlier correspondence to your Committee contained a breakout of the currently proposed military construction task. Although not completely defined at this time, we do not envisage a need for a very large follow-on effort. For the most part it would be limited to some additional runway construction, added aircraft parking area, more capable command control communications to the facility, and other relatively austere personnel support facilities.

We have enclosed a statement covering detailed rationale on the need for deployments in the Indian Ocean and the expansion of Diego Garcia for your review. In addition, we would like to repeat our previous offer to provide you and your Committee with a detailed briefing on our plans.

Sincerely,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

Enclosure.

RATIONALE FOR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PROPOSED EXPANSION OF DIEGO GARCIA

Current U.S. naval deployments in the Indian Ocean are completely consistent with our policy of periodically augmenting the minimal permanent presence we have maintained in that area for over a generation. The most recent deployments have been prompted by the Soviet naval presence there and their ability to introduce additional forces quickly into the area. Broadly speaking, the Soviets have demonstrated an increased readiness to use military assistance and shows of force to influence events where major U.S. interests are at stake, and to project military power into distant areas, including the Indian Ocean, as Soviet naval forces and airlift capabilities have grown. With the probable opening of the Suez Canal in the next two years, a still greater Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean area, which includes the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, will be both possible and probable.

In our judgment, an adequate U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean provides a clear signal to the Soviets of our resolve to ensure a credible military capability there. We are confident that the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean will continue to have a salutary effect on the Soviets by underscoring our strategic mobility. We wish to emphasize that our deployments are not a threat to any nation or group of nations. In this connection, no specific tasks have been provided our forces except to maintain general operational proficiency while on station in the area. However, the presence of these forces assures us an adequate capability to meet contingency situations involving friendly governments on or near the Indian Ocean littoral, as well as offering a deterrent effect to potential harassment of significant international straits and sea lanes. These considerations have focused attention on the need for security and stability in the general area.

In sum, our capability to deploy a U.S. force into the Indian Ocean supports not only the U.S. national interest, but the interests of our closest friends and allies as well, since such a force provides a tangible reminder of our mutual interest in security and stability in the Indian Ocean. However, maintaining naval forces in the Indian Ocean is not without difficulty. The ships that have been recently deployed have come from the western Pacific. In view of the extended distances involved, it has been necessary to secure bunkering and limited facility support from friendly countries in the area. However, in looking ahead, if we wish to have the capability to move or maintain our ships in the area, development of more practical support facilities seems essential. An obvious solution is Diego Garcia, with some supplemental bunkering and aircraft landing rights elsewhere in the area.

Consequently, we intend to expand our communications facility on Diego Garcia to make it a useful and effective support facility for U.S. forces operating in the Indian Ocean area. This facility will be capable of providing support for a flexible range of activities including maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and enhanced communications. The current supplemental military appropriations budget now being presented to Congress contains a request for \$29 million to improve support facilities on Diego Garcia. Specific projects we have in mind are increased fuel storage capacity, deepening of the lagoon to provide an anchorage, lengthening the existing 8000-foot runway, and expanding the airfield parking area, in addition to certain improvements to our existing communications facility and construction of additional personnel quarters.

As you may recall, in 1965 the British constituted a number of Indian Ocean islands under their control into what is known as the British Indian Ocean Territory. By an exchange of notes on December 30, 1966, the U.S. and UK agreed that these islands would be available for the defense purposes of both governments, initially for a period of 50 years. Under the terms of this arrangement, both governments agreed in principle in December of 1970 to the establishment of a communications facility on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago. Current plans to develop expanded logistics support facilities at Diego Garcia, available for the use of both U.S. and British forces, are in complete accord with the intent and basic philosophy set forth in the

original 1966 Agreement. We will be operating from what will, in fact, be a self-sustained facility on British sovereign territory in the outer reaches of the Indian Ocean with minimal political or military visibility. Thus we believe that to assure our continued ability to deploy U.S. forces into the Indian Ocean area, the facilities we now propose at Diego Garcia are essential.

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
November 26, 1974.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U. S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further expansion of our telephone conversation of noon today.

As you recall, when I discussed Diego Garcia with you in your office in September, I had offered the following points:

The Indian Ocean is an all weather transit route for the Soviet Navy between European and Asiatic Fleets, therefore we can expect the Soviet Navy to be in the Indian Ocean regardless of U.S. Navy presence.

The oil routes from the Persian Gulf to the United States and our allies in Western Europe and Japan run through the Indian Ocean. A periodic U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean will be required, both to protect those supply routes in the event of hostilities, and to demonstrate to our friends in the Middle East, evidence of United States interest and support.

The naval base facility on Diego Garcia will be only a replenishment stop intended to support task groups in the Indian Ocean when the President determines naval forces should be deployed there.

There will be no combat forces permanently based on Diego Garcia.

Without Diego Garcia, U.S. Navy Task Groups in the Indian Ocean will have to be supported from Subic Bay which is over 5,000 miles from the Persian Gulf.

Diego Garcia will not require additional U.S. Navy forces but, in fact, will compensate for programmed reductions in force levels.

The Navy has proposed to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia, originally intended solely to support the Naval Communications Station there. The expanded facilities are for the purpose of providing logistic support to a naval task force. The total cost of these modest improvements to, and expansion of, the currently available facilities, amounts to \$28.6M. We have proposed to fund these projects in two years: \$14.8M in FY 1975 and \$13.8M in FY 1976. The amount for FY 1976 varies from the \$12.1M provided to you earlier because of cost escalation. A breakout of the principal items in this plan, with the associated costs is included in the enclosure.

In addition, the U.S. Air Force has requested \$3.3M in FY 1975 for projects which would improve the capability of the airfield at Diego Garcia to handle logistics cargo aircraft. The total amounts of Navy and Air Force funds being requested in FY 75 and FY 76

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for facilities at Diego Garcia, to improve its capacity for fleet support is \$31.9M.

Incident to the foregoing proposal to fund the fleet support facilities in FY 75 and FY 76, \$6.9M of previously programmed improvements to the communications facilities has been slipped to the FY 77 program.

Other than the \$28.6M in FY 75 and FY 76 proposed for the fleet logistic support function, and \$6.9M programmed for FY 77 for improvements in the original communications facility, the Navy has no plans for future Milcon programs for Diego Garcia.

Sincerely,

J. L. HOLLOWAY III,
Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Enclosure.

Restructured Diego Garcia development plan		<i>Thousands</i>
Fiscal year 1975:		
POL storage (320,000 barrels)	\$5,492	
Pier	4,000	
Runway extension/aircraft parking apron	3,500	
Powerplant expansion (phase I)	1,165	
Substation	252	
Subsistence building addition	393	
Subtotal		14,802
Fiscal year 1976 (cost estimates have been escalated from earlier total of \$12.1M to new total of \$13.8M):		
POL storage (160,000 barrels)	1,530	
Powerplant expansion (phase II)	1,254	
Aircraft parking apron/runway extension	1,173	
Hangar	572	
Operations building addition	265	
Airfield transit storage	160	
BEQ—277 men	4,325	
BOQ—32 men	1,550	
Ready issue ammunition magazine	251	
Cold storage	531	
General warehouse	713	
Receiver building addition	149	
Amphibious vehicle repair hardstand	46	
Aircraft arresting gear	245	
Utilities distribution system	927	
Armed Forces radio and television station	109	
Subtotal		13,800
Total		28,602

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR JOHN: Knowing of your personal concern for the adequacy of our defense posture, I am writing to express my views on the necessity of going forward with a modest expansion of the naval support facility on Diego Garcia.

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is, I believe, clear. Not only is it an important crossroads of maritime activity, but it is, as well, key to our ability to demonstrate our support for allies in the region and to protect U.S. interests there. As you know, we have maintained a military presence in the Indian Ocean for more than twenty years. In recent times, as the presence of other Western countries in the area has been altered and the resource potential of the area has become more important, we have been conducting more frequent naval deployments in the Indian Ocean.

The level of funding requested and the nature of intended improvements are in keeping with the limited character of our operations. The expenditures are further justified as measures which will shorten the length of the supply line and reduce the strains which our deployments could place on our limited logistical support resources in the Pacific. It is also important to recognize that construction of expanded facilities on Diego Garcia does not imply a significant new increase in the U.S. military presence in the area.

I know that you recognize the importance of this proposal and am confident that I can count on your support to resist any efforts to reduce the funding to carry it out or to restrict otherwise my latitude to do so.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

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THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 23, 1975.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 13, the President sent to the Congress a message concerning his determination, in accordance with Section 613(a)(1)(A) of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975, that the construction of United States facilities on Diego Garcia is essential to the national interest of the United States.

I am pleased to transmit to you today the attached supporting justification which has also been approved by the President. I hope it will be of assistance to the Senate in its consideration of this important legislation.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF,
Assistant to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIMITED SUPPORT FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA

In 1966, the United States signed an agreement with the British Government providing that the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory would be available for 50 years to meet the defense purposes of both governments. In this context, we concluded in 1972 an Administrative Agreement providing for the establishment of a limited communications station on the small atoll of Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean. In February 1974, an agreement was negotiated *ad referendum* to replace the 1972 agreements and to provide for the construction and operation of a proposed support facility. The British Government announced in December 1974 its agreement with our proposal to expand the facility.

The United States has an important interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean area. In particular, the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf area is essential to the economic well-being of modern industrial societies. It is essential that the United States maintain and periodically demonstrate a capability to operate military forces in the Indian Ocean. Such exercise of our right to navigate freely on the high seas communicates to others the importance we attach to the stability of the region and to continued free access by all nations.

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The credibility of any US military presence ultimately depends on the ability of our forces to function efficiently and effectively in a wide range of circumstances. Currently, the US logistics facility closest to the western Indian Ocean is in the Philippines, 4,000 miles away. At a time when access to regional fuel supplies and other support is subject to the uncertainties of political developments, the establishment of modest support facilities on Diego Garcia is essential to insure the proper flexibility and responsiveness of US forces to national requirements in a variety of possible contingencies. The alternative would be an inefficient and costly increase in naval tankers and other mobile logistics forces.

Objections have been raised to this proposal on the grounds that it will prompt an increase in the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and give rise to an arms race in the region. Clearly, both we and the Soviets are aware of the military presence of other nations, but it would be incorrect to assume that Soviet actions are determined exclusively by the level or nature of our force presence. The growth of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 to the present can most convincingly be ascribed to the pursuit of their own national interests—including the continuing expansion of the Soviet Navy in a global "blue water" role—rather than to US force presence as such.

A distinction must also be drawn between facilities and force presence. The proposed construction on Diego Garcia would enhance our capability to provide support to US forces operating in the Indian Ocean. However, there is no intent to permanently station operational units there, and the installation would not imply an increase in the level of US forces deployed to that region. We have, on several occasions, expressed our willingness to consider constructive proposals for arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, but we do not believe that construction on Diego Garcia should be contingent upon the outcome of discussions on such proposals. In our view, these are two separate issues.

The Diego Garcia proposal has been criticized by a number of regional states which favor the concept of a special legal regime limiting the presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean, as expressed in the several Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions adopted in the United Nations General Assembly. United States policy has consistently been to oppose measures that would constitute an unacceptable departure from customary international law concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas.

We are aware of the concern expressed by some states of the region, but we do not share their conviction that the construction of support facilities on Diego Garcia will result in an arms race or that these facilities will somehow represent a threat to their interests. On the contrary, it is our belief that such facilities will contribute to the maintenance of healthy balance essential to the preservation of regional security and stability. It is our considered judgment that the legitimate differences in perspective between ourselves and certain other nations with respect to Diego Garcia are susceptible to reasoned discussion within a framework of mutual respect and need not inhibit the development of satisfactory relations with the states of the region.

SECTION IV

Articles For

THE SOVIET NAVY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

(By Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell)

(The authors.—Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell is Director of Research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. He has taught at the University of Pennsylvania and the National War College. His papers and books have been widely published. Dr. Cottrell's article, "The Political Balance in the Persian Gulf," appeared in the Winter 1974 issue of "Strategic Review".

