



National
Qualifications

X837/77/11

History

Marking Instructions

Please note that these marking instructions have not been standardised based on candidate responses. You may therefore need to agree within your centre how to consistently mark an item if a candidate response is not covered by the marking instructions.



General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.

- (a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.
- (b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.
- (c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.
- (d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.
- (e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.
- (f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.
- (g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are
 - relevant to the issue in the question
 - developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
 - used to respond to the demands of the question (for example, evaluate, analyse).

Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions

To gain more than 12 marks in a 25 mark essay question, candidates must make a reference (however minor) to historiography. If candidates do not refer to or quote from historians, or show that they have considered historical schools of thought, they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marking scheme and so will not achieve more than 12 marks.

The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

Marking criteria grids

The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria

- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given **in bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

25 mark questions – mark ranges and individual marking criteria

| | | Mark ranges | | | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------|--|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| Marking criterion | STRUCTURE | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | | An attempt to structure the essay, including at least one of the following | Structure displays a basic organisation, but this may be loose. This includes | Structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This includes | Clearly structured, perceptive presentation of issues. This includes | Well-defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question. This includes | Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout. This includes |
| | | No relevant functional introduction which relates to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• relevant functional introduction.• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue; generally summative. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• relevant functional introduction.• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue; generally a summation of the argument. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• relevant functional introduction with main interpretations.• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument.• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, evaluating the key issues. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument.• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues and/or points. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument.• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues and/or points. |

| | | Mark ranges | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|--|--|---|--|---|--|
| Marking criteria | THOROUGHNESS AND/OR RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue shows some awareness, if superficial, of the narrative involved. For example, attempt to engage with two relevant factors in the issue; attempt to show links between the factors and the whole question.• Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue; attempt to show different views or interpretations. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue, engaging with key or main narrative points.• Factual content links to the issue. Approach relates to analysis. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue.• Factual content links to the issue. Approach relates to analysis and evaluation. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge.• Points of evidence link to points of analysis or evaluation. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.• Points of evidence clearly link to points of analysis or evaluation. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.• Points of evidence clearly support and link to points of analysis and evaluation. |

| | | Mark ranges | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|---|--|--|---|--|--|
| Marking criteria | ANALYSIS, EVALUATION AND LINE OF ARGUMENT | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | No evidence of analysis. OR Analysis is not relevant to the question. | Much narrative and description rather than analysis and evaluation. Weak sense of argument but an attempt to show the extent to which a factor is supported by the evidence. | Attempt to answer the evaluative aims of the question and analyse the issues involved, although this is possibly not deep or sustained, but includes the relevant isolated factor. There is a sense of the overall impact or significance of the factors when taken together. Argument is generally clear and accurate but there may be confusions. | Sound awareness of the evaluative aims of the question and the candidate tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis. Argument is clear and accurate, and comes to a suitable – largely summative – conclusion. | Secure grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues. Argument is clear and directed throughout the essay. Conclusions arise logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body, and attempts synthesis. | Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues. Firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues. Clarity in direction of argument linking to evaluation. Conclusions give a robust overview or synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors. | Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues with a detailed and effective analysis and evaluation which advances the argument and considers various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones. Conclusions give a robust overview or synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors. |

| | | Mark ranges | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|---|--|---|--|---|--|---|
| Marking criteria | HISTORICAL SOURCES AND INTERPRETATIONS | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | No discernible reference to historical works. | General reference to historical works. | Some awareness of historians’ interpretations in relation to the issue. | Awareness of historians’ interpretations and arguments. | Sound knowledge and understanding of historians’ interpretations and arguments. | Sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent. | Sound knowledge and understanding of historians’ interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography. Note: the term ‘current historiography’ refers to the prevailing present thinking on the issue, not necessarily recent works. |
| | | | | May use historians as illustrative points of knowledge. | May use historians as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation. | Some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. | Some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them; may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations. | Consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations. |

Marking the source-handling questions

There are three standardised stems used in the source questions

- ‘How fully . . .’ or ‘How much . . .’
- ‘Evaluate the usefulness . . .’
- Interpretation of two sources

‘How fully . . .’ question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to add knowledge as exemplification of interpretation points to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source does not reveal about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Up to 3 marks

- interpretation of points from the source.

Up to 7 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the source with the candidate’s own historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information such as omissions
- other points of view, including additional historians’ interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Candidates should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is. They can gain up to **3 marks** by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. Candidates cannot gain marks for simply quoting points from the source; they must paraphrase or interpret them to gain marks.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual development they give in their overall evaluation of the source’s comprehensiveness. This should include the views of two relevant historians (**2 marks** are available for this). Where a candidate includes the views of additional historians, award marks for wider contextual development.

There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question, and therefore no marks awarded for this.

‘Evaluate the usefulness . . .’ question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- consider the provenance of the **entire** source in light of the topic being discussed. At all stages of the answer the provenance should underpin commentary which should include analysis and evaluation of the source
 - source rubric provenance – comment on authorship, purpose and timing of the source in light of the historical event or issue in the question
 - source content provenance – establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points which illustrate provenance, and analysing and evaluating them in light of the historical event or issue in the question
- contextualise those points with historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Award a **maximum of 6 marks** for provenance comments based on **3 marks** for the rubric and **3 marks** for source content interpretation.

3 marks

- source rubric provenance – comments on provenance regarding authorship, purpose and timing as seen in the rubric.

3 marks

- source content provenance – comments on provenance regarding the interpretation of the content of the source.

Up to 4 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the sources with the candidate’s own knowledge
- wider contextual development, for example other relevant information which provides more information about the historical issue, and significant omissions in the source
- other points of view, including additional historians’ interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Interpretation of two-sources question (16 marks)

Candidates must

- establish the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue within each source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to assess what the sources reveal about different interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue
- comment on how the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue in the two sources relate to other possible interpretations with wider contextual development.

Award marks as follows

6 marks

- comments on interpretation (**3 marks** per source).

Up to 8 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the sources
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about interpretations of a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information about other interpretations of a historical issue which have been omitted
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Marking instructions for each question

Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

Part A – Historical issues

Question 1 **‘Religion, ritual and superstition underpinned all aspects of life.’**
How valid is this view of North British society in the late pre-Roman Iron Age?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to come to a conclusion about the forces which shaped Iron Age society up to AD300. Candidates may be aware that this is Ian Armit’s view and should build an argument that looks at the evidence for religion, ritual and superstition underpinning all aspects of life in the Iron Age. The candidates might discuss other types of evidence and other factors/forces which impacted life in the Iron Age, the extent to which hierarchy, symbols of power, economy, agriculture, status, warrior values and tribal interaction influenced life in the Iron Age.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests religion, ritual and superstition underpinned all aspects of life in the pre-Roman Iron Age

- probably used ritual to mark important points in the agricultural/farming year
- scant evidence, often based on analogy with Gaul, Ireland and Southern England and Wales
- likely had numerous Gods, some of which would have been linked to rivers, lakes and mountains
- assumed to be druids (anything else would have been mentioned by the classical writers)
- discussion of house cosmology – ritual pits dug into wheelhouse floors, pits filled with animal bones and artefacts (Sollas in North Uist contained 3 sheep, dismembered to fit, cremated animal remains, pottery: Hornish Point in South Uist – quartered body of young boy about 12 years old)
- house cosmology – roundhouse doors orientated uniformly to the east or southeast, to face the rising sun?
- examples of religious/ritual artefacts – Ballachulish figure, granite three-headed figure
- examples of hoards as ritual deposits (Duddingston Loch, Edinburgh)
- examples of sacrifice (Eildon Hill North – horse under rampart, Torrs Pony Cap – may have been mask for ‘a pantomime horse’ in religious ceremony)
- examples of cults ‘Cult of the Head’ – Skull perforated for display at Hillhead Broch or Lochend in East Lothian – 7 absent skulls from communal burial
- examples of burials – scattering of high-status burials (cist burials from Moredun, Edinburgh, chariot burial from Newbridge).

Evidence suggesting the importance of other factors in shaping Iron Age society

Agriculture

- people chose to settle in fertile areas
- worked arable and pastoral mixed economy – found quern stones, grain, bones of animals
- produced a surplus – stored in souterrains
- managed the land – complex field systems (Leuchars in Fife, Orchard Rig in Peeblesshire)
- boundary system to separate animals from arable crops
- remains of cereal crops show extent of different crop cultivation
- possible use of hillforts as seasonal meeting places to exchange agricultural produce
- settlements location near good farmland. Crannogs built on water to avoid wasting land for agriculture.

Warrior values

- need to reflect military prowess to ensure tribal and intertribal standing
- shaped by 'heroic', lordly practices of warfare, feasting and drinking
- manufactured warrior paraphernalia to reinforce values – scabbards, swords, chariot burial
- warfare, feuding and raiding probably rife, especially on tribal fringes.

Social hierarchy and status

- need to use personal ornament and settlements to create and maintain social order
- valued expressions of personal status – upsurge in prestige objects (helmets, torcs, collars, war trumpets, horse gear, swords, scabbards)
- upper classes consciously distinguished themselves from lower rank (clothing, speech, aristocratic pursuits – hunting)
- settlements built to maintain and reflect social hierarchy (Gurness, Eildon Hill North).

Tribal interaction

- need to exert tribal identity
- shaped by contact with Rome – brief exposure to Rome's military presence, cultural influences, political systems, material goods
- fragmented insular communities became increasingly aware of and involved with continental fashions in art and metal work
- feuding and raiding between tribes necessitate a degree of defensive capabilities.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|---|
| Richard Hingley | Highlights the extent to which house cosmology and burials influenced daily life in the late pre-Roman Iron Age. |
| Ian Armit | Emphasises the complex and diverse nature of the Iron Age as is evidenced through various ritual finds at Broch sites. |
| Alastair Moffat | Suggests the Iron Age was steeped in religion, ritual and superstition. |
| Alfred Smyth | Argues that the names of barbarian magnates as found in Roman classical writers works and on Roman inscriptions, proves there was a warrior elite in Northern Britain for example Calgacus the swordsman, which suggests warfare was important. |

Question 2 **To what extent was defence the main purpose of the walls in the Roman Empire in Northern Britain?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to examine arguments on the purposes of the Roman walls built during Hadrian and Antonine's reigns respectively. The title allows for defence being the main purpose to be discussed and is likely to be considered first. However, candidates might discuss other purposes of the walls such as bureaucratic control, symbols of power and demarcation. The essay should reach a conclusion as to the most likely purposes of these two walls.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest defence was the main purpose of the walls

- Hadrian's Wall was the most heavily fortified border in the Empire – used for frontier defence with forts along the wall
- Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall built to protect the province from attack as well as to help police the neighbouring provinces
- defensive forts built along linear barriers at both Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall
- excavations on both Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall revealed the existence of pits on the berm (space between the wall or rampart and the ditch). At Byker, on Hadrian's Wall, the pits were arranged in three rows, each containing two posts, probably the trunks of trees with their branches cut back and sharpened – was it a heavily defended frontier line?
- frontiers had added role of keeping the army busy – keeping them out of internal politics
- however, frontiers would not have stopped an invasion, merely slowed it
- frontiers did not suit Roman preference for open fighting – they were not fighting platforms – scarcely room to pass behind a man let alone fight
- frontiers were 'a stumbling block rather than a barrier.'

Other reasons for walls might include

Walls used for bureaucratic control

- Luttwak states that the frontiers provided 'preclusivity' – total control of all movement into and out from the line
- walls acted as collection points for the import and export duties upon which the empire's tax revenues depended
- at Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall gates acted as customs posts to allow trade and taxes to be collected
- at Hadrian's Wall frontier control was achieved at milecastles and turrets along the linear barrier
- walls meant that tribes could only enter the empire unarmed, under guard, and after paying a fee
- walls theoretically allowed the province to develop peacefully to the rear.

Walls were symbols of Roman power

- frontiers allowed Rome to maintain 'Pax Romana' – an attempt to safeguard any Roman citizen to the rear of the frontier
- frontiers were as much propaganda statements as a functional facility
- symbolic statement of Roman grandeur and technique
- promoted Roman identity and power
- confirm barbarian impression of Roman might – both reassuring and intimidating provincials
- used to display an Emperor's career and demonstrate the extent of their influence – frontiers were 'prestige projects' (Mike Ibeji)
- Antoninus Pius needed to establish credibility with the army and gain military prestige
- Hadrian, in AD122, needed to appear commanding and powerful in light of imperial unrest – frontier would bolster position in Britain and in Rome.

Walls were built to demarcate the empire

- Hadrian – ‘he was the first to build a wall 80 miles long from sea to sea to separate the barbarians from the Romans’ from *Historia Augusta, Life of Hadrian II*,² referenced by David Breeze
- a wall would clearly delineate the Empire’s boundary as well as delimiting it without prejudice to forts and patrols north of it
- ‘in origin, Hadrian’s Wall served as a physical demarcation of the Roman province – a political as well as military dividing line – and the scale of its construction was doubtless intended to impress the northern barbarians as much as it hoped it would discourage’. From Hanson and Maxwell in *Rome’s North West Frontier: the Antonine Wall*
- ‘it was a form of early political apartheid’ Hanson and Maxwell *ibid*.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Nic Fields | Argues that Hadrian’s Wall AD122–410, highlights that the frontiers were to bring stability to the empire, to create a visible demonstration of imperial security. |
| David Breeze | Contends, in short, the purpose of Antonine’s Wall was frontier control. |
| Brian Hanson and Gavin Maxwell | Suggests that although the wall was primarily a military frontier built by and for the army it was intended to fulfil political and socio-economic roles, to encourage the native peoples within the area now clearly defined to accept Roman rule and advance towards self-government. |
| Antony Kamm | Suggests that the frontiers were to mark the boundaries between former barbarians and permanent barbarians, with facilities for passage between the two. |

Question 3 **How important was the work of Saint Ninian in the conversion of Northern Britain to Christianity?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to come to a conclusion about the factors which influenced the peoples of Northern Britain to convert to Christianity. The work of Saint Ninian should be discussed. Candidates might discuss the work of other Saints as well as the role played by the Romans and even the Vikings. The essay should reach a conclusion as to the most important factor in influencing the people of Northern Britain to convert to Christianity.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which indicates the importance of the work of Saint Ninian

- Bede introduces us to Ninian, the traditional story that he was born in Britain and travelled to Rome to be trained in the church
- Ninian was allegedly consecrated by Pope Siricius and travelled to Gaul and spent 10 years with Saint Martin of Tours, who promoted the building of 'white huts'
- Saint Ninian was sent as a Bishop, around AD395, to an existing Roman community at Whithorn, Candide Casa (The White House)
- the local chief Tuduvallus seems to have accepted Ninian and his Christian congregation
- Ninian preached to converted Christians and developed the structures of an organised Church
- however, Ninian did more than preach to the converted – he was responsible for the Southern Picts conversion, Saint Bede writes in his Ecclesiastical History of the English People – Book 3 Chapter 4 'the Southern Picts themselves abandoned idolatry and embraced the faith by the preaching of the word by Saint Ninian'
- he reputedly walked the land with a hand bell and followers, setting up churches across central Scotland, up the east coast as far north as Orkney and Shetland
- evidence for his work in conversion rests on place names and local tradition – scant evidence but consensus suggests that many sites were Ninianic
- the site of Saint Kentigern's Monastery in Glasgow was built on ground consecrated by Ninian
- his achievements will have been exaggerated as a result of the 12th century cult of Saint Ninian, crediting him with founding 150 religious sites – 'surely implausible' (B Paterson).

Factors which suggest other reasons for the conversion of Northern Britain

Work of other Christian Missionaries

- at an early date Ninian was not the only holy man active in Scotland
- from AD450 there were Irish monks preaching on the west of Scotland
- between AD450–500 there is evidence for Saint Colmoe and Brendan evangelising over Picts and Scots. Similarly, Senanaadn Oran, Finan of Molville and Kieron of Clonmacnois and Machar and Kessog were concentrating in the North
- Saint Oran established Christian community at Iona – Scots of Dalriata had been giving Kings a Christian Burial on Iona for at least 13 years prior to Saint Columba's arrival
- the work of Saint Columba on Iona was another highly important factor. 'Columba is a key figure in any study of the church in Celtic areas' (L and J Laing)
- Columba arrived in AD563 with Ninian's gospels – underpinning his position in Scotland as a legitimate leader
- Columba acted as an adviser to the rulers of Dal Riata: he had royal blood himself, which helped. He was the first Patron Saint of Scotland. His burial place on Iona became the burial place of scores of kings and queens from Scotland, Ireland, England and Norway. Later churchmen took up the political role he took
- he has been dubbed 'a Johnny come lately' but no doubt he made a lasting impression on Scotland and assisted in the conversion of many to Christianity
- Adamnan's 'Life of Columba' was widely circulated and had a huge influence
- Columba's arrival along with Ninian's earlier work had a hugely significant impact in laying the foundations for an organised church.

Importance of Rome

- Northern Britons already had a belief system with a pantheon of Gods so Christianity could be added to the existing pool of belief systems
- Roman occupation of Northern Britain was a factor in the conversion, it opened Britain to wider influences, first converted Christians in Northern Britain may have been Jews or Greeks
- from the 4th century, evidence of Roman Christianity in Northern England, Bishoprics, Sees and Bishops – potentially influencing those further north
- evidence for sub-Roman Christianity – the Latinus tombstone and an even earlier Christian cemetery under the east end of the priory
- Whithorn could be an offshoot of Roman Christianity filtering north from a Christian colony based around Roman settlement at Carlisle
- evidence of Christians in the Roman frontier zone from the 4th century at Carlisle supports notion Christianity spread north from the Roman Bishopric at York
- Rome arguably had a profound impact on the frontier zone including the conversion of some of the local peoples.

Importance of the Vikings

- forced conversion – Earl Sigurd and all of Orkney were at least nominally baptised in 995 when King Olaf Tryggvason demanded, 'I want you all and all your subjects to be baptised. If you refuse, I'll have you killed on the spot, and swear that I'll ravage every island with fire and steel' The earl could see what situation he was in and was baptised
- as Vikings integrated, the 'mother's milk theory' led to Vikings adopting religious customs of their spouses and passing faith to their families, children were converted through their mothers
- Vikings spread Christianity on their travels even hedging their bets in the early days as is evidenced in grave finds with both pagan goods for an afterlife and Christian crosses.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| Alfred Smyth | Suggests Columba is remembered as the father of Scottish Christianity whose monks built up a brilliant Christian civilisation. |
| L and J Laing | Highlights Columba was the key figure in any study of the church in Celtic areas. |
| Bridget Paterson | Suggests Ninian was responsible for laying the foundations of the faith while Columba was a 'Johnny come lately'. |
| Charles Thomas | Suggests the knowledge of Christianity may have reached either the Damnonii or the Votadini before AD400 although the archaeological evidence is sparse on this, but as such it does reflect the importance of Rome bringing in Christianity as this was before AD400. |

Question 4 **How far can it be argued that Pictish symbol stones were nothing more than memorials to the dead?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to analyse the debate relating to the purposes of Pictish symbol stones. Candidates should discuss the evidence that symbol stones were memorials to the dead. Candidates should also look at the view that the stones had political, social, religious and military purposes. Candidates can discuss the view that they commemorated battles or demarcated tribal boundaries. The essay should reach a conclusion on whether the stones were memorials to the dead.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest they were memorials to the dead

- most widely accepted explanation is that the stones were personal memorials and that symbols identify the status and tribe, or occasionally, occupation of the deceased
- V rods, representing a broken arrow, like Z rods, can be taken as indicators of death
- mirror and comb often seen to mean the memorial has been commissioned by a wife or daughter
- some symbols may represent the afterlife, angels to summon the dead as seen on the Hilton of Cadboll stone
- stones fulfil same purpose as later medieval heraldic devices, representing family names
- according to C Thomas, Aberlemno I could represent a memorial to a member of the Serpent Group who was a king and had died (represented by a broken spear). The memorial could have been erected by his widow (mirror and comb)
- the Class II stone at Aberlemno would have been a memorial to an underking (crescent) who later became a King (double disc)
- four kings and one king's brother (Nechtan, Oengus, Talorgan, Kenneth son of Fert an Drust) are all identifiable in symbol stones – indicates that the stones may have been memorials to kings
- W Cummins suggests that the Saint Andrews Sarcophagus might be a memorial/tomb of Constantine son of Aed, 'the son of the last recorded King of the Picts'
- however, only circumstantial rather than conclusive evidence that stones have been found close to burials (Dunrobin stone had originally been set within a stone burial cairn).

Factors which suggest the symbol stones had other purposes such as

Political

- S Foster states that the stones may have been statements of tribal affiliation
- by the 9th century Picts were under threat from encroaching Scots and this prompted creation of huge nationalistic symbols dominating the back of the cross slab at Aberlemno
- stones commissioned by secular chieftains to glorify the Christian God and the kingdom of the Picts
- the political and religious elites are perceived to have controlled the appearance of the symbol stones – stones were used by elites to establish/reinforce the position and status of key members in society.

Social

- A Richie states that stones were a means of communication throughout Pictland
- symbols may represent social and cultural values such as the spirit of the forest and the importance of hunting, warfare and strength
- stones may reinforce the social hierarchy – as seen on the Hilton of Cadboll cross-slab
- S Foster states that the stones were meant to legitimise claims to land – which represented the transfer of inheritance from one generation to another
- stones were meant to represent lineages and were public statements of marriage
- the mirror and comb represents endowment paid by one lineage to another
- stones were territorial boundaries, as at Aberlemno; where the stone was set up on a ridge between the South Esk and Lunan Valleys and linked to the rebuilt fortress at Finavon
- F Wainwright states the distribution of stone marks with precision the known boundaries of Pictland.

Religious

- core symbols on Class I stones were of religious value, displaying cult beliefs such as the bull head at Burghead
- stones perceived to be prayer stations, commissioned by secular chieftains to glorify the Christian God and legitimise their own political power
- many of the later symbol stones are cross-slabs and would have belonged to contemporary churches and monasteries
- St Andrews Sarcophagus commissioned by the Church or some rich lay patron of the Church which represents Christian and Pictish values.

Military

- commemorate or celebrate battles – Aberlemno represents an action-packed battle scene which most believe to be the battle of Nechtansmere, AD685 – Anna Richie comments that this stone represents a vital national issue
- purpose of the Sueno stone may be to commemorate an unknown victory by the men of Alba, the Gaelicised Picts of the lands south of the Mounth over the men of Moray of those lands north of the Mounth
- the stone depicts battle paraphernalia including spears, axes, decorated shields, swords and mounted warriors – evidence of military power.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Sally Foster | Suggests that the designs cannot be strait-jacketed, which meant something different in each context, although it makes most sense when looked at in the light of Celtic religious beliefs and practices. |
| Charles Thomas | Suggests the symbol stones are memories of late Iron Age weapons and equipment and used as symbols of rank and to commemorate the dead. |
| Anthony Jackson | Suggests the symbols on the stones are records of marriage treaties and symbols refer to families or kinship groups. |
| Isabel Henderson | Suggests that the role of sculpture as ethnic identifiers cannot be sustained. |

Question 5

‘Driven mainly by the desire to establish permanent settlements.’

How justified is this view of the reasons for the Viking presence in Northern Britain until 1034?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to reach a conclusion on the reasons for the Viking presence in Scotland up until 1034. Candidates are likely to use the evidence to discuss the desire to establish permanent settlements as a reason for the Viking presence. Candidates might also consider other reasons for the Viking presence in Scotland such as the desire to raid, trade and the ease of access and familiarity of the land. This essay should reach a conclusion on what was the most significant reason for the Viking presence in Scotland up until 1034.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest the desire was to settle and colonise

- Norse impelled to move due to overpopulation in Scandinavia
- land shortage in conjunction with overpopulation – agricultural resources most limited in Norway
- inheritance system in Norway where land was equally divided among sons, produced too many farms and was not sustainable
- polygamy suggests that families were growing too big to live off their inherited farming units so settlement elsewhere was inevitable with Scotland being a choice destination
- dispossessed members of Royal families looked to transfer their traditional social and political structures unimpeded to Scotland
- Vikings who came were pastoral farmers in the main whose lifestyle was based on raising cattle and sheep and growing barley and oats, the Northern Isles were perfect for this
- the Northern and Western Isles were ideal for continuing the common practice in Norway of living on isolated farms – perfect for long-term settlement
- Orkney has good soil and flagstones for building and the Western Isles has fertile machair – all desirable to settle
- kings of Norway and Denmark were busy concentrating on conquering Anglo-Saxon England and controlling trade in Ireland. This left a vacuum in the Northern Isles – which allowed the creation of an Earldom
- Earldom established AD867–870 which later allowed rulers like Earl Sigurd the Stout to emerge as powerful rulers taxing other areas such as Caithness and beyond.

Evidence which considers other reasons

The desire to trade

- there may have been pre-existing contacts between Scandinavia and Western Europe stimulated by trade – Scandinavia produced furs, walrus ivory, ropes and amber all of which were highly valued commodities
- the earls of Orkney established their own efficient administration of estate farming and tax collection indicating trade and economy was paramount
- Scandinavian materials like steatite and flax were introduced to Scotland
- native material repeatedly found in Norse houses in the North suggests a degree of active social interchange between the Picts and Vikings – Buckquoy, Brough of Birsay
- the Viking North was plugged into a trade network with Scandinavia and the Atlantic, which was different from the rest of Britain, and suggests opportunity was taken by enterprising Vikings
- the Northern and Western Isles were a convenient springboard to Atlantic trade and to the rich and populous parts of Europe – evidenced by the establishment of the Viking trade town of Dublin
- scales found in Viking graves such as Kiloran Bay on the Hebridean island of Colonsay indicate importance of trade
- scales found in a stone cist on the island of Gigha, which is directly on the western sea route to Ireland suggesting trade was important

- it is possible that the movement of the Vikings was as a result of the desire to expand more trade routes to Western Europe
- however, not all were noble traders as some came as sea-borne pirates, taking advantage of the increase in sea-borne trade.

Desire to raid

- the quest for moveable wealth was the dominating motif of Vikings history with direct plunder or the exaction of tribute
- Claire Downham suggests the interests of Vikings in Alba appear to be a series of hit and run raids
- Northern Scotland would have been used to provide pirate bases
- Vikings came to plunder and raid the rich vulnerable Christian communities such as Lindisfarne and Iona
- A Smyth suggests monasteries were like shop windows crammed with loot of the centuries
- natives could be readily enslaved and sold by Viking raiders.

Access and familiarity of the land

- it was comparatively safe and straightforward for Vikings to move to Northern Britain – given a good wind it might be possible to sail from Norway to Shetland in 24 hours
- Shetland was so accessible as even without accurate knowledge of navigation the length of the archipelago allowed Vikings to make landfall easily
- the scatter of Northern and Western Isles allowed ease of Viking movement and acted as bases and stopping of points for shelter and supplies
- the direction of prevailing winds allowed the Vikings easy access with the easterly winds blowing them naturally to Scotland in the spring and the westerlies blowing them home again in the autumn
- movement to Scotland allowed them to maintain their maritime way of life
- Northern Britain could support a method of subsistence and a type of agriculture similar to that in Scandinavia – pastoral farming with a little growing of oats and barley
- the chain of small islands around the north and west coast of Scotland were ideal as stepping-stones and the coastline was familiar to that in Norway
- land provided easy passage through isthmuses and portages such as Tarbert Argyll giving access from the Atlantic to the Irish Sea.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|---|
| Alfred Smyth | Suggests the Vikings were motivated by overpopulation, piracy, trade and colonisation simultaneously. |
| Claire Downham | Suggests the Vikings were initially motivated by piracy. |
| Barbara Crawford | Suggests an array of topographical, economic and cultural reasons impelled the Vikings to Northern Britain. |
| Ian Walker | Suggests the initial phase of the Viking presence in Scotland was seasonal hit and run attacks against wealthy coastal sites. |

Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

Part B – Historical sources

Question 6 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the challenges facing the Romans during the Flavian conquest of Northern Britain.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation may be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Author | Tacitus wrote The Agricola as a eulogy to his father in law. | Heavily biased as written to glorify and venerate him – a laudatory biography written as an act of piety. |
| Purpose | Style had precedence over fact – directed at elite Roman audience, designed to excite and reinforce his chosen version of events, rather than record history. | Political and personal agenda ensured that fact was of secondary importance in The Agricola. |
| Timing | Contemporary of Agricola written at the end of the 1 st century AD. | Tacitus was the archetypal armchair historian, relying on oral accounts of Northern Britain having never travelled to the island. |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| The climate is wretched, with its frequent rains and mists, but there is no extreme cold. | Bullish attitude towards poor climate that Agricola and his army endure while subduing the Celts further glorifying Agricola to the elite audience Tacitus is writing for. |
| The Celts' strength is in their highly-trained infantry. | The Celts' foot soldiers were their strength. Typical of the classical Roman writer exaggerating the strength of the opposition. |
| Some tribes also fight from chariots. The nobleman drives, his dependants fight in his defence. | The ruling elites fought from chariots perpetuating the view that the Celts' tactics were based on numbers and social hierarchy. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Roman state was inherently imperialistic with imperialists' attitudes to other people, thus acceptable and expected to dominate
- guerrilla warfare adopted by the Celts was effective to an extent as it took 5 seasons for Agricola to defeat the Celts in a pitched battle
- the Celtic ambush on the 9th legion which was almost successful highlights the threat posed by guerrilla tactics
- Battle of Mons Graupius as later outlined by Tacitus, suggests the Celts did cooperate in the face of Roman imperialism – yet according to Tacitus, Agricola overcame that obstacle to defeat the Celts and conquer Northern Britain
- the Roman campaigning season was limited from spring to the end of autumn due to the lack of light and climate.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- there were physical obstacles to subduing the North such as the mountain massif separating the Northwest from the Southeast along with rivers, estuaries and indented western coastline – scant evidence of the Romans actually subduing the Northwest
- Agricola pulled back because Domitian had different priorities – Legions (II Adiutrix) withdrawn to support Danube army and the camp at Inchtuthil abandoned
- the Highlands were too daunting a prospect to invade. Mention the role of the Gask Ridge forts. Inchtuthil, sits opposite the mouth of the Tay glen up which lie the only known substantial areas of settlement within the Highlands
- glen-blocking forts suggest plan was to control potential opposition movement from North to South suggesting undefeated tribes
- it was not economically worthwhile. '[The Romans] rule the most important part of it – more than half – and have no need of the rest, in fact the part they have brings them in little money' Appian
- he also calls them 'poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians'
- Romans more suited to conquering proto-urban societies with more readily available food supplies for the army and a better infrastructure to support the army and Roman administrative structures
- Britain was a long way away from Rome, the North even more so, so the imperial desire to see the job done was not always there.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| David Breeze | Concludes the reason for the failure of the Romans to conquer Scotland was a lack of consistent imperial policy, as they had the necessary resources, but the political will was not there. |
| Richard Ogilvie and Iain A Richmond | Suggests the terrain was too daunting for the Romans. |
| Fiona Millar | Suggests the geographical isolation of Britain was a key factor in Roman failure to conquer North Britain. |
| Groenman-Van Waateringe | Suggests it is now possible to conclude that a successful permanent Roman occupation was only possible in those regions where the Romans were confronted with a well-organised proto-urban or urban structure, which they could utilise for the supply of their armies. |

Question 7

How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the Scots' presence in the west of Scotland by the beginning of the 6th century AD?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| . . . men of Ireland who raided Britain for its wealth in silver. . . | Suggests Scots were traditionally from Ireland who first came raiding to Britain. |
| A relatively dense population in northern Europe struggled to survive on resources diminishing . . . | Considers that it was climate change that caused a squeeze on resources which put pressure on the population and encouraged migration. |
| Chiefs and even peoples sought other lands and others' wealth in the age of migrations which brought the Scots to settle in the 4 th or 5 th century . . . | This view emphasises the role of the Chiefs and is alluding to the traditional view that the Scots migrated from Ireland to the west of Scotland by around AD500. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- 'men of Ireland . . .' supports the derogatory Roman view of the Scotti as Gaelic-speaking pirates who raided Britannia in the 3rd and 4th centuries
- Annals of Tigernach, written around AD500 reads 'Fergus Mor Mac Erc, with the nation of Dal Riata, took or held Britain and died there' – statement of invasion and colonisation
- Senchus Fer nAlban – provides a genealogy of Dal Riadan kings from Fergus Mòr
- linguistic evidence perceived as the securest evidence for an invasion by the Gaels
- no Brittonic place names in Argyll – suggests obliteration or displacement of Brittonic speakers
- Ptolemy in the 3rd century cited Epidii in Argyll (a Brittonic name in P Celtic) – that the name is replaced by Gaelic one suggests population movement
- even if there was not mass movement, there could have been a more conservative elite takeover of the native ruling dynasty.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| . . . the North Channel can be seen as a linking mechanism rather than the dividing one envisaged in the concept of the 'sea-divided Gael'. | Suggests that instead of viewing the sea between Scotland and Ireland as a barrier it is more of a means to enable easy travel between the two. |
| . . . good sea communications would enable the same language to continue to be spoken and develop in tandem. | Suggests that regular travel by sea between the two lands would encourage an acceptance of one common language, (Gaelic) which would grow and be established. |
| However, although Argyll maintained a regional difference from at least the Iron Age through to the medieval period, occasional developments in material culture and settlement types passed from one area of the west to another, with individuals moving between the two. | Suggests that there was evidence of movement of people and culture between different areas on the west for a long time going back as far as the iron age. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- early Ireland was a sea-based society and travellers would undoubtedly have made the one-day journey across to western Scotland – Argyll and Ireland only 20 miles apart – allowing same language to be spoken
- early medieval commentators regarded the Highland Massif as a linguistic divide, separating Brittonic and Goidelic – the western coast of Scotland and Ireland were not really separated since the Irish Sea and North were an open line of communication
- counter to the view in the source possibly cultural influences went from Scotland to Ireland rather than vice versa
- not one example of zoomorphic penannular brooches in Argyll whilst these were the most common type on Ireland
- one example of a spiral ringed pin in Argyll compared to over 40 examples in Ireland
- any similarity on brooches suggest movement from Scotland to Ireland as Scottish brooches date to the 7th century whilst the Irish brooches dates from the 8th century.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- traditional legends use Bede's views to legitimise and show the descent of a ruling dynasty from a powerful, mythical figure
- Bede's view used to bolster Dal Riata claims to territory in Antrim
- Adamnan writing about 7th century Argyll is in a Gaelic speaking world
- place names and personal names referred to by Adamnan are Gaelic, the people of Argyll are the 'Scotti in Britain'
- lack of excavation in Argyll has impaired understanding
- archaeological evidence to support migration theory are workshops for penannular brooches found in Argyll and in Ireland
- brooch workshops found at Dunadd in Dal Riata and in Ireland at Dooley and Donegal
- crannogs found both in Scotland (Argyll) and Ireland
- archaeological evidence that refutes the traditional migration theory – characteristic Irish settlement types are not found in Argyll
- Irish crannogs date from around AD600 whilst Scottish ones were being constructed since the Iron Age
- characteristic settlements in Dal Riata are the hilltop duns, built from the early Iron Age – a settlement type distinct to Argyll and there is no evidence of a change in the normal settlement type at any point in the first millennium.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------|---|
| Leslie Alcock | Suggests settlements show very little sign of the transportation of material culture to Dalriadic Scotland. |
| Sally Foster | Highlights Iron Age origin and close connections with Ireland. |
| Alfred Smyth | Contents that the Scots were infiltrating from as early as the 3 rd century. |
| Wilhelm Nicolaisen | Suggests the presence in Argyll of place-name elements and 'souterrain ware' from north-east Ireland are proof of Irish colonisation. |

Question 8 **How fully does Source D explain the reasons for the formation of Alba by the end of the 9th century AD?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| . . . Scandinavian raids on northern parts of Britain were becoming commonplace. The long, broken coastline of Argyll made Dal Riata particularly vulnerable to seaborne assault and its people suffered accordingly. | Contents there were regular attacks by the Vikings on the west coast and these were putting pressure on the Scots. |
| . . . there was probably much co-operation between uncle and nephew which seems to have permeated down through the aristocracy in their respective kingdoms where it was reflected in social and cultural changes. | Argues that as a result of the leaders' family ties there inevitably would be links between the two kingdoms especially between the aristocracy, that would influence society and culture and spread to the commoners as well. |
| . . . an increasing Gaelicisation of Pictish society, a process that had probably begun in the previous century. It is likely that the Pictish language, a tongue of Brittonic origin, had already adopted some Gaelic characteristics long before AD800. | Argues the long-term links between the two peoples had led to the Gaelic language and Scots culture emerging in Pictland. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- lots of intermarriage between the ruling elites: increasing appearance of Gaelic names among the Pictish kings
- common cultural heritage, as shown, by a comparison of Pictish sculpture with illuminated Gaelic manuscripts and of decorated metalwork from Ireland and northern Britain
- Dal Riata colonisers gradually infiltrated Pictish territory from the West
- several men were kings of both kingdoms simultaneously and some of them were from the Pictish royal house, Oengus, son of Fergus, King of the Picts AD729–761, who also ruled the Scots AD741–750 and Constantine who ruled both kingdoms for a while at the end of the 8th century. There was no real reason why the two kingdoms should not have been permanently united by one of them
- the Viking incursion was important, it weakened gradually the Picts and lost them the Northern Isles and Caithness: also there was a Viking victory over the Picts in AD839 just before Kenneth took over the Pictish throne. 'A battle was fought by the gentiles against the men of Fortrui and a large number fell in the engagement' *Annals of Ulster*.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Scots, the minority, succeeded in subsuming Pictland and Pictish institutions as power vacuum emerged following the Vikings' slaughter of Picts at Fortrui, AD839. In ensuing civil war Cinead able to emerge as most powerful warlord
- Kenneth MacAlpin clearly made a huge personal contribution to the formation as war leader and tactician. He may have been in league with the Vikings. He may have had a claim to the Pictish throne through his mother
- the kingdom of the Picts was larger than Dal Riata in Argyll and both more populous and agriculturally richer, which was of course part of the attraction for the Scots 'Undoubtedly the agricultural wealth of Pictland was an enormous temptation to power-hungry warlords.' Sally M Foster *'Picts, Gaels and Scots'*
- it was in fact the Dal Riata kingship which disappeared, not the Pictish one
- the appearance of Saint Columba and other saints from Gaelic Ireland among the Picts from 590s on introduced a major cultural influence and brought the Picts within the Gaelic cultural sphere for the next 200 years, producing a Christian society heavily influenced by Gaelic models

- the Church favoured political union, especially if led by the Dal Riata, the people of Saint Columba.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|---|
| Lloyd and Jenny Laing | Suggests Dal Riata kings had ruled the Picts from Pictish territory. Since seven rulers appear to have been of Dalriadic origin, though ruling Pictland from Forteviot, inside Pictish territory, it might be guessed that the Scots had in the early 9 th century pushed eastwards into Pictland. |
| Alfred Smyth | Suggests Dal Riata ascendancy evolved as a gradual process of infiltration of the Pictish east, which must have escalated under pressure from Vikings in the Hebrides and Argyll in the early 9 th century. |
| Ian Walker | Suggests Kenneth MacAlpin was completing a gradual process of the merging of two cultures which had begun centuries before which was a slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time. |
| Dauvit Broun | Suggests that there was no power vacuum into which Cinead walked. |

Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

Part A – Historical issues

Question 9 ‘Throughout, Edward’s interference in Scotland was focused on expanding his own power in Scotland.’

How valid is this view of Edward I’s actions between 1286 and 1292?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to consider whether or not Edward always had sinister intentions towards the Scots from the moment Alexander III died in 1286. Or were his intentions initially benign, trying to help out his neighbours during their crisis, and if so, when and why did his intentions change?

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest that Edward was always focused on expanding his power in Scotland

- Edward sought papal dispensation for the marriage of his son and the Maid of Norway without first consulting the Scots
- Edward did not offer the Scots any direct support upon the death of their king until he was no longer distracted by the French situation and was able to turn his full attention to expanding his authority in Scotland
- Edward offered that the Norwegians could send the Maid of Norway to England for safe-keeping but was deliberately vague on when he would return her to Scotland
- Edward inserted Bek, Bishop of Durham into Scottish affairs before his son was married to the Scottish Queen. He expected the Scots to be obedient to Bek
- Edward insisted the Guardians resign their positions during the Great Cause and then reinstated them under his authority
- Edward used his army and navy to intimidate the Scots into granting the Award of Norham
- Edward deliberately prolonged the Great Cause, allowing the Count of Holland to travel to look for documentary evidence, so the Scots would get used to his authority
- Edward insisted on a judgement, which gave him more power for longer, rather than an arbitration
- Edward heard evidence from descendants of illegitimate claims in order to prolong the Great Cause
- Edward had a history of using force in Wales and Ireland and seized the Isle of Man from the Scots, appointing Walter de Huntercombe as custodian there
- Edward interfered in the Western Isles disputes, which was intrusion in the affairs of another realm
- Edward insisted in the Treaty of Salisbury (1289) that he, along with the Scots and the Norwegian King, should have a say in the marriage of the Maid of Norway
- in addition to forcing the Guardians to give up Scottish independence at Birgham, Edward also made them surrender royal castles in Scotland to his authority
- from 11 June 1291, the Guardians of Scotland were just another arm of Edward’s administration of Scotland.

Evidence which may suggest that Edward was not solely focused on expanding his own power in Scotland

- Edward was invited in by the Scots who needed his royal authority to support their guardianship
- before being asked for help, Edward did not intrude in Scottish affairs, only offered his condolences for the death of his brother-in-law
- in the Treaty of Salisbury (1289), Edward promised to pass the Maid to the Scots as free and quit of all marriage contracts as when he received her from Norway. Edward accepted all guarantees and safeguards requested by the Scots in the Treaty of Birgham (1290)
- getting papal dispensation for the marriage of his son and the Maid was in line with Edward's correspondence with Alexander III before he died, which suggested a possible marriage for the Maid of Norway. It was also in line with tradition – both Alexander III and his father had initially married English princesses
- although the Award of Norham was given in England, the Great Cause was completed in Berwick
- Edward sought advice from as far afield as Paris lawyers to ensure his decision in the Great Cause was in line with Scottish traditions and precedents
- Edward's decision to grant the crown to Balliol was met with support and approved by the auditors, 40 of whom were chosen by Bruce and 40 by Balliol
- although Edward had used force in Wales and Ireland, he did not use force against the Scots.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| GWS Barrow | Takes the view that the Guardians fatally compromised Scottish independence when they surrendered their authority, although they had little alternative. |
| Wendy Stevenson | Takes the view that Edward's behaviour was so untrustworthy that the Scots felt the need to negotiate strongly to ensure the Treaty of Birgham would protect their political independence. |
| Michael Prestwich | Takes the view that Edward's actions from the summer of 1290 onwards showed no respect for Scottish traditions of independence. |
| Peter Traquair | Takes the view that even though Edward became overlord, he did not make sweeping changes to Scotland's government and allowed the Scots to continue running their country largely uninterrupted. |

Question 10

To what extent were the military achievements of William Wallace his greatest contribution to the Scottish resistance movement?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to evaluate the impact of the differing events, actions and roles in Wallace's life in order to come to a conclusion about which made the greatest contribution to the Scottish resistance movement. Candidates could then reach a conclusion about whether or not the military achievements of Wallace, at Stirling Bridge and during his raids into England, were more influential for Scottish resistance than his other contributions, including his role as Guardian, which saw political and economic achievements, the influence of his actions while in exile, or the impact of his death. Candidates might also wish to compare his actions to those of other leaders of Scottish resistance to determine importance.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest Wallace's greatest contribution to Scottish resistance was his military achievements

- the common army of Scotland was prepared to follow Wallace's leadership
- Wallace was able to gather a band of loyal fighters around him, building an army after his involvement in events at Lanark
- Wallace was a capable fighter that other noble leaders wanted to fight alongside, including Richard of Lundie, William Douglas, and Andrew Murray
- Wallace was prepared to take action against symbols of English authority in Scotland, like his attack on Ormsby or the murder of Hazelrig
- Wallace rose from being one of a group acting under noble leadership to become the leader of the country's army, suggesting his military capabilities
- Wallace was willing to force men to join his army, including imprisoning men until they submitted, or hanging those who deserted
- Wallace was able to adapt tactics to suit his circumstances, hit and run tactics against English supplies from Selkirk Forrest
- Wallace trained his men well to gain military supremacy from a small army, use of schiltrons defended by bowmen
- Wallace was able to use the landscape to his advantage, including the forest at Selkirk or the bridge and river at Stirling
- Wallace utilised raids against northern England, a promising tactic later adopted by Robert Bruce
- Wallace was prepared to use scorched earth tactics against his enemies before Falkirk
- Wallace was a ferocious fighter, from the brutal murder of Hazelrig to skinning Cressingham
- upon his return from Europe, Wallace re-joined the resistance movement, raiding Annandale, Liddesdale and into Cumberland.

