



National  
Qualifications  
2023

## 2023 History

### Advanced Higher

### Finalised Marking Instructions

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## General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

*Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.*

- (a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.
- (b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.
- (c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.
- (d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.
- (e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.
- (f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.
- (g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are:
  - relevant to the issue in the question
  - developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
  - used to respond to the demands of the question (for example, evaluate, analyse).

### Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions

To gain more than 12 marks in a 25 mark essay question, candidates must make a reference (however minor) to historiography. If candidates do not refer to or quote from historians, or show that they have considered historical schools of thought, they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marking scheme and so will not achieve more than 12 marks.

The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

### Marking criteria grids

The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria:

- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given in **bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

## 25 mark question – mark ranges and individual marking criteria

		Mark ranges						
Marking criteria	STRUCTURE	0-9	10-12	13-14	15-17	18-19	20-22	23-25
No attempt to set out a structure for the essay.	An attempt to structure the essay, seen in at least one of the following:	The structure displays a basic organisation but this may be loose. This would refer to:	The structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This would include:	Clearly structured, perceptive, presentation of issues. This would be included in:	Well-defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question:	Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout:		
No relevant functional introduction.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant functional introduction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant functional introduction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant functional introduction with main interpretations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument.</li> </ul>		
No separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>separate sections which relate to relevant factors.</li> </ul>		
No conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.</li> </ul>		

		Mark range							
Marking criteria	THOROUGHNESS/ RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH	0-9	10-12	13-14	15-17	18-19	20-22	23-25	
No evidence of relevant knowledge of the issue.		Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge.	Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue.	Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue.	Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge.	Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.	Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.	Evidence clearly supports and is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	
Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue.		The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis.	The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis and evaluation.	The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis and evaluation.	Evidence is linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	Evidence is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	Evidence clearly supports and is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation.		

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	ANALYSIS/EVALUATION/ LINE OF ARGUMENT	0-9	10-12	13-14	15-17	18-19	20-22	23-25
		No evidence of analysis.  OR  Analysis is not relevant to the question.	There is much narrative and description rather than analysis or evaluation.	There is an attempt to answer the evaluative aims of the question and analyse the issues involved. This is possibly not deep or sustained.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and the candidate tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues.	Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues with a detailed and effective analysis and evaluation which advances the argument and considers various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones.
		There is a weak sense of argument.	Argument is generally clear and accurate but there may be confusions.	Argument is clear and accurate and comes to a suitable – largely summative – conclusion.	Argument is clear and directed throughout the essay.	Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues and arguments. Clarity in direction of argument linking to evaluation.	The conclusions arise logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body and attempts synthesis.	The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	HISTORICAL SOURCES/INTERPRETATIONS	0-9	10-12	13-14	15-17	18-19	20-22	23-25
		No discernible reference to historical works.	General reference to historical works.	There is some awareness of historians' interpretations in relation to the issue. Historians may be used as illustrative points of knowledge.	There is an awareness of historians' interpretations and arguments. Historians may be used as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography.
					There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them.	There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. There may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.	Shows consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.	

## **Marking the source-handling questions**

There are three standardised stems used in the source questions

- ‘How fully . . .’ or ‘How much . . .’
- ‘Evaluate the usefulness . . .’
- Interpretation of two sources

### **‘How fully . . .’ question (12 marks)**

Candidates must

- establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to add knowledge as exemplification of interpretation points to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source does not reveal about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

#### **Up to 3 marks**

- interpretation of points from the source.

#### **Up to 7 marks**

- contextual development which develops points from the source with the candidate’s own historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information such as omissions
- other points of view, including additional historians’ interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

#### **Up to 2 marks**

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Candidates should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is. They can gain up to **3 marks** by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. Candidates cannot gain marks for simply quoting points from the source; they must paraphrase or interpret them to gain marks.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual development they give in their overall evaluation of the source’s comprehensiveness. This should include the views of two relevant historians (**2 marks** are available for this). Where a candidate includes the views of additional historians, award marks for wider contextual development.

There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question, and therefore no marks awarded for this.

## **'Evaluate the usefulness . . .' question (12 marks)**

Candidates must

- consider the provenance of the **entire** source in light of the topic being discussed. At all stages of the answer the provenance should underpin commentary which should include analysis and evaluation of the source
  - source rubric provenance – comment on authorship, purpose and timing of the source in light of the historical event or issue in the question
  - source content provenance – establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points which illustrate provenance, and analysing and evaluating them in light of the historical event or issue in the question
- contextualise those points with historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

**Award a maximum of 6 marks** for provenance comments based on **3 marks** for the rubric and **3 marks** for source content interpretation.

### **3 marks**

- source rubric provenance – comments on provenance regarding authorship, purpose and timing as seen in the rubric.

### **3 marks**

- source content provenance – comments on provenance regarding the interpretation of the content of the source.

### **Up to 4 marks**

- contextual development which develops points from the sources with the candidate's own knowledge
- wider contextual development, for example other relevant information which provides more information about the historical issue, and significant omissions in the source
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

### **Up to 2 marks**

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

## **Interpretation of two-sources question (16 marks)**

Candidates must

- establish the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue within each source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to assess what the sources reveal about different interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue
- comment on how the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue in the two sources relate to other possible interpretations with wider contextual development.

Award marks as follows

### **6 marks**

- comments on interpretation (3 marks per source).

### **Up to 8 marks**

- contextual development which develops points from the sources
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about interpretations of a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information about other interpretations of a historical issue which have been omitted
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

### **Up to 2 marks**

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

## **Marking instructions for each question**

### **Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034**

#### **PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES**

##### **Question 1**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may suggest society was, in the long term, changed by the Roman occupation:**

**Economic and Political change:**

- David Breeze talks of a gradual and enduring coalescence of tribes beyond the empire in their bid to oppose the Roman forces
- Ptolemy's Geography lists twelve tribes north of the Forth in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century but by the end of the century only the Caledonians and Maeatae are mentioned
- Dio, writing in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century refers to the Caledonians, stating that 'the names of the others have been included in these' – indicative of coalescence
- by the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, further amalgamation was suggested with mention of the Picts (the Verona List of AD 314 cites the Scoti, Picti and Caledonii rather than Ptolemy's 12 tribes)
- Rome changed Northern Britain by stimulating long term amalgamation of native tribes into a larger state and subsequent single nation
- academics in 1960s argued that Roman presence brought major changes in native settlement patterns – the move from defensive to enclosed but non-defensive (G Jobey, Hownam Fort)
- hints of literacy – ABCD stone from Traprain Law
- occasional place-names: for example, Kirkintilloch is Gaelic for 'fort of the end of the ridge.'

**Religious change:**

- the Roman presence, primarily military, initiated a gradual and piecemeal conversion from paganism to Christianity
- Christianity had its roots in Rome's frontier zone – evidence from southern areas exists of Christian inscriptions, cemeteries and place names
- from late 4<sup>th</sup> century there were an increasing number of Christian burials, indicative of Roman conversion (long cists, east-west orientation of graves, and absence of grave goods)
- Christians were in the frontier zone with evidence of enduring Christianity in sub-Roman period (around Whithorn).

**Physical change to the landscape:**

- complex road systems established, complete with fords and bridges (Dere Street – in 11<sup>th</sup> century Edward I marched north by way of Dere Street)
- roads remained 'until the cobbles wore away and stones were dislodged'
- structures such as the Antonine Wall and Hadrian's Wall would be major and enduring physical impositions on the landscape. The scale of Roman works would have permanently changed perceptions of what constituted social and political power for natives.

## Evidence which may consider society was not, in the long term, changed by the Roman occupation:

### Social economic and political Continuity:

- Lloyd Laing's much used phrase, 'Celts were still Celts'
- Keppie suggests that 'we should not suppose that the tribesmen exchanged their cloaks for togas or began to speak Latin'
- periods of occupation in the North were too short to alter much of the native way of life for the great mass of the population
- Vici which grew around Roman settlements and installations failed to survive beyond the Roman occupation – little relevance to the native population
- much of the northern land was beyond the reach of routine military surveillance and policing even during the occupation – remained substantially unaffected by the Roman interlude
- native economy disrupted in the short term but in the long term remained the same – little change in farming methods, manufacturing or trade
- settlement patterns were unaffected by Roman interlude – the move from defensive to enclosed but non-defensive pre-dated the Roman interlude – for example, at Eildon Hill North the hillfort defences had ceased to be maintained before the arrival of the Romans
- very few Roman finds or Roman style goods found in sub-Roman sites
- society remained essentially Celtic – Hanson states 'that for years it has been almost axiomatic that Roman conquest must have had some medium – or long-term impact . . . on present evidence this cannot be substantiated either in terms of the environment, economy or indeed, society'
- core of society remained untouched.

### Religious continuity:

- Lawrence Keppie, 'it should not be imagined that the Roman presence in Scotland itself influenced the spread of Christianity – which came much later'
- Christianity in the lowlands came via the Atlantic and owed nothing to the centuries of a Roman presence
- Christianity did not take root in the Roman period but slowly infiltrated the north from 5<sup>th</sup> century, thanks to series of holy men (Ninian, Patrick, and Columba).

### Physical continuity in the landscape:

- Roman sites were stripped of re-usable materials, left 'overgrown and forgotten'
- military installations dismantled and burnt or cast aside (column shafts and capitals from HQ building at Bar Hill were thrown into adjacent well)
- only the frontiers really endured and given that people were not travelling around the land, few would be aware of any real physical change to the landscape.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
David Breeze	Suggests the greatest gift Rome was able to give her northern neighbours was the impetus to unify Scotland after the Ice Age.
Lawrence Keppie	Suggests Scotland's Roman Remains highlights that Britain was a fringe province and impact was, in long term, minimal.
Ian Armit	Suggests impact would vary greatly across Scotland, much was short-term change.
William Hanson	Suggests the core of society was untouched by Rome; the presence was little more than a series of brief interludes.

## Question 2

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest the Picts were mysterious:**

- their symbol stones are unique and no one has yet explained, and naturally in the nature of things can never explain, the actual significance of the designs (which were also on metal) to those who erected them
- there are a lot of obvious/fairly convincing theories: grave markers; territorial markers; totems; marriages; abstract; commemorations
- the artistic skill involved is of a very high order but perhaps one can never explain explosions of artistic talent
- the carvings may have been by itinerant craftsmen, using patterns drawn on vellum or on their own skins
- the Picts have left the most individual legacy of all the peoples of Scotland
- the symbols may also be found on other materials such as silver, or carved into natural stone surfaces
- they may have had a talismanic or religious function. Later (Class 2) stones incorporate Christian symbolism
- the Aberlemno, records a victory in battle, probably over the Angles
- Class 2 stones tend to be dressed and formalised to an extent not seen on the earlier stones
- Picts are regarded as problematic and atypical on the basis of the Pictish paradigm – Pictish symbols, Pictish language, matrilineal succession, ‘Foul Hordes’ paradigm, lack of documentary sources and idea of Picts as a lost people
- politically distinct – since Picts had a degree of political cohesion which marked them out from Britons and Scots though typical with kings, warrior elites, clerics
- religiously distinct – in that they remained pagan long after others were baptized though then converted.

**Evidence which may consider Picts were actually a typical people of Northern Britain:**

- origins typical – notion of non-European origin invalid – Picts existed in Britain as any other Northern British people, common artefacts, monuments and social structures suggest indigenous and typical
- language, succession and origin typical – notion of non-indo-European language and matrilineal succession now robustly discredited, idea of Foul Hordes based on 6<sup>th</sup> century Gildas’ biased writings, idea of lost people exaggerated since evidence to suggest aspects of continuity
- Picts shared common cultural, social, political and economic traits with the Gaels, Scots and Britons
- areas of typicality have been overlooked due to domination of Wainwright’s idea (1955) that Picts were ‘problematic’ and peculiar
- religion typical ultimately – Picts shared Christian faith with neighbouring barbarian societies thus securing wide connections through travelling clerics/Holymen
- language typical – language very much like Celtic Britons – a form of p-Celtic
- trade typical – Picts, like neighbouring tribes, engaged in trade, primarily along east coast, with Northumbria perhaps as far afield as Frisia, so hints of connections
- social organisation typical – Picts, like their contemporaries were hierarchical, concerned with social status, warrior elites and symbols of power – common values amongst early medieval kingdoms.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Barbara Crawford</b>	Crawford states if the Picts are to remain to many people doggedly mysterious. . . it is a result of these mute yet eloquent inscriptions.
<b>Frederick Wainwright</b>	'The Problem of the Picts' was the starting point for any Pictish study and even though challenged by contemporary academics still shapes popular thought.
<b>Leslie Alcock</b>	Suggests the Picts were a typical northwest European barbarian society.
<b>Thomas Clancy and Barbara Crawford</b>	Suggests at certain level ruling elites, whatever ethnic background, shared common aims and ethical constraints however, marked difference between Picts, Scots, Gaels and Britons.

### Question 3

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest Northern British Kings derived power from warfare:**

- Alex Woolf argues that ‘leadership in warfare was one of the main functions of the king and certainly the main quality determining the success of any individual’
- kings, in touring their land, spent much time at the margins of their kingdom, putting them close to potential enemy territory and raids – thus, kings were ‘first and foremost, leaders in war’
- the importance of military might was reflected in the Senchus fer nAlban – it recorded a sophisticated system of assessment in Dál Riata to recruit armies and navies used to defend the kingdom
- the importance of military prowess was seen in Kenneth MacAlpin’s rise to power – the alleged treason
- creating a strong military force tied up young men into a loyal relationship with the king
- local lords had an obligation to provide the king with equipped soldiers and sailors in times of need, while others would submit agricultural produce to support the hierarchy
- the increasing importance of military might was reflected in the number of symbol stones which depicted royal authorities in a militaristic stance (Dupplin Cross).

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for Northern British Kings power:**

**Kingship:**

- the 4<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> century witnessed a gradual move from petty tribes to centralised kingdoms in which warlike, heroic kings ruled over increasingly defined states
- as early as the 6<sup>th</sup> century sources record the existence of a ‘Rex potentissimus’ (most powerful king) in Southern Pictland and by the late 7<sup>th</sup> century there is a single ‘rex Pictorum’
- kings and the concept of kingship were common to Picts, Britons and Scots.

**Source of Power – Descent:**

- Sally Foster claims that in Dál Riata power was inherited through tanistry, where successors were nominated from alternating, eligible kin groups
- power could be gained through direct patrilineal succession. Intermarriage between dynasties or races would bestow power on an individual – though no guarantee that power would be maintained
- Bede suggests that in Pictland, power was derived from matrilineal succession
- A. Woolf suggests that in Pictland, power was not gained through matriliney since Pictish kings are referred to as the sons of their fathers and no source other than Bede refers to this succession practice.