*(Mr. R. M. Burrell was educated at the Universities of St. Andrews and London. He has traveled widely in the Middle East since 1963 and in 1970 was appointed as lecturer in the Contemporary History of the Near and Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He is the author of *The Persian Gulf* which was the first of the Washington Papers issued by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1972. He was co-editor with Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell of *The Indian Ocean: Its Political Economic and Military Importance* published by Praeger in 1972.)*

IN BRIEF

Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean is the extension of an old Czarist thrust for an outlet to the south, dating from the time of Peter the Great. That interest is overlaid with the ideological drive for a worldwide Soviet hegemony. Increasing Soviet military power and decline of the European powers impel the present Soviet drive to replace Britain as the dominant power in the littoral states. Soviet naval power has been aggressive in grasping the opportunity. In Iraq, in Bangladesh, in South Yemen and in the Somali Republic, Soviet base-building has been active. Reopening of the Suez Canal will greatly benefit the Soviet naval presence, both military and commercial. Soviet dominance serves both to protect its own interests in the area and to threaten the vital oil suppliers of Europe and the United States. In extension to Africa, the Soviet build-up threatens to outflank Europe. Because the littoral states are accustomed to a Great Power presence, the United States is called to provide a balancing naval presence to reassure friendly powers and discourage Soviet-inspired expansion.

Analysts of Soviet global policy often distinguish between the long-term and short-term horizons. The short-term aim is the reduction of Western political, economic and military influence wherever it exists, leading, in the medium-term, to its elimination and, finally, to the institution of exclusive Soviet hegemony. This framework of analysis is useful, but on some occasions its use can blind us to other important aspects of Soviet activity. The Kremlin's ultimate objective is stated above and is immutable—the creation of a world under Soviet paramountcy.

To gain this objective the USSR will use many techniques and the flexibility of Soviet tactics is too often ignored. Perhaps the greatest change in this respect in the last decade has been the creation of a powerful oceangoing navy and its use for a whole spectrum of political objectives. The creation of a Soviet Navy has presented the Kremlin with new opportunities, and the Soviet leadership has shown little reluctance to use them. This new dimension of Soviet power is nowhere more evident than in the Indian Ocean basin.

Many writers have commented upon the historical continuity between Soviet and Czarist imperialism.¹ The drive for warm water ports and an outlet to the great oceans of the world can be traced back to the days of Peter the Great and Catherine. At the time of the Russo-German talks of November 1940, Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, made it a condition of Soviet adherence to the four-power pact that the area south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf be recognized as a center of Soviet aspirations. At the same time Stalin gained Italian and German support for the abolition of controls on the passage of Soviet vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, i.e., for the abrogation of the 1938 Montreux Convention. In October 1944 during the Yalta talks Stalin demanded the right to establish Soviet bases on the Bosphorus but this was refused. Soviet pressure on both Iran and Turkey was renewed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in the hope of extracting territorial concessions.

The parallel between Soviet and Czarist policies was not limited to their objectives. They also shared a similarity of method in the move to increase political influence in areas contiguous to the Russian heartland. The expansionist drive was then a continental and *not* an oceanic one. The USSR had come out of the Second World War as the world's strongest land power and was determined not to lose this position. The Czarist legacy lingered on in the modes of execution as well as in the horizons of ambition.

The first signs of change came after Stalin's death in the mid-1950s when Moscow began to develop its influence in countries beyond the borderlands of the Soviet Union. It is true that there had been such attempts before—the first treaty of friendship and commerce that the USSR signed with an Arab country was that between the Soviet Union and the Yemen in November 1928—but these were isolated opportunistic events, unsupported by a consistent policy and rendered ineffective by the internal weaknesses and preoccupations of Russia in the interwar period.

The real push overseas—in the literal sense of that word—did not begin until the mid-1950s and was not to become dynamic until a decade later. The circumstances which enabled the USSR to take this radically different approach were many—the gradual ebb of European empires was certainly one factor and the peace orientation of the West was another; but a more important one was the Soviet naval expansion which developed an effective surface naval presence capable of projecting itself to any quarter of the globe. In short, the Soviets always had access to "warm water" but they did not have the requisite naval capability to utilize this access. It was this fundamental change in the configuration of Soviet military power which enabled the Kremlin to pursue aims which had long been sought—and for which the will had long been present—but for which the means had hitherto been lacking. This change in the role of the Soviet surface fleet from being primarily, indeed a most exclusively, a defender of the homeland to that of becoming an important instrument of Soviet global diplomacy is perhaps the most significant change in the equation of East/West relations that has occurred since the Soviet Union became a nuclear power;² for now that the Soviet leadership can hope to achieve sustained influence beyond its continental confines, it can further advance the long-established objective of securing global political hegemony.

Indian Ocean Intrusion

The Soviet willingness to use naval power has now been revealed on a global scale, from the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the South Pacific; but the most remarkable change occurred in the area of the Indian Ocean, for so long regarded as a British lake. There is evidence that the presence of the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean formerly had an inhibiting effect on Soviet policymakers, but this factor must not be overstressed, for the speed with which the Soviets moved a fleet into the Indian Ocean after the announcement of British military withdrawal is a clear indication of prior planning and decision-making.

Before 1968 Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean had been confined to the regular oceanographic expeditions which had begun in 1955 and 1956. About two months following the announcement of Britain's intention to withdraw,

¹ See for example: Ben-Cion Finoluk, "Soviet Penetration into the Middle East in Historical Perspective" in M. Confino and S. Shamir, eds., *The USSR and the Middle East*, Jerusalem, 1973; and S. Page, *The USSR and Arabia*, London, 1972.

² On the details of this change see N. Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the Seventies*, New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1972.

however, a small Soviet "flag-showing" force entered the Indian Ocean.³ This force included a light cruiser, a guided missile frigate and a guided missile destroyer supported by a fleet oiler and a merchant tanker. This flotilla came from the Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok, and during their four-month cruise they called at Madras and Bombay, Karachi, Colombo, Basra and Umm Qar in Iraq, the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea, and Mogadishu in Somalia. Two further cruises, of smaller scope, were made in 1968. From the spring of 1969 the Soviets have maintained a permanent surface naval vessel presence in the Indian Ocean. A further development occurred in 1969 when ships from the Soviet Pacific and Black Sea Fleets united for the first time and conducted joint maneuvers in the Indian Ocean. By the end of 1969 Soviet vessels had visited nearly twenty ports in the Ocean. At the time of this writing, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean numbers some thirty ships, of which just under half are combatants.

In the early stages of Soviet penetration, the presence was believed by some Western observers to have been designed to counter the presence of American A-3 Polaris submarines in the area. This presence has never been admitted by the U.S. authorities and thus much of the discussion of the deployment of Polaris submarines is based on nothing more than speculation and conjecture.

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has frequently included ships with an antisubmarine warfare capability, but the purposes which the Soviet presence has tended to serve offers little support for the view that this was a fundamental reason for their presence. Even many of those who accept the Polaris thesis, i.e., that the Soviet presence was in response to Polaris, also argue that the Soviet presence is primarily political. The essence of sea power lies in its flexibility and the Soviets have exploited this fact to the full—they have, in fact, learned the lesson which the Greek Themistocles taught nearly two and a half millenia ago—"He who has command of the sea has command of everything." The pride which the Soviets have taken in their Indian Ocean naval presence has been made clear on several occasions but nowhere more plainly than in the interview with Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, the Naval Commander in Chief, entitled, "On Ocean Watch," which was printed in *Pravda* on July 29, 1973—Soviet Naval Day, (and excerpted in "Strategic Review," Winter 1974). After commenting on the increased importance attaching to the Navy in the Soviet Armed Forces, Gorshkov went on: "Ocean voyages and long distance cruises have become everyday activities for the Navy. This year many dozens of submarines and surface ships have graduated from the school of long distance cruises. The cruiser *Admiral Senyavin*, and the destroyer *Skrynnyy*, have thousands of miles of sailing in the Indian Ocean behind them."⁴ Admiral Gorshkov went on to discuss the increasing number of port visits made by Soviet ships and the task which the Navy was fulfilling in strengthening friendships between the USSR and foreign states.

Political Effects

The role of navies in cementing political ties is an old one. Oliver Cromwell, remembered primarily for his land battles during the English Civil War, is reported to have believed that "a man of war [i.e., an armed vessel] is the best ambassador," but it seems doubtful whether navies can actually create political ties. What navies can most certainly do is to strengthen ties and show tangible commitment to an ally. This aspect was well illustrated in Iraq during 1972. In the early months of that year the government in Baghdad felt politically isolated in the Arab world and believed that it needed external support before it proceeded with its long-sought aim of nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company. The Baathist government was convinced that nationalization would precipitate active Western intervention against the regime. In February 1972 Saddam Hussein Takriti, the Vice Chairman of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council, went to Moscow and reportedly spoke of Iraq's wish for "a solid strategic alliance with the USSR." The Soviet leadership welcomed the delegation warmly and was quick to seize the opportunity which was offered. Iraq's potential economic wealth, her oil supplies, her strategic location and increasing problems with Egypt after the death of Nasser were all factors which influenced Moscow's decision; so too was the recent loss of Soviet influence in the Sudan and the fact that by building up a major presence in Iraq, pressure could be put on Iran and Turkey to modify their pro-Western stance.

³ R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Iran, the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean*, New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., September 1972. See also Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Political Balance in the Persian Gulf," *Strategic Review*, Vol. II, No. 1, Winter 1974, Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, pp. 32-38.

⁴ Translation available in *Strategic Review*, Vol. II, No. 1, Winter 1974, Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, pp. 105-106.

For Moscow then the attractions of an alliance with Iraq were very great. On April 6, 1972, Premier Kosygin visited Baghdad and two days later signed the fifteen-year Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. On April 11th, a Soviet naval squadron arrived at Umm Qasr, the Iraqi port at the head of the Persian Gulf, for a six-day visit. In this way the USSR was able to demonstrate immediately and effectively its degree of commitment to Iraq and to indicate the value which it placed upon that country's friendship. This naval visit was even more influential than might have been expected, for Iraq's Navy is very small, while that of her neighbor Iran—with which relations were very bad—was growing rapidly. To Baghdad, therefore, the presence of the Soviet ships was a welcome sign of support and reassurance, and indeed of warning to Iran.

The local context of power is all-important in any discussion of the value and effectiveness of a naval presence. The Indian Ocean has, for nearly five centuries, been accustomed to the presence of outside navies—Portuguese, Dutch, French or British. The idea of an external naval presence is, therefore, nothing new and consequently requires little in the way of justification. Although much publicity has been given to the idea, first mooted by the Sri Lanka government, of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, free of great power naval presence, the littoral countries of the Ocean have in fact been accustomed to the presence of foreign ships in its waters and have come to accept the existence of these ships. The Soviet intrusion into the Indian Ocean—while new in terms of its geographic origin—is therefore for the littoral states a repetition of the previous historical pattern; as one European navy (the British) begins to withdraw, another (the Russian) comes to take its place. To some of the littoral states this new Soviet presence seems part of an established continuum, and Soviet protestations that the purpose of its Navy is purely peaceful and designed to preserve the status quo can thus appear to take on an aura of reality. The ease with which the local justification for a naval presence can be achieved is a major asset in the deployment of naval force and the Soviet Union has been quick to capitalize upon the Indian Ocean area's memory of external powers having a naval presence in its waters.

The historic existence of naval power in the region has had other advantages for the USSR too; for the mere presence of a vessel can sometimes be cited as the reason for the occurrence of certain events when, in fact, other factors were really the decisive ones. That the "mythical" effect of naval presence can be profitable for Moscow was shown in 1969 in Libya when the USSR claimed that the presence of its warships offshore was responsible for preventing a Western-supported royalist counter-coup. The myth again was widely disseminated—and quite widely believed—in the Arab world.

