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ANNUAL REVIEW

of the

U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITIES
SYSTEM

November 15, 1960

Prepared by the
Departments of State and Defense

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

Section I	Introduction
Section II	Conclusions
Section III	Overseas Military Facilities System
Section IV	Major Common Problems
Appendix A	Country Evaluations
Appendix B	Status of the Nash Report Recommendation

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FOREWORD

This report has been prepared by the Departments of State and Defense pursuant to the President's Directive that "each year the then existing base system should be reviewed" and that "earnest and continuous scrutiny should be given by all appropriate officials as to whether each overseas base throughout the world continues to represent a net advantage to U.S. security" (NSC Action No. 1876).

For the purpose of such a determination, "overseas base /s/" have been considered to include all installations operated by the U.S. military services, whether directly or through civilian contractors, to meet U.S. military requirements. Thus construed, the term extends beyond those large installations from which air, sea, or land combat operations could be mounted directly, and which are normally connoted by the word "base." It includes a variety of supporting and other activities, such as logistics facilities, communications and intelligence-collecting installations, and research and development stations.

The term does not, however, include the use of U.S. military personnel in advisory or training capacities abroad for the development of foreign military capabilities in as much as such activities are considered to fall outside the scope of this report. In preparing this report the term "military facilities" is used in preference to "military bases". It was considered that the term "military facilities" more aptly described overseas military installations and did not necessarily connote a combat operational capability.

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SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

In his letter of October 15, 1956, the President requested the late Frank C. Nash to undertake a wide range study of all elements of the United States' system of overseas military bases and operating facilities and to make recommendations regarding U.S. policies. The Nash Report, as completed in December, 1957, was referred by the President to the National Security Council for recommendations. Although 123 different recommendations and conclusions were identified by the NSC Planning Board, the Board submitted to the NSC recommendations only on nine basic and major policy issues. With certain revisions, the NSC approved these recommendations including a requirement that a review of existing base systems should be submitted annually to the Council. The President further directed that there should be continuous scrutiny of each overseas base by the appropriate U.S. officials to assure that it continues to represent a net advantage to United States security (NSC Action No. 1876).

Annually, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) review the military requirements of the Services for overseas facilities to determine what facilities are necessary for the implementation of approved U.S. military policy and plans. Requirements approved by the JCS are incorporated in the annual Defense document, "U.S. Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO)."¹ USBRO includes requirements for new overseas facilities and revalidates the continued need for existing overseas facilities.

The JCS assessment is based on military factors and does not take into account foreign political and other considerations. In the case of new facilities, the political factors are assessed when the Department of Defense requests the Department of State to negotiate with the appropriate foreign government for the facilities and operating rights required. A decision to approach the Government concerned then rests upon a determination that, with both the military and political factors evaluated, the proposed facility would be of net advantage to U.S. security. If during the course of negotiations, developments indicate that the facility would, in fact, not be of net advantage, the request is withdrawn.

The fulfillment of military requirements overseas has of course always been subject to the possible development of adverse political factors, either during the course of negotiations or after installations were in place. For this reason, the problem of "net advantage to U.S. security" has always been a matter of State-Defense consideration. However, until recent years there was no systematic review

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of existing facilities except for their revalidation as military requirements by the JCS. As a result of NSC Action No. 1876, the Departments of State and Defense undertook in early 1959 the first thorough evaluation of the then existing overseas military base system against the criterion of "net advantage" from the combined political and military standpoint. In reports submitted to the NSC in January, 1959 and March, 1959, the Secretaries of State and Defense stated that they considered the system as a whole as well as each base to be of net advantage to U.S. security. Subsequently, in October, 1959, the President requested the Secretary of Defense to reexamine the overseas base system and to review the findings and recommendations of the Nash Report. This study by Defense was to provide a basis for Council discussion of U.S. overseas bases with special emphasis on the implications of developments in the missile field.

The Secretary of Defense submitted his report to the President on July 18, 1960. It was referred to the NSC Planning Board for comment. The Board noted that the Departments of State and Defense were then preparing the annual review required by NSC Action 1876 and that the Defense Report and the State/Defense "net advantage" review were complementary. The Board agreed that the two papers should not be considered separately but should be presented to the NSC at the same time.

An essential element in this State/Defense review of the net advantage or disadvantage of overseas military facilities is the annual report submitted by each Chief of Diplomatic Mission in accordance with Department of State instructions (CA-9273, April 27, 1959). These instructions request his analysis of the local political factors as they currently affect each facility and the total facility complex in his country. This report supplements the continuous flow of daily reporting and analysis received from the field by the Departments of State and Defense. The determination as to the net advantage of each facility to United States defense. The determination is made in Washington after appraisal of military, political and other security is made in Washington after appraisal of military, political and other pertinent factors. The fact that an overseas military facility creates political liabilities or risks to the attainment of particular U.S. objectives in a country does not in itself justify a determination that the facility is a net disadvantage. Such liabilities and risks may be outweighed by the military and other considerations involved leading to the conclusion that the facility represents a net advantage to U.S. security.

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SECTION II - CONCLUSIONS

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1. A national security policy based on the will to deny Sino/Soviet aims toward world domination will require a substantial system of overseas U.S. military facilities of varying scope and pattern.

2. Except in the case of Morocco where we desire to keep certain facilities but have agreed to the withdrawal of the major United States facilities by the end of 1963, facilities in the current system represent a net advantage to U.S. security. At the present time, however, the system contains certain facilities which could be eliminated but have been temporarily retained in connection with pending negotiations.

3. The stability and reliability of U.S. military facilities overseas is usually greatest in countries with whom we have mutual defense treaties particularly NATO. It is preferable that overseas facilities with strike or combat operational missions related to the capability of the United States to conduct general war be located in such areas.

4. While the overseas military facilities system fulfills important foreign policy objectives, a facility which has outlived its military usefulness should not be continued solely for political considerations. Each facility in the system should fulfill a basic military requirement. Since overseas military facilities frequently have political disadvantages which are prejudicial to U.S. interests, they should be kept under continuing review to assure that they are vital militarily.

5. Developments in the field of new and long-range weapons will have only a limited and gradual effect upon the total system in the foreseeable future. Requirements will be reduced for facilities which have been supporting the SAC medium bomber force in the UK, Spain and Morocco and the fighter/bomber and light bomber in the NATO area. A substantial network of overseas facilities to support other features of U.S. military posture will, nevertheless, continue to be required.

6. The existing overseas military facilities system inadequately meets the requirements for support of U.S. military operations in the Middle East (except Turkey), Africa south of the Sahara and South and Southeast Asia mainland in event of limited war or local aggression. To enable the conduct of successful military operations in those areas, airfields, harbor facilities, channels of communication and transportation and other installations are needed. In many cases, these essential physical installations and infrastructure are inadequate or non-existent.

7. While the political conditions in those areas largely preclude the negotiation of the desired agreements which would permit the establishment of or the availability of the needed facilities, careful and selective programming of the MSP and other aid activities for certain countries may provide a way for the development of essential facilities to meet high priority requirements of U.S. forces. While negotiations concerning their availability can be delayed until an opportune time, the availability of these facilities is necessary for emergency military operations.

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8. Technological improvements in Soviet weapons capability and changes in U.S. weapons systems are affecting the military value of certain overseas facilities. As public consciousness of this fact grows, we may be faced in some areas with development of adverse governmental and popular attitudes toward those facilities which will be politically disadvantageous and prejudicial to broader U.S. interests.

9. A significant part of the overseas military facilities system is utilized for intelligence activities as well as normal purposes. In the near future the fulfillment of this requirement will remain a high priority task. The technological developments emerging in the intelligence field have not as yet reached the point where it is possible to consider reducing overseas facilities for intelligence purposes.