**Source of Power – Agriculture:**

- Sally Foster claims ‘power came from the land’, kings derived authority from their ability to exploit the agricultural potential of the land and control its inhabitants
- Northern Britain was in places, very agriculturally productive and its inhabitants, such as the Picts, were well capable of producing, storing and redistributing gains from arable and pastoral farming
- the plentiful agricultural produce was a currency for power
- the kings’ power depended on their ability to accumulate and redistribute agricultural wealth – hence the abundance of souterrains, storage buildings, nucleated farming settlements with fields and trackways (Easter Kinnear and Hawkhill in Fife)
- kings visited their lands on a seasonal basis with the dual purpose of obtaining food renders from the inhabitants whilst using their royal presence to reinforcing control over their clients
- touring farms and estates allowed royalty or their officials to meet subjects, dispense justice and collect tax in kind (there is mention of tax or cain being collected in the form of corn, malt, cattle, swine, sheep, cheese, hides and foals).

### **Source of Power – Trade and Industry:**

- kings derived power from their ability to support a range of specialised manufacturing activities
- in the absence of a monetary economy the manufacture and manipulation of prestige goods were fundamental to a king's power
- the gift of a prestige good had a contractual character whereby the giver/king reinforced their powerful position whilst determining from whom they could expect loyalty and services
- evidence suggests that royal centres incorporated areas for the manufacture of prestige goods – for example, Dunadd in Argyll reveals evidence of gold, silver and garnet working
- Dunadd also suggests that the control of trade was a source of power since it has produced the largest quantity of imported pottery from anywhere in British Isles
- penannular and annular brooches were produced on royal sites and were used as a way of deriving and maintaining the king's authority. (Hunterston brooch, Ayrshire).

### **Source of Power – Religion:**

- kings derived authority through association with Christianity – a fashionable new source of power
- association with Christianity lent authority to kings
- symbiotic relationship between the church and kings meant that the church helped kings administer the land and in return the church gained land
- 'Learned clerics provided administrative support, conducted inauguration ceremonies and supported the aspirations of kings' (B. Crawford and T. Clancy)
- King Nechtan, AD 716 used the church to gain political unity with Northumbria (changes the Pictish church from Columban to Roman observance, in line with Kingdom of Northumbria)
- Nechtan, in creating a reformed church, the Pictish Church, managed to extend royal authority
- St Columba was 'a close friend of Scottish kings' (A. Smyth)
- kings derived power through association with the Christian church when it gave them access to the technology of writing, as seen on the 9<sup>th</sup> century Dupplin Cross.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
Stephen Driscoll	Argues that kings derived power from shires/thanages by basing themselves in a 'caput'/principal residence from where they controlled the pett, portions of land and nucleated settlements.
Alex Woolf	Mentions that power, for Gaels, did not rest solely on descent but on 'febas', or 'worth'.
Sally Foster	States that the church provided ideological sanction and legitimisation for the kings and nobility.
Ian Walker	Suggests that kings maintained power using the resources of their own royal lands and the dues and hospitality collected from subjects. 'The entire hierarchy was supported by farmers'.

## Question 4

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the peoples of Northern Britain were unable to mount effective resistance to Viking incursions:**

- they did not know they were coming. Raids began out of nothing at very end 8<sup>th</sup> Century AD
- 795 ‘devastation of all the islands of Britain by the gentiles (Vikings)’ Annals of Ulster
- first recorded raid, but there may have been others just before that
- though the Dál Riata and the Picts had armies and navies and the Britons and Gododdin had warriors it was very difficult to stop people who appeared out of the blue anywhere on very long coastlines or on a multitude of islands
- the advantage always lay with the attackers
- peoples of Northern Britain were disunited. There was no United Kingdom, no central authority, no means of communication to arrange joint action, no common language indeed
- the Northern Britons raided and fought each other, but that was different to trying to meet an enemy at sea or on the coast or on islands
- the raiders were so ruthless that they could not easily be bought off, though there is some evidence of monks doing this
- Northern Britain had a lot of portable loot: captives as slaves: livestock: precious metals and stones from abbeys and churches; the Vikings were going to keep coming
- island communities had no chance: their small populations could not defeat all warrior forces and they could not get help. Perhaps though there was some determined resistance by them as there are references to fighting on the islands
- monastic centres did recover, or were deliberately left alone to allow them to recover, so that they were worth raiding again
- massive military expeditions which were coordinated with the characteristic speed and ruthlessness of the later Viking period
- Dublin Vikings. . . besieged Dumbarton Rock for four months. . . capturing it when its defenders were forced to surrender because their water supply dried up.

**Evidence which supports the view that the peoples of Northern Britain were successful in repelling Viking incursions:**

- the Vikings did not sweep all before them
- the Western and Northern Isles were ‘lost’ as was Caithness but the Picts and Dál Riata won some battles and their heartlands were safe, though the Dál Riata were impelled Eastwards
- the Scottish kingdom was in the long run very successful in defending itself against Viking attack, to judge at least from the sparsity of settlements apparently established in central and eastern Scotland
- any hopes that the Norsemen may have had of establishing a power-base in the traditional Pictish heartlands were consistently thwarted.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Alfred P Smyth	Refers to the exposed and relatively defenceless Gaelic and Pictish population caught up in the fury of heathen Viking attacks at the close of the 8 <sup>th</sup> century.
Nick Atchison	The Vikings could raise and easily move by sea large forces with which the Picts, Britons and Scots could not compete.
Barbara Crawford	Distinguishes regional variation, stating that in Southern Scotland the impact was sporadic and transitory with very few permanent Scandinavian communities establishing themselves – impact was certainly not immense across all of Northern Britain.
Anna Ritchie	The Vikings seemed to have recognised the strength of native culture and to have responded with an instinctive need to dominate rather than obliterate.

## **Question 5**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may be used to examine the social distinctions between the peoples of Northern Britain 1034:**

**Minimal social distinction:**

- shared common Celtic background of Scots, Picts and Britons
- shared warrior values, prestige based social organisation
- shared tribal attitudes
- shared subsistence methods
- shared social values – status rested on kindred and land
- a new common practice/style of kingship was developing – power legitimised by the church and extended through the support of the church and the political elite (mormaers and thanes)
- united system of control emerging – ‘Mormaers’ used as a common term for leading magnates fighting alongside Scottish kings and used practically to extend central royal authority over remote parts of Scotland
- AAM Duncan asserts, ‘the kings of Scotia and Scotland stamped united upon the four or five disparate peoples north of the Tweed and Solway’.

**Continued social distinctions:**

- significant degree of social fragmentation existed due to undeveloped infrastructure of the North – Highlands and Islands remained remote and poor road system prohibited interaction
- unstable geographic frontiers.

**Evidence which may be used to examine the cultural distinctions between the peoples of Northern Britain 1034:**

**Minimal cultural distinctions:**

- linguistic divisions between P and Q Gaelic speakers may have begun to disappear even before the 9<sup>th</sup> century political changes – see increasing gaelicisation of Scotland (Foster)
- increasing gaelicisation of toponomy – combination of Pictish ‘pit’ with Gaelic names suggests increasing ‘gaelicisation’ of ruling elite in later Pictland/Alba, for example Pitcarmick ‘Cormac’s shape’
- Alex Woolf argues that in the former territory of Pictland, a new ‘Albanian’ language developed which was primarily Gaelic yet retained Pictish elements
- increasing gaelicisation of art – rapid loss of Pictish symbols
- intermarriage between different kingdoms
- *‘what continued was. . . an oral culture which continued to sing the praises of the warlord and chief of the kindred.’ M. Lynch*
- all the societies of Northern Britain were intensely hierarchical, a person’s identity was dependent on gender, age, wealth, family ties and the possession of a craft or specialised learning
- united by fact that almost everyone was engaged in farming their local environment
- united by the importance attributed to conflict – military action, fortified residences, military equipment, war horses – reflects common warrior values.

**Continued cultural distinctions:**

- linguistic divisions – Orkney, Shetland, Caithness, Galloway and Western Isles spoke Old Norse whilst pockets of old Pictish kingdoms spoke Pictish languages. Anglo-Saxon spoken in the southeast, Cumbric spoken by the Britons and Scots had own language other than in court. In part united by written language of Latin, as Bede observed
- there was a distinct settled Scandinavian cultural zone in the North Isles as well as the north and west of Scotland
- different house styles endured – Black house in Western Isles, longhouses in Northern Isles
- different forms of land tenure (udal tenure on family land in the northern isles).

## **Evidence which may be used to examine the religious distinctions between the peoples of Northern Britain 1034:**

### **Minimal religious distinctions:**

- all peoples of Northern Britain were or were becoming Christianised
- saintly missionaries had converted Southern and Northern Picts. Angles had been converted
- Viking conversion well underway by 10<sup>th</sup> century – traditional date for conversion of Earldom of Orkney is AD 995 but it is likely this process had begun much earlier
- Synod of Whitby had resolved ecumenical differences between the Roman and Celtic church
- common religious and administrative centre focused on St Andrews
- united in use of Christianity to secure Kingship
- united by spread of continental artistic influences – common religious art and symbolism.

### **Continued religious distinctions:**

- Irish/Celtic cultural zone on Iona endured after the establishment of new eastern Christian centres
- still hints of paganism – evidence of 10<sup>th</sup> century Vikings retaining polytheism.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
Sally Foster	Argues that Picts identity was subsumed. . . they had become Scots, but the new peoples of Alba shared common culture, land organisation and faith.
Alfred P Smyth	Argues some fragile religious unity amidst political changes but cultural divisions remained between those in south-western Scotland, the eastern spine and the north.
Fiona Watson	Highlights the role played by the church in diminishing distinctions but suggests that for ordinary people life remained the same irrespective of cultural and social distinctions, priorities remained the same: farming and meeting the family's basic needs.
Michael Lynch	Highlights the extent to which cultural and social distinctions endured despite some political integration.

## Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 6

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	The account of Strabo.	A Greek Geographer and Historian. Biased and inaccurate account as written as a descriptive history of the peoples of Britain that is typical of the classical writers justifying Roman imperial policy in conquering Britain.
<b>Purpose</b>	To record the history and Geography of the early Roman conquest of Britain.	Likely to overemphasise the barbaric nature of the peoples of Northern Britain suggesting a need of Romanisation.
<b>Timing</b>	Written in AD 20.	Source likely to have inaccuracies as relies on testimonies of Romans who took part in the early raids of Britain having never actually visited there himself. During the transitional period of Rome moving from a Republic to an Empire.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
Their lifestyle is in part like that of the Gauls, though in part more simple; insomuch that some of them, though possessing plenty of milk, have not the skill enough to make cheese, and are totally unacquainted with horticulture and other matters of husbandry.	Suggests the peoples of Northern Britain are not advanced in the ways of farming, which emphasises backwardness in agriculture.
In their wars they are more barbarous, making use of chariots for the most part, as do some of the Gauls.	Suggests that they still rely heavily on outdated practices of war such as using chariots, more of a status object rather than practical in warfare. They describe them as 'barbarous.'
Forests, surprisingly, are their cities: for having enclosed an ample space with felled trees, here they make themselves huts and lodge their cattle, though not in any permanent way.	Suggests that they live in enclosed settlements and are a nomadic people who have not developed permanent urban centres, again points to backward nature of Celtic society. They use 'surprisingly' and 'huts' which indicates a degree of condescension.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Cassius Dio suggested that northern tribes had no cultivated land. . . living by pastoral pursuits and by hunting, which supports Strabo view
- Tacitus' account of Mon Graupius talks of chiefs using chariots supports Strabo view
- Newbridge Burial, Midlothian — shows tribal leader buried with their chariot which supports Strabo view of importance of Chariots in warfare
- majority of land which was settled comprised undefended farmsteads — indicates universal importance of agriculture in Northern Britain
- agriculture vital in society — ability to co-opt and redirect surplus production enabled social elite to come to prominence
- Rome sought to highlight the role of warfare in Northern Britain in order to make their advance through the north seem epic and gallant.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- warfare, feuding and raiding perceived as rife, especially on tribal fringes and thus underpinned society
- aerial photography reveals complex field systems, cord-rig, cultivation ridges — indicators of settled, sophisticated farming communities
- modern picture of Celtic society is of stability — undefended farms, wholesale land cultivation and stability
- agricultural surplus essential to enable the construction of homes and residences of power
- settlement seen to reveal instability — the purpose of forts, crannogs and brochs was seen as providing refuge, those in the immediate neighbourhood fled to these sites in times of danger
- enormous time, effort and material resources invested in warrior paraphernalia and on apparently military defences — suggests warfare was a significant force
- the desire to/need to express status typical of society in the LPRIA
- emphasis on heroic pursuits such as drinking, warfare and feasting evidenced by artefacts such as Torrs pony cap and drinking horns
- the construction of majestic, elaborate monuments reveals importance of expressions of status
- importance of religion — Ian Armit notes that religion, ritual and superstition 'permeated' Iron Age society
- it is assumed religious worship in Northern Britain, as elsewhere in the British Isles, was led by druids and that a pantheon of gods was worshipped
- evidence of votive offerings and human/animal sacrifice to win favour of gods, for example, success in war, plentiful harvests.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Kamm	Suggests war and fighting was inherent and integral in Celtic society.
Ian Armit	Suggests the agricultural economy underpinned all other elements of society.
Richard Hingley	Highlights the use of monumental architecture to convey social status in Celtic society.
Stuart Piggott	Calls Celts 'cowboys' suggesting farming practices were not sophisticated.

## Question 7

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . problems elsewhere led to a failure to follow up Roman victories as the political backwardness of the north rendered local government difficult.	Suggests Northern Britain was not a priority in the grand scheme of the Roman Empire, which led to conquests being abandoned in favour of dealing with rebellions elsewhere. Suggests society in Northern Britain was not advanced enough for Rome to put the effort in to conquering and imposing Roman ways.
The invasion of the early AD 140s does not appear to have been an attempt to complete the conquest of the island. . . the location of the British frontier was determined at least as much as by external factors as by local conditions.	Suggests Roman incursions into Scotland was dictated by Imperial policy - the Antonine invasion of the AD 140s made no attempt to conquer the whole of Scotland.
The combative nature of the northern tribes slowed the northern progress of the Roman army.	Suggests the northern tribes were able to muster more resistance than the Romans had expected.

### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- AD 85, Flavian pulled back as a result of ‘the dangerous crisis on the Danube’ – all of Legio II Adiutrix pulled out
- death of Severus thwarted 3<sup>rd</sup> century attempts at control – Caracalla returned to Rome
- Scotland lacked the easily available precious metal resources that places like Wales offered
- low potential tax revenues
- considerable expenditure in keeping an army in the North
- Strabo, writing during Augustus’ reign wrote ‘no. . . advantages would arise by taking over and holding the country. . .’
- Appian, former secretary to the emperor wrote in mid-2<sup>nd</sup> century, ‘they rule the most important part of it – more than half – and have no need of the rest; in fact, the part they have, brings in little money’. He also talks of ‘profitless tribes of barbarians’
- Romans may have forwarded ‘lack of economic incentive’ as an excuse for not conquering – rarely used it as a reason for conquest
- lack of a developed market economy caused logistical difficulties – lack of local market mechanisms made army difficult to supply
- the North lacked the local administrative, legal and law enforcement systems which Rome usually used to administer provinces – Rome couldn’t do their usual – rule by bending governing classes to imperial will
- too difficult to coerce a society made up of extended family groupings and too difficult to attack a society which lacked an identifiable seat of power.

### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- several classical accounts document the warlike nature of the Highlanders (Dio describes that they stood their ground with determination whilst Herodian talks of fearsome and dangerous fighters)
- in both Agricola’s and Severus’ campaigns the natives’ guerrilla warfare tactics meant Roman control was shaky whilst Hadrian’s biographer recorded that ‘the Britons could not be kept under Roman control’
- evidence that tribes could unite to resist Rome: ‘Caledonian confederacy’ at Mons Graupius’ in AD 80s, Caledonii join Maeatae in revolt during Severan campaigns
- Barbarian conspiracy (AD 367) to attack reveals that Northern tribes could put aside differences and work together to face their common enemy
- highlands too daunting
- dense forestation made communication difficult.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Gordon Maxwell	Wider imperial concerns meant Rome never wholly committed in the North.
Groenman van Waateringe	Suggests successful permanent Roman occupation only possible in those regions where the Romans were confronted with a well-organised proto-urban or urban structure.
Brian Dobson	Suggests Rome wanted to retain the North only because of their Roman will to retain what had been won.
David Woolliscroft	Argues that the benefits of conquering Scotland were not worth the additional dangers of being there.

### Question 8

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
He was not the first king of Dál Riata origin to rule both Picts and Scots. No less than three of his predecessors had ruled both peoples even if it not certain that they held both kingships at the same time.	Suggests Kenneth was not the first Scottish king to rule Pictland; his reign did not mark a significant break with the past.
... he founded a new dynasty at a most critical period in the evolution of the Scottish nation. . .	Demonstrates that Kenneth's real achievement was to establish a new royal dynasty (the MacAlpin dynasty), which ruled Alba/Scotland for nearly 200 years.
He most probably fought his way to power at the expense of both the Picts and the house of Fergus, son of Eochaid of Dál Riata. . .	Suggests that Kenneth had to defeat both Pictish and Scottish rivals to claim the throne.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the kingdom of the Picts was larger than Dál Riata in Argyll and both more populous and agriculturally richer, which was of course part of the attraction for the Scots and the Vikings
- it was in fact the Dál Riata kingship which disappeared, not the Pictish one
- the Pictish kingdom was highly organised: an army, a navy, an obligation to military service, taxation, judges, powerful royal officers, mormears, thanes, all supported by the Church. The wealth and power of the new Alba was no doubt predominantly Pictish.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
This may have led him to a strategic and concerted effort to assume control of the area.	Suggests his contribution was significant, making a deliberate attempt ('strategic and concerted') to develop a larger power-base, Alba.
He may also have been impelled to move east due to the pressure of Viking attack on Argyll, which also blocked him from moving north and cut the Dál Riata off from their Irish homeland.	Alluding to the view that MacAlpin was prompted to move east due to a Norse threat to the link between Dál Riata and Ireland which saw him move east and expand his kingdom for greater security.
He was, however, helped by the fact that many of the Pictish nobles had already been wiped out by the Vikings in AD 839; though the long-held tradition that he was personally responsible for the treacherous death of the Pictish nobility at a feast in Scone is likely to be fictitious.	Suggests that the crushing defeat of a Pictish army by the Vikings in AD 839 created an opportunity for Kenneth to seize power in Pictland.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the Norsemen/Vikings did attack all-round the coasts of Northern Britain and put pressure on the Scots in Dál Riata to save themselves and seek pastures new by expanding East
- they had already pushed into Pictland a generation before Kenneth's time, when there was intense Viking raiding on Argyll
- Pictland was not one United Kingdom and there were different sub-rulers to deal with
- Kenneth was a warrior leader who did not succeed peacefully but was helped by his own aggression; though he must have been from a royal line he also gained a lot of experience from fighting the Vikings
- the Viking incursion was important; it weakened gradually the Picts and lost them the Northern Isles and Caithness.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- Kenneth MacAlpin clearly made a huge personal contribution as war leader and tactician. He may have been in league with the Vikings. He may have had a claim to the Pictish throne through his mother. However, all his achievements could well have died with him, leaving him a minor footnote in history
- Dál Riata was a warrior society, with a system of military obligation – see the Senchus fer nAlban – highly organised for war and conquest
- the Church favoured political union, especially if led by the Dál Riata, the people of St Columba
- the primacy of St Andrews, the head church of Pictland, was not eclipsed, despite the growing importance of Dunkeld, where Kenneth MacAlpin installed the relics of St Columba in a new church
- Dunkeld had long-standing significance as an early historic power centre and had become a prehistoric tribal centre, ‘fortress of the Caledones’
- Scone was an important Pictish centre. Kenneth MacAlpin made it his new royal centre, perhaps bringing to it the Stone of Destiny
- several men before Kenneth MacAlpin were kings of both kingdoms simultaneously and some of them were from the Pictish royal house, for example, Oengus, son of Fergus, King of the Picts AD 729-61, who also ruled the Scots AD 741–750 and Constantine (Romanitas) who ruled both kingdoms for a while at the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> Century. There was no real reason why the two kingdoms should not have been permanently united by one of them.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ian Walker	Suggests Kenneth MacAlpin was completing a gradual process of the merging of two cultures which had begun centuries before, a slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time.
Olwyn Owen	Supports the view that Viking influence from settlements in the Northern and Western Isles was significant, suggesting they made inroads into North-East Scotland and became an important player in the politics of the emerging nation of Scotland.
Stephen Driscoll	Suggests the conquest of the Picts must have involved some violence, not a 17 <sup>th</sup> century union of crowns type of affair.
Dauvit Broun	Highlights Norse as a catalyst and calls for a reinterpretation of creation of Alba.

## Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 9

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the Guardians failed to provide Scotland with stability or peace:**

- peace was threatened when the Guardians initially failed to recognise an heir. Instead, they decided to wait 6 months to see if Yolande was pregnant before acting
- the Scots needed Edward I's help to get Eric II to send his daughter to Scotland
- when 3 of the original Guardians died, they were not replaced
- Robert Bruce attempted 2 risings (1286, 1290) to seize the throne by force
- the earl of Dunbar – a Guardian – was murdered
- the Treaty of Salisbury gave both the Norwegian King and the English King a say in the marriage of their monarch
- the Scots lacked a royal court for the education and upbringing of their young queen
- the Scots allowed Edward I to put a Guardian (Bek) into Scotland for the young monarch and her fiancé, despite neither being in Scotland
- other disruptions to law and order also existed, such as the abduction of English widow Eleanor de Ferrers, the rivalry between the Comyns of Badenoch and the earl of Atholl, renewed dissent within Man and the Western Isles
- the Comyn family dominated the Guardianship, initially to the exclusion of their enemies
- several decisions seemed to have been to benefit the Guardians and their friends, rather than for law and order, for example, the lands of the dead earl of Fife went to the Bishop of St Andrews, while his offices went to the Comyns and Stewards while his son was an infant
- the Guardians could not stop Edward taking over the Isle of Man in June 1290 or sending an English agent into the Hebrides to end the ‘war and disorder’ there.

**Evidence which supports the view that that the Guardians did provide Scotland with stability or peace:**

- the Scots recognised the threat of civil war and quelled the Bruce rebellions before they escalated
- the Bruce's were included in the embassy to Norway regarding the Maid, to reduce dissent
- the Treaty of Salisbury secured the transfer of the Maid of Norway to England, then Scotland, and kept her free of marriage or betrothal
- the Guardians realised the danger of a closer alliance with England and negotiated the Treaty of Birgham, a formidable document to clearly protect every aspect of Scottish independence
- the Guardians governed as Alexander III had done, without excessive taxation, maintaining law and order, raising rents, paying fees
- the Guardians represented all classes and areas of Scottish society
- Hugh of Abernethy was caught and imprisoned for the murder of the earl of Fife
- when the Maid was rumoured to have died in 1290, the Bishop of St Andrews wrote to Edward I in fear of the danger to Scottish peace and prosperity.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Fiona Watson</b>	Takes the view that while the Scottish nobility were not entirely united, they managed to maintain control over the situation.
<b>Michael Prestwich</b>	Takes the view that Edward I's actions in Mann and the Western Isles showed no respect for Scottish independence, as they were a surprising intervention in the affairs of another realm.
<b>Michael Brown</b>	Takes the view that by 1289 the cracks in the Guardians' authority were showing as they lacked the authority of a king.
<b>Wendy Stevenson</b>	Takes the view that the Scots had little choice but to accept closer ties with England and acted as best they could to protect their political and ecclesiastical independence.

## Question 10

<b>Aim of the question</b>	Responses might evaluate whether Edward I was high-handed with the Scots from the moment John capitulated at Kincardine in 1296. Did turning John into Toom Tabard, jailing him, removing the stone of destiny and forcing the Scots to sign the Ragman's Roll ensure the Scots would enact their revenge? Or were other factors more important in ensuing the collapse of the English administration in Berwick in 1297? Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.
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### Candidates might refer to:

#### Evidence which supports the view that the humiliation of King John was the most important reason for the collapse of the English administration:

- John was humiliated at Kincardine when Edward refused to accept a negotiated surrender and stripped him of his kingly relics
- John was taken to imprisonment in the Tower of London
- English soldiers took the Stone of Destiny to England. The Kingdom's seal was broken and legal documents about Scottish independence taken away in one large chest and two smaller chests
- Edward also took valuable items from Edinburgh Castle, a Forfar priory and from the bishoprics of St Andrews and Ross, including 3 chests of jewels, a griffon's horn and a gilt crook
- Scottish leaders were in English jails, after Dunbar, or in exile, after John's submission
- Edward had the Ragman's Roll taken round Scotland to collect seals and written submission from 1,764 Scots.

#### Evidence which supports the view that other problems caused the collapse of the English administration:

- Edward set up an 'alien' administration – they spoke a foreign language, held different customs and were unaware of how the kingdom of Scotland usually operated
- the Scottish political community, used to a very active role in government, were excluded
- Englishmen were appointed to key jobs: Ormsby as Justiciar of Lothian, Hesilrig as Sheriff of Lanark
- Berwick was too far south to govern Scotland and was slow to react to events. It was convenient for England
- English garrisons were in Scottish burghs and castles, including Kirkintilloch, Aberdeen, Forres, Urquhart etc
- in October 1296, Edward I ordered that only English priests be considered for church vacancies in Galloway
- under a year later, this order was applied to all of Scotland
- Edward imposed strict controls on Scottish trade and levied his taxes on goods travelling through the ports of Inverness, Banff, Aberdeen and Berwick
- Warenne did not want to be lieutenant of Scotland and stayed in the north of England
- Cressingham was detested for imposing high levels of taxation more suited to England
- in May 1297 Cressingham sent £5,188 from Scotland to Westminster. Wool was seized from Border Abbeys and not paid for
- rumours in May 1297 suggested Edward I was about to ask the Scots for military service in France again. Prisoners were released early if they agreed to fight for Edward I
- in areas like the western Highlands, Edward alienated families like the Macdougall's by promoting their enemies, the MacDonalds
- releasing John Comyn lord of Buchan and Alexander Comyn earl of Buchan from jail to quell Andrew de Moray's rebellion in the north was unsuccessful and he was able to remove the English from the north, as far south as Dundee
- when Cressingham tried to alert the English to the seriousness of the situation in Scotland in July 1297, Edward instead believed Clifford and Percy that they had quelled the problem by getting the nobles and bishops to capitulate at Irvine.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Alan Young</b>	Takes the view that there was wide-ranging support for the government and policies which represented John Balliol's kingship.
<b>Michael Prestwich</b>	Takes the view that the high handed policies of the English provokes the end of their own administration in Scotland.
<b>Fiona Watson</b>	Takes the view that Wallace must have been charismatic to attract support, but that plenty were willing to resist English occupation.
<b>GWS Barrow</b>	Takes the view that the English regime was too superficial, no more than a handful of leading Scotland had resigned themselves to English overlordship and occupation.

## Question 11

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that Robert acted out of concern for the Comyn threat:**

- Balliol had been released into papal and then French custody and Bruce might have been alarmed at the chance of a Balliol restoration
- Robert was not popular politically in Scotland in 1304–+1306 and might have feared the Scottish political community would have supported an alternative rising if Robert had not seized the throne
- the Comyn claim to the throne came from his father – a lesser claim – and his mother – the youngest sister of John Balliol. This gave Comyn a claim from a higher branch of the family tree than Robert Bruce
- if the Balliol claim had collapsed in 1303, when John ordered the French king to ‘act as best he could’ with Edward I, this would have left John Comyn as the next royal heir of the senior line
- John Comyn was a popular and experienced political leader, unwavering in his support for Scottish independence until 1304, a member of the Guardianship or warden of Scotland (under John de Soules) since 1298.

**Evidence which may consider that other factors caused Robert to usurp the throne:**

- the Bruce family had been seeking the throne since the reign of Alexander II
- Robert’s ‘rights’ had been guaranteed when he switched sides in 1302. Their threat in the Ordinance of 1305 might have alienated Robert from the English cause
- Robert was punished in the 1305 Ordinance, losing the sheriffdoms of Ayr and Lanark to the Comyn family
- Edward had ordered an inquest into Robert’s powers and privileges as lord of Annandale
- Robert had a pact with the Bishop of St Andrews for support in a rising
- it is possible Robert also had the support of the Bishop of Glasgow, who absolved him of the Comyn murder and gave him the royal robes for the inauguration
- involvement in the murder of John Comyn and his uncle in the church in Dumfries forced Robert to act before he could be excommunicated
- Edward I was ailing, and his son did not share the same appetite for Scottish affairs or military conquest
- the English Crown was almost bankrupted by the constant warfare of Edward I’s reign
- many Scots found the English did not pay them for their fees and expenses after 1304, increasing dissatisfaction against English overlordship
- many likely saw the 1304–1305 settlement as a period of recuperation before another rebellion, rather than as a lasting settlement.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Penman	Takes the view that Robert needed Comyn neutrality or his vested interest in a Bruce claim to the throne, but their personal animosities poured out in the church.
Fiona Watson	Takes the view that Robert’s actions in 1306 were those of a man with nothing to lose, gambling everything for the throne.
GWS Barrow	Takes the view that Bruce would not have intended to kill John Comyn but intended to take the throne himself and give his estates to Comyn.
Michael Prestwich	Takes the view that resentment about his treatment by Edward I must have played its part in Robert’s decision to turn against the English king.

## Question 12

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that Robert's military strategies were vital:**

- the Scots' raids into northern England (as far as York) could not significantly threaten the English king safely in London
- Edward II showed only basic concern for the devastation of his six northern counties by the Scots as he was preoccupied with Thomas of Lancaster, his cousin
- Edward II was prepared to abandon the north to over a decade of destruction rather than relinquish his claims in Scotland
- attempts to stir up anti-English sentiment in Ireland and Wales failed, especially as the Irish resented the idea of replacing English overlordship with that of the Scots
- campaigning on three fronts left the Scots dangerously over-extended
- the campaign in Ireland cost Robert his last brother and his adult heir, threatening the Scottish king's position more than English control in any country.