An example of real, as opposed to fictitious, Soviet support for an ally occurred in the aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war when Soviet vessels were sent to Bangladesh, at that country's request, for mine-clearing operations. The Soviet vessels were based in Chittagong and although they departed this summer (1974) they were there sufficiently long to have swept mines from the entire Bay of Bengal, not merely the approaches to Chittagong harbor and the Ganges delta. At the end of June 1974 there were reports that Soviet vessels entered the Red Sea to assist with the clearing of mines from the Straits of Jubal at the southern end of the Gulf of Suez. The importance of a permanent Soviet naval presence in such an area needs little comment. Also, the Soviet helicopter carrier, *Leningrad*, has made a first trip to the area and is now deployed in the northwestern sector of the Indian Ocean.

The fact that Soviet vessels are capable of undertaking these sorts of tasks gives the Soviet Union both further opportunities for involvement in the affairs of the Indian Ocean states and the justification for a peacetime presence. The acceptance of such a peacetime presence can make it even easier to justify an increased number of vessels at a time of impending or actual crisis. In these ways, the misgivings of the littoral states can be assuaged and the presence of a permanent Soviet fleet be made to appear natural, and indeed in the interests of these states. By entering quietly, by building up a presence gradually, and by performing tasks for which it will be appreciated, the Soviet Union has already begun to establish a favorable basis from which its presence could easily—and without serious political risk—be expanded. The U.S. policy of rapidly putting more ships into the Indian Ocean at a time of crisis—as happened in 1971 and 1973—has no such advantages. The expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia probably would not have provoked public political complaint had Washington shown a more consistent attitude to the level of its forces in the region.

Base Building

The Soviets have been very careful in planning their Indian Ocean policy to make sure that the logistical infrastructure they have established is capable of supporting a much greater naval presence than the one which is currently maintained.⁵ They have laid the groundwork already for a very rapid expansion of their forces, even without the Suez Canal being available to them. The chain of supply points, deep sea mooring buoys and fleet anchorages which have been established around the whole western and eastern coastlines of Africa is impressive and complete. The presence of a refueling task force off Conakry in Guinea is ample proof that the Soviets do not need the excuse of a pre-existent Western presence before they move into an area; and comforting delusions about mutual forbearance should be banished from the minds of Western policy-makers without delay. The Soviet Navy has mooring buoys off the Seychelles, Mauritius and in the Chagos Archipelago as well as both north and south of Sokotra.⁶ Port Louis in Mauritius is used for fleet supply purposes and Soviet vessels have also made regular calls at Fernando Po and Conakry in West Africa. (The acquisition of permanent facilities in West Africa would, of course, also help Soviet support for Cuba and aid Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean.)

In June 1974 Mr. Frank Judd, the British Minister responsible for the Royal Navy, said in Nairobi that the Soviet naval build-up was causing concern to the British government, for it began to appear that the USSR had aims well beyond those of parity with the other major sea powers of the world. The purpose of that expansion is something that the West should question.

In that same speech Mr. Judd praised the work of the Royal Navy's Beira patrol—the small British presence in the Mozambique Channel which is designed to prevent oil supplies from reaching Rhodesia. If the British were to declare that they could—or would—no longer maintain that presence (whose efficacy can indeed be questioned), there is little doubt that Moscow would immediately offer its ships in the service of the U.N. resolutions and so gain still further "respectability" among the littoral states. The mere presence of a few ships of the right type here provides the USSR with an opportunity to exercise pressure on the West by restricting its options—while the offer of their use in the avowed "interests" of the littoral states helps to foster the acceptability of the Soviet presence.

Although the Kremlin has made plans to support its Indian Ocean naval presence by supplies directed via the Cape route, there is much evidence to suggest that the real Soviet interest lies in the reopening of the Suez Canal route. The advantages are immediately obvious on looking at the map. To reach the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Northern Fleet based at Severomorsk in the Kola Peninsula must steam 11,200 miles if the Cape route is used, but only 7,300 miles if the Suez route is open. For the Baltic Fleet based at Leningrad, the distance is 10,800 miles via the Cape and 6,900 miles via Suez. The really startling difference occurs with the Black Sea Fleet based at Novorossiysk. The Cape route distance is 10,400 miles; the direct route, across the Eastern Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, is only 3,300 miles—a reduction of nearly 70 per cent.⁷ The opening of the Suez Canal would give the Soviet Navy the advantage of being able to increase its Indian Ocean presence very rapidly, for transit times would be cut drastically. Without deploying any more ships than are used at the moment the opening of the Suez Canal will give the Soviets the flexibility to increase very substantially their Indian Ocean presence almost immediately.

The Soviet interest in the Suez route has been indicated by the Soviet military and naval thrust in the region. Though the Canal has been closed, the Kremlin has taken particular care since 1967 to maintain its interests in ports in the Red Sea and around the Horn of Africa.⁸ Soviet military and economic aid to the Yemen was, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, used to improve the facilities at and to deepen the approaches to, and the roadsteads of, the port of Hodeida. When the British withdrew from what is now the People's Democratic Republic of the South Yemen (PDRY), Soviet technicians provided assistance with the management of the harbor facilities at both Aden and Mukalla. Current Soviet military aid to PDRY is believed to exceed \$40 million per annum.

⁵ See *Means of Measuring Soviet Naval Power with Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean*, Subcommittee on the Near East and Southeast Asia, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 12.

⁶ See Statement by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt before Committee on Foreign Affairs (Subcommittee on the Near East and Southeast Asia), U.S. House of Representatives, March 20, 1974.

⁷ See map, page 42, in Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Subcommittee on the Near East and Southeast Asia), U.S. House of Representatives, February 21, March 6, 12, 14, and 20, 1974.

⁸ See M. Abir, *Red Sea Politics*, Adelphi Paper No. 93, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1972.

Across the Red Sea in the Somali Republic, port facilities at Berbera have been developed by the USSR to allow for the accommodation of vessels up to 12,000 tons. (The Somali Republic's Navy, it should be noted, consists of ten motor torpedo boats manned by a total of 300 men, so the facilities are scarcely for local use.) SAM missiles have been installed to defend the port, and in 1972 a Soviet communications station was erected there. Facilities were further improved by the building of more than a dozen oil storage tanks at Berbera. Air facilities in Somalia would certainly assist the USSR in both air surveillance and fleet support operations and the Soviets are currently engaged in building a new military air facility at Mogadishu. To all intents and purposes the Soviet Union has base facilities on a major scale in Somalia. In fact, it may be said that the Soviets will have as good, if not better, facilities in Somalia than the United States will have in Diego Garcia even after the use of the additional funds which both the Houses of Congress approved in September. The original request of \$29 million has been reduced by about \$11 million as the Bill goes for final consideration by the Senate-House Conference. This sum should permit the U.S. Navy to enhance the value of Diego Garcia by an appreciable extent. The opening of the Suez Canal would doubtless see yet more Soviet deployment in the area. The Soviet air forces also use the former British airfield near Aden.

Those writers who point out that the U.S. Sixth Fleet would also gain proximity advantages by the opening of the Suez Canal should note that the present draught of the Canal is only thirty-eight feet. That limitation and the tightness of some of the Canal curves would prevent the major fighting vessels of the Sixth Fleet—aircraft carriers of the *Enterprise* and *Forrestal* classes—from making passage from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. (No Soviet vessel, however, including the new 40,000 ton *Kiev* aircraft carrier, is too large to sail through the Canal.)⁹

Commercial Penetration

Soviet commercial use of the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean is also a factor worthy of consideration.¹⁰ In the pre-closure period (1960–66) the USSR was the second fastest growing user of the Suez Canal—Japan being the first. By 1966 the Soviets were seventh in the table of users with over ten million tons of Russian shipping transiting the Canal in the last full year of its operation. The Soviet petroleum trade was, unlike all the other oil trade, a southbound flow from the Black Sea oil ports to North Vietnam and other Asian countries. The recent oil deals with India would be much easier in terms of delivery for the USSR if Suez were to be reopened. Soviet general cargo vessels also made much use of the Canal, particularly to South and Southeast Asia. When the Canal is reopened, the size of the Soviet merchant fleet will be effectively and immediately increased substantially and the prospect of greater competition with Western shipping lines will become even more acute. It is, of course, also possible that Soviet shipping will be able to use the Suez Canal free of charge by off-setting Canal dues against Egypt's huge debt to the USSR.

Soviet merchant shipping development has followed closely the pattern of naval growth—newer and better ships in larger numbers. The USSR already has the third largest merchant fleet in the world and ranks sixth in terms of carrying capacity.¹¹ The Soviet vessels are, generally speaking, smaller in size than those being built by Western shippers but this gives the Soviets greater flexibility in trade with many of the smaller and less well-equipped ports of Africa and Asia. The development of larger ships has not, however, been ignored by the Soviet Union. *Pravda* carried a report on August 26, 1973 that the 180,000 ton tanker, *Crimea*, was nearing completion at the Kerch shipyard and the January 1974 issue of *Soviet Military Review* carried a description and a drawing of a 370,000 ton tanker currently being built.

Soviet Oil Posture

The existence of these ships provides an interesting indication of the future of the Soviet oil trade.¹² In the past the USSR has striven to maintain an autarchic position with regard to petroleum supplies and has also endeavored to supply almost all the oil needs of its satellites, including Cuba and North Korea. The

⁹ For a discussion of the Soviet aircraft carrier *Kiev* see: R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 2, No. 22, November 1, 1973.

¹⁰ See G. S. Sick, "The USSR and the Suez Canal Closure", *Miran*, London: 1968, pp. 91–98.

¹¹ M. Pelmar, op. cit.

¹² See: A. Wolynski, "Soviet Oil Policy" in *Soviet Objectives in the Middle East*, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict; and R. M. Burrell, "The Soviet Union and Middle Eastern Oil," *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 2, No. 1 and Vol. 2, No. 2, 1973.

maintenance of exports to the West has also played a large role in Soviet policy; oil has been the Soviet Union's largest single source of hard currency for several years, and oil has also been used as a means of gaining entry to African and Asian trade. The major problem for the Soviet Union is that her older oil fields in the Caucasus and Volga region are now drying up and the emphasis is shifting to the Eastern Siberian fields. The problem with these is that they are difficult and expensive fields to develop and Soviet oil technology is backward. That is why the Russians are interested in getting American and Japanese firms to provide the capital and expertise to develop these areas. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European states are using more oil—even though they are still primarily pre-automobile economies—and the pressure on supplies is beginning to become serious. Soviet crude oil production in 1972 fell short of its planned level and the rate of increase in output was one of the lowest for any years since the end of the Second World War.

Shortages are therefore developing—the USSR warned its Comecon partners over seven years ago that they would need to look for external supplies and they have been doing so increasingly since 1970. Some U.S. estimates have put Soviet bloc oil imports in 1980 at eighty million tons and this figure must be worrying for Moscow. On the one hand, it will not want to see its control over the satellites' energy supplies diminish and, on the other hand, it will wish to maintain the level of its hard currency earnings and to gain further penetration of the African and Asian oil trade. Some temporary respite has been gained by the general increase in world oil prices, for these will allow the USSR to increase the level of hard currency earnings without increasing the actual volume of oil traded. This in turn will allow more oil to be devoted to the Third World oil markets, which are important politically, but for which only relatively small supplies of oil are needed.¹³ In general, however, the USSR will need more oil imports if she is to retain control of her satellites' supplies and steps have already been taken—notably in Iraq—to secure future imports. The Iraqis are reported to be somewhat unhappy about the various deals, for it seems that the oil is priced at less than the prevailing market value and the quality of Soviet barter goods is lower than the Iraqis wished.

The evidence therefore points to increasing Soviet involvement in the Middle East oil trade—at least until the Siberian fields come on stream. The Soviet bloc probably has no long-term absolute shortage of oil (its reserves are believed to be about 15% of the global total compared with 6 per cent in the USA)¹⁴ but the near future position is much less certain. Soviet and the satellite oil consumption is rising (though its current per capita level is less than 30 per cent of that in the USA) and it has been reliably estimated that Comecon may be a net oil importer by 1976–77. This fact alone gives the Kremlin another reason to be interested in the constellation of naval forces in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region.