10. To clarify the effect upon criminal jurisdiction arrangements of the Supreme Court decision banning the right of courts-martials to try civilians and dependents, the United States should consider officially notifying, where appropriate, foreign governments with whom it has such arrangements of the effect of the Court's decision. Instructions to U.S. negotiators on criminal jurisdiction should permit entering into agreements relating solely to uniformed military personnel and without reference to civilian component or dependents if necessary to conclude an otherwise satisfactory jurisdiction arrangement. In those instances where facilities are manned by a limited number of military personnel and depend primarily on civilians for operational activities, the Secretaries of State and Defense should be authorized to determine that special jurisdiction arrangements are not required.

11. The conduct of U.S. personnel, military and civilian, stationed at overseas military facilities is generally satisfactory. Incidents of misconduct by U.S. personnel are relatively rare though they are often highly publicized and exploited by both friendly and unfriendly elements in foreign countries.

12. The "rights and privileges" accorded to the United States for the operation of overseas military facilities and for its personnel can be a source of friction with host governments and local populations and a contributing factor to the attitude towards the U.S. military presence. To assure a favorable attitude toward the U.S. military presence, such "rights and privileges" should be limited to those necessary for the effective operation of the facility and to enable U.S. personnel to perform their official duties in a satisfactory and efficient manner.

13. While the economic benefits of overseas facilities to host countries generally have been recognized by them, these facilities may also have a detrimental effect.

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effect economically. Land requirements for U.S. facilities should be limited to requirements for active and current operations. Facilities for standby purposes or required for post-hostility requirements should be sought only in exceptional cases. The impact of a facility on the local economy, particularly in under-developed countries, should be carefully studied to determine whether the use of local public services and other resources should be compensated for by the United States.

14. There is a need to publicize more vigorously the valid and persuasive reasons for the U.S. overseas military facilities system to counter the misconceptions put out by the Sino/Soviet Bloc. Emphasis should be placed on the deterrent value of the facilities system and, wherever possible, the facilities should be identified with the basic security interests of the host country and with the overall U.S. objective of protecting the integrity and independence of the non-Communist world.

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SECTION III-THE OVERSEAS MILITARY FACILITIES SYSTEM

1. The Character of the System

The overseas military facility system is a natural and logical consequence of U.S. national security policy; its scope and nature are dependent upon the aims and goals of that policy and are essential to its fulfillment. So long as the Sino/Soviet Bloc continues to demonstrate the ability and determination to use its political, military and economic resources to attain world domination, a key element of U.S. national security policy will be to deny this goal through utilization of all resources available including military power.

The NSC in commenting on the main issues of the Nash Report affirmed generally the need for overseas facilities when it stated as follows:

"Progressively the situation, as affected by tremendous developments in weapons technology and other factors, is going to change rapidly over the next ten years the need for our present overseas base system. Accordingly, while an overseas base system will most probably remain essential (a) to maintain and disperse our deterrent to general war, (b) to maintain forces to deter and cope with local aggression, and (c) to support foreign policy objectives; each year the then-existing base system should be reviewed. In fact, a small net expansion of our base system may be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and to meet Soviet offensive techniques."

An analysis of national security policy and the military strategy derived therefrom identifies the following specific purposes which overseas military facilities are designed to fulfill:

1. The support of a nuclear retaliatory posture which could not be completely neutralized by enemy surprise attack;
2. The support of U.S. forces deployed in furtherance of the "forward strategy concept";
3. The maintenance of an effective posture for the air and sea defense of the North American continent;
4. The support of collective security arrangements to which the United States is a party;
5. The support of U.S. forces to be deployed in situations of limited war or local aggression;
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6. The support of research and development activities relating to long range weapons and military space vehicles;
7. The conduct of essential intelligence operations on the periphery of the Sino/Soviet Bloc area; and

8. The maintenance of essential communications facilities to support U.S. military forces and installations overseas.

The capability and willingness of the United States to counter the employment of aggressive military power by the Sino/Soviet Bloc is made militarily and politically credible by the overseas military facilities system. Under U.S. national security policy the forward deployment of U.S. ground, sea and air forces at overseas military facilities is required in order to bring U.S. military power to bear effectively against Sino/Soviet aggression. These forces will require essentially the same facilities system, with some adjustments in selected areas. Militarily, the present dispersal of U.S. combat operational capability to numerous facilities overseas provides an added advantage by requiring the potential enemy to spread his "strike" capability and complicating his ability to neutralize the United States retaliatory posture.

Military facilities overseas also fulfill important political objectives. They provide forceful and concrete evidence to all nations of the determination of the United States to resist communist expansion and to support allies who are thus threatened. The meeting of these objectives is, however, a secondary benefit and does not justify the establishment or retention of a facility if the military value or purpose does not exist or no longer exists.

In terms of type, number and geographic location, the present U.S. overseas military facilities system is capable of satisfactorily serving the foregoing purposes and meeting U.S. security requirements. While political problems can develop which would deny or curtail U.S. access to these facilities, there do not appear to exist at this time or to be emerging in the near future major political threats which would bring about any dramatic or large-scale alterations or in the essential elements of the Communist/Free World relationship assuming no change in U.S. national security policy, there will be a continuing requirement for an overseas military facilities system. While internal political developments within a particular country may affect individual facilities, it is not anticipated that they would have any major effect upon the system as a whole.

Aside from the effect of revisions in U.S. national security policy, it is likely that any alterations in the overseas military facilities system will be the result of advances in weapons technology. Foreseeable developments have however, reduced the importance of overseas military facilities to U.S. military

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strategy and will have only a limited impact in the near future on the overseas military facilities system. For example, the advent of the ICBM in significant quantities would permit phasing out overseas facilities for the SAC medium bomber forces located in Spain, the United Kingdom and Morocco. Although these installations are large in physical size and their elimination from the system would substantially reduce the consciousness of the "American presence" in the countries concerned, they are few in number and would not substantially affect the system as a whole. New weapons developments, on the other hand, may create new requirements for overseas facilities. The employment of the Polaris submarines can be made more effective if supporting facilities are available in friendly areas near the Sino-Soviet land mass. Programs to counter the Soviet missile threat require U.S. facilities capable of detecting, tracking and eliminating such missiles. Similarly, research and development activities related to the U.S. long-range weapon and military space vehicle programs are creating a need for specialized technical facilities overseas.

In determining the net advantage of U.S. military facilities, Communist technological progress also affects both the military and political elements of the equation. The growing missile delivery capability of the Soviets has significantly increased the vulnerability of U.S. military facilities overseas. It is likely that a part of the primary strike effort of the Soviets would be directed at the "soft" targets presented by overseas facilities supporting the U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike force. These are essentially the installations in Spain, the United Kingdom and Morocco from which the SAC medium bomber force operates. While the geographic dispersal of these facilities creates targeting problems for the Soviets and might strain their current missile stockpile, this is only a temporary condition. Similarly, the vulnerability of other facilities which support U.S. forces with "strike" or combat operational missions is gradually increasing. At the same time this dispersal of facilities increases the Soviet difficulties of launching a well coordinated attack which could provide essential time and warning during which the U.S. response could be mounted.

While the offensive potential of the Sino/Soviet Bloc has grown, there have also been technological improvements in Bloc defensive capabilities, particularly in the area of air defense against manned aircraft. These developments reduce the military effectiveness of SAC's manned aircraft force and consequently reduce the military value of the overseas facilities supporting that force.