**Evidence which may consider that other reasons prevented the Scots from full victory over the English:**

- the Scots had defeated the English in battle, exposing the weakness of the English king's command, his poor tactics and low English morale. Yet that did not lead to significant problems for the English king
- the Scots could gather hostages to exchange for their prisoners in England but had no leverage for anything more important, such as to negotiate independence for Scotland
- after 1314, the Scots could do no more than gain truces to buy time to regroup and consolidate what they had gained
- Edward II was stubborn and would not acknowledge that he had lost everything in Scotland, not even when Berwick (the last English-held territory in Scotland) fell to the Scots in 1318
- Bannockburn was not a decisive victory to end the war. Edward was able to restore his army and invade again (in 1319, 1322). One victory did not mean the Scots would repeat this in future conflicts
- despite Scottish victories, some Scots continued to oppose Robert as king and continued to adhere to Edward II, including in Stirling, Perth, Dundee, Bothwell, Lothian and the marches
- Robert's attempts to harry English supporters in Scotland did not lead to many changing to fully support the Scottish king
- despite victory at Bannockburn, the Scottish king reverted to avoiding pitched battles, enabling the English and their supporters to withdraw from the country
- recovering areas like Berwick gave the English a clear target near their borders to attack the Scottish king
- the Papacy continued to support the English king, imposing truces on the Scots and exacting punishments when the Scots ignored them
- Englishmen who tried to help secure Scottish independence, like Andrew Harclay earl of Carlisle, was charged with treason and executed.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Fiona Watson	Takes the view that Ireland proved that the Bruce were not invincible. The campaigns were both inglorious and miserable.
Michael Brown	Takes the view that Robert's mobile, plundering forays into English-held territory aimed to impoverish communities and demonstrate the inability of Edward II to protect his adherents.
Colm McNamee	Takes the view that the raids into northern England had tried to force the English to the conference table but had failed.
Michael Penman	Takes the view that years of Scottish military dominance had in the long run amounted to really very little at the bargaining table.

### **Question 13**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may suggest that King Robert was not able to establish effective government in Scotland:**

- Robert's government was weakened by the fact that he had usurped the Scottish throne – John Balliol lived to 1314 and then his son, Edward, should have been king
- in the Declaration of the Clergy (1309) Robert included seals of those who could not or would not support him, to exaggerate his support
- Herschips in Galloway, Buchan and Argyll tried to use terror to cow his opponents
- the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) was signed by a group who, within months, would try to kill the king and replace him with Edward Balliol
- Robert downplayed the threat of Edward Balliol by ensuring the Soules Conspiracy was associated with William de Soules, rather than Edward Balliol
- Robert was forced to remove those who continued to oppose him, issuing an ultimatum in 1313 and then creating the Disinherited in 1314
- Robert tried to legislate against opposition – making the spreading of rumours against the king illegal in 1318 and threatening immediate imprisonment until the king decided to release the perpetrator
- by ending cross-border landholding, Robert was imposing a single national identity on his people, contrary to the traditions of the landed classes in several countries
- Robert was willing to harass the men (and tenants) in parts of Scotland outwith his authority
- Robert had to vilify the Balliol kingship to justify his usurpation of the throne and portray himself as the saviour of the kingdom from numerous outrages
- his three tailzies show his willingness to rewrite Scottish succession rules to suit himself, switching between nearness of degree and primogeniture at will
- Robert changed the laws to enforce military service on the political community, including annual weapons inspections, readying for further conflict
- Robert continually ignored papal truces to suit his own goals in Scotland.

**Evidence which may consider that King Robert was able to establish effective government in Scotland:**

- Robert held frequent councils and parliaments (19), maintaining the good government of his predecessors
- Robert secured the position of the Scottish church
- Robert established new laws regarding crimes, such as murder, rape, dealing with debt, dealing with disputes
- Robert's retribution in the Black Parliament was lenient to most, especially those who had been pulled into the conspiracy through feudal ties, who were pardoned
- the tailzies of 1315 and 1318 were mature attempts to ensure a clear succession, preferably to an experienced adult male, to protect the future of the kingdom, learning from the mistakes of 1284
- like his predecessors, Robert rewarded his supporters, redistributing lands, jobs and titles, especially from the Disinherited
- even those who had long opposed the king, such as Adam Gordon a landlord from the Borders, were rewarded when they switched to support Robert. Gordon gained substantial lands in the north-east
- taxation remained rare and when issued was only for the duration of the king's lifetime
- the Crown continued to maintain normal government, paying salaries and expenses for royal officials, the royal household, the exchequer etc
- military service was clarified, in terms of amount, training and equipment required, but impositions remained small.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Roland Tanner	Takes the view that Robert resorted to coercion and seal abuse in 1309 and 1320 to increase perceptions of how much support he held.
Michael Penman	Takes the view that the united front of 1309 was an orchestrated sham, many of the seals belonged to individuals who were dead, faithful to the English or, at best, of uncertain loyalty.
Robin Frame	Takes the view that even in 1320 Robert could not count on universal support. Not only were there dispossessed magnates in exile but several signatories rose against him.
Fiona Watson	Takes the view that Robert was a usurper who suffered throughout his reign from an acute awareness of his own lack of legitimacy.

## Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 14

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The government of the realm, which included the defence of its status as subject to God alone, depended on the king.	Suggests Alexander III ensured that royal authority focused on him individually, re-establishing monarchical authority.
In retrospect, the decline of the royal house of Scotland began in 1275 with Queen Margaret's death.	Suggests that the peak of Alexander's reign had passed by 1275 when his first wife died.
However, it was the deaths of her children – David (1280), Margaret (1283) and Alexander in (1284) – that dealt the king a series of personal blows.	Suggests that the rapid deaths of his three children was a significant blow to the king and his authority.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Alexander failed to remarry until his wife and all three of his children had already died
- Alexander had married his two eldest children off, in the hope of securing the succession
- Alexander's daughter gave birth to his granddaughter, Margaret Maid of Norway
- Alexander acted to stabilise the succession after the death of his final son, calling a meeting at Scone to settle a tailzie on his granddaughter and make plans to remarry.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The castle at New Ayr was refortified and weapons were deposited there. Although Alexander evidently anticipated an attack on the Stewart lordship he could not be certain of where Hakon would land and thus took the precaution of also fortifying Wigtown, Inverness and Stirling as well as Inverurie.	Suggests Alexander was determined to retake the Isles and made significant defensive preparations in multiples areas around his kingdom, focusing on those most likely to see attacks.
Garrisons were established and maintained for six months with compensation also being paid to those whose cattle were taken to feed the individuals who were required to defend these different areas of the realm.	Suggests Alexander was cautious, making defensive preparations in multiple areas and ensuring that he did not alienate his people by seizing goods for lengthy campaigns.
There is an account of Alexander III ordering the building of two galleys and the manufacture of oars. Payments were made to those who guarded the ships for 23 weeks.	Suggests Alexander was prepared for a battle at sea, or the need to move in amongst the islands to secure his control over the area.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Alexander utilised local knowledge for his defence, relying on local magnates to garrison and protect their areas against a potential Norwegian attack
- despite such extensive preparations, the Scots only had to face a skirmish at Largs
- areas such as Skye and Caithness had to give hostages to ensure they would not support the Norwegians
- the Scots had to face a substantial Norwegian invasion – 120 ships in total
- despite attacking areas including Kintyre and Bute, King Hakon was open to negotiations
- eventually the area was settled in the Treaty of Perth, 1266.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- Alexander controlled his nobility, ending the factionalism of his minority
- only one military campaign, paid for out of the regular income of the crown
- Alexander rewarded his supporters, for example, Alexander Comyn earl of Buchan given the sheriffdoms of Whigtown and Dingwall
- maintained good law and order, not overly relying on lords who would become too powerful
- Alexander used local lords and barons who were part of their communities and supported the king
- Alexander's kingdom was one of local and international peace and increased prosperity
- more land was cultivated than before, so trade and towns grew
- increased trade with Europe stimulated the economy and increased the use of silver coins
- Aberdeen, Berwick and Inverness in particular benefitted under Alexander III
- Alexander successfully refuted the claims of Henry III and Edward I to English overlordship over Scotland
- Alexander rejected papal interference over his decision regarding the inheritance of the earldom of Menteith
- some areas, such as Galloway and Moray, consistently resisted the expansion of monarchical rule
- the 1284 Scone tailzie was too vague to prevent constitutional crisis when Alexander died without siring another direct heir.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
AAM Duncan	Takes the view that Alexander's magnates showed their acceptance of the kingdom shaping their political actions and of the king with their political allegiance.
Alan Young	Takes the view that the king had to rely on key magnates who then became even more powerful, such as the Comyns. The reign was an effective alliance between the Crown and nobility.
Nicholas Mayhew	Takes the view that Alexander won a greater trading prosperity which stimulated Scotland's economic life.
David Santiuste	Takes the view that peaceful relations with England allowed Alexander the space to establish himself as one of Scotland's most effective kings.

## Question 15

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks will be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	Chronicle of Lanercost.	Written by a Franciscan who disliked Robert the Bruce who likely took over the Chronicle in 1297, writing in the aftermath of John's downfall and likely biased towards their English patrons and against the Scots.
<b>Purpose</b>	To create a written history of the time period they lived in and the events occurring in the north of England and in the Scottish Wars of Independence.	Patriotism to the English king led to a hatred towards the Scots. However, there is clear evidence of detailed information of the Scots campaigns which other chroniclers could not give. Record keeping of John's reign.
<b>Timing</b>	1272–1346	Contemporary account of northern English history in the 13 <sup>th</sup> Century. Written during the reign of John Balliol.

Point in Source C		Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The magnates, prelates and other nobles of the kingdom of Scotland assembled and there, by common assent, it was formally and solemnly decreed that their king could do no act by himself, and that he should have twelve peers, after the manner of the French, and these they then and there elected and constituted.		The Scottish political community removed power from their king, leaving him as a figurehead. Instead, power was given to a Council of 12. This shows the English were noting discord in Scotland before John's defeat in 1296, suggesting his removal by Edward I was not out of line with the wishes of the Scots themselves.
The parliament also insultingly refused audience to my lord the Earl of Warenne, father-in-law of the King of Scotland. . .		This shows that the English regarded themselves as having been insulted by the Scots well before they would have known of the Scoto-French Auld Alliance being formed against England. The Scots refused to allow English ambassadors to enter Scotland to get answers for John's failure to attend the 1295 parliament over the MacDuff appeal.
Also, the parliament then decided upon an active rebellion by revoking homage to King Edward I of England by entering into a treaty with the King of France so that they should harass England between them. . .		The new government of Scotland – the Council of 12 – started to negotiate with the French to form an alliance against the English. The phrase 'active rebellion' highlights the seriousness of the problem and the view of the author.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- John had agreed to Edward's demands for military service against France when at an English parliament in 1294
- no Scottish king had fought for an English King since Malcolm IV
- the Auld Alliance with France was signed in 1296
- Edward I used the Scots' failure to attend the 1295 parliament or appear at the muster at Portsmouth to plan a campaign in the north against his recalcitrant subjects
- it is likely Edward I only heard of the Auld Alliance once already moving north against the Scots.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- John struggled to get the Bruce family to acknowledge him as king – it took 18 months to get homage
- Edward I began interfering in Scottish legal appeals within weeks of John's coronation with the Bartholomew appeal
- in total, there were at least 9 legal appeals to England (1292–1294), although the best known is the MacDuff appeal
- John had been an English landowner and cleric at Edward I's court. He had married Edward I's cousin and the English king was godfather to John's son, Edward Balliol
- John's supporters, including the Comyns, expected reward for their support during the Great Cause
- John had made a deal with Bek Bishop of Durham for his aid during the Great Cause
- John had to pay homage for his kingdom multiple times to Edward I and was made to give up the Treaty of Birgham's protections
- the Scottish political community had become increasingly powerful and used to ruling alone during the Interregnum but was deeply fractured by the Great Cause. John had to resurrect unity under monarchical authority
- John was not a strong military leader – his attempts to defend Scotland in 1296 were poor and he did not lead the army, instead hiding in the north
- when John capitulated, Edward stripped him of his kingly trappings and jailed him for the rebellion.

**Historians**

**Perspective on the issue**

**AAM Duncan**

Takes the view that John was an ineffectual king with no stomach for his responsibilities.

**Michael Brown**

Takes the view that while John does not deserve total censure, he was not prepared to fight for his kingdom – a vital element of medieval rule.

**Amanda Beam**

Takes the view that John slowly evolved from an extensive but passive landholder to an ambitious but controlled king.

**Michael Penman**

Takes the view that if John Balliol was a puppet king, he was a puppet of the Comyn family who ran most of his everyday government.

### Question 16

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Politically for Bruce successes in battle were priceless as if he was going to succeed in the Scottish power struggle, then Bruce realised he needed to win the hearts and minds of the Scots.	It was not the battles which were significant, but the widening political support which victory brought.
To have survived these encounters at Glen Trool and Loudoun helped break the stigma of defeat that had clung to him since Methven which was now gradually being replaced with successes and this prompted increasing support.	These victories enhanced his previously tarnished reputation as 'King Hob' and led to increasing support as his success grew.
At last the Scots were beginning to have some belief, some hope in him and Douglas certainly felt hopeful enough to take heart and fight at Loudoun, leading Douglas to become a key commander in Bruce's army.	Bruce gained trusted military supporters who he could utilise to fight for him in the south when he went north.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Robert had previously been defeated by the English at Methven and Dalry in 1306
- Robert had become known as King Hob (king of nothing) by the end of 1306
- Robert used the landscape to reduce the power of his enemies, for example, the hills and lesser-known paths at Glen Trool, the bogs at Loudoun Hill
- Robert's loyal lieutenants, his brother Edward and James Douglas, campaigned for the king in the south-west when Robert was in the north
- Douglas led raids from Selkirk Forrest and was key in regaining his family lands in Douglaston from the English.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the death of Edward I in July 1307 robbed the English of their determined leader
- Edward II was preoccupied with problems in England and less interested in Scotland – he did not campaign there until 1310 and allowed his Scottish supporters to form truces with Robert
- Robert no longer had to fight the English and Scots simultaneously
- Edward II replaced the excellent Valence with John of Brittany as his lieutenant in Scotland
- the murder of John Comyn removed the unifying leader of the Comyn family, reducing their ability to withstand the Bruce campaign
- Robert adopted guerrilla tactics, avoiding any pitched battle
- Robert rose from his sick bed to defeat the Comyns at Inverurie
- Robert razed castles as he could not garrison them and did not want them falling back into enemy hands
- Robert destroyed entire areas to strip enemies of resources to campaign or resist, for example, Herschips of Buchan, Galloway, Argyll
- Robert rewarded any who came into his peace, with lands, titles, jobs etc. which had been taken from his enemies
- Robert utilised support from the Catholic Church who absolved his crimes and preached support for the king as equivalent to going on crusade
- Robert took on his enemies one at a time, often in surprise attacks, isolating them from each other
- Robert's enemies were poorly supported or resourced by Edward II.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
A Grant	Takes the view that the transformation of Robert's fortunes was largely due to the outstanding military skill he showed from 1307. He would forsake conventional warfare for guerrilla warfare, at which he proved a genius.
EJ Cowan	Takes the view that luck was key for Robert, which held at Glen Trool and Loudoun Hill, but gave him the greatest break in the death of Edward I.
Michael Penman	Takes the view that the death of Edward I was a real watershed as Edward II showed neither inclination nor the necessary leadership skills to recover and reconquer Scotland.
Fiona Watson	Takes the view that although Robert was lucky to escape capture in 1306 and 1307, fortunate to have Edward II as an adversary, yet was also developing powerfully effective strategies to fight the multi-faceted war on his own terms.

## Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 17

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that the impact of the Treaty of Union was sustained economic development:**

- access to the English domestic market provided by Article 4 – fuelled the expansion of key industries (initially black cattle and linen, later cotton, coal and iron) provided by the Treaty of Union and, by extension, the strategic needs of the British state during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars
- establishment and expansion of key manufacturing companies – for example Carron Ironworks, which directly benefitted from British government contracts to supply the army and navy
- approximately 50% of Scottish exports were sold in England in 1707 (Lenman)
- access to England's colonial trade – spectacular success of the tobacco industry which due to the multiplier effect stimulated demand for linen and other manufactures in the colonial markets as return cargo. Glasgow merchants began operating in and profiting from the slave trade
- preferential terms secured protection for vulnerable aspects of the Scottish economy. Malt, salt and coal were privileged in the Scottish domestic market through a favourable tax regime. Woollens benefitted from direct subsidies
- payment of The Equivalent, £398,085, over 50% of which was paid to compensate for the lost capital of the shareholders of the defunct Company of Scotland, provided a huge injection of capital into the Scottish economy. Effectively wrote off Scotland's national debt
- incomplete statistical evidence indicates there was modest economic growth following 1707 in terms of overseas trade and coastal shipping
- the impact of British government policy, such as the establishment of the Board of Trustees for Fisheries and Manufactures which invested in technological advancement and quality assurance
- sustained proto industrialisation from 1760 onwards.

**Evidence which suggests that the impact of the Treaty of Union was not sustained economic development:**

- absence of economic growth following the Treaty of Union – decline of the Scottish linen and woollen industries linked to the imposition of newly imposed duties by the British parliament in 1711 and 1715, and its resultant inability to compete with Irish and Dutch imports
- despite some protection, did expose the relatively fragile Scottish economy in terms of quality and price to English competition
- five-fold increase in the imposition of duties across Scottish exports reduced competitiveness of virtually all export industries causing a deleterious effect upon economic activity
- Scots customs officers overly zealous in their efforts to replace the famously inefficient Scottish customs infrastructure with the new British system – various complaints to the Convention of Royal Burghs confirm they were applying higher duties than their English counterparts, placing various Scottish industries at a competitive disadvantage
- relative backwardness overall of economic development in comparison with England. Most industrial development remained relatively small scale and was concentrated in the Lowlands – the Highlands were almost entirely unaffected
- importance of the political impact of the Treaty of Union – replacement of the Scottish Parliament by Westminster and the abolition of the Privy Council.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Bruce Lenman</b>	Questions the importance of the Scots' access to English colonial markets following Union. 'The imperial dimension of trade concessions was probably of little importance. Scots had long traded with English colonists anyway. It was legal under Scots law'.
<b>Tom Devine</b>	Argues that the Union benefited some key areas such as the linen industry, though he also states that the impact of the Treaty remained uncertain until after 1740. 'Union could well have been the political prelude to the 'development of underdevelopment' rather than the catalyst for a new age of progress and prosperity'.
<b>Christopher Harvie</b>	Stresses the importance of the political impact of the Treaty of Union, specifically the replacement of the Scottish Parliament by Westminster and the abolition of the Privy Council. However, he argues that the economic impact of the Union on the Scottish economy is less clear – 'the assumption that Scotland was pulled along by innovations and market forces generated in England may be rather too facile'.
<b>Christopher Smout</b>	Acknowledges that in the short term there is scant evidence of the Treaty of Union causing economic growth. 'Linen consignments failed to develop their potential before 1740. Cattle exports rose, but supply proved disappointingly inelastic. There was no quick breakthrough'.

## Question 18

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest that the defeat of the 1715 Jacobite rising was due to the Earl of Mar's Leadership:

**Leadership of the Earl of Mar:**

- an opportunistic politician with no military experience. His leadership was characterised by unsuccessful strategies and missed opportunities; for example, the pre-emptive seizure of Edinburgh castle was abandoned amidst confused orders, while the planned western advance on a poorly defended Glasgow collapsed due to similarly poor organisation
- contemporary accounts consistently criticise Mar's prolonged hesitation in southern Perthshire prior to the battle of Sheriffmuir which resulted in disquiet within his army leading to widespread desertion. It also allowed the Duke of Argyll time to organise his Hanoverian troops
- details of events at the battle of Sheriffmuir: for example, the stalemate largely due to a lack of orders issued by Mar. Critically, he failed to seize the high ground due to an inability to command his army to carry out simple manoeuvres despite arriving at the battlefield first
- Mar's army was imbalanced, being overpopulated with poorly chosen officers unable to lead; many owed their commissions to aristocratic birth rather than military experience.

**Leadership of James Francis Stuart:**

- a distant, uninspiring figurehead. Barely present during the rising – landed two months after the rising's pivotal battle, Sheriffmuir, by which time effective momentum had been lost
- James's active leadership once in Scotland was barely perceptible in terms of strategic military value. His actions – the burning of buildings and crops as part of a strategic retreat were unlikely to aid the cause
- he returned to France on the 4th of February following three months of ineffectiveness.

**Impact of other Jacobite leaders:**

- leadership of Lowland Jacobites, for example Nithsdale, who chose to go south on a hopeless campaign, rather than north to link up with Mar
- inability of Mar's senior officers such as William Mackintosh of Borlum and the Earl of Carnwrath to successfully lead diversionary manoeuvres.

**Evidence which supports the view that the defeat of the 1715 Jacobite rising was not due to a failure of leadership:**

**Hanoverian response:**

- the broad strength of the Whigs, in terms of Kirk, economy and aristocracy, all of which ensured access to formidable military resources
- Hanoverian army led by John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll – a decorated commander who had served with distinction during the Nine Years War and the War of Spanish Succession
- had earned a reputation as a thorough effective commander who was open to his officers' advice
- Campbell arrested or closely supervised known Jacobites such as the Earl of Carnwrath
- tactical superior of Mar. Succeeded in forcing a stalemate at Sherrifmuir despite being outnumbered. Although an indecisive outcome, it favoured the government strategically, halting the Jacobite advance south. Also, reached Edinburgh quickly enough to prevent its capture by Mackintosh of Borlum
- the Duke of Argyll captured the Jacobite capital of Perth in December 1715.

### **Domestic support and foreign support:**

- although Mar's host was the largest Jacobite army, totalling 16,000 men support even in the Highlands was regionalised. Few western clans played an active role, and many Highland chiefs who rose did so reluctantly
- the rising gained only limited support from the Lowlands. The Union guaranteed the Presbyterian church – thus, the Kirk which enjoyed a near total control of the lowland population, preaching an anti-Jacobite message
- majority of Scotland's population was anti-Catholic. Hanoverian propaganda successfully linked Catholicism and Jacobitism (despite the overwhelming loyalty of Episcopalians to the Jacobite cause)
- the rising achieved very limited support across the rest of Britain – a small force of Northumbrian Jacobites represented the total English contingent. They were encircled and defeated at Preston on the 12th of November
- European support was important for any rising pitted against the might of Hanoverian Britain – France withheld assistance under the leadership of the Duke of Orleans
- similarly, Spain supplied limited financial support, but no military aid.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Tom Devine</b>	States that dysfunctional leadership at all levels was responsible for squandering an advantageous position.
<b>Murray Pittock</b>	Maintains that Scottish support for the Jacobite cause was widespread, readily transferable into a marching army and could have been sufficient to achieve a successful outcome. Sympathy for James was 'endemic in what was essentially a Jacobite society'.
<b>Andrew Mackillop</b>	Reminds us of the ineffectual response from England – 'in England Jacobitism was nearly always a social form of political disaffection which preferred getting on the wrong side of a claret bottle than a bullet or bayonet'.
<b>Rosalind Mitchison</b>	Dismisses Mar's leadership as flawed and inefficient, describing James as 'showing no sense of urgency. . . he arrived after Sheriffmuir, hung around a while. . . and left on a ship'.

## Question 19

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that the Highlands experienced significant change prior to 1745:**

- declining militarism of clans – last major battle between clans took place at Spean Bridge in 1688. Tensions between clans no longer escalated into full scale military conflict. Underlines the declining primacy of traditional clan values due to the increasing importance of commercial pressures. Wars cost money
- the Highlands became increasingly assimilated to lowland norms due to the changing role of the clan chief from paternalism to commercial landlord
- market forces enabled the increased absenteeism and consumerism of clan chiefs, sustained by growing markets for Highland produce, particularly cattle. The auctioning of leases by the Duke of Argyll from 1710 onwards was symptomatic of the changing attitude of clan chiefs
- emigration to Canada began in the 1730s due in part to rising rents as clan chiefs increasingly neglected their patriarchal duties in favour of profit. Greater numbers of Highlanders migrated to the lowlands
- customs of past significance fell into disuse, such as the right of passage which obliged young chiefs to lead raids on neighbouring lands before gaining acceptance by the clan
- increasing government intervention during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, as witnessed by the Glencoe massacre, and the early 18<sup>th</sup> century such as Wade's military roads and bridge building in the 1720s
- clan society was not a set of unchanging rules preserved from antiquity, but rather an evolving method of social organisation. For example, the marked decline in the arbitrary powers of chiefs which began in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and accelerated after the failure of the 1715 rising. Clan chief's private courts powers of sentence no longer extended to execution – the last hanging occurred in 1728.

**Evidence which may suggest that the Highlands did not experience significant change prior to 1745:**

- the Disarming Acts of 1716 and 1725 were not effectively enforced allowing the military nature of clan society to endure
- rule of law remained inconsistent – cattle raiding continued in large areas especially around Lochaber
- continued existence of the clan system, the ability of chiefs to mobilise for war through the feudal system of landholding and the emotional bond between clans folk and their chief
- apparent failure of the 'law of progress' as the Highland economy failed to match the growth of lowland commerce. Barter remained common while agriculture remained primitive and largely subsistence. Trade, services and industry developed only sporadically
- townships remained the most common form of settlement – the development of burghs in the lowlands was not replicated in the Highlands
- the authority of the Episcopalian church remained unchallenged in parts of the Highlands as the Church of Scotland made only partial inroads, particularly in the north-east
- many Highlanders rarely saw a minister or priest due to the large scale of parishes and low density of the population. Thus, local folklore and taboo unrelated to Christianity endured in some areas
- Gaelic remained the language of the Highlander – only the chief, church ministers and a few others spoke English.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Argues that the process of change was evolutionary, and that the decline in clan society and in particular the role of the clan chief were trends well established prior to the Treaty of Union.
Bruce Lenman	Maintains that change caused by commercialisation was both significant and long term, and that this change was both continuous and accelerating manifesting in higher rents and a decline in the social coherence of clans.
Ian Whyte	Emphasises the changing economic and cultural nature of the Highlands as a result of highland chiefs becoming increasingly drawn into national politics and the economic demands of lowland and English markets.
Murray Pittock	Suggests government programmes for ‘improvement’ had a significant impact upon the region including the disbanding of Highland Companies following the 1715 rising and the building of Wade’s roads and bridges.

## Question 20

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that urban living conditions improved between 1707–1815:**

- increased incomes by 1800 facilitated access to better clothing and more plentiful foodstuffs. Of the five Scottish towns which trebled in population between 1750–1801 – Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock, Falkirk and Greenock four were primarily manufacturing towns in which incomes were rising
- establishment and expansion of urban manufacture led to increased earnings for an expanding urban workforce—for example St Rollox chemical works, Glasgow (established 1799) became the largest chemical factory in the world
- evidence of urban workers earning enough to remit some of their income to the areas they had left, especially the Highlands
- increased variation and availability of fresh agricultural produce due to transport improvements — specifically turnpike and canal construction including the Forth and Clyde Canal, 1790. Famine was averted throughout the entire 18<sup>th</sup> century
- the Monkland canal improved the supply of coal for heating a rapidly expanding Glasgow after 1790
- medical advances — Scottish medical knowledge was comparatively good by contemporary standards, hospitals and doctors were a largely urban phenomenon. The major innovation during the 18<sup>th</sup> century was vaccination against smallpox, relatively available in urban areas
- construction of vastly improved urban environments — most famously Edinburgh's New Town (begun 1767). Also, Glasgow's Merchant City (1750s onwards) and city centre improvements to Aberdeen, Dundee and Perth. Early examples of public efforts to improve sanitation — for example the draining of Edinburgh's Nor' Loch
- Edinburgh's prosperity was notable and unusual — partly based on industry, but higher incomes were also earned by an emerging urban middle class and a large skilled working class employed in small scale consumer industries
- access to some types of schools — burgh schools and modern academies — and Scottish Universities with the arguable exception of St Andrews were the preserve of urban environs.

**Evidence which may suggest that urban living conditions did not improve between 1707–1815:**

- rapidity of urbanisation placed unsustainable demands on urban amenities — typical growth rates include the population of Aberdeen doubling between 1707 and 1750, whilst Greenock's population increased from 2,000 in 1700 to 17,500 in 1801
- standards of the vast majority of urban housing was appalling — characterised by overcrowding, poor sanitation, disease and poverty
- new areas of improved urban housing were the preserve of a small, wealthy elite — most famously Edinburgh's New Town. The overwhelming majority of poor working urban residents would experience overcrowding and poor sanitation — for example, Edinburgh's Old Town
- migration from the Highlands and from Ireland (particularly east Connaught and Ulster) further increased pressure on resources creating intolerable urban slums denuded of basic amenity
- the system of parish schools buckled under the demands of rapid urbanisation
- the development of industrial staple towns — for example Paisley, Falkirk and Hawick — which were increasingly reliant on one or two industries as industrialisation progressed—were particularly susceptible to social crises following cyclical unemployment. This was also true, and on a larger scale in both Glasgow and Dundee
- much early industrial development was rural rather than urban based, thus at least during the early stages of proto industrialisation the increasing wages associated with manufacturing industry predominantly benefitted workers in the countryside, not the town. Other industrial employers paying cash wages, notably coal and salt production, were by definition rural employers.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Bruce Lenman</b>	Confirms extremely fast process of urbanisation – ‘urban growth, both in absolute and relative terms was extremely rapid – an extraordinarily fast process’.
<b>Tom Devine</b>	Reminds us to consider the different circumstances of individual Scottish cities – he suggests that the most acute difficulties were experienced in Glasgow and Dundee – ‘it was these two cities which suffered acute problems of health, sanitation and poverty’.
<b>Christopher Smout</b>	Distinguishes between the differing experiences of the working and middle classes, the latter of which he contends generally prospered during the second half of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century – ‘almost all groups in the middle class shared a dizzy sense of opportunity which pervaded towns from 1760 onwards’.
<b>Michael Lynch</b>	Notes that urbanisation had a direct impact on change in the workplace both in terms of conditions and on the organisation of labour. ‘Hours were shorter. Perhaps an average for the journeyman of ten or twelve hours a day rather than the fifteen he would have worked in 1700, but workshops were larger and the social distinctions between master and apprentice had been replaced by more by a more absolute division between employer and wage earner’.