Evidence which may consider other contributions from Wallace which were more important for Scottish resistance

- to become a guardian, Wallace was knighted by the Scottish nobility, giving him vital authority and status
- as Guardian, Wallace led the resurgence of the Scottish government
- by insisting everything was done in the name of King John, Wallace was able to prevent further conflict between warring noble factions within Scotland, the Bruces and the Comyns
- the Lubeck-Hamburg letter attempted to reinvigorate the Scottish economy after the disruption of warfare, declaring Scotland free from English interference
- Wallace was able to consolidate Scottish control over their kingdom, removing English influence in all castles except Berwick and Roxburgh
- Wallace was able to inspire support from other nobles, the Bishop of Glasgow gave him support through his initial rebellion
- Wallace was able to appoint the pro-independence William Lamberton as Bishop of Saint Andrews
- Wallace went abroad after the loss at Falkirk, on diplomatic missions to the king of France and the papacy. While this did not generate huge support, it kept alive the Scottish cause on the continent
- Wallace's harsh treatment by Edward I highlights his importance as an unlikely leader of society and resistance
- Wallace's death would inspire future generations to fight for Scottish independence.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------|---|
| ADM Barrell | Takes the view that Wallace was clearly a capable leader as so many leading Scots were willing to join Wallace. |
| AAM Duncan | Takes the view that Wallace did everything he could to narrow the odds before a battle, from utilising landscape and creating an effective battle formation. |
| EJ Cowan | Takes the view that Wallace's humble beginnings worked against him, as society did not want a lower-class man leading armies and directing government policy. |
| GWS Barrow | Takes the view that Wallace's most important contributions were raiding Northumbria, filling the vacant see at Saint Andrews and reviving the guardianship. |

Question 11 **How important to his success were the tactics Bruce adopted in the Scottish civil war between 1307 and 1309?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to discuss whether or not Bruce's change of tactics, from chivalric to guerrilla warfare at the start of 1307 was the most important reason why he was able to win the civil war. Candidates might compare the influence of this change to other factors, including the death of Edward I, the weakness of Bruce's opponents or Bruce's lieutenants.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest Bruce's tactics were vital for success in the civil war

- Robert had learnt from early mistakes at Methven and Dalry and soon abandoned his chivalric training for guerrilla warfare
- Robert preferred swift, small-scale attacks where he held the initiative
- Robert avoided pitched battles, preferring to ambush opponents on familiar ground, Glen Trool
- Robert could not spare the men to hold garrisoned strongholds once captured, so instead razed them to prevent enemies regaining them and using castles against him
- Robert was prepared to utilise brutal tactics to destroy opponents, herschip of Buchan
- Robert generated an impressive reputation, cemented at Inverurie when he rose from his sick bed to lead his men
- Robert used the landscape, including bogs, hills etc. but also augmented nature with pots etc
- Robert had a core network of loyal lieutenants whom he trusted to lead his army and make key decisions on his behalf. He was able to split his army and send divisions led by his lieutenants to attack key opponents in other parts of the country
- Robert was willing to accept former enemies into his peace and reward even the newest supporters. He made it worthwhile to support his claim to the Scottish throne, for example Earl of Ross.

Evidence which may consider other reasons for success in the civil war

- Robert was able to gain supplies and support from his allies in the Isles and Ireland before re-launching his campaign in 1307
- Edward I was an old and infirm man who died in July 1307, leaving his less able and less interested son, Edward II, to enforce English authority in Scotland
- Edward II faced considerable financial constraints which limited his ability to defend his father's conquest of Scotland
- without English support, key Scots like the Earl of Ross and John Macdougall of Lorn were forced to make truces with Bruce, or even come into his peace
- Robert was able to focus on opponents within Scotland without facing a war on two fronts against the formidable English army
- Robert's Scottish opponents were fragmented and distributed across the whole of the country, meaning he could pick them off one at a time
- the death of John Comyn of Badenoch left the Comyn family without a core leader to unite their opposition to Bruce
- Robert retained the support of sections of the Scottish Church, who fought with him and supplied his army, and preached in support of him from the pulpit.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| Michael Brown | Takes the view that Robert was able to extend vital support through patronage, which ensured he gained trusty leaders with authority in different parts of his realm. |
| David Cornell | Takes the view that Robert destroyed castles to deprive his enemies of a regional focus of their political power, and as they were indispensable to the English war effort in the Scottish Lowlands. |
| Alexander Grant | Takes the view that military skill or genius transformed Robert's military fortunes. |
| Michael Penman | Takes the view that the death of Edward I was the real watershed, as Edward II had neither the inclination nor the leadership skills to prevent Robert's rise. |

Question 12 **How far were Edward II's military campaigns in Scotland the reason for England's inability to defeat the Scots in the ongoing war between 1310 and 1323?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to discuss whether or not Edward II was responsible for his inability to beat the Scots militarily despite the superior English forces. Candidates might compare the influence of Edward II's poor military experiences to other factors including Bruce's military experiences or the second front in Ireland.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest Edward II's weak military campaigns in Scotland were the most important reason for England's inability to beat the Scots in war

- Edward II was unable or unwilling to defend his lands in Scotland from Bruce's attacks. These included the lands of his supporters, the Lothian Scots, whose lands were raided by Bruce
- Edward II's inability to launch a strong campaign in Scotland meant he found it very difficult to impose his authority over his northern garrisons
- Edward had to allow his adherents to make truces with Bruce due to the lack of military support from England
- other than attempt to block Scottish trade, Edward did little to oppose Robert I, with only one abortive expedition into southern Scotland in 1310
- Edward II was unable to protect his lands in northern England against Scottish raids which began in 1311
- Robert's ultimatum to the Scots, and his brother Edward Bruce's deal with Sir Philip Mowbray over the status of Stirling Castle, forced the English King to muster an army and march to war in Scotland in 1314
- in 1314, knowledge of the likely battle sites well in advance gave Bruce an advantage as he could prepare his troops and tactics in accordance with the sites
- Edward's troops were exhausted and demoralised at Bannockburn after two days of marching. Many abandoned the battlefield within an hour, or at the first sign of a Scottish victory
- Edward was unable to defeat the Scots at Bannockburn despite vastly outnumbering the Scottish army
- despite Edward's military ineptitude, he managed to escape the battlefield without being captured by the Scots, which would have been catastrophic for his authority
- the English loss at Bannockburn convinced Edward's supporters in Scotland to make peace with Robert as they recognised that even if English help was available in the future, the shift of power in Scotland was now irreversible
- Edward II had such political problems in England that he had little opportunity to invade Scotland
- maintaining English garrisons in Southern Scotland was ruinously expensive for the English crown and were only defensive — they could not have helped Edward II recapture Scotland
- although his loss at Bannockburn was humiliating, it did little to change the course of the war. Edward continued to claim overlordship but remained unable to enforce his rule. Continuing to refuse to make peace simply led to repeated, then elongated truces.

Evidence which may consider other reasons why the English were unable to defeat the Scots in war

- Bruce did not have the forces or equipment for sieges, so was forced to use guerrilla tactics including surprise attacks, night attacks, wading through moats and climbing walls with rope ladders to defeat the English
- Bruce gradually removed each English garrison in Scotland, culminating with Berwick in 1318. The English lost even symbolic control in Scotland
- Bruce attacked English supporters in Scotland with sustained mobile attacks, plundering forays across their territory, driving off livestock and taking food or cash as blackmail in return for truces. He weakened the north, highlighting the inability of Edward II to defend his lands and supplying Bruce's forces
- Bruce maintained his military pressure on English dominions to try and force a resolution, harrying the north of England for 10 years to the extent that the north paid protection to the Scots or accepted Robert as their lord
- the Scots were able to recapture Berwick, the last piece of Scottish territory in English hands, in 1318
- the Scots opened a second front against the English in Ireland, stopping the English use of Irish troops and resources against Scotland
- campaigning in Ireland meant the Scots were able to prevent Irish ports being used to attack Scottish shipping
- the Scots raised the possibility of a pan-Celtic alliance against Edward II with Ireland and Wales
- Bruce could rely on trusted lieutenants who would further his cause, both across individual campaigns and leading sections of the army at Bannockburn
- Bruce trained his men carefully, including making his schiltrons mobile
- when the English did invade Scotland, Robert could utilise his control over the north and retire beyond the Forth, refuse to give battle and allow the English to run out of resources and retreat. Scorched earth policies could speed this process.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Alexander Grant | Takes the view that Bannockburn was the greatest humiliation of English arms since the loss of Normandy over a century earlier. |
| Fiona Watson | Takes the view that training and planning in advance of Bannockburn allowed the Scots to control the design and tempo of the battle. |
| GWS Barrow | Takes the view that by 1314, the north of England was close to exhaustion, devastated and impoverished by Scottish raids. |
| Michael Brown | Takes the view that Edward still had adherents in Scotland, but their loyalty was tested by sustained attacks from the Bruces and Edward's inability to defend them, and the complaints which arose persuaded Edward II to take the field in 1314. |

Question 13

To what extent was the increase of international pressure on England the most important reason for the creation of the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton in 1328?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to discuss whether or not the swing in international support towards the Scots across the 1320s, including from the Papacy and the French king, was the most important reason for the English agreeing to negotiate a peace treaty in 1328. Candidates might compare this to other factors including the deposition of Edward II and the weak minority rule of Isabella and Mortimer, the strength of Robert Bruce in Scotland, Scottish raids and resumption of war against England.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may suggest international pressure was vital in the creation of the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton

- from 1309, the French king had been friendly with Robert, but the full Franco-Scottish alliance was revived in 1326 at Corbeil near Paris
- the Treaty of Corbeil was insurance for Robert in case war resumed with England
- the French promised far more support for the Scots than before, including providing aid and counsel for the Scots in an Anglo-Scottish war: The Scots would no longer be isolated in the event of English aggression
- Scotland maintained vital mercantile links with Flanders, exporting wool, leather, timber and importing food and manufactured goods. Recapturing Aberdeen in 1308 gave the Scots a port for economic development and diplomatic ties overseas
- Robert and his political community had repeatedly ignored papal bulls requesting peace with England which led to the subsequent excommunication of Robert and his supporters in 1319–1320
- papal attitudes to the Scots began to change in 1324, when Pope John XXII recognised Robert's title as King of Scots
- Robert's full rehabilitation with the papacy came in 1329 when the Pope granted the rite of coronation to the Scottish kings, recognising that Scottish rulers were not subject to the superior lordship of the English crown
- international recognition of Robert as king of Scots increased pressure on the English to find a lasting peace settlement which confirmed this recognition of Bruce's title and power.

Evidence which may consider other reasons for the creation of the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton

- Edward II was deposed and his wife, Queen Isabella and her lover, Roger Mortimer, led a regency government for the 14-year-old Edward III
- the removal of Edward II cancelled the 13-year Anglo-Scottish truce, enabling Robert to reopen hostilities
- Robert reopened the second front in Ireland
- James Douglas came close to capturing the teenage Edward III during one of his raids into northern England for Robert, scaring the English regime
- Robert raided into northern England, attacking strongholds and granting land to his followers, making it appear that he was annexing Northumberland
- Bruce was able to scare the English further by threatening to take some of the border castles
- the Scots were taking tribute from North Riding, Yorkshire, over 100 miles south of the border
- Isabella and Mortimer could not allow the Scots to conquer their northern lands, and had to sue for peace
- Isabella and Mortimer were almost bankrupt, so the offer of compensation in the Treaty was a considerable incentive to make a lasting peace
- English weakness ensured that when they sought a new truce, Robert was able to issue a set of demands which led to a lasting peace settlement
- Robert was more secure within Scotland after dealing so forcefully with the Soules conspiracy (1320) and with the birth of a son, David, in 1324.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|--|
| Michael Brown | Takes the view that the regency government were much more vulnerable to military pressure than Edward II had been, forcing them to seek peace in language acceptable to Robert. |
| Fiona Watson | Takes the view that despite profound ill health, Robert was still able to threaten the English in Ireland and their own northern territories. |
| Chris Brown | Takes the view that the deposition and murder of Edward II provided the key change in circumstances and opportunities that Robert could seize, particularly the nullification of the truce. |
| Michael Penman | Takes the view that the Franco-Scottish Treaty was sufficient threat to Edward II, particularly as it was negotiated while his wife and son were in France, that he had to improve his northern defences in preparation for future attack. |

Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

Part B – Historical sources

Question 14 **How fully does Source A explain how effective Alexander III was at establishing his royal authority over Scotland?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| He fostered economic growth by encouraging the wool and leather trades. | Contends Alexander continued to develop royal authority through a flourishing economy. |
| Alexander successfully raised a Scottish army which confronted Hakon's forces at Largs. . . | Argues Alexander was able to raise an army to defend his kingdom but the eventual battle at Largs was an inconclusive skirmish due to bad weather. |
| His reign therefore saw the expansion of the kingdom, at the expense of Norway. | Argues Alexander continued his father's attempts to expand the kingdom into the Western Isles, replacing Norwegian control in the area. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Alexander ruled over a prosperous period of prolonged peace and increasing population
- Agriculture and foreign trade flourished
- Alexander boosted the royal income with a new custom tax on wool and hides
- Alexander extended Scottish authority into the far west, far north and the Isle of Man
- Alexander clashed with families like the Macdougalls who looked to the Norwegian king for protection
- Alexander had tried to negotiate taking control over the Isles without force and eventually negotiated the Treaty of Perth (1266) to take control over the Isles in return for payment of 4000 merks and annual rent of 100 merks a year, and a marriage alliance between his daughter and Eric II.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Alexander used the booming economy to increase the defences of the country as well as significant building work; cathedrals of Dunblane, Dunfermline and Saint Andrews were examples of this
- Alexander had key officers of state to help government, like the chancellor, and divided the land into sheriffdoms with royal castles to improve law and order
- Alexander relied on elite nobles to extend his authority into difficult regions, Galloway, Moray
- Alexander held political meetings, called *colloquia*, with his political community as necessary for key decisions, for example the tailzie in 1284
- Alexander tried to prevent the factionalism of his minority continuing under his adult rule and worked in partnership with his political community in running the country
- Alexander protected the Scottish Church from papal and English interference, ensuring Scottish bishops would continue fighting for independence after his death
- Alexander attempted to secure his succession, first with three children, and then with a tailzie on his granddaughter and a second marriage
- Alexander could be judged as ineffective in terms of establishing a lasting dynasty through his failure to remarry immediately after his first wife died, or for marrying Yolande (for love or attraction) rather than a more suitable political match
- Alexander could be seen as ineffective as he did not adequately secure his succession after his three children died, either by remaining safe to provide another direct heir, ensuring his political

community fully accepted his granddaughter as his heir or providing clear and detailed provisions for her minority

- Alexander could be seen as ineffective in expanding royal control over his kingdom as he relied on magnates to expand royal authority on his behalf, and his control over them and over the Western Isles (gained in the Treaty of Perth) remained nominal. Without a strong adult king after his death, this control became even more fragile
- Alexander could be seen as ineffective as the magnate factionalism which had dominated his minority was not adequately dealt with. Controlling magnate ambitions and tensions depended on the King's personal intervention and strength. When Scotland again lacked a strong adult ruler these tensions and factions resurfaced and worsened.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Michael Penman | Takes the view that Alexander III ruled successfully despite concerns over noble disputes and the need to avoid alienating his brother-in-law, Edward I. |
| Richard Oram | Takes the view that although Alexander was a successful ruler governing a stable and peaceful realm in alliance with his nobility, he does not deserve his golden reputation due to immoral behaviour and failure to provide lasting solutions to key problems. |
| GWS Barrow | Takes the view that Alexander was a strong and prosperous king who created such political cohesion among his magnates and churchmen that he could enforce loyalty to an unknown infant female heir and that governing could continue unabated upon his sudden death. |
| Nicholas Mayhew | Takes the view that Alexander does not deserve his golden reputation as economically, any achievements of the reign were due to the work of others, such as King David I, or were common to the whole century, not just the reign of one monarch. |

Question 15

How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of King John's relationship with his Scottish nobility during his reign?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| Alexander III's work of expanding royal authority continued, with three new sheriffs appointed for the west coast. | Suggests John expanded royal authority and rewarded supporters with government jobs like sheriffdoms. |
| . . . King John's highly limited itinerary throughout Scotland suggests that government remained in the hands of the remainder of the former Guardian administration of 1286 to 1291. | Suggests John didn't travel around his kingdom to fulfil his royal duty of giving good justice to his people, leaving this task instead to his nobles. |
| . . . he failed to put any personal stamp on his regime and was probably led by the Comyns and their allies. | Suggests John was accused of being a Comyn-dominated puppet. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- John rewarded former guardians, kinsmen and friends he knew from England with positions in his new administration, Alexander de Balliol of Cavers became Chamberlain, Master Thomas of Hunsingore became Chancellor
- Comyns had dominated Balliol's auditors during the Great Cause and continued to dominate his royal offices
- three sheriffdoms were created in the Western Highlands: Skye (Earl of Ross), Lorn (Alexander Macdougall, lord of Argyll) and Kintyre (James Stewart)
- John knew the importance of establishing royal authority in the west through royal agents
- John was inexperienced in Scottish politics, having only inherited his Scottish lands after his mother's death in 1290.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| . . . the Bruces formed the most powerful opposition to the Balliol kingship after 1292. . . | Suggests the Bruce family maintained their opposition to John's kingship, refusing to submit to his authority for as long as possible. |
| . . . early 1293, Angus Macdonald had also failed to do homage to King John and it was his heir Alexander Macdonald of Islay who made an appeal to Edward I's jurisdiction. | Suggests other magnates also refused to accept John as their king, including Angus Macdonald, and they were prepared to go against John to Edward I of England. |
| In Fife, Macduff, a younger son of Malcolm earl of Fife, complained to Edward I that he had not received justice in King John's court concerning his inheritance of the lands of Creich and Rires. | Suggests Macduff felt he could not get a fair trial in Scotland due to being in opposition to the Comyns, so appealed to Edward I over his inheritance in Fife. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Bruce family tried hard to avoid paying homage to Balliol as King – it took 18 months for John to get homage from Robert Bruce the grandson once his father and grandfather had resigned their claims to their Scottish lands
- Balliol saw several magnates refuse to accept his authority, especially if their complaint was against a Comyn – few felt they would get fair judgement against the Comyns under Balliol
- other key appeals to Edward I against John's justice included Bartholomew of Berwick over unpaid bills
- John's humiliation at English parliaments where he was called to answer for the legal appeals would have damaged his authority in Scotland and ability to enforce his decisions across his realm.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- Bruce hostility and defiance continued across the reign, even forcing Balliol to accept a Bruce nominee, Master Thomas of Dalton, as Bishop of Galloway
- John was given a treatise on government: The King's Household to guide his rule due to his political inexperience
- John held a significant number of parliaments to re-establish royal authority and dispense good justice, at least 7 parliaments in 4 years
- John made significant efforts to dispense justice on a scale unprecedented within Scotland, calling all with a complaint to parliament to seek redress
- there were 11 known appeals to Edward I under John's reign with 9 separate appellants
- despite initially agreeing to aid Edward I in his French war, John sided with his magnates and refused to attend Edward's muster at Portsmouth in 1294
- the Council of 12, whether designed to aid or replace John, were determined to maintain a Balliol dynasty, incorporating a marriage for the king's son to the niece of the French king
- John sent trusted nobles to France to negotiate terms for the Auld Alliance
- John relied on his magnates to defend the kingdom against Edward I's invasion in 1296, as he retreated north and eventually sought peace.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| Steve Boardman | Takes the view that John's position within Scotland was limited by the disaffection of the Bruces and their supporters. |
| GWS Barrow | Takes the view that John made a worthwhile effort at government and was not merely an ineffectual puppet or complete nonentity. |
| Ranald Nicholson | Takes the view that John set out to be no less a king than his predecessors. |
| Fiona Watson | Takes the view that John did a reasonable job as king considering his circumstances and his reputation has been vilified by the man who usurped his throne – Robert Bruce. |

Question 16

Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the nature of King Robert's usurpation of the Scottish throne in 1306.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| Author | English clerics. | Part of charges levelled at the Scottish Bishop by English clerics from the diocese of Durham effectively acting on behalf of Edward I. |
| Purpose | Charges issued to the pope regarding the Bishop of Saint Andrews' actions. | Reprimand for failing to abide by the oath the Bishop had made to Edward I regarding Robert Bruce, and sneaking out to attend his coronation. |
| Timing | August 1306 | The immediate aftermath of the usurpation of the throne in March 1306 and the subsequent military rising. Lamberton had been captured near Kinross and was questioned by English clerics in Newcastle. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| Robert Bruce then earl of Carrick was raising himself by treason to make himself king of Scotland by force. . . | Robert broke his oath of loyalty to Edward I (given in 1302) when he rose to take the throne of Scotland for himself – in quite extreme language to highlight the seriousness of his crime. |
| He murdered John Comyn lord of Badenoch, in the Greyfriars church in Dumfries near the high altar, because John would not agree to the treason which Robert planned against the king of England. | This argues that Robert's determination meant that he would go as far as to murder those who did not agree to his treason and join him. |
| Then the Bishop of Saint Andrews knew all the plots of Robert Bruce. . . | Noting in a scornful manner the double-dealing here stating that the Bishop knew all about his plot in advance and did not warn Edward despite his oath of fealty to the English king. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Robert met with John Comyn in Greyfriars Church to discuss the situation regarding the Scottish throne. An argument broke out and Robert stabbed Comyn
- Robert's supporters rushed forward and finished off Comyn, whose uncle, Christopher of Seaton was also killed
- Robert left Greyfriars Church and went to Glasgow to seek absolution from the Bishop of Glasgow to try and keep the Church onside
- Robert rushed to make his inauguration as soon as possible and also as close as possible to the traditional Scottish ceremony for legitimacy
- Robert had been exploring the possibility of seizing the throne in advance of events at Greyfriars Church, making a bond with Bishop Lamberton of Saint Andrews in 1305
- some historians believe that Comyn and Bruce had met before and Bruce had suggested a deal where he seized the throne and Comyn was granted Bruce's lands as compensation. However, Comyn reneged on this agreement or informed Edward I of Robert's intentions, leading to the conflict
- Robert's father had died in April 1304, ensuring that the young Bruce was now the head of his family and inherited their claim to the Scottish throne
- the rash actions in Greyfriars undermined Robert's careful planning regarding taking the throne. Yet it would still take a further 6 weeks before he was enthroned
- after the murder, when Robert went to Scone to be crowned King before anyone could react, the Bishop was ready to go with him and actually helped officiate
- the Earl of Fife was an infant. Instead, his aunt, the Countess of Buchan, took on the role of placing the throne on the new King's head
- Robert immediately faced a civil war against the Comyn family and the angry reaction of Edward I of England.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Robert and Comyn were long-standing opponents who had been incapable of working together in the Scottish guardianship, coming to blow at Peebles in 1299 and with Robert resigning in 1300
- Robert was offended by his exclusion from the Ordinance of Scotland, 1305 when other leading rebels had been given lenient sentences
- Robert felt Edward I was attacking him, threatening his lands and titles, despite the fact that Bruce had fought for Edward I since 1302
- Robert's inauguration was makeshift, highlighting that he had support from the clergy, nobility and people of Scotland, but that the majority stayed away, either refusing to accept the usurper or unwilling to risk involvement
- Robert would be defeated three times over the coming months by agents of the English crown and the family of John Comyn, until his following was all but wiped out and he became King Hob.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|--|
| AAM Duncan | Takes the view that Comyn's murder was unpremeditated but provoked as he was a violent man. |
| Fiona Watson | Takes the view that Robert's position in Scottish politics was effectively over from 1300 onwards and his actions in 1306 were due to having nothing to lose. |
| GWS Barrow | Takes the view that Robert wanted the throne but would not have arranged the meeting with the secret intention of killing Comyn. |
| Michael Penman | Takes the view that old personal animosities and frustrations came out in Greyfriars, and that Robert was forced to prematurely act on his plans to take the throne. |

Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

Part A – Historical sources

Question 17 **How important was the Treaty of Union in causing the 1715 Jacobite rising?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to assess the relative importance of the Treaty of Union in causing the Jacobite rising of 1715. Candidates may choose to compare the impact of the Treaty of Union with other causal factors associated with the 1715 rising, including long term anti-English sentiment. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests the Treaty of Union caused the 1715 Jacobite rising

Economic impact

- popular perception amongst Scots that the Union had failed to promote economic growth, in 1713 the Scottish peer, the Earl of Findlater, was narrowly defeated in his House of Lords motion to dissolve the Union on the basis of its lack of economic stimulus in Scotland
- Jacobite propaganda exploited the prevailing economic stagnation creating specifically anti-Hanoverian sentiment, and consequently support for the Stuart cause
- instances of central and eastern lowland support, for example in Panmure and Southesk, contrasts with the absence of sympathisers from Glasgow. The Clyde valley's booming tobacco trade and multiplier effect was the only thriving sector of the Scottish economy in 1715.

Political impact

- despite being an architect of the Union, the Earl of Mar's decision to declare the rising was a direct result of a lack of Hanoverian patronage within the administration that implemented it. Although a nakedly opportunist politician, it seems unlikely that Mar would have risked a rebellion unless he felt there was no other option
- the Treaty of Union abolished the Scottish Parliament and Privy Council. Discontented Scottish Peers were forced to compete to gain entry to the House of Lords for 16 seats – not all did so
- the Privy Council's decision making function was not replaced, creating a vacuum of leadership in Scotland. Decisions affecting Scots were made in the distant Westminster by Ministers and Members of Parliament with little knowledge of Scottish affairs
- some Tories argued that the constitutional loyalty should return to the 'rightful monarchs', while J Prebble states that Whig repression of such Jacobite sympathies was 'foolish and spiteful'.

Evidence which suggests the Treaty of Union did not cause the 1715 Jacobite rising

Long term anti-English sentiment

- Jacobitism benefited from a general anti-English feeling partly due to taxation which paid for William of Orange's wars with France
- Darien's failure cost the kingdom of Scotland approximately 20% of its capital, weakening resistance to a Union. England's failure to assist Scotland exacerbated Anglophobia
- English legislation which pre-dated the Union was generally hostile to Scottish interests. The Alien Act, (1705) threatened significant tariff barriers to English markets in addition to specific tariffs which were imposed on Scottish salt, coal and linen during the 1690s.

Dynastic loyalty

- Episcopalians remained loyal to the House of Stuart as the lawful Royal line on the basis that monarchs were appointed by God, and the removal of James II was thus blasphemy
- the House of Stuart attracted particularly strong loyalty amongst Highland clans, which were remote from government authority and easily motivated. Some Jacobite clans were Catholic, and many more were Episcopalian
- the chief's authority was beyond question – his clan would follow his loyalty, and would be forced to fight alongside him.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------|--|
| Christopher Whatley | Argues that the economic impotence of the Union was the pivotal factor in causing the 1715 rising. 'In the immediate post 1707 decade many Scots felt economic promises were broken. In the Jacobite rising of 1715, led by the Earl of Mar, dissatisfaction with the Union had been a highly effective recruiting agent.' |
| Arthur Herman | Suggests the causation of the rising went beyond the impact of the Treaty of Union to a general antipathy towards England – 'Therefore, it is safe to say that negative attitudes to England won the Jacobites a fair amount of support, and in turn were a cause of the 1715 rebellion'. |
| John Prebble | Argues that 'discontent in Scotland was both wide and deep. The 'Fifteen' at its outset seemed to have all the elements of success. The Scots were by now tired of the Union.' However, he also recognises the view that Stuart Catholicism was certainly a handicap to their success. |
| Tom Devine | Maintains that the Union provided a context, but it was Jacobite propaganda that was key to winning popular support for the rising, 'the Jacobites could pose as champions of Scottish nationalism and defenders of Scottish liberty'. |

Question 18

How far can it be argued that Highland society underwent significant changes in the years following the Jacobite defeat at Culloden in 1746?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to establish the nature and extent of change which occurred in the Highlands during the second half of the 18th century. Candidates may choose to analyse clan society and the impact of Hanoverian legislation following the Jacobite rising. The impact of commercialisation and clearance may also be considered. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests that Highland society underwent significant changes in the years following the Jacobite defeat at Culloden in 1746

- impact of Hanoverian legislation. Widespread property damage – homes of clanfolk burned, cattle killed, estates of Jacobite leaders plundered represented an extension of Cumberland's initial reprisals
- 41 estates were seized by the crown
- 1747 Abolition of Heritable Jurisdiction – removed clan chiefs right to hold private courts, though T Devine argues the impact of this legislation was not significant as the military tenures were already becoming obsolete
- Disarming Acts after the 1745 rising rigorously enforced by patrols of detachments based in hill bothies – banned the carrying of weapons, playing of the bagpipes and wearing of tartan. Sentences for the guilty were transportation or execution
- Act to suppress Non-juring Episcopalian meeting houses
- garrisoning of the Highlands and the building of Fort George, expansion of Fort Augustus and the consolidation of Wade's roads
- Jacobite defeat at Culloden accelerated long term change. The destruction of clan society and the transformation of chiefs to commercial landlords led to a wave of voluntary emigration in the 1760s
- 'Clearance' as a process of dispossession was not only as a result of large sheep farms. The establishment of crofts displaced established communities, while many small tenants gave up their land due to spiralling rents, endemic poverty, lack of local opportunities and various 'pull factors' from abroad
- many Highland landowners adopted sheep farming and clearance as commercial landlords, largely due to indebted estates and the increasing profitability of sheep rearing
- typical was Sir George MacKenzie of Coul, who argued for the necessity of clearance and the mass introduction of flocks of Cheviots
- the introduction of Cheviot sheep, the 'four-footed clansmen', arrived and thrived in the Highlands from the early 1780s, as vast tracts of the Highlands was converted to large scale sheep ranching.

Evidence which suggests that Highland society did not experience significant changes in the years following the Jacobite defeat at Culloden in 1746

- the impact of the most severe excesses of Hanoverian legislation was relatively short lived. The atrocities committed by government troops are largely committed during the immediate aftermath of Culloden
- significant number of paternalistic landlords such as Sir John Sinclair who opposed clearance and actively argued for a continuation of elements of traditional Highland husbandry including the payment of rent in kind in mutton and wool and the active support of small scale tenant farmers with both capital and holdings
- similarly, the Duke of Argyll encouraged the continuation of small scale sheep farming amongst his tenants using native highlanders as shepherds
- the rapidity and extent of change was not uniform. The Highlands lacked uniformity, and regional variation was pronounced. There is little evidence of clearance due to the import of sheep impacting upon the Western Isles until as late as the mid 18th century
- analogously, however draconian Hanoverian legislation impacted upon the central and western Highlands its impact upon the far north and Hebridean society was less pronounced.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------|---|
| John Prebble | Argues that Highland society was transformed during the second half of the 18 th century, primarily as a result of the Hanoverian response following Culloden. |
| Christopher Smout | Emphasises a more gradual change which originated through the pressures of commercialisation evident at the end of the 17 th century. |
| Murray Pittock | Suggests that the impact of Hanoverian legislation accelerated pre-existing patterns of change. |
| Michael Lynch | Maintains that the breadth and depth of change in Highland society after 1745 was colossal, and caused largely by government policy which amounted to 'a programme of calculated social engineering.' |

Question 19 To what extent were the developments in Scottish Lowlands agriculture between 1707 and 1815 part of a long-term pattern of change?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to assess the nature of agricultural improvement that took place in Scotland between 1715 and 1800. Candidates may consider the evidence of both the rapidity and extent of change. In addition, candidates may examine the regional differences across Scotland. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests developments in Scottish Lowlands agriculture between 1707 and 1800 were part of a long-term pattern of change

- pace of change was particularly gradual prior to the 1740s
- many 18th century changes represented a continuation of earlier patterns beginning in the 17th century – the reduction in the number of multiple tenancies, increasing use of longer, written leases and the expansion of land under cultivation through drainage of marsh and the removal of peat
- 17th Scottish agriculture was already responding to commercialisation – eastern cereal growing areas such as the Lothians, Moray Firth and the Orkneys was exporting to Europe in addition to shipping produce to expanding market opportunities in the west of Scotland
- increased yields were already being achieved during the 17th century by liming, manuring and four-crop rotations. Tree planting introduced by some landed gentry.

Evidence which suggests developments in Scottish Lowlands agriculture between 1707 and 1800 were not part of a long-term pattern of change

- revolution in this context would involve concepts such as a sudden or significant shift in terms of technology or organisation used
- examples of change which represented clear progression from previous practice, for example, abandonment of ‘paring and burning’, as a means to expand the area under cultivation, and the withdrawal of free grazing and run-rig
- many ‘improvements’ had a fundamental impact upon the physical appearance of the land – draining, reforestation, walling etc
- establishment of new organisations – 1723 Honourable Society of the Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture and the impact of ‘improvers’ such as John Cockburn of Ormiston (though some, including Cockburn, went bankrupt)
- enclosure – present in the 17th century but limited to a few gentry. By the 18th century, although progress was varied, by 1790 69% of farms in Angus, Fife, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire had some enclosure activity, with more than a 1/3rd of them having completed enclosing. However, many irregular undivided fields remained
- the rising of ‘Levellers’ who destroyed fences in Galloway in 1724 was so violent it had to be suppressed by military intervention, in addition to low level resistance to change amongst tenants. This provides an interesting contemporary view on the nature of agricultural change
- 1760s as a watershed – newly available bank lending and expanding urban markets are linked to a rapid acceleration of agrarian innovation. New techniques, such as James Small’s plough became widespread in the 1760s – as did an intensification of liming resulting in 300% increases in yields in some areas between 1750–1800
- rising prices at the end of the century provided further stimulus to landowners to improve
- tenants insufficiently committed to improving were removed under ‘improving’ leases, resulting in the complete dislocation of traditional life-styles
- planned villages, such as Inveraray, represented real economic and social reconstruction. Although construction was gradual during the 18th century, there was a tendency of these ‘colonies’ to house only ‘suitable’ tenants – Whatley labels ‘social selection’.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------|---|
| Tom Devine | Argues that agricultural development prior to the acceleration of improvement in the second half of the 18 th century was stagnant, 'In most areas, outside the progressive south eastern counties the landscape had hardly changed at all. Enclosure had made little progress . . . and the 'improved' agricultural methods were rarely practised.' |
| Christopher Whatley | Provides another traditional interpretation. 'To a large extent Lowland agriculture developed along lines established in the 17 th century. The efforts of some ambitious landowners notwithstanding, the period prior to 1760 was not one of significant rural reorganisation, and changes in farming systems proceeded slowly.' |
| TC Smout | Emphasises the regionalised nature of development and the scale of change in some areas of Scotland which he points out compared favourably to the continent – 'the farming system in many parts of Scotland became the envy of Europe.' |
| Michael Lynch | Maintains that agricultural change was gradual to the point that it formed a significant barrier to general economic development – 'Agriculture was undoubtedly the most important bottleneck which had to be passed through before general economic growth could establish itself.' |

Question 20 'Islay's management of Scotland was almost free from Westminster's interference.'

How accurate is this view of Scottish politics in the Age of Islay?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to assess the extent to which the earl of Islay's management was autonomous from Westminster's governance. Candidates may consider the extent and nature of Islay's management in the context of political corruption, the impact of the Treaty of Union and the indifference of British ministers. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests Islay's management of Scotland was almost free from Westminster's interference

- representative bodies such as the Convention of Royal Burghs retained their independence and ability to act as a lobby body which actively scrutinised new legislation affecting Scotland
- Argyll and Islay's Argathelian management established effective control of Scottish affairs between 1725 and 1741 through a system of governance designed by Lord Advocate Duncan Forbes of Culloden and Lord of Session Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun
- Argathelian power was further increased by extensive patronage and political corruption. By 1741 half the constituencies in Scotland were controlled by Argyll and Islay
- the earl of Islay, 'the uncrowned king of Scotland', enjoyed significant authority under Carteret who relied completely on the Campbell machine to administer Scotland
- the independence of Scottish law ensured that along with the Kirk, institutions that pre-dated Union continued to underpin a form of local and national administration that remained unique within the new British state
- indifferent British ministers effectively devolved executive control, granting the second Duke of Argyll and the earl of Islay significant autonomy
- irregularity of direct interference in Scottish affairs from Westminster – between 1725 and 1737 British Ministers intervened only once following the Porteous Riot in Edinburgh
- status of Edinburgh as the capital of Scotland endured – continued to act as an administrative, legal and religious centre
- the General Assembly retained a powerful and independent voice within Scottish society, evolving into the closest equivalent of a Scottish parliament
- appointment of Scottish Secretaries of State between 1713–1725 and 1742–1746 was not a reflection on British attempts to tighten administrative control on Scottish affairs, but rather a result of political struggles within England.

Evidence which suggests that Islay's management of Scotland was not almost free from Westminster's interference

- long term impact of the establishment of the British state – the absence of a centralised mechanism of administration following the abolition of Parliament in 1707 and the Privy Council in 1708
- examples of direct intervention by Westminster – the dismissal of the Duke of Roxburgh from his position as Secretary of State for Scotland following the Malt Riots of 1725
- establishment of the Board of Trustees following the Malt Riots consolidated the Union and British control over Scottish affairs
- legislation on Scottish affairs originated in London and was subject to British Ministers
- significant London-initiated legislation indicating increased intervention included the annexation of Highland estates, the abolition of heritable jurisdictions and the establishment of sheriffs as instruments of local government
- abandonment of commissions established to administer Scottish affairs from Edinburgh in the years immediately following Union
- English politicians continued to dominate senior political positions. These nominally British ministers granted Scottish politicians limited autonomy on the expectation that stability and order be maintained. When this was not forthcoming, they were removed from office
- effectiveness and extent of administrative autonomy dependent on the effectiveness and will of the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General both of whom reported to British ministers

- formulation of legislation, foreign policy and other areas of significant decision making remained in London, and were often presided over by men who knew little about Scotland.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| John Mackie | Confirms that the governance of Scotland between 1707 and 1745 was largely entrusted to Islay who though appointed by a British Prime Minister was almost entirely left to govern as he saw fit. |
| Robert Harris | Argues that Islay's autonomy has been overstated, and that Scotland was in fact tightly controlled throughout the period 1707 to 1750 to the point that the terms of the Treaty of Union were breached on numerous occasions to Scotland's detriment. |
| Michael Lynch | Maintains that the government of Scotland prior to 1745 was one of semi-independence in which Islay's management of Scottish MP's, backed by the Kirk's general assembly, had considerable autonomy within a satellite state of Britain. |
| Alex Murdoch | Contends that the earl of Islay's 'management' of Scotland's affairs, through an informal system of government, allowed for considerable autonomy over Scottish affairs free from British interference. |

Question 21

‘The Enlightenment was confined to the elite.’

How valid is this view of the impact of the Enlightenment on Scottish society?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to assess the extent to which the Scottish Enlightenment was confined to the elite of Scottish society. Candidates may consider themes such as its influence upon contemporaries and the wider practical application of the Enlightenment’s ideas. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests that the Enlightenment was confined to the elite

- at its core, the Enlightenment was the product of creative thinking by a small number of intellectuals, self-styled ‘literati’, many of whom were either urban middle class or aristocratic
- the ‘great men’ of the Enlightenment were often university professors, lawyers or church ministers, living in the relatively closed society of Edinburgh’s private clubs. David Hume was arguably the most notable example, he was also the son of a landed laird
- learned dynasties emerged in disciplines including maths and medicine as sons succeeded fathers in the same or related university chairs
- 18th century Scottish intellectuals were dependent on finance and social approval of the landed classes
- numerous other key individuals benefited from the approval and association of the social elite – for example Adam Smith resigned his chair at Glasgow University to become tutor and companion to the Duke of Buccleuch
- by their nature some of the key areas of advance, such as Hutcheson and Hume’s pioneering philosophy, are associated with academia, intellectualism and arguably elitism. It should be noted, however, that philosophy’s basis upon morals could be used to argue that the great philosophers were thus interested in all of society, dominated as it was by moral considerations
- close association with the landed classes underlined by an absence of social comment regarding privilege and property in stark contrast to Hume’s attack on religion or Smith’s critique of mercantile economics.