In overseas areas where U.S. facilities are located, the governments and population are becoming more aware of improved Soviet weapons capabilities. At the same time, in their propaganda the Soviets repeatedly stress their ability to launch a nuclear missile attack against U.S. facilities and the host country. As a consequence, the task of maintaining ready and reliable access to the facilities will become politically more difficult and there will be growing reservations abroad as to the value of such facilities in deterring Soviet military aggression or in meeting it without unacceptable destruction of the host country.

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There is one major purpose which the present overseas facility system does not adequately serve -- the support of U.S. forces deployed in situations of limited war or local aggression. The regions where such situations are most likely to develop are the South and Southeastern Asian mainland, the Middle East and Africa. Except in Turkey, U.S. facilities capable of supporting U.S. military operations in those areas are highly limited. Similarly, the local facilities are inadequate, if they exist at all, to support military operations.

If U.S. military operations are to be effective, minimum physical installations should be available in such categories as airfields, harbor facilities, communications and transportation facilities and logistic support installations. The basic need is not for the permanent stationing of U.S. forces but the availability of local facilities from which U.S. forces could, in an emergency, conduct operations in the area. While the lack of facilities is not necessarily a bar to such operations, they can severely impair their success.

In considering overseas military facilities, it is essential to recognize the extent to which certain facilities are utilized for intelligence activities as well as normal military purposes. In the near future the fulfillment of this requirement will remain a high priority task. The technological developments emerging in the intelligence field have not as yet reached the point where it is possible to consider reducing overseas facilities for intelligence purposes.

In summary, it appears that there will be a continuing need for a substantial net of overseas military facilities. The system has and will continue to divest itself of individual and groups of facilities without adversely affecting U.S. security interests. There are at the present time some facilities in the Philippines and the West Indies for which military requirements do not exist but the facilities involved have not been released as yet. It is expected that these areas will be leased formally as a part of the revised facilities agreements now under negotiation. The facilities which are likely to be reduced in the foreseeable future are those required for the overseas deployment of SAC's medium bomber strike force and committed fighter bomber and light bomber forces. New requirements, however, related to other activities such as Polaris submarines, research and development of long range weapons and military space vehicles, communications and intelligence, and anti-Soviet missile measures will, in part, offset those reductions.

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2. Major Political Developments Affecting the System

The operational effectiveness and capability of overseas military facilities is affected by political developments in the country where they are located. These developments and the political climate generally may reflect an external political stimulus, may be purely internal in character or, most likely, may be a mixture of the two. During the period under review there were a number of political developments which have affected or will in the future affect the operations of the system. With the exception of Morocco, where U.S. forces will be withdrawn by the end of 1963, except for certain communication facilities, these developments have not seriously impaired the ability of the United States to use its overseas facilities.

Sino/Soviet attacks on U.S. overseas military facilities continued unabated during the period under review. The Summit collapse, the U-2 and RB-47 incidents and the Malinovsky threat all served to provide occasions for the Communists to intensify their propaganda attacks on United States military facilities. While there are no indications that these events and the Communist campaign have so affected the current policies or attitudes of countries where such facilities are located as to jeopardize their existence or effectiveness, there were certain immediate repercussions or discernable long-term implications. The immediate repercussions were largely limited to a relatively few countries located on the Sino/Soviet periphery from which we conduct active intelligence operations. In such cases we were confronted by the insistence of the host government that it be kept informed or consulted in advance when facilities within its territories are the base for active intelligence operations against the Communist Bloc. While we have agreed to the desires of our allies to be informed or consulted it is too early to determine whether the host government will seek to limit the scope and character of active intelligence operations we wish to conduct from facilities within its borders. In some areas, principally outside the NATO complex, these events were seized upon by governments and political groups and exploited in a manner which, though having no immediate concrete effect, may complicate our ability to operate the facilities involved effectively and ultimately the tenure of the facilities.

It can be expected that the continuing effect of the Communist campaign against overseas U.S. military facilities when coupled with the publicized Soviet advances in space and missile technology will gain adherents to the "lightening rod" philosophy, namely that U.S. facilities overseas by their presence in the country will attract Soviet missile attacks and in some extreme cases the beliefs are held that the facilities are intended to divert these attacks from the U.S. mainland. The current dissension in the U.K. over the berthing of the Polaris submarines is a case in point. It is felt unlikely that such public attitudes

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attitudes will become sufficiently strong that they will affect governmental policy in any countries where the facility involved is related to U.S. combat operational capability.

However, the political repercussions generated by the U-2 and RB-47 incidents have had a lingering effect. Repetitions of similar incidents in the future may have the cumulative effect of creating adverse political attitudes of sufficient strength that they would pose serious threats to continued effective use of the facility involved if not to the continued existence of the facility. Display of national sensitivities over active intelligence operations can be expected from our allies who are immediately adjacent to the Sino/Soviet land mass and from the less politically sophisticated new nations of Africa and Asia.

While the overseas military facilities complex is generally stable, internal political developments in a few countries have or may affect the operational capabilities of the facility. In the case of Morocco, internal considerations resulted in the United States agreeing to evacuate U.S. military facilities by the end of 1963. These facilities are primarily for the support of SAC operations and Navy activities. However, also housed within their limits are communications and passive intelligence activities for which there will exist a requirement after 1963 in Morocco. At this time it is uncertain whether it will be possible to secure Moroccan agreement to permit the continued operation of communications facilities in that country after 1963.

As a part of its efforts to gain a larger role in NATO and to establish itself as a nuclear power, France refused to grant the United States permission to deploy and store nuclear weapons on French soil under U.S. control. This lack of custody and control of nuclear weapons forced the United States to redeploy dual capable aircraft stationed in France to other parts of Europe.

In the case of Cuba, internal political developments have brought into power a government hostile to the United States and in alignment with the Sino/Soviet Bloc. While it has consistently attacked the United States on virtually all matters, including the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo, it has taken no formal action to request the United States to withdraw from the base. Threats against the base have not been accompanied by serious harassing techniques directed towards forcing United States withdrawal from the base. The extent to which the Castro regime will be content to limit itself to a verbal offensive against the base is uncertain and as actions which it can take against the United States become exhausted, it is not unlikely that the base at Guantanamo will become a target for concerted harassment in an effort to make the U.S. position untenable and that the Cuban Government will request closure of the base or the Treaty of 1903 will be denounced.

In the Dominican Republic, the strained relationship between the United States and the Trujillo regime prior to the breaking of diplomatic relations manifested

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itself when the Dominican Republic served notice of its intention not to renew the agreements covering facilities in that country. While the Dominican Government may permit continued use of the facility during the life of the covering agreements, it is in a position to take measures at any time which would for all practical purposes make continued use of the facility untenable or impossible. Alternate arrangements which will make the facility unnecessary are being developed.

In a number of areas such as Libya, Japan, Korea, the British West Indies, Philippines and Taiwan, negotiations have been concluded or are in progress concerning U.S. facilities and the status of U.S. forces. It has been necessary to enter into these negotiations as a result of internal political pressures claiming that the agreements in existence were inequitable and discriminatory when compared to those we have with other allies. The agreements which have been concluded or are under negotiation would not impair the effectiveness of the facilities involved.

In other areas, we have concluded a number of agreements or arrangements which have permitted the establishment of new facilities, primarily related to research and development activities and communications and intelligence activities.

In general and in spite of occasional political outbreaks, the domestic political climate in overseas areas has not inhibited the operation of overseas facilities and has permitted, when necessary, the establishment of additional facilities.