Economic Warfare

The securing of oil supplies for herself is, however, a relatively recent Soviet concern. The older and primary Soviet interest has been—and remains—the denying of oil to the West. The Soviet Union gave full propaganda support to the Arabs during the October War for their policy of restricting oil production and putting a total embargo on exports to the U.S. and the Netherlands. Indeed the USSR had long been urging such a policy and was undoubtedly pleased by the chaos and disunity which it caused within the Western alliance.¹⁵

The military effects of that crisis received too little attention. The Bahrain refineries, for instance, supplied much of the U.S. Navy's oil for its Indian Ocean and Western Pacific operation, and the Sixth Fleet drew its supplies from the Middle East-fed refineries at Naples. A restriction of Middle Eastern supplies at a time of crisis would seriously undermine NATO's ability to respond to a threatening posture of the Warsaw Pact forces. The restriction in Persian Gulf supplies would be relatively easy to achieve: mines could be laid by "persons unknown"—or even by Palestinian guerrillas with skilled "assistance"—either in the approach channels to the handful of major oil loading terminals in the Gulf or in the narrow shipping lanes of the Straits of Hormuz. The construction of improved naval facilities at Umm Qasr by the Soviet Union—the facilities which

¹³ See R. M. Burrell, "Soviet Oil Exports: A Change of Emphasis?", *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 3, No. 8, 1974.

¹⁴ British Petroleum Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1973.

¹⁵ R. M. Burrell, "The Oil Weapon: Who Gains Most," *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 2, No. 23, 1973; and W. Laqueur, "Confrontation," Chapter 6, New York, 1974.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, then Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, believed to be "considerably more extensive than any which would be required for Iraqi needs alone,"¹⁰ should be seen against the background of a scenario of potential threats to Western interests. The one-year termination notice placed on U.S. naval facilities on Bahrain in October 1973 during the Arab/Israeli conflict by Sheik Essa, the ruler of Bahrain, has now been withdrawn. But the U.S. naval presence there will continue to be a political hostage and a source of annoyance to the increasingly radical Bahrain Parliament.

The problems caused by the temporary and relatively small scale interruptions to energy supplies during the October War should give the Western powers every encouragement to review the level of their naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This, it must be stressed, would be a move welcomed by many of the littoral states—particularly those whose incomes depend on the free flow of oil. The littoral states of the Indian Ocean have long regarded the use of naval power for the defense of trade as a rational and perfectly legitimate exercise of national sovereignty. Indeed, the lack of such prudent policy is likely to be read as a sign of weakness or a lack of interest—or both—and to lead the littoral states to a reconsideration of the value of friendship with the West: "If they won't defend their own vital interests, how can we ever expect them to help in the defense of ours?" Without the traditional commitment of a naval presence—and the manifestation of that support in frequent and sustained port visits—the West is likely to lose the allegiance of those who genuinely seek her friendship but who, understandably, require some expression of tangible support and interest in return. This would be particularly true of states which have a common border with the USSR—such as Iran—where both territorial and maritime activity could be used by the Soviet Union in peacetime to bring political pressure to bear.

Analysis of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean over the past six years should indicate a concentration on the northwestern sector of that Ocean and on the provision of logistic supply points off the east coast and Horn of Africa. There has recently been evidence to suggest that the Kremlin is pleased with the progress made in those areas and that all the necessary steps have been taken to make maximum use of the Suez Canal when it is in operation. A simultaneous move can therefore be made to secure facilities elsewhere in the Indian Ocean basin. The Soviet Navy has recently secured bunkering rights at Mauritius and Singapore but the most startling change was the request for permission to build a satellite tracking station in Australia.¹¹ U.S. authorities believed that such facilities could be used for intercepting Western military communications and for gaining strategic information of great value to the Soviet Armed Forces. The equipment installed could also have been used to jam Western diplomatic and military communication channels. This request was refused by the Australian government, but Soviet activity elsewhere in the southern Indian Ocean continues unabated.

Russian scientists are carrying out atmospheric and meteorological research with French cooperation on the Kerguelen Islands which are situated about halfway between South Africa and Australia. The extent of Soviet oceanographic and other intelligence activity in the Indian Ocean is very great. Oceanography began in a small way in the late 1950s but has been maintained at a much higher level since 1968. A great amount of information about subsurface currents, changes in water densities, variations in salinity and temperature gradients has been gathered in the Indian Ocean. This information is extremely valuable in allowing submarines to use the so-called "blind zones" where techniques of sonar location are rendered inaccurate and ineffective. Soviet vessels are also used regularly to gain intelligence and monitor Western communications. A spectacular example of this occurred in January 1971 at the time of the British Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in Singapore when four Soviet vessels passed through the Straits. The Soviet vessels doubtless endeavored to monitor diplomatic wireless communications connected with the conference. At the same time, their presence provided an obvious and spectacular indication that the Soviet Navy was now using the Indian Ocean as freely as the British Navy had once done.

As well as using the Indian Ocean to outflank the West's allies in Asia and taking a position to threaten Western oil supplies in a time of crisis, the USSR is also keen to use the Ocean to expand Soviet influence along China's southern flank. This fact has doubtless been appreciated in Peking and may well account for what appears to be a degree of Chinese approval for the U.S. expansion of the Diego

Garcia facilities. There are some signs that Moscow is now beginning to seek to counter Chinese relations with East Africa and to gain more influence in Tanzania. The greater interest recently shown in Malagasy and Mauritius would also fit into this pattern.

This analysis has indicated the many ways in which the USSR is endeavoring to use its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In the broadest sense, that presence is being used both as a strategic weapon and as a means of projecting Soviet power in a new area of the world. No longer is the Navy confined to its former role of defending the Soviet homeland: it is now a "blue water" fleet and it is used to further the Soviet Union's global objectives. Its task of expanding Soviet influence has already been very successful. The presence of Russian ships in the Indian Ocean has ensured for Moscow a seat at the conference table on a whole series of issues where previously the Soviet voice was not heard. Soviet vessels are now endeavoring to enhance Moscow's image at the expense of the West—and of China—on all shores of the Indian Ocean. It finds that sea power is a very effective means of cementing alliances and of detaching countries from their former friends.

Restoring Balance

To many of the littoral states, the West appears to have lost interest—and their genuine desire for friendship with the West has thereby been sapped. Unless the West makes use of its historic ties with the area, its chances of regaining influence will rapidly wane. The presence of Western navies in the Indian Ocean has long been accepted as an advantage which, if lost, can only result in the USSR getting a "free ride" in the region. The erosion of Western influence must be halted and those people who desire the West's friendship must be given evidence of sustained support so that they can resist both the political and psychological pressures upon them to change their allegiance.

Naval power is ideal for this purpose. It is flexible, it has none of the potential provocation of a territorial military commitment and it has an historical acceptance in the area. Its uses are manifold. It can give valuable aid in times of disaster and can provide a visible sign of interest by the flag power. It can deter harassment and blackmail by enemies and provide a safe means of evacuating civilians in time of crisis. It gives its owner the opportunity to choose from a wide spectrum of roles. It can command the respect of enemies and stiffen the confidence of friends. What matters is its existence, rather than the purpose for which it was built. Francis Bacon knew this, writing in the seventeenth century, "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," he said, "To be master of the sea is an abridgment of Monarchy—this much is certain that he who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will. Whereas those that may be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits."

When the issue of enhanced facilities on Diego Garcia was being discussed, much publicity was given to Indian opposition to the project (an opposition motivated, at least in part, by India's desire to maintain Soviet protection against China). Other countries stridently echoed India's voice—Sri Lanka, Iraq, South Yemen (PDRY), Somalia and Malagasy. It should be noted that three of the latter states, i.e. Iraq, PDRY and Somalia, are those where Soviet influence is high and whose opposition is therefore at least open to the suspicion of external influence. On the other hand, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore and, interestingly, the People's Republic of China were publicly favorable to an enhanced U.S. presence. Several of the other littoral states—particularly the oil producers of the Gulf—are known to support privately a greater U.S. naval presence in the area, but they would prefer to see more positive proof of U.S. commitment before declaring their views publicly. The U.S. commitment must be in evidence quantitatively as well as qualitatively. These states have no desire to see the Soviet Union achieve a naval monopoly in the area, but without U.S. support they must submit.

Other states made public statements against the U.S. plans but they did so for domestic political reasons: the Whitlam government's criticism in Australia was influenced by local electoral tactics and Indonesia's criticism too was for public rather than for official consumption. The views of the littoral states need individual examination, and when such an examination is made, the simple assumption that they oppose a greater U.S. presence will be found to be baseless. Indeed, even Bangladesh is reported unofficially to favor the expansion of the U.S. Diego Garcia facilities as a counter to the increasing influence of India over its policies and to the growing Soviet presence in India and the Indian Ocean.

¹⁰ See note 6.

¹¹ *The New York Times*, April 9, 1974.

In the context of the Indian Ocean today, no one has described the role that a naval presence can play better than Admiral J. C. Wylie. In discussing the Sixth Fleet's political utility and the special kind of diplomatic influence and role naval forces can play, he wrote: "by the nature of a navy its special capabilities and limitations, it is particularly close to the diplomats in the State Department. . . . In the Navy the nation has a uniquely useful and versatile tool which can be applied overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, actively or passively, but almost always effectively at whatever may at any moment be in the national interest."¹⁸

To those who say that a Western naval buildup would be a threat to peace, it should be pointed out that a balance of forces is a guarantee of peace—often indeed, the only guarantee. It was the fact that Soviet and American naval forces were of large but comparable strength in the Eastern Mediterranean in October and November 1973 which smoothed the way for diplomacy; had either side been in a position of overwhelming superiority the path to the conference table would have been much more difficult.

The danger in the Indian Ocean is that the USSR could achieve a position of dominance in an area where the lessons of naval power are still deeply imprinted on the diplomacy of the littoral states. Those states know the value of naval power—but they lack their own. They contain over one-third of the world's population. Thirty of them have freed themselves from colonial status since 1947 but historic tensions remain high between many pairs of neighbors.

The Soviet Union here has no need to create tensions—merely to exploit them. The temptation to settle disputes by force prevails throughout the world, but it can become acute when only one great power is present and where the country seeking change is a client of that superpower. The essential question is whether or not the West can allow the USSR—a power whose interests in so many instances lie in altering the status quo—to achieve a position of potential naval hegemony in an area where conflicts are many and where air maritime power is still influential. If the USSR does achieve such a position, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's view that the Indian Ocean is the area with the greatest potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade may prove to be disastrously accurate.

¹⁸J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967, p. 60.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN

(By Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations)

Recent events including the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and the worldwide economic dislocations which flowed from that embargo and ensuing price rises, have served to focus attention on the Indian Ocean area.

I think it is evident, as a result of that experience, that our interests in the Indian Ocean are directly linked with our interests in Europe and Asia; and, more broadly, with our fundamental interest in maintaining a stable worldwide balance of power.

In the judgment of many observers, the Indian Ocean has become the area with the potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade. It follows that we must have the ability to influence events in that area; and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence. That, in my judgment, is the crux of the rationale for what we are planning to do at Diego Garcia.

We have no land bridge to the critical Indian Ocean littoral areas, as do the other great powers of the Eurasian landmass. We cannot fly to these countries except over the territory of others or along lengthy air routes over water. The most efficient way we have of reaching them directly is by sea.

The Navy has been in the Indian Ocean area for many years. Since the late '40s we have maintained a small naval presence based in the Persian Gulf, called the Mideast Force. This force consists of a flagship stationed in Bahrain and two destroyers or destroyer escorts are on rotational assignments from other units. It is too small to give us any significant military capability, but it has served an important diplomatic purpose by providing a tangible symbol of U.S. interest in the area. We periodically sail additional ships into the area for training and port visits. The frequency of these visits was reduced during the Vietnam War. The Secretary of Defense recently indicated that we intend to reestablish the pattern of regular visits to this area.