Evidence which suggests that the Enlightenment was not confined to the elite

- breadth of disciplines which experienced significant development – education, philosophy, literature, art, architecture, science and economics
- broad acceptance of these ideas was achieved through a wide diffusion throughout the educated classes through analysis in the press, journals and church sermons
- application of Enlightenment ideals of reason and order to agriculture and industry contributed generally to new efficiencies gained in both the agrarian and industrial revolutions, and so ultimately to economic growth
- key figures, such as Adam Smith, based their theories on practical experience – in Smith’s case the Wealth of Nations was based on the commercial activity he observed in Scotland. Devine notes this relationship between theory and practice ensured the dissemination of key ideas
- application of scientific advances to technology and thus industry. 18th century Scottish scientists such as Joseph Black and James Watt were applied scientists whom developed practical application from research and teaching
- similarly, medical advances through scientific discovery can be argued to benefit the wider population, though medical treatment remained the preserve of those who could pay
- literature – egalitarian theme of much of Robert Burns’ work stands at odds with concepts of elitism, written in Scots, the language of the Ayrshire peasant society to which he belonged. Hogg and Thomas Telford came from similarly modest backgrounds
- position of education as a national institution was reinforced as schools and universities became increasingly focused upon applied arts, social sciences and science teaching.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------|--|
| Tom Devine | Believes 'The Scottish Enlightenment was much more than a period of unparalleled creativity by a small number of 'great men'. . . Nor was reason confined to the lecture theatre or the scholarly textbook. It affected all aspects of human behaviour.' |
| TC Smout | Argues that the Enlightenment had a close relationship with the elite landed classes of Scotland, who acted as key patrons rather than featuring as the actual great minds. 'It was surely one of the necessary preconditions for the cultural golden age that the landed classes should be its friendly patrons, even if they could not be its finest participants.' These great minds, he goes on to describe as being 'in the great majority' from the professional middle classes. |
| John Prebble | Uses the construction of the New Town as a metaphor for the elitism inherent in the Enlightenment. 'The bed of the Nor' Loch became a class gulf. Rank and privilege, profession and trade paraded their manners on George Street and Princes Street, and the tall lands they had left became the homes of the diseased and poor.' |
| John Mackie | Confirms the importance of patronage from the elite of Scots society to the great minds of the Enlightenment – 'patronage (from the gentry) gave a livelihood to men of learning.' |

Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

Part B – Historical sources

Question 22 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the failure of the 1745–1746 rising?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| . . . few could have thought the invasion of a country would be a practical proposition on such meagre resources. | Argues that Charles's resources were insufficient to achieve his aim of recapturing the British throne. |
| Charles's main chance lay in a dynamic thrust towards London, backed by French men and money, and then finally a French landing on the south coast. Yet the Royal Navy was successful in largely cutting off supplies. . . | Contends that Charles required French assistance to succeed but the Royal Navy's blockade largely prevented it ever arriving. |
| Too few of his Scottish commanders realised this tactic was his only real hope. | Puts forward the view that Charles's Scottish commanders lacked the foresight to understand a French backed capture of London was the only way Charles could succeed. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Charles's munitions were woefully inadequate and his likely chances of success seemed poor; a point reinforced by the luke-warm reception he received when landing on Eriskay
- Charles's problems in raising the new clans partly resolved by Cameron of Locheil's support
- however, the Hanoverian Highland army was weakened by the redeployment of the Black Watch to Europe in 1743
- the Royal Navy's stranglehold on the English Channel and North Sea was near complete, though a relevant observation should also question the extent to which French perseverance was half-hearted
- the main task for the Royal Navy was to control and protect the seas around Britain, to ensure no armed expedition from France could succeed, though patrols were not at full strength due to British campaigns in north America
- differences of tactical opinion between Highland Jacobites and 'the Irish' hampered the rising throughout.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| The Hanoverian front line was backed by a secondary line which was equally strong, however the Jacobite front line by contrast had very little standing behind it; there was in fact no fully formed second line as such. | Believes that the Hanoverian front line was backed by reinforcements – the Jacobites had no comparable strength in depth. |
| Further, many regiments within the Jacobite army had too many commanders. | Contends that the Jacobite army was unbalanced. It had too many officers. |
| In terms of artillery, over the few short months of its existence the Jacobite army found itself disadvantaged by such a variety of field guns. | Argues that Jacobite artillery was mis-matched and ineffective hampering the army's chance of success. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Jacobite army's over commitment to the Highland charge rendered a second line of troops largely irrelevant. In accordance to French tactical doctrine, the soldiers that were not committed to the first wave of attack were formed in inflexible columns
- the Hanoverian army also had a third 'reserve' line to call on if needed
- enclosures to the right of the Jacobite position were undefended allowing Hanoverian cavalry and foot soldiers to outflank the Jacobites from the rear
- the clannish nature of the Jacobite army left it unwieldy and overpopulated with an ill-assorted assemblage of officers in contrast to the streamlined hierarchy of modern European armies
- the Jacobite artillery division lacked training and hardware. In common with the poor quarter mastering of the entire army, much of the ammunition they had was incompatible with their cannon.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- Charles's leadership at Culloden and also throughout the campaign has been widely criticised, particularly for his dishonest assurances of French support
- the Hanoverian army was disciplined and well organised. It was divided into well-ordered lines and was well munitioned throughout the campaign
- hundreds of Jacobite stragglers were missing, exhausted and lost on the morning of 16th April following the previous night's abortive attempt to launch a surprise night attack on the Duke of Cumberland's camp at Nairn, fundamentally weakening the Jacobite army on the eve of what was to be the decisive battle
- regionalised support in Scotland contributed to the failure of the rising. There was little support in the Lowlands and outright opposition in Glasgow and the West whilst even in the Highlands support was uneven
- Charles's Catholicism was a propaganda gift for the Hanoverians who portrayed him as a foreigner from Italy, the home of 'popery'.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| John Mackie | Maintains that it was Charles's lack of munitions and resources which ensured the '45 failed. 'Supplies were short. His half-starved men were routed. He made no endeavour to rally his forces because he lacked the funds to pay them'. |
| Tom Devine | Argues that the lack of support for Charles's cause rather than the specific events at Culloden were key to the rising's failure. 'Scottish backing during the rising was remarkably thin on the ground'. |
| Stuart Reid | Offers a revised interpretation of the importance of Culloden, and specifically the victory on the field which he argues was won by Cumberland's mounted cavalry rather than the bayonets of his infantry. |
| Andrew Mackillop | Emphasises the weakness of Charles's leadership, and specifically his refusal to act on the advice of his senior officer corps. |

Question 23

How fully does Source C explain the reasons for the rise of radicalism in the latter part of the 18th century?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| The French Revolution spawned new ideas that seemed to provide an unprecedented challenge to the established order in the Scotland of the 1790s. | Argues radical, anti-establishment ideas originated from the French Revolution. |
| The bloodbath of the French nobility and clergy in the 'September Massacres' attracted widespread coverage in the Scottish press. . . | Contents events in France were well publicised through Scottish newspapers. |
| . . . wave of unrestrained optimism and sheer political excitement, which fuelled an explosive growth of reform societies. . . | Argues that increased radicalism in Scotland by establishing 'legitimate' reform groups. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- impact of the concepts associated with the French Revolution was pronounced – ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity directly influenced the establishment of The Friends of the People
- in 1793–1794, the Scottish press provided powerful support to the anti-reform cause, but this could not have been easily anticipated as late as the middle of 1792. Newspapers were a site of ideological and political struggle in Scotland in the 1790s
- spontaneous riots erupted in east coast towns associated with European trade during 1792. Closely associated with revolutionary France, property was destroyed, effigies of authority figures (mainly Dundas) were burned, and Trees of Liberty were planted.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- leading figures of the radical movement including Thomas Muir and William Dalrymple talked openly of inspiration from events in France
- the draconian nature of government's reaction spoke volumes of the perceived threat that a revolution inspired mobilisation of the masses presented
- the reaction of the Dundas despotism including the repression of riots and the support for harsh sentencing particularly transportation
- the role of the courts and Lord Braxfield
- movement for burghal reform associated with events which preceded the French revolution including rapid urbanisation and the growth of a literate middle class largely excluded from the electorate
- religious and ecclesiastical dispute can be argued to be inward looking, separate from continental influences and within Scotland
- impact of the Scottish Enlightenment. Political awareness heightened through the work of figures such as Hutcheson and the writing of Burns
- Thomas Paine and the Rights of Man.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| TC Smout | Represents the orthodox interpretation that Scottish radicalism was essentially 'awakened' by transformative events which acted as a catalyst to mobilise the radical movement. |
| Gordon Pentland | Argues that the impact of the French Revolution was magnified by the expansion of the newspapers and political pamphlets. 'Growing numbers of people from the 1790s were interested in politics and had access to an exponentially increased volume of printed matter'. |
| Andrew Murdoch | Accepts that the French Revolution was a turning point in Scottish radicalism but also argues that American Independence also influenced popular protest. |
| Michael Fry | Confirms the significance of the French Revolution, but suggests the impact on Scottish politics was relatively modest – 'the appetite for liberty grew, unleashed on Europe by the French Revolution. In Scotland they met a minimal response.' |

Question 24

Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the nature of Scottish schooling in the 18th century.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that the candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| Author | Written by a parish minister for the First Statistical Account. | A structured response to Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster's questionnaires sent to all 900 parish ministers across Scotland. Attempt to assess the state of the nation by a series of questionnaires containing 160 questions. |
| Purpose | To gather statistical evidence regarding the provision and standard of education. | Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster was an Enlightenment figure who believed in the value of surveying the provision of education and other aspects of Scottish life in order that they be improved upon. It was to establish the national picture in regard to population, geography, agriculture, industry and the like. |
| Timing | 1791 | Shows the state of the nation in regard to the impact of the Industrial Revolution. Complete edition published in 1799 to include further appendices, the First Statistical Account was well placed to review a period of intense educational reform from the 1750s onwards. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|---|
| Currently the parish of north Leith spends about £100 per annum on supporting the poor and educating their children, although the school master's annual salary is meagre at just £8 and a few pence. | Tone is critical when it refers to the issue of the inadequate remuneration for teachers and their need to seek supplementary incomes. |
| . . . no area of Edinburgh would be better advantaged by the establishment of a grammar school, if only the landowners could be persuaded to finance the construction of a proper school house. | Makes a strong case for the need for a grammar school – critical of landowners 'if only' in their lack of support in funding this. |
| Currently it is the Sunday school that is run by the Scottish Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (SSPCK) which is of the greatest benefit to the people, because 100 children attend who were formerly brought up in the profoundest ignorance and they are now truly educated. | Positive in view of the considerable role of Sunday schools which provided significant elementary education, often financed by the Scottish Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- financial necessity encouraged some teachers to broaden the subjects they taught within the curriculum, and also seek additional employment typically as a tutor or assistant to the parish minister
- financing the establishment of grammar schools and town academies was problematic during the latter 18th century. Heritors, philanthropists and burgh councils variously provided funds, however they were not compelled by legislation to do so
- though the Kirk no longer had absolute control of education due to population growth, migration and urbanisation, it retained considerable influence through parish and Sunday schools and the wider work of the SSPCK.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the success of grammar schools and town academies, such as Ayr, Stirling and Perth was partly due to the expansion of the focus on 'new subjects' with specific links to commerce. The rise of business and the professions led to fundamental changes in subjects taught and the type of teachers employed
- town councils played an important role in the development of grammar schools, financing their construction and ensuring their curriculum included the study of Latin which was essential for progression to the Universities
- though the parish school system was under strain due to the growth of the urban population, the Kirk's influence upon school provision was maintained as ministers and elders appointed masters. They also supervised the instruction of parish schools
- the SSPCK had a wider and marked impact upon Highland schools. The development of education in the Highlands was dissimilar from the rest of the country, partly due to the size of some parishes. The SSPCK provided elementary schooling across these areas
- the embryonic middle classes contributed to a growing demand for literacy which encouraged the establishment and growth of private and adventure schools.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------|--|
| Tom Devine | Maintains the nature of Scottish schools reflected the quality of teachers and the increasing pressure on their living standards. He states that their limited remuneration 'led to them petitioning parliament as early as 1749 . . . and also broaden their teaching to include "new subjects"'. |
| Donald Withrington | Confirms the importance of the partnership between the state, private individuals and the Kirk in funding and maintaining Scottish schools, 'the state . . . gave parliamentary backing for the funding of a parochial school system and the church acted as managers for the whole enterprise'. |
| JD Mackie | Emphasises the difficulty in funding grammar schools, noting that the Education Act (1696) compelled heritors of every parish to provide a 'commodious house for a school', but in reality, this was limited to elementary provision. |
| TC Smout | Argues that the nature of Scottish schools during the 18 th century was transformed largely due to its changing purpose as a result of the demands of the emerging professional classes. |

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

Part A – Historical Issues

Question 25 ‘It would be wrong to claim there was an economic gulf between North and South.’

How valid is this view of the USA in the 1850s?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to assess the extent to which an economic gulf existed between North and South in the 1850s and to what extent this was based on agriculture versus industry. Candidates might also discuss the wider differences and similarities that existed between North and South that contributed to the economic differences. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which may support the view

Common economic features

- the USA remained a largely rural nation. Agriculture dominated the USA’s economy regardless of the section. The North West was known as ‘the larder of the USA’ producing food crops whereas agriculture in the South was focused on cotton, tobacco etc but agriculture dominated the economy in both sections
- while there was some urban development, 80% of Americans lived in rural communities
- between 1850 and 1860 half a million farms came into production across the USA
- farming industry in both North and South became more reliant on technology. This led to a development in industry across the USA
- the North was industrialising rather than industrialised. For example, four Northern manufacturing industries employed more than 50,000 people
- industry in South was developing, for example Tredegar Iron Works. The Upper South was traditionally along the same lines as the North – although perhaps not industrialising at the same rate as the North
- there was a clear bond between the developing industrial economy of the North and the Southern agricultural based economy. The textile factories of the North East were reliant on southern cotton production. New England mills consumed 283.7 million pounds of cotton, or 67 percent of the 422.6 million pounds of cotton used by US mills in 1860. The textile industry of New England was dependent on Southern cotton production
- there was a common desire to grow the railroads and an eagerness to ensure the construction of the trans-continental railroad which would bring trade between the east coast and the Orient
- development of the telegraph with 50,000 miles by 1850.

Evidence which may support other views

Contrasts in industrial development

- a more progressive and diverse Northern economy. Financial and trading centres in the North East, an industrial based economy in the North East and food producing farms in the North West. A strong economic bond developed between the North West and North East based on beneficial trading arrangements
- there was greater industrial development in the North than the South. There were approx. 140,000 factories in the USA in 1850, of which only approx. 20,000 were found in the South. Suggesting there was a gulf between North and South in economic development and diversification
- by 1860, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had nearly \$100 million each invested in manufacturing industries. The most industrialised of the Southern states, Virginia, had invested less than \$20 million. The other states in the South had less than \$5 million invested in manufacturing industries
- the value of goods manufactured in these states also suggests an economic gulf in industrial production. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania production were valued at more than \$150 million. Virginia was valued at less than \$30 million. Alabama was valued at less than \$5 million

- the North had greater railway mileage with journey times significantly reduced. The South tended to rely on their river network more than railways
- while there was some industrial development in the Upper South, the Southern economy as a whole was dominated by agriculture
- there was limited urbanisation in the South. By 1860, only 20 towns had more than 5,000 inhabitants. Charleston and Richmond only had a population of 40,000. This was compared with the heavily populated northern industrial cities (New York, 813,000, Philadelphia, 565,000, Boston, 177,000, Chicago, 112,000)
- the South had 35% of US population but produced only 10% of manufactured output.

Southern 'King Cotton'

- cotton produced in the South in the 1850s had accounted for 77% of the 800 million pounds of cotton used in Britain
- Southern crops made up three-fifths of total American exports. Cotton was by far the country's largest export comprising 50% of US exports
- during the 1857 Financial Crisis, James Hammond emphasised the Southern confidence in cotton production during a debate in the U.S. Senate: 'You dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is king'
- inequalities in wealth distribution with society dominated by the planter class which made up approx. 5% of the southern population
- with only 30% of the nation's free population, the South had 60% of the wealthiest men. Only 25% of the White Southern population owned slaves. Only 2.5% had more than 50 slaves. The average was less than 5. This suggests that there was an economic gulf between North and South but also an economic gulf within the South itself
- the 1860 per capita income in the South was \$3,978, in the North it was \$2,040
- as a result of the cotton boom, there were more millionaires per capita in the Mississippi River Valley by 1860 than anywhere else in the United States
- the South prospered, but its wealth was very unequally distributed. The distribution of wealth in the South became less democratic over time, fewer whites owned slaves in 1860 than in 1840.

Ideological differences

- the Tariff was of annoyance to the South as this impacted on the profits in the South. The Southerners feared a reactionary tariff would be imposed by the USA's trading partners for example Britain. The North favoured a Tariff as protection from British industrial imports. This suggests an economic gulf between North and South. The 1857 economic depression had a significant impact on the Northern economy. Hence the speech by James Hammond to the Senate in 1857.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Charles and Mary Beard | Take the view that the sections were divided into an agricultural South and an industrial North. |
| David Potter | Takes the view that there was no economic gulf between North and South and therefore rejects the views of Charles and Mary Beard. |
| Frank Owsley | Takes the view that if slavery was the corner stone of the Confederacy, cotton was its foundation. At home its social and economic institutions rested upon cotton, abroad its diplomacy centred around the well-known dependence of Europe . . . upon an uninterrupted supply of cotton from the southern states. |
| Avery Craven | Takes the view that the South had the same level of economic enterprise as the North. |

Question 26

‘Men from both the North and the South were motivated to fight for similar reasons.’

How justified is this view of the motives of the men who fought in the American Civil War?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to evaluate the motives that soldiers on both sides had for fighting for their respective sides and to assess the extent to which the motivations were largely similar. Candidates might discuss the differences in their respective motivations in reaching a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence which supports the view****Common motives**

- patriotism – loyalty to their state and/or their region (North or South)
- desire for revenge on both sides emerged as the war continued and casualty lists increased
- after 1862 in the South and 1863 in the North, men were forced to fight as conscription was introduced
- use of bounties to encourage recruitment ‘Rich mans’ war, poor mans’ fight’
- fear of showing a fear of fighting, the shame of cowardice! The white feather for cowardice!
- comradeship – many regiments recruited from an area associated with that particular regiment therefore men signed up with their friends, family and neighbours. This perhaps added an element of peer pressure
- fighting for fellow soldiers
- religion – a complex issue for many soldiers but references are present in many letters of soldiers on both sides.

Evidence which supports other views**Ideological motives**

- ideological motives, the ideological themes were similar in both North and South but soldiers on each side may have differed in their interpretations of them. Evidence points to sophisticated discussions of the Constitution, states’ rights, nationalism, majority rule, self-government, democracy, liberty, and slavery. While these themes were evident on both sides, the soldiers often had contrasting views on the issue of slavery or liberty for example
- Union recruits often refer to abstract principles: national unity, constitutional liberty, survival of the republican experiment, the principle of majority rule
- Southern recruits also emphasised the principles of liberty and self-government but their interpretations of this were quite different.

Differing interpretations of the Revolution

- while soldiers on both sides felt compelled to honour the 1776 Revolution, they interpreted this differently. Confederate soldiers fought for liberty and independence from what they considered a tyrannical government while Union soldiers fought to preserve the nation created by the Founding Fathers.

Additional differences

- a desire to defend the Union in comparison to the defence of the southern homeland against an invading army
- northerners fought to prevent the collapse of all that the USA represented – the pride in the ‘Great Experiment’ of Democracy argument. In this context, Secession was viewed as a challenge to the foundation of law and order. In contrast, Confederate soldiers fought for the independence of the South and a desire to resist what many in the South perceived as northern tyranny
- northerners may have fought to punish what they perceived as an act of treason whereas southerners argued that they were simply defending their rights
- southerners fought to defend slavery and what they perceived as their property rights. While few Union recruits would have argued in favour of racial equality or even for the emancipation of slaves, the Union interpretation of ‘Liberty’ and the Union appear to be inextricably linked.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|---|
| Peter Parish | Takes the view that combined forces of nationalism and democracy produced a massive increase in commitment to the cause of one side or the other, which made this a people’s war. Huge response of 1861 was the product of individual enthusiasm, state action and local initiative. Men joined due to encouragement of family and friends, motivated by a mixture of patriotism, fear of being thought a coward and anxiety that it would all be over before they could get involved. |
| Reid Mitchell | Takes the view that northern soldiers were imbued with ideology. Men enlisted due to youthful high spirits, community pressure and overpowering enthusiasm. As war continued anti-slavery sentiment grew among Union soldiers. Soldiers’ ideology motivated them through the hellish second half of the war. Loyalties to fellow soldiers were important. |
| Alan Haughton | Takes the view that men were filled with thoughts of excitement and the drama of war. Hope and expectation of demonstrating courage and ability on the battlefield. In the North, patriotic sentiment was based on pride of democratic system. In the South, many fought for independence and defence of their own institutions and laws. Real affinity towards their community and section. Immediate stimulus to fight was group loyalty to men on either side of the soldier. |
| Bell Wiley | Takes the view that men were attracted by rates of pay and prospect of promotion. Escape mundane existence. Devotion of the masses to the Union, coupled with the leadership of Lincoln, whom they regarded as their representative and champion, sustained the Northern cause during the bloody reverses of 1861–1862. Southerners volunteered due to deep-seated hatred of the North, northern hostility to local institutions, a desire for adventure and a sense of it being the right thing to do. |

Question 27 **To what extent did the nature of warfare change during the American Civil War?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to assess the extent of change in the nature of warfare during the course of the Civil War. Candidates may wish to consider the impact of technology, the strategies and tactics adopted by both sides during the war and the scale of human involvement in the conflict.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence of changes to the nature of warfare

- the impact of new weapons such as the Spencer carbine and the minie ball and the use of percussion caps
- there was improvement in artillery due to rifling
- the development of iron-clad warships with revolving gun-turrets and steam-driven propulsion
- the use of torpedoes and submarines for example the CSS Hunley which sank the Union blockade ship Housatonic off the coast of Charleston in 1864
- the use of newspapers as a form of propaganda
- strategy and tactics evolved with the war. The move to total war tactics and Sherman's scorched earth policy
- the increase in use of trench warfare particularly by Lee to defend Virginia for example at Petersburg
- the scale of manpower involved continued to increase, in 1862, the Army of the Potomac comprised 125,000 men
- conscription was eventually required on both sides to sustain the war effort for example Confederate draft law of April 1862 and the Union drafts of July 1863 and March, July and December 1864
- new technology continued to be developed but lacked the ability to decisively provide a breakthrough. This perhaps explains why technology did not end war more quickly
- the use and role of railroads. 22,000 miles of railroad track in the North and 9,000 in the South. Northern tracks tended to be 'standard gauge,' whereas Southern tracks were not standardized, therefore people and goods frequently had to switch cars as they travelled – an expensive and inefficient system. Union officials used railroads to move troops and supplies which was vital to the war effort
- the use of telegraph – the Union established the U.S. Military Telegraph Corps in 1861, led by Andrew Carnegie. The next year alone, the U.S.M.T.C. trained 1,200 operators, strung 4,000 miles of telegraph wire and sent more than a million messages to and from the battlefield
- the use of balloons by Union spies – floated above Confederate encampments and battle lines in hydrogen-filled passenger balloons, sending reconnaissance information back to their commanders via telegraph
- Andersonville was established as a prison for captured soldiers. More than 45,000 soldiers were imprisoned here. The Confederacy could not provide adequate food for the prisoners and conditions were extremely poor. 13,000 soldiers died of malnutrition, disease, overcrowding or exposure. Captain Henry Wirz, the prison's commandant, was arrested, charged and hanged following a military tribunal for his war crimes. This may be the first documented case of execution for war crimes and certainly the only case during the Civil War.

Evidence of limited change in the nature of warfare

- methods of recruiting armies by volunteering
- the use of full-frontal infantry assaults continued for example Pickett's charge at Gettysburg in 1863
- the use of cavalry continued to be significant. There were slight differences in their use as cavalry was largely used for intelligence gathering, screening, and direct cavalry versus cavalry battles
- the limited nature of medical service remained a significant issue throughout the conflict. Two-thirds of all deaths during the Civil War were due to disease
- strategies and tactics continued to follow the traditional methods from Napoleonic times
- the earliest example of barbed wire during the war was at Knoxville in November 1863 but this was not mass-produced until the 1870s therefore its impact on the Civil War is limited

- the continued use of underground mining of enemy positions.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| James Fuller | Takes the view that Grant's concept of total war was evidence in support of the argument that the Civil War was a modern war. |
| Herman Hattaway | Takes the view that new weaponry was too primitive, too unreliable and too few in numbers to influence the outcome of the war. |
| Frank E Vandiver | Takes the view that the men responsible for directing the war on both sides had to evolve new methods of leadership and new ideas of command. However, the idea of a civilian war effort was unfamiliar to all. |
| Alan Farmer | Takes the view that the war did not exhibit the ruthlessness and cruelty that has characterised wars in the 20 th century. The war reflected the impact of industrial growth. Factories and machines transformed warfare. However, elements of continuity also remained for example strategy and tactics were largely based on Napoleonic principles. |

Question 28 **How accurate is it to claim that the role of women in sustaining the war effort in both the North and the South during the American Civil War has been significantly underestimated?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to assess the role of women in both North and South in sustaining the war effort. Candidates might discuss both the positive and negative contributions that women made to their respective sides in order to reach a reasoned conclusion regarding the significance of their role in sustaining the war effort.

Candidates might refer to

Women in the South

Role of women in the South has been underestimated, positive impact on the war effort

- women kept plantations going. With men fighting for the Confederacy, women were forced to take on the role of maintain the plantations and the home front
- women dealt very effectively with shortages
- women largely maintained control of slaves in the South
- women led civil unrest. The Richmond bread riots in mid-summer 1862 were led by Mary Jackson and Minerva Meredith. More than 100 women armed with axes, knives, and other weapons took their grievances to Governor John Letcher on April 2.

Role of women in the South has been exaggerated: negative impact on the war effort

- played role in undermining morale of Confederate army from autumn 1864 onwards with letters to soldiers pleading for the latter's return
- the severe hardships led to a sense of defeatism amongst women in the South for example, paying for food on a private's pay of \$11 a month when a barrel of flour cost \$100 in the Confederacy.

Women in the North

Role of women in the North has been underestimated, positive impact on the war effort

- role in US Sanitary Commission which raised approximately \$25 million to support sick and wounded soldiers
- Clara Barton provided nursing care for wounded Union soldiers immediately after the Baltimore Riots of 1861, she treated the wounded on numerous battlefields including Antietam and in 1864, she was appointed by Union General Benjamin Butler as the 'lady in charge' of the hospitals at the front
- increased role in industry and farming which was vital to maintaining the war effort
- replaced men, who had volunteered, in many professions
- increased role in food/factory output which was critical to ensure supplies reached the front line.

Role of women in the North has been exaggerated: negative impact on the war effort

- as the war dragged on, Northern women grew weary of the sacrifices that they and their families were making. When riots against the military draft took place in Northern cities such as Boston and New York in 1863, working-class women joined in the mob violence
- impact of inflation, cause significant problems for women on the home front. Poor families, those on fixed incomes, and women subsisting on soldiers' wages often found it impossible to pay for food.

Common contributions of women in North and South in sustaining the war effort

- volunteered to be nurses despite social opprobrium
- helped raise funds by sale of bonds etc
- some acted as spies for example Union spy Elizabeth van Lew or Confederate spy Rose Greenhow
- kept the home fires burning
- set up relief organisations
- kept up morale: by letter writing, tending to the sick or sending additional supplies to men in camp.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|--|
| Drew Faust | Takes the view that women faced severe hardship on the home front, and this led to the growth of defeatism as seen in the content of letters sent to the fighting men of the South. |
| Alfred Eaton | Takes the view that at the beginning of the war, Southern women were great supporters of the rebellion and that it gave them opportunities to enter new occupations. |
| Charles Roland | Takes the view that in spite of fierce patriotism of most Southern women, their morale collapsed under the burden of war and their demoralisation did much to wreck the Confederacy. |
| Reid Mitchell | Takes the view that historical judgements on Confederate women have ranged from them as more devoted to the Cause than their men folk, to arguing that their withdrawal of support doomed the Confederacy. |

Question 29

To what extent did Northern political pressure force Lincoln into issuing the Emancipation Proclamation?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to assess Lincoln's motivation for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. Candidates might discuss the importance of political pressures on Lincoln in comparison to the range of other pressures and reasons for his decision. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence supporting the role of

Political pressures

- by December 1861 most Republican Congressmen had rejected Crittenden's Resolutions and favoured direct action on slavery. Some began using the phrase 'Emancipation' from this point forward
- pressure from abolitionists. Radical abolitionists were convinced that emancipating the slaves would weaken the southern war effort. Frederick Douglass noted that the Emancipation Proclamation would act as a 'moral bombshell' to the Confederacy. Horace Greely also pressured Lincoln in writing
- radical Republicans put considerable pressure on Lincoln. There were a number of differing reasons for their view, but all agreed that it would weaken the Southern war effort
- pressure from Douglas in particular who argued that the Union were fighting with one hand rather than two by failing to enlist black soldiers into the Union army. His case was strengthened by the fact that the blacks were already serving in the Union navy
- action of the slaves crossing into Union lines challenged the Fugitive Slave Law. The law stated that they should have been returned to the South. Lincoln was pressured into making a decision on the future of these slaves
- General Butler took the decision to confiscate all slaves as 'contraband of war.' and General Fremont took the decision to free the slaves of Confederate supporters in Missouri. This put pressure on Lincoln to ensure there was a single Union approach to slaves as the war evolved
- actions of individuals like Sumner ('state suicide' theory) and Horace Greely ('the prayer of twenty millions')
- pressure to transform Union war aims from 'Union as it was' to 'Union as it should be'
- congressional action against slavery for example Johnson/Crittenden Resolution, First and Second Confiscation Acts, Militia Act
- Lincoln didn't have the constitutional power to abolish slavery therefore he had to do it as a war measure.

Evidence which supports the importance of other reasons

Military pressures

- evolution of Lincoln's policy: message to Congress of December 1861, first draft plan on emancipation of March 1862 and attempts to persuade the Border States to take the lead, use of presidential war powers since emancipation was a vital military necessity to win the war
- white volunteers less willing so would make wide scale use of blacks more acceptable. Lincoln argued that they were 'a resource if vigorously applied . . . will soon close the contest'
- by 1864 100,000 white soldiers did not re-enlist. Spring/Summer offensives would not have been possible without the 120,000 black soldiers. An eighth of Union troops around Petersburg were black
- would black soldiers have been as willing to take risks in battle without emancipation?
- suggestion from Seward to delay announcement until some military success is achieved
- timing, psychological and ideological boost for North and a blow to the South
- foreign involvement, the Proclamation meant war would stay domestic and now a war of attrition.

Lincoln's personal views on slavery

- Lincoln personally against slavery but not an abolitionist
- Lincoln emphasised his opposition to slavery's expansion in the 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Barbara Fields | Takes the view that the actions of the blacks themselves in both North and South put pressure on Lincoln leaving him with no option but to issue a proclamation in effect recognising the legality of the existing circumstances. |
| Kenneth Stampp | Takes the view that Lincoln was reluctant to emancipate the slaves, but the war demanded such drastic action. |
| Hugh Tulloch | Takes the view that Lincoln's actions were those of a politician having to change tack due to the evolving nature of the conflict. In this case, Lincoln's actions are viewed not only as necessary but also as just. |
| La Wanda Cox | Takes the view that Lincoln's actions looked towards long-term racial equality. |

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

Part B – Historical sources

Question 30 **How fully does Source A explain the reasons for the growth of anti-slavery sentiments in the USA in the 1850s?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| Within little more than a year over 1.2 million copies had been sold, which focused Northern opinion against slavery and provided an extraordinary impetus to the anti-slavery movement. | Argues that the book <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i> ignited Northern opinion against slavery. |
| . . . contributing to the widespread excitement about the enforcement of the most hated Fugitive Slave Law, which the North felt had been imposed on them following the 1850 Compromise agreement. | Contends Northern opinion had been angered by the inclusion of the Fugitive Slave Law in the 1850 Compromise agreement. |
| These anti-slavery feelings became embedded within Northern politics with political parties appealing for votes by denouncing the ‘Slave Power’ and emphasising the ‘Slave Power Conspiracy’ at the heart of federal government. | Argues that the slave power conspiracy had gained momentum in the North during the 1850s and had provided a focal point for Northern political opinion. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Fugitive Slave Law caused outrage in the North as emphasised by the Anthony Burns case in 1852
- the impact of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* led Lincoln to describe Harriet Beecher Stowe as the lady who caused the war
- role of abolitionist groups for example William Lloyd Garrison and the *Liberator*
- Slave Power Conspiracy as a consequence of the actions of leading politicians including James Polk and the Mexican War, Franklin Pierce and the Cuban fiasco, Stephen Douglas and the Kansas Nebraska Act
- the Kansas Nebraska Act awakened the spectre of Slave Power
- the Act prompted a coalition of anti-slavery groups for example Anti-Nebraska Party, The People's Party and Republicans
- Franklin Pierce and the Ostend Manifesto, Cuba and the Gadsden purchase.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the 1850 compromise negotiations, the stalemate under Clay's bill and Stephen Douglas' omnibus bill
- the emergence of Republican Party channelled anti-slavery sentiment in the North. The coalition of Northern political opinion gave the minority voices a national voice when the abolitionist movement, the Free Soil Party for example had made limited political impact. Dred Scott Case
- the Kansas Nebraska Act and subsequent ‘Bleeding Kansas’ focused national opinion on the issue of slavery in the territories
- Emigrant Aid Societies encouraged anti-slavery settlers to settle in the new territories in order to prevent the potential spread of slavery
- Lecompton versus Topeka state legislatures in Kansas
- Democrat control of the Presidency for nearly fifty years led to frustration in the North and heightened the sense of slave power control

- five out of seven Supreme Court judges were from Southern States
- Dred Scott case and Chief Justice Taney's 'conversation'
- the Lincoln Douglas debates, and the House Divided Speech gave the issue of slavery and the opposition to it a national platform
- 'Bleeding Sumner'
- John Brown's actions in Kansas and subsequent raids 1859.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| James McPherson | Takes the view 'Even more important than the Fugitive Slave issue in arousing Northern militancy was the Kansas-Nebraska Act which was passed by Congress in May 1854. Coming at the same time as the Anthony Burns case, this law may have been the most important single event pushing the nation toward civil war'. |
| William Gienapp | Takes the view that the Republicans who emerged in 1854 were united in opposition to the 'slave power'. |
| Hugh Tulloch | Takes the view that the Kansas-Nebraska Act erased the stability of Missouri Compromise. The Republican Party, born as a result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act attracted those opposed to Southern determination to maintain slavery. |
| Ludwell Johnson | Takes the view that the 1850 Compromise inflicted fatal 'internal damage' to both national Political Parties. Sectional alliances had consistently overwhelmed partisan allegiances, and though party unity regained strength after the Compromise, both parties inherited 'a heavy burden of personal enmity and suspicion. |

Question 31

How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for Southern Secession?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| Few people in the South could see any difference between Lincoln and Seward – or for that matter between Lincoln and William Lloyd Garrison. They were all Black Republicans and Abolitionists; after all, had not Lincoln branded slavery a moral, social and political evil when he said that the Declaration of Independence applied to Blacks as well as Whites? | Suggests that Southerners believed Lincoln and all Republicans were abolitionists and would end slavery if elected to office. |
| To Southerners, any attempts by Lincoln to reassure them was meaningless. | Suggests that Southerners had already confirmed their views on Lincoln and were not willing to listen to anything that he said therefore exacerbating the situation in 1860. |
| A Republican victory in the Presidential Election would put an end to the South's political control of its destiny and would mark an irreversible turning away from this Southern ascendancy. | Suggests Lincoln's election would leave Northerners in control of federal government. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- regardless of the Republican candidate in 1860, Southerners viewed them as abolitionists because of the purely sectional nature of the Republican ideology
- during the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, Lincoln had made it clear that he wished to see the 'ultimate extinction' of slavery therefore Southerners were unwilling to listen to Lincoln's attempts to appease the South. He had emphasised that he would and could not interfere with slavery where it already existed, but Southerners were not willing to listen to Lincoln by 1860
- as President, Lincoln could appoint Republicans to key positions of government and begin the process of limiting slavery, revising or repealing the Fugitive Slave Act and introducing economic policies that would put slavery on the road to extinction
- the Republicans were a sectional party with Lincoln's name absent from the ballot paper in ten of the Southern states
- Lincoln remained quiet during the election campaign which failed to allay Southern fears
- Republicans emphasised the Slave Power Conspiracy during the election while Southern Democrats played on the 'Black Republicans' image
- Lincoln won 40% of the vote, all in the North.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| The immediate peril arises from the incessant and violent agitation of the slavery question throughout the North. | Suggests that the South believed that the North continued to attack the institution of slavery and therefore secession was the only remaining solution for the South. |
| This agitation in the North has been continued by the public press and by abolition sermons and lectures. | Suggests that the rise of abolitionism and media attacks on slavery exacerbated the situation. |
| The Southern States claim one argument in favour of immediate secession is that they are denied equal rights with the other States in the common Territories. | Suggests that the Southern States agreed that they were not equal partners in the union. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- candidate gives exemplification of the range of anti-slavery agitation
- Lincoln was perceived as an abolitionist which frightened southerners following incidents such as John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry in 1859
- the Republicans controlled Congress therefore the election of Lincoln in 1860 would ensure a Northern dominance in federal government.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- North and South divided into two sections – contrasting in many ways for example industry versus agriculture, free labour versus slave labour, interventionist government versus limited government
- territorial expansion the key to tension for example Texas, Mexican War, California, Kansas, Nebraska – should these new territories be free or slave?
- control of government meant representation for the controlling section and the dominance of their ideology for example tariff in the North meant potentially lower profits in the South therefore the economy of the South would be threatened. Economics rather than slavery caused the war, however, slavery was arguably at the heart of the economic and social differences
- economic disagreements over funding of internal improvements
- political opinion in the North and South diverged into sectionalised political opinion into the 1850s. The 1850 crisis emphasised this common political opinion in each section as each section united against each other during the compromise negotiations
- the Kansas Nebraska Act led directly to the emergence of a number of Northern political parties which unified under the banner of the Republicans. The Republican Party was therefore a 'rainbow coalition' of all Northern political ideals
- consequently, the Democrat party became increasingly more southern orientated in its political views
- the Republican and Democrat platforms in both the 1856 and 1860 Presidential elections reflected the sectionalised nature of both movements which directly opposed each other
- splits within the Democratic Party that allowed for the election of Lincoln
- political disagreements over the future nature of the American republic
- issue of slavery and more importantly slavery expansion
- Northern perception of a 'slave-power' conspiracy
- concept of a 'blundering generation'
- doctrine of states' rights
- Davis argued that the South seceded in defence of states' rights. The Republican Party had engineered war to further their political and economic domination over the South.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------|---|
| Hugh Tulloch | Takes the view that Lincoln's election triggered off secession because the Republican Party threatened the extension of slavery and because Lincoln threatened the honour and survival of the planter class. 'It was the coming of the Republican Lincoln to power in 1860 that triggered off secession and a civil war'. |
| Brian Holden-Reid | Takes the view that sectional issues were crucial to the Republican victory. The message received in the South was not one of compromise or union. |
| William Gienapp | Takes the view that the Republicans had united in opposition to the 'slave power.' If they directly opposed the institution that formed the foundation of Southern economic and political life, Southerners could not see a future within the Union. |
| David Donald | Takes the view that tensions and paranoia between North and South intensified. The politicians were to blame for failing to respond with clear policies that would reduce tensions and calm the escalating conflict. |

Question 32

Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the nature of Lincoln's relations with his generals during the American Civil War.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|------------------------------|--|
| Authority | Abraham Lincoln. | President of the USA writing to his General in chief, General George McClellan, being prepared to demonstrate his power as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union. |
| Purpose | Letter to General McClellan. | In this early letter of a series to McClellan, Lincoln expressed his frustration/annoyance/exasperation at McClellan's cautious approach as opposed to Lincoln's favoured all-out assault. |
| Timing | 9 April 1862 | In spring 1862, the Union Army took the offensive on the Virginia Peninsula, targeting Richmond. Recent Union victories in the West prompted expectations of a similar outcome in the Peninsula Campaign that would lead to a swift and successful end to the war. McClellan's total lack of any sort of decisive leadership when the time looked so good led Lincoln to take this action. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|---|
| Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. | Lincoln shows his frustration at McClellan's claims that the Union army were not adequately resourced the war effort. |
| My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of Army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. | Lincoln had ordered that the defence of Washington was to be a priority. Lincoln accuses McClellan of ignoring this order and leaving Washington susceptible to attack. Lincoln questions McClellan's decision to leave less than 20,000 troops to defend the line between Washington and Richmond. |
| This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. . . the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. | Lincoln's awareness of the need for public support for all the army's actions – and their expectation that the President will pick army commanders to do their duty to the utmost. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Lincoln was frustrated at McClellan's disregard for his orders who declared that 'I can do it all'. He was overly confident and optimistic about the war effort and his own abilities. McClellan was arrogant and took credit for victories that were not necessarily his for example in West Virginia at the start of the civil war
- political differences between Lincoln and McClellan. McClellan was a Democrat who did not want to emancipate the slaves and described Lincoln as a 'well-meaning baboon . . . the original gorilla'
- Lincoln and McClellan differed in their view regarding the purpose of the war
- McClellan wanted to outmanoeuvre the Confederacy and avoid 'total war' that Lincoln favoured. McClellan wanted to ensure that he did not create a lasting division between North and South. Hence his desire to avoid frontal assaults. Despite having a large army which outnumbered the Confederacy, he was reluctant to attack. He was over cautious and indecisive. He exaggerated the size of the enemy. This was most evident in the Peninsula Campaign of 1862 which the source refers to.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- several of Lincoln's appointments were based on the political allegiance of the generals rather than based on their military ability. This unified the Northern political effort but was not necessarily an appropriate approach to winning the war
- Lincoln had similar criticisms of General Meade. Meade had offered to resign for his failure to capture Lee at Gettysburg and his overtly cautious approach. Meade had himself criticised his predecessor, Hooker for being too cautious. Lincoln could not sack Meade given the victory at Gettysburg, despite his frustrations
- Lincoln criticised Meade for failing to pursue Lee given the significant Confederate losses at Gettysburg, following Pickett's charge. Even during the retreat, Lee's army found themselves extremely vulnerable as a consequence of heavy flooding which had made the Potomac River near impassable. However, Lee was able to erect strong defensive positions before Meade could organise an effective attack
- it wasn't until the appointment of Grant that Lincoln found a General in Chief who shared similar views on the war effort. Lincoln praised Grant highly.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| Hugh Tulloch | Takes the view that the North paid dearly for the caution of McClellan. McClellan did not appreciate that in a modern democracy war was politics. In addition, Tulloch argues that Lincoln was willing to take risks – allowing Burnside to adopt a dictatorial style in order to achieve military success for example. |
| Joseph Dawson | Takes the view that McClellan was the personification of limited warfare. He mistakenly believed that whenever the war ended, the nation could only be restored on the basis of the Union as it stood in 1860. |
| James McPherson | Takes the view that several of Lincoln's generals were appointed for political reasons and as such they proved to be incompetent on the battlefield. |
| Edward Bonekemper | Believes that Lincoln's and Grant's attributes contrasted and complemented each other. Lincoln was a political genius while Grant had military acumen. Lincoln delegated more and more military authority to Grant as the general earned the president's confidence. For his part, Grant yielded to Lincoln's political expertise on most significant issues, including the movement toward emancipation and the use of black soldiers. Grant also deferred to Lincoln on most major military strategic issues – a demonstration that Lincoln indeed was the senior partner in their successful partnership. |

Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

Part A – Historical issues

Question 33 **How far was the blurring of the caste structure the most significant internal cause of the collapse of the Tokugawa regime?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to evaluate the impact of the blurring of the caste structure upon the ability of the Tokugawa to maintain control. Candidates might make a judgement regarding significance, which might include a discussion in relation to other internal factors that may have contributed to the Tokugawa collapse. This question is focused upon the internal factors that contributed to the downfall of the Tokugawa.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the perspective that the blurring of the caste structure was the most significant internal cause of the collapse of the Tokugawa regime

- caste structure a crucial control mechanism as it dictated predictable behaviour across all the distant Hans within Japan
- the rigid structure, in theory, prevent social mobility and was rooted in reciprocal relations of loyalty and filial piety
- the Daimyo controlled their domains, the samurai maintained control, the peasants produced the staple food, currency and provided taxation payments
- towards the end of the Tokugawa regime castes began to deviate from their supposed behaviour, which made the previous predictable and reliable behaviour become unpredictable and difficult to control
- peasants not necessarily content to remain on the land and increasingly reluctant to confine their activities to food growing and began diversifying into other kinds of activity. This was especially true of those peasants who lived close to castle towns
- changing position of the merchants – supposed to be the lower caste, yet their wealth was increasing
- Samurai selling privileges to merchants
- division between upper and lower level samurai and the discontent of the latter.

Evidence which considers alternative perspectives regarding significant internal causation factors

- inherent problem of a decentralised system of government with the Tokugawa only having direct control over 25% of land in Japan – as illustrated through the failure of the Tempo Reforms
- impact of Tempo reforms in strengthening other notable clans within Japan – notably the Choshu and Satsuma
- impact of policy of Sakoku
- lack of a standing army. Samurai individual warriors attached to a lord. They did not operate as a national army and found it difficult to withstand any external threat
- rise of nationalism through the Shinto Revivalist movement and shift of emphasis away from Neo-Confucianism
- Shinto was the indigenous Japanese religion that had been suppressed by Tokugawa as they placed great emphasis on Neo-Confucianism – because it underpinned the caste structure
- roots of Shinto revivalism in a reaction against Chinese domination
- Motoori Norinaga, one of the founders of the School of National Learning, who at first reacted against worship of Chinese thought – searching for pure Japanese culture
- Shintoism was centred upon the Emperor as a living god – direct descendant from Amaterasu, the sun goddess
- Shinto revivalism led to the development of an emperor-centred loyalism and a growing belief that the Shogun had usurped power from the Emperor

- the fact that the Tokugawa Shoguns had kept the Emperor as the notional figurehead for the caste structure ultimately served to weaken the regime, as the Emperor became a rallying cry for the Shinto Revivalists
- many of those Choshu and Satsuma activists who were instrumental in the downfall of the Tokugawa were highly influenced by Shinto Revivalism
- dilution of Alternate attendance system.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| Kenneth Hensall | Contents that the rise of the merchant class . . . ultimately helped undermine Tokugawa policy. Clearly, a class system that placed merchants at the bottom was losing touch with reality. |
| Harold Bolitho | Highlights the weakness of the Tokugawa system of government. 'One by one the control mechanisms of the system failed: in the countryside the frequency, and the scale, of agrarian risings mounted . . . in the towns and cities reports of riots and looting told a similar story.' |
| Janet Hunter | Suggests that 'the dynamic forces within society and in the economy eventually came into conflict with a national polity which sought to avoid change'. |
| Richard Storry | Contents 'as . . . scholars examined the concept of loyalty, a corner-stone of Neo-Confucianism so firmly endorsed by the Bakufu, they began to think that after all perhaps the Japanese owed loyalty not so much to the Tokugawa Shogun as to the rather neglected line of emperors . . . Thus among the educated . . . there was already, by the 1850s, a mental climate prepared for a return of the emperors to the centre of the stage'. |

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Question 34 | How significant was the information gathered from the West in influencing the nature of the Meiji social reforms passed between 1868 and 1912? |
| Aim of the question | The aim of this essay question is to allow for an evaluation of the significance of Western thought and influence in shaping the social reforms during the Meiji period. It would be relevant for candidates to weigh up the continuing influence of indigenous Japanese thought and tradition when developing their line of argument. There can also be nuances in their argument – with some reforms being more influenced by the west than others. |

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the argument that the abolition of the caste structure was copied from the west

- declaration from Charter Oath – ‘knowledge shall be sought throughout the world’
- caste structure formally abolished in 1871
- idea to move towards a more western influenced class based society, which permitted social mobility
- eliminated the distinctive Japanese Samurai caste.

Evidence which suggests this area of social reform was not copied from the west

- Neo Confucianist principles continued to be used to underpin loyalty and piety within society
- permeations of Neo-Confucianism apparent in the village structures, families and the work place
- geographical differences. Villages in outlying areas of Japan often saw little change.

Evidence which supports the argument that the legal reforms were copied from the west

- judicial reforms, which were largely copied from the west in their urgent desire to overturn the humiliation of extra-territoriality.

Evidence which supports the argument that the education reforms were copied from the west

- initially education reform was influenced by the West
- influence of missionary schools, which particularly influenced the early education of girls
- Western works of literature were translated into Japanese in the early Meiji period
- Ministry of Education set up in 1871, which restructured primary, secondary and tertiary education along western lines
- universities established – 1897 second university (after Tokyo) established at Kyoto
- influence of Iwakura Mission and especially the French system
- Mori Arinori was minister of Education from 1885 until his assassination in 1889 because some believed his reforms were too western
- infrastructure of schooling (elementary, high school, university) were much influence from the West.