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3. Intergovernmental Agreements and Negotiations

The overseas military facilities system and the presence of U.S. forces and personnel utilizing and manning them rest upon a series of intergovernmental agreements and arrangements which authorize the activities and govern the presence and status of U.S. personnel, military or civilian. In the NATO area, a multi-lateral agreement, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which has been supplemented by bilateral agreements, covers the presence and status of U.S. personnel. While the United States makes extensive use of facilities developed as a part of the NATO Infrastructure Program, it also has arranged with various NATO countries for use of other facilities. Special arrangements may cover all facilities in the country or treat each facility separately. These agreements set forth the conditions, rights and operational and administrative details concerning the functioning of the facilities involved.

In the non-NATO area, the normal practice has been to have a single agreement combine the "status of forces" and the "operating rights" relating to the facility and its personnel. The agreement may be an umbrella one covering all facilities in the country or covering only a single facility. In both the NATO and non-NATO areas, the intergovernmental agreements may be supplemented by technical agreements negotiated between the military authorities of the United States and the host nation. Normally this type of agreement deals with the military operational details of the facility and any inter-military relationships.

In terms of U.S. interests, the agreements which have been negotiated with other governments have proven successful in that they have permitted the effective carrying out of U.S. military operations abroad, have safeguarded the rights of U.S. personnel and provided a reasonably stable definition of relationships between the U.S. forces and their personnel and the host country. Although our agreements with countries where military facilities and personnel are located formally define relationships, a need to renegotiate various aspects of these agreements arises from time to time. "Status of forces" and "operating rights" negotiations are conducted virtually every day as mutual accommodations are made in response to specific developments. These accommodations may take the form of intergovernmental exchanges of notes, understandings on a "modus operandi", and informal acceptance of precedents. In each event, they reflect the considered judgement of the U.S. representatives involved, diplomatic and military, that the essential requirement of assuring the capability for effective operating of the facility remains unimpaired.

^mThe basic problem besetting "status of forces" or "operating rights" agreements is the desire of the host country for "most favored nation" treatment. Those aspects of our agreements on which the host nations mainly focus their concern are (1) any apparent infringement of the prerogatives of sovereignty, particularly in the case of criminal jurisdiction; (2) the extent of U.S. capability

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for unilateral military action in the operation of the facility which could affect the policies or activities of the host country, and (3) the special privileges and favored treatment granted U.S. personnel in comparison to its own citizens. Variations in agreements, unique arrangements, classified understandings, all serve to complicate negotiations since they provide the host nation the opportunity to pick and choose those features which best serve its interests.

The demands of host governments frequently reflect the adjustments in political and social conditions and relationships that have evolved since the original agreements were signed. Efforts to retain the last vestige of special rights or privileges for reasons of convenience, ease of operation, cultural or racial snobbishness or other similar reasons can threaten the continued existence of overseas facilities. Rights and privileges accorded U.S. overseas military facilities and personnel in bilateral agreements should be limited to those necessary for the operation of the facility and to assure that U.S. personnel are able to perform their official duties effectively.

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4. Relationship to the Mutual Security Program

While not its primary purpose, the Mutual Security Program (MSP) does provide a major tool which the United States can selectively employ to meet its needs for overseas military facilities. While the MSP has provided the funds for the U.S. contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Program, the contribution has not been a political "quid pro quo" in securing facilities for U.S. use in the NATO countries. In other areas, particularly underdeveloped countries, there has been and undoubtedly will continue to be, a more direct connection, explicit or implicit, between MSP and U.S. military facilities.

In a limited number of cases such as Spain, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, U.S. aid programs in whole or in part have been a direct "quid pro quo" for the establishment of U.S. facilities in the country. In other areas where we have facilities and conduct aid programs, there is a tacit "quid pro quo" relationship. The degree to which this relationship is voiced varies considerably. In Ethiopia, the continued existence of the facility at Kagnew has been an acknowledged factor in determining the level of military aid to that country. On the other end of the spectrum are the facilities in such places as Portugal, Pakistan, Japan and the Philippines where the willingness of the country to accept U.S. military facilities is a far more subtle but nevertheless real factor in determining aid levels and the composition of the programs.

In addition to the foregoing, the MSP contributes to meeting U.S. requirements for overseas facilities in still another manner -- by assisting in financing the development of facilities for the country's own use but which at the same time meets U.S. military needs. Particularly in those underdeveloped countries with which the United States is allied in a mutual defense effort, the countries' own armed forces require a military facilities system to support their defense effort. Facilities established for and used by the country's forces for its own defense effort are being constructed in places and in a manner that will at the same time fulfill U.S. requirements. Bilateral understandings provide that the U.S. forces can be stationed at those facilities or may utilize them under agreed conditions.

The assistance provided in these instances is normally furnished as a part of the regular economic or military assistance program for that country. (Although the aid may be extended through the MSP, in some instances the funds may originate from U.S. military appropriations. Agreed inter-agency criteria determine whether U.S. military funds or MSP funds are to be used). Politically the technique of using MSP to help a nation develop selected facilities has demonstrated itself to be a more fruitful means of securing facilities to meet U.S. military requirements than efforts to negotiate directly for U.S. facilities. In the newly independent countries with their highly developed sensitivities, it preserves the forms of sovereignty; it provides them a sense of participation in the common defense effort; and it demonstrates in a tangible manner a relationship of equality and partnership with the United States.

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In the critical areas of Africa, the mainland of South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, facilities to support U.S. military operations to meet situations of limited war of Sino/Soviet inspired local aggression are inadequate. Political conditions existing in those areas preclude the establishment of U.S. facilities per se. The MSP has performed and can perform an increasingly important role in meeting those requirements indirectly by selective programming of facilities which the country needs but which can at the same time serve U.S. military needs. Owing to the under-developed character of these areas, the basic modern infrastructure which would be required to support military operations is very limited, e.g., airports are generally inadequate; port facilities are not sufficiently developed; communications and transportation are primitive. For their own orderly economic development, countries in these areas require these essentials of a modern infrastructure system. Frequently, the same facility in the infrastructure system which is needed for development purposes can be used to support military operations. The physical existence of facilities which can support military operations in emergencies is essential to the success of those operations. The political question of the right to use such facilities is one that can be deferred to the time of the emergency.

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5. The Stability and Reliability of the Overseas Military Facilities System

While countries have accepted the presence of U.S. military facilities and personnel as being in their national interest, the American military presence is nevertheless an unnatural condition in the life of the country and tends to have a disturbing and unsettling effect on the political and social life of the country. These effects can occasionally reach the point where the continued presence of the facility and its personnel becomes prejudicial to the attainment of the broader objectives of U.S. national policy or where the facility can no longer be relied upon to meet the purpose for which it was originally established.

The degree to which political disadvantages arising from the U.S. military presence may manifest themselves is dependent upon the interplay of such factors as 1) the strength of common purpose and community of interest between the United States and the host country, 2) the general international climate, 3) the position and prestige of the United States on the international scene, 4) the stage of internal political development of the country, and 5) the attitude and activities of the United States in relation to the facility and the manner in which U. S. personnel conduct themselves.

In considering the stability of the overseas military facilities system, it is necessary to recall that those overseas facilities which have a "striker" or combat operational mission to meet a Sino/Soviet military offensive are largely located in the NATO countries and in those countries of the Far East with which we have bilateral mutual defense treaties. The availability of these vital facilities is assured as long as the basic political alignment of those countries with the United States against the Communist threat continues and in cases where the host country as well as the United States is threatened or under attack. However, the availability of these bases may become less certain when the host country is not directly involved and the United States (in using nuclear weapons or conducting intelligence operations against the Bloc) is not involved.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that some host governments are concerned by the ability of the United States to employ facilities in a unilaterally determined manner. While there has been no serious effort made by host nations to restrict or limit U.S. activities on the facilities, there has been greater insistence by the host nation, as in the case of Norway, that it be consulted, kept fully informed and in some cases consent to the proposed operation. The extent to which a host government is made a party, through appropriate consultative mechanisms, to the activities of the facility, its reliability is considerably enhanced.