In addition to these visits, the United States on two occasions in the past three years has operated carrier task forces for extended periods in the Indian Ocean. I would hasten to point out that on both occasions these deployments also taxed our logistics support capabilities to the absolute limit, requiring a significant reduction in our ability to support our forces in other key areas, such as the Western Pacific. And this was in an environment when the pace of operations was relatively slow, and the logistics support requirements correspondingly low. It was also in a situation where our extended and highly vulnerable supply lines were not subjected to any hostile threat. In short, it was an artificial situation, far more advantageous than that which we could expect in a combatant environment; yet our ability to operate a modest force even under these favorable circumstances was marginal.

The lesson of these two experiences is clear. If we are to have any reasonable contingency capability for the deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area, we must have the rudiments of a logistics support facility in the area.

We currently maintain a communications facility on Diego Garcia, which is located in the center of the Indian Ocean. We propose to take advantage of its central location, and its political accessibility under our existing agreement with the British Government, to provide the essential elements of a naval support facility in the Indian Ocean.

This facility will be capable of providing support for a flexible range of activities including ship and aircraft maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and improved communications. It will also provide for the operation of ASW aircraft in support of naval forces. The current supplemental military appropriation recently presented to Congress contains a request for \$29 million to improve the facilities on Diego Garcia. Specific projects include increased fuel storage capacity, deepening of the lagoon to provide an anchorage which will accommodate an aircraft carrier and its escorts, lengthening the existing 8000 ft. runway and expanding the airfield parking area, in addition to certain improvements to our existing communications facility and the construction of additional personnel quarters, to accommodate a total of 609 people. We believe that if we are to have an assured capability to deploy and support U.S. forces into the Indian Ocean area, the facilities we now propose at Diego Garcia are essential.

The upgrading of Diego Garcia does not in itself postulate any given deployment of forces, but will significantly enhance our capability to operate naval forces in the Indian Ocean, to the extent such deployments are required.

The Soviets recognized the growing importance of the Indian Ocean area some time ago. Since 1968 we have seen a pattern of steady buildup both in the Soviet naval presence, and in Soviet capabilities for the support of military operations in the Indian Ocean.

We must presume that the Soviets' plans for the expansion of these capabilities are based on perceptions of their own interests and objectives in the region, and are not driven predominantly by U.S. activity in the area. This is borne out by the fact that the rate of Soviet buildup has increased steadily throughout the period, while our own activity has remained at a relatively low level.

As a result of this Soviet buildup, the Soviets possess a support system in the area that is substantially more extensive than that of the U.S.

For example, the Soviets have established fleet anchorages in several locations near the island of Socotra, where an airfield provides a potential Soviet base for reconnaissance or other aircraft. In addition, they have established anchorages in the Chagos archipelago, including the installation of permanent mooring buoys. (They have done this in other areas around the Indian Ocean littoral as well.)

They have built a communications station near the Somali port of Berbera to provide support for their fleet. At the same time they have increased their use of, and are expanding naval facilities at Berbera, which currently include a restricted area under Soviet control, a combined barracks and repair ship and housing for Soviet military dependents. In addition, they engaged in building a new military airfield near Mogadiscio, which could be used for a variety of missions.

Soviet naval combatants and support ships have had access to the expanded Iraqi naval port of Umm Qasr, where facilities are being built with the assistance of Soviet technicians. In my opinion, those facilities are considerably more extensive than any which would be required for Iraqi needs alone.

The Soviets have been extended the use of port facilities at the former British base at Aden, and air facilities at the former Royal Air Force field nearby. They maintain personnel ashore in both locations. In addition, they use the port of Aden for refueling, replenishment and minor repairs.

Since 1971 Soviet naval units have been engaged in harbor clearance operations at Chittagong, Bangladesh.

In addition to their regional support facilities in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets are embarked on a worldwide program to expand bunkering and visit rights for their naval, merchant and fishing fleets. Since Soviet merchant vessels are frequently employed for logistics support of Soviet naval forces, the establishment of merchant bunkering facilities expands the Soviet Navy's logistics infrastructure. The Soviets have recently secured bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore and have made approaches to other Western and nonaligned countries.

In summary, Soviet support initiatives and the tempo of their naval activity in the Indian Ocean since 1968 have expanded at a deliberate pace which cannot be related, either in time or in scope, to any comparable expansion of U.S. activity.

Underlying all of this is Soviet recognition of the critical importance to most of the world's economies of the sea lanes which pass through the area. As a result of that importance, the Soviets recognize that any nation which has the capability to project substantial naval power into the Indian Ocean automatically acquires significant influence not only with the littoral countries, but with those countries outside the area which are dependent on the free use of its sea lanes as well.

In a similar fashion, our plans for the area are a product of our own interests and our perception of the growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean area. This, coupled with the importance of our interests in the area, has led us to the conclusion that we must have at least the rudiments of a capability to support U.S. military forces in that part of the world. I would add that the development of such capability provides tangible evidence of our concern for the security and stability of the region.

What we are proposing for Diego Garcia is primarily a capability for logistics support of forces that may be sent into the Indian Ocean in contingencies, for or periodic deployments. In this sense, it is a prudent precautionary move to ensure that we have the capability to operate our forces in an area of increasing strategic importance to the U.S. and its allies.

The geopolitical asymmetries between the U.S. and the Soviet Union must be kept in mind in assessing the relative importance to the two countries of the capability to operate naval forces in the region. The Soviet Union dominates the Eurasian landmass. It has borders with some key Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. Its land-based forces can already be brought to bear in the region. The U.S., on the other hand, can project its military power into the area only by sea and air, and over great distances. The Soviet Union, in sum, has the geographical proximity necessary to influence events in the Indian Ocean littoral, without the employment of naval forces if necessary. We do not. Limiting our capabilities to operate naval forces effectively in the region would not be in U.S. interest; and would clearly put us at a disadvantage in the region.

SECTION V

Articles Against

VICTOR ZORZA: HALTING THE NAVAL RACE

Although the reopening of the Suez Canal is expected only later this year, it has already given a start to a naval race between the superpowers which may eclipse, in cost and intensity, all the arms races of earlier years.

It does not have to happen—but it is acquiring a mad momentum of its own, as the nuclear missile race once did. If it is not halted now, before it really gets going, the opportunity to arrest it will not recur for a good many years.

The crucial lap of the naval race begins on the small island of Diego Garcia, barely a speck on the map of the Indian Ocean, which Britain is willing to make available for a United States base in an area previously untenanted by the superpowers. The Pentagon wants the base because the Soviet Navy will now be able to use Suez to increase its presence in the area. Soviet ships will now have to spend much less time at sea on their way to the Indian Ocean—a 2200 mile journey from the Black Sea, instead of 9,000 miles from Vladivostok in the Far East.

Some spokesmen for the U.S. naval lobby say that this would enable the Russians to quadruple the number of ships on station, without actually assigning more ships to the area, but other experts dispute this claim. To match the Russians, the United States would have to increase its own strength. The Diego Garcia base, the Navy argues, would provide support facilities for both ships and aircraft which would make it less necessary to bring other vessels from far off, leaving them free for other tasks, and would make the whole operation far less costly.

The argument may make good naval sense, but it leaves out of account the politics of the arms race. The Soviet naval lobby was pressing the Kremlin last year for permission to increase its own strength in the Indian Ocean—as was evident from the cries of alarm its spokesmen were uttering in the press about U.S. intentions. But Washington publicly signalled Moscow that its intentions were entirely honorable.

Administration officials let it be known that they did not want to do anything that would push the Soviet Union into a naval race in the area, and the Kremlin allowed itself to be taken in by this—or so it would now seem to Moscow. One Moscow journal associated with the Soviet anti-arms lobby even suggested at the time that, although U.S. hawks were trying to extend the superpower confrontation to the Indian Ocean, they would probably fail to achieve their objective.

The publication of this article in Moscow, coupled with the unprovocative Soviet conduct in the Indian Ocean, suggested, as did the signs in Washington at the time, that both powers were leaning over backward to contain the naval race in the area. All this changed during the October war, when both navies sent in powerful reinforcements and Washington announced that it would henceforth maintain an increased and "regular" presence in the Indian Ocean. Then came Henry Kissinger's successful peace effort in the Mideast, with its promise of the reopening of the Suez Canal, which strengthened Washington's resolve to go back on its implied promise to the Kremlin to keep the Navy on a leash in the Indian Ocean.

But why should the building of naval support facilities on Diego Garcia, which the Pentagon says can be done for a paltry \$20 million, be viewed in such cataclysmic terms? Because, to begin with, it would destroy the delicate balance between the naval lobby and its opponents in the Kremlin. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are now embarked on major naval construction and modernization programs, but the political leaders in both countries have so far conceded much less than the naval lobbies are demanding.

In the United States, the Navy's inordinately costly ambitions are a matter of public record. In the Soviet Union, they are to be found between the lines of articles and speeches by naval leaders. They do not ask publicly for money. But their description of the navy's tasks leaves little doubt that, if these are to be fulfilled, far more money will have to be found than the Kremlin can now be seen to be spending.

In both countries, the naval lobbies have been using the Indian Ocean, because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf oil routes, as the bogey with which to push the politicians into crossing a new strategic threshold. The decision to build a base on Diego Garcia will, if it is maintained, represent the crossing of the threshold by the United States.

The Soviet Union will follow, as night follows day, and the last quarter of the century will witness a naval race which promises—because the ship is more versatile and ubiquitous than the missile—to outdo the great missile race that dominated the third quarter of the century.

INDIAN OCEAN: CONFRONTATION OR SECURITY?

(By V. Pavlovsky and Y. Tomilin)

Diego Garcia, a tiny island in the Indian Ocean, in the Chagos Archipelago about 1,700 km southwest of the Indian subcontinent, has latterly figured prominently in the world news.

Aggressive imperialist circles are planning to use this islet, a mere 27 sq km in area, to set up a major military base. As far back as 1966 the U.S.A. and Britain signed an agreement to build military installations on the Chagos Archipelago and also on the three islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Des Roches, all British colonial possessions in the Indian Ocean. This aroused a storm of protest in the independent countries of the Indian Ocean. Finally, Washington and London announced that only Diego Garcia would have a U.S. naval communications station. In the spring of 1973 the station went into operation.

LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE

In January the Pentagon got the British government to agree to a significant expansion of Diego Garcia installations, making the island a major military outpost in the Indian Ocean. Congress has already been asked for \$30 million to implement plans for extending the landing strip on Diego Garcia, deepening the harbour, and building port facilities to take U.S. warships including Polaris submarines.

The establishment of this new military bridgehead in the Indian Ocean is a key element in the far-reaching designs of Western top brass. As the "Washington Post" noted on January 30, a U.S. base on Diego Garcia (the island being unpopulated, this would cause no political complications) would make it far easier for the United States to assert itself throughout the entire area.

The militarists in the U.S.A. and some other Western states have long sought to entrench their "presence" here. The dispatch of special American naval squadrons to the Bay of Bengal in December 1971 (at the height of the struggle for liberation in Bangladesh) and to the Strait of Bab el Mandeb in October 1973 (when hostilities flared up in the Middle East) showed conclusively enough how dangerous relapses of the positions of strength policy are. A "task force" of U.S. warships from the Seventh Fleet is plying the waters of the Indian Ocean at the present time.

Up till now the naval base in Bahrain has been the Pentagon's stronghold in the Indian Ocean. But, judging by foreign press reports, the U.S. will soon have to leave it, since the Bahrain government has decided to suspend the lease.

Britain has a naval base at Simonstown in South Africa. From this strategic vantage point it controls entry into the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic.

In the eastern sector of the Indian Ocean there is a large combined U.S. and British naval base at Cockburn Sound on Australia's southwestern coast. Finally, the British base at Singapore controls the key passage into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. Under the 1971 agreement between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, Britain maintains in this area six frigates or destroyers, a unit of long-range aircraft, some helicopters and airborne and ground forces.