Evidence which suggests this area of social reform was not copied from the west

- concern that education was becoming too westernised by the 1890s
- although infrastructure western, ideas being transmitted via the system, especially after 1890, represented traditional core Japanese values
- Imperial Rescript of Education – 30th October 1890 – and its role in directing schools to place more emphasis on moral education, developing a sense of nationalism and loyalty to their emperor
- key figures of Motoda Eifu, who played an important role in shaping the direction of Japanese education. Education was used as a vehicle to modernise Japan with a new ideal whilst still retaining an identity with her cultural past
- education was a primary agent in the cultural revolution in developing a unique sense of Japanese identity linked to the living deity that was the Emperor
- improvements in education provision were also essential to create an educated workforce for Japan to embark upon their rapid process of modernisation and industrialisation was influenced by the west – but the key focus on loyalty uniquely Japanese.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|--|
| Marius Jansen | Summarises a modern consciousness was advancing steadily . . . The impact of the west provided the catalyst, but in its essence, it included a reformulation of older moral and political traditions of benevolence. |
| Sydney Wood | Argues western activity was to be critically evaluated and shaped to suit Japan, including within the sphere of social reforms. |
| Charles Fahs | Highlights Japan's strong feeling of national identity was helpful in preventing blind acceptance of everything western. To its due Japan succeeded in maintaining many of her own rich social traditions. |
| Ian Buruma | Believes they recognised the power of western ideas and wished to learn more, so Japan could one day compete with the best of them. |

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Question 35 | <p>‘The actions of the Meiji government were crucial in Japan’s economic development.’</p> <p>How valid is this view of the development of Japan’s economy between 1868 and 1912?</p> |
| Aim of the question | <p>The aim of this essay question is for candidates to analyse and evaluate the impact of the actions of the Meiji government upon Japan’s economic growth in the Meiji period. It is highly relevant to compare the role the government with other contributory factors, such as the Zaibatsu, before drawing a reasoned conclusion in relation to the role of the government and Japan’s economic development.</p> |

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the perspective that the role of the government was instrumental in Japan’s economic development.

The Role of the Government

- Government had a limited reliance on foreign loans. They took firm control over expenditure – provided partial funding of large scale private enterprise and support for the Zaibatsu. Many historians argue Zaibatsu could not have developed without the encouragement and support of the government
- Government initiation of the Iwakura Mission which turned into a fact-finding mission about western knowledge, including industrial expertise
- role of state in industrial processes and policies – they built model factories such as Tomioka silk reeling mill
- they carefully deployed Yatoi – but then dismissed them once their knowledge was disseminated
- Government initiated military reform which stimulated industrial development
- Government improvements in infrastructure contributed to economic development.

Evidence which considers other reasons for the economic development in Japan after 1868 such as

The Zaibatsu

- the Zaibatsu were unique vertical monopolies that came to dominate Japanese industry after 1868 – often from the production of raw materials to distribution of finished goods
- most had their own bank
- from 1880s onwards they began to dominate manufacturing and commercial activities
- some concentrated on certain fields, others embraced a range of activities
- these huge conglomerates were led by four giants – Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda
- Mitsubishi conglomerate controlled 25% of shipping and ship building, 15% of coals and metals, 16% of bank loans, 50% of flour milling, 59% of sheet glass, 35% of sugar and 15% of cotton textiles
- they developed networks of foreign contacts and gathered information in order to sell a wide variety of goods abroad
- some were private enterprises, but some developed because of Government favouritism
- benefitted from mass economies of scale.

Role of Westerners and international environment

- psychological impact of the Unequal Treaties provided great impetus for industrial growth
- details of industrial knowledge gained on the Iwakura mission
- use of Yatoi in Japan.

Tokugawa foundations

- although not intentionally encouraged by the Tokugawa, economic foundations were laid during the Tokugawa period
- alternate attendance led to the creation of an extensive infrastructure, including the building of bridges
- alternate attendance also led to the dramatic growth in Edo to over one million inhabitants, who needed supplying with commercial goods. The peasants living in nearby villages began to diversify into commercial goods to supply Edo – stimulating a money based economy
- this was replicated on a smaller scale across Japan following the stipulation of samurai to live in the caste towns within their Han
- the transformation of Samurai from a warrior into an administrative caste led to them indulging in extravagant lifestyles, getting into debt to merchants, increasing the importance of merchants within Japan
- move from a rice based to a money based economy
- fairly literate population
- but impact of Unequal Treaties in the Bakumatsu period stunted this economic development.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| Edwin Reischauer | Argues ‘the great wealth and broad base of the Zaibatsu enabled them to finance promising new fields in the economy and thus increase their share in its fast-growing industrial sector’. |
| W J Macpherson | Contends that the role of the government was crucial. |
| Wakita Osamu | Argues that the Tokugawa years should be termed Japan’s ‘early modern period’ by ‘drawing attention away from the period’s feudal aspects and toward those long term trends related to the emergence of modern Japanese state and economy after 1868’. |
| Mikiso Hane | Takes the view that modernisation would depend heavily upon the adoption of western science, technology and industrialisation. |

Question 36

To what extent was the 1902 alliance with Britain the most significant cause of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to analyse the 1902 alliance with Britain as a cause of the Russo-Japanese war. This is an isolated factor question, so candidates would be expected to give due consideration to the given factor before moving on to discuss and evaluate its significance in relation to other causation factors that have been identified by historians. Candidates will reach a conclusion regarding the significance of the Alliance with Britain in causing the conflict.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence which supports the alliance with Britain was a key causation factor**

- Japanese confidence grew dramatically when Britain emerged from splendid isolation to sign a diplomatic agreement with Japan
- Britain was motivated by a mistrust of Russia, they hoped that this alliance would be a means of containing Russian expansion in the East, avoiding a Russo-Japanese partition of NE Asia and preserving the British Treaty system in China
- according to the Treaty, both parties promised they would remain neutral in the event of either signatory becoming involved in a war that was being fought over interests in China and/or Korea
- in addition, and importantly, both countries promised support if either signatory became involved in war with more than one power
- they also promised not to enter into separate agreements with other powers in relation to China and Korea, and promised to communicate frankly and openly
- this treaty meant that France, Russia's ally at this point, would not risk coming to Russia's aid in the event of war as this would also have meant going to war with Britain
- Japan was emboldened by this treaty. Not only had Britain recognised publicly Japanese interests in Korea, but they knew that if they risked a war with Russia, no other nations would be pulled into the conflict.

Evidence which supports arguments for alternative causes for the war between Japan and Russia**Anti-Russian sentiment emanating from the Tripartite Intervention**

- Japan had been delighted when, in the aftermath of their defeat of China, they were awarded their first foothold on the Asian mainland in the form of the Liaodung Peninsula
- however, the Russians, who were in the process of expanding their interests in the region, were unhappy with this
- Russia instigated the Tripartite Intervention, with France and Russia, and forced Japan to hand back this recently won territory
- despite being awarded an additional indemnity as compensation, the Tripartite Intervention caused profound humiliation and embedded a strong desire for revenge
- the additional indemnity was used to further strengthen the military, which eventually increased Japanese confidence in launching war in 1904
- Russia later leased the Liaodong Peninsula which further angered Japan
- the consequence of this was a profound anti-Russian sentiment within Japan, which was later fuelled by the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway.

Japanese reaction to the Russian action during the Boxer rebellion

- Japan's reaction to Russia's behaviour during the Boxer Rebellion was arguably, highly influenced by the Tripartite Intervention
- Russian actions exacerbated the pre-existing anti-Russian sentiments
- during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, eight nations occupied territory in China, at the request of the Chinese government
- Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata took the lead in organising and managing the international force of European, American and Japanese troops
- Russian troops failed to withdraw completely when they were supposed to, and occupied part of Manchuria
- 5 March 1904, Japan cut diplomatic relations and launched attacks on Russian held territory, leading to war being declared on March 10
- Russian occupation of Manchuria was certainly a catalyst to war, but Japan had been looking for an excuse to challenge and prevent what they perceived to be Russian expansionism in Asia.

Concerns over Korea

- historically, Korea had played an important role in previous conflict between Japan and China
- although Korea had come under Japan's sphere of influence after the victory over China, she was not formally a colony, so still could be exploited by others
- the Korean peninsula was Japan's obvious means of accessing the Asian mainland and was known as the 'dagger pointing into the heart of Japan'.

Desire to be perceived as equal with the west

- some aspects of the Unequal Treaties were still in place and many in influential positions in Japan believed that the best way to overthrow them was through military victory and the acquisition of an overseas empire
- the Iwakura Mission had raised awareness about the key characteristics of becoming a world power – including an overseas empire
- military victory and an ensuing empire would also allow access to raw materials and markets, which in turn would help fuel their industrial development, another means of challenging perceptions of the west towards Japan.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Michael Barnhart | Highlights the importance of the 1902 alliance with Britain in encouraging the Japanese to adopt a firmer line with Russia, 'Japan had obtained recognition –in treaty form no less – of its own great power status in an alliance between equals with one of the greatest nations in Europe'. |
| Andrew Gordon | Argues that the motivating factor for war was linked to growing suspicion of Russian motives in the region. 'The Russians came to rival the Japanese position in Korea. They challenged it in Manchuria as well by seizing the leasehold for the tip of the Liaodung peninsula in 1898'. |
| John Benson and Takao Matsumura | Developed a similar argument. 'The European powers' growing interest in Asia could scarcely be overlooked, and this encouraged Japan's development of a more aggressive foreign policy'. |
| Bonnie B'Oh | Contends that the motivation for war was still linked to the Japanese desire to be perceived as an equal with the west. 'For Japan, Imperialism was a means of gaining equality with the West'. |

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Question 37 | How successful were the Taisho years, between 1912 and 1920, in contributing to changing attitudes towards Japan's position as a world power? |
| Aim of the question | The aim of this essay question is to evaluate the impact of events that occurred between 1912 and 1920 with regards Japan's standing on the global stage. The Unequal Treaties had now been overturned, but evidence suggests that Japan is still not perceived as an equal player within global affairs. Candidates might tackle this question by discussing the impact of key events. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion. |

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the perspective that Japan's actions within the context of WWI contributed to Japan being perceived as a world power

- the impact of Japan's participation during WWI
- Japan joined the conflict on the winning side, acquiring Germany's Chinese sphere of influence in Shantung, extending its control of Manchuria and its overall influence on China
- Taisho years witnessed imperial expansion becoming more aggressive and planned – 21 Demands in 1915, which was interpreted by the West as an attempt to bring China under its control. Evidence of shifting perspectives within Japan – growing confidence about their ability to operate as a global, expansionist power
- from 1915 Japanese industry underwent considerable expansion because it was able to capture markets from European powers actively involved in the war. The Indian markets for textiles had been dominated by Lancashire products before 1914
- Japan took over trade routes in Asia that had been dominated by western powers prior to the war. The number of merchant ships dramatically increased over the period of WWI, from 488 in 1900 to 2996 by 1920. All contributed to shifting perspectives to Japan as an economic power
- Japan emerged on the winning side in 1918 virtually as a non-combatant without having incurred any of the costs of war, unlike Britain and America – in a strong position to compete on a global power
- the expansion of other Japanese industries, for example ship building and heavy engineering.

Evidence which is more critical of the impact of WWI

- the West intervened with their 21 Demands and forced Japan to drop the most ambitious of their demands – clear evidence of western perspectives towards Japan and their ambitions
- Japan was not directly involved in any of the conflict so the international reaction to their involvement was limited
- the international economy was also very unstable after the war and Japan was forced to trade in a very uncertain political world
- the growth that had taken place had only been possible because of the absence of competition and on the return to peace Japanese industry suffered severe dislocation
- not all workers benefited equally as wages had not risen as fast as prices and high food prices led to Rice Riots in 1918.

Evidence which supports the impact of Japan's participation in the Paris Peace Conference

- confirmation of Japan's changing status as a nation and evidence of their increasing influence in international politics
- became a council member of the new League of Nations
- the Japanese government was happy that it was at the 'top table' in international diplomacy.

Evidence more critical of the impact of Japan in the Paris Peace Conference

- Japan's desire for racial equality clause as part of League of Nations Charter was not accepted
- although maintained control of the former German Mariana Islands, it was through a League mandate rather than outright ownership
- The Japanese government had been rebutted on some of the other claims it had made at the talks and still felt it was being treated as a second class citizen. This feeling was widespread among the Japanese public.

The impact of Taisho Democracy

- political parties in the Diet came to dominate the cabinets – influenced by other world powers and their interactions with them
- influenced by foreign developments (such as Russian Revolution, establishment of Labour Party) led to demands for more social justice and equality, advanced by social movements of the period
- first ‘commoner’ Prime Minister, Hara Kei, first to be an elected member of the legislature. Other global powers aware of these political developments.

However

- there was no change in the attitude in US to Japanese immigration – 1908 they attempted to limit the flow of Japanese migrants, not allowed to own land in California.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Kenneth Pyle | Holds the view ‘The outbreak of WWI in Europe in the summer of 1914 provided (Japan) extraordinary opportunities to advance the twin objectives of empire and industry’. |
| Ayira Iriye | Contends that ‘the Japanese were rewarded by being invited to the peace conference, the first time Japan attended a conference as a fully-fledged member’. |
| John Benson and Takao Matsumura | Take the view ‘The rejection by the Powers of Japanese proposals for the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the Versailles Settlement heightened the grievance of the Japanese towards the unequal treatment to which the coloured races were subjected by Western peoples’ |
| Richard Storry | Highlights that during this period ‘it was not long before Japan became a creditor rather than a debtor among the nations.’ |

Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920.

Part B – Historical sources

Question 38 **How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of society during the late Tokugawa period?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| The reality of this Tokugawa power depended on stabilising a coalition of daimyo because only roughly one quarter of the land belonged directly to the Tokugawa family. | Contends that the interpretation of this source highlights the importance of controlling the daimyo within late Tokugawa society as the Tokugawa only had directly control over 25% of the land. |
| Within their own domains the daimyo were left with a great deal of autonomy, free from interference as long as they did not behave in any way regarded as disloyal by the shogunate. | Argues that on the decentralised nature of Tokugawa society, as long as the daimyo were loyal and did not present any threat to their control, they were given a huge amount of freedom. |
| Some argue that Tokugawa Japan missed an opportunity to develop as a centralised state and halted progressive trends such as the emergence of a fluid class system, free cities, and vibrant international contacts. | Considers a somewhat negative view of Tokugawa society, in that their decision to maintain a decentralised system of organising society proved to be an obstacle to ‘progressive’ trends – so was holding Japan back in developing a class based, urban society with international links. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Bakufu-Han system is the term given to the decentralised system of government enforced during the Tokugawa period – with the daimyo being subdivided into Fudai and Tozama depending on their history of allegiance to the Tokugawa, with the former being entrusted with domains that were strategically important
- a further control mechanism of Alternate Attendance was used to keep the daimyo under surveillance, which shaped Japanese society as it meant that the daimyo and their families spent the majority of their time in Edo, it hindered any major accumulation of wealth and Han nationalism
- the Tokugawa caste structure was rooted in a rice-based economy, as opposed to a money based one, which certainly presented an obstacle to economic development.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| The Tokugawa went far towards enforcing an ideological orthodoxy calculated to preserve the permanent supremacy of their family in a rigidly hierarchical, warrior dominated society. This dominated the Tokugawa period. . . | Argues that the interpretation being presented here is that the warrior dominated, rigid caste structure was paramount to the Tokugawa maintaining their supremacy. |
| They also wanted to create a society uncontaminated by the outside world and this led the Tokugawa government to close Japan. | Argues that Tokugawa society also attempted to cut off all contacts with outside countries through their policy of isolation. |
| . . . the Japanese had lived in peace during the Tokugawa period – except for local peasant risings – with themselves, and with the world for two and a half centuries. | Argues that the perceived successes of this stable society are celebrated with Tokugawa society being remarkably stable, with the exception of a few localised peasant uprisings. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the caste structure was a theoretical rigid society with the Emperor the theoretical apex, with the Shogun and their Bakufu below them, then the daimyo, Samurai, peasants, merchants and Eta
- the Tokugawa regime attempted to impose the policy of Sakoku. This meant that if Japanese attempted to leave Japan, they would not be allowed back into the country to prevent alien ideologies from entering the country. Any external contact severely regulated
- although the Tokugawa regime was born out of civil war and strife, they were so successful at creating a stable regime, the samurai caste transformed from a warrior caste to an administrative one.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- Samurai followed the bushido code which dictated their theoretical code of behaviour within Japanese society
- they were the warrior class, operating as autonomous individual warriors, responsible to their own masters, but given the responsibility to maintain law and order based upon their own personal interpretation of unacceptable behaviour
- the peasants were a theoretical rigid caste, above the merchants and Eta, but below the Samurai and daimyo
- the combination of the rigid caste structure underpinned by the belief system of Neo-Confucianism imposed strict regulation upon their lives with the expectation of unquestioning and undeviating loyalty to those above them in the caste structure
- although the Tokugawa regime implemented the policy of Sakoku, they actually did permit highly controlled contact with the Dutch – and they particularly gained industrial and medical knowledge through the controlled Dutch settlement at Dejima
- there was also trading with China via some of the islands to the south of Japan
- religion and belief systems were also significant during the Tokugawa regime
- individuals had to register at their Buddhist Temple
- although suppressed by the regime, Shintoism continued to be followed by many Japanese people as their own indigenous faith rooted in the belief that the Emperor was a living God
- position of the Eta caste.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------|---|
| Peter Duus | Contends that ‘in their Confucian vision of society, all people could be divided into four classes – officials, peasants, artisans and merchants’. |
| Janet Hunter | Argues that the Tokugawa confirmed their hold on power by a complex structure of physical, political and economic controls over several hundred local lords whose domains made up the rest of the country, the samurai class who constituted their followers and the populace who resided within their domains. |
| Mikiso Hane | Is of the belief that ‘in order to ensure political control and social stability the Tokugawa Bakufu set out a rigid class system’. |
| Ann Waswo | Argues that the importance of neo-Confucianism was rooted in the fact it ‘stressed the ethical nature of government, stressing obedience to one’s superiors’. |

Question 39

Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the impact of foreign influences on Japan before 1868.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Authority | Tokugawa Nariaki. | Author was a member of the Tokugawa family and one of daimyo who was approached for his advice – so very aware of the impact of foreign influences. His reaction also serves to highlight the impact of foreign influences in dividing opinion with Japan, even within the Tokugawa family itself. |
| Purpose | To express their opinion with regards to how the threatened incursion from the west should be handled. | Author firmly trying to persuade that they should have no dealings with America following the pivotal moment when the Tokugawa approached all daimyo and the Imperial court for their advice when facing the threat of Perry. |
| Timing | 1853 | Source was written in between Perry's two visits. He had arrived in July 1853, presented President Filmore's list of demands, and would be returning in 1854 to receive the Tokugawa's response. |

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|--|
| I now hear that those who have witnessed the recent actions of the insolent foreigners, think that if the Bakufu does not expel them there may be some who will complain about the humiliation brought upon the country by the government. | A sense of outrage – insolent foreigners- that if the Bakufu do not expel the foreigners, especially considering their recent actions, the government will be blamed for reaping humiliation upon the country. |
| However, I fear that if you, the Bakufu do not decide to carry out expulsion of the foreigners, then the lower orders, including ignorant commoners, may fail to understand your actions and opposition might arise. | The Tokugawa risk losing control over the lower orders – the ignorant commoners – if they do not reinforce their policy of Sakoku and expel the foreigners. |
| It might even be that Bakufu control of the great lords would itself be endangered. That is the reason why we must never choose the policy of peace with these arrogant foreigners. | If the daimyo (the great lords) become disaffected by the way in which the Tokugawa handled the foreign incursion, then the Bakufu may lose control. The author here is warning of the potential dangers of foreign influences upon the caste structure, one of their most important control mechanisms. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- one of the key control mechanisms had been the policy of isolation, and the incursion of Perry and his manner of communication implied superiority over the Japanese
- Tokugawa Bakufu thrown into a genuine state of uncertainty – approached Imperial Court for their opinion – marked a huge turning point in their control as they had never before consulted the Emperor on any issues to do with the state. The Imperial Court recommended that no negotiations should take place with the West. The subsequent disregarding of this advice led to widespread discontent
- the Tokugawa also approached all daimyo for their advice and opinion – which consequently split the daimyo between those that supported the actions of the Bakufu and those that did not – which further weakened Tokugawa control.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- pressure from America had been growing. They were heavily involved in the whaling industry in seas around Japan and desperately wanted access to Japanese ports for refuelling and protection for ship-wrecked sailors – creating uncertainty
- Commodore Biddle had approached Japan in 1846 but had been sent away without receiving any concessions – but the Tokugawa were becoming increasingly fearful of their ability to expel any further advances because of their military inferiority
- Perry arrived in 1853 with a third of the American navy – left the Tokugawa feeling threatened
- he delivered a letter from President Fillmore demanding Japan to open its ports to American ships – Japan given months to respond with the passive aggressive threat of military action if their response was not favourable
- when Perry returned, the Tokugawa Bakufu disregarded imperial advice and signed the Treaty of Kanagawa
- this led to outrage amongst Shinto nationalists – and contributed to the growth of the Shishi movement
- the Shogun accused of usurping power from the Emperor – the apex of the Shinto religion
- opponents rallied under the banner of Sonno-Joi
- Kanagawa opened the door for a flurry of other unequal treaties with Britain, France, Russia and the Dutch, reaping further humiliation
- division appeared within the Tokugawa, and daimyo and samurai across Japan, with regards how far to adhere to traditional policies and how far to adapt to the changing environment
- also served to highlight the vulnerability caused by the lack of a standing army
- political, social and economic impact of the Unequal Treaties
- terms with regards to tariffs and trading rights were forced upon Japan which were not reciprocated – Japan did not receive such benefits when trading with signatory nations
- impact of extra-territoriality.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Thomas Huber | Contends that ‘it was Perry’s arrival which finally made it possible for serious reformers in Choshu and elsewhere to convert their theoretical understanding into an urgent public demand for change’. |
| Marius Jansen | Suggests that ‘the agreements Perry and Harris had wrung from reluctant Bakufu negotiators made it necessary for Japan to abandon policies of seclusion and enter the international order on terms defined by the west’. |
| E Herbert Norman | Believes that ‘by allowing foreign merchants to enter Japan, it (the Bakufu) accelerated the economic disintegration of the country’. |
| William Beasley | Contends that ‘despite the Bakufu’s diplomatic rear-guard action and the strong criticism coming from many influential Japanese, Japan had last been brought – in subordinate condition – into the world of what scholars now call free trade imperialism’. |

Question 40

How fully does Source D explain the nature of the response of the Meiji regime towards the demands for political reform after 1868?

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| . . . it took swift action by launching an attack against the two opposition liberal parties, the Kaishinto and Jiyuto, by direct repression. | Argues that the attitude of the government to the political parties that had emerged within the context of political reform after 1868 was one of concern and alarm, which led them to take action to repress the parties and try to win over some of their supporters. |
| Having promised a Diet, the Government in 1882 passed new regulations in regard to meeting and association, which were far more severe and more rigorously enforced than the previous regulations. . . | Argues that in 1882, after the constitution had been established, the government passed laws which placed severe restrictions on any political meetings and associations – revealing their attitude to the freedom of political expression and highlighted as significant by the author of this source. |
| The most stringent repression, however, came only after the Government had succeeded in removing some of the ablest political leaders from successful participation in the democratic movement. | Highlights that the desire of the Meiji leaders to inhibit the freedom of political speech extended to the removal of political leaders from the democratic movement. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- when the franchise was introduced, only 1% of the total population could vote – revealing the attitude of Meiji regime to political reform
- the attitude of the Meiji regime to political reform was to retain considerable theoretical power for the emperor and limit party involvement
- attitude apparent through the Safety Preservation Law of 1894 intended to suppress the Freedom and People's Rights movement – it imposed stringent restrictions on the press, public speeches and political meetings
- followed up by 1900 Public Order and Police Law 1900 which specifically prohibited workers from organising and going on strike. Women were banned from political organisations.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- one of the main objectives of the new Meiji oligarchy was to establish a centralised government to replace the ultimately flawed decentralised Tokugawa regime which only had direct control over 25% of the land
- this was achieved through the replacement of the Han system with the Prefectural system
- the new regime also wanted to give the façade of a democratic government to the Western Nations that had imposed the Unequal Treaties upon Japan – and were arguably more interested in the appearance of democracy as opposed to a genuine desire to create a democratic state
- their attitude to political reform was highly influenced by their desire to overturn the Unequal Treaties
- this attitude of creating a western style façade is evident in the fact they copied so much of their new constitution and their bi-cameral parliament from the German constitution with the creation of the House of Peers and House of Representatives, which consolidated centralised control over Japan

- basic aim was the centralised control over Japan in the theoretical absolute, if symbolic, sovereign power in the hands of the emperor, and actual political power in the hands of the ruling elite who acted as his advisors
- what took political precedence was the right of the nation – not the individual – which consolidated the centralisation process
- the new constitution of 1889 stressed the duties of the subject rather than the rights of the citizen
- according to Article 11, the Emperor assumed centralised control of the army and navy, had the power to appoint the prime minister, cabinet members, military chiefs of staff and other senior advisers. In reality, during the time of the young and inexperienced Emperor Meiji, the oligarchy exploited these powers as they wished to retain power.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Ian Buruma | Suggests 'Japanese democracy was a sickly child from the beginning. The constitution was a vaguely worded document that put sovereignty into imperial hands'. |
| John Benson and Takao Matsumara | Contend 'This was no western style liberal democracy. As Article 3 of the Constitution implied, the basic aim of those drawing up the Meiji Constitution was to retain theoretically absolute (if symbolic) power in the hands of the ruling elite who acted as his advisors'. |
| Janet Hunter | Believes '(The Meiji statesmen) did not create a unified nation under an absolute emperor, nor a parliamentary democracy, but a series of major groupings, each of which could utilise the imperial position to impose its policies on the rest of the population'. |
| Mikiso Hane | Argues 'The diet became an institution which provided the people with a voice in government'. |

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

Part A – Historical issues

Question 41 To what extent were the Germans justified in considering the Treaty of Versailles to be nothing more than a disgraceful act of vengeance?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to discuss the impact of the Treaty of Versailles on the German people and the reasons why Germans considered it vengeful. Candidates might consider the reasons why Germans hated the Treaty and the extent to which this was justified. Candidates might discuss the range of terms: territorial, military, reparations and ‘war guilt’ against their intentions, operation and impact. They may debate whether they stand up to scrutiny as being disgraceful and vengeful. By looking at the different clauses from these different perspectives, candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion as to how far Germans were justified in their views of the Treaty.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the Germans’ view that Versailles was disgraceful and vengeful

Territorial

- there were strong objections to the territorial clauses of the treaty
- Alsace-Lorraine was lost to France – a symbolic humiliation for Germans because these territories had been taken from France by Prussia/Germany in the Franco-Prussian War 1870–1871
- the creation of a Polish Corridor divided Germany and took away German territory. It also left Germans trapped in what became Polish territory and therefore under a foreign government
- indeed, the splitting of Germany by the establishment of the Polish Corridor undid the work of unification that had been done in 1850–1871
- the Saar region was internationalised for 15 years – which meant it was effectively occupied by the allies
- Germany lost all of her overseas colonies
- the comparable Treaty of Saint Germain with Austria saw Austria treated far more leniently.

Military

- the military terms of the Treaty were hated because to Germans they left the country vulnerable to attack and unable to defend herself
- the army was reduced to 100,000 men, and conscription was banned
- the navy was only allowed 6 battleships and 12 small vessels
- Germany was allowed no airforce at all and no submarines
- the Rhineland was demilitarised to create a buffer zone between France and Germany and to allow France to invade Germany easily if the German government breached the terms of the Treaty
- traditional elites hated the military clauses.

War Guilt

- clause 231 – the ‘War Guilt’ clause – was regarded by Germans as humiliating and dishonest. Germans believed that the causes of the war were international and that no one country was to blame or should be blamed
- war guilt was also damaging for Germans psychologically because it meant that German troops, sailors and airmen had died in vain and were dishonoured
- by accepting the Treaty – even though it had no choice but to do so – the newly elected democratic government was blamed for Germany’s humiliation and war guilt, perhaps more than any aspect of the Treaty, became a focus for right wing nationalist opposition to the republic and to democracy
- resentment of the Treaty enabled conservatives and extreme nationalists such as the Nazis to argue that democracy was un-German and parliamentarianism weak and ineffectual and a foreign imposition.

Reparations

- Germany's economic crisis in 1923 was also blamed directly on the Treaty, especially the reparations clauses, and therefore on the republic and democracy
- reparations were viewed as little more than an attempt to destroy Germany.

International/diplomatic

- exclusion from the League of Nations.

Evidence which challenges the Germans' view that Versailles was disgraceful and vengeful

Territorial

- although Germany lost a significant amount of territory in the east and the west and her overseas colonies, the country was otherwise intact. In other words, by and large Germany retained her territorial integrity
- territories lost such as Alsace-Lorraine were important to Germany economically but not so important as to be able to prevent economic recovery
- the territorial losses Germany suffered were nothing like the territorial confiscations imposed by Germany on Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918
- in this Treaty Russia lost territory in the west and south (including Ukraine) which amounted to 27% of Russia's farmland and meant, too, the loss of 62 million people, 26% of her railways and 74% of her iron ore and coal.

Military

- although the German military machine was stripped back by Versailles, this meant that Germany could concentrate on building up a crack military elite
- there was never any real prospect of Germany being invaded by France or by Russia in the short term, and indeed the chaos caused by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 meant that the French were unlikely to do something similar again without the support of other European powers, especially Britain
- after the war and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, middle and eastern Europe was a jumble of chaotic, politically weak states none of which presented any threat to Germany at all.

War Guilt

- War Guilt may have been experienced by Germans as humiliating and dishonourable and unjust, but there is little doubt that Germany's actions on the run up to 1914 were indeed the main cause of the war
- Germany encouraged Austria to go to war with Serbia and Germany's failure to understand that Britain would defend Belgian neutrality. These were clear examples of culpability or at least ineptitude that brought about conflict
- German aggression was also evident in her attempt, from 1908, to overtake Britain in the building of Dreadnoughts. This caused an arms race
- War Guilt was far less important as a principle to the Allies than it was to the Germans. For the Allies it was thought to be essential to have War Guilt to be able to rationalise punishing Germany in the form of reparations.

Reparations

- although the final figure for reparations – 132,000 million gold marks – was a huge sum, it was a much less harsh fine than that imposed on France by Germany in 1871 (5 billion francs to be paid back in five years)
- Germany was supposed to pay about 7% of her annual income per annum but in fact never paid more than 3%.

Actions of German Government

- candidates may discuss the view that the Weimar government, either unintentionally or not, gave support to the critics of the Treaty by its own actions, thereby increasing the view of the German people regarding vengefulness.

- Scheidemann's rhetoric on not signing the Treaty: 'May the hand wither. . .'
- Government support for victory marches by returning soldiers
- dismissing Erzberger's plans for taxation to pay reparations
- yet there were German politicians who acknowledged privately that it could have been worse
- Otto Landsberg SPD, first Minister of Justice in 1919 stated that Germany should make good restitution with the Allies and accept responsibility since the German invasions of the Allies were not self-defence.

Perspective of the Allies

- France: Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, like most people in France, thought that Germany had been treated too leniently at Versailles
- USA: President Woodrow Wilson wanted a just and lasting peace but advocated punishment for Germany – 'to undergo the punishment, not more than it can endure but up to the point where it can pay it must pay for the wrong that it has done.' Edward House, a member of the USA's negotiating team, said, 'Looking at the Treaty in retrospect there is much to approve and much to regret'
- Britain: a variety of attitudes pertained. Prime Minister David Lloyd George agreed that Germany should be punished but should retain enough economic strength to resume the role of European trading partner. Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, demonstrated the attitude of those who wanted the severest punishment ('everything you can squeeze out of a lemon, and a bit more.') Economist John Maynard Keynes and leading civil servant Harold Nicolson both resigned because they felt the Treaty was too harsh
- whilst acknowledging that the Treaty severely punished Germany, many observers believed that it could have been much harsher.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------------------|--|
| R J Evans | Takes the view that Treaty of Versailles was greeted with incredulous horror by the majority of Germans. The sense of outrage and disbelief that swept through the upper and middle classes like a shockwave was almost universal and had a massive impact on many working class supporters of the moderate Social Democrats as well. |
| Martin Collier and Philip Pedley | Takes the view that Versailles left Germany humiliated and scarred but it was also left potentially strong. The Treaty left Germany as a united nation state with the potential to regain its status as an important world power. Germany was not weakened as much as Germans' imagined and their view of vengefulness is somewhat exaggerated. |
| Colin Storer | Takes the view that Germans of all political persuasions saw Versailles as vengeful, unreasonable and unacceptable. The terms of the Treaty were considered by the population as a whole as not only unfair but also insulting: an affront to national honour. |
| Stephen Lee | Takes the view that Versailles was justified by the need to safeguard against the very real threat posed by Germany, to rebuild France and to give viability to the new democracies of Europe. But because the Allies excluded Germany from the peace negotiating process Germany came to see itself as a victim without actually being destroyed. |

Question 42

How far can it be argued that the appearance of stability during the period called the 'Golden Years', between 1924 and 1929, hid severe tensions?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to discuss the extent to which political and economic developments 1924-1929 made the Republic more stable following the crisis years of 1918-23. Candidates might choose to discuss political and economic developments that did make the Republic more stable by comparison with 1918-23 and 1929-33, or they might choose to argue that political and economic developments led to an illusion of stability but in fact left the Republic as vulnerable, or perhaps even more vulnerable, than it was after 1918. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the view that political and economic developments created an illusion of stability

- political violence did not completely disappear
- extremist parties did not gain mass support but their impact was still felt on the streets where there were still frequent clashes between the Communists and the Nazis, for example the decline of the middle class DDP had serious consequences because it indicated that the middle classes were not convinced by democracy
- the Centre Party moved to the right and some of its leaders, such as Heinrich Brüning, favoured a more authoritarian government
- the likelihood of stability was undermined by the fact that there were six coalition governments between 1924 and 1929, each one short-lived. Parties found it difficult to cooperate and voters were alienated by the horse-trading that was needed to establish each of the coalition governments (because voters were excluded from that process)
- there was growth of narrow sectional interest parties encouraged by the PR system
- a series of minor issues highlighted the deep divisions within Germany. There was fierce controversy over the new national flag originally adopted by the 1848 revolutionaries and hated by conservatives
- the negative 'stab-in-the-back' myth continued to exercise a powerful grip on public imagination
- the Republic lacked charismatic leaders
- Hindenburg's election was a disaster because it meant that the Presidency of the Republic went to someone who was not committed to democracy and whose values were those of the old *Kaiserreich*
- there was continuing and growing resentment of the Republic among opinion shapers
- industrialists hated the welfare system and resented the influence of the trade unions and the workers
- few among church leaders, school teachers, lawyers and the army officer corps made much effort to promote democracy and democratic values
- there was economic growth but it was patchy rather than across the economy and country as a whole
- there was a growing trade deficit
- unemployment stayed above 1 million putting an enormous strain on welfare services
- agricultural prices fell sharply after 1927 and this bred resentment of the Republic among farmers
- the extension of the welfare state after 1927 was costly and many resented these increased costs passed on in the form of higher taxes
- investment from USA was short-term and the economy became too dependent on this investment
- by 1929 production was back to 1913 levels but was significantly smaller than in other European countries
- prosperity returned for many, but others harboured resentment at the loss of their savings in 1923 and felt insecure.

Evidence which supports the view that political and economic developments made the Republic more stable

- the success of the democratic parties in the Reichstag elections 1924–1928 was an optimistic sign though middle class, liberal parties remained small
- political assassinations diminished and political calm was restored, and there were no serious attempts to overthrow the Republic
- the election of Hindenburg as President in 1925 was regarded by many as an indication that the Republic would be strengthened, and the constitution upheld
- hyperinflation was curbed never to return again
- reparations were reorganised on a more reasonable level in the Dawes and Young plans
- economic recovery was present in industry – industrial production grew – and Germany benefited from growth in investment mainly from the USA
- nominal hourly earnings, real hourly earnings and real weekly earning net of tax all grew
- the welfare reforms were very popular among those who stood to benefit most.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|--|
| Ruth Henig | Argues that it has often been asserted that by 1928 the Republic was putting down roots and was gaining in acceptability and in support. This was not in fact the case. Strong opposition to the Republic was becoming widespread and achievements in the economic and political sphere were being turned against the Republic in a broad nationalist campaign designed to discredit it and to replace it with a more authoritarian political system. Even before the onset of the depression the fate of the Republic was balanced on a knife-edge. |
| Eberhard Kolb | Argues that the years from 1924 to 1929 are commonly described as a period of ‘relative stabilisation’ of the Republic. This is true if the stress is laid on the word ‘relative’. There was certainly progress in foreign affairs and in establishing law and order and consolidating the regime politically. The economy also revived to some degree. But this stabilisation was fragile and superficial. The Republic did not in fact succeed in consolidating its political and socio-economic system so as to be capable of facing a serious crisis. |
| Erich Weitz | Argues that the stabilisation programme carried out from 1924 had its successes. It secured German territorial identity and put an end to revolutionary attempts on the extreme right and left. It gave Germany a sound currency. All of this created the conditions for an economic revival, financed by the influx of American capital. Gross national product increased and in 1927 industrial production reached the 1913 level and surpassed it in the following two years. These were the storied ‘Golden Years’ of the Republic evident in statistics but also in lifestyles. |
| Detlev Peukert | Contents that ‘In describing the years between 1924 and 1929 as ones of relative stability, we should not forget that they seem stable only by contrast with the periods of crisis that preceded and followed them. The period 1924 –1929 was marked by a good number of smaller and greater crises that were indicators of deeper structural tensions in German society’. |

Question 43

‘Decision-making in the Third Reich was chaotic.’

How valid is this view of German government under Hitler between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to discuss the directly related issues of where power lay in the Third Reich and the nature of Hitler’s dictatorship. Candidates might be expected to consider the possible illusion of total command, examine in particular the nature of Hitler’s leadership, the structure of the Nazi dictatorship and the way Nazi Germany was governed and its effects. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence which supports the view that Hitler’s rule was chaotic**

- the ‘Hitler myth’ projected the idea of the commanding, omnipresent leader
- chaos resulted from the charismatic nature of Hitler’s leadership. Everyone relied on the leader with no clear power structures
- Hitler was lazy and preferred to spend time in his mountain retreat rather than get involved with the routine business of government. These habits caused confusion and resulted in contradictory policies and chaotic government
- power was concentrated in the hands of the Führer, but beneath him there was a confusing array of state and party institutions cutting across each other’s jurisdictions but all seeking to ‘work towards the Führer’
- just as barons owed loyalty to a feudal monarch so Nazi leaders owed loyalty to the Führer. Hitler saw loyalty in personal not institutional terms, so he did not mind Goering or Himmler building up great power so long as they remained completely loyal to him. The result was that the Nazi leaders constantly quarrelled with one another and the overall structure of government was reduced to a mess of constantly shifting power bases or warring factions
- this system created jealous rivalries, which served to enhance Hitler’s power but seriously undermined efficient government
- although there was a complex police system its efficiency was dependent on the willing cooperation of millions of Germans.

Evidence which supports the idea that Hitler’s rule was to some extent efficient

- Hitler inherited and used effectively an already well-established administrative and industrial structure which he did not disrupt, and which continued to function
- traditional institutions such as the civil service cooperated with the regime
- internal rivalries generated a degree of efficiency as rivals sought to outdo each other in pursuit of policies that Hitler would approve of the Nazi Party had a series of sections reaching right down to local block units seeking to ensure that all Germans complied with the regime. The key positions were the Gauleiter, at the top of the regional structure, and the block leader at the bottom. The component organisations of the party were greatly expanded during this period
- the decision making and policy initiatives that sprang from the process of ‘working towards the Führer’ indicates that Hitler had enormous personal authority and a hold over his subordinates which stimulated them to act without the need for his specific orders
- Hitler’s prejudices set the tone and the aims of the regime, and his method of working meant that he could operate as the supreme authority at the centre of a polycratic state that was chaotic
- Hitler’s place at the centre of the regime was never seriously challenged
- the complexity of the regime that resulted from Hitler’s leadership meant that his ‘will’ alone was the only decisive factor. For the most part Hitler was able to have his own way on ultimate goals such as racial and foreign policy
- Hitler’s influence on the great departments of state: diplomacy/foreign policy, internal security, the economy, fiscal policy.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Martin Broszat | Argues that the Hitler state was chaotic and polycratic and Hitler had to operate against a background of changing structures and institutional circumstances. |
| Ian Kershaw | Contends that Hitler's was a charismatic rule and though his personality should not be overrated it should not be ignored either. He was undoubtedly powerful, but his leadership also meant that government was unstable because it caused chaos and depended on continued successes and the avoidance of the usual routines of governing and government. |
| Tim Kirk | Contends that powerful leading figures in the party built personal empires, which were semi-independent of any other control than Hitler's approval. The result was chaotic government characterised by internal rivalries and conflicts. |
| Frank McDonough | Argues that in some ways Nazi rule was indeed remarkably efficient. So, for instance, the fusion of the SS and the police enabled fanatical SS leaders, who were imbued with the revolutionary Nazi spirit of the pre-1933 party, to build themselves an impregnable position within the state. They could now use the bureaucratic police apparatus to launch an effective and brutal campaign against the enemies of the Third Reich. |

Question 44

‘The status of women was seriously diminished by Nazi policies.’

How valid is this view of the changing role of women in Germany between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to examine the degree to which Nazi policies diminished the status of women during the early period of the Nazi regime. Candidates might decide to look at the broad range of Nazi policies on women or they might select two or three key policies and look at these in depth and detail to assess their impact on women’s lives. They might also choose to consider women’s status in the context of the Nazis’ broader goal of creating a *Volksgemeinschaft*. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence which supports the idea that the status of women was seriously diminished**

- Nazi policies reinforced the traditional view of marriage and so sought to reverse the liberation of women that was associated with the Weimar Republic
- the Nazis’ outlook and policies on women were oppressive and diminished women’s status by reinforcing the superiority of men
- the Nazi also demanded that women provide proof of their fitness to marry. The 1935 Marriage Law required a certificate of fitness to marry before a marriage licence was issued
- the Oct 1935 Blood Protection Law forbade marriage between Aryan women and Jews, black people or Roma
- the Nazis aimed to increase ‘pure’ German births by offering financial incentives to women for example marriage loans of 1000RM to newlyweds, also birth grants thereby reinforcing what were thought of as traditional values about women as mothers and child bearers
- women who chose not to have children or could not have children were penalised. Childless couples had to pay higher taxes
- restrictions were imposed on contraception information.

Evidence which supports the idea that the status of women was not seriously diminished

- for many women the Nazis’ emphasis on ‘traditional family values’ was popular and reassuring. These women accepted the Nazis’ claims that women were ‘equal but different’
- Nazi policies aimed to increase ‘suitable’ marriages. Unemployed people could have a marriage loan of 600RM in 1933
- in 1937 marriage loans were extended to women in work
- propaganda regularly focused on raising the status of mothers and housewives. The introduction of the Mother’s Cross badge scheme
- Nazi views of women were little different from those of the churches and received widespread support
- attempts to drive women back into the home were not successful. The number of women in all jobs increased, especially after 1936 when there was a labour shortage in key areas. In industry and crafts women workers went up from 2.7 million in 1933 to 3.3 million in 1939, in trade and transport women workers went up from 1.9 million in 1933 to 2.1 million in 1939
- all told, married women working outside the home went up from 4.2 million in 1933 to 6.2 million in 1939.