With respect to U.S. military facilities located in countries with which we have not joined in a multilateral or bilateral mutual defense treaty, only in Spain and Morocco do we have facilities with "striker" missions. Other facilities in these

SECRET

By M NARA Date 10/15/83
Authority NND 9840-A

in these areas, while they perform essential functions, are needed primarily to support and contribute to the general military posture of the United States. The stability of facilities in the non-defense treaty areas is generally less assured in the long run. International developments, local political struggles and at times events of seemingly little importance have greater influence and often affect the stability of the facility in the country in these areas in a way which is at times difficult to comprehend. Situations where the continued presence of the facility can become a serious political disadvantage to U.S. security interests can develop rapidly and for reasons which, in our view, bear little relationship to the presence of the facility. While only in Morocco has it been necessary to agree to the withdrawal of U.S. facilities, the situation in Cuba, Libya, Saudi-Arabia, Cyprus and Ethiopia where facilities are maintained requires continuing and careful attention.

In general, reports from Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions and other available information indicate that the outlook as to the stability and reliability of the overseas military facilities in the near future is a favorable one.

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SECTION IV - MAJOR COMMON PROBLEMS

1. Criminal Jurisdiction:

Although the problem of criminal jurisdiction has not affected the operations of U.S. military facilities, it continues to be an important factor in our relationships with some countries. In some non-NATO countries where a "Status of Forces" agreement or a "Base Agreement" provides a jurisdiction formula less favorable to them than in NATO countries and since the exercise of jurisdiction and sovereignty are so intimately related, this inequity has been exploited by local elements to the detriment of the overall cooperative effort. Although opposition political forces have seized upon the issue of jurisdiction and any incidents which may arise for exploitation in order to damage the common defense effort, some friendly governments and political groups have been concerned over this disparity in treatment and sincerely consider that their national sovereignty is not being fully respected. This has led them to seek to renegotiate jurisdiction agreements. Such negotiations are being conducted or may be initiated in the near future in the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea and the British West Indies — areas where important systems of facilities exist.

In accordance with the determination of the NSC, arrangements on criminal jurisdiction have been sought during the course of negotiations which are "at least as favorable as those contained in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement." While as a general policy every effort is made to get as large a measure of immunity as possible for U.S. personnel from the jurisdiction of the host state, what can be obtained depends on such factors as our general relationships with the country, the size of the United States force involved, local population with whom we enter into negotiations fully expects the "most favored nation" treatment. As a rule outside of the NATO area, they have made a concerted effort to inform themselves on the jurisdiction arrangements the United States has with NATO and other countries and are prepared to demand those features which will enable them to exercise the maximum amount of jurisdiction.

U.S. negotiating instructions on jurisdiction arrangements, in furtherance of the NSC determination, normally exceed the minimum NATO SOF requirements, particularly on the points of "waiver" and "official duty determination." In the case of waivers, U.S. negotiators have sought to gain acceptance of the NATO/Netherlands formula which provides that the host government will waive its jurisdiction to the United States in all cases except where it deems the case to be of particular importance. In Japan, the modified version of the NATO/Netherlands formula has been continued, but it has been necessary to continue to classify the agreement due to Japanese political considerations. The Philippines has refused to accept the NATO/

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SECRET

By m NMRA Date 11/15/63

2. Land Requirements

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The period when the United States required substantial acreage on which to build airfields and other major facilities for combat forces has passed. New requirements are usually for relatively small areas, parts of which, because of the nature of the facility, may be used by the local inhabitants, e.g., the antenna farms for communications installations often continue to be used for agricultural purposes. Nevertheless, while the need for new areas has been less than in the past, increasing pressures from some governments and local populace have been directed against the lands which are currently in the hands of U.S. forces solely for its use.

The principal concern of host governments and the local population is over land which has been made available for use by U.S. military forces and which is not used or is only rarely used for purposes related to the military mission of the facility or the force. A continuous review of land holdings is undertaken by the U.S. military forces which permits the return of unneeded lands. Areas in the Philippines, Japan, Newfoundland, the British West Indies and Italy have been returned or are being returned to the host government.

Where a similar requirement for training or maneuvers exists on the part of the host government's armed forces, means are being explored to have the areas made available for joint use with the facility being held by the host government and used by U.S. forces; in some cases where the facility is in U.S. hands, it is made available for use by the forces of the host country. Proper scheduling of the use of the facility by U.S. forces and those of the host government would permit more effective and continuing employment of the facility.

In some cases where land areas have been devoted to "non-military" purposes, primarily recreation and other morale activities, and where normally the local population has been prohibited from utilizing the facilities involved, there has been noticeable resentment by the local communities and a demand for the release of the area. Such facilities are maintained only where local facilities are considered inadequate or unavailable. Aside from the potential economic value of the land, the discriminatory aspects have created considerable irritation and ill-will pre-judicial to U.S. interests. To minimize and wherever possible eliminate these adverse attitudes, close scrutiny is made on a continuous basis to determine the need for the retention of such areas. When conditions permit meeting the needs of the force through locally available facilities, these areas are released to the host government. Where this is not feasible and where the physical location of the area does not affect the military operations of the facility, arrangements are being made to permit the participation and use of the areas by local inhabitants. In those instances where U.S. law or regulations limit the use of the activity to U.S. personnel, e.g., motion picture theaters, efforts are being made to have such installations in inconspicuous areas where their presence is not readily apparent to the local public.

SECRET

Authoritative
By MARA Date 11/15/63

Netherlands formula and has insisted on more favorable waiver provisions.

In attempting to gain acceptance by the host nation of the U.S. position on "official duty determination", the situation has been complicated by the fact that the NATO SOF is silent on this point. Some host governments are reluctant to agree to formal arrangements which would permit the United States unilaterally to make a conclusive and final determination. In Japan it has been possible to agree upon special arrangements which would make the final determination a decision. The Philippines has taken the position that the final determination should be made by the Philippines with respect to offenses occurring outside the area of the family.

A major development affecting jurisdiction arrangements over U.S. personnel with foreign governments occurred in January, 1960, when the Supreme Court ruled that members of the civilian component and dependents could not be tried by court martial in time of peace. Since the Court's action was taken on constitutional grounds, this situation cannot be remedied by legislation. The complex problems raised by the Supreme Court's action have been under study by the responsible executive agencies. A number of alternative arrangements have been studied which would enable the United States to exercise jurisdiction over the civilian component and dependents. All of these alternatives involve substantive and procedural foreign policy and legal problems and would probably require the enactment of special legislation or an amendment to the Constitution. While U.S. military authorities overseas have been advised of the Supreme Court's decision and directed not to subject members of the civilian component or dependents to courts-martial, the United States has not acted to notify officially foreign governments of the decision and its impact upon existing agreements. Those provisions of the agreements which affect U.S. jurisdiction over civilian component and dependents have in fact become inoperative.

Action with respect to those provisions of the agreements which affect United States jurisdiction over the civilian component and dependents has become imperative in order that the status of such persons may be clarified. In pending negotiations on jurisdiction, the negotiators have been instructed to endeavor to obtain agreements which would permit the United States to exercise jurisdiction over the civilian component and dependents in cases where this could be done other than by court-martial. Such provisions are being sought against the eventuality that the Congress might enact legislation permitting the exercise by Federal district courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad by members of the civilian component or dependents of service personnel.