The imperialist military presence in the Indian Ocean also relies heavily on U.S. bases in the Pacific. Important strongholds oriented also toward the Indian Ocean are the bases at Sattahip in Thailand and at Subic Bay in the Philippines, besides which there is the base on Guam from which submarines enter the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless the Indian Ocean still forms a gap between the bulk of U.S. and British armed forces permanently deployed on the one side in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific on the other. Needless to say it could quickly become the connecting link in this entire pattern of naval strategy if the plans for a large base at Diego Garcia are pushed ahead.

The moves taken to enlarge the Diego Garcia bridgehead indicate that the U.S. intends to impart a broader and more permanent character to its presence in

the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the possibility cannot be excluded that after Diego Garcia, the other British islands listed in the afore-mentioned 1966 agreement will also be "developed."

The establishment of such island bases is linked with the Pentagon's "grand ocean strategy." In 1971 the "Washington Post" military correspondent said that regearing the U.S. military machine to the Guam Doctrine was likely to turn the Navy into the dominant arm of the service before the close of the present decade. Small wonder that in 1971-72 the U.S. Navy was already getting a bigger share of budget appropriations than any other arm of the service.

It is clear that these designs tie in with other plans harboured by the more zealous cold warriors. It is symptomatic, for instance, that the North Atlantic Assembly, a gathering of parliamentarians from NATO countries, called in 1972 for permanent Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

NATO strategists are seeking to somehow prop up the crisis-torn neo-colonialist SEATO and ASPAC blocs. The British Tories have been traditionally active in this respect. The British "Foreign Report" bulletin says that the Conservative government also toyed with the idea of putting together a new military bloc for the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.

The colonialist racist regimes in southern Africa, too, are anxious to implement their adventurous designs. The Malagasy paper "Hita Si Re" says they are trying to get the plans for knocking together one more—a South Atlantic—bloc off the ground.

China's present leadership is pursuing the same ends in the Indian Ocean as the imperialist aggressors. Thus "Newsweek," referring to Chinese diplomatic sources, reported in late February that Washington had received Peking's tacit agreement before deciding to go ahead with the establishment of a large military base on Diego Garcia.

The Maoists allot the Indian Ocean an important place in planned preparations for war. They intend to carry out there tests of China's first ballistic missiles, which are to be launched across Indian territory. The Delhi "Patriot" links the recent Paracel clash involving P.R.C. naval forces with Peking's designs to ensure its own military presence in the Indian Ocean.

SPURIOUS PRETEXT

The policy of building up military tensions in the Indian Ocean is conducted under cover of vociferous propaganda about a bogus "Soviet threat" in this part of the world. This is asserted in chorus by the well-known U.S. news analyst Joseph Alsop, by Sir Terence Lewin, the British admiral commanding joint NATO armed forces in the Eastern Atlantic, and many other Western "hawks." Similar inventions are churned out day after day with even greater insistence by the Peking propagandists.

To illustrate the so-called "Soviet threat," they allude to Soviet shipping in the Indian Ocean, ignoring the plain fact that for a leading sea power like the U.S.S.R., the Indian Ocean is the only ice-free sea lane between its western and eastern ports. Moreover, as Soviet economic and commercial contacts with the countries of the Indian Ocean grow, carriage of cargo to them by Soviet merchant ships likewise increases. It stands to reason that the build-up of Western "military presence" in the Indian Ocean imperils Soviet sea communications.

It is noteworthy, however, that attempts to scare Asian countries with the bogey of "Soviet expansion on the high seas" are getting nowhere. In a recent interview for an Australian broadcasting company, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi emphasized that Soviet ships had not been the first to come to the Indian Ocean and that they had no intentions other than peaceful. The position of the Soviet Union, which has never considered ideal the presence of big-power naval forces in waters far removed from their own shores and which has declared its readiness to resolve the problem on an equitable basis, is meeting with understanding and support in the countries of this area. Influential quarters in the leading Asian states have strongly condemned imperialism's military preparations in the Indian Ocean. The Indian government has qualified the Anglo-American agreement on the Diego Garcia base as a direct threat to India's security and as a move to "escalate confrontation rather than co-operation." Sri Lanka Premier Sirimavo Bandaranaike sharply protested U.S. and British action in messages to Nixon and Heath. The Sri Lanka government has raised the question of convening a special U.N. General Assembly session to discuss the Diego Garcia base issue. A broad spectrum of countries, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of South Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tanzania, Thailand and Australia, are opposed to these schemes. The Asian

public is also increasingly aware of what is behind the provocative moves of the Peking militarists. "An analysis of the P.R.C.'s military activity shows that Peking is trying hard to rebuild its navy," says the Iranian "Kayhan." "As soon as the opportunity offers, the Chinese will start looking beyond the horizons of the Yellow Sea."

THE ALTERNATIVE

Further developments will show whether the Indian Ocean will be made a genuine zone of peace and whether this task will be accomplished in the general context of security in Asia.

The discussion at recent U.N. General Assembly sessions of the question of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean revealed a tendency to reduce the idea to the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of navigation and research in the Indian Ocean. This, in effect, leaves aside the question of what should be done to ensure reliable security in this part of the world.

However, as was emphasized by India's Minister for External Affairs Swaran Singh in the February issue of the Indian magazine "Round Table," "the Indian plea to treat the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be studied in the context of Asian security." Otherwise, the Asian public notes, the Indian Ocean countries will inevitably be drawn into the orbit of the arms race, which would play into the hands of aggressive forces endeavouring to impede normalization in Asia and collective security on the scale of the entire continent.

Nor can one rule out other, still wider, adverse consequences, should the opponents of international détente achieve their aims in the Indian Ocean. Incidentally, in the U.S.A. itself many are aware of the dangers with which such prospects are fraught. This is well illustrated by a recent "Washington Post" article significantly titled "Halting the Naval Race."

As far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, in its attitude to the Indian Ocean problem, as in other things, it adheres staunchly to its Leninist policy of vigorously upholding peace and the freedom and security of the peoples. With other peace-loving states, the U.S.S.R. is consistently working to help bring about a situation in which the Indian Ocean countries could live in peace, without fear of the future. The Joint Soviet-Indian Declaration, signed at the end of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's recent visit to India, clearly emphasized: "The two Sides reaffirm their readiness to take part, together with all interested states and on an equal basis, in the search for a favourable solution to the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace."

The independent Afro-Asian countries and all forces fighting for the triumph of reason and realism in world affairs are closely watching development in the Indian Ocean. Their resolve to ensure lasting peace in this part of the world places a secure barrier in the way of the machinations of the enemies of the freedom and security of the peoples.

SECTION VI

Speech For

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate more than a few minutes. I want to make some additional remarks about the bill, particularly this Diego Garcia aspect.

Mr. President, the Director of the CIA, Mr. Colby, testified before our subcommittee on this matter, and I notice that certain segments of the press undertook to play up what they called a rift, or a dissension, or a great disagreement between the military part of the Government and Mr. Colby. That is unmistakably the meaning of what some of them said. But, Mr. President, that is a great disservice to the military segment of our Government and to Mr. Colby.

What he said and what happened just do not justify, I submit, any such conclusion. Even though as late as this morning and until an hour ago, they were calling me, wanting me to comment upon this alleged rift between the CIA's Mr. Colby and the military. There is just nothing to it, Mr. President. There is no such animal as that running around in Washington now. There are a lot of different things running around, but certainly that is not one of them.

I want to say with all the emphasis that I can that Mr. Colby was trying to testify and did testify truthfully. He gave some of his estimations, and maybe some of them verged on military matters. With all deference to him, and I am friendly to him, my estimation and some of them verged on military matters may not be worth a great deal. They are somewhat out of our field. But at the same time, he is not taking any licks at the military, and they were not taking any licks at him, so far as I know. I just wanted to comment on that, Mr. President.

I wish to say one other thing too, about this whole concept of the Indian Ocean. I think it is a broad policy question and it has some military aspects. I shall be glad when the Congress has fully disposed of the matter. I think we ought to proceed and dispose of it. But, Mr. President, there are important aspects of this Indian Ocean problem aside from any military concern about it. They are spelled out in one short, three-letter word, a very short word, o-i-l, oil.

Out of this area north of the Indian Ocean at the Persian Gulf comes more than 80 percent of the oil that supplies Japan, certainly an ally of ours. Through the same Indian Ocean comes about 50 percent of the oil that supplies Western Europe and England, certainly, overall, a major ally of ours. Through this same Indian Ocean is going to come, by 1985, according to the estimates, about 20 percent of our own oil supply. It is around 10 percent now from the Middle East.

So, entirely apart from any so-called military significance—immediate military significance—I am thoroughly convinced—and I did not let the Navy come and brief me on this matter until I had looked into it some myself—that we had better be alert to be sure that we not get caught short in the whole vast area of the world there. We have to have better facilities for the operation of our Navy, the Navy we already have in that vast area of the world, and will have as long as we continue to be internationalists, so-called, as is our policy.

I have never been a fanatic on it, but we cannot withdraw into a shell. Our economy is so dependent on exports and imports, we are not going to be withdrawing into a shell any time soon. We are not going to solve our own energy sources problem in a few years. I am on an appropriations subcommittee with the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. BIBLE), who is here in the Chamber and compliments me by listening to me. He and I know that we are not going to solve this energy sources matter in 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 years. We are going to have it with us, at the very best, for a good number of years.

We heard all of this on the Committee on Appropriations. I should not advocate that we use up all our oil just to be independent of the Middle East anyway, unless we have to.

So, I am vitally concerned that we have the facilities there—a pier and oil storage, fuel storage, and the things that have to go into operating a Navy—that might be needed to protect our oil supply lines.

This is the route that they will come, no mistake about that, these huge oil tankers. They will never be able to use the Suez Canal.

At present fuel and repairs and supplies and everything to this Indian Ocean area have to come all the way from the Philippines. It is over 3,000 miles, anyway, to keep supply ships going back and forth.

If a carrier over there has to be replaced, or go in for repairs or for rest of the crew, there is all this distance involved. Therefore, I am convinced that if we fix up the facility there on Diego Garcia, we can far better utilize the Navy we presently have.

We read a lot about that this is going to cause us to have to build more carriers, more supply ships for the carriers, and other carrier forces. I do not believe there is a word of truth in that. There may be other reasons that will cause us to have to do that, but I am sure we can better utilize the carriers, supply ships, and carrier forces that we already have—utilize and operate them better—by having something out there in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

The island is a thousand miles or more from any shoreline. I hope we can get some kind of reasonable agreement from Great Britain, and I believe we will, and proceed on with the elemental needs for this naval installation there. I believe that is the course that we will follow, and that we will obtain an agreement. I had thought we ought to have it by now, but matters came up that they could not do it. We will thus, as I say, be augmenting, reinforcing, and making more operative the Navy we already have.

I wish we could have this oil problem go away, but it is not going away. We will have to deal with it.

So far as the money is concerned, we have reduced this appropriation to \$18.1 million, rather than the \$33.2 million that was requested by the Defense Department, and I commend the Senator from Missouri on that figure. The Navy has assured me over and over that they are not planning and do not expect to make any further requests above the \$29 million, except for about \$5 million additional that will be necessary to properly round out this matter and provide something more in the nature of adequate quarters, and so forth.

We can go on to talk about what is going to happen with reference to the Soviet Navy, and all, but these are the fundamentals. I think that we are on the right track to get an agreement and then go on with financing these matters with reference to Diego Garcia.

I support the proposal on that basis, Mr. President.

The Defense Department has, from time to time, requested the construction of a support facility at Diego Garcia. During the past few years Congress has approved over \$20 million in military construction funds for an austere communications facility at Diego Garcia.

Of this year's \$29 million Navy request, \$14.8 million was approved for construction of a new pier, extension of the existing runway from 8,000 feet to 12,000 feet, oil storage facilities, powerplant expansion, and substation and subsistence building addition. The full \$3.3 million request was approved for the Air Force to provide additional ramp space, oil storage, and open munitions storage.

The committee approval of a total of \$18.1 million represents a 44 percent reduction in the Defense request of \$32.3 million. The authorization of these funds will allow the Navy to construct a modest support facility for a carrier task force and naval air reconnaissance operations. The facilities are strictly logistical in nature, permitting limited import upkeep and resupply.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The United States has long had substantial interests in the Indian Ocean. We have been dedicated to the economic growth and well-being of the countries in the area. For many years the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean has been a visible source of support to our friends there and represented a U.S. commitment to deter aggressive activities by outsiders.