## **Question 21**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may suggest that during the Age of Islay the power to govern remained within Scotland:**

**Islay's political power:**

- the Earl of Islay controlled virtually all governmental functions within Scotland between 1725-1761 except for during the years between 1737 and 1741
- dubbed 'The King of Scotland', he was appointed by the British Prime Minister Robert Walpole to manage Scottish affairs following the Malt Tax riots
- Islay's ability to govern was reinforced by his appointment to positions of high office – Keeper of the Seal of Scotland and office of the Lord Justice General
- Islay's control over Scottish politics was total – the electoral system was controlled through effective management. His grip on Scottish political and civil affairs was reinforced through his personally held political party, the Argathelians, whom relied upon a complex network of informal contracts and the use of patronage
- parliamentary dissent amongst Scottish MPs during the Age of Islay was entirely absent following the demise of the Squadrone Party
- Islay's use of patronage extended beyond politics – he controlled the high offices of law and universities and exercised influence within the General Assembly and the Convention of Royal Burghs. Amongst Islay's most prominent appointees was Francis Hutcheson to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University.

**Evolution of Scottish Administrative Infrastructure:**

- key Argathelians Duncan Forbes, the Lord Advocate, and Andrew Fletcher, a Lord of Session became architects of a system of government largely autonomous from Westminster
- development of specifically Scottish governmental infrastructure – for example modernisation of the machinery of tax collection augmented by military garrisons, particularly in the Highlands
- Islay oversaw the reform of the Scottish financial system including the establishment of the Royal Bank of Scotland (1727) within which tax revenues were held.

**Westminster's indifference:**

- Scotland was virtually ignored by Westminster's new legislation – as long as Islay's governance delivered political stability the British legislator's lack of Scotland specific law confirmed was a given. Between 1727 and 1745 Westminster passed only 2 pieces of major legislation and 7 minor acts which applied specifically to Scotland
- the British ministerial post of Secretary of State for Scotland remained vacant between 1725–1741.

**Evidence which may suggest that during the Age of Islay the power to govern was not within Scotland:**

**Removal of Scottish political infrastructure:**

- vacuum created in executive and legislative authority following the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and the Privy Council ensured all legislation originated from Westminster – the ultimate political authority was firmly vested in London
- Earl of Islay's report to Walpole described the effect of this vacuum as 'a long series of no administration. . . the letter of the law had no effect on the people'
- although absenteeism saw the landed Scottish elite contribute to this power vacuum as they relocated south, their power over Scottish political, economic and civil life remained intact, albeit geographically remote.

### **Westminster's governance:**

- Westminster's authority was absolute, within the context of the maintenance of the Union and the supremacy of the House of Hanover. Relative lack of British legislation reflected Hanoverian priorities regarding Scotland as being focused upon political stability and military security
- London's ambivalence reflected the maintenance of an orderly, peaceful Scotland and not an inability to exercise governmental authority
- Walpole's ministry wielded enormous economic power through the Equivalent funds which were released in return for the maintenance of the status quo in Scotland by Islay's management. Thus, Islay's authority was dependent upon the approval of the British government
- 1725 Prime Minister Walpole's enforcement of the Malt Tax in Scotland resulted in a national response of outrage which required General Wade and 400 dragoons – Devine describes the Scottish response in all major cities as 'a dangerous challenge to the union state'
- English ministers were responsible for passing all legislation relating to Scottish government and affairs – for example the establishment of the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Manufactures and Fisheries (1727)
- 1741–1746 Scottish Secretary of State appointed to report directly to Westminster
- Westminster's response following Culloden illustrated the sovereignty of the British parliament and its ability to enforce legislation if it deemed it necessary – for example the annexation of highland estates, the abolition of heritable jurisdictions and the establishment of sheriffs as instruments of local government
- the extent of autonomy remained dependent on the effectiveness and will of the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General both of whom reported to British ministers.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Robert Harris:</b>	Accepts that Islay achieved considerable autonomy from Westminster, however, concludes that ultimate political power remained firmly in a (disinterested) London. 'In all important matters the power of decision lay outside Scotland with men who knew little of Scotland, and who usually wanted to know little'.
<b>Tom Devine:</b>	Suggests that Islay's management of Scotland was almost free from Westminster's interference, describing this arrangement as based on a 'contract with Walpole; Islay would deliver political stability and the votes of Scottish MPs in return for patronage and the authority to govern. . . Walpole trusted him to run Scotland with hardly any reference to Westminster'.
<b>John D Mackie:</b>	Summarises the political impotence of Scotland following the Union. 'There was no effective independent administration in Scotland. . . a Scotland that had, broadly speaking, no electoral rights no active Parliamentary representation and no political voice beyond an occasional outburst of resentment'.
<b>Rosalind Mitchison:</b>	Stresses the symbolic significance of Walpole's enforcement of the Malt Tax in Scotland as the introduction of British legislation almost certain to be unpopular, describing the severity of the reaction in Scotland as 'a movement of national resistance'.

## Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 22

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that the candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	'Chevalier' James Johnstone was a wealthy Edinburgh merchant, prominent Episcopalian and one of the first notable society figures to publicly declare for the Prince's cause.	Chevalier quickly became a senior Jacobite officer of considerable significance. He held various senior posts including aide-de-camp for both Charles and Lord George Murray. He also commanded his own company and fought in support of the Duke of Perth's. Went into exile after the '45.
<b>Purpose</b>	A personal account of the rebellion.	Johnstone was 'a Scot', rather than one of 'the Irish' within Charles's senior officers. As such, he tends to favour Lord George Murray's role when writing of Charles's failings. He is attributing blame on to Prince Charles.
<b>Timing</b>	Written around 1770.	Though not commercially published until 1802, Johnstone's memoirs were written after Charles's defeat and has had time to reflect on events. His account is largely consistent with other contemporary accounts.

Point in Source A		Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
Prince Charles acquired a strong enthusiasm for battle as a result of the events at Prestonpans but his wish to fight became a blindness and he repeatedly criticised Lord George Murray for his unwillingness to risk battle, even when all his officers could see there was little point in doing so.		Critical in the role of Charles in terms of his poor judgement in wishing to commit to battle prematurely, an isolated view at odds with his officers. Strong terms such as 'blindness' reveal the Chevalier's attitude to Prince Charles.
. . . the Prince's over-confidence extended to his faith in the recruitment of his English subjects. Alas, his enthusiasm was not shared by these disloyal people; in truth, there was no reason for supposing fifty thousand men would leave London to join our army, as we had found the English hostile to our cause.		Describes the near universal hostile reaction amongst the English population to the advancing Jacobite army which undermined Charles's anticipated recruitment of soldiers to fight for his cause. The language underlines his disappointment – these disloyal people.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
<p>The effect of false messages communicated to our Prince, including the claimed arrival of ten thousand French soldiers, were also immensely damaging as every soldier in our army believed a French invasion was imminent. When it did not come mistrust and ill-discipline followed.</p>	<p>Language strongly suggests anger that intelligence failures and poor communication were particularly damaging to the morale and operation of the Jacobite army, leading to poor discipline. Expressions such as ‘false messages’ and ‘immensely damaging’ show the Chevalier’s anger at the way in which the Prince and his followers were misled.</p>

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- victory at Prestonpans was achieved with relative ease. The total Jacobite fatalities was around forty in comparison to the approximate five hundred of Cope’s Hanoverians causalities. Charles interpreted this victory as vindication of the invincibility of his army and their Highland charge
- Charles’s advance from Edinburgh into England was based upon his assumption that his loyal subjects would rise and join his army. This was wholly mistaken, aside from the celebrated Catholic ‘Manchester Regiment’ which totalled 200 men
- communication issues bedevilled the Jacobite campaign both within the officer core and externally, particularly with the French. Charles’s promises of French military assistance was the most infamous example.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- Hanoverian incompetence played a significant role in the Jacobite’s initial success. In 1744 there were only 3,000 Hanoverian soldiers in Scotland
- Scotland was not secure and quickly returned to Hanoverian control once the Jacobites advanced into England
- despite the reservations of Lord George Murray and the advantages the site afforded the Hanoverian army, the climactic battle of Culloden represented the fulfilment of Charles’s eagerness to engage the Hanoverians
- in an attempt to avoid Hanoverian forces, Charles’s chosen route of advance through northern England circumnavigated areas traditionally associated with support for the House of Stuart, notably Lancashire, where recruitment would have appeared most likely
- strength of the Hanoverian response following Cumberland’s return from Europe, the naval blockade and use of military intelligence
- absence of meaningful European intervention.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
John Prebble	Critical of the leadership and personal qualities of the Prince whom he describes as ‘self-centred and tragically reckless. . . he brought little but the innocent appeal of his personality’.
Rosalind Mitchison	Argues that Prestonpans and other Jacobite successes occurred by luck rather than design. ‘By chance, by force and by the failure of the government, the Jacobite army was initially effectively unopposed’.
Daniel Szechi	Specifically critical of Charles’s tactics throughout the rising, concluding that ‘his strategic vision was very poor’.
Tom Devine	Emphasises the lack of domestic support for Charles’s cause ‘Scottish backing during the rising was remarkably thin on the ground long before the crushing defeat of Culloden; it was this together with the virtual disappearance of support in England which ultimately ended the last hopes of restoration’.

### Question 23

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Continued crop innovation was central, encouraged not least by rising consumer demand in England and yields accordingly improved. . .	Suggests that the introduction of new crops was important in improving productivity.
. . . landowners even erected model villages for their newly prosperous commercial tenantry. . .	Suggests that improving landlords invested to improve the physical infrastructure.
Enclosure of ‘commonties’ (customary common land) also accelerated greatly after mid-century which provided new field divisions. . .	Suggests that the enclosure of land was important to new cropping techniques and an increased commercialisation of agriculture.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the introduction of soil improving crops to improve fertility including sown grasses, turnips and clover improved the productiveness of land
- numerous examples of planned and expanded villages such as Ormiston, Tynningham and Turriff; importantly some of these also featured attempts to integrate agricultural production with cottage industries such as weaving, brewing and distilling
- enclosure created enlarged fields demarcated by ditches, dykes and hedges which fundamentally altered the physical appearance of farmland by removing the traditional open-fields and common grazing.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- the introduction of other crops, such as the potato, supplemented staple crops – particularly oats. This was especially important in the Highlands in providing a nutritious crop tolerant of infertile conditions
- the ‘Improvers’ impact was not confined exclusively to husbandry and planned villages, and included the construction of rural infrastructure improvements such as road and bridge building
- the rural landscape was fundamentally altered by afforestation, irrigation and the replacement of fermtouns on a huge scale. Notable examples include the drainage of the carse of Blairdrummond moss by Lord Kames and the planting of 27 million trees in Perthshire by the Duke of Atholl
- not all of the ‘Improvers’ efforts were successful – for example the spectacular bankruptcy of John Cockburn of Ormiston
- the ‘Improvers’ as a collective body changed as the 18<sup>th</sup> century progressed. Initially the movement was dominated by predominantly amateur aristocratic members of the Honourable Society of Improvers, though as the impact of the ‘Improvers’ became more pronounced those behind these successes came from an increasingly diverse backgrounds including the clergy and enterprising farmers.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Tom Devine</b>	Reminds us of the impact of Improvers' literature published throughout the 18 <sup>th</sup> century – ‘the wide dissemination of the Improver’s publications did give greater impetus to the spread of most progressive ideas’.
<b>Christopher Smout</b>	States that the Improvers’ impact was significant, but for the most part concentrated in the second half of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century. ‘While unable to influence the course of agrarian change in the adverse demand circumstances before 1760, the Improvers arguably had a profound impact on the response of the supply side between 1760 and 1820’.
<b>Christopher Whatley</b>	Argues that improvements to rural land such as Enclosure tended to be most impactful on larger farms until at least mid-century, and that other manifestations of improvement such as planned villages were far more numerous in the Lowlands than the Highlands.
<b>John Symon</b>	Provides the traditional interpretation of the impact of the Improvers – ‘many Improvers did notable work in the first half of the 18 <sup>th</sup> century, yet the agricultural revolution began in earnest only in its second half’.

### Question 24

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
To set up effective parish schools took many decades, as the achievement inevitably lagged, but it is now widely accepted that, in the lowlands, nearly all parishes had a functioning school by the early 1700s.	Suggests that parish schools were established across almost all of the lowlands by the end of the 17 <sup>th</sup> century.
... parish schools became deeply embedded... giving rural education a status lacking in most European countries as it was delivered by teachers who were full time professionals.	Confirms the importance of the quality and professional nature of teachers in establishing schooling in rural communities.
... although education was not compulsory, Kirk sessions usually paid the fees for poorer children, and sending children to school became part of community expectations.	Underlines the role of the Kirk in ensuring that even the poorest children could attend school which reinforced the importance of schooling.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- though the 1696 Act was successful in establishing a network of schools the education provided was relatively basic, often being limited to elementary instruction. Nonetheless, basic literacy was achieved across the Scottish Lowlands by the 1760s
- the professionalisation of teachers in parish schools was far from uniform. The nature of the parish school system meant regional variation, village by village, ensuring considerable variation in terms of teachers from university graduates to predominantly female villagers whom themselves possessed only rudimentary literacy and numeracy
- largely through the parish school system Scottish schooling continued to be affordable certainly in comparison with England, giving rise to the celebrated tradition of the ‘Lad o’ pairts’.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given
The 1803 Education Act sought to improve the quality of public schooling by attracting better teachers through improved salaries and accommodation.	Suggests that teachers were underpaid, resulting in legislation aimed at improving their pay and conditions of employment.
... it also granted parishes the right to raise by local taxation the significant sum of £35 a year as a public fund from which localities could pay for additional school building, as were required by each parish.	Argues that considerable funds could now be generated through tax raising powers enabling individual parishes to build additional schools.
... it also quietly transferred important powers such as matters of curriculum, problems over the condition and repair of school buildings and even the disciplining of teachers from the Church to the state.	Contends that the real significance of the 1803 Act was the transfer of wide-ranging powers from Church to state.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the inadequate remuneration of teachers remained a significant problem in terms of teacher recruitment and retention. However, the expansion of grammar schools and academies afforded new opportunities. Teachers were increasingly graduates, partly due to the continuing importance of Latin
- funding of education and the extraction of sufficient funding from heritors remained an issue throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, particularly in the establishment of rural schools. The shortfall of funds was most pronounced in the Highlands. Thus, the financing aspect of the 1803 Act was significant
- the secularisation of society eroded the Kirk's control of education throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This process was evident in the role of town council's development of grammar schools and the establishment of independent schools both of which were outwith the control of the Kirk.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- the evolving curriculum, largely in response to the demand generated by the professions and the business classes led to fundamental changes in subjects taught and the type of teachers employed
- the continuing diversification of educational provision impacted upon the cost of schooling. As expectations and choice increased, so did the price. A case in point was the establishment of private and 'adventure schools' which enhanced educational provision for those that could afford it
- the Kirk continued to have a significant influence over Scottish education primarily through the activities of the SSPCK which had established 176 schools in the Highlands by 1758, achieving significant expansion in the provision of education. By 1750 an estimated eighty percent of Highland parishes had a school
- university expansion and reform permeated down to schools, partly as a legacy of the reformation's attempts to create an integrated system of education.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Christopher Smout	Suggests that though important, the parish school system was gradually subsumed by other types of school provision which reflected education's changing purpose, largely due to the demands of the emerging middle and professional classes.
John Mackie	Supports the contention that financing the building and maintaining of school buildings was a defining difficulty during the 18 <sup>th</sup> century. He argues the Education Act (1696) successfully compelled heritors to provide buildings for elementary but not secondary schools.
Arthur Herman	Contests the impact that the Schools Act (1696) had, arguing that it failed to address the shortcomings of educational provision in the Highlands which remained significantly inferior to that available in the Lowlands.
Robert Houston	Challenges accepted views of Scotland's superior literacy in comparison with other countries, and stresses the inconsistency of 'universal' literacy across Scotland.

## Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 25

Candidates might refer to:

**Common economic features:**

- the USA remained a largely rural nation. Agriculture dominated the USA’s economy regardless of the section. The North-west was known as ‘the larder of the USA’ producing food crops whereas agriculture in the South was focused on cotton, tobacco etc but agriculture dominated the economy in both sections
- while there was some urban development, 80% of Americans lived in rural communities
- between 1850 and 1860 half a million farms came into production across the USA
- farming industry in both North and South became more reliant on technology, this led to a development in industry across the USA
- the North was industrialising rather than industrialised, for example, only four Northern manufacturing industries employed more than 50,000 people
- industry in the South was developing, for example, Tredegar Iron Works. The Upper South was traditionally along the same lines as the North – although not industrialising at the same rate as the North
- there was a clear bond between the developing industrial economy of the North and the Southern agricultural based economy. The textile factories of the North-East were reliant on southern cotton production. New England mills consumed 283.7 million pounds of cotton, or 67 percent of the 422.6 million pounds of cotton used by US mills in 1860. The textile industry of New England was dependent on Southern cotton production
- there was a common desire to grow the railroads and an eagerness to ensure the construction of the trans-continental railroad which would bring trade between the east coast and the Orient
- development of the telegraph with 50,000 miles by 1850
- California Gold Rush led to an economic gulf as Northern states benefitted.

Evidence which may support other views:

**Contrasts in industrial development:**

- a more progressive and diverse Northern economy. Financial and trading centres in the North-East, an industrial based economy in the North-East and food producing farms in the North-West. A strong economic bond developed between the North-West and North-East based on beneficial trading arrangements
- there was greater industrial development in the North than the South. There were approx. 140,000 factories in the USA in 1850, of which only approx. 20,000 were found in the South. Suggesting there was a gulf between North and South in economic development and diversification
- by 1860, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had nearly \$100 million each invested in manufacturing industries. The most industrialised of the Southern states, Virginia, had invested less than \$20 million. The other states in the South had less than \$5 million invested in manufacturing industries
- the value of goods manufactured in these states also suggests an economic gulf in industrial production. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania production were valued at more than \$150 million. Virginia was valued at less than \$30 million. Alabama was valued at less than \$5 million
- the North had greater railway mileage with journey times significantly reduced. The South tended to rely on their river network more than railways
- while there was some industrial development in the Upper South, the Southern economy as a whole was dominated by agriculture
- there was limited urbanisation in the South. By 1860, only 20 towns had more than 5,000 inhabitants. Charleston and Richmond only had a population of 40,000. This was compared with the heavily populated northern industrial cities (New York, 813,000, Philadelphia, 565,000, Boston, 177,000, Chicago, 112,000)
- the South had 35% of US population but produced only 10% of manufactured output.

### **Southern ‘King Cotton’:**

- cotton produced in the South in the 1850s had accounted for 77% of the 800 million pounds of cotton used in Britain
- Southern crops made up three-fifths of total American exports. Cotton was by far the country’s largest export comprising 50% of US exports
- during the 1857 Financial Crisis, James Hammond emphasised the Southern confidence in cotton production during a debate in the U.S. Senate: ‘You dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is king’
- inequalities in wealth distribution with society dominated by the planter class which made up approx. 5% of the southern population
- with only 30% of the nation’s free population, the South had 60% of the wealthiest men. Only 25% of the White Southern population owned slaves. Only 2.5% had more than 50 slaves. The average was less than 5. This suggests that there was an economic gulf between North and South but also an economic gulf within the South itself
- the 1860 per capita income in the South was \$3,978, in the North it was \$2,040
- as a result of the cotton boom, there were more millionaires per capita in the Mississippi River Valley by 1860 than anywhere else in the United States
- the South prospered, but its wealth was very unequally distributed. The distribution of wealth in the South became less democratic over time, fewer whites owned slaves in 1860 than in 1840.

### **Ideological differences:**

- the Tariff was of annoyance to the South as this impacted on the profits in the South. The Southerners feared a reactionary tariff would be imposed by the USA’s trading partners, for example, Britain. The North favoured a Tariff as protection from British industrial imports. This suggests an economic gulf between North and South. The 1857 economic depression had a significant impact on the Northern economy. Hence the speech by James Hammond to the Senate in 1857.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Charles and Mary Beard	Take the view that the sections were divided into an agricultural South and an industrial North.
David Potter	Takes the view that there was no economic gulf between North and South and therefore rejects the views of Charles and Mary Beard.
Frank Owsley	Takes the view that if slavery was the corner stone of the Confederacy, cotton was its foundation. At home its social and economic institutions rested upon cotton, abroad its diplomacy centred around the well-known dependence of Europe . . . upon an uninterrupted supply of cotton from the southern states.
Avery Craven	Takes the view that the South had the same level of economic enterprise as the North.

## Question 26

Candidates might refer to:

### Lack of unity:

- one of several reform movements at the time, for example, temperance, women's rights
- several abolitionist organisations in existence ranging widely in their approach
- aims of the movement were divided – immediate versus gradual approach
- influence of and attitudes towards William Lloyd Garrison and 'The Liberator'
- 'The Liberator's' circulation did not exceed 3,000
- role and influence of Frederick Douglass
- attitude of anti-slavery societies.

### Lack of interest:

- limited appeal of the group in the free states
- complete failure of the movement in the South
- background of Northern hostility towards Black people
- Northern fears.

### Political limitations:

- 'Gag rule' limited the political impact of abolitionism
- lack of political forum to achieve their aims
- 1850 Fugitive Slave Law
- lack of Liberty Laws in some Northern states
- the failure of the Dred Scott Case which ruled against the abolitionist case
- failure to win the support of either Whigs or Democrat Parties
- limited impact of the Liberty Party.

### Failure in the South:

- fear of an insurrection by enslaved peoples was widely held in the South
- the publication of 'The Liberator' in the same year as Nat Turner's revolt led many Southerners to blame Northern abolitionists for stirring up trouble among enslaved people
- increase in the arguments in defence of their ownership of enslaved peoples amongst Southerners
- abolitionist literature was excluded from most Southern States.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Harold Temperley	Takes the view that the abolitionist movement found it more difficult to agree upon how to achieve its aims, rather than the aims themselves, and this handicapped its effectiveness.
Charles Beard	Takes the view that the role of the abolitionists was insignificant since, in his view, was not the cause of the conflict between the North and the South ownership of enslaved people.
Avery Craven	Takes the view that the abolitionists' militant strategies were inadmissible and unacceptable.
James Freehling	Takes the view that the Federal Government had limited powers, states' rights were seen as sacrosanct, and autonomy was fiercely guarded. As long as ownership of enslaved people was maintained in 15 states, it could not be abolished by amendment.

## Question 27

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may support the view that disputes over western territories had the most damaging impact on national politics between 1854 and 1860:**

- the Kansas-Nebraska Act prompted a coalition of anti-slavery groups, for example, Anti-Nebraska Party, The People's Party and Republicans
- Stephen Douglas' repeal of the Missouri Compromise caused outrage in the North
- the competition for control of Kansas sparked a race between settlers in favour of the ownership of people and free-soil settlers giving a focal point for the Northern political voice
- rival state legislatures emerged in Kansas with the Lecompton representing the settlers in favour of the ownership of people 'official' result in Kansas versus the anti-slave 'unofficial' Topeka state legislature
- 'Bleeding Kansas'
- the Whigs were terminally divided into sections following Kansas Nebraska Act
- the Act awakened the spectre of the 'Slave Power Conspiracy'.

**Evidence which might suggest other reasons contributed to severely damaging politics between 1854 and 1860:**

**Southern political power, the sentiment of those against the ownership of enslaved peoples & Slave Power Conspiracy:**

- many Northern Democrat voters sought a new political party as the Democrats were increasingly dominated by Southern opinion
- the Democrats had controlled the Presidency for nearly fifty years leading to calls of a conspiracy in the North
- five out of seven Supreme Court judges were from Southern States
- the Democrats appeared to be committed to advance the cause of the ownership of enslaved peoples; hence the 'Slave Power Conspiracy' theory which dominated Northern thinking
- 'Bleeding Sumner' and the apparent attack on democracy by politicians in favour of the ownership of enslaved people
- Northerners opposed the extension of the ownership of enslaved peoples into the territories and increasingly supported parties or groups that reflected these views
- Republicans viewed the ownership of enslaved peoples as restricting the South's economic growth
- the Republicans were one of a number of coalitions in the North which were opposing the ownership of enslaved peoples.

**Nativism:**

- mass immigration from Europe to Northern cities led to resentment of immigrants from WASPs and therefore the rise of the 'American Party' or Know Nothings
- the apparent strong links between the hierarchy of the Democratic Party and the Catholic Church led to calls for changes in Northern political circles. This was exacerbated by the fact that most Catholics voted Democrat
- there was religious and political opposition to immigration but critically social and economic motivations also existed in the North leading to a change in political direction in the North
- however not all Republicans held nativist views. Lincoln famously stated his opposition to the Know Nothings in 1855
- perhaps a degree of inevitability that the Know Nothings would be dominated by a Northern coalition movement which became part of the Republican coalition or 'umbrella'
- issues of temperance, anti-immigration, anti-Catholicism particularly in Northern politics fatally divided the Whigs, leading to their collapse.

### **Northern Economic Policies:**

- the protective tariff had long been an issue in US politics, but the issue was exacerbated by the 1857 Economic Crisis
- the concept of ‘free labour’ was heightened in political circles by the Dred Scott case of 1857 and added increased support to political movements that support abolitionism
- Government aid for internal improvements and the desire for a homestead law following the movement of people into Kansas and Nebraska
- multi-faceted appeal of the Republicans – a rainbow coalition of Northern ideals, many of which encompassed the economic views of Northerners from a range of economic backgrounds and occupations.

### **Failings of politicians and leading officials:**

- Stephen Douglas’ introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 1854 and his repeal of the 1820 Missouri Compromise led directly to the downfall of the Whigs, emergence of the Republican Party and ‘Bleeding Kansas’
- James Buchanan’s adoption of the fraudulent Lecompton Constitution which favoured the ownership of enslaved people and inept leadership from 1856 furthered the divide
- Lincoln’s debates with Douglas in 1858 led to widespread fear in the South regarding Northern attitudes to the ownership of enslaved peoples
- role of the abolitionists, particularly John Brown, led to an increasingly entrenched southern political stance on slavery.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Peter Parish</b>	The rivalry between North and South was exacerbated by the imbalance in the political power brought about by territorial expansion.
<b>Hugh Tulloch</b>	The Republican Party was born in the aftermath of the Kansas-Nebraska controversy. The Republicans attracted those opposed to Southern determination to maintain the ownership of enslaved people.
<b>Charles Beard</b>	The Republicans were the vehicle to establish supremacy of Northern capitalism throughout the USA.
<b>William Gienapp</b>	The Republicans were united in their opposition to the ‘slave power’. The Know-Nothings had eroded previous party loyalties.

## **Question 28**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Northern diplomacy:**

- Trent Affair and Lincoln's diplomacy
- actions of key USA representatives in their dealings with Britain
- effect of the Emancipation Proclamation and the impact of the final proclamation
- role of Charles Francis Adams – USA Minister in London
- direct approach of William Seward, for example, May 1861
- Adams' and Lincoln's dealings over the 'Laird Rams' in summer 1863
- Lincoln's insistence that the conflict was a domestic rebellion whilst maintaining the blockade of the South.

**Union military success:**

- impact of the failure of Southern military strategy in the autumn of 1862 and summer of 1863
- Sherman's march through Georgia and the capture of Atlanta in 1864 made Lincoln's re-election likely and ended any final consideration of foreign intervention.

**Popular opinion in Europe:**

- British public opinion was divided over the conflict
- French leaned towards intervention on the Confederate side but were reluctant to move without British support
- much resentment towards Confederate attempt at 'economic blackmail'.

**Self-interest of the European powers:**

- European calculations of self-interest, for example, Britain's defence of Canada and France's involvement in Mexico under Napoleon III
- fear that involvement in a war so far from home would be extremely costly, for example, impact of the Crimean War shaped British attitudes
- no vital British interest appeared at stake; therefore, it was unlikely that they would become involved.

**Economic factors:**

- cotton embargo on Europe and how this was perceived
- Britain's fear of losing valuable markets and investments in the North, for example, British dependency on Northern grain.

**Failure of Southern diplomacy:**

- failure of Confederate representative Mason to persuade British involvement
- difficult to argue what more Confederate representatives could have achieved.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Emory Thomas</b>	Takes the view that the Confederacy's hopes depended on the success of its armies. But the lack of success prevented European recognition which was essential if Southern armies were to succeed. It was a vicious diplomatic circle. However, he also argues that the role of C.F. Adams in London and W.L. Drayton in Paris ensured good USA relations in Europe. Emancipation introduced a moral dimension which could not be ignored.
<b>Phillip Shaw Paludan</b>	Takes the view that Seward waved the sword in 1861 as a diplomatic threat. Trent affair scared both Britain and the North and both sought to retain dialogue in preference to war.
<b>Thomas Boaz</b>	Takes the view that the South only needed to withhold cotton to force British/French intervention. USA blockade declaration allowed Britain to declare its neutrality and trade with both sides.
<b>Brian Holden Reid</b>	Takes the view that the South's belief in the power of King Cotton deluded her into believing foreign intervention would come. France would not act unilaterally. She would only follow Britain's lead. Britain desired to avoid confrontation, and this explains why the conflict did not spread.

## **Question 29**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may support the view that General Grant demonstrated his abilities as a great military commander:**

- Grant was an intuitive soldier, identifying opportunities and taking advantage of them
- Grant was always aggressive in warfare and in seizing the opportunity to counterattack sealed the Union breakthrough of the Confederate lines
- Grant always tried to seize the offensive in battle which led to a breakthrough of the Confederate lines. Grant's reply, wholly in character with his approach to warfare, captured the imagination of the northern public, 'No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted'
- Grant was aggressive in battle and was determined to achieve a victory
- Grant grasped the opportunity in the western theatre and gradually took control of the Mississippi River which would be strategically vital to the outcome of the war. Grant was well known for his offensive strategy such as the siege of Corinth in 1862 or the siege of Petersburg in 1865
- Grant was nicknamed 'Unconditional Surrender Grant'
- Grant's command at Shiloh in 1862 exemplifies the large casualties under his command
- early successes, for example, Vicksburg
- exploitation of manpower and resources of the Union
- strategy aimed at destroying the South's will to continue the war
- development of idea of total war
- refusal to retreat after reverses at Cold Harbor and The Wilderness campaign
- respect for chain of command and Commander-in-Chief
- awareness of political implications of military events
- developed modern command structure
- greatness dependent on opposing generals.