Women and the *Volksgemeinschaft*

- Nazi policies also aimed to develop healthy Germans and women were expected to be involved in that development process
- many women therefore took part in the Nazi welfare organisation, the *NS Volkswohlschaft*
- the Nazi government also oversaw a huge expansion of health offices in rural areas which encouraged improved sanitation, preventative medicine and ‘genetic and racial’ care
- Nazi educational policies were also used to reinforce the traditional role of women
- school education prepared women for what was thought to be their proper role as mothers and housewives
- opportunities for women to progress in education were restricted. The enrolment of women at university was restricted to 10%
- in Nazi youth groups too, girls and women were bombarded with messages about women’s subordination to men and with activities that underscored that message and that also underscored the Nazi view of women as homemakers and helpmates of their husbands
- the Nazis sought to get women out of the workplace and into the home. So, in 1933 women in the top ranks of the German civil service and medicine were dismissed
- in 1936 a ban was placed on women becoming judges or lawyers
- no female Nazi members of the Reichstag were permitted.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------|--|
| Wolfgang Benz | Argues that the Nazis reinforced the traditional view of a male dominated society. The image of women was shaped by the idealisation of a woman’s role as mother and keeper of the house, educator of the children and wife under her husband’s authority. Women were expected to procreate for the regime and the upbringing and education of girls was oriented towards the ideal of future motherhood. Higher schooling for girls was impeded and coeducation rejected outright. Until the war, when women were drawn on as a reserve labour force in large numbers and in violation of the Nazi ideology, the regime did everything it could to keep women out of the workplace. |
| Alexander De Grand | Puts forward the view that the fascist position had always been that class distinctions were artificial and superficial but that biologically determined gender roles were immutable . . . The conservative and stabilising elements of Nazi ideology – to keep women in their place and maintain them as pillars of traditional hierarchical society – could not be reconciled with the political, social and racial ambitions of the regime. |
| Tim Kirk | Suggests that in the Nazi regime the status of women was markedly diminished by marriage policies. These policies made women more dependent on marriage economically. The Marriage Law of 1938 made it possible for a man to divorce on the grounds of a woman’s refusal to procreate or for using contraceptives illicitly. Women stood to lose further from such legislation, which enabled judges to free men of the obligation to pay maintenance. In practice then, new marriage laws shifted the balance sharply in favour of men. |
| Ute Frevert | Takes the view that in respect of attitudes and policies towards women, National Socialism was the most repressive and reactionary of all modern political movements. Yet it seems that the overtly anti-feminist policies of the regime after 1933 were at least partially successful in that they secured the approval, perhaps gratitude, of many German people, men and women alike. |

Question 45

To what extent was the development of the German economy between 1933 and 1939 aimed at gearing Germany towards war?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to discuss the extent to which it can be argued that Nazi economic policies were aimed at gearing Germany for war as opposed to bringing about a German economic recovery. Candidates might consider the real function of autarky as a policy at the time. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the idea that economic development was greatly influenced the need to prepare for war

- by 1936 the economy had recovered sufficiently to allow Hitler to pursue rearmament, but Schacht expressed doubts that Germany could afford this. He was replaced by Goering, who set about making Germany more self-sufficient
- Goering's Four Year Plans were launched to increase production of oil, rubber and steel and attempted to make Germany self-sufficient (autarky)
- work schemes included the building of new roads – the *Autobahnen*
- arms spending rose from 13% to 23% of GDP between 1933-39
- in 1937-38 the money spent on the military rose to 10 billion RM. By 1938-39 this had risen to 17 billion
- the Nazi government refused to curtail spending when recovery had begun in the mid-1930s, and insisted instead on increased levels of spending, mostly on autarky and rearmament programmes
- considerable sums were spent on the manufacture of synthetic goods
- Germany continued to import key raw materials such as copper to sustain rearmament and by 1936 had used up its reserves of raw materials and so was forced to buy raw materials, such as oil, on the open market.

Evidence which supports the idea that other factors influenced economic development

- within the first year of taking office laws and initiatives were introduced which dealt effectively with the number of Germans out of work. Work schemes introduced by Brüning, Papen and Schleicher were continued through the Law to Reduce Unemployment, June 1933
- in summer 1934 Hjalmar Schacht, who was appointed President of the Reichsbank in May 1933, launched his New Plan the aim of which was to make the German economy independent of the world economic system
- in 1934 Schacht negotiated a series of trade agreements between Germany and countries in South America and south-eastern Europe aimed at preventing Germany running up a foreign currency deficit while still being able to acquire raw materials
- by the end of 1935 Germany had a trade surplus and industrial production had increased by 49.5% since 1933
- Schacht also introduced Mefo Bills, bills issued by the government as payment for goods
- the so-called 'Battle for Work' also included the government lending money to private companies so they could create jobs
- the Labour Service and Emergency Relief Schemes put thousands into work and were labour intensive
- the regime's attempts to reduce unemployment were successful. In 1933 the percentage of those unemployed was 26. By 1936 this had fallen to 7.4
- the agricultural depression, which pre-dated the Great Depression, was dealt with by the Reich Food Estate (Sept 1933) which took control of the planning and organisation of agriculture, and in the same month the Reich Entailed Farm Law attempted to improve the security of ownership of land for the small farmers
- Reich Entailed Farm Law policy offered farm loans with low interest rates to help farmers recover. There was a 41% increase in farmers' income. Food production greatly increased
- Nazi policies that encouraged women to leave the workplace, forced Jews out of their jobs and the introduction of conscription also helped address unemployment
- the suppression of trade unions helped to restore business confidence, as did the ending of reparations payments

- the Nazi government increased public expenditure and investment in public works schemes, particularly in the construction of homes and motorways

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|--|
| Richard Overy | Contends that Hitler viewed the economy as primarily an instrument of power. It was not simply an arena for generating wealth and technical progress. Its raison d'être lay in its ability to provide a material springboard for military conquest. Hitler's equation of a strong economy with national revival and military success meant that in the early years of the regime (1933-36) priority was given to national revival as a precondition for the revival of Germany's international position. |
| Adam Tooze | Argues that no one in Germany starved in order to sustain rearmament, but the restriction of consumer opportunities was very real, in the late 1930s, 'as rearmament expenditure reached new heights, the trade-offs became very severe indeed.' At the same time, of course, 'rearmament brought new opportunities for Germans of all social classes'. |
| Geoff Layton | Contends that by mid-1936 unemployment had fallen to 1.5 million, industrial production had increased by 60% since 1933, GNP had grown over the same period in real terms by 40%. |
| Wolfgang Benz | Argues that from 1933-36 Nazi economic policy was more concerned with recovery although rearmament was nevertheless a priority. However, from 1936 and the launch of the Four Year Plan rearmament became the absolute overriding priority and was pursued without regard for any other consideration. |

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

Part B – Historical sources

Question 46 **How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of the German Revolution of 1918–1919?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| The war-weary German Imperial High Seas Fleet refused to put to sea at Kiel on 28th October 1918. | Revolution from below – sailors mutinied against Naval officers who had ordered them to sail out and break the British naval blockade. |
| . . . the exhausted German masses had no time for the Kaiser and continued to regard him as the reason for past troubles . . . | Revolution from below – caused by German masses who blamed the Kaiser for not ending the war. |
| At home however the rapid spread throughout Germany of workers' and soldiers' councils. . . | Revolution from below – caused by spread of workers' and soldiers' councils throughout November inspired by events of the Russian revolution and demand for radical political change. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- from summer 1918 the German armies began moving back to the German frontier. Morale among the troops and at home was disintegrating. Among the generals, there was a growing fear of revolution prompted in part by the fact that in April radicals in the SPD had formed a new party – the USPD – that opposed the war and in July the Reichstag had voted for peace
- by September 1918 Germany's allies were requesting an armistice and the Hindenburg Line was breached on 28th September 1918. Germany itself now faced the prospect of invasion. On 29th September the Reichstag called for a new government which was supported by the German High Command in their effort to control a transition with Ludendorff recommending a new civilian government be formed and that it negotiate an armistice
- on 3rd/4th October Prince Max von Baden was appointed at the head of majority government including the SPD and Centre/Liberal political parties
- although Baden's 'October Reforms' went a long way towards establishing a democracy the reforms were not enough to stop popular unrest as expressed in mutinies at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven – strikes, riots and the setting up of soviets across the country but by this time popular unrest in Germany and in her armed forces was spreading rapidly and becoming increasingly violent so Max von Baden handed power over to Ebert and the majority SPD
- Germany's troops and resources were exhausted leading to opposition to the war and these forces from below (principally growing popular resentment against the Kaiser) contributed to the sailors' mutiny at Wilhelmshaven on 29th October/Kiel on 3rd November
- the sailors' revolt spread to the civilian population in both ports and cities across Germany
- Philipp Scheidemann, an SPD leader and Chancellor of Germany from February to June 1919, argued that Germany's military collapse was not the result of revolution but rather the revolution was the result of military collapse
- on 7th November in Munich, a 'Workers' and Soldiers' Council' forced Ludwig III to abdicate
- on 9th November Karl Liebknecht declared a socialist republic in Berlin 4th January 1919 saw the outbreak of the Spartacist Revolt

- some 50,000 soldiers supported Kurt Eisner's attempted revolution in Munich in November 1918
- revolutionary leadership came from the likes of the *Spartakusbund*, especially in Berlin, from Marxist-syndicalist shop stewards in some factories and from (in Marxist terms) centrist USPD (Independent Socialist) leaders
- January 1919 – Spartakist Revolt. Thermidor of the revolution – suppression – role of Freikorps
- revolution from below inspired by events in Russia, October 1917 Revolution with the German councils partly mirroring the example of Soviets in Russia.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| For SPD leader, Friedrich Ebert, common sense and mutual interest dictated cooperation between the officer corps and his moderate Social Democrat Party and in return for their support the officers would retain their power of command. | Revolution from above – Mutual interest of both Ebert and Officer Corps motivated their deal due to fears of further uprising from the left and the army agreed to support the government and in return could maintain their autonomy. |
| Alarmed by the development of the Russian Revolution in 1917, Ebert was prepared to forge a relationship with the officer corps. . . | Revolution from above – Ebert aim was to prevent a similar revolution occurring in Germany because he was anti-Bolshevik, he wanted to establish a parliamentary not a soviet democracy. |
| The eventual strategy developed by Ebert was to create a larger coalition of a broad centre, which would direct the establishment of the Republic. | Revolution from above – Ebert wanted to establish a broad centre left government. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Ebert had hoped for a smooth transfer of power from Max von Baden's government. His plans were upset by the spread of councils (soviets) across Germany
- he wanted to establish a moderate and certainly less radical change than his left wing opponents such as the Spartacists and therefore collaborated with the Centre Party and left wing liberals to create a new form of central government called the Council of People's Deputies
- Ebert and the SPD leadership feared that the councils (soviets) would have the effect of encouraging a Russian-style revolution even though many of those councils themselves were not Bolshevik
- on 8 November Kurt Eisner (USPD) had led a demonstration in Munich that led to his supporters taking over the main public buildings there and to the proclamation of a Bavarian Republic
- a general strike was called for by the Workers and Soldiers Council of Berlin for 9th November 1918, the day after Kurt Eisner had declared Bavaria a republic
- rumours of a putsch and reports that the leader of the Spartacist League, Karl Liebknecht, was on his way to central Berlin to declare Germany a socialist state prompted another leading Social Democrat, Philip Scheidemann, to declare a republic on November 9th
- although the pact with the army seemed like a missed opportunity to set up a people's army and to sweep away the old order that led Germany to catastrophe, in fact Ebert's options were limited
- Ebert could not afford to do without the army not least because the threat of further risings from the extreme left was real and the new Republic had no army of its own to deal with this or any other threats from the left
- the army leadership agreed to crush 'Bolshevism' in Germany, hereby preserving the new Republic but at the price of securing the army's independent status
- as far as the SPD was concerned most political goals had been achieved with the October reforms
- the councils themselves were becoming sites of a power struggle between moderates wanting a social republic and radicals wanting a socialist republic

- the number of Spartacists may have been small, but they had charismatic leaders and combined with other radical left wing groups to mount demonstrations which terrified the German conservatives – the military, landowners, industrialists, businessmen, financiers and the professional upper and middle classes
- left wing agitation was invariably seen as Bolshevik-inspired
- Ebert had good reason to fear disorder. Strikes in the towns and cities and the mutinies at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven in the first week of November, desertions from the army and the rapid spread of soviets across the country all persuaded him that a Bolshevik-style revolution was a distinct possibility
- evidence that the Bolshevik revolution in Russia had indeed led to chaos and disorder
- Ebert was right to be concerned about the possibility of Germany descending into a bloody civil war. He was caught between extremists on the left and the right
- Ebert also had to find some way of dealing with widespread rioting in the Ruhr and disturbances in Berlin, Cologne, Dresden and elsewhere across the country
- Ebert's concerns seemed to have been borne out by the Spartacist Uprising in January 1919.

Points from recall which offer wider and more critical contextualisation of the views in the sources

- Ebert and the SPD had never been in government, but they had operated highly successfully in the Reichstag before the war. Ebert himself would have been quite content to accept a constitutional monarchy but was forced to manage the transition to a Republican democracy following the abdication of the Kaiser on November 9th
- Ebert and the SPD leadership wanted to ensure that the Republic would win as much support as possible and could not afford to align themselves with the radical left, which they viewed as a danger to the Republic
- Ebert was on the centre-right of the SPD and it was he who had persuaded the SPD to support the war
- the actions of the SPD and of Ebert in the chaotic period of the German Revolution were conditioned by the SPD's history. In the 1880s and 1890s the SPD had been subject to repression and thereafter was always afraid of renewed repression that would put their organisation at risk. For this reason, the SPD emphasised their legalistic outlook, favoured gradual reform through parliament and rejected radical revolution. Ebert was a reformist socialist who 'hated revolution like sin'
- Ebert wanted to restore order in Germany because he wanted the country to be stable and secure when he took it into the negotiations for the peace. This was what motivated his decision to strike a deal with the army in the pact with Groener
- Ebert's options were limited in November 1919. He was constrained by the fact that he needed the experienced army officers, civil servants, judges and academics to run the country
- 15th November – Stinnes-Legien agreement led to concessions by German Industrialists to workers to stabilise relations and engender support for the new Republic rather than the communists who had been trying to encourage the workers to strike and take over the means of production
- Ebert's hope that the army would be loyal to the Republic proved to be mistaken in the longer term.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|--|
| Detlev Peukert | Argues that the first phase of the revolution began 'at the end of September 1918 when Germany's leaders decided to face up to imminent defeat on the battlefield. But the origins of the revolution in fact 'go back much further' – to the disillusionment, dissatisfaction and anger caused by the authorities' failure to win the war and failure to ensure that during the war standards of living did not fall and the burdens of the war were shared equally. |
| Eberhard Kolb | Argues that the threat from the left provoked a strong defensive reaction from the middle class and confirmed the belief of the SPD that it was only in co-operation with the officer corps and the traditional bureaucracy that they could maintain order and solve day-to-day problems. |
| William Carr | Contends that by the end of October 1918 'a revolutionary situation existed in Germany.' Wartime privation and hardship had eroded the old relationship between the Kaiser and his people. The shock of military defeat 'was the last straw.' Even so, it is only with the actions of the sailors at Wilhelmshaven from 30 October that the revolution can be said to have truly begun. |
| Ruth Henig | Contends that for Ebert the aim was clear: to stabilise the political situation sufficiently to enable elections to take place as soon as possible for a National Assembly. General Groener correctly surmised that Ebert was as anxious as the army to defeat the Bolshevik challenge which threatened to spread revolution through the major urban centres of Germany and that Ebert needed military assistance to restore order. |

Question 47

Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the reasons why the Nazi Party was able to increase its support between 1928 and 1932.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|---------------------------|---------|---|
| Author | Hitler. | Leader of the NSDAP and responsible for policy, aims and actions of the Party. Wrote the speech and responsible for its aims. Hitler himself had sought out this opportunity to address the Business community. |
| Purpose | Speech. | Hitler spoke at the Industry Club (Industrieklub) and addressed some of Germany's wealthiest men in an effort to convince Industrialists to support the party with funds and provide political influence. He also aimed to highlight Nazi policies which they would empathise with and ease any fears they may have had about the 'socialist' element of the NSDAP. |
| Timing | 1932 | Increasing popularity of the NSDAP since elections in 1930. By 1932 increased economic crisis, strikes, worker unrest was a major concern for Hitler's audience – the industrialists. This makes it very useful because 1932 proved a critical year for the Nazis. |

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|--|
| Many hundreds of thousands of SA and SS men of the National Socialist movement have every day to mount on their lorries, protect meetings, undertake marches and sacrifice themselves night after night for the German nation. | Reference to the relentless 'sacrifice' by the efforts of SA and SS to defend Germany day after day. |
| No one can deny that we are industrious, but we need your support if we are to change this political situation we are in and gain control of our own economy and free it from oppressive foreign interference to make our nation strong again. | Reference to Hitler's attempt to gain the support/influence from the Business community (need your support) to change the political situation and uses emotive language how they can free the economy from foreign interference. |
| This solution is a realisation that a flourishing economy can only be protected by a powerful and stable political state which my Party, with your help, will establish for the people of Germany. | Hitler aiming to present himself and his Party as the only solution, and that with their (Industry's) help, he will establish a powerful and stable political state to protect the economy. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Hitler had not had a positive relationship with many of Germany's leading industrial magnates. Parts of the proper title of the Nazi Party were enough to concern them: 'workers' and 'socialist' did not, in their opinion, conjure up an image of a man who wanted to do business with the nation's industrialists
- the speech lasted for 2.5 hours and it became 'one of the most important and effective speeches of the Führer's career' (Louis Snyder). Hitler explained to the assembled magnates that they had nothing to fear from the Nazi Party. He sold his dream of a Germany with the trade unions crushed and with the workers controlled by the state in co-operation with industrial owners. Hitler also attacked Communism and Socialism and those who supported both. By the end of the speech many in the audience were at the least prepared to go some way to accept Hitler as a viable alternate to the doomed Weimar government
- reference to the important role of the SA who, for all their violence and thuggery, were also deployed in the propaganda campaigns. They projected an image of strength, order and youthful dynamism, and of tough anti-communism, and at the same time assisted at soup kitchens and other welfare projects run by the Nazis. Propaganda by deed. By 1932 their role had become critical in spreading the message of the NSDAP and with almost 2 million members they constituted significant commitment and popular support for Hitler across a wide section of German society
- propaganda was crucial in the projection of the image of Adolf Hitler as the 'strong man' the country needed. This proved to be highly successful
- Hitler's speeches were also propaganda and he used these effectively to target Germans' specific grievances and tailored his message to whichever audience he was addressing such as the Industrialists
- support from big business/wealthy industrialists was a key aim of the Nazis as these groups were part of the 'Elites' and were able to exert political influence. Hitler was eager to win the backing of leading industrialists including Fritz Thyssen
- support from other powerful individuals (Thyssen along with Bosch, Krupp and Hjalmar Schacht) was crucial as they were later to petition the President to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. (This gave Hindenburg the impression of a far wider base of support among businessmen than Hitler actually had)
- financial support from wealthy individuals had been an ongoing tactic by the Nazis since the early 1920s (such as relations Hitler had cultivated with wealthy Nazis sympathisers amongst Germany's business community such as Ernst Hanfstaengl, Kurt Lüdecke, Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter)
- media support, from industrial and media magnate – Alfred Hugenberg (former CEO of Krupps Steel and well connected with German Industrialists) had been crucial in giving the Nazis a degree of political credibility after 1928 and in supporting Hitler's campaigns through to 1932 and thereafter.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- the growing and widespread appeal of the Nazis from 1928–32 can be demonstrated by considering the breakdown of their vote at elections. In 1928 the Nazis had won 2.8% of the vote. However, in the July 1932 Reichstag elections [on 31st July], the Nazis increased their vote from 18.3% to 37.4% of those who voted. They won 230 seats in the Reichstag which was remarkable
- what this evidence seems to show is that between 1928 and 1932 the Nazis won increasing support among the workers. Moreover, in the SA perhaps as many as half the men were working class even though the Nazis tended to have less working-class voters in the big towns and cities than did the Socialists
- division on the left was also a reason for the Nazis political success between 1928 and 1932
- the Nazis benefited from the economic depression of 1929 but even before then they were picking up support in the countryside because of the agricultural depression that had begun towards the end of 1927. The Nazis won support in the countryside and especially in the Protestant north. Indeed, the Nazis' vote first started to rise dramatically in the countryside because Weimar governments had failed to prevent an agricultural depression, which had begun well before the Great Depression. Historians often refer to the increasing vote for the Nazis in the countryside from 1928 as 'the farmers' revenge'
- the presidential elections of April 1932 in which Hitler won 11 million votes underscored the fact that the Nazis vote was not a freak event but was rather building to a crescendo throughout 1932

- the Nazi Party was highly effective as a campaigning organisation with powerful messages. (training for NSDAP speakers, over 6000 by 1932 – targeting of their campaigns in marginal areas)
- the Nazis were also helped by the widespread effects of economic collapse during 1929-32. In this context their propaganda was effective and helped the Nazis increase their support
- the economic crisis affected all classes of society, so it is no surprise that all classes of society were willing to vote for the party they perceived as the only one strong enough to lead Germany out of the crisis
- the Nazis also won the support of the lower middle and middle classes. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the petty bourgeoisie voted disproportionately for the Nazis. The Nazi Party did less well when it came up against pre-existing ideological and organisational loyalties – in Social Democratic or Catholic strongholds, for example. But where political or religious loyalties were weak or were weakening as a consequence of the depression – in Protestant rural and middle-class Germany, the Nazis did very well indeed
- the Nazis were well organised in the regions and set up associations covering most groups in society
- the Nazis had been reorganised by Hitler after the Munich putsch and the Führerprinzip gave them cohesion
- the Nazis promised something for everyone even though their promises were often contradictory
- the swastika banner was effective in giving the Nazis a clear, striking visual symbol that everyone recognised
- technology was used effectively to create the image of Hitler as the man of the hour especially during the 1932 presidential election campaign when Hitler was flown around by plane so that he could reach lots of places quickly but also to convey the idea of him as a messianic figure descending to earth from heaven
- Hitler's charismatic leadership and his image as a strong, decisive leader made him an attractive alternative to the leaders of the parliamentary parties
- widespread discontent and disillusion with democracy enabled the Nazis to win support from across society and among all age groups so that they effectively became a catch-all party of protest
- continuing bitterness about the Treaty of Versailles made the Nazis' nationalism and promises to smash Versailles attractive to voters
- the Nazis' authoritarianism and anti-parliamentarianism, and their relatively conservative social values, as well as their promises to restore German greatness, were especially appealing to the middle classes who not only voted Nazi but also joined the Nazi Party.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|---|
| Conan Fischer | Takes the view that the Nazis had broad support because their ideology appealed across German society. He argues that the Nazis managed to create a mobilising myth that had at its heart the vision of Hitler as the potential saviour of Germany and its people. The Nazis managed to construct a political allegory with which a broad section of the German population could empathise. They provided a myth that emphasised the sameness of all Germans at a time when a divided, fragmented society was looking for escape from crisis. |
| Dick Geary | Contends that the transformation of the electoral fortunes of the NSDAP between 1928 and 1932 was not simply a consequence of the party's propaganda or Hitler's charismatic leadership, important as these were, but really depended upon the climate within which Weimar politicians operated. |
| Detlev Muhlberger | Argues that the middle classes responded strongly to the Nazis but there was also a surprisingly high level of support from the working class. Indeed, the NSDAP was supported at the polls by around 40% of working class voters. The NSDAP was what it claimed to be: a <i>volkspartei</i> , not a working class or middle class affair. |
| Peter Fritzsche | Takes the view that the Great Depression speeded up the Nazis' gains after 1928, but had little to do with the transformation of middle class politics after 1918. It was this latter process that prepared the Nazi breakthrough and without which Nazi gains cannot be explained. |

Question 48

How fully does Source D explain the reasons for the limited extent of resistance in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1939?

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| Nazi informers regularly reported any suspicious activities to the local Gestapo office and the very existence and activities of these Nazis, snoopers doubtless helped inhibit resistance. | Argues that a key reason for limited resistance was the possibility of being informed on to the Gestapo and this was enough to put many off from resisting the regime after 1933. The reputation of the Gestapo was enough to encourage conformity. |
| . . . equilibrium existed whereby Northeimers did what was expected of them and in return were spared the potential rigours of the police state and possibility of terror. | Contents that a key reason for limited resistance was in many ways a compromise between populace and state since many understood the nature of the Nazi Police state and the 'possibility of terror' which was sufficient to deter most Germans from resisting the regime. |
| After 1935, when the Nazi state increased its scrutiny of the attitudes of the Churches, police detectives stood at church doors on Sundays taking down names and taking notes on the contents of services. | Maintains the regime would take steps to monitor any potential resistance including individuals or organisations such as the Church, if regarded as a potential opposition to the regime. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the nature of the Nazi's 'police state' – the creation of the Gestapo, the role of police spies (for example undercover SS at work in Northeim)
- willingness of most ordinary Germans to make an accommodation with the regime. For most ordinary Germans this was a pragmatic decision based on a wish to avoid arrest and punishment
- most people were willing to put up with Nazi government and ideology so long as life continued with as little disruption as possible. People made conscious decisions to manage their situations with regard to the policies and ideology of the Nazis
- the creation by the Nazis of concentration camps (March 1933) for opponents of the regime
- the extinction of democracy – the Enabling Act, 23 March 1933
- examples of legislation and actions of the Nazi government to consolidate their power – laws against trade unions, political parties, arrests and imprisonment of political opponents and creation of one-party state, control of the media, concordat with the Catholic Church and setting up of apparatus of police state
- the various institutions of the town of Northeim which were permeated by the Nazis and typical across German cities and towns during the period 1933–39. Examples might include press schools, churches, sports clubs, branches of political parties and trade union branches
- the corollary of the above – the creation of Nazi institutions such as DAF, KDF, the effective 'coordination' (*gleichschaltung*) of institutions and community responses to Nazi policies all limited and undermined opportunities for resistance and enhanced Nazi controls to limit opposition.

Points which offer wider contextualisation of the view in the source such as

- the limited nature of resistance was indeed caused directly by the fact that the Nazis had at their disposal not only the entire police and security services but also that they were prepared to use the SS-Gestapo against their enemies ruthlessly so that people knew that resistance would be severely punished and therefore kept silent and did not criticise the regime
- although the Gestapo is no longer viewed by historians as the all-seeing, all-knowing organisation it used to be portrayed as, it was nevertheless highly effective because of people's willingness to inform on their neighbours and the variety of agencies and institutions that worked with it
- the concentration camps were never hidden from public view by the Nazis. On the contrary, the Nazis made every effort to make sure people understood that the concentration camps were being used to deal with anyone who opposed the regime and therefore, as the Nazis saw it, the German nation
- the opposition of the regime was indeed unable to cooperate to resist not least because on the right they could not agree about what should happen once Hitler was removed. Many in the conservative opposition were not democrats and were not looking to restore democracy and this meant that there was little chance of their winning support from opponents of the regime who were socialist in outlook and attitude
- the dimensions of 'everyday life in Nazi Germany' during the crucial period 1933–34 when the Nazis moved at government/state level and at local level to embed their power
- the active role of the Nazi Party in winning over the German people might be considered, the role of party activists at street level, the role of the *Blockwartführers* and fundraisers, the role of propaganda both locally and nationally
- Nazi propaganda did have an impact in persuading people to support the regime but, more important, as unemployment fell and living standards improved so more people felt better off and were minded to support rather than oppose the regime
- many people also welcomed Hitler's promises to restore national prestige and his foreign policy successes 1933–39 seemed to many, proof that Hitler was able to fulfil these promises
- it is also the case that there was broad sympathy for many of the Nazis' other policies especially where these concerned nationalism and ethnicity. Although people did not like the idea of violence against Jews, there was no vigorous opposition to policies that discriminated against the Jews
- consent therefore was expressed not simply because of fear. The Nazis' economic policies were popular because they seemed to bring about recovery. People felt much better off especially in the period from 1933–1937
- opponents of the regime had to contend with the fact that whether their opposition was nonconformity or dissent or outright resistance there was a good chance that the Gestapo would get to know about it very quickly
- coercion was extremely important in creating an atmosphere in which resistance was perceived to be futile
- coercion was very important in keeping opposition in Nazi Germany down, but so was the consent of the masses.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|---|
| Richard J Evans | Believes that by July 1933 'the Nazis had created virtually all the fundamental features of the regime that was to govern Germany until its collapse, almost twelve years later, in 1945.' For the Nazis 'the bullet and the ballot box were complementary tools of power, not alternatives.' Widely accepted legal norms 'such as the notion that people should not commit murder or acts of violence, destruction and theft, were disregarded from the outset by the Nazis'. |
| Peter Fritzsche | Argues that the dismantling of the Weimar system, and the destruction of the Socialist and Communist movements 'provided the Nazi leaders with more than enough legitimacy to establish a dictatorship.' They were helped, too, by a series of presidential decrees, and by the Enabling Act, 'that rapidly and decisively shifted the balance of power to the executive.' Also important was 'the slow but discernible economic recovery in the spring and summer of 1933.' The 'Night of the Long Knives' completed the process of presenting the regime as strong on law and order and Hitler as a strong leader and statesman. |
| Robert Gellately | Contends that the consolidation of power was based on a combination of illegality, including murder, oppression, violence and terror, plebiscites and propaganda. However, 'coercion and violence were limited and predictable. Hitler set out to combine popularity and power and aimed terror at specific groups of 'outsiders'. Those who came to support his regime, and that was the great majority, accepted the harsh approach to these 'others' as part of the bargain. It was a characteristic feature of Nazi Germany that the regime found no difficulty in obtaining the collaboration of ordinary citizens. There was no organised resistance. |
| Ian Kershaw | Argues that resistance and opposition to Hitler acted without the active mass support of the population. Large proportions of the population did not even passively support the resistance but rather, widely condemned it. Resistance from groups hostile to the regime never ceased, but resistance was fragmented, atomised and isolated from any possibility of mass support. In any case, opposition was crushed and neutralised through the unprecedented level of repression by the Nazi state. |

Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902-1984

Part A – Historical issues

Question 49 **How significant were the demands of agriculture in driving segregationist policies of South African governments before 1929?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to evaluate the reasons for the introduction of segregationist legislation by consecutive South African governments before the Wall Street Crash in 1929 in order to assess how far legislation was driven by the demands of the agricultural industry. Other factors to be considered may also include racial ideology and Afrikaner nationalism as driving forces as well as other arguments such as the development of the precedent set by the British and the role of African Chiefs. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests agricultural demands as main factor

- while Revisionists see migrant labour as supporting mining, more are arguing it also supported the demands of rural production and suited the needs of rural workers
- 1913 Land Act designed to aid the needs of poor white farmers for cheap labour for example by banning share cropping
- Land Act forced Africans to live in the Reserves and undermined independence of African farmers. Purchase or lease of land outwith the Reserves was forbidden
- tenants of white farmers required to provide at least 90 days work for their landlords
- Trapido describes 'the union between gold and maize'. By removing black land ownership, they had no choice but to become either migrant labourers or wage labourers on farms
- vast majority of Bills passed by the South African Parliament were designed to assist farming
- the laws of 1913 and 1929 ensured that most of the best land stayed in white hands
- Hertzog promoted the export of agricultural produce through transport subsidies
- grants given to tackle drought relief and rural unemployment
- white farmers had power to evict tenants unwilling to submit to full control of their time and labour
- however, legislation unevenly applied according to Worden who argues that many white farmers could not afford to pay wage labour and so continued to rent land to Africans as tenants or sharecroppers.

Evidence which might provide other reasons for the development of segregation

- mineral revolution of the 1880s resulted in drive for cheap labour to maximise profits from mining companies
- establishment of migrant labour system in order to restrict cost of mining labour through controlling the cost of labour
- impact of 1913 Land Act making it illegal for Africans to purchase or lease land outwith the Reserves forced blacks into the migrant labour system or onto farms as wage labourers
- Wolpe's 'reserve labour subsidy' theory – the Land Act was designed to ensure a ready supply of labour to the mines
- 1911 Native Regulation Act bans strikes by African workers hired under contract
- SAP regarded as having strong links to mining corporations and favouring mine owners over the workers (such as in the 1922 Rand Revolt)
- widely recognised that mining was the lifeblood of the Union
- the importance of gold as a source of revenue
- Smuts seen as the ally of 'Hoggenheimer' that is, mining capital represented by the Chamber of Mines
- 1920 Native Affairs Act established principle that African political activity would be divorced from white political activity through establishment of tribal councils for administering the Reserves
- 1922 Apprenticeship Act ensured white labourers had a chance to progress in jobs sooner

- after 1924 in particular, White mine workers demanded greater job protection and the safeguarding of wage differentials in the post war period. Seen in the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act
- the Pact government (Hertzog) responded to pressure from white mine workers
- mines and Works Amendment Act (1926) excluded black workers from certain jobs
- Chamber of Mines objected to the Act of 1926 but had to accept it
- growing fear of a black rebellion through 1920s recession increasing black urbanisation. Results in promises from Hertzog's civilised labour policy.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Merle Lipton | Argues that 'These laws hindered Africans wishing to leave white farms or reserves'. Lipton suggests that the laws were introduced to aid white farmers by providing cheap labour by restricting African movements. |
| Rob Skinner | Determines that 'Segregationist legislation had been introduced with the aim of regulating employment, land rights and rights of residence in urban areas. Hertzog was focused on exclusionary labour policies and the political separation of the races.' |
| William Beinart | Is of the view that 'Segregation on the land was therefore not about keeping the Africans off white-owned farms but about regulating the conditions under which they remained'. He argues that segregation was not to separate the blacks and the whites but to ensure white dominance. |
| Nigel Worden | Is of the opinion that segregation was a 'Rigid and uniform policy enforced by the state in the interests of the mine owners, white workers and farmers'. He focusses on economic benefits to whites as a driving force of segregation. |

Question 50 **How far can it be argued that the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s was a result of the promotion of a shared culture?**

Aim of the question The aim of this question is for candidates to evaluate how far the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism between the onset of the Great Depression and the start of the Second World War was driven by the promotion of a shared Afrikaner culture by individuals and organisations including the FAK. Other factors may include social and economic circumstances enhancing Afrikanerdom, the role of Malan, the NP and DRC as well as attitudes to race. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the view that this was a result of the promotion of a shared culture

- establishment of the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge) in 1929 to promote Afrikaner culture (music, poetry etc)
- language movement and recognition as Afrikaans as an official language promoted ethnic identity. Use of Afrikaans to create and increase sense of national identity and exclusivity
- Afrikaner magazines including Die Huisgenoot and Die Burger intended to reach all including isolated farms
- Christian National Education and promotion of shared history and culture in Afrikaner schools
- role of Dutch Reform Church
- Gustav Preller as the ‘populariser of history’ translating books in Afrikaans: distortion of Afrikaner history
- the mythology of Afrikaner nationalism elaborating history of the Volk – ‘Civil Religion’ with rituals, ceremonies, martyrs
- Hermann Gilliomee’s emphasis on ethnic mobilisation
- efforts made by extreme nationalists to exaggerate commonality and create sense of identity among Afrikaners by playing on prejudices and fears
- celebrations for the centenary of the Great Trek and Malan’s ‘Blood River’ speech
- Ossewa Brandweg (1939) – cultural organisation which grew out of the Voortrekker celebrations.

Evidence which suggests other reasons for the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s

Other social factors

- origins of attitudes to race in DRC/neo-Calvinist theology
- examples of alleged status of Afrikaners as ‘God’s chosen people’ – including God’s Covenant with Voortrekkers at Blood River 1838
- half of Afrikaners urbanised by 1936
- 1932 Carnegie Commission findings revealed extent of urban poverty.

Economic factors

- role of the Broederbond after 1918 largely drawn from the intelligentsia fostered ethnic identity through economic activity
- establishment of Afrikaner Trade Unions to win allegiance of workers (Spoorbond for Railway workers, 1934)
- anti-capitalist stand of Afrikaner politicians including Hertzog
- impact of Great Depression and devaluation crisis 1931–1932
- falling demand for South African exports led to overcrowding in reserves and black squatter communities on the edge of towns heightening white fears of ‘the black peril’
- new financial institutions to support Afrikaners including SANTAM and SANLAM
- Volkskongres of 1939 organised by FAK for the investigate Afrikaner poverty levels.

Political factors

- Afrikaner Nationalism as a political force with appeal to 'poor whites' and the white working class
- significance of Malan's Purified National Party including growing awareness the inequality of poor Afrikaners and Malan's commitment to the poor white question
- new leaders in Afrikanerdom: Purified National Party leaders young, urban intellectuals. Party founded on Christian-Nationalist principles
- exaggeration of effects of British imperialism and the fear of being overwhelmed by the black drift to the cities by Afrikaner intellectuals
- failings of the United Party in combating increasing onslaught from National Party.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|---|
| Rob Skinner | Is of the view that the development of Afrikaner Nationalism was most deeply connected to the formation of class identities in an urbanising and industrialising South Africa. |
| Isobel Hofmeyr | Emphasises the role of language and Afrikaner publications in creating a sense of national identity. 'Building a nation from words: Afrikaans language. Literature and national identity'. |
| Merle Lipton | 'An umbrella under which all Afrikaners could find shelter', Lipton identifies the broad appeal of Malan's National Party and argues that economic concerns 'were always a prime concern of the Afrikaner Nationalist movement'. |
| Hermann Gilliomee | Describes the importance of the development of Afrikaans in the growth of nationalism and the role of 'language manipulators' including Malan and the DRC who help foster ethnic identity. 'Professionals in education, the media and the Church took on the massive task of building a nation from words.' |

Question 51

To what extent was bitter division in the white community the greatest consequence of South African participation in the Second World War?

Aim of the question

The aim of this question is for candidates to evaluate how far the division between different elements of the white community including Afrikaner and English-speakers, capitalists and non-capitalists, United Party supporters and National Party supporters, rural and urban demographics, pro and anti-imperialists was the greatest impact of the experience of the war years. Candidates may link this directly to the outcome of the subsequent 1948 election. Other factors may include social, economic and political consequences of the Second World War including the growth of African resistance. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports divisions amongst whites as the greatest consequence

- split over UP and Smuts' support of 'England's war' as many Afrikaners wanted to align with Hitler and the Germans or remain neutral
- war years saw Hertzog and Malan reunify the party with Hertzog speaking of 'cooperation between the two parts of national minded Afrikanerdom'
- factions in Reunified National Party as many profoundly distrusted Hertzog
- National Party rejects Hertzog's proposal that in any new constitution English and Afrikaners should be given equal rights. Hertzog left parliament convinced his brand of nationalism no longer had a future resulting in formation of the breakaway Afrikaner Party subsequently dividing the NP
- War Measures Act (1940) increases division between industrialists and workers as legislation designed in part to curb industrial unrest/control work force
- Ossewa Brandweg anti English, sympathetic to National Socialism
- Malan rejected the Ossewa Brandweg as a 'foreign ideology', further dividing Afrikanerdom given the OB had 250,000 members by 1942 (a quarter of Afrikaners)
- Smuts – pro maintenance of white control but relaxation of segregation, while supported by liberal whites, increased resentment from Afrikaners/those fearful of black influx
- NP Sauer Report seen as Afrikaner retaliation to the 'liberalism' of the UP Fagan Report
- division over language – NP and supporters increasingly pro bilingual teachers
- increasing division during war years over relations with Britain as Malan promotes his republican message. Subsequently moderated in 1948 to aid attraction of 20% of the English-speaking electorate
- struggles to reabsorb returning troops into society along with acute housing shortage resulted in growing divisions between whites, most notably about race. Views became entrenched
- Malan's rhetoric including 'the perception that Afrikaners had been discriminated against by the Smuts' administration' (Dubow)
- rural producers (mostly Afrikaner) alienated by Smuts' price control policy
- Smuts' government favoured profitability of the mines over the interests of the working class (Nancy Clark and William Worger)
- Smuts increasingly criticised by Nationalists as an 'apostle of the kaffir state'.

Evidence which considers other effects of the Second World War on South Africa

Other social factors

- fear over strikes, squatter camps and increasing crime rates in the cities
- high inflation
- increased use of black labour – skilled men had joined the forces
- white employment rose by 20% in war years, black employment by 74%
- all races aid the war effort (though blacks in restricted roles)
- increasing racism in the workplace
- militant attacks
- white workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions in industry felt threatened by the breaches in the colour bar
- rent strikes and bus boycotts – Increasing black protest including the Alexandria bus boycotts (1940–1945) and mineworkers strikes (1946).

Economic Factors

- increase in demand led to post-war industrial boom
- 1939–1945 gross output doubled
- emergence of black trade unionism and strike action
- consequences of urbanisation for South Africa's farmers.

Political factors

- ANC development as Xuma reorganises finances and extension of membership. Barber argues that during the war, Xuma 'reshaped a small ramshackle organisation'
- relaxation of Pass Laws
- defeat of the United Party in the 1948 election by the National Party
- post war immigration schemes to attract European workers (1946). Nationalists felt this would 'plough the Afrikaner under'
- 1943 election, with Malan's NP forming the official opposition
- commissioning of the Sauer Report and recommendations including physical separation of the races
- Smuts increasingly criticised by Nationalists as an 'apostle of the kaffir state'
- Fagan Commission appointed to assess urban blacks/labour provisions.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| James Barber | Describes the economic impact of war on South Africa. 'During the war South African industry had faced a major challenge. Demand increased especially in the manufacturing sector, both in the country itself and in terms of the war effort'. 'The war exposed the very questions that Hertzog and Smuts had pushed aside: neutrality and loyalty to the crown'. He argues that Afrikaner Nationalism was deeply divided. |
| Dan O'Meara | Emphasises the economic mobilisation of Afrikaners during and immediately after the war to create a single economic identity by 1948. He argues that 'the war enabled Malan to create a new class alliance under the banner of 'Afrikaner Nationalism'. |
| Nigel Worden | Sees the socio- economic impact of war as part of a lengthier process. The war accelerated what was already happening in terms of the drift to towns. Many factories were already employing blacks by the mid-1930s. |
| Albert Grundlingh | Argues the solidarity engendered by common wartime experiences was not translated into a common post war consciousness. 'Once out of uniform, old differences and distinctions in political outlook emerged'. |

Question 52 ‘The development of Bantustans was largely intended as a source of cheap labour.’

How valid is this view of apartheid policies after 1960?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is for candidates to assess the extent to which the development of the Bantustans and apartheid legislation of the 1960s was driven by the desire to maintain a constant supply of cheap labour for mines and industry. Candidates might consider other reasons for the introduction of what some historians view as ‘apartheid’s second phase’ which may include the need to meet changing demands of agriculture, external pressures, increasing internal threats from growing African resistance and ideological motives such as attitudes to race and religion. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the demand for cheap labour as the main reason for the development of apartheid in the 1960s

- subsistence farming according to radicals had all but disappeared in the Reserves in the 1950s and therefore so was the basis of migrant labour in spite of the government seeking to maintain cheap labour for manufacturing (Wolpe)
- Homeland/Bantustan development linked to industrial decentralisation of the 1960s relocating industry to the edge of the reserves as an alternative to migrant labour
- lack of local industry forced Africans to travel long distances for work
- increasing manufacturing demands for a stable workforce. No union rights were granted to black workers in the 1960s
- illegal for Africans to strike or negotiate wages
- many continued to live and work outside their ‘registered’ homelands
- restricting numbers of workers entering cities was re-described as part of the government’s drive to boost productivity in the reserves
- Verwoerd describes Separate Development as ‘Political independence and economic interdependence’ (1959)
- aim to mechanise industries in white areas as far as possible to limit requirement for black workers in cities
- more industries to be developed on borders of the Bantustans so labour could commute daily and therefore avoid residence in white areas.

Evidence which considers other reasons for apartheid legislation in the 1960s

Pursuit of white supremacy

- aim to secure white dominance in a smaller white state by the move to self-government of the homelands
- Broederbond increasingly influential (Wet Nel, Botha, Eiselen) so stricter Separate Development and a resultant rapid decline in practical apartheid
- Posel challenges the idea that 1960s apartheid was mainly an extension of the migrant labour system
- eight homelands (later ten) were established by the legislation of 1959. Four of these (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were granted independence
- Verwoerd saw apartheid of the 1960s as the self defence of the white race
- 3,500,000 Africans forcibly removed from homes to rural slums
- approximately a million Africans deported from farming areas consequently given to white farmers
- Verwoerd had promised that by 1978 South Africa would be an all-white country – key to this vision was the black homelands/Bantustans. ‘If South Africa was to choose between being poor and white or rich and multiracial, then it must choose to be white’ (Verwoerd)
- section 10 residential rights of Africans working in cities now rebranded as an indefensible deviation from separate development and ‘ethnic self-determination’ by the National Party
- record number of white immigrants to South Africa in the early 1960s.

External pressures

- possibly a tactical reaction to the decolonisation of Africa
- some argue that the commitment to separate development was largely the ideological means to legitimise the denial of the franchise to Africans
- ideological shifts away from treating reserves as reservoirs of African labour to the state's defence against increasingly severe international condemnation of Apartheid after the Sharpeville shootings of 1960
- the establishment of the South African Republic (1961).

Growing resistance

- separate development stimulated ethnic differences, even where this ethnic identity was based on created, rather than historic, tribalism
- led to the forced relocation of millions of Africans
- 500,000 Coloureds and Indians driven out of cities
- the Granite Response to the perceived onslaught against white minority rule saw the likes of a Publications Control Board, the Defence Act (1961) extending military training and the requirement of the South African Broadcasting Corporation to openly support the government.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| Rob Skinner | Argues that the Bantustans became the centrepiece of a huge effort of social engineering designed to maintain white privilege and based upon a highly bureaucratic form of racial domination. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was thus an attempt to provide a political solution to African ambition, based on 'ethnic' rather than 'racial' division. |
| T Dunbar Moodie | Argues that changing ideology in the National Party led to Separate Development and claims Verwoerd and De Wet Nel advocated it 'as insurance that the black nations would develop along their own ethnic lines.' |
| Hermann Gilliomee | Identifies apartheid in the early 1960s as a means of nurturing the identity of the Volk. 'For this brief period, there was a sense of purpose, dedication and destiny'. |
| Deborah Posel | Identifies apartheid in the 1960s as a departure from previous policies. She argues that the state was increasingly alarmed by urban radicalism which had climaxed at Sharpeville. The 'major impetus within the Bantu Affairs Department to restructure its urban policies derived from the escalation of urban resistance in the late 1950s'. |

Question 53

‘Soweto gave Africans a sense of confidence that they could challenge the government’s power.’