The United States also has a substantial interest in the petroleum resources of the Middle East. The increasing importance of energy sources to the world's economies and the embargo of the recent Middle East war have highlighted the value of the Middle East petroleum reserves. These reserves constitute over 60 percent of the world's proven crude oil reserves. It has been estimated that Europe depends on the Middle East for 50 percent of its oil supply; Japan depends on the Middle East for over 80 percent of its oil supply. This severe reliance of our allies on uninhabited access to the Middle East petroleum resources makes the support facility of Diego Garcia particularly critical.

The Arab countries themselves should view the expansion at Diego Garcia as a friendly move which could help protect their product—oil. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not objected to the proposed expansion.

The demand on Middle East oil will continue to accelerate in the foreseeable future. The United States presently receives about 10 percent of its oil from the Middle East. If the present trend in U.S. energy demand continues and U.S. oil production continues to decline as it has since 1970, the United States may well have to depend on the Middle East for 20 percent of its oil supply by 1985, or approximately 128 million barrels per month.

The routes for transporting oil from the Middle East will remain through the Indian Ocean. The opening of the Suez Canal will not eliminate the necessity to transport oil through the Indian Ocean since the canal cannot accommodate some 70 percent of the tonnage of all modern oil tankers.

At the present time the U.S. Navy must depend on the Subic Bay as its supply station for Indian Ocean operations. The base is over 5,000 miles from the Persian Gulf. To operate from such a distance puts a severe load on our Navy which has already been spread very thinly.

The expansion of Diego Garcia will underline the U.S. interest in the peaceful development of the Indian Ocean area. At the same time the expansion at Diego Garcia will signal the U.S. determination to assure the access to and transporting of the crucial petroleum resources of the Middle East.

SOVIET ACTIVITY

A wealth of intelligence information on the Indian Ocean area was provided to the Armed Services Committee. As might be expected, intelligence estimates differed on the precise extent of Soviet military activity in the Indian Ocean area. There was unanimity among intelligence estimates, however, that the Soviet military presence has been steadily increasing in the Indian Ocean area and will probably continue to increase. Without going into the technicalities of how to define and measure military presence or military bases, it is clear that the Soviet Union has a significance entrée and capability for military activity in the Indian Ocean.

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIEGO GARCIA EXPANSION

In noting the steadily increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, Mr. President, I do not intend that this Soviet activity be the primary justification for expanding our support facility at Diego Garcia. An extended base at Diego Garcia is necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean. It is for our own needs and our own use.

The authorization of the \$18.1 million for the proposed facilities at Diego Garcia does not imply a new or expanded role for U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. Deployment of U.S. forces will depend on future developments. I, for one, hope that the United States never needs to deploy substantial military forces in the Indian Ocean.

The proposed facilities at Diego Garcia will be consistent with a low U.S. military profile in the Indian Ocean. These facilities will be located on a deserted island almost 1,000 miles from the nearest coastal country.

The Soviet Union has its own interests in the Indian Ocean area. They will continue to pursue these interests regardless of what the United States does in the Indian Ocean area. The United States can have no assurance as to Soviet intentions, and should not sacrifice its own interests in anticipation of Soviet behavior. I would like to emphasize Mr. President, that there is nothing in the proposed expansion at Diego Garcia which is provocative toward the Soviet Union. Diego Garcia will not in any way be a base for U.S. strategic operations. Rather it is a support facility which will give the United States a tentative connection to the Indian Ocean area.

In short, the United States has significant interests in the Indian Ocean—particularly since most of the oil of the industrialized free world must pass through this area. A small support station at Diego Garcia would facilitate efforts to protect U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean.

I thank the Senator from Missouri for yielding to me, and I yield the floor.

SECTION VII

Speech Against

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on May 12, 1975, the President of the United States, by letter, certified to the Congress that the construction of naval facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is vital to the national interests of the Government of the United States. The text of the President's letter to the Congress reads as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with section 613(a)(1)(A) of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-552), I have evaluated all the military Authorization Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-552), I have evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia. On the basis of this evaluation and in accordance with section 613(a)(1)(B), I hereby certify that the construction of such facilities is essential to the national interest of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 12, 1975.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, may we have order? I cannot hear the Senator's remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
The Senate may proceed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Under the provisions of Public Law 93-552, 93d Congress, 2d session, section 613, I am laying before the Senate a resolution of disapproval in accordance with the provisions of section 613. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks section 613 from the public law be printed in order that Senators may have an opportunity to read this section of law and know exactly how this resolution of disapproval will be handled in the Committee of the Armed Services and on the floor of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I was very surprised that the President of the United States would send this resolution to the Congress at this time in view that that we have been told by the administration that the President is in the midst of a reappraisal of our foreign policy because of the debacle of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia.

I think in the debate of this resolution, when it is returned from the Armed Services Committee, a number of very important questions should be examined during the debate.

Why, in the face of the fact that all the nations bordering on the Indian Ocean have asked the United States and the Soviet Union not to escalate the arms race in the Indian Ocean area, has the administration forwarded this letter of certification? At a meeting in New Delhi on November 17, 1974, 30 nations issued a policy statement opposing the United States building a naval facility on the island of Diego Garcia.

Why does this administration persist in the face of a staggering deficit in our budget insist on building a naval facility that will cost approximately \$175 million? I contend that the money that the administration is requesting to start building naval facilities on Diego Garcia, amounting to \$14 million for the Navy and \$3.3 million for the Air Force, is only a downpayment. Already in the fiscal year 1976 budget, the Navy is asking for an additional \$13 million for operational facilities on Diego Garcia.

Mr. President, are we going to engage in an adventure of Southeast Asia and Vietnam all over again? Is there an extension of a policy of the United States trying to be policeman for the world in the face of our bitter experience in Vietnam?

Are we not scattered throughout the world enough by having military personnel on all five continents—perhaps, if Antarctica is considered a continent, on all six continents—and naval ships on all the oceans of the world and on a good many seas?

In voting the naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, are we going to vote a three-ocean Navy? The Navy contends that they will be able to operate carriers in the Indian Ocean with only a 12-airplane carrier force. However, will it really have to be 15 carriers to fulfill our commitment in the Atlantic, Pacific, and the Indian Ocean?

I believe that the role of the carrier in sea warfare should be a part of the debate on the island of Diego Garcia. I submit that the aircraft carrier is now obsolete with the technical advancement of the new cruise missiles. I submit that in the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets always know exactly within a few hundred yards where our carriers are operating. Can a carrier task force adequately protect itself in its operations in the Indian Ocean?

What are our so-called vital interests in the Indian Ocean? Certainly, having a task force in the Indian Ocean had no effect on the oil situation during the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. In fact, our naval vessels were completely cut off from Arab oil and the United States could do nothing about the Arab action.

Incidentally, I understand that there is an interesting article in this week's U.S. News & World Report, which once again raises the specter of war in case of another oil embargo. I hope that that does not come to pass.

Mr. President, the question of Diego Garcia and allowing the Navy to build a naval operating facility on this island some 1,200 miles south of the tip of India is a vital policy question. I urge upon my colleagues to take due notice of this action and to study all of the facts that are available. I urge my colleagues to give serious consideration as to whether this Nation should support a naval base thousands of miles from our shores which will amount to nothing more than "showing the flag" in an area of the world where the nations have requested that we not have our Navy there in force.

For the information of my colleagues, on December 5, 1974, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S20742, I delivered a speech setting forth reasons for my opposition to the building of naval operating facilities on the island of Diego Garcia.

I ask unanimous consent that that speech be printed in the RECORD at an appropriate point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Finally, I point out that the Senate has 60 legislative days to act upon this resolution and the Armed Services Committee should report it back to the floor of the Senate within 20 days with its recommendation. I urge the Armed Services Committee to report this resolution of disapproval favorably in order that the United States will not embark upon another adventure in the southern part of Asia.

Mr. President, I send to the desk the resolution of disapproval and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

S. Res. 160

Resolved, That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12, 1975.

EXHIBIT 1

SEC. 613. (a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act with respect to any construction project at Diego Garcia may be obligated unless—

(1) the President has (A) advised the Congress in writing that all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia have been evaluated by him, and (B) certified to the Congress in writing that the construction of any such project is essential to the national interest of the United States;

(2) 60 days of continuous session of the Congress have expired following the date on which certification with respect to such project is received by the Congress, and

(3) neither House of Congress has adopted, within such 60-day period, a resolution disapproving such project.

(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 60-day period.

(2) For purposes of this section, "resolution" means a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12.", the first and second blanks being filled with the name of the resolving House and the third blank being filled with the appropriate date.

(c) Subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section are enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the Senate in the case of resolutions described by subsection (b)(2) of this section; and they supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change such rules at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

(d) A resolution with respect to a proposed construction project of the island of Diego Garcia shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(e)(1) If the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate to which a resolution with respect to a proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia has been referred has not reported such resolution at the end of 20 calendar days after its introduction, not counting any day which is excluded under subsection (b)(1) of this section, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration of any other resolution introduced with respect to the same proposed construction project which has been referred to the committee, except that no motion to discharge shall be in order after the committee has reported a resolution of disapproval with respect to the same proposed construction project.

(2) A motion to discharge under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be made only by a Senator favoring the resolution, is privileged, and debate thereon shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution, the time to be divided in the Senate equally between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(f)(1) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consideration of a resolution shall be privileged. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(2) Debate in the Senate on a resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with a resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of a resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.

(4) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a resolution, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a resolution is in order in the Senate.

EXHIBIT 2

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MANSFIELD

Mr. President, I feel compelled to speak out on the issue of Diego Garcia, the projected naval operating facility in the Indian Ocean. As we move toward the final days of this second session of the 93d Congress, Senators are receiving a great deal of pressure from both the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy to approve \$14,802,000 as a down payment on naval facilities that will enable the Navy to operate carrier task forces from the Island of Diego Garcia. In addition, the Air Force is requesting Air Force facilities on Diego Garcia that will enable KC135 tankers to refuel B52's operating out of Thailand over the Indian Ocean. First of all, I would like to briefly give you some background, both historical and legislative, which bear directly upon the Navy's efforts to make the Island of Diego Garcia an operating base.

Diego Garcia is an atoll located within the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles due south of the tip of India. The heavily vegetated island consists of 6,700 acres with average elevations of three to seven feet. It is horseshoe shaped with a 40-mile perimeter. The enclosed lagoon is 5½ miles wide by 13 miles long with average depths of 30 to 100 feet. The annual rainfall is approximately 100 inches. The United States Government became interested in Diego Garcia in the early Sixties, particularly when the British Government announced that it was withdrawing its naval forces from Singapore and indications were made public that Her Majesty's Government intended to greatly reduce its Indian Ocean naval squadron. At about the same time, the Russian navy began operations in the Indian Ocean and making port calls to nations bordering on the Indian Ocean. It must be pointed out that for years the United States Navy has been traversing the Indian Ocean with carriers and other auxiliary combatants when the transfer of aircraft carriers was made to the Pacific fleet.

Beginning in the early Sixties, as aforementioned, with the announcement that the British were greatly reducing their naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the United States has in a more frequent manner stepped up its operations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which is a part of the Indian Ocean. At the present time, naval presence is maintained at Bahrain consisting of a supply ship and two destroyers. The Russians have not matched this naval strength. However, since 1968, the Russians have greatly increased their presence in the Indian Ocean, sometimes having as many as 30 combatant ships, which include a large number of mine sweepers.

The United States sometime in calendar year 1966 began negotiating with the British Government for a lease to establish a communications station and an operational base on Diego Garcia. This base was to be an austere logistic support activity which was mainly a refueling stop for naval units operating in the Indian Ocean. In 1965, the British formed the British Indian Ocean Territory which comprises the Chagos Archipelago which, of course, includes Diego Garcia. The United States Navy stated that the selection of these islands was predicated in unquestioned UK sovereignty in the absence of a population. A bilateral agreement was signed in December 1966 between the British Government and the United States Government to the Indian Ocean territory.