As a result of the Supreme Court decisions holding the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime unconstitutional, uncertainty exists in some countries on the jurisdictional status of such persons. This is not a problem in the NATO area or in countries which have adopted the NATO SOF jurisdictional provisions. In such countries the result of the Supreme Court decisions is to give

SECRET

By CM MARA Date 15/10/63
Authority ND 484061

to give the local courts exclusive jurisdiction over such persons. However, in some other areas where the United States has been given exclusive jurisdiction over members of the civilian component and dependents, the local authorities are unable to exercise jurisdiction. This situation coupled with the effect of the Supreme Court decisions is to create a hiatus where neither the United States nor the territorial sovereign has jurisdiction. Unless remedied, this situation will eventually result in miscarriages of justice.

As requirements in connection with communications, intelligence and research and development activities have grown, facilities have been established in new countries with which we do not have agreements relating to the status of U.S. personnel, particularly on the jurisdiction question. In some cases since the facilities and the United States personnel, military and civilian, involved have been relatively small, it has been possible to secure the consent of the host country to extend assimilated "diplomatic" or other types of exclusive jurisdiction by the United States. In other instances, no provisions on jurisdiction have been negotiated.

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Authority CM NARA Date 4/15/03

3. Consultation on Use of U.S. Military Facilities:

Periods of heightened international tensions intensify the consciousness of host nations to the presence of U.S. facilities and forces and deepen the concern that those facilities and forces might be employed by the United States in a manner which the host government would not necessarily consider consistent with its own interests. U.S. support of the GRC during the Taiwan Straits crisis evoked reactions from the Philippine and Japanese Governments, who do not have mutual defense agreements with the GRC, questioning the use of facilities within their areas to conduct or support combat operations in the Straits. The U-2 and RB-47 incidents brought a number of reactions for assurances that active intelligence operations on this nature were not being conducted from facilities in the host country and would not be undertaken without the knowledge of the host government.

The fear of a nuclear war held by the general public sometimes presents to a government a real political force which must be considered seriously. The presence of U.S. military facilities in the country and the constant reiteration of the Soviet threat against these facilities have contributed to this public concern. To reassure their people, some host governments have considered it necessary to seek arrangements which would not permit any actions by or from U.S. facilities in the country that, without their knowledge, might involve their country in war. Due largely to the nature of the facilities system, these demands have been limited to a relatively few countries and have not become sufficiently inhibiting so as to make the facilities of doubtful military value.

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By m NARA Date 4/15/03
Authority NWD 98484701

The daily operations and activities of U.S. military facilities and personnel can influence the attitudes of the host government and its people. They can make a positive contribution or be the source of strains and stresses which in turn can threaten the stability of the facility itself. Although instances involving the operation of facilities or the activities of U.S. personnel which have an adverse effect locally occasionally arise and usually are given considerable publicity, these instances are comparatively rare. To deal with these relatively few situations, Defense has issued a number of directives stressing command responsibility for assuring that the facilities and personnel do not conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the United States. In this connection the policy of having dependents accompany military personnel has been a major contributing element to their proper behavior and conduct.

Special privileges are normally granted under base rights and status of forces agreements through which United States forces and their personnel are "permitted" duty-free entry of household goods and personnel effects and the duty-free resale of items through the base exchange and commissary. Abuse and unwise exercise of these privileges could be a source of considerable irritation to the host governments and their populations. As a result of a special study, the OCB has established guidelines for all U.S. personnel overseas, civilian and military, which should considerably reduce this possible area of friction. Military commanders are responsible for assuring that effective measures are taken at all overseas military facilities to assure that these privileges are not exercised in a manner which will have an adverse reaction on the local population. Difficulties inevitably arise and military commanders are seeking to minimize them.

A minor irritant frequently arises in connection with the extension of certain of these privileges to groups that are not normally considered a part of the U.S. military force. These groups are primarily the overseas employees of U.S. civilian agencies and the employees of private U.S. firms under government contract to the military services and to civilian agencies. Frequently the civilian agency employee by virtue of special agreements have the same privileges as have been granted to U.S. forces. In these cases the use of the military activities such as PX's, commissaries, motion picture theaters, clubs, etc., is one of convenience for the individual. Civilian contract employees have been granted these special privileges in most agreements at the U.S. request. It was felt this would provide a personal recruiting incentive for the contractor and secondly, would contribute to lower contract costs.

While most host governments recognize that a U.S. military facility brings with it certain economic benefits, the presence of the facility and its operations sometimes impose a financial burden upon the government. In the case of the NATO countries and other developed areas where facilities are located, the principle was established and has been accepted by host countries that to the extent a facility imposes a financial burden it is to be considered a part of that nation's contribution to the common defense. With the extension of the United States' military

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Authoritative
By MARIA DALE Date 4/15/63

ility system into areas that are relatively underdeveloped or are beset with financial difficulties, we have sought to adhere generally to this principle. However, in cases where the burden has become significant, special arrangements have been made to offset it, i.e., reimbursement for the costs of private lands acquired for the facility site, United States upkeep or assistance in the maintenance of roads, and other public services.

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Authority NNND 9840A
By CM NARA Date 9/15/03

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COUNTRY EVALUATIONS

APPENDIX A

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b. Denmark

There are no U.S. military facilities or forces in Denmark proper. The policy of Denmark has been against the stationing of foreign troops within its territory but this reluctance, however, does not extend to Greenland which is constitutionally an integral part of Denmark.

Denmark values and prizes its contribution of Greenland to the defense of Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere and to a large extent regards it as their paid-up membership dues in NATO. The manner in which U.S. facilities in Greenland are operated and administered causes no friction with the Danes and the existence of these facilities has made U.S.-Danish relationships stronger and more intimate. The logistic and scientific help which the U.S. forces in Greenland bring is appreciated and its role in the eventual commercial exploitation of the island recognized.

The Danes, however, are jealous of their sovereignty over Greenland and react instantly and emotionally to any implication or suggestion that this sovereignty might be diminished. The Danish Government views all requests for new facilities or rights or for any extensions in light of possible impairment of Denmark's sovereignty. While some delays have been encountered in meeting requests of the United States, we have always received whatever we really wanted in Greenland. The whole basis for granting such requests is based on Danish conviction of their necessity for the defense of the West. We can impair our rights and our ability to get additional ones if we ask for more and more concessions under the guise of real defense needs when they are in fact and are so considered by the Danes as merely conveniences.

In their relationships with the local population in Greenland, U.S. forces have established an excellent relationship which has greatly contributed to the favorable political climate which exists. They have created a reservoir of good will through their acts of mercy and in their official relations with Danish Government representatives and Greenlanders.

No adverse factors in the Danish or Greenland political climate militate against the retention of U.S. military facilities in Greenland. However, if these conditions are to be maintained, strict attention to Danish sensitivity related to their sovereignty over Greenland is necessary; and their desire to be consulted in advance on questions concerning U.S. military facilities which touch on their interests must be satisfied.

The Danes are also making the Faroe Islands available for Loran and other special facilities.

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I. United Kingdom

Increased tension in East-West relations, unsolved problems within NATO and assuring security against the nuclear threat have exerted varying pressures on the British government and public. While there may be somewhat less confidence today in the ability of NATO to carry out its deterrent and defensive tasks than there was a year ago, the great majority of the British people continue to support the NATO concept as the most effective way of defending the British way of life against the threat from the East.