How important was the Soweto uprising in the development of African resistance in the 1970s?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is for candidates to examine the importance of the Soweto uprising in the development and resurgence of resistance to the apartheid state in the 1970s. Other factors may include the growth of the Black Consciousness Movement and the role of Steve Biko, the militant campaigns of POQO and MK and the growing support from anti-apartheid campaigns outwith South Africa. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence which suggests the Soweto uprising was important**

- demonstrations after Soweto continued in various forms until the end of apartheid in 1994
- most demonstrations after Soweto localised and spontaneous rather than being directed centrally. This was a new feature of anti-apartheid protests
- traditional leaders of opposition to apartheid seemingly becoming less relevant
- ANC and PAC beneficiaries of Soweto as it enhanced sympathy for the armed struggle as a result of the revulsion at the brutal response of the security forces
- Government Total Strategy a response to the ‘Total Onslaught’ or fear of co-ordinated attack orchestrated by Communists to destroy apartheid following Soweto. Total Strategy saw an escalation in the response from MK and POQO
- thousands of young people slipped away to join the armed struggle
- many joined the ANC/MK training camps in Tanzania, Angola and elsewhere
- widespread international condemnation of Soweto bolstered international support for the anti-apartheid campaign from publicly organised events. India and Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, provided aid and support
- Soweto uprising and death of Biko in police custody (1977) marked the end of a point at which many considered the chance of a peaceful solution to problems caused by apartheid. Increasing militancy
- increasing resentment of government integrationist policies saw many more prepared to see all whites as enemies
- Mandela and others comment on the contacts between ANC prisoners on Robben island and the student leaders sent there after 1976.

Evidence which suggests other reasons for the development of African resistance in the 1970s**Black Consciousness Movement and Biko**

- the role of the Black Consciousness Movement as a source of inspiration for the Soweto students
- the role of the South African Students Movement (SASM) and discontent resulting from twenty years of ‘Bantu’ education
- Biko helped set up the Black Communities Programme in 1970, establishing black self-help groups for black communities
- the influence of the BCM in strikes and protests of 1972-3
- the Azanian People’s Organisation in 1978 bringing together BPC, BCP and SASO, all organisations which had been banned in 1977 after the Soweto riots
- spread of Black Consciousness ideas among the ANC in exile as large numbers of activists joined ANC training camps
- black consciousness failed to penetrate the working class or peasant communities
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness
- role of Biko forming SASO, as president of the Black People’s Convention and death in 1977 in police custody.

The ANC and PAC

- the organisation of the ANC in exile and tenuous links with South Africa
- the Cillie Commission report blamed the Soweto riots on outside 'agitators' and ANC activists later claimed that the ANC had played a major part in organising the revolt
- in 1978, the ANC and SACP set up a small group to ensure greater co-operation with internal political meetings, although the armed section was still envisaged as forming the cutting edge. This amounted to recognition that they failed to take full advantage of Soweto
- by the late 1970s the ANC was increasingly focusing on urban areas and building mass organisations
- developments in other African countries, especially the liberation of Angola and Mozambique and their subsequent support of the armed struggle
- PAC/POQO training camps in exile.

Growing Worker Unrest

- increased worker militancy from around 1973, 160 strikes in March alone. Between January and September 1973 more than 70,000 workers involved in industrial action
- 'the labour troubles of 1973 were forerunners of a revival of militant African political activity' (Barber)
- poor living conditions and reaction to oppression
- increased size of the African urban workforce, including skilled and semi-skilled workers. Rebirth of African trade unions
- growing unpopularity of the homelands policy of the National Party.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Rob Skinner | Argues that 'Soweto had engendered a fundamental transformation of the political landscape in South Africa and reinvigorated the transnational dimension of the resistance movements'. |
| Francis Meli | Stresses how the ANC was the ultimate beneficiary of the uprising because it welcomed thousands of young cadres who were to form the basis of its escalating armed struggle. 'The heroic struggles of Soweto had a profound impact on the ANC. They resulted in the accelerated expansion of the movement both inside and outside the country'. |
| Dale McKinley | Agrees that Soweto was important. However, he argues the insurrection was quickly suppressed and suffered a lack of local structures to direct the protest. "The uprising had thus clearly revealed both the potential power and the severe limitations of black consciousness 'ideology'". |
| Tom Lodge | Identifies the wider generational conflict in the aftermath of Soweto as key for the development of resistance as it was young people who had taken the initiative in Soweto and driven the protests. 'Continuing assertion and strengthening of their generational identity by so-called youth leadership was one important consequence of the revolt' as 'the revolt accelerated the erosion of elder authority'. |

Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902-1984

Part B – Historical sources

Question 54 How fully does Source A explain the aims of British government policies in South Africa before 1910?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the interpretations in the source |
|---|---|
| . . . the British authorities under Milner determined that rebuilding the Witwatersrand mining industry was critical to a stable South-African economy. | Maintains the British thought that safeguarding mining was the foundation of economic stability. |
| They also aimed for a unified state under imperial control. | Argues they also aimed to unify the 4 colonies under British control. |
| Milner's answer was to turn to China, and between 1904 and 1908, over 63,000 Chinese indentured workers were brought to South Africa. | Contends Milner introduced his immigration scheme to increase the workforce. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- British victory in the Boer War between 1899 and 1902 completed British acquisition of control of Southern Africa but Britain had to manage the entrenched bitterness between Afrikaners and English speakers in the aftermath
- Boer War had not been decisive so British found it hard to impose control – forced to make concessions
- Milner believed unity was essential to economic growth
- customs union established in 1903 – an essential precursor to political unification
- Africans unwilling to work in mines after wages dramatically fell during war which resulted in increasing the workforce through Chinese labour.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Milner aimed to Anglicise South Africa with an influx of British settlers
- needed Boer agriculture to provide food for urban areas (and ensure economic stability through reconstructed agriculture)
- reconstruction under Milner sought to encourage investment by finance capitalists and restore mining productivity to pre-war levels
- restoration of land and reparations to Boers for war damages
- regeneration and extension of rail network
- establishment of commission under Godfrey Lagden to try to standardise race laws across the four colonies
- Milner hoped union would prove attractive to all white South Africans and these ideas were particularly stressed by Milner's kindergarten
- Liberal Party victory in 1906 saw greater willingness to give more power to the region, partly due to increased tension in Europe
- Selborne focused on developing transport, tax reforms and native affairs to enhance British influence by stimulating the economy
- against political equality, Selborne described native participation in elections as 'absurd and dangerous'
- overcome labour problems

- aim to avoid further disputes between the colonies and with others in Southern Africa
- 1907 new Liberal Government in Westminster allowed 'responsible self-government' for the Transvaal and Orange Free State
- Milner and Selborne saw Union as central to Imperialism
- many of the large diamond and gold companies were English owned and based in London
- labour shortages 1901-5 resulted in a focus on maintaining cheap labour – Mozambicans forced to migrate to gold mines
- aim to preserve white control when a demographic minority
- denationalisation policies to reduce nationalism failed and led to Dutch speakers establishing Afrikaner/Christian National Schools
- 1906 Bambatha rebellion stressed need for white unity.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| James Barber | Argues that the British priority was one of South African prosperity for British interests. 'The British objective was to achieve a long-term settlement which would establish a stable, prosperous and loyal dominion'. |
| Denis Judd and Keith Surridge | Are critical of Milner and highlight the failings of his policies and leadership stating that the 'overall aims of Milnerism failed' and that 'permanent British supremacy was not established in South Africa'. |
| Leonard Thomson | Argues that other countries were industrialising and were eroding the pre-eminence of British global strength. Therefore, British policy aimed to 'prevent rivals encroaching on territories hitherto dominated by British trade and capital'. |
| Rodney Davenport | Highlights the British racial attitudes, particularly under Milner who saw blacks as being 'low on the Great Chain of Being'. He explains there were 'stricter laws, more strictly enforced'. |

Question 55

How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the introduction of apartheid?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| . . . whites and blacks are so culturally dissimilar that they could never live together as a community. | Suggests that ethnic differences make it impossible for blacks and whites to live together. |
| The government argued that African people had absolute ethnic and culturally distinct differences that had to be preserved in separate homelands. | Suggests that it was better for the development of blacks to do so separately along tribal lines, facilitated by territorial separation. |
| . . . it is more likely that the plan was to keep the more numerous African communities separate so that they would be unlikely to present a united front against whites. | Suggests that separation of blacks by tribe/ethnicity to prevent cooperation between them and therefore lessen the threat to whites of a black majority overthrowing white rule. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- population Registration Act 1950 registered everyone according to race
- grand apartheid's overall strategy of keeping the races separated as much as possible
- group Areas Act 1950 designated specific areas for racial groups
- territorial segregation through the Bantu Self-Governing Act 1952 which set up eight 'self-governing' homelands for Africans
- in 1946 blacks made up 79% of the population. By 1970 it was 89% resulting in an increased fear of 'die swart gevaar' (black menace).

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| . . . it represents the codification of one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position to whites for centuries. | Argues that the development of apartheid was a comprehensive approach to keeping blacks downtrodden. |
| . . . the function of it was to entrench white supremacy forever. | Argues that apartheid was to maintain white rule indefinitely. |
| The Dutch Reformed Church furnished apartheid with its religious underpinnings by suggesting that Afrikaners were God's chosen people and that blacks were a subservient species. | Argues that apartheid was based on Christian National belief that Afrikaners were the superior people in South Africa. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- many examples of segregation had preceded National Party victory such as carrying of passes however it was all formalised in national law
- Separate Representation of Voters Act 1951 removed coloured voters from Cape electoral register resulting in an all-white electorate
- state increasingly dominated by Afrikaners as English civil-servants retired and were replaced by Afrikaners. By 1959 only 6 out of 40 heads of government departments were English-speakers
- apartheid intensified during the premiership of Hendrik Verwoerd in the later 1950s
- the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and views of Afrikaner academics such as Cronje who advocated complete racial separation in order to secure the long-term survival of the Afrikaner people.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- evidence of growing African resistance including growth in ANC membership and examples of resistance increasingly put down with force
- belief in white supremacy at the heart of ideology – that social miscegenation would lead to racial decline (Immorality Act and Mixed Marriages Act)
- Establishment of SABRA (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs)
- details of relevant 1950s legislation such as the Native Laws Amendment Act 1952 with closer regulation of passes and conditions of residence, Bantu Authorities Act 1951 etc
- economic or practical reasons for the development of apartheid including Bantu Education Act 1953 giving state control over education
- apartheid as a means of extending the benefits of the migrant labour system to manufacturing
- commercial farmers guaranteed a supply of labour from the Reserves
- influx control legislation would restrict the process of black urbanisation and therefore the development of a black urban proletariat
- influx control to protect interests of white workers threatened by lower wages of black workers
- NP justified policies as not only being to safeguard the whites, it would also protect blacks.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|---|
| Dan O'Meara | Argues that apartheid was designed to support Afrikaner capital with agriculture as the dominant force. 'The concept of apartheid was thus first and foremost a solution to the problems of farmers within the Nationalist alliance'. |
| Hermann Gilliomee | Argues that apartheid was a 'radical survival plan' to secure Afrikaner rule against a growing black majority and the development of African resistance. He finds its earliest roots in the Dutch Reformed Church where 'DRC Ministers and missionary strategists were the first in the field to formulate an apartheid ideology'. |
| Harold Wolpe | Argues that apartheid ideology was a way of justifying the extension of the economics of cheap labour to manufacturing industry. 'Influx policies not only helped manufacturing industry, but also ensured that sufficient Africans remained in the rural areas where their labour was needed by commercial farmers'. |
| Deborah Posel | Identifies the trend for greater state interventionism globally as influencing the origins of apartheid. 'Apartheid was born, then, of the appropriation of globally current enthusiasms for a big interventionist state yoked, in the South African case, to an ideologically distinctive vision of racial order and nationalist advance'. |

Question 56

Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the nature of African resistance during the 1950s.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Author | Robert Sobukwe. | Reflects a shift to a more activist African position in the resistance movement. Had been ANCYL leader but disagreed with integrationist approach. Firm supporter of Africanism. Helped form the PAC in 1959. Author of the <i>Africanist</i> newspaper. |
| Purpose | The Inaugural Speech on the Formation of the PAC. | To promote the philosophy of the newly formed PAC differentiating it from the ANC from which it had split and had new members expelled. Saw the liberation of South Africa from apartheid in the same context as anti-colonial movements in Africa: Africa belonged to black Africans who must fight alone for their liberation. |
| Timing | April 1959 | Formation of the PAC by those frustrated by the ANC's lack of progress, and the prevalence of Africanist views. The PAC was formed during early days of separate development, when PAC membership exceeded the ANC. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| . . . true democracy can be established in South Africa and on the continent as a whole, only when white supremacy has been destroyed. | His tone shows his determination to achieve democracy, the destruction of white supremacy is required for democracy in South Africa. |
| . . . African people can be organised only under the banner of African nationalism in an All-African Organisation where they will by themselves formulate policies and programmes and decide on the methods of struggle. . . | A rallying call to all black South Africans – arguing that Africans alone should determine their future, the recognition that achieving this will involve struggle. |
| We wish to emphasise that the freedom of the African means the freedom of all groups of people in South Africa, because only the African can guarantee the establishment of a genuine democracy in which all men will be citizens governed as individuals and not as sectional groups. | An inducement that freedom and democracy can only be achieved through African actions, from which all races will benefit. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- PAC had a simple philosophy and gained much support from rural areas, especially in the Witwatersrand where many of its leaders were based
- PAC blamed ANC failings on its willingness to work with other groups
- PAC rejected the Freedom Charter, largely due to its emphasis on equal rights
- from its inception, the PAC believed Africans could only act successfully by themselves
- many members – though not Sobukwe himself – saw whites as the enemy who should be expelled from South Africa
- opposed communism and associated with other independence movements in Africa, fighting colonialism.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- membership of the PAC by 1959 exceeded that of the ANC by 25,000 showing growth of Africanism
- rivalry and growth of Africanism came to a head in the events which led to the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1961. Consequent banning of the ANC and PAC led to militant campaigns
- main African opposition in the 1950s led by the ANC 1952 Defiance Campaign saw 10,000 attend initial meeting in Durban. Demonstrates growth in urban and working-class resistance
- ANC membership rose from 4000 to 100,000 after the Defiance Campaign though vast majority of the 8 million Africans did not become involved. Shows dominance of ANC in opposing apartheid in the 1950s
- Federation of South African Women founded in 1954 co-ordinated campaigns against the pass laws – demonstration of 26,000 in Pretoria. Demonstrating increased role of women
- Congress Alliance and Freedom Charter of 1955 – statement of ideals and aims rather than strategy. Demonstrates greater unity of resistance groups in statement of shared vision
- Women's Pass protest of 1956
- growing unplanned and spontaneous rural protests more difficult to suppress, demonstrative of growing grassroots discontent
- Zeerust Uprising, 1957 and Pondoland Revolt show increasing direct attacks on authority
- more localised resistance – Zeerust in Western Transvaal (1957) chiefs appointed by Bantu Affairs Department deposed. Similar action in Natal and Transkei
- Treason Trial 1956-61 led to international publicity with ANC middle leaders increasingly seeking alliances beyond South Africa's borders
- Government reasserted control through banning leaders and newspapers – Mandela's banning extended until 1961. Led to organisations exploring prospect of more militant campaigning to counter oppression
- Feit argues that the leadership of the ANC remained detached from any popular base, so the ANC was overrated in the 1950s
- arguably Sharpeville exposed the failings of the 1950s movement – Charterists versus Africanists as the 1950s saw greater polarisation within black opposition
- as the 1950s progressed, and especially after the adoption of the Freedom Charter, the PAC provided a clear alternative to the ANC aiming – like the ANC – at the creation of a mass movement for Africans. Many saw the PAC as being more extreme in aims
- 1 May 1950 – National Stay Away. Violent clashes in Transvaal. First example of combined worker action/country-wide.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|--|
| Saul Dubow | Argues that the Defiance Campaigns were a turning point in 1950s resistance. 'The Defiance Campaign of 1952 was a crucial moment in which the developing Congress Alliance came to test the potential and limits of mass civil disobedience'. |
| Nigel Worden | Sees the nature of 1950s African resistance as having come from trends of the 1940s, particularly in terms of rural resistance. 'The most successful mass campaigns of the decade took place not in the towns but in the countryside'. Describes this as a decade of heightened defiance but lost opportunities. |
| James Barber | Is critical of the role of the PAC arguing that it relied on 'emotion and rhetoric rather than routine organisation'. |
| Dale McKinley | Is critical of the growth of African protest in the 1950s arguing that it failed to reach its potential. 'Little effort was made to organise the black working class . . . the ANC recoiled from mass mobilisation'. |

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914 -1945

Part A – Historical issues

Question 57 **How far can it be argued that the February Revolution was ‘a revolution from below’?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is for candidates to debate about where the revolution originated and where it sustained its main support base. ‘Below’ suggests grassroots support from the workers, the peasants, soldiers, sailors and the revolutionaries with analysis and evaluation of the extent to which each played a significant part in the lead up to February. Candidates might consider ‘above’ to mean the nobility, the Church, the Generals, Admirals, the wealthy bourgeois sector disappointed with the failure of the Duma. Candidates might consider the growth of unrest on the streets, the Duma which refused to disband, the increased desertions of troops at the front, and the Army officers who advised Nicholas to stand down. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Factors which support the view that the February Revolution came from ‘below’

Policy of Russification

- 19th century saw more and more uprisings from nationalist minorities for autonomy
- Russification was resented, and became more rigorous in the late 19th century
- Nicholas II strongly supported Russification and took an active role in it
- Russification persecuted many and therefore lost Tsarism the support of nationalist minorities who had previously been loyal to the regime
- Russia’s population 170 million, ½ non-Russians: Poles, Finns, Ukrainians
- education increased national consciousness; monarchy seen as oppressive.

Impact of War on the countryside

- less agricultural output, farm horses requisitioned, cut in chemical fertilisers supply
- inflation made trading unprofitable, peasants began hoarding grain instead of trading
- Army largely peasants, their families were suffering under Tsarism so more likely to mutiny, peasants moving actively against Tsar for example. soldiers in Petrograd garrison
- hard winter 1916 – 1917, so bad harvests meant starvation for the peasants.

Impact of war on urban centres

- terrible living conditions as everything went into war effort: widespread hunger, lack of fuel, unemployment, inflation (cost of living rose by 300%)
- much unemployment as rural migrants and refugees fled German occupation
- more and more notes put into circulation, money worthless which meant rampant inflation, especially in 1916
- army given food and transport priority: food distribution to civilian areas unreliable, hunger bordered on famine for much of Russia during war, shortages especially bad in towns.

Riots by Workers led to Revolution the ‘spark’ from below

- strike – 18 February, Putilov steel works employees, largest, most politically active Petrograd factory plus workers angered at (untrue) rumours of further bread supply cuts
- 23 February (International Woman’s Day) when thousands of women on streets demanding food and an end to war
- 25 February Petrograd paralysed by city-wide strike, modern estimates 1,500-2,000 people killed/wounded in disturbances. Much confusion, little direction from top
- 27 February first meeting of “Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Workers’ Deputies” (mainly Mensheviks) in same building as Provisional Committee in the Tauride Palace
- Service and Williams contend that the workers and the soldiers were the only ones to act, yet behind scenes Duma, bourgeois, generals pleased.

Military weaknesses

- the army’s ‘*crippling weakness*’ was a lack of equipment, not lack of spending, but due to poor administration, poor resource distribution, due to weak central leadership
- soldiers barefoot, boot shortage: groups not working together-one region had leather, one nails, one soles
- hospitals in excellent condition but disorganised
- lack of equipment – soldiers told to pick up the rifle of the man killed in front
- Russia had more shells than Germany
- Russia in war not hopeless, it had material and human resources, but it had bad leadership.

Factors which support the view that the February Revolution came from ‘above’

The Tsar and the regime

- Nicholas II did not want to be tsar and his personality as a timid leader who is manipulated by his aristocratic advisers to be more ‘ruthless’ meant he took reactionary stances
- Nicholas was a family man whose interests lay in socialising and hunting – unwilling to get involved in politics – indecisive, weak, lacked organisational skill
- Nicholas said by one minister to be ‘*unfit to run a village post office*’
- industrial progress was made by this regime, but it did not reach strike-prone working class
- agricultural reforms of the regime were unsuccessful and alienated land-hungry peasantry
- there was little in terms of political progress, he resisted change and would not co-operate with the Dumas or with the Progressive Bloc during the war – the Tsar remained an autocrat
- regime unable to adapt to changing conditions and would have fallen even without WWI, though WWI did act as a catalyst for revolution
- Nicholas misjudged the seriousness of the situation post 1904 – from Bloody Sunday to poor appointments, to leaving Rasputin and the Tsarina in charge as he went to the front.

The role of the Duma

- Tsar told Duma to dissolve, all except 12 members did, they became ‘Provisional Government’
- remaining ministers in Tsar’s cabinet, facing opposition, escaped from capital
- Rodzianko (loyal to Tsar before) advised Tsar to abdicate if monarchy to be saved
- 28 February, troops stopped Tsar’s train at Pskov, army high command and Duma advised abdication
- here the argument is that the regime collapsed from within.

Political Effects of War

- August 1914, Duma supported Tsar: voted for own suspension until end of war
- BUT within a year as Russia was failing in war, it demanded own recall, back in Aug 1915
- Progressive Bloc, which contained 236 of the 422 Duma members, tried to get Tsar to make concessions in authority, but he refused, and it became focal point of political resistance
- 1915 Nicholas made himself army Commander-in-Chief and therefore personally responsible for Russia's progress in the war. He was blamed for many defeats which resulted in low morale and eventually the Tsar lost army support
- unpopular German Tsarina Alexandra, and Rasputin's (murdered by aristocrats, December 1916) influence over Tsarina, made them more unpopular: decreased standard of rule, ministers changed frequently – able ministers dismissed in favour of friends
- Tsar blamed for leaving Tsarina and Rasputin in charge, so working classes more against him
- Tsar was with the army, 800km away from Petrograd – isolated
- in February, Tsar ordered extremely loyal Cossacks to fire on demonstrators, they refused.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| Peter Kenez | Argues soldiers' refusal to obey was more important than workers' demonstration, as once the chains of command were broken, the imperial regime collapsed. |
| Tsuyoshi Hasegawa | Contends that first Russia united against common war enemy, so this gave Tsarism the chance to redeem itself, but it did so badly in war, society was torn apart as everyone suffered. |
| Michael Lynch | Argues that ' <i>enlightened ministers</i> ' Stolypin and Witte attempted to reform, but government was conservative, did not trust them, so threw away last chance of survival. |
| Richard Pipes | Argues that the regime alienated the army generals and the Duma ('above'). |

Question 58

To what extent was Lenin's leadership responsible for the success of the Bolshevik Party from April to October 1917?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to consider the role and influence of Lenin's leadership of the Bolshevik Party from his return from exile to the seizure of power in October 25/26th 1917. They might explore his policies – April Theses, authority over the Bolshevik Party as undisputed leader and the determination to lead a second revolution – the socialist revolution. Other relevant factors may include – failures of the Provisional Government, increasing economic and social dislocation in Russia allied to worker, soldier and peasant radicalisation. Events such as the failed Summer Offensive, the Kornilov Affair might also be considered. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence of the role of Lenin, his leadership and its importance

- Lenin's leadership of the Bolshevik Party was undisputed. Even when in exile before April 1917 he was unchallenged as the leader. His authority and status were never challenged within the Party despite disagreements over tactics – Kamenev's disagreement over Bolshevik seizure of power but Lenin's will prevailed in Central Committee on 16th October
- policies such as April Theses sets Bolshevik Party apart from all other socialist parties as conditions deteriorate in Russia Bolshevik Party able to gain popularity from certain sections of Workers and Soldiers – in Petrograd and Moscow especially
- Lenin was determined that Bolshevik Party would lead a Socialist revolution to take Russia out of the war, to begin the Socialist revolution and begin the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat'
- Lenin's sectarian nature to decline cooperation with 'bourgeois' Provisional Government and all other parties – especially other socialists. There was no chance of a coalition government
- July Days, Petrograd, 1917 – Lenin unusually vacillates to launch coup as 'premature' when Kronstadt sailors seek leadership for revolution. Bolshevik popularity temporarily declines after 'July Days' suppression by forces loyal to the Provisional Government
- Trotsky – Lenin's leadership assisted by Trotsky as chairman of MRC in Petrograd who persuaded Lenin to wait to launch coup when 2nd All Russia Congress of Soviets was meeting to provide fig-leaf of cover for armed seizure of power in name of the Soviets
- debate to launch seizure of power – Central Committee in October debate. Lenin by his authority persuades leadership to seize power wins by 19-2 votes. Only Kamenev and Zinoviev vote against Lenin's proposal.

Evidence which supports other reasons for Bolshevik success

Growth of support for Bolshevik Party

- Bolsheviks were only party that opposed continuing the war from April Theses onwards. Initial support for 'Revolutionary Defencism' was overturned when Lenin returns from exile. Pravda changes editorial policy to reflect Leninist view
- Petrograd Soviet leadership was alienated from Workers and Soldiers because it supported Kerensky's policies which Bolsheviks exploited after July until October
- trade unions and factory committees in Petrograd, Moscow and Riga especially were becoming pro-Bolshevik from early autumn. Working class radicalisation seeking a Soviet government but not necessarily a Bolshevik government ruling by dictatorial methods
- peasant soldiers – there was still front-line patriotism, but this was in decline after failure of Summer Offensive and Kornilov Affair. Army rank and file becoming radicalised
- rear garrisons on Northern Front elections to Soldier Committees was larger representation for Bolsheviks. Kronstadt Naval Garrison votes Bolshevik majority in September Soviet election
- the Soviet view as expressed by Lenin that the majority of working class were with them and that 'half of the army immediately join' followed by 'nine tenths of the peasantry in a few weeks'

- by end of September there was greater evidence of popular impatience for radical change – Army officers' authority undermined, peasants against private landowners, strikes increased as economy declines – lack of orders, fuel scarce, spiralling inflation and wages unable to keep up with price rises, raw materials scarcity for industry and labour militancy leads to lock-out and unemployment.

Impact of Kornilov Affair aftermath

- General Kornilov – move against Petrograd Soviet fails. Effect of the Kornilov Coup on Kerensky's support and Lenin's popularity
- increased status for Bolsheviks – Red Guard led the defence of Petrograd and armed from army arsenals. They kept the weapons and used them in October. Bolsheviks portrayed as heroes who saved the revolution
- Kerensky lost support among workers, peasants and army. Political Left view him as a counter-revolutionary while Right view him as betraying Kornilov and Russia descending into chaos
- September elections in Moscow saw Bolshevik support increase- gain of 51% of votes in city Soviet election, up from 11% in June, reflected Bolshevik popularity but in some areas of Petrograd-Vyborg district – they gained as much as 70% support from working class constituency
- Kadet support in same election in Moscow increases from 15% to 31% – Middle classes rally to the Right who made appeals to patriotism and law and order. Class struggle now out in the open
- SRs and Mensheviks – vote migrates *en masse* to Bolshevik Party as the working class becoming more radical with calls for soviet government but not necessarily a Bolshevik one.

Problems faced by and failures of the Provisional Government

- the Provisional Government was not elected by the people and as such was linked to the Tsarist era. It was illegitimate and was too divided to cope with mass politics and a war
- Russia was experiencing national disintegration from February Revolution onwards. Industrial economy, social structure of the countryside
- Great Russian provinces and nationalities were losing cohesion as old power structures unravel and power devolves to local soviets and spontaneous actions
- Tsarist police in the countryside dissolved, Okhrana abolished, and militia used in cities to police population. 'Power lying in the gutter'
- the war continued unabated. Summer Offensive failed with losses of 400,000 dead, wounded and missing, large-scale refusal to obey orders after initial advances stall. Officers' authority limited in both rear and frontline units
- land reform – Provisional Government left reforms of agriculture for Constituent Assembly to decide. By autumn there were large-scale land seizures and requisitioning of Landowners properties. Deserting soldiers used violence to carry out attacks
- Kerensky moved towards the Right as he appointed General Lavr Kornilov as Commander in Chief of Army at the insistence of the Kadets in the coalition government on 25th July. He is the hero to the nationalist Right, business leaders and Army officers. Kerensky agreed to increased discipline, death penalty for desertion and to curb influence of Soldiers' Committees
- failed to convene Constituent Assembly which would have provided legitimacy if these moderates had won the popular vote. The elections when they did take place were won by the SRs who beat the Bolsheviks into second place.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| Richard Pipes | Argues that Bolsheviks not representing the people but launched a secretly planned coup as power of Provisional Government so weakened. |
| Christopher Read | Contends Lenin's role was crucial for driving the Bolshevik Party forward to October seizure of power. |
| Peter Kenez | Considers the complete collapse of the authority of the Provisional Government was the most striking aspect of the events leading up to October. |
| Helen Rappaport | Argues the complete collapse of the authority of the Provisional Government was the most striking aspect of the events leading up to October. |

Question 59

How successful was the NEP in achieving its aims?

Aim of the question

Soviet Russia from 1921-1928 was dominated by the NEP. This policy instigated under Lenin continued until 1928. The aims of the NEP extended beyond the economy. The aim of this essay question is for candidates to discuss the economic and political/social aims of the NEP in Soviet Russia. Candidates should be aware of the debate within the Communist Party over a temporary concession in economics but in the context of a determined desire to maintain a firm hold on power. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

The peasants and NEP

- move away from 'requisitioning of surplus' – Prodravverстка – of grain to a Tax in Kind – Prodnalog – of 20% for peasants of Russia. Aim was to encourage production of food for the cities as well as for export abroad to revitalise the economy devastated after Great War and Civil War
- peasantry make up 80% of the population of Soviet Russia and their numbers were increasing as some urban workers desert northern cities to return to recent-ancestral agricultural areas for guaranteed food supplies. By 1921 Petrograd's population had fallen to 550,000 from 2,000,000 in 1917. NEP designed to stabilise social security in both urban and rural contexts
- 1920 – grain seizures were 423 million Poods, 1921 – Tax in Kind was 240 million Poods – peasants left with more of their produce to sell or to use for other agricultural purposes. (Pood = 17kgs) helps to reduce potential for counter-revolutionary activity which fulfilled a crucial aim of NEP
- trade – private traders were allowed to transport foodstuffs to cities and sell manufactured goods to peasants. 'NEPmen' make money from both activities
- famine 1921 – only 43% of total land sown in 1920 and coupled with drought in southern Russia and east of Siberia. Millions died and foreign relief accepted reluctantly by Soviet Government. NEP hope to revitalise rural economy which was a qualified success
- NEP context of agriculture still primitive – wooden ploughs used in 40% of farms. Due to 1917 Land reforms farms were smaller, less efficient and were mostly suited to subsistence farming not producing for the market
- peasant commune strengthened in years after 1917. Strip farming still used widely in agriculture. Consolidated farmlands of the Stolypin era were mostly back in the commune due to pressures of war, revolution and peasant peer-pressure. NEP recognises indirectly the retrograde developments from October, 1917
- by 1925 grain harvest was 72.5 million tons, up from 50.3 in 1922, but still less than 1913 at 80 million tons of grain. NEP has success for the peasantry to an extent.

Kulaks

- richer peasants grew in number during NEP. Difficult to define a rich peasant in Marxist class terms in Russian agriculture. 1925 – 6% of peasants were leasing land, only 1.6 % were employing labour. Soviet government needed the industrious and hardworking peasants to produce more food. However, traditionally the Bolsheviks looked on the 'Kulaks' as the class enemy in the countryside. This was a crucial area for Party debates in the 1920s
- peasants had ambitions to improve but if they did increase wealth and land they were labelled as a 'Kulak' and were subject to suspicion of the regime. They remembered the time of stealing their grain by the Soviet regime in time of War Communism
- peasant cooperatives were a success – by 1928 50% were in cooperatives where they shared the burdens of farming and the benefits of NEP trade between peasant families and communities
- communist party and the Soviet regime were weak in the countryside. Peasant elders – *Skhod* – had more authority and status among the Peasants. Increased wealth and output increased this dominance which was never an aim of NEP.

NEP and the cities – urban development

- 1921 – shops, cafes, restaurants and even small-scale manufacturers were established once again. Private enterprise was now allowed
- ‘25,000 cafe and shops opened in Moscow . . . the city was brought to life.’ – eyewitness Walter Duranty
- increase in unemployment under NEP as factories had to be profitable and were not given government subsidies as they were previously under ‘War Communism’ of the Civil War era
- wages were paid in cash once again not only in supplies and food rations. Prices in the new shops, restaurants were high and there was widespread unhappiness by workers as increased inequalities were now apparent
- 1924 – 300,000 shops and market stalls were closed down in response to concerns from Workers and Trade Unions about conspicuous wealth from NEP men and a lack of grain being marketed by the peasants in the ‘scissor crisis’ of that year. NEP was creating social tensions which was a by-product of allowing capitalist-developments in a socialist state.

NEP and the working class

- NEP had disadvantaged proletarians – young workers found it difficult to find employment as they were unskilled compared to older, more experienced colleagues. Women workers who were given generous conditions such as a 6 hour-day and payment for maternity and post-partum benefits were not hired as they cost more to employ
- urban unemployment rose as unprofitable enterprises were closed down as they could not pay their way in a fiscally-disciplined economy. The economy had not recovered to a pre-war level to allow for unemployed workers to find alternative jobs easily. In 1929 there were 1.9 million unemployed workers registered by the Soviet state
- workers had paid holidays, sick pay and medical treatment at work far in excess of any western workers in the 1920s. The 8-hour working day was legal in Soviet Russia compared to capitalist nations
- unions were represented on the running of factories with the right to set overtime hours and piece rates in consultation with management and did make representations to party authorities on rising inequalities.

NEP and the Communist Party

- Lenin had called NEP a ‘retreat’. However, in 1921-1924 there were different attitudes he took. Aims of NEP developing as Lenin spoke of NEP and ‘the party needing to learn to trade’ as lasting for a ‘decade or more’ before a more socialistic policies could be implemented
- as long as the state controlled the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy then capitalism could not return to Soviet Russia. Private trade on a small-scale was not a threat said Lenin
- right leaders such as Bukharin saw NEP as a way to build socialism ‘on a peasant nag’ in the mid-1920s as a way to maintain the alliance of countryside and city while growing revenues from trade would be used for capital accumulation and buying capital goods from abroad
- Left Communists such as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1925 saw NEP as not sustainable for the Soviet Union to build socialism as there would be insufficient capital-accumulation to build an industrial society. NEP was allowing peasant Russia to develop in a bourgeois way inimical to socialism. The peasant Kulak would have control over food to the cities
- party activists were against NEP – ‘New Exploitation of the Proletariat.’ Bourgeois experts’ were still in authority in Industry and in Soviet state – Mensheviks especially prominent in the Economic Ministry
- peasants reluctant to market grain if state prices too low for their supplies and finished manufactured goods too costly – 1923 and 1928 scissors crises
- ‘Ban on factions’ at 10th Party Congress – Party leadership seeks to tighten discipline and ensure debate limited. ‘Workers Opposition’ silenced.

Factors which demonstrate NEP's aim to maintain political oppression

- religion – Orthodox Church under attack in 1922 and Church valuables being taken to pay for famine relief. Patriarch not replaced after death of Archbishop Tikhon in 1925. Catholic clerics of Polish origins shot for 'counter-revolutionary' activities. Judaism and Islam were not subject to similar levels of attack
- 1925 'Union of the Militant Godless' was set up to agitate against religious belief in the cities especially. Peasantry mostly left alone with their strong religious beliefs in NEP-era
- Menshevik and SR parties still illegal and leadership persecuted in NEP
- 1922 – expulsion of intellectuals, artists who were considered 'counter-revolutionary' such as Bulgakov
- 1922 – censorship of arts and literature – pre-publication censorship was tightened – Glavlit
- OGPU, concentration camps and death penalty were utilised as instrument of state policy to deter political rivals
- crushing peasant revolts – Tambov 1922, Tuchachevsky used poison gas against peasant rebels as well as executions, village burnings and arrests.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Alec Nove | Argues Lenin's aim for NEP was only a temporary retreat but no change in the political monopoly of power for Communist Party. This was achieved throughout NEP-era. |
| Walter Duranty | Argues that the NEP was a success as the economy recovered and the State received taxes from trade to repair dilapidated infrastructure of cities. |
| Orlando Figes | Believes NEP could have built a socialist society with time due to economic growth from 1921-1927. |
| Robert Service | Concludes NEP was a success as economic concessions made to avoid potential upheaval from peasantry which diminished in NEP-era, Stalinist policies in the 1930s saw mass oppression in countryside coupled with substantial decline of production. |

Question 60

How far can it be argued that Stalin's victory in the leadership struggle was due to his skills as a politician?

Aim of the question

By 1929 Stalin had won the leadership struggle to succeed Lenin who died in 1924. The defeat of all rivals – Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev etc was due to various factors – both strengths and weaknesses of Stalin and those who opposed him. This aim of this essay question is for candidates to address the issue of his skills as a politician, that is, his ability in politicking compared to others. This might include his ability to present ideas of 'Socialism in One Country' (originally Bukharin's idea) as moderate and a vision which was achievable to the Party membership that Stalin had enlarged since Lenin's death. Candidates might also include the skills of forming and breaking alliances as part of politicking. Outside political persuasion/commitment/ideological sense other influences might be discussed. To that end the weaknesses of opponents, the notion of luck and that being used, and the nature of the party structure and culture of the time might be evaluated in order to come to an understanding of this victory. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence of Stalin's skills as a politician

Ideological stance

- '*Permanent Revolution*' v '*Socialism in one country*'. This was the ideology and national vision that Stalin used to counter Trotsky. This appealed to the younger of the party and Komsomol as it was patriotic and less ideological in tone and content as opposed to Trotsky's ideas
- since 1925 Party membership had become less educated and more Proletarian – Lenin Enrolment – and these new people were inclined to accept Stalin's practical ideas. Due to their Civil War experiences middle-ranking party leaders were used to obeying orders rather than debating directives
- Trotsky view of '*Permanent Revolution*' would entail conflict with the capitalist world. The Soviet people were exhausted after wars, revolutions and famines. This policy would only entail more war and potential threats
- Stalin adopted the mantle of 'Lenin for today' – he was the successor to Lenin and carrying on his mission. He linked his ideas to those of Lenin to stress continuity and ideological correctness. Stalin initiated the Cult of Lenin.

Political strengths

- Stalin's power base in the Communist Party: as Commissar for Nationalities, as General Secretary who was in charge of the Lenin Enrolment
- use of alliances as temporary expedients to defeat rivals – Left v Right leaves Stalin as ultimate victor by 1929
- Stalin membership of the Orgburo and Secretariat. These political posts were not seen by opponents as being important
- 'Comrade Card Index' – Stalin building a very effective powerbase before Lenin dies and others do not realise this until too late
- use of 'ban on factions' from 1921 – 10th Party Congress to outmanoeuvre his opponents as being an 'anti-Party faction'.

Evidence of other reasons for Stalin's victory

Opponents and their weaknesses

- the contenders over power in the 1920s including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev and Bukharin were no match for Stalin in terms of cunning or ruthlessness
- Trotsky the Jewish, former -Menshevik intellectual who was close to Lenin but too intellectually arrogant and aloof to make a success of politicking post-1924
- Trotsky was viewed as a potential military dictator – the 'Man on the White Horse' – a Bonaparte-like figure from the French Revolution whom Bolsheviks feared would appear to take power
- Central Committee refused to read 'Lenin's Testament' – as they were all criticised but missed an opportunity to get rid of Stalin
- Stalin's use of other leadership contenders to neutralise threats and to build alliances, Zinoviev which side-lines the Comintern and Kamenev.

Party structure

- Communist Party highly centralised and hierarchical Stalin able to use to advantage in leadership struggle as he had key positions of power by 1924 onwards
- 'Ban on factions' from 1921 allows leadership views to be imposed on Party. Stalin able to use this to brand opponents as 'anti-party'
- Nomenklatura – 5,500 party and government posts appointed by central party bodies which allowed Stalin to appoint supporters to key positions due to his position in Orgburo and Party Secretariat
- selection of delegates to Party conferences was under Stalin's control – this helps explain the hostile reception to Trotsky from 1924 onwards.

Party struggle favours Stalin

- 1924 – At 13th Party Congress Stalin allies with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky. Trotsky defeated by Stalinist delegates as well as Zinoviev and Kamenev supporters
- Trotsky made tactical mistake of not appealing to supporters in the Red Army and outside the Party structures
- Trotsky wrote Lessons of October which attacks Zinoviev and Kamenev who failed to support Lenin's plans for a seizure of power. Stalin stayed in the background and leaves the Left of the party to destroy itself
- 1925 – Stalin and Bukharin in alliance. Right of the party supported Stalin due to perceived view that NEP was compatible with 'Socialism in One Country'
- 14th Party Conference – attacks on Stalin by Left were easily defeated. In 1926 Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev united to form 'United Opposition'. They held street demonstrations against Stalin. They were accused of 'factionalism' and expelled from the Party
- 1928 – Stalin turned on the Right. Advocated end of NEP and was for rapid industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture. These were the policies of the defeated Left whom Stalin had defeated
- 1929 – 15th Party Congress – Bukharin defended NEP but was outvoted by Stalinist delegates and the remainder of the Left. Bukharin and allies-Rykov and Tomsy were all removed from their Leadership posts.

Good fortune

- potential rival – Sverdlov died of Spanish flu in March 1919 – Lenin turned to Stalin as an effective administrator/troubleshooter who could get things done – no matter the cost. Lenin used Stalin in Civil War which increased his status
- the death of Dzerzhinsky in 1926, allowed Stalin to put his supporters into the OGPU which will assist him in the struggle for power and into the 1930s Purges
- Lenin died in January 1924 of a stroke. He had been ill for several years beforehand and was no longer in effective control over Party of Soviet state. If Lenin had not died, Stalin would have been seriously demoted due to his personal coarseness to Krupskaya
- 1923-1926 Trotsky suffered attacks of fever which did sap his physical strength and made him less able to deal with concerted attacks from Stalin
- failing to attend Lenin's funeral which was seized upon by Stalin as the opportunity to take hold of the leadership mantle was a serious mistake. Trotsky was correctly informed of the date but chose not to attend as he was in Sochi in a sanatorium.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Chris Ward | Argues that ideology of Stalin – Socialism in One Country – appealed to most people while Trotsky – Permanent Revolution – was seen as being underrated. |
| Isaac Deutscher | Argues that the key factor was Trotsky's inability to recognise Stalin, who he underrated and patronised, as the main threat to him as the successor of Lenin. |
| Michael Lynch | Argues that Stalin portrayed as a moderate who refused to become involved in Party warfare as he was the conciliator and upholder of unity. |
| Robert Conquest | Argues that Stalin by skill and cunning simply outmanoeuvred his colleagues. |

Question 61

‘The rise of external Fascist threats was the driving force of the Purges.’

How valid is this view of the causes of the Purges of the 1930s?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to evaluate the dangers the Soviet state faced in the 1930s and how these threats were used by Stalin to justify the Purges. Old Bolsheviks, senior Party leaders, managers in industry and senior commanders of the Red Army were all victims. With the emergence of fascism in Germany and the growth of militaristic aspiration in Japan, the belief that there was a distinct threat by hostile powers to the state by the mid to late 1930s was strengthened. Other reasons for the Purges might be expected here and include the internal threat to the Party, to the leadership, to the economy and the desire to control everyone – above and below. By extension there might be a discussion of the mobilisation of the Terror State to include denunciations of alleged ‘saboteurs’ ‘enemies of the state’ and relatives of those denounced as a method of control which spiralled out of control with no justification whatsoever.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the view of external – Fascist threats to Soviet security – escalation might include discussion of the extent of the impact of the following

- 1933 – Hitler became Chancellor of Germany – ferociously anti-Communist politician
- 1935 – Germany announced re-armament – Western powers appeased Hitler
- 1936 – Germany re-occupied the Rhineland – Western powers appeased Hitler
- 1936 – Spanish Civil War broke out – Soviet Union aided the Republicans against the Nationalists who received Nazi and Italian aid
- 1936 – Anti-Comintern Pact signed with Italy, Japan and Germany to counter Communist influence
- 1937 Japan invaded China – Soviet military aid sent to Nationalist Chinese
- 1938 – Border clashes between Red Army and Japanese forces in Lake Khasan.

Evidence which supports other driving forces

Internal – political factors

- Trotsky formed a bloc of opposition to Stalin and was waging a war against him from exile. There were former supporters of Trotsky at all levels of Soviet society. Trotskyites very prominent in Spanish Civil War where Stalin’s NKVD was involved in suppressing them in Spain
- Stalin intended to kill Old Bolsheviks to increase his personal power. Use of Show Trials such as Zinoviev and Kamenev and Bukharin to defeat and silence opponents whom he feared were still a threat
- Bolshevik culture was violent from the beginning of the regime Lenin’s use of Terror in the Civil War years
- purges were a normal part of Communist party procedures – Chistka – was used in early 1930s to rid the party of undesirable elements but was done peacefully. Stalin’s Purges were different in that violence was used against the Party members and Leaders
- party members were accused and were coerced into confessing and denouncing others for fear of their families and friends being swept up into the NKVD torture chambers. Show Trials of Leaders such as Zinoviev and Kamenev used to denounce Bukharin
- Stalin wanted to remove anyone in the Party who might be able to form an alternative government in the event of a war.

Internal – Stalin personality

- Stalin’s personality – vengeful and paranoid especially after suicide of his wife in 1932 – Nadia’s death scarred him. ‘She went away as an enemy’
- Stalin’s fragile self-image – as the ‘hero of the revolution’ who would carry through the victory of socialism. Yet, he knew he was not, and the Old Bolsheviks knew it too
- replaced Yagoda with Yezhov to increase the violence of the Purges to root out and unmask all enemies. Stalin believed in violence as a means to solve problems
- Stalin thought he was acting in the interests of the Party, the State and the Workers

- Stalin had to save the Soviet state from external threats – war looming from mid-1930s onwards.

Internal – Economic justification for actions

- 1936 was a year of poor harvests due to weather and economic production declined. Purges escalated in that year
- Purges provided slave labour in and from the Gulags. This aided Industrialisation of the Soviet Union. Gulag labour used for Moscow Underground, Belomor Canal, Magnitogorsk etc
- the pace of Industrialisation had to quicken, and more workers/prisoners needed as threat of war intensified in the mid to late 1930s
- Purges used to blame ‘scapegoats’ for economic failures of the 5 Year Plans. Wreckers were sought to explain short comings
- unwilling population were driven forward to greater efforts by the Purges as fear of being purged was an incentive to produce and believe . . . even if only superficially
- tension created between workers and plant managers because of Stakhanovite campaign of 1936. Party leadership endorsed the Stakhanovite campaign and certain workers responded as they will have increased material benefits. Denounced Managers who do not facilitate this by not providing tools, auxiliary support, time and infrastructure to beat records
- class enemies such as Kulaks and ‘NEPmen’ were eradicated from Soviet life as the move towards Socialism was being made. ‘Speculators’ and ‘Kulak Blood Suckers’ were targets for the purges.

Other reasons for the Purges – desire to control everyone

- Purges spun out of control as NKVD exceed targets to show loyalty, Purges expanded with a culture of excess force being used by NKVD
- Stalin recognised the excesses of Yezhov by bringing in Beria to reduce the deaths and lower numbers in the Gulag. A means of maintaining control
- Stalin wanted to ensure control over the military. They were purged as the external threat increased by late 1930s. In 1937-1938 Red Army lost best Commanders as 3 out of 5 Marshals were killed, 14 Army generals and roughly 10,000 Army officers killed, jailed or expelled from the Army. The Navy lost all senior fleet commanders, and the Air Force lost all Air Chiefs
- foreign communists were heavily purged. They were seen as being spies and/or Trotskyites. Polish Communist Party had lost all its leaders
- ‘Disloyal’ National Minorities were persecuted as in event of war their loyalty to the state was suspect – Finns, Koreans, Ukrainians over-represented in victims
- Purges were a way to expel religious belief from the Soviet Union. Orthodox Church heavily persecuted in the village and towns as were Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist Communities throughout the Soviet Union.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------------|---|
| Robert Service | Believes that Stalin’s malevolent personality was the decisive factor for the range and extent of the Purges. |
| S Sebag Montefiore | States there was a hint of Anti-Semitism as accused were charged with having a ‘second Motherland’ – Judaism. |
| Dimitri Volkogonov | Argues that Purges were Stalin’s desire for control and vengeance which wreaked havoc on the Military as war threat loomed in the late 1930s. |
| Orlando Figes | Contends sexual and personal jealousies were to blame for the Purges as denunciations were used to settle scores. |

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914-1945

Part B – Historical sources

Question 62 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons for the defeat of the Whites in the Civil War.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source AND for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|----------------|--|
| Author | Baron Wrangel. | Most progressive White Commander, defeated but left to manage the evacuation of troops and civilians at the Black Sea/only White Commander to support land reform. |
| Purpose | Memoirs. | A resolute defence, in part, of Tsarism, typical of a White General, but also an honest assessment of the reasons for failure of the Whites. To set the record straight against prevalent Bolshevik propaganda in the 1920s. |
| Timing | 1926 | Civil war over for 5-6 years, Bolshevik regime seemingly more secure. |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| Our noble cause was undermined because the Reds had the great advantage in the war of having control of the substantial military assets of our noble country. . . | Showing his sense of belief in his cause which was let down because of the Bolshevik control of war industries of Russia. The way he expresses this shows his disappointed recognition of Red strengths. |
| We, on the other hand were reduced initially to scavenging from the enemy to supply the army with the necessary munitions . . . | He expresses his frustration that the Whites had such limited access to military supplies that they had to scavenge, and this led to their defeat. |
| This assistance was, however, limited in nature with only the British offering money and suitable equipment needed to continue the fight for freedom. | Foreign intervention limited and only the British offered appropriate support. Again expressing regret that he was let down. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Bolsheviks controlled the armaments industries around Moscow and Petrograd
- whites unable to access supplies to supply their forces especially in early years of the Civil War
- foreign interventionist nations were not fully committed to the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime especially after the Armistice of 11th November 1918 that ended the Great War
- foreign interventionists had different motivations. Consider the different attitudes of USA, Japan, France and Britain.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Reds controlled the centre of Russia and they had advantage of population and supplies
- Whites on the periphery of Russia and were unable to conscript Peasants in large numbers
- foreign intervention used by the Bolsheviks to portray the Whites as unpatriotic
- Red Army led by Trotsky who conscripted 25,000 ex-Tsarist Officers and 135,000 ex-NCOs to provide experienced leadership
- hierarchical leadership and strict discipline imposed on Red Army, but problem of ill-discipline never fully resolved for example, 1st Cavalry Army committed anti-Semitic atrocities in Ukraine
- Red Army had access to ex-Tsarist military arsenals and training facilities
- conscription of Peasants facilitated by Reds control of central Russian heartlands
- Whites unable to offer National Minorities freedom/autonomy as they were committed to the restoration of 'Russia, one and undivided'
- Whites associated with returning land from peasants to former landlords. Peasants more likely to opt for Reds as they were for allowing the land Redistribution of 1917 to stand
- Lenin's policy of 'War Communism' was focused on producing all that the Red Army needed to win the Civil War
- Cheka – use of Red Terror against all opponents – social class enemies as well as non-Bolshevik Parties all oppressed
- strikes in factories forbidden, managers given control as Workers Committees lost authority over production in Bolshevik cities
- control over railway hubs of Moscow and Petrograd gave Bolsheviks huge advantage of transport of supplies and soldiers to the various fronts
- Whites geographical location on periphery of Russia meant they could not coordinate attacks and they were always at a disadvantage over conscription of Peasants
- ill-discipline plagued White Armies – General Denikin- – 'I can do nothing with my Army'
- endemic corruption of White Armies – supplies sold off, prostitutes wearing British Nurses uniforms
- Whites not adept at quality propaganda nor engaging in politics as the Generals were anti-political. Saw politics as a 'dirty business' and blamed politics for the decline of Russia from 1917 onwards
- Reds used propaganda extensively. Artists engaged for Agitprop and education among Red Army troops – in schools a Reading Primer – 'Slaves we are not, We are not Slaves!'
- foreign intervention troops not committed – French sailors mutinied in Odessa
- in Britain the Labour Party and trade union movement were against supporting Whites
- Red Army by 1920 was 5 million strong, Whites' largest army of Kolchak was only 125,000 strong, Yudenich's Northern Army was 15,000 strong in 1919.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Richard Pipes | Argues Red Army had the advantages of Bolshevik control of cities and Russia's railways. |
| Evan Mawdsley | States Reds had access to Tsarist army's arsenals – 'Aladdin's Cave'. |
| Peter Holquist | Believes Civil War won by the Bolsheviks as they were able to mobilise and use violence for political ends much better than the Whites. |
| James White | Claims Trotsky's organisation won the war for the Bolsheviks. |

Question 63 **How fully does Source B explain the extent of social change in Stalinist Russia?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| . . . by 1936 they were spending five times longer on household chores than their men. | Contends more of women's time being spent on domestic duties by 1936 showing limited social development. |
| Now the role of the parent was supported as a figure of authority irrespective of their social origins or attitudes. | Parents were to be given automatic respect from their children even if they were hostile to the Soviet regime. |
| Women were losing established rights they had gained in the 1920s as the 1936 Family Code made the provision of abortion almost impossible for women to obtain legally. . . | Argues that an example of the limitation of women's rights was that abortion was now illegal due to new Law passed in 1936. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- men spent less time on domestic chores due to emphasis on building socialism – men were seen as being in the forefront of industrialisation drive
- patriarchal family unit was now viewed by the State as the building block of the Soviet state
- abortion was allowed since 1921 but was made illegal in 1936 as the state wanted more children to be born for service as soldiers, workers and collective farmers.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Soviet state promoted 'liberation' for women as there was a need for women to work in the factories and fields
- Soviet education system equally educates both sexes. Women were majority of teachers in the 1930s Soviet Union
- elite wives in this period took on roles of charity work and self-improvement akin to Tsarist era aristocratic ladies. 1920s Soviet elite women were encouraged to work and educate themselves
- 17th Party Congress declared socialism had been achieved. No more remnants of exploiting Capitalism left therefore it was permissible to use traditional institutions to support the state
- Stalinist state still adhered to creating 'New Soviet man' (no return to patriarchal ideology of tsarist era)
- Komsomol members were taught to be sexually chaste and to value marriage as the ideal relationship. No more sexual liberalism of the 1920s
- school children taught to view marriage and children as the highest ideal of the nature of Soviet family life
- New Year celebrations and Fir Tree returned as a Soviet alternative to Christmas. 'Father Frost' – alternative Saint Nicholas – was once denounced as a kulak ally now returned to popular culture
- wedding rings were brought back in 1936 having been banned in 1926. Marriages were more formally celebrated at state registry offices. Divorce was made harder and more expensive to obtain by 1936 Family Law
- 1928-1932 millions died in famine and chaos of those years and Soviet birth-rate plummeted. Family was needed to maintain future demographic strength of the Soviet Union
- Policies of Urbanisation and Secularisation were still being undertaken in 1930s by Stalinist state. 'Quicksand Society' needs to be ended to restore stability
- Stalin's image dominated household – 'Red Corner' where the Orthodox icons once were placed had been replaced by image of Stalin

- RAPP – Soviet Writers Union began class war against the ‘avant garde’. Socialist Realism was the only accepted form for Literature. This was extended to all art forms – theatre, sculpture and cinema. Eisenstein’s film of *Alexander Nevsky* gave patriotic support to Russian nationalism against German invaders. *Ivan the Terrible* film was viewed as strengthening the Russian state not as an oppressor of the serf masses
- 1936 – Shostakovich’s opera *Lady MacBeth of Mtsensk* was attacked as too dissonant for the masses to relate to
- Russian classics in music, ballet and theatre were given the Stalinist regime’s support. Glinka and Tchaikovsky were back in vogue once again
- 1938 learning Russian was made compulsory in all schools in the Soviet Union. All university students and technical/vocational students had to be proficient in Russian to gain entry into educational institutions
- 1936 – in armed forces Russian was made the sole language of command and instruction. National – Territorial units abolished when universal military service introduced in 1936. All units were based on whole union recruits, but Russians were dominant ethnic group in terms of commanders and technical units where skills in communications/artillery/airforce required language and advanced training.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------|---|
| Orlando Figes | Argues Stalinist society needed to restore stability after early 1930s famine, and upheavals that convulsed society. |
| Wendy Goldmann | Contends women were relegated to subordinate roles in Industry, Agriculture and Government service. Stalinist 1930s saw a return to a male dominated society. The Communist Party was led by men and expected women to play a subordinate role. |
| Sheila Fitzpatrick | States the cultural life of the Stalinist 1930s was one of conformity and of people trying to make life bearable for themselves and their families. The stability of the family was one that the ordinary people generally agreed with. |
| Beryl Williams | Argues men built socialism. The high-status Proletarian worker was male, a metal worker or a Blacksmith. |

Question 64

How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the strengths of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War?

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to the interpretations given</i> |
|--|---|
| The necessary 'scorched earth' policy which our army pursued as it was retreating, destroyed collective farms and industrial machinery in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia and the Leningrad region, because there was no other way out. | Suggests the importance of the destruction of economic assets by Red Army in 1941-42 as vital to the war effort but forced upon them by implication of great regret. |
| The Russian people did not take this path because it trusted its government and therefore were ready to make the needed sacrifices to ensure the defeat of Germany. | Suggests the Russian people trusted its government which suggests the loyalty of the Russian people in supporting the Soviet government to win the war even in adversity. |
| . . . the heroic bravery of the Red Army proved to be the decisive force. . . | Suggests the Red Army's courage to fight the invader as a united fighting force was paramount to their success. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- retreating Soviet forces destroyed dams, railways, burnt crops and evacuated livestock to deny them to the invaders
- Russian patriotism to defeat the German invaders significant factor in victory
- Red Army's bravery in battle suffered massive casualties to defeat the German Army and Axis allies
- Russian people were viewed as the core of the strength of the Soviet Union. Ethnic Russians judged to be most loyal. Some others were seen as disloyal Chechens and Tartars.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to the interpretations given</i> |
|---|---|
| The result of growing sophistication and stability among the Soviet High Command was more effective control and tactical performance from 1943 onwards, where Soviet Commanders had learned from hard experience. . . | Argues that Red Army leaders were growing in skill to defeat Germans. |
| Soviet industry was fully geared to producing enough modern war materials. . . | Argues that industry was able to produce enough modern and effective weapons to defeat Germans. |
| Soviet society was responding to official appeals to Russian patriotism. . . | Argues that Russian patriotism was emphasised in propaganda during the war, rather than Communist ideology. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- experience of Commanders such as Zhukov, Koniev, Vatutin and Rokossovsky
- Soviet industries were able to produce necessary weapons after disruption of 1941-42 to out-produce Germany by 1943 onwards
- much Russian industry moved Eastward beyond the Urals for safety
- official propaganda emphasised Russian patriotism – Heroes from Tsarist-era praised, such as Alexander Nevsky and Kutuzov
- less emphasis placed on worldwide revolution to appease Western Allies – no longer portrayed as ‘Capitalist exploiters’ but as ‘comrades fighting against a common enemy’.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- Soviet Union had huge support of Lend-Lease from USA and Britain. Red Army motorised by US Jeeps and Studebaker 2.5 tonnes lorries by 1943. Great Britain supplies Rolls Royce Merlin Engines to power Red Air Force planes
- Red Army was supplied with effective weapons such as PPSH-41 sub-machine gun. Easy to use and effective in all weathers. Over 3 million made
- Soviet Command Economy was able to maintain production of food and supplies to the Armed Forces and Home Front. No repetition of 1917 shortages which brought about political upheavals
- Stalin by 1943 was listening to Commanders he trusted to be competent and allowed them freedom to plan and execute successful operations such as Bagration and Uranus
- strict discipline in Red Army – Penal Battalions, Blocking detachments from NKVD. Order 220 – ‘*Not One Step Backwards*’ encouraged fighting spirit of Red Army soldiers
- Russian heartland of the Soviet Union remained mostly loyal to Soviet Government. Ukrainians Baltic States and some caucasian peoples were tempted to collaborate with Germans invaders who were perceived by some as liberators from Communism
- German mistake to ignore the vast size and military/economic potential of the Soviet Union. Largest state in the world with huge reserves of manpower and economic assets – oil, gold, timber, aluminium, bauxite, zinc, etc
- women used in both industry and the military. Soviet women served in the military at all levels. 3 million women in the Red Army and in partisan movement as well. Women made up over 50% of the industrial workforce and 60% of the collective farms. 23 women were awarded the *Hero of the Soviet Union* medal
- Orthodox Church was enlisted to promote patriotism, churches reopened, and the Patriarch elected in 1943. Church enthusiastically promoted loyalty to the State and Victory
- Red Army became more traditional – officers’ epaulettes – Pogoni – restored in late 1942, Uniforms reverted to traditional Russian in style and medals named in honour of Tsarist generals and Orthodox saints – Nevsky Medal
- Battles of Stalingrad, Kursk and the siege of Leningrad had no parallel in the Western Allies’ war. Soviet military casualties estimated at between 12-18 million. Soviet Union was prepared to accept massive casualties – for every 1 British soldier killed 90 were killed in the Red Army. Total war dead for Soviet Union estimated at 27 million
- Soviet workforce received extra rations at factory canteens, 12 to 14-hour shifts were the norm. Absence from workplace was a criminal offence. Labour discipline was the toughest of the Allies.
- Soviet Army developed sophisticated techniques of camouflage – ‘maskirovka’ – and disinformation that gave them advantage over German Army
- Soviet Union had received information from spies in both Western Allies and inside German Military. *Operation Citadel* plans were leaked to Soviet Union from German spy Harold Suchtze-Boyse. British Soviet spies – Kim Philby-*et al* – passed information to Soviet intelligence services during the war years.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|---|
| Max Hastings | Argues Soviet Union able to accept massive casualties that Western Allies would have found unacceptable. Due to Stalinist system no choice but to fight on. |
| Richard Overy | Believes the reform of Red Army and Red Air Force in 1942-1943 was the crucial factor for victory in 1945 for Soviet Union. |
| Henri Levesque | Contends collective farms system was inefficient but did produce enough for the State to meet the needs of the Red Army and the Soviet people. |
| Reina Pennington | Argues Soviet Women were never seen as equal to the men who fought and worked for victory. |

Section 9 – Spain: The Civil War – causes, conflict and consequences, 1923-1945

Part A – Historical issues

Question 65 **How far can it be argued that the failings of its agricultural system was the main problem facing Spain in the 1920s?**

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to examine the extent to which the agricultural system was the main problem facing Spain in the 1920s. In doing so, candidates may look at the regional differences in the agrarian sector, land ownership, the subsistence existence of many in rural areas and also the barriers to agrarian reform. Candidates may also consider other problems in Spain at the time, including the Army, regional differences, the church, the monarchy and political differences before coming to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which suggests that the failings of the agricultural system was the main problem facing Spain in the 1920s

- Spain was still a largely agrarian country during this period, with a poorly developed industrial economy in most places
- problems of *Latifundias* although aristocracy only owned (best) 6% of land. The influence that these people had in deciding both the agrarian policy of the country and influencing much else
- the use of casual labour helped to keep living standards depressed in rural areas
- the lack of an industrial revolution experienced by other European countries meant that there was not the mass migration from rural to urban areas in Spain on the same scale as elsewhere
- half of Spain went to bed hungry
- peasants faced seasonal unemployment, low prices and depressed wages
- subsistence farming also a major problem throughout Spain
- reputation of landless labourers of Andalucia as the ‘most wretched class in Europe’
- lots of land not used productively. Use of prime agricultural land for rearing bulls for bull fighting or for seasonal recreational use instead of being used for farming
- failure to invest in farming meant that the land was of poor quality and techniques were out-dated, especially when compared to other European countries
- divide between industrial and agrarian sectors but also between types of land ownership in North and South.

Evidence which suggests that other problems deserve consideration as the most important

The Army

- the imperial role of the Army and its connection to the monarchy and the right
- the resentment against losses in Morocco after the Battle of Annual as well as the loss of the Spanish Empire
- the increasing politicisation of elements of the Army
- the Army considered themselves a ‘state within a state’ and were hostile to civilian interference in military matters
- divisions within the Army between *Africanistas* and *Peninsulares* over issues such as promotion and pay.

The regional question

- there were regional movements in a number of areas, with Basque, Catalan and Galician regional parties increasingly popular in their areas
- significant regional movements in Catalonia and the Basque lands, both of which were of major economic importance to Spain
- centralists, including many in the Army and supporters of the Monarchy feared regional autonomy.

The Church

- Spain was a traditional Catholic country, with the Church having a privileged position in society
- the Church controlled education gave them a degree of control over Spanish minds
- the Church was associated with the ancien regime and to many it was the antithesis of a modern, democratic, liberal, Spain
- the Jesuits were incredibly influential in the Spanish economy, believed to own up to a third of Spain's wealth. They were involved in mining, infrastructure, exports, banking and shipping
- anti-clericalism growing in pockets all across Spain. The *Semana Tragica* witnessed the destruction of dozens of churches in Catalonia.

The monarchy

- increasingly alienated from his people, Alfonso was also losing support among his traditional allies
- growing Republican movement which cut across class divides
- support for the Dictadura further eroded support and led to division
- decision to replace one military dictator with another in 1930 lost Alfonso key political allies who flocked to the growing republican movement.

Political differences

- strong socialist and anarchist movements in some areas, for example areas with large working class populations
- the 'Turno Pacifico' and its ending with the establishment of the Dictadura
- growing Republican movement alongside traditionalist Monarchists
- growth in membership of both the UGT and the CNT trade unions.

The Dictadura

- dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera heightened political and regional tensions further
- the suspension of the *Cortes* and the setting up of the *Union Patriotica*
- also, the banning of the Catalan and Basque languages and the purging of 'separatist' teachers
- the CNT were banned in 1921 and remained an illegal organisation until 1931
- although initially successful, Primo's public work programmes did long term damage to the economy and the peseta.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Paul Preston | Argues 'Repression had intensified the hatred of the braceros for the big land owners and their estate managers.' |
| Antony Beevor | Contends 'The Church was detested by the workers and labourers for preaching acceptance of poverty while amassing vast riches.' |
| Hugh Thomas | States '90 percent of those who were educated in religious schools did not confess or attend mass . . .' 'Though (Catholic schools) favoured the status quo and the better off (they) were charitable and educational.' 'Nearly 20 Spanish provinces had an illiteracy rate of 50 per cent or over.' |
| George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert | Contend that 'By resorting to a dictatorship, Alfonso XIII revived republicanism, turning former staunch monarchists into republicans.' |

Question 66

To what extent was the disunity of the Right the main reason for the victory of the Popular Front in the 1936 election?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is for candidates to examine the reasons why the Popular Front was successful in the 1936 elections. Candidates are required to decide whether it was the disunity of the Right which was the main factor. Other factors could include the creation of the Popular Front, the growth of CEDA and the Falange which worried many about a descent into fascism, the reactionary, anti-reform nature of the Bienio Negro and the brutality of the regime during this period, and the programme that the Left stood under. Candidates can then come to a reasoned conclusion as why the Popular Front won the election of 1936.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence to show that the victory of the Popular Front was due to the disunity of the Right

- the loss by the Left in the previous election had been due to their disunity. The Right had been unified and now the situation was reversed
- the Spanish electoral system favoured united groups, the popular vote was actually quite close (under 1% between the Popular Front vote and that of the Right wing block as a whole). The disunity of the Right combined with the creation of a unified Popular Front meant that under electoral rules, this was translated into a lead of over 260 seats to under 150 for the parties of the Left
- CEDA was intended as a unifying force on the Right, but the rhetoric of Gil-Robles turned many away. Gil-Robles and CEDA campaigned under the slogan, 'All power to the Leader' and this type of pseudo fascism scared moderate right of centre politicians and voters
- Lerroux had been key to the majorities of both the Bienio Reformista and the Bienio Negro governments. This time his party was suffering from corruption scandals and he was not even elected as a Deputy in 1936. Radical Republican Party supporters were generally anticlerical and would rather switch their votes to other Republican parties (within the Popular Front) than to those on the (Catholic) Right, such as CEDA
- the *Falange Espanola* supported the National Front but was not a part of it. The *Falange's* leader, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, had his own perspective on what path Spain should take. This further alienated right-wing voters
- National Front manifesto, written in 1935, talked about an 'old, time honoured state with roots in the history of Spain.' Such strong links to the past may have alienated centrist voters who voted for the right in 1933.

Evidence to show that the victory of the Left was not due to the disunity of the right

Actions of the previous government

- many voters were also disappointed with the actions taken by the Government during the previous two years. There had been a reversal of many the reforms of 1931 to 1933 with a dilution of workers' rights, restoration of power to the church and attacks on Trade Unions
- there had been an attack on the limited reforms in agriculture, meaning a setback for the peasants. In fact, many peasants who moved onto expropriated lands faced brutal repercussions including dismissal and eviction
- parties of the left experienced unprecedented repression during the two years of reaction with political newspapers closed down and political opponents monitored
- the Regional reforms, including the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia had been repealed. This led to many in those areas voting for the Popular Front even if they were more socially conservative on other issues. Luis Companys, upon his release from jail, pleaded for Catalan Nationalists to join the Popular Front
- the Government's use of martial law to quell strikes. The socialist FNTT trade union was targeted with members arrested and their newspaper closed down
- during the Asturias rising, Moorish troops under the command of Franco treated mining villages as enemy territory. Looting, rape and summary executions were commonplace

- the events following the Asturias rising had seen a brutal repression by the army under Franco and a foreshadowing of what awaited Spain if it abandoned democracy. The Right offered no alternative to the political violence which had increased since then
- with its authoritarianism, the aggressive rhetoric of Gil-Robles, the fascist nature of the CEDA's youth wing and the extent to which the reforms passed between 1931 and 33 had been reversed, it is easy to see why the Left were concerned. This concern contributed to the unity of the Popular Front.

Reasons to vote for the left

- the Left promised reform which was needed to land ownership, wealth distribution and social equality. Many people wanted a period of peace and stability with economic growth and greater equality, the Left seemed best placed to deliver this. Mild reforms which would have increased death duty on the rich, proposed under the previous government had been defeated by the elite wing of CEDA. Even Gil-Robles admitted that this was 'suicidal egoism'
- the Popular Front called for the immediate release of all political prisoners who had been arrested after the failed uprisings in 1934. This ensured modest support from the anarchist CNT. Although the CNT did not join the PF, many of its members supported it and voted for it in the election
- the Popular Front also campaigned to re-hire state employees who had been dismissed during the political repression of the previous government
- the Popular Front was made up of many parties of the Left, including the PSOE, the Republican Left, the Communists, the POUM and regional parties. This gave it a broad appeal and also lessened the fears of some of the centre-right who believed that a Popular Front Government would not be over dominated by the extreme Left
- the Popular Front's manifesto included a left of centre economic policy. It supported protectionist measures to defend industry, protection of small businesses, a major expansion of public works and progressive tax reforms
- the Popular Front campaigned to re-instate Catalan autonomy gaining the support of Catalan parties
- the Communists joined the Popular Front after a policy decision in the Soviet Union where Stalin had encouraged western Communists to join anti-fascist fronts
- although the Anarchists did not join the Popular Front, very many of them voted for it.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---|--|
| Paul Preston | Argues that Robles' speeches were often filled with 'anti-democratic and anti-Semitic innuendo', the oppressive, anti-reformist nature of his government partnership with Alejandro Lerroux's Radicals, and the frank admiration offered to foreign fascist regimes helped lead to the Right's defeat in the 1936 elections. |
| Raymond Carr | Contends that 'The Popular Front pact put the left Republicans in government on a programme of democratic reforms.' |
| William Phillips And Carla Rahn Phillips | Believe that 'Given the constitutional structure of the Republic, a small shift in the popular vote could mean a substantial change in the composition of the Cortes.' |
| Harry Browne | Argues that 'The electoral advantage given to the Left by the Popular Front was not matched on the Right. Gil-Robles was unwilling on a national basis, to ally himself to the conspiratorial Right.' |

Question 67

To what extent were the resources of Spain evenly divided between the Republicans and the Nationalists at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is for candidates to examine the position of the forces of both sides at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Candidates may include reference to the division of the army, navy and air force, the geographical split of forces and the equipment each side had. Candidates may also examine the division of other resources available to each side, including economic assets. Candidates can then come to a reasoned conclusion about the validity of the statement.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence of the division of resources on different areas

Army

- the Nationalists had the Army of Africa, considered both the most experienced and the fiercest troops in the Spanish army. It consisted of two parts, the foreign legion (Tercio de Extranjeros) and the Regulares, including the local Moroccan troops. They were used to combat, harsh conditions and to dealing ruthlessly with enemies
- in terms of size, the Army of Africa consisted of around 35,000 – 40,000 men and the Nationalists secured around 60,000 men and officers on the mainland
- the Nationalists had most of the senior officers and their Generals had the advantage of having planned the coup months in advance. They also had around 30,000 other armed police from the Carabineros, the Assault Guard and the Civil Guard. This gave them a total of around 130,000
- the Republic had around the same number of men from the Peninsular Army, though fewer officers. They also had slightly more from the armed police units. This meant they had around 90,000 men.

Navy and Air Force

- although the Spanish Air Force was small, virtually all of it remained loyal to the Republican Government
- however, the Air Force lost all planes stationed in aerodromes under rebel control
- the navy was central to the Nationalist uprising and the vast majority of officers rebelled, however the junior ranks were well organised and over-powered the officers on most ships, leaving almost all of the navy in Republican hands. Most of the merchant marine was also at the disposal of the Government
- the Republic had almost double the amount of ships than the Nationalists as well as 13 submarines. The Republic also had approximately double the amount of sailors than the Nationalists
- the loyalty of both the navy and the air force meant that the Army of Africa was effectively stranded in Morocco with no way of getting over the Straits of Gibraltar.

Militias

- both sides had militias, with Falangists and Carlists on the Nationalist side and trade unionists, Nationalists and Left parties on the Republican side.

Economic

- the Republicans had most of the large cities with their industrial areas and workforce
- they held the mining areas and also had control of the largest export of Spain, the fruit crop via Valencia. They also held the country's gold reserves. About two-thirds of the Spanish mainland remained in Republican hands
- the Nationalists had most of the best agricultural land. They also held Spanish Morocco and the help of the Riffian tribes.

Strategic Positions

- nationalists gained control of Seville in the south, making it easier for the Army of Africa to land on the mainland
- the Military Uprising was also successful in the west, along the Portuguese border. This would later allow resources to flood into Nationalist areas from Portugal
- nationalists gain control of approximately one-third of Spanish mainland territory.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|---|
| Antony Beevor | Argues 'For a long war it looked as if the Republic had the advantage.' |
| Paul Preston | Contends 'Franco's army (of Africa) was paralysed by the problems of transport across the Strait of Gibraltar . . . controlled by Republican warships.' |
| Raymond Carr | Believes 'The strength of the Nationalist army was to lie in the fact that it captured the allegiance of most of the junior officers – a cadre which the Republic could not improvise.' |
| Julian Casanova | States 'Above all, from the very beginning they had the Army of Africa . . . its best known and best trained troops were the Tercio de Extranjeros, the Foreign Legion.' |

Question 68

‘The supreme farce of our time.’

How valid is this view of the effectiveness of the Non-Intervention Committee?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is for candidates to assess the extent of the validity of the quote that the Non-Intervention Committee was a farce or not. Candidates can look at evidence that the Non-Intervention Committee was a failure and that it succeeded in keeping other countries from joining the war. Candidates can then come to a reasoned conclusion about the Non-Intervention Committee.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence to support the view that the Non-Intervention Committee was so ineffective that it could be considered the supreme farce of our time

- NIC set up in Whitehall under Lord Plymouth's leadership in the Locarno Suite did not go unnoticed at the time
- the aim of the NIC was to prevent 'official' intervention, this constituted a significant loophole as German and Italian Aid arrived in Spain through intermediaries. Lord Halifax believed this was a success as unofficial aid could be denied by the relevant responsible spokesperson and, therefore, no official government response would be required
- Britain and France's role at the Nyon Conference, the failure of the monitoring system meant that the Nationalists continued to receive the aid they needed whilst the Republican forces did not. The Nyon Conference was viewed as an 'appeasers paradise' as despite unequivocal evidence showing Italian involvement in the attack of merchant ships in the Mediterranean, the Conference refused to openly condemn, or even accuse Italy of breaching the terms of the NIC
- amongst British Conservatives, anti-communist feeling was rife. Unwilling to come in on the side of the 'Reds'. Many by reasons of 'class and education' were sympathetic to Franco. Therefore the Non-Intervention Committee can be seen as a convenient way for them to give tacit support to Franco while outwardly appearing neutral
- argument that Britain allowed class prejudice to prevail over national interests
- non-intervention was suggested by France after pressure from Britain and was mainly designed to provide a way to keep France out of the war
- Leon Blum knew that continuing to offer the Republic help would be heavily criticised by opposition parties in France, the right wing press and even by members of his own Popular Front Government. So, the motives behind French non-intervention were dishonest
- from the outset, Germany and Italy ignored the Non-Intervention Committee and never had any intention of stopping the supply of arms, men and equipment to the Nationalists
- even after the Battle of Guadalajara, where the Republican Government gained proof that Italian troops were not volunteers, the NIC refused to condemn Italy
- as well as the Axis powers, the Soviet Union also breached the terms of the NIC by sending arms to the Republican camp
- the British attitude to Spain in championing the Non-Intervention Committee was completely in keeping with general policy of Appeasement. Chamberlain continually believed Hitler's promises and therefore believed he could 'contain' conflict. This was shown to be as incorrect in Spain as it was elsewhere
- by suggesting that Britain would not help France in the result of a wider European war if Blum continued to arm the Republican camp, the British Government were effectively blackmailing the French into non-intervention
- many Spanish republicans believed that Great Britain would act as champion of the underdog, but they underestimated the deep prejudice of certain governing circles
- the breaches of the non-intervention rules were so blatant, with Italy alone sending 70 000 troops, that no one could have believed it to be working or indeed intended to work
- the NIC lacked the means to enforce its policies
- the role of Barclays and National Westminster Bank in the financing of both sides
- in May 1937, President Azaña stated that the Republic's greatest enemy was the British Government because they were allowing Germany and Italy to intervene freely in the Civil War.

Evidence to oppose the view that the Non-Intervention Committee was so ineffective that it could be considered the supreme farce of our time

- the British public more sympathetic towards Spain than other areas of appeasement policy, but still not willing to risk war as can be seen by hugely positive reaction to Munich. Therefore, there was little else Britain could have done
- genuine belief that intervention could have led to the outbreak of a wider European war
- desire of the British Government to keep Mussolini and Hitler apart. Intervention on the side of the Republic could solidify relations between Rome and Berlin
- Sir Henry Chilton, British ambassador to Spain in 1936 was vehemently anti-Bolshevik who sent reports back of Red atrocities. Naval Officers in Gibraltar were also pro-Nationalist. The Government's view was therefore coloured by the views of people such as this and tried to steer a path between the two sides
- Samuel Hoare talked of the dangers in doing anything to bolster up communism in Spain as it could then spread into Portugal which would gravely affect British interests
- even outspoken anti-appeaser, Winston Churchill wrote, in August 1936 that 'It is of the utmost importance that France and Britain should act together in observing the strictest neutrality'
- there were many British business interests in Spain. In addition, this was a sensitive area for UK due to Straits of Gibraltar. The British Government were therefore frightened of backing the 'loser' as this could seriously affect business and strategic interests
- fear of the devastating effect of modern technology, enhanced by Guernica: 'The bomber will always get through'
- lack of military preparedness as illustrated by fears of Chiefs of Staff
- later in the war there was a need to 'buy time' to rearm
- the British were constrained by their considerable commercial interests in Spain, including mines, sherry, textiles, olive oil and cork
- Habana brought refugees from Spain under the British charitable effort
- belief that the British Government was simply pragmatic by waiting to see what way the Civil War played out. To intervene on the losing side would have been catastrophic to British commercial/strategic interests
- from a purely diplomatic standpoint, Britain wanted to maintain Spain's territorial integrity and secure the benevolent neutrality of whichever side emerged victorious
- fears over a civil war breaking out in France were justified. Street fighting, constant attacks from the right-wing media and a restless officer corps all put Blum in a difficult position.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------|--|
| Michael Alpert | States 'Britain was an insular society for whom abroad was very far away. (At the Labour Conference) the block vote system ensured that the motion against non-intervention was defeated by 3,029,000 to 51,000 votes. Non-intervention was based on the wider aims of GB and France that is, an alliance with Italy and appeasement of Hitler.' |
| Enrique Moradiellos | Argues 'UK wished Franco to win and did not wish to upset the Axis powers.' |
| Filipe Ribero De Meneses | Believes 'It was cynical detachment.' |
| Paul Preston | Contents 'Both sides denied aid though the Republic had a legal right. A quiet glee that they may turn Hitler and Mussolini against the European Left. Inclined by their considerable commercial interests to be . . . anything but sympathetic to the Republic.' |

Question 69

‘Franco’s military leadership was the single most important reason for the Nationalists’ victory.’

To what extent is this an accurate assessment of the reasons for the outcome of the Civil War?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to consider the extent to which the victory of the Nationalists and the defeat of the Republican can be attributed to Franco’s military leadership. This may be discussed along with other factors such as German and Italian military, the lack of support for the Republic, the Non-intervention pact and disunity among the left. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence supporting the view that Franco’s military leadership was the most important reason for the Nationalists’ victory**

- Franco's leadership, although criticised has also been interpreted as cleverly controlled to ensure total political control and ensure a sustainable victory. Franco also merits acclaim for personal involvement in securing aid without conceding much
- as a young General, Franco was known for his bravery and panache. In the Civil War he was more controlled and methodical, reflecting the graveness of the task in hand
- Franco’s command of the army was reflected in the performance of his Generals. Most of the experienced Generals in the Spanish army joined the rebellion, especially those who had spent the most time in the conflict in Spanish Morocco with Franco. This often showed on the battlefield when the Republican side could not always organise their supply lines to match their advances
- Franco had at his disposal the Army of Africa, who were fiercely loyal to him. Consisting of experienced Spanish troops, Moroccan mercenaries and the Legionnaires, they were by far the best fighting – and most feared – soldiers in the Spanish army. In the war in the South, in the first few months, the Army of Africa under Franco, swept across vast areas of land, deliberately terrorising the defeated areas in order that Republican defenders further ahead were demoralised
- Franco understood the role of propaganda and symbolism. His decision to relieve the nationalists in Toledo instead of marching on Madrid helped to solidify the Nationalist side
- Franco was the only person that Hitler and Mussolini were prepared to deal with. Franco was seen as the one credible person among the Nationalist command and so all aid was given through him, this ability to source military assets and supplies was crucial to the Nationalist victory
- Franco’s early victories were invaluable to Nationalist morale
- Francoist repression was also important. Franco established military control in occupied zones and unleashed a tyranny that devastated Republican morale and caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee their homes and pour into the cities where resources were scarce
- however, Franco’s slow progress angered both Hitler and, especially, Mussolini who desired a quick victory.

Evidence supporting the view that other factors may have been more important**Franco’s Political Skills**

- Franco was able to achieve a degree of unity amongst the Nationalist factions that the Republicans could not match. The formation of the FET y de las JONS combined the two mass organisations on the Nationalist side, the Carlists and the Falange. Nationalist unity was pivotal to their success
- Franco used the Catholic Church to help unify the differing factions.

Divisions within the left

- Popular Front politicians had little in common. Similarly, many of the Republican combatants hated each other as much as the rebels. This exploded in May '37 and after this the Republic was close to a one party state. As the Communists gained more control, they tried to systematically 'purify' the Republican side of non-communist elements
- the sectarian nature of Soviet Aid further heightened divisions within the Left as aid was only given to the Republican Army and not the militias
- the activities of the SIM (the secret service of Spanish armed forces) echoed Stalin's show trials and crippled the Republic's ability to fight effectively after 1937
- last remaining resistance in Madrid collapses as a result of the military coup launched by General Seigsmundo Casado in March 1939. Casado attempted to end the influence of the PCE over the Government and seek peace talks with Franco. After Franco made it clear he would accept on unconditional surrender, Casado flees Madrid leaving it defenceless.

Resources

- although the Republic had key industrial areas, the Nationalists had more raw materials which proved to be increasingly important as the war went on. As they took more land their advantage increased. The fall of the Basque lands to the Nationalists in 1937 was particularly important
- the Republic's resources were stretched to breaking point by late 1938. The influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees into cities placed impossible pressure on the Republic to feed its people.

Non-intervention

- non intervention was a crucial element in determining the outcome of the war. In particular, Britain's role was central in effectively condemning the Republic to a slow death. Britain was aware that non-intervention was at best ineffective and at worst directly aided the Nationalists
- in May 1937, President Azaña stated that the Republic's greatest enemy was the British Government because they were allowing Germany and Italy to intervene freely in the Civil War
- non-intervention forced the Republic into seeking Soviet aid. This aid, whilst ensuring their survival, proved costly in the long term because it heightened internal divisions within the Republican camp.

Axis aid

- German and Italian planes allowed the Army of Africa to get over the Straits of Gibraltar and onto the Spanish mainland. Without this aid, the military uprising would have, in all probability, have been defeated given the importance of the Army of Africa
- Franco was able to equip his army largely on credit so that his troops could get up to date and plentiful armaments. This was in sharp contrast to the Republican side which had difficulty getting supplies and had to pay for them. The Nationalists were well funded by rich supporters, including the ex-Royal family
- as well as the Axis powers military assistance, The Texas Oil Company also supplied the Nationalists due to the political leanings of the company's owner
- Franco enjoyed a tactical advantage because of the geographical position of Portugal, where Nationalist aircraft could refuel. The British stationed in Gibraltar also gave assistance to the Nationalists while denying this to the Republicans
- the Condor Legion eventually gave Franco total air superiority. This was displayed at Guernica and most of the successful battles for the Nationalists
- the Germans provided an air force, artillery, technicians and ammunition among other support. Although there is some evidence that the Germans were happy to prolong the war, they were prepared to put enough support into Spain to ensure Franco's eventual success. They used Spain as a testing ground for their new air force and weaponry, meaning that the Nationalists had access to the most up to date equipment
- by February 1937 there were 50,000 Italian troops serving in the Nationalist army. The Italians also provided aircraft and tanks, among other supplies. The Italian navy also helped in the Mediterranean
- neither Hitler nor Mussolini attached political influence to the aid given to Franco. This was in sharp contrast to Soviet aid which fuelled internal division within the Republican camp
- Axis ships and submarines prevented the Republic from receiving the aid they desperately needed.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Hugh Thomas | Argues that 'Franco's achievements in the Civil war were considerable. As supreme commander of the Nationalist forces his duties were political and strategic.' |
| Paul Preston | Argues 'Western democracies betrayed Spain' 'By 1937, Italy was effectively at war with the Spanish Republic.' |
| Raymond Carr | Contends 'Axis fears of rebel defeat led to extra aid in November 1938. Republican government blamed lack of unity'. |
| Antony Beevor | States '(The Republican offensive on the Ebro) was beyond military stupidity, it was the mad delusion of propaganda.' 'German and Italian regimes were at least reassured that France, as well as Great Britain, would do nothing to hinder their intervention in Spain'. |

Section 9 – Spain: The Civil War – causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

Part B – Historical sources

Question 70 How fully does Source A explain the extent to which the failure of the reforms of the Azaña government paved the way for the election of right-wing parties in 1933?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the interpretations given |
|--|--|
| . . . the Agrarian Reform Institute had as yet only installed 4600 families. | Argues that the agrarian reforms failed to bring about widespread change in the countryside. |
| An expropriation committee was still working its way slowly through the problems caused by the dissolution of the Jesuits. . . | Argues that of dissolution failed to make sufficient progress with altering the status of the Church because there was a lack of secular education ready to take over from Catholic schools. |
| . . . Azaña had frightened the middle class. | Argues that reforms were considered too radical for the middle class. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the failure of the agrarian reforms led to a loss of support from socialist and anarchist agricultural trade unionists. There was widespread disillusion that much needed reform had not happened
- the anti-clerical nature of the Azaña Government worried many and provided a rallying call in the 1933 election as people rallied round the Church. This greatly aided the growth of CEDA
- the scare stories about the actions of the Government were often exaggerated greatly, but many former middle-class republicans switched to centre right parties
- the Socialists felt betrayed by the timidity of the Azaña reforms and would not enter into an electoral pact, with disastrous consequences.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- there were allegations of electoral fraud, especially in the South where braceros put their ballot papers into glass receptacles, under the watch of paid henchmen
- the Socialists (PSOE) had decided not to ally themselves to the Republicans. The unity brought about by the pact of San Sebastian was dead and buried
- the previous coalition had snubbed the Radicals and they moved to side with the Right. The position of Lerroux in this was crucial. He felt snubbed personally and moved his Radical Republican Party to supporting the Right coalition, mainly in the hope of attaining a high position or indeed forming a Government. This was an important part of the electoral arithmetic
- both sides won approximately the same number of votes, with even a small majority of votes for the Left, but disunity meant the Left got 99 seats while the Right received 212 seats as an effect of the new electoral system brought in by the new Republic where the winning party in each electoral district took 6/7ths of the seats available
- the Right were far better organised, the Union de Derecha y Agrarios brought all parties together in an electoral pact
- the unemployment rate in Spain was 12%, nearer 20% in the South. Although this was replicated throughout the Western world due to the depression, much of the anger of the people was directed against the incumbent Government
- the rise of CEDA, largely as a result of a resistance to the measures taken against the Church. The perception of persecution of the Church meant that there was another rallying point for traditionalists and the CEDA gave a political outlet for this, bringing some peasantry to the Right coalition who may not otherwise have voted for them.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|---|
| Paul Preston | Argues 'The Left had committed a fatal tactical error.' 'The margin of victory in some places in the south was sufficiently narrow for electoral fraud to have made a difference.' |
| Antony Beevor | Contends 'The Left was divided when it went into the elections.' |
| Raymond Carr | States 'The Azaña coalition of Socialists and Left republicans was in disintegration and disarray.' 'The elections came at the worst possible time: a sharp fall in agricultural prices and the worst year of the slump.' |
| Harry Browne | Argues 'The Socialists' decision to withdraw from an electoral pact . . . helped to produce a Centre-Right Cortes.' |

Question 71

Evaluate the usefulness of Source B as evidence of the political challenges facing the Republican Government at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source B | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Author | The Republican Government By loudspeaker in Madrid. | An official announcement by the threatened Government, reflecting determination to spread message as immediately as possible because the situation was precarious. |
| Purpose | To deter any revolutionary acts/To make people believe the crises are over. | In many parts of Republican Spain at that time the workers were seizing control. The coup having failed was not yet defeated. |
| Timing | Just over a week after the rising. | This is a crucial period when the Government faced the army rebels and the workers revolution. An illustration of extreme actions on the streets and the Government still holding on. |

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| The Government is now on the point of finishing with the criminal subversion fostered by some sections of the military – those shameful elements who have betrayed their country! They will be overcome. | Sets the tone and determination of the Government as it addresses the treachery of parts of the army which was faced by them at the outbreak of the Civil War. |
| . . . fascist elements within the Left, in despair at their defeat, are trying to fake solidarity with our cause in order to join with others in an effort to discredit and dishonour the forces loyal to the Government and the people. | The Government is trying to equate revolutionary acts with the Fascists within the Left as rogue elements exploiting the uncertainty to discredit Government. Tone here might suggest propaganda. |
| They do this by presenting themselves as alleged revolutionaries who carry out such acts as looting and robbery in our name! | The determination here that even this early on, the Government is not prepared to countenance revolution. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- there was no effective Government in many parts of Spain, where workers', Militias had taken control
- this was a foreshadowing of later Show Trials of POUM and anarchists in particular, accused of being fascists
- the Government was clearly scared that it was losing control of its own areas and was prepared to use force against those workers who acted independently.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the command structure within the Republic meant that in the first few months many of the militia operated outside of the control of the Government
- 'the Right were united as to what they were fighting against, the Left were divided over what they were fighting for'
- there were numerous changes of leader for the Republicans, with political and military command separate at times
- many were convinced that there were only two possible outcomes, a socialist Spain or a fascist one
- the initial refusal to arm the workers not only cost the Republic valuable time, it showed the distrust the Government had for the workers
- the Popular Front was a very loose coalition with many elements having little in common
- the Communists did not want a revolution to scare Britain and France away from closer ties with the Soviet Union
- the Republican Government wanted their fight to be seen by others as democracy against fascism, not left-wing revolution against the Spanish army
- for many of the militias, the only point in fighting was to defend the revolution, not bourgeois democracy.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Paul Preston | Argues 'Communist efforts against the revolutionists had let their own control in the war effort slip. Their efforts led to a second civil war within the Civil War'. |
| Antony Beevor | Contends the CNT and UGT rapidly filled the vacuum caused by the collapse of law and order, creating revolutionary organisations in Republican territory. |
| George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert | State 'The revolutionaries were not defining crimes according to the laws of the Second Republic, which they proclaimed abolished.' |
| Raymond Carr | Believes the mass reaction which helped to defeat the Generals' rising weakened, if it did not destroy, the conventional structures of command in the Republican zone. |

Question 72

How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the motives of Spaniards who fought in the Civil War?

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| Many volunteers enlisted for the militias formed by their left-wing parties because they knew they would have to fight to protect the rights they had gained. . . | Argues that left-wing parties supporting the Republic had gained so far and set up militias to protect these gains. |
| They were met by anarchists who believed that this was the perfect time to launch their own revolution. | Argues that anarchists used the Civil War to achieve their own aims. |
| This was a major victory for the Government, for it ensured that all of Catalonia would remain loyal in fighting for the Republic in the hope that they would re-gain their autonomy. | Argues that Catalan loyalty was achieved because they hoped to re-gain self-rule. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Militias were formed on both the Right and the Left sides linked to political parties or trade unions
- CNT had launched continuous strikes against the Republic between 1931 and 1936
- Catalan autonomy had been rescinded in 1934 having been granted in 1931.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| . . . Carlist claim regarding the Communist threat that 'Navarre had saved Spain'. | Illustrates how many believed they were saving Spain from Communism. |
| . . . Carlism as a movement led from below, but it was a uniquely populist form of royalism. | Argues Carlists were royalists seeking a re-establishment of the Monarchy. |
| Their medieval crusading faith made them fearless. | Argues any who fought for the Nationalists believed they were taking part in a holy crusade. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Navarre region saw the most enthusiastic support for the Nationalists
- there were many royalists fighting for the Nationalists
- the Church was a unifying symbol for the Nationalists
- many believed that Spain would either be Communist or Fascist and were fighting to stop Communism.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- the Right were a diverse group, as were the reasons for their participation. All were welcome if they were willing to submit to discipline and fight the Republic
- they were often divided as to what they were fighting for, but united on what they were fighting against
- many people wished to defend the democratic gains they had made in the previous five years
- just under half of the army remained loyal, often dependant of the success/failure of the uprising
- the examples of Italy and Germany meant that many would fight against the rise of fascism in their country
- Falange believed in the possibility of the establishment of a fascist state
- there were many who openly wanted to copy Italy or Germany and deliberately spoke, acted and dressed in their image
- loss of election in 1936 had convinced the Right that violence was needed and ended split with 'Accidentalists'
- for some on the Left anti-clericalism was a strong motive
- other on the Left believed in the Comintern message of a Communist cooperation with the Republic
- many people, on both sides, were victims of geography and supported the side who were in control of the area they were living in
- with such atrocities on both sides no-one was neutral
- the election had been fought on the basis of civilisation versus barbarism. Many believed that Spain was on the brink of collapse
- apparent communist support for the government caused alarm and the army was given the message that a coup might be the answer
- for some on the Right this was a struggle against separatism
- many in the Basque country also saw the civil war as a chance for autonomy
- the Carlists – all wanted a traditional Spain without liberal democracy
- motives of the Spanish Church and of some Roman Catholics
- many in the army fought because of the unit or regiment they were in
- Liberal Intelligentsia inside Spain was forced to take a side.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Antony Beevor | Emphasises that the Carlists were famous for their ferocious rejection of modernity. |
| Hugh Thomas | Contents 'Between February and June 1936 (according to Robles) . . . 160 churches had been burned to the ground, 269 mainly political murders and 1,287 assaults . . . 69 political centres had been wrecked, there had been 113 general strikes and 228 partial strikes, while ten newspaper offices had been sacked. This unified the Right behind the 'Crusade'. |
| Stanley Payne | States that ' . . . a very large number of people wanted a new Spain-which would be worthy of Spain's great past . . . Murders for political reasons (in 1936) were reported almost daily.' |
| Paul Preston | States those who claimed to be rising in defence of law and order and of eternal Catholic values inaugurated a savage purge of leftists. |

Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

Part A – Historical issues

Question 73 'The Devil's Decade.'

To what extent was this bleak assessment of Britain's social and economic conditions still valid by 1939?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to consider the economic and social condition of Britain by 1939. The 1930s has a reputation for high unemployment, the Means Test, grinding poverty, hunger, poor health and early death. However, is this picture of Britain by 1939 overly pessimistic? For a significant number the 1930s was a period when many Britons could afford to purchase consumer goods such as a vacuum cleaner, an electric cooker and for a growing number, the ability to buy a car or even to afford their own home. Candidates would be expected to come to a reasoned conclusion over whether this was 'The Devil's Decade'.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence on the state of employment

Unemployment

- candidates may provide examples of national and/or local unemployment statistics
- heavy industry in the north of England, Wales and Scotland was adversely affected because of the global economic downturn of the 1930s. Industries such as coal, iron and steel, textiles and shipbuilding were affected due to fall in demand both at home and overseas. Moreover, the ancillary services for these industries were affected by their decline
- the effect of unemployment upon the pre-war economy. With high unemployment the Treasury was faced with the situation where tax revenue was reduced
- the social implications of large scale unemployment. High unemployment caused stagnation in social mobility, it allowed many to descend into poverty. Especially those workers who were on the breadline
- Government spending on welfare was reduced which reduced disposable income which in turn restricted demand which added to unemployment.

Political response to unemployment

- an example of any political pressure which highlighted the effects of unemployment the 1936 Jarrow March to London
- high unemployment gave rise to some political unrest. Riots and demonstrations by the unemployed were not uncommon in the industrialised heartland of Britain
- however, the UK avoided the social and political upheaval seen in other European countries. Extremist parties made little headway in the UK
- if the recession had been deeper, the political situation may have been very different.

However increased employment opportunities for many

- certain sectors of the British economy were thriving. Light engineering, plastics, chemicals and electrical engineering, motor vehicle and the aircraft industry
- within the depressed areas those individuals employed outwith the heavy industries fared well
- white collar employment increased, the banking sector including building societies grew providing employment and mortgages for many
- growth of national chain stores Woolworths and Boots the Chemist, which not only provided employment but also demonstrated that many people had more disposable income
- the National Government introduced the Special Areas Act to attract light industries to distressed areas
- local councils built 500,000 council houses, which pumped money into the economy
- from 1937 onwards increased armaments production created employment
- many workers were forced to move home to find employment unemployed workers from Wales moved to Oxford to work in the car industry

- in general British agriculture did well in the 1930s.

Evidence on the state of the economy and social conditions

Economic factors which stimulated the economy

- interest rates were low which encouraged borrowing and allowed some to purchase their own home
- Britain left the gold standard which reduced the cost of British exports and contributed to a fall in prices.

However many had to endure a poor standard of living

- the falling standard of living for many resulted in a poor diet for millions and subsequent decline in the population's health
- at this time the Britain's housing stock was mainly owned by private landlords, not council housing. Housing conditions were often poor, rents were high, and overcrowding was common. These poor conditions had an effect on the overall health of the population
- rents were frequently not met and harsh choices were made about the quantity and quality of food bought
- Government slum clearance plans to provide better housing for the working classes were shelved due to the depression
- unequal access to education. Although education was supposed to reflect a meritocratic philosophy, the reality was that intelligent children from the working class still found it difficult to access an academic education because there was still an element of payment needed
- the stifling effect of the class system in the 1930s.

However Rising levels of prosperity for many

- during the 1930s, for the majority of the employed, living standards rose significantly
- there was a growth in leisure activities which indicates higher disposable income for many
- the 1930s was a golden age for advertising and cinema. The popularity of professional sport especially football, and a thriving fashion industry aimed at the middle classes were all apparent during this time and many people had more money in their pocket to spend on luxuries rather than necessities
- other popular leisure activities such as cinema (pictures) and dance halls
- sales of ice-cream and confectionery increased during the 1930s
- by 1939 about 27% of the population owned their own house
- more than half of all households had a radio by 1939
- prices fell in the Depression, which meant more money for luxuries for those in employment
- hire-purchase allowed people to pay up expensive items over a lengthy period of time
- family sizes fell
- improvements at work such as reduction in working hours, holidays with pay
- seaside holidays for many
- three million houses were built in the 1930s
- there was a 1200% increase in homes with electricity
- huge increase in car ownership but it was still not the norm
- vacuum cleaners and washing machines became more widespread
- a better diet and improved health for many
- free school milk was introduced after 1934.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Martin Pugh | Argues that the Depression was a regional issue. Hardship was concentrated in central Scotland, the north of England and south Wales, where mature industries such as coal mining and ship building were in very serious decline. |
| John Stevenson | Points out that the interwar years were marked by substantial economic growth. |
| Charles L Mowat | Argues that Britain at this time was a divided nation. Mowat argued that a national class consciousness emerged in the thirties brought about through literature and the threat from fascism in Spain. |
| Robert Pearce | Argues new industries were increasing the demand for skilled labour in the period before 1939. |

Question 74

‘The battle to defend Britain in 1940 was won by the RAF.’

To what extent is this an accurate assessment of the events of 1940?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question revolves around the controversy over whether the importance of the RAF in the Battle of Britain in saving the country from defeat in 1940 has been overstated to the detriment of the Royal Navy. Candidates therefore would be expected to consider the part played by the RAF in retaining control over the skies before considering the part played by Britain’s naval forces. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion on which service was more vital for Britain’s survival in 1940.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the role of the RAF/Battle of Britain in preventing German invasion

- ‘The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin,’ Churchill June 1940
- ‘Never in the history of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few’. Churchill’s speech in the House of Commons on 20 August 1940
- Churchill’s Battle of Britain phrase was well used by the British Government in 1940 for propaganda purposes
- the Battle of Britain took place between July and September 1940
- the aerial warfare was between the Luftwaffe’s bombers and Messerschmitt Bf109s and Britain’s Hawker Hurricanes and Supermarine Spitfires
- important leadership of Hugh Dowding of RAF Fighter Command
- a review of the events of the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940 with an explanation of the reasons why the RAF was able to defeat the Luftwaffe
- the RAF had 644 fighters to the Luftwaffe’s 725 at the beginning of the battle. However, by October 1940 Britain was far out-producing the enemy
- evidence of the severity of the Luftwaffe’s attacks on the RAF and its bases and the loss of life which accrued because of this. Some assessment of the degree to which these attacks stretched Fighter Command to its utmost limits and how German losses compared. How close Germany came to achieving its stated goal of air superiority out of these heroic efforts
- importance of newly developed Radio Direction Finding, radar, which detected German aircraft before they reached their target
- traditional argument that it was a few hundred brave pilots who defeated the might of the Luftwaffe
- German aim of achieving control of the skies was denied, which thwarted any attempt at invasion
- an examination of the nature of Operation Sealion and the extent to which Hitler believed he had to win air superiority over the Channel in order to allow the invasion to take place
- Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering initially believed he would easily sweep the RAF aside in just a few days, but the dogfights dragged on for three and a half long months
- by the time the battle ended in late-October, Germany had lost more than 1,700 planes—nearly twice as many as the British.

Evidence which supports the actions of the Royal Navy to prevent Operation Sealion

- that a slow moving German invasion fleet of barges filled with soldiers would have been sitting ducks for the Navy and that the certainty of massive loss of human life from such attacks by the Royal Navy would have dissuaded the Germans from launching any invasion even if they had gained temporary air superiority
- the German barges would have had to cross the 21 mile wide Channel in possibly challenging conditions
- the disparity between the navies was huge with Britain having 70-80 destroyers in home waters. The German navy had a total of 8 destroyers
- the Navy also had five capital ships on hand (battleships, battle cruisers), whereas the German navy had none
- the Royal Navy outnumbered the German navy by ten to one

- the Kriegsmarine had lost ships during their invasion of Norway which meant that no German capital ships were available for an invasion of Britain in 1940
- the Kriegsmarine's Commander in Chief Admiral Raeder stated, 'the Norway losses weighed heavily upon us for the rest of the war'
- the German navy could now not prevent the evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk
- invasion was not necessarily inevitable in the summer of 1940, and many German commanders had serious misgivings – and a fear of the Royal Navy
- the belief amongst the Navy that fast-moving ships at sea were safe from German air attack
- no capital ship had been sunk by an aircraft up to that point
- recent research suggests that the German navy had completely rejected the notion of an invasion on all of these grounds if only because it would have been almost impossible to supply and reinforce any German troops from the first wave of landings who did make it ashore
- further evidence suggests that Churchill himself thought an invasion highly unlikely but talked up the prospect as a method of drawing the USA into the conflict, keeping the British public behind the war effort and the trade unions quiet during his period of political difficulty in late 1940
- after Dunkirk the Royal Navy transported Navy and Army demolition parties to Europe to destroy oil stocks, 2 million tons, which the Germans could have used in any invasion of Britain
- the Royal Navy attacked potential invasion harbours including Zeebrugge, Calais and Boulogne in 1940 putting them out of action for a time
- British warships blew invasion barges out of the water. Hitler ordered the dispersal of the barges to safer areas
- that the German threat of stretching a minefield across the channel to prevent the Navy assisting in repelling an invasion force was an empty one since the German fleet contained very few of these mine laying ships anyway
- Britain had 52 minesweepers and 16 minesweeping trawlers arrayed against four German minelayers.

Bomber Command and the threat of German invasion

- the Air Ministry claimed that Bomber Command destroyed many invasion barges
- but precision bombing was extremely difficult, and Churchill was unconvinced about the raids. He stated, 'what struck me was the apparent inability of the bombers to hit these very large masses of barges'.

Change in German priorities

- was Hitler more concerned to attack the Soviet Union in 1941 rather than continue with preparations for invasion?

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| Anthony Cumming | Today there is greater academic consensus that Fighter Command's position was not as disadvantageous relative to the Luftwaffe as once supposed. Cumming explains why after centuries of holding a special place in the affection of the British public, the Royal Navy lost out to the RAF as the main perceived bulwark against foreign domination. The 'bombs versus battleships' debate. |
| Gary Sheffield | Suggests that in an analysis of Bomber and Coastal Command's contributions, both played a significant part by attacking the German invasion preparations and airfields across the Channel. |
| Derek Robinson | Believes that an inadequate German fleet was relying on 1,000 flat-bottomed barges as landing craft on the notoriously unpredictable Channel; sitting ducks for the much more powerful Royal Navy, waiting in home waters. |
| Andrew Gordon | Contends that the Germans stayed away because while the Royal Navy existed they had no hope of capturing these islands. |

Question 75 'It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of Churchill's wartime leadership.'

How valid is this view of Churchill as a war leader?

Aim of the question The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to examine the importance of Churchill's leadership during the Second World War. This quote from Richard Lamb is clearly supportive of Churchill's wartime record but not all concur with this view, indeed many historians are extremely critical of his wartime leadership. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion concerning Churchill's wartime record.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the significance of Churchill's wartime leadership

Churchill's personality/leadership

- Churchill had been a consistent opponent of appeasement and had recognised the threat which Hitler posed to the peace of Europe, making him the only credible prime minister after Chamberlain was forced to resign
- he was a great orator with a charismatic personality. His inspiring speeches boosted the morale of the country
- he visited bombed areas and was visibly moved by the scale of destruction he witnessed. Churchill's empathy was well received by the British public
- he led Britain to victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, an outcome which seemed very unlikely when he became Prime Minister in May 1940
- Churchill provided strong and decisive leadership skills at a time of national crisis, leading Britain when she was fighting Nazi Germany alone (June 1940 to June 1941). He had a single-minded pursuit of victory at all costs and he embodied the British spirit of resistance in the face of formidable odds
- Churchill made it clear that he had no intention of negotiating with Hitler in May/June 1940 despite the advice of other senior politicians. This galvanised the whole country.

Churchill's military decisions

- Churchill had an experienced military background with a firm grasp of military matters and was therefore eminently suitable to the post of Minister of Defence in addition to his position of Prime Minister
- his determination to win the war/make extremely difficult decisions was demonstrated when he took the extremely difficult decision to attack the French navy at Oran/Mers El-Kebir, Algeria in July 1940 (Task force led by HMS Hood). This action was said to have impressed Roosevelt as it demonstrated Churchill's and Britain's determination to continue the fight against Nazi Germany.

Churchill's political decisions

- Churchill was a skilled diplomat who improved Britain's chances of success such as securing Lend Lease from the USA
- Churchill's ability to persuade Roosevelt that the defeat of Germany was the first priority of the Allies after Pearl Harbour
- Britain borrowed huge sums of money from the USA \$4.3 billion (£2.2 billion) were borrowed at two per cent interest rates – a triumph for Churchill who had exerted considerable diplomatic pressure in his efforts to win the loan from the Americans
- he made friendships and alliances with countries that were decidedly more powerful than Britain, USA (more natural) and the USSR (overcoming his anti-communism)
- the Grand Alliance – it was Churchill's skill as a negotiator and diplomat which bound together the vital alliance of Britain, USA and USSR and forged victory in the war
- Churchill was a powerful force in resolving the internal conflicts between the military and the politicians in the running of the war.

Churchill and the Home Front

- he established and led an effective coalition government for five years
- his War Cabinet included important Labour politicians most notably Clement Attlee and Ernie Bevin.

Evidence which is more critical of the significance of Churchill's wartime leadership

Churchill's personality/leadership

- Churchill had an excessive ego and believed in his own manifest destiny
- he was impulsive, so much so he had to be reined in by his closest advisors such as Sir Alan Brooke
- Churchill was often brusque. He had a poor relationship with De Gaulle, leader of the Free French
- he was so single-minded and stubborn it prevented him seeing the big picture of the war.

Churchill's military decisions

- Churchill's military strategy was often suspect for instance in Norway, Greece and Italy. Arguably Churchill's decision to defend Greece helped to delay victory in North Africa by two years
- Churchill's reluctance to open a Second Front infuriated Stalin who accused Britain of being cowardly
- that far from being a reckless adventurer, Churchill may even have been overly cautious in his approach to military matters to preserve lives and prevent significant disasters
- in Singapore 130,000 Allied troops became prisoners of war. This defeat at the hands of the Japanese was the largest surrender in British military history
- Churchill was ultimately responsible for the actions of Bomber Command which laid waste many of Germany's cities even when it was clear that the Allies were close to victory, the controversial bombing of Dresden in February 1945 which caused huge loss of civilian life
- argument that Churchill made a serious military mistake in advocating the bombing of Germany before giving resources to Coastal Command to defeat the U boats
- Churchill dismissed senior military officers if they did not agree with his military strategies.

Churchill's political decisions

- Churchill's insistence on the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers at the Casablanca Conference prolonged the war claimed his critics
- he has been accused of having sold Britain out to the Americans
- he has been accused of being responsible for the decline of the British Empire
- as a result of Britain's debt and colonial decline her influence on the world political stage diminished. Churchill has been blamed by some for this state of affairs
- his diminishing influence in the end-of-war conferences in which Stalin and Roosevelt dominated
- Churchill was party, with Stalin, to the so called 'Naughty Document' (name given by Churchill) which decided the fate of several East European countries
- Churchill and the Home Front. Churchill's energies were fully focused on winning the war. He had little desire to organise the Home Front, which he left to Labour coalition ministers.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Martin Gilbert | Churchill's official biographer. Has researched Churchill's actions from the huge amount of the primary source materials and written numerous books on Churchill. Pro Churchill. |
| John Charmley | Is a severe critic of Churchill. He believes that in winning the war Churchill betrayed his core values of British independence, Empire, and his anti-socialism. He also argues that this betrayal was further shown when Churchill made Britain subservient to America, and that Halifax would have made a better Prime Minister. |
| Richard Lamb | Is generally supportive of Churchill. He does not attack Churchill's integrity but prefers to be critical about his strategic awareness. Lamb is not alone in his evaluation of Churchill's naivety in military matters. |
| Stephen Roskill | Criticises Churchill's use of the RAF primarily to bomb Germany rather than support the Navy during the Battle of the Atlantic. |

Question 76

To what extent did the work of Labour Ministers in the wartime Coalition Government contribute to Labour's election victory in 1945?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is to allow candidates to evaluate the various reasons why the Labour Party won the 1945 General Election so convincingly. The question refers to the performance of Labour ministers in Churchill's Coalition Government however candidates will be expected to explore other reasons behind the Conservatives defeat in 1945, such as the importance of the Beveridge Report, the contrasting personalities, manifestos and campaigns in addition to issues pertaining to the 1930s anti-clericalism. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to

Evidence which supports the importance of the work of Labour Ministers in the wartime Coalition Government

- details of Labour War Cabinet Members-Clement Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison Home Secretary, Ernest Bevin Minister of Labour and National Service, Hugh Dalton Minister of Economic Warfare, Arthur Greenwood and Sir Stafford Cripps
- the popular view was that they had the experience to run the country after the war as they had gained a great deal of experience during the war of organising the Home Front.

Evidence which supports the importance of other factors

The Beveridge Report and its influence on the 1945 General Election

- the Beveridge Report sold a very impressive 635,000 copies, Published December 1942
- the contrasting response of Labour and the Conservatives to the Beveridge Report of 1942 Labour firmly tapped into the mood of the nation for a 'New Jerusalem', a better future for all post war
- the Conservatives appeared reluctant to engage in a national discussion about future welfare reform
- Churchill called Beveridge a 'windbag and a dreamer'
- Churchill said that decisions about the Beveridge Report must await the outcome of the election at the end of the war
- the perceived success of large-scale government intervention in all aspects of daily life during the war led many to believe that such an approach to government should be tried in peacetime and that Labour was the only party advocating such an approach.

The Conservative Party and the 1945 General Election

- Churchill broadcast a very negative speech about the Labour Party in the run-up to the 1945 election, his ill-judged 'Gestapo Speech'. He expressed views that the public largely rejected and subsequently the Conservatives lost votes at the election
- however, the decline in electoral support due to this is hard to quantify but there is evidence to suggest that these ideas were abhorrent to the majority of the public who could scarcely believe that Churchill would round on his Coalition colleagues with such venom a few weeks after VE day
- the Conservatives took for granted a public gratitude for winning the war which they wrongly assumed would result in support at the polls. Churchill was reliant upon his war reputation to attract votes from the electorate
- the Conservatives focused too much on Churchill's charismatic leadership
- the Conservative and Labour manifestos were very different in emphasis
- the Conservatives were associated with the policy of appeasement and the poverty and unemployment of the 1930s, 'the Ghost of Neville Chamberlain.' There's little doubt that the 'never again' mentality was well to the fore in 1945 and that fears of a return to mass unemployment and the hungry 30s persuaded many to vote Labour.

The Labour Party and the 1945 General Election

- the Labour Party ran a coordinated election campaign
- Labour campaigned in favour of full employment, nationalisation of industry, social security and housing
- the Conservatives complained that the Labour Party's election agents had been in place throughout the war whilst theirs had been serving in the forces. Hence the Conservatives were not well organised when an election was called
- the Labour Party was much more organised than the Conservatives, indeed some constituencies were not contested by the Conservatives and the prospective candidates effectively were handed a seat in parliament
- the General Election of 1945 was not a betrayal of the greatly revered Winston Churchill, rather it was a positive vote in favour of a dream – the New Jerusalem that so many wanted to build, and they trusted Labour to build it.

Wider context which may have influenced the outcome of the 1945 General Election

- the importance of the armed forces votes which generally went to Labour
- the influence of organisations such as ABCA which were accused by the Conservatives of encouraging the members of the armed services to vote Labour
- the significance of the ten-year election gap. Prior to 1945 there had not been an election since 1935 due to war. Arguably if there had been an election in 1940 the Labour Party would have won many seats. The number of Labour MPs was 'artificially low'
- the role of the media. Left wing ideas and beliefs were increasingly promoted
- JB Priestly Postscript on the radio
- Conservatives were blamed for the military defeats at the beginning of the war, 'Tories were unlikely to win any general election after the evacuation of British forces from Dunkirk in June 1940,' Paul Addison
- the Soviet Union had a planned economy and the Red Army had been pivotal in defeating Nazi Germany. The Labour Party was associated much more with central planning than the Conservatives were.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Kevin Jefferys | Believes that the responsibility for the 'Home Front' held by Labour members of the Coalition Government were a major vote winner for Labour in 1945. |
| Steven Fielding | Believes that the winner of the election would simply be the party who whole heartedly advocated the social change proposed in the Beveridge Report regardless of label and campaign style. |
| Paul Addison | Believes that the 'Gestapo speech' had only minimal impact on the election and that the result was decided long before the war ended. He points to a consistent Labour lead of 10 points in the polls from 1943 onwards. The success of anti-Conservative parties in wartime by-elections is often seen as a sign of a swing to the left in British politics between 1940 and 1945 with the collectivism of wartime government policies being hugely approved by the public. |
| Henry Pelling | Justifies the overwhelming support for Labour as a reaction to Conservative rule in the 1930s. |

Question 77

How far can it be argued that Britain was no longer a leading world power by 1951?

Aim of the question

The aim of this essay question is for candidates to approach this from the point of view of assessing the Labour Government's post-war foreign policy against the backdrop of a dire financial situation caused by the war and the new military and political reality that saw Britain well behind both Superpowers in importance and influence. The central theme could be an assessment of Britain's success in carrying out its post-war commitments and its ability to find a role that fitted in with the reality of the Cold War era. Reference could be made to Britain's Foreign Secretary Ernie Bevin's central role in directing British policy at this time, Britain's relationship with her Dominions and the creation of the Commonwealth, the formation of NATO and the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to**Evidence about the economic state of Britain in 1945**

- an analysis of Britain's financial situation in the immediate aftermath of the war
- from being a great creditor nation with the world's most powerful currency, Britain ended the war in debt to the tune of £3,700 million, a huge balance of payments deficit and an enormous loss of overseas markets
- by July 1947, sterling was freely convertible to dollars, threatening to wipe out Britain's dollar reserve and virtually destroying the £ as a trading currency
- after the financial crises of 1947, 1949 and 1951, Britain's economic capacity to remain a world power, even with US financial aid, was severely challenged by the fragility of her trading and financial position
- faced with financial ruin, Britain was forced to reduce some of her overseas commitments, resulting in military withdrawal from Greece, Turkey and Palestine
- however the sterling area still accounted for over half the world's trade in the immediate post-war years and Britain retained close commercial ties with her Dominions despite interference from the USA.

Evidence of the achievements of Ernest Bevin, Labour Foreign Secretary

- the extent to which Bevin's abrasive personality and forthright views dominated British foreign policy and whether his personal intervention in a number of key areas secured for Britain, a more satisfactory outcome than at first appeared possible
- Britain found itself in a difficult position relative to the new world order of the competing superpowers of USA and USSR and there is an argument that Bevin himself was in some way responsible for the onset of the Cold War mentality
- specific foreign policy issues may be referred to including the breakdown in relations with the USSR and the abandonment by Bevin of the Labour philosophy of 'left speaking to left' in our relations with the USSR
- Bevin's attitude towards the Soviet Union in comparison with the USA. Bevin's important role in helping to create NATO, April 1949, and to tie the USA to European security for the first time
- this strengthened Britain's position as a key element in a Western European security system.

Evidence of the handling of British decolonisation

- Indian independence, 1947. Creation of Pakistan
- Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel, 1948
- the loss of India was a major blow to Britain's military and political presence east of Suez. Indian independence was successfully achieved and a noble foreign policy initiative or was it an abandonment of the Indian sub-continent to civil war with undue haste?
- how far was Britain's decision to decolonise forced upon it by the superpowers or how far was it a rational decision taken for sound political reasons?
- the issues facing Britain in the Middle-East, particularly Palestine. Did Britain pursue an appropriate policy in this area?
- ultimately Britain was relieved to withdraw from Palestine, an area it had governed under a League of Nations Mandate since 1922
- after Britain left, fighting immediately broke out between the Jews and the Arab League.

The remaining Empire

- Britain still retained control over substantial parts of Africa as well as islands in the Caribbean, Hong Kong and had interest in the Suez Canal
- reference to specific examples of decolonisation, Transjordan (1946), Burma and Ceylon (1948) and Libya (1951)
- by 1951, Commonwealth relationships had undergone a fundamental transformation, the full effects of which were only just becoming apparent and in Malaya and Iran the emerging conflicts there clearly marked out some of the limits of British world power status in the post-war world.

Evidence of Britain's role in relation to Europe, the Cold War and the Marshall Plan

- Britain continued to see herself as the world's third greatest power and to that end retained a military presence in significant and strategic areas of the world
- argument that Britain missed an opportunity in this period of enhanced European cooperation due to its reluctance to participate in the Schumann Plan, concerning coal and steel production, and ultimately to further European integration. However, with much of Europe in ruins close European ties were not an attractive proposition
- Bevin's success in obtaining considerable American financial aid, Marshall Plan funding for European (and British) economic regeneration
- Britain's 'special relationship' with the USA and its Cold War policies. Did these further British interests? or US interests?
- an examination of Britain's contribution to the resolution of issues relating to Germany in the context of the Cold War
- the issue of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. The possession of an independent nuclear deterrent was a significant factor in allowing the British to see themselves as the third world power, and if nothing else, the gap between Britain's status in the world and any other countries apart from the USA and USSR was enormous.

The Korean War

- rearmament and British involvement in the Korean War, 1950–1953
- Britain was a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and as such wielded considerable influence in international affairs
- the onset of the Cold War and Britain's alignment with the USA led many critics to suggest that the concept of an independent British foreign policy had been subverted by the necessity of following the lead of the USA, a notion which seemed to gain credence after Britain's entry into the Korean War in 1950.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| John Darwin | Is less convinced that world power status had been lost by 1951, citing the fact that Britain's continued influence on the development of world affairs was still considerable. |
| Corelli Barnett | Is, of course, disparaging about Britain's dreams and illusions of continued great power status and cites this misguided pursuit of a seat at the top table as primary cause of the country's decline as an industrial nation in the post-war decades. Candidates may be familiar with the criticism of Corelli Barnett who accuses Britain of global overstretch and clinging on the dreams and illusions of power we neither no longer had nor could afford. |
| Peter Hennessey | Still sees much value in considering Britain as the third superpower at least, that is, until the Suez Crisis, 1956, which finally did dispel any notions of world power status. |
| Steven Fielding | Bemoans Britain's subservient position between the two superpowers and focuses on the degree to which Britain followed US foreign policy. |

Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

Part B – Historical sources

Question 78 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons why Chamberlain resigned as Prime Minister in May 1940.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be **up to 3 marks** and source evaluation **up to 3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|--------------|---|
| Author | Hugh Dalton. | Dalton was a Labour MP in the House of Commons and an eyewitness of Chamberlain's humiliation. Dalton was a critic of Chamberlain's handling of the first eight months of the war. Dalton was later Minister of Economic Warfare from 1940 in Churchill's wartime Government. |
| Purpose | Memoirs. | A long serving Labour MP who rose to become Chancellor in the post-war Government and with a deep and wide involvement in politics. These experiences led to these memoirs, the purpose of which was to present in detail the manoeuvrings of parliamentarians. |
| Timing | 1957 | 12 years after the end of the war and 17 after Chamberlain's resignation. Recognises the historical significance of the Parliamentary Debate which brought down Chamberlain. |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| . . . he (Keyes) said in his opening sentences, that he spoke for a large number of naval officers who were deeply critical of the Government's handling of the naval side of the war. | Admiral Keyes wears his uniform to add weight to his speech. He said that he was speaking on behalf of fellow naval officers and was highly critical of the Government's conduct of the naval campaign in Norway. |
| . . . Amery's criticism of the Government, ending with Cromwell's famous words of dismissal to the Long Parliament, 'You have sat here too long for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!' | Amery urged Chamberlain to resign, adding even more threat by quoting Cromwell's famous words. |
| Labour's Herbert Morrison spoke well, with much good detail, and was very definite. He named Chamberlain, Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare as Ministers who must go. | Not surprisingly, Dalton praised Herbert Morrison, a member of his own party, who insisted that Prime Minister Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare must resign. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- details of the disastrous Norway Campaign of April 1940
- details of the Norway Debate, May 1940
- Chamberlain was openly criticised by senior members of the armed forces especially after the Norway Campaign. For many this illustrated his inability to plan, equip and execute a basic military strategy
- this lack of ability is seen as a metaphor not only for his leadership but also for his general inability to lead Britain in wartime
- Chamberlain's huge parliamentary majority after the Munich Agreement of September 1938 was drastically reduced at the end of the debate
- Chamberlain reluctantly accepted that he had no option but to resign in favour of either Halifax or Churchill.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Chamberlain has been criticised for not sufficiently preparing the armed forces for war
- details on the readiness of the army, navy and air force for war
- Chamberlain was widely criticised for his failed policy of appeasement as it gave Germany the time to prepare for war
- with war imminent Chamberlain tried but was unsuccessful in gaining meaningful alliances
- the USA confirmed their isolationist policy towards possible conflict in Europe
- Chamberlain's distrust of the Soviet Union prevented any alliance with them. Chamberlain's general lack of drive was continually criticised and not just by the Labour Party
- changing attitudes of many members of the Conservative Party towards Chamberlain by May 1940
- long standing Labour Party criticisms of Chamberlain and their refusal to serve under Chamberlain in a coalition government
- Attlee stated of Chamberlain that 'he treated us like dirt'
- Chamberlain's government was ideologically opposed to extensive state intervention in the economy and Chamberlain had a poor relationship with the Trade Union movement
- throughout the 1930s industrial relations were poor between Chamberlain (who was Chancellor of the Exchequer) and the Trade Union movement due to the austere government policies and the unemployment of the hungry thirties. When Chamberlain needed the unions' cooperation to fulfil his economic targets, they refused to work with the man that presented their members with so much misery in the past
- the transition from a peacetime economy to wartime economy was slow and uncoordinated
- there was over one million unemployed in February 1940 and this reflected badly on Chamberlain's organisational skills at a time of national emergency, when full employment was essential.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|--|
| Angus Calder | Suggests that it was not Chamberlain alone who contributed to difficulties faced by Britain but that his optimism, which now seems so feckless was shared by other leaders of both major parties. |
| Robert MacKay | Contends that absolute readiness for war is probably an unattainable ideal for any country, not least because of the uncertainty about the exact circumstances in which a future war might take place. |
| Mark Donnelly | Argues that the Norway Campaign was seen as a manifestation of the deeper malaise which the Prime Minister's consistent failures of leadership since the outbreak of war had produced. |
| Paul Adelman | Argues that 'the transition from a peacetime economy was slow and uncoordinated' under Chamberlain's leadership. |

Question 79

How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the extent to which wartime work had a significant and lasting effect on many women's lives by 1951?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| Married women well-trained and fitted for their job will be allowed to continue, as is the case for teachers and nurses where there is need of them. | Suggests that in certain occupations such as teaching and nursing, married women will be able to continue to work after the war. |
| Some women liked the independence their wartime earnings gave them. . . | Suggests that women liked the fact that they had their own earnings and were not dependent on anyone. |
| . . . if the men have work that is well paid, many married women who worked during the war will be glad to stay at home. | Suggests that in post-war Britain many married women will be happy to give up work. If their husband is sufficiently well paid. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- during the war many women were employed in 'new to them' jobs and the range of jobs they were called upon to do for example, work in shipbuilding, heavy engineering, munitions and on the land
- some employers even went as far as to increase wages for women to the level of men's in like-for-like non-skilled jobs and there was an increase in the female membership of trade unions
- mass observation surveys tend to reinforce the point of view that war work was seen as a temporary phenomenon and that women expected to return to their more traditional roles in society once the conflict ended
- Marwick's view is that war work was emancipating, drew women, traditionally housebound, into the world of work, giving them a financial independence and an enhanced sense of their status in society.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| Traditional employers of women such as textiles, clothing and pottery did not recover their pre-war position, whilst others such as metal manufacture and chemicals saw significant expansions. | Argues that women were now less likely to work in previously popular jobs such as textiles, clothing and pottery but more likely to in the metal manufacturing and chemicals industries. |
| Accompanying the shift in the composition of women's jobs was a shift from full-to part-time employment. | Argues that many more women were now employed in part-time rather than full-time jobs. |
| The long-term trend towards older and married women making up a much larger proportion of employed women is clear by the late 1940s. | Contents that by the late 1940s a greater proportion of the female labour force consisted of older and married women. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the number of women remaining in full-time work after the war fell significantly thus contradicting the notion that war work was an emancipating experience
- trade union opposition to women members and to women in skilled occupations remained
- career opportunities for professional women expanded in the fifties, but social norms still centred round a woman as a carer and housewife.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- although equal pay was a long way off, the differentials had been eroded during the war and women were better paid for similar type work as men
- the marriage rate increased post (and during) war and the baby boom post war would seem to indicate a significant return to the pre-war notion of domesticity and motherhood as women's primary preoccupation
- in this respect, the Beveridge Report proved to be a socially conservative document in introducing Family Allowances as a 'reward' for child bearing and in making the retrieval of missed national insurance contributions for women, who took time out to have children, more difficult than for men who returned to work after a break
- the education reforms introduced through the 1944 Butler Education Act certainly reinforced the notion of training for motherhood as a substantial part of the education of those who failed the eleven plus test (qually) in Scotland.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| Harold L Smith | Is dubious about the war having real lasting impact. |
| Arthur Marwick | Believes that the war had a profound social impact and that its effects were to be felt long after its conclusion. |
| Penny Summerfield | Emphasises the limited extent of wartime changes and also the temporary nature of many of the changes that did occur. |
| Peter Hennessey | Argues that women were more influenced by the community in which they lived with regards to their expectations of life and that the prevailing norm of the fifties was a return to domesticity and motherhood. |

Question 80

How fully does Source D explain the reasons why the Conservative Party won the 1951 General Election?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| The Tories based their campaign once again on the Butler-MacMillan <i>Right Road</i> platform. | Suggests that the Conservative campaign was based on Butler and MacMillan's consensus agenda on economic and social policy issues. |
| They cashed in heavily on the electorate's weariness with the years of Sir Stafford Cripps' austerity, following on all the drawn-out hardships of the long war. | Suggests that many of the electorate were tired of shortages and rationing, associated with Labour's Sir Stafford Cripps, after the privations of the war. |
| Foremost among the Conservative promises of a better life was the pledge to build 300,000 houses a year. . . | Contents that the Conservatives promised that, if elected, they would build 300,000 desperately needed houses per year. |

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- increased rationing and seemingly petty bureaucracy all of which seemed to cause disaffection especially in the middle-class vote
- import controls limited the quantity and range of consumer goods available
- clothes rationing remained until 1949
- rationing of most basic foodstuffs and petrol continued until 1950
- bread was rationed between 1946 and 1948
- the black market flourished
- queues and shortages were common
- the British Housewives League pressure group. Had 100,000 members and campaigned against rationing and austerity.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- continuing economic difficulties for example, devaluation of the pound
- the chaos in the economy caused by Attlee's decision to participate in the Korean War and the subsequent rise in defence expenditure which resulted in cuts in welfare spending
- many members of the Labour Party were unhappy with Britain's involvement in the Korean War which led to a split in the party
- the loss of Labour heavyweights such as Ernie Bevin who died in April 1951 and Stafford Cripps who resigned due to ill-health in October 1950
- the revival in the fortunes of the Conservative Party through organisational restructuring by Lord Woolton and policy changes by Rab Butler and Maudling. Massive membership-drive which saw party membership rise to over a million. Huge fund-raising campaign to raise £1million
- attraction of large donations from big business scared of further Labour nationalisation
- the economic indicators were not good for Labour and many of the Cabinet felt holding off till spring 1952 was a better idea
- the Labour Governments were still reeling from the resignation of Bevan, Wilson and Freeman
- all the opinion polls should have convinced Attlee to wait until 1952
- the 1948 Parliamentary Reform Act changed many constituency boundaries to reflect recent population movement. This severely disadvantaged Labour as many previous supporters now found themselves living in safe Tory seats
- postal voting was introduced for the first time and experts estimate that the Tories benefitted by a ratio of 10:1
- Labour's vote held up well in their traditional heartlands but fell in the marginal seats of the south-east
- the Liberals failed to field any more than 109 candidates compared to 475 in 1950. The vast majority of ex-Liberal voters voted Conservative.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Paul Adelman | Stresses the unpopularity of austerity as the reason for many voters defecting to the Tories. |
| Peter Hennessey | Believes that changes within the Conservative Party enhanced their electability and also emphasises the damage done to the Labour Party by policy drift. |
| Kenneth Morgan | Argues that the years of austerity and overbearing state control had taken their toll on the electorate. |
| Alan Sked and Chris Cook | Argue that Labour's real problem was the wider disaffection of middle opinion (not necessarily middle-class opinion) against a programme of consolidation which was at best drab and puritanical, and at worst illiberal and restrictive of choice. |

[END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]