**Evidence which may support the view that General Grant did not demonstrate his abilities as a great military commander:**

- Grant's strategy often brought about large casualties which concerned the Northern public
- the Northern public were appalled by the 13,000 Union casualties
- cries for Grant's removal radiated from all around the country
- Shiloh, almost sunk the Union cause through sloppy defences
- 'Butcher' Grant, human cost of his tactics too high
- personal frailties, alleged drunkenness.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>James McPherson</b>	Takes the view that the capture of Vicksburg was one of the most important strategic victories in the whole war.
<b>Susan Mary Grant</b>	Takes the view that Grant worked well with Lincoln as he recognised the need for the General-in-Chief to be subservient to Commander-in-Chief.
<b>Hugh Tulloch</b>	Takes the view that Grant demonstrated his leadership beyond the battlefield also by carefully sourcing additional resources to support his war effort.
<b>T Harry Williams</b>	Takes the view that Grant was a great battle captain but needed the support of Lincoln and Sherman for ultimate success.

## Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 30

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians’ views that the candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source’s value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	John C Calhoun.	Senator for South Carolina which became the lead state and voicing the views as a Southern ‘fire eater’ and fierce defender of Southern rights.
<b>Purpose</b>	Speech in the Senate.	To warn the Senate of Southern discontent during the 1850 crisis.
<b>Timing</b>	4 March 1850.	In the midst of the debate/disagreements over Clay’s omnibus bill. A convention of Southern states had already met at Nashville to discuss secession. Calhoun’s speech emphasises the discontent in the south during this period of division. This was his final speech before his death soon afterwards.

Point in Source A		Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The agitation has been permitted to proceed, with almost no attempt to resist it, until it has reached a point when it can no longer be disguised or denied that the Union is in danger.		Calhoun warns that if the disagreements over the issue of slavery are not addressed, he is warning that there is a ‘danger’ that the Union may not continue as the Southern states threatened to secede to highlight the severity of the situation.
. . . the immediate cause is almost universal discontent, which pervades all the States composing the Southern section of the Union. . . .		The Southern states were almost completely unified in their discontent as highlighted by the word ‘pervades’.
It is manifest [obvious], that on all the questions between it and the South, where there is a diversity of interests, the interests of the latter will be sacrificed to the former.		Southerners argued that the Northern states would always be favoured by Congress concerning issues in which North and South disagreed. He makes this totally clear by the use of words such as ‘manifest’ and ‘sacrificed’ showing the depth of feeling in the South.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the speech was written prior to 1850 compromise was agreed as the crisis deepened following the Mexican War and the perceived Northern attempts to prevent slavery in the new territories following the Mexican War
- Southerners feared that slavery would be abolished
- the balance of free and slave state representation in Congress was changing and the acquisition of California and New Mexico would tip the balance in favour of the North.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the evidence in the source:**

- California had asked for entry to the Union with a constitution which excluded slavery (ie – a free state)
- January 1850 – Henry Clay proposed a compromise followed by 7 months debate
- the three fifths clause of the constitution and the Fugitive Slave Law offered protections to slave holders
- vocal defenders of slavery such as John C. Calhoun emphasised these legal protections of slavery
- Northerners rejected the continuation of the trade/sale of slaves in DC
- debate over fugitive slaves and claims that the Northern states were not adhering to the law of 1793 and actively attempted to prevent Southerners recapturing slaves
- 63 ballots in the House of Representatives to elect a Speaker in 1850
- President Taylor refused to make concessions to the South in early 1850 heightening tensions
- Henry Clay, ‘the Great Compromiser’ emerged to find a solution as a slave holder but with a dislike for the institution. His Omnibus Bill was presented to Congress in January 1850
- The Bill included the acceptance of California as a free state, Utah and New Mexico admitted with no reference to slave status, slave trading to end in DC and an enhanced Fugitive Slave Law. Texas would surrender land to New Mexico in exchange for \$10 million debt to be settled by Congress
- 7 months of debate and failure to reach a compromise
- epic and fierce speeches on either side from Clay, Calhoun and Daniel Webster emphasised the divide in opinion
- in June 1850, 9 out of 15 slave states met to formulate a Southern response. This emphasises the divide that existed within the Southern section. Secession did not appear popular despite the disagreements. In the first convention, they met to express their collective concerns during the crisis of 1850. Only two Southern states were not represented
- President Taylor’s death allowed for a fresh approach to compromise from Stephen Douglas. Taylor’s stubbornness had added to the tensions and difficulties
- Douglas’ bill which was eventually successful. Allowed each side to vote on the individual terms that they supported rather than the bill as a whole. This failed to address the issues directly storing up trouble for the future
- on November 11, delegates from the Southern states reassembled in Nashville, Tennessee, to discuss the recent Congressional Acts regarding slavery. Assorted speakers advocated responses that ranged from sullen acquiescence to a commercial boycott to outright secession. Resolutions bristled with Southern defiance against Northern encroachments on the region’s rights, institutions, and very way of life. Yet very few Southerners paid any attention to the convention
- the Fugitive Slave Law caused significant problems
- 9 Northern states passed Personal Liberty Laws to counter the Fugitive Slave Law
- Uncle Tom’s Cabin by Harriet Beecher Stowe was published selling 300,000 copies in 1852 in the USA alone. Lincoln stated in 1863 when he met Stowe: ‘So you’re the little woman who wrote the book that made this great war’
- 1852 Presidential elections; Democrats were divided over their candidate. Franklin Pierce was eventually chosen over Lewis Cass. The main focus of their platform was to resist ‘agitation of the slavery question under whatever shape or colour the attempt may be made’
- the Whigs were critically divided with Winfield Scott elected as candidate on the 53rd ballot! But they were totally divided over their platform. This would be the final Presidential election for the Whigs and hailed the demise of the two-party national political system
- the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 aroused Northern suspicion about the Pacific Railroad across the South therefore favouring Southern interests
- Pierce and the filibustering expedition to seize Cuba in 1853 and the resulting Ostend Manifesto again raised tensions. Northern questions Southern motives regarding the expansion of slavery.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
David Potter	Takes the view that the 1850 Compromise was more of an ‘armistice’ than a compromise.
Joel Silbey	Takes the view that moderate politicians worked to maintain party alliances, emphasising issues that mitigated slavery as a political question. Moderates struggled to maintain the existing party system as an instrument of conflict resolution, but they did not relinquish sectional identification. Rather, they believed that sectional disputes could be resolved in the traditional manner using the existing cross-sectional parties. The election results suggested that the system was still able to absorb volatile national issues despite the tensions in this period.
Ludwell Johnson	Takes the view that the 1850 Compromise inflicted fatal ‘internal damage’ to both national political parties. Sectional alliances had consistently overwhelmed partisan allegiances, and though party unity regained strength after the Compromise, both parties inherited ‘a heavy burden of personal enmity and suspicion’.
Avery Craven	Has argued that the Congressional leaders addressed limited issues during the Compromise negotiations while deliberately overlooking the ‘principles’ at stake. In fact, the Compromise changed little: ‘the conditions that had produced the crisis, and the interests and ideals that lay back of contending groups, were still there. Most of them had to do with . . . things that men will not compromise.’ Competing Republican ideologies embraced and expressed many of the things that ‘men would not compromise’ in 1850.

### Question 31

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
In a vicious assault by overwhelming Confederate numbers at Milliken's Bend, Louisiana in June 1863, the white soldiers fled but the black troops stood fast demonstrating their bravery and commitment to the Union cause.	African American soldiers fought bravely when they were allowed to fight following the Emancipation Proclamation which was critical to Union victory.
By the end of the war, almost 179,000 black men had served in the Union army and another 20,000 had enlisted in the navy. This was critical to Union victory.	The volume of African American soldiers and sailors was critical to Union victory particularly towards the end of the war.
Lincoln recognised their contribution with high praise when he declared that their service was indispensable to Union victory.	Lincoln was well aware of the critical role that African American soldiers were to Union victory.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the contribution of many individual regiments was vital to the Union war effort, for example, the 54th Massachusetts as characterised in the film 'Glory'
- the number of African American soldiers involved in Union war effort totalled 10% of the Union total in 1865. These new recruits added the 'overwhelming numbers' of Union troops (180,000) that Lee 'yielded' to in 1865
- use of runaway enslaved people crossing into Union lines and providing Northern commanders with valuable strategic information.

#### Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the contribution of African American soldiers helped alter Northern opinion towards emancipation by seeing their contribution and sacrifices for the Union cause
- African American soldiers played a crucial role when the need for their labour in army was greatest. Non-combatant war work largely carried out by African American soldiers before the Emancipation Proclamation was critical to the Union war effort
- runaway enslaved people destabilised the Southern economy and their ability to wage war. Many of the runaway enslaved people fought for North. It is estimated that 500,000 slaves fled to join the Union army with a devastating effect on the Southern economy
- African American recruits provided fresh impetus to a flagging war effort in 1863
- war was not over in 1863; African American soldiers need for 'movement on all fronts'
- Lincoln believed sight of African American soldiers would quell the rebellion 'if vigorously applied'
- African American people made up more than a third of Confederate population, therefore they were crucial in supporting the Confederate war effort in factories, mines and agriculture
- however, there were contradictory policies initiated by the Federal government throughout various stages of the war. For example, in refusing to enlist African American soldiers into army yet welcoming them into Federal navy
- issue of discrimination in terms of rates of pay. African American soldiers were excluded from the officer corps
- some plantation owners moved 'their property' to safety from advancing Union troops, thus limiting their efforts
- March 1865 – Confederate Congress passed laws allowing 300,000 slaves to serve in the Confederate Army, however this was too late in the war to make any impact.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Benjamin Quarles</b>	Takes the view that African American soldiers entered the Union forces at a time of serious depletion and made up 10% of Union total by end of conflict.
<b>Peter Batty and Peter Parish</b>	Take the view that African American contribution, though seldom spectacular, was still notable and caused many Northern whites to revise their opinions.
<b>Susan Mary Grant</b>	Takes the view that the decision to raise African American regiments was viewed as a necessary war measure.
<b>Gabor Boritt</b>	Takes the view that their absence would have limited Grant's 'Total War' tactics.

### Question 32

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
. . . the Southern soldiers reserved their democratic right to interpret orders broadly or simply disobey orders. . .	Argues that lack of military discipline within Confederate ranks.
Privates both resented and envied the privileges that their officers enjoyed.	Contends that this was causing divisions within the army.
Often the Confederate soldiers were in a position to put their officers in their place by petitioning for the resignation of unpopular commanders, which only acted to further demoralize Confederate discipline.	Argues officers often couldn't run the army properly because of the power of lower ranks to dismiss them. Also lower ranks in the Confederate Army could elect their own officers and this caused a lack of discipline.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- officers were therefore selected on the basis of popularity rather than ability, expertise or experience
- refusal to carry heavy equipment on long hot marches
- lack of discipline marching in line: Lee reported to Davis that 'our great embarrassment is the reduction of our ranks by straggling which it seems impossible to prevent'
- Southern soldiers considered it their right to determine the length of their service. In the early days of the war, some Confederate soldiers would return home following a victory in battle believing that they had performed their role. Conscription Act 1862 brought about significant desertion.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
. . . the North therefore overwhelmed the South with their great numbers and resources.	Argues the Union had superior manpower and resources therefore the South were inevitably defeated by this advantage.
. . . did not owe their defeat to numbers but to faulty strategy and the poor leadership of Jefferson Davis, who attempted to defend all Confederate territory. . .	Contends Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, made mistakes throughout the duration of the war and failed to devise an effective strategy to allow the South to win the war.
The growth of power of the central government compromised the power of the state governments and the states' rights that they seceded to secure. It is without doubt that this hindered the Confederacy.	Argues the Southern states had seceded to defend their states' rights however Jefferson Davis centralised much of the decision making during the war in order to maximise their chances of victory, however this compromised the states' rights that they seceded to protect.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the Confederacy was simply overwhelmed by the superior size of the Union army and the superiority of Union industrial base
- Lee announced to his troops ‘the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources’ following the surrender to Grant
- Union blockades on land and sea meant that no further supplies would arrive
- issues of states’ rights.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- a degree of political campaigning for positions took up unnecessary time, for example, Beauregard versus Joe Johnston at Manassas
- the democratic approach within the army was also found within government circles as Davis’s government preserved the traditional civil rights of freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom from arbitrary arrest. This hindered Confederate morale with Lee commenting that the Confederacy had ‘put all our worst generals to commanding our armies and all our best generals to editing newspapers!’
- development of idea of total war – campaigns of Grant and Sherman
- weaknesses within the Confederate government
- failure of ‘King Cotton’ diplomacy to win foreign recognition
- leadership of Lincoln
- strength of Northern political system to manage crises.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Current	Takes the view that the idea of ‘God and the strongest battalions’ was the key explanation for Southern defeat.
Frank Owsley	Takes the view that Southern defeat should be attributed to the issue of states’ rights.
T. Harry Williams	Takes the view that Northern victory was the result of the superiority of Northern military leadership towards the end of the conflict.
Emory Thomas	Takes the view that that the Confederacy’s hopes depended on the success of its armies. But the lack of success prevented European recognition which was essential if Southern armies were to succeed. It was a vicious diplomatic circle. However, he also argues that the role of CF Adams in London and WL Drayton in Paris ensured good US relations in Europe. Emancipation introduced a moral dimension which could not be ignored.

## Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 33

**Evidence which may support the significance of the revival of Shintoism as a force for change:**

- rise of nationalism through the Shinto Revivalist movement and shift of emphasis away from Neo-Confucianism
- Shinto was the indigenous Japanese religion that had been suppressed by Tokugawa as they placed great emphasis on Neo-Confucianism – because it underpinned the caste structure
- roots of Shinto Revivalism in a reaction against Chinese domination
- Motoori Noringa, one of the founders of the School of National Learning, who at first reacted against worship of Chinese thought – searching for pure Japanese culture
- Shintoism was centred upon the Emperor as a living god – direct descendant from Amaterasu, the sun goddess
- Shinto Revivalism led to the development of an emperor-centred loyalism and a growing belief that the Shogun had usurped power from the Emperor
- the fact that the Tokugawa Shoguns had kept the Emperor as the notional figurehead for the caste structure ultimately served to weaken the regime, as the Emperor became a rallying cry for the Shinto Revivalists
- many of those Choshu and Satsuma activists who were instrumental in the downfall of the Tokugawa were highly influenced by Shinto Revivalism.

**Evidence which may consider other internal forces for change:**

**Blurring of caste structure and socio-economic changes:**

- caste structure a crucial control mechanism as it dictated predictable behaviour across all the distant Hans within Japan
- the rigid structure, in theory, prevent social mobility and was rooted in reciprocal relations of loyalty and filial piety
- the Daimyo controlled their domains, the Samurai maintained control, the peasants produced the staple food, currency and provided taxation payments
- towards the end of the Tokugawa regime castes began to deviate from their supposed behaviour, which made the previous predictable and reliable behaviour become unpredictable and difficult to control
- peasants not necessarily content to remain on the land and increasingly reluctant to confine their activities to food growing and began diