

Based on the reasoning of GAGELER CJ, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ, I have reconstructed their chain of arguments into a formal modus ponens structure:

1. If s323(1)(c) requires only proof of an agreement to commit acts constituting an offence (without requiring proof of knowledge of all elements), then it covers the same activity as common law doctrines of acting in concert, joint criminal enterprise, and common purpose. (Implied from paras 36-37)

Parliament intended s323(1)(c) to cover the same activity as those common law doctrines. (Para 36)

Therefore, s323(1)(c) requires only proof of an agreement to commit acts constituting an offence.

2. If s323(1)(c) requires only proof of an agreement to commit acts constituting an offence, then the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew all elements of the offence. (Implied from paras 29-30)

s323(1)(c) requires only proof of an agreement to commit acts constituting an offence. (Conclusion from argument 1)

Therefore, the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew all elements of the offence.

3. If the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew all elements of the offence, then for offences where knowledge of age is not an element, the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew the age of the victims. (Implied from paras 32-33)

The prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew all elements of the offence. (Conclusion from argument 2)

Therefore, for offences where knowledge of age is not an element, the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew the age of the victims.

4. If for offences where knowledge of age is not an element, the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew the age of the victims, then the trial judge did not err in not directing the jury that such knowledge had to be proved. (Implied from paras 38-42)

For offences where knowledge of age is not an element, the prosecution does not need to prove the accused knew the age of the victims. (Conclusion from argument 3)

Therefore, the trial judge did not err in not directing the jury that such knowledge had to be proved.

5. If the trial judge did not err in not directing the jury that knowledge of victims' ages had to be proved, then the Court of Appeal erred in quashing the convictions on that basis. (Implied from para 43)

The trial judge did not err in not directing the jury that such knowledge had to be proved. (Conclusion from argument 4)

Therefore, the Court of Appeal erred in quashing the convictions on that basis.

Final Conclusion:

If the Court of Appeal erred in quashing the convictions, then the appeal should be allowed and the respondent's appeal against conviction should be dismissed. (Implied from para 43)
The Court of Appeal erred in quashing the convictions. (Conclusion from argument 5)
Therefore, the appeal should be allowed and the respondent's appeal against conviction should be dismissed. (Para 43)

This final conclusion precisely reflects the culmination of the argument chain and matches the disposition of the case as stated in paragraph 43 of the judgment.