The Navy came to the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1970 Military Construction Program with a submission for the first construction increment of a proposed logistic facility on the Island of Diego Garcia. The logistic facility was approved by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the House Appropriations Military Construction Subcommittee. When presented to the Senate, there was strong opposition from within the Senate Appropriations Committee to the United States becoming committed to another naval operations base within the Indian Ocean. Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time, was very much opposed to the United States committing the Navy to sustained operations within the Indian Ocean and so stated in Committee meetings on a number of occasions. The Military Construction Subcommittee also strenuously opposed the appropriation of money to construct the operating facility and the Military Construction FY 1970 conference committee debated this matter through a number of meetings lasting over a two-week period. Finally, an oral agreement was reached wherein the Navy was to be instructed to come back in FY 1971 for a new appropriation which would support only a communications

station, and all of the logistic support facilities were to be deleted from the FY 1971 program. The rationale at that time for the communications station was that, in time, the United States would have to withdraw from the main continent of Africa the large communications facility that the United States Government had at Asmara, Ethiopia. (Kagnew Station Communications Center, Asmara, Ethiopia, is now being phased out and the Navy will centralize its African communications facilities at Diego Garcia).

In support of the FY 1971 appropriations for the communications facilities on Diego Garcia, the Navy stated the following:

"The requirement to close the gap in reliable communication coverage which exists today in the central Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal area was a major consideration in developing the initial concept for a support facility on Diego Garcia. Establishment of a communications support capability in this area is an immediate requirement and is a requirement which exists independent of the modest logistics support facility which was rejected by the Congress. The purely passive role and image of a communications facility should not raise the same concern of active commitment which had apparently been associated with the logistics support aspects of the original concept."

As previously mentioned, the Navy was instructed to come back in the 1971 military construction program with a communications package only and to all intents and purposes the logistic support facility was not to be a part of the package. In fact, it was specifically agreed that there would be no items which could in any way support a carrier task force.

In all of the communications and oral conversations that the subcommittee had with the Navy, it was indicated that the Navy would not use Diego Garcia as an operational base. Members of the subcommittee were reassured, when the FY 1971 construction budget for Diego Garcia was approved, that the Navy did not intend to operate fleet surface units from Diego Garcia.

To bring you up to date concerning the FY 1975 Military Construction Authorization Bill, H.R. 16136, which is still in conference, I will explain Section 612 in the Bill. This section precluded the obligation of any funds until the President of the United States has advised the Congress in writing that he had evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for these facilities and has certified that this construction is essential to the national interest. Such certification must be submitted to the Congress and approved by both Houses of Congress. This will assure the opportunity for full debate on the policy question of Diego Garcia.

I might say, parenthetically, that I consider this most prudent and realistic action for the Congress to take. I wish to further point out that Section 612 of the Authorization Bill was adopted by a record vote of 83-0 in the Senate.

The position of the House Armed Services Committee is that the Administration should be given the authority to build the facilities in Diego Garcia but that prior to the exercise of that authority the President shall notify Congress of his intention and that Congress shall have 60 days to reject the blanket authority it had previously given to him. This procedure has heretofore been used too often by the Executive and acquiesced in by the Congress. The negative power of the Congress—the power to deny a change in the *status quo*—is turned on the Congress itself. The burden of persuasion shifts away from those who desire action to prove the rightness of their cause. The Congress must insist that the justification for policy must be made *prior* to the grant of authority. It is exactly that insistence that was included in the Military Construction Authorization.

It is my contention, as stated earlier, that the Senate position in the Authorization Bill is realistic and prudent and Diego Garcia, as a policy question, should first of all be thoroughly investigated by the Foreign Relations Committee, then the question should be taken to the floor and the two Houses of the Congress should be allowed to work their will.

On November 17, at a meeting in New Delhi of the 30 nations surrounding the Indian Ocean, a policy statement was issued unanimously that America and the Soviet Union should not escalate the arms race in the Indian Ocean and the area should be left in peace; particularly, all 30 nations opposed the United States' building a facility on Diego Garcia. The cost of this naval base for both construction and equipment will amount to approximately \$175 million; thus, as you can see, this \$14 million plus \$3.3 million is only a down-payment.

Within the Department of Defense we do have a difference of opinion as to how important the building of this base is to our national interest. The Navy

says that it is imperative for the defense of the United States, particularly in keeping the oil routes open in the Indian Ocean. The CIA has stated that the buildup of the Russians, particularly in Somaliland, is certainly not as extensive as outlined by Admirals testifying for this project.

Mr. President, is this Southeast Asia and Vietnam all over again? It appears to me that our Government must have learned something about trying to be policemen for the World during our experience in Vietnam; 45,000 dead and 300,000 wounded men must certainly mean something to us. I respectfully submit that the United States cannot go on attempting to be a policeman for the World. And most certainly in my humble opinion, the construction of this operating base in the Indian Ocean is only a further effort by the Department of Defense to play the role of policeman in the Indian Ocean and to actively involve our military forces in the politics of an area that now wants to be left at peace. Yet in the face of all the nations in the littoral area requesting that we not build up Diego Garcia as a naval base, there are those individuals in high places that contend we should go ahead in our own national interest with the building of this naval base. I ask the question—what really are our vital interests in the Indian Ocean besides gunboat diplomacy and "showing the flag"? Our presence in the Indian Ocean had no effect on the oil situation during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, in fact, our naval vessels were completely cut off from Arab oil and the United States could do nothing about the Arab action.

In closing, there are a few points that I would like to make that I think have a direct bearing in my opinion upon whether or not Diego Garcia funding should be approved to build a naval base on Diego Garcia. In allowing this naval base to be built, I think Senators should be aware that they are actually voting for a 3-ocean Navy. It is my contention that this base on Diego Garcia could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. We already have an admission from the Navy of a cost of \$173 million. Oh yes, the Navy will contend that the base will only cost \$35 million but they are not telling the American people of the cost for salaries of the Seabees that are building the base, nor are they advising the Congress of the complete costs for the communications equipment and other machinery that will go into the making of this base.

I submit that all of the information I have in hand shows that the aircraft carrier is now obsolete with the technical advancement of the new cruise missiles and I might say, by way of explanation, that in the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets always know exactly, where our carriers are.

I state that for just this one time cannot the United States Government wait and really find out what the intentions of the Soviet Union are in regard to the Indian Ocean. All the reports I have indicate that the Soviet Union's naval activity is of a low order.

In summary I would like to say that it appears to me that our Department of Defense is advocating a 3-ocean Navy to station sailors 10,500 miles from home and putting obsolete carriers in the Indian Ocean, which are vulnerable and practically defenseless against new weaponry.

Are we building a naval base, a new Wake Island, that is completely, in time of crisis, undefendable?

Mr. President, in closing I am reminded of a very important incident that occurred on the floor of the Senate. Some years back when the Defense Appropriation Bill was on the floor and the Senate was considering appropriating money for the Navy for naval landing craft (FDL's) the late great chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Richard Brevard Russell, said and I quote: "If we make it easy for the Navy to go places and to do things, we will find ourselves always going places and doing things." I remind the Senate in approving the building of a naval base on Diego Garcia that we will be making it easy for the United States to go to the Indian Ocean and more than likely that we will do things.

SECTION VIII

References

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 1974 PROCUREMENT SUPPLEMENTAL

- I. Senate report on S. 2999; report # 93-781; April 9, 1974.
 - A. Page 29; Statement of Title III Military Construction request of \$29m by Navy for Diego Garcia. Matter deferred on the basis of (1) there being no written agreement with the United Kingdom as to the proposal and the future status of Diego Garcia, and (2) the testimony by the Navy Department did not reveal the matter to be an urgent one.
- II. House report on H.R. 12565; report # 93-934; March 25, 1974.
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 - B. Pages 12-15; Statement of House Armed Services Committee position on the Diego Garcia request. (Approved).
- III. Conference Report on H.R. 12565; report # 93-1064; May 24, 1974.
 - A. Page 2; Title III, site in the bill.
 - B. Page 9; House conferees recede on the authorization of \$29m for Diego Garcia with Senate assurance that the project would be given careful consideration by the Senate in the military construction bill for FY 1975.
- IV. Senate hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 2999; March 12 and 19, 1974.
 - A. March 12, 1974—pages 40-56; Statement by Admiral Moorer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; on Diego Garcia. Questioning of Admiral Moorer, and Honorable William P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense by Senator Symington.
 - B. March 12, 1974—Pages 59-61; further questioning by Senator Symington of Admiral Moorer and Secretary Clements.
 - C. March 12, 1974—pages 63-65; further questioning by Senator Symington of Admiral Moorer and Secretary Clements.
 - D. March 12, 1974—page 87; further questioning by Senator Symington of Admiral Moorer and Secretary Clements.
 - E. March 19, 1974—pages 152-165; statement by Senator Claiborne Pell re Diego Garcia and questioning by Senators Symington, Goldwater and Scott of Va. of Senator Pell.
 - F. March 19, 1974—page 183; Statement by Senator McGovern re Diego Garcia.
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 - C. March 18, 1974—pages 10-20; Statement by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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 - E. March 18, 1974—pages 53-54; Questioning by Congresswoman Schroeder of Secretary Clements and Admiral Moorer.
 - F. March 18, 1974—pages 57-58; Questioning by Congressman Hunt of Secretary Clements and Admiral Moorer.
 - G. March 19, 1974—pages 103-112; Questioning by Congresspersons Bennett, Arends, Bray, Robert Price, Holt, Pike, White, Dan Daniels, and Fisher of Secretary Clements, Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Doolin.
 - H. March 19, 1974—page 115; Congressman Whitehurst questioning Secretary Clements.

- I. March 19, 1974—page 262; Congressman Gubser proposed amendment to provide that none of the funds authorized in section 301-B shall be used for POL facilities Diego Garcia until such time as naval petroleum reserves are utilized in an amount at least equal to the petroleum products which will be stored and consumed from such facilities on Diego Garcia.
- J. March 19, 1974—pages 267-270; Congressman Pike's amendment to strike sections 301-A and B of the bill which would strike the Diego Garcia project. (Defeated) Further questioning by Congressmen Stratton, Daniel, Pike, Dickinson, Fisher, Leggett of Mr. Doolin.

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 - A. Page 6; synopsis of Diego Garcia issue and the Armed Services Committee's action of approving \$14.802m of the Navy request and the \$3.3m Air Force request.
 - B. Page 34; restatement of Committee action on the Navy request of \$29.0m.
- II. House Report on H.R. 16136; report #93-1244; July 31, 1974.
 - A. Page 32; House Committee action on \$29.0m Navy request. Statement of Committee's feeling our presence in the Indian Ocean to be major factor of U.S. foreign policy.
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 - A. July 11—pages 138; Statement by Rear Admiral Charles D. Grojean, USN; Director, Politico-Military Policy Division; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Letter to Senator Symington re Diego Garcia from Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, pp. 139-40. Pp. 140-159 Senator Symington questioning Admiral Grojean and Rear Admiral A. R. Marschall, USN, Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command; Capt. W. C. Giovanetti, USN; and Lt. Col. David J. Cade, USAF. Other Senators participating in questioning: Senators Taft and Dominick.
 - B. Pages 161-172; Statement of W. E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, accompanied by John B. Chomeau, Office of Strategic Research; William B. Newton, Office of Current Intelligence; and George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel. Questioning of the above mentioned gentlemen by Senators Symington, Taft and Dominick.
- V. House Hearings before Subcommittee #5 of the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 14126; June 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19, 26, 27, 28.
 - A. June 26, 1974; Pages 560-572. Statement of Rear Admiral Charles D. Grojean, USN; Director, Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; accompanied by Rear Admiral A. R. Marschall, CEC, USN, Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Questioning of the above gentlemen by Congressmen Pike, Whitehurst, White, Beard, King, Brinkley.
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