No serious issues have risen during the period under review to disturb the generally satisfactory course of Anglo-American relations or which have affected the support of the Government or the British people for the retention of U.S. military facilities. Cooperation in this area of defense matters is perhaps even closer than a year ago as typified by such action as agreement on the EMEWS facility. However, the U-2 and RB-47 incidents have set in motion a wave of uneasiness in the United Kingdom concerning U.S. use of military facilities in the United Kingdom. With the shooting down of the United Kingdom based RB-47, participation in control arrangements. Opposition pressure relaxed somewhat after the Prime Minister stated that he was consulting the President to see whether arrangements for U.S. use of military facilities in the United Kingdom should be improved or modified. The public announcements on the U.S.-United Kingdom discussions appear to have eased the pressures on this matter in the United Kingdom. While the U-2 and RB-47 incidents focused unusually concentrated and public attention on U.S. military facilities in the United Kingdom, the repercussions of these incidents do not seem to have significantly affected the solid basis of support for such facilities.

There has been a noticeable growth in agitation for the unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom. Although these "unilateralists" still constitute a small minority group in terms of overall public opinion, they have made inroads in the labor unions and the Labor movement. The National Executive of the Labor Party, as a result of unilateralist pressure, revised its recently adopted "non-nuclear club" defense policy in favor of a formula going much further towards the unilateralist position. It is apparent, however, that the Labor Party's defense policy, which still considers NATO as fundamental to British security, will continue to be under strong attack from a sizable minority of Party members both within and without Parliament.

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A-14

3. Middle East and South Asia

A. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has little identification with those global defense efforts of which U.S. military facilities in that country are a part. It does not openly identify U.S. military operation with its own security, and displays great sensitivity to allegations, from Cairo and elsewhere, that the Dhahran Airfield is a "United States base." In official and public statements, Saudi Arabia emphasizes the point that Dhahran is a Saudi airfield at which U.S. military forces have been granted certain operational facilities, and that it is not an American base.

The Saudi Government agreed to the continuation of U.S. military operations at Dhahran by an agreement of April 2, 1957, which expires in 1962. The military facilities accorded the United States under this agreement are justified by the Saudi Government domestically and within the Arab World by the economic and military benefits which the country enjoys in exchange. The 1957 Agreement was concluded by King Saud over the objection of Prince Faisal. Prince Faisal is known to remain cool toward United States military operations at Dhahran. Since he has assumed primary responsibility for the conduct of government affairs, his attitude may carry considerable weight when renewal of the Agreement is sought. The current attitude of King Saud on this subject is not clear, although he frequently stresses his dependence upon the United States. Thus, it is as yet difficult to judge whether, and on what terms, the present U.S. facilities at Dhahran can be retained upon expiration of the 1957 Agreement.

There do not appear to be in the offering any political developments which in and of themselves would affect U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Although dissatisfaction with the present regime is widespread and occasional subversive rumblings are heard, no emerging civilian or military leader has yet been adequately identified around whom restive factions might coalesce. The leadership of the royal family is calculated more to maintain its own dominant position than to achieve progress in the country. Crown Prince Faisal, who acts as the main fount of authority, has achieved commendable fiscal reforms and has taken preliminary steps toward formulating an economic development program. Apart from occasional lip service, however, he apparently has no intention of embarking on any political reforms that might jeopardize the position of the royal family. The King has also publicly favored economic development, and has flirted with the idea of political reform. In large part, these activities represent an effort to enhance his popular prestige at the expense of that of Prince Faisal, with the ultimate objective of reasserting personal control of government affairs.

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A-18

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B. Pakistan

The United States maintains, under an agreement negotiated with Pakistan, a major military communications facility in that country.

Under the present Pakistani government, all political activity has been banned and the U.S. facility, consequently, has not become nor been a factor in internal politics. Although Pakistani officials generally accept the need for the existence of the facility as a part of the overall defense effort of the Free World, they do not consider it as making any direct contribution to the security of Pakistan.

Until the U-2 incident the location of a U.S. military facility in Pakistan had not been a significant factor in Pakistan's external political relations. As a result of the role of the facility in the incident, Pakistan became a specific target for threats and propaganda attacks by the Communist Bloc and provided additional fuel to Afghan/Pakistani tensions. While nominally seeking assurance from the United States that facilities in Pakistan would not be involved in such active intelligence operations, the Pakistani Government remained unswerving in its alignment with the United States in face of Soviet threats though it has begun to evidence a sensitivity to Soviet pressures connected with United States military presence in Pakistan near the Soviet frontier.

The isolated location and self-sufficiency of the facility has enabled it to maintain excellent relations with the local community and to minimize the awareness of the "American presence" in this politically sensitive area. The anticipated arrival of dependents will result in a much larger American community in this relatively small metropolitan area and the local population will become more "American conscious" than it has been in the past. The extent to which Pakistani attitudes are adversely affected will be largely dependent upon the manner in which U.S. personnel deport themselves and the success of the facility's community relations efforts.

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A-19

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c. Iran

Except for very small and highly specialized facilities relating to communications and intelligence activities, U.S. military operations in Iran are related to advising and training of Iranian forces. The facilities and their operations are not evident and have no impact per se on Iranian governmental and public attitudes.

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A-20

4. Africa

A. Ethiopia

The only U.S. military facility located in Ethiopia is part of the military communications system. Negotiations are currently being conducted for an expansion in this facility.

From a political point of view, certain advantages and disadvantages accrue to the United States by virtue of the existence of the facility. Ethiopia has, in the past year, been steadily drifting towards a more neutral political posture. A continued U.S. military presence should act, to some degree at least, as a barrier to the adoption of complete neutrality. Nevertheless, the closure of the facility in Ethiopia appears to be a long-range objective of the Bloc and it can be expected that it will seek through its growing relations with the Ethiopian Government to achieve this goal.

The Ethiopians have consistently looked upon the U.S. military assistance program, in large part, as a consideration for the facilities which have been made available to the United States. Time and again their demands for increased military assistance has been made against veiled and implied threats to terminate the communications facility.

Given the political drift in Ethiopia, the unceasing aid requests and increased Bloc relationships, our ability to maintain occupancy of the communications facility may become more difficult than in the past.

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A-21

B. Morocco

Under the Heads of State Accord of December 22, 1959, the United States agreed to the withdrawal of U.S. military facilities from Morocco by the end of 1963. While the United States is prepared to close down all major facilities by that time, the United States mentioned during the December, 1959 talks that there would be an urgent requirement for continuing certain minor communications facilities after 1963 which it was hoped the Moroccans would approve. The King of Morocco, claiming not to recall such mention, has nevertheless indicated a willingness to consider U.S. proposals. Discussions with the Moroccans on post 1963 requirements have not yet been actively initiated.

The favorable reaction to the December, 1959 agreements has given way to renewed Moroccan tenseness regarding the need to eliminate foreign forces from the country. Any Moroccan Government, whatever its political complex, is almost certain to feel that this requirement is a sine quo non for the full realization of national sovereignty. No antidote to this aspect of Moroccan nationalism is presently apparent. Three recent developments appear most responsible for this increased tenseness. First, the new government of the King and the Crown Prince sought to demonstrate its determination to be the champion of popular issues and not the victim. Second, the government's desire not to let the left-wing politicians capture the nationalist role for themselves. Third, recent international developments such as the demonstrations in Japan, the threats to Guantanamo by Castro, the evacuation of Belgian bases in the Congo, have shown the Moroccans that it is a popular idea around the world to rid one's country of foreign bases. As a result of these attitudes, the government has served notice that it regards the speedy departure of foreign forces as a compelling popular issue and national requirement. Negotiations with the Spanish and French are being conducted on the withdrawal of their forces. While the Crown Prince has indicated that he and his father would respect the December, 1959 accord, he and other Moroccan officials have suggested to the U.S. Ambassador and other ranking U.S. officials the modification of the accord to provide an earlier termination date.

In balancing the favorable and adverse factors relating to the presence of U.S. military facilities, the weight of the unfavorable side is greater than in past years and represents a serious and far reaching net political disadvantage to the United States. Nevertheless, certain ameliorating and positive measures can be taken to assure tenure of these facilities through 1963 and reduce the pressure for earlier withdrawal, foster the possibility of gaining reentry rights to the facilities for contingency purposes and encourage sympathetic consideration and possible consent to post 1963 facilities. These measures may prove to have some efficacy and value but they would in no way alter the basic Moroccan determination to cause the closure of U.S. military facilities and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

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A-22

BY CMA-NARA Date 9/15/62
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Union of South Africa

The Union of South Africa's geographic position makes it an excellent site for scientific facilities required by the military research and development program concerned with long range weapons and military space vehicles, particularly those activities carried out on the Atlantic Missile Range. During the period under review, special arrangements were made in individual cases with the South African Government to base United States military planes and ships at South African airfields and ports to carry on the necessary scientific observations. In order to meet effectively the continuing need for the intensified military R and D program, the United States has entered into discussions with the South African Government to establish permanent observation facilities in South Africa. Preliminary indications are that the SAG will be fully cooperative and consent to the establishment of these facilities.

SECRET

A-23

By CM NARA Date 9/15/03
Author NYD 484061

Libya

The balance of factors affecting U.S. military facilities in Libya continues relatively unchanged. For all practical purposes, there is still no self-identification on the part of the Libyans with the defense efforts or purposes of which the U.S. military facilities and operations are a part. The willingness on the part of the Libyans to accept these facilities has been entirely dependent upon the economic benefits to Libya which accrue from these arrangements.

While the Libyan Government recognizes the economic advantages of the presence of U.S. military facilities, its attitudes towards the facility is also affected by U.S. attitudes, policies and action which affect the Middle East and North Africa and by internal problems which arise from the presence of the facility such as proximity to Tripoli, jet plane noise, heavy vehicular traffic, a foreign community with different religious and cultural background, spectacular contrast in standards of living, etc. The effect of these factors have been felt primarily in an increased "price" for the facility which in the minds of the Libyans results in a satisfactory balance that justifies continuation of the facilities.

The successful conclusion of the recent financial negotiations with the Libyan Government, together with the memorandum of understanding on the military facilities agreement which was signed at the time, has resulted in improving considerably the immediate political and psychological outlook for the U.S. facilities complex in Libya. It is felt that barring unforeseen developments, Libyan officials will probably be more inclined during the immediate future to cooperate with the United States in seeking to reduce some of the problems and frictions which have existed in the past. The decision by the United States to initiate construction of the access road to Wheelus field should contribute materially and psychologically towards the development of generally more favorable conditions.

Despite carping criticism and constant irritation caused on both sides by the presence of U.S. military facilities in Libya, these facilities are considered to be to the net advantage of the United States. The financial advantages to the Libyans of the recent negotiations and the degree of inertia in their generally pro-Free World politics outweigh for the present the presumptive effects on Libyan attitudes of reaction to the U-2 and RB-47 incidents, Soviet missile threats and the "anti-Pase" propaganda of Afro-Asian neutralists. It should be pointed out, however, that to the degree Libya becomes financially more independent, the outlook is that in the long run the presence of U.S. facilities could develop to the net disadvantage of the United States.

SECRET

A-24

B. The Bahamas

U.S. military facilities have been established in the Bahamas under agreements negotiated with the United Kingdom but their implementation requires the concurrence of the Government of the Bahama Islands. The government has wholeheartedly supported U.S. operations in its territory and there has been a remarkable absence of suspicion of U.S. motives or criticism of the government for making land available. However, it is deeply conscious of its prerogatives and powers and jealous of any infringement of them.

There is no particular consciousness of an American military presence. The large number of American tourists, the relatively isolated location and self-sufficiency of the facilities and the fact that personnel off-duty normally wear civilian clothes all serve to make the presence of U.S. military relatively inconspicuous.

Considerable interest was aroused in the Bahamas, the U.K. and the U.S. by the news (coincident with the Holy Loch controversy in Britain) of the U.S. Navy's desire to establish an Undersea Test and Evaluation Center in The Tongue of the Ocean and Exuma Sound area. However, rights to establish this Center will in all likelihood be readily granted.

SECRET

A-38

C. Bermuda

After being established in Bermuda for the last 19 years, the U.S. military facilities and their personnel are accepted as an important and integral part of the Island's social and economic pattern. These favorable patterns are bolstered by the close and extensive business, family and social ties Bermudians have with the United States.

While Bermuda continues to remain relatively stable and no political parties qua parties exist, increasing population pressures, rumblings of racial discontent and impatient developing labor organizations will have an important impact on future stability and possible implications for the future of U.S. military facilities.

The issue of the Ferry Point Bridge remains as the only significant point of friction with the Bermuda Government which holds that in connection with the Leased Base Agreement of 1941 the United States has a legal commitment to provide a bridge for transportation between St. George's Island and Somers Island other than across Kindey Air Base. In a note of June 30, 1955 to the British Embassy, the United States agreed that the bridge should be constructed at U.S. expense. Congressional authorization for this project has been given to the USAF but final approval of the appropriate Congressional appropriations subcommittee to utilize USAF military construction funds to build the bridge has not been secured despite continuing efforts by State and Defense. The use of such funds by USAF for preliminary engineering surveys has been approved but no action is being taken on the Bridge project as a result of a recent visit and study of the project by the Financial Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. Consideration is now being given to an alternate facility to be built for the Bermudians in fulfillment of the outstanding commitment. However, continued delay serves to provide the British and Bermudians with a standing complaint that the U.S. has not honored its obligations. This issue has been used in the past and may well be used in the future by the Bermudians as grounds for denying the U.S. additional requests for facilities or rights.

SECRET

A-39

D. British West Indies

In 1941 when the destroyers-for-bases agreement was made between the United States and the United Kingdom, there was no prior consultation with the West Indies colonies concerned with the U.S. military facilities to be located within their territories. Since that time, the West Indies colonies have been united in a federation (established in 1958) and gained self-government in August 1960. The West Indies Federation will become completely independent in a year or so. The U.S. military facilities in the West Indies have played a special and unique role in the political development of the area. The problems of the facilities and the local issues they created started the West Indies thinking of themselves regionally and as an emergent nation, and contributed to the developing sense of West Indian nationalism.

There has been a growing view in the West Indies that they should have a voice in any facilities agreement affecting their territory. The presence of large areas of land designated as "leased areas" for U.S. military use, occasional incidents between U.S. personnel and the local citizenry, the desire for the return of the Chagaramas area (a leased area on which a naval station exists) to be the site of the federation capital, uncertainty as to the role and function of the West Indies have all contributed to demands for discussions to revise the existing "Leased Bases Agreement." The agreement of the United States to enter into such discussions with the British and West Indian representatives has served to improve the political climate in that it denied the argument that the United States was too intransigent to give careful consideration to the West Indian point of view. These talks began in early November, 1960, with representatives of the United Kingdom and the West Indies.

Although the West Indians have little awareness of what is happening in the rest of the world or desire to take a hand in the struggle between the free world and the Communist Bloc, the United States enjoys a large and deep seated store of goodwill and respect throughout the area. Nevertheless, there is a need for continued improvement in the local political climate, particularly in Trinidad, if U.S. military facilities in the area are to operate effectively. The major factor in this situation will be the revision of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement. If the West Indians gain what they consider to be satisfactory solutions on such questions as tenure, criminal jurisdiction, land requirements, Chagaramas and joint use in the facilities, the prospects for these facilities being a net advantage to the United States is considerably enhanced.

SECRET

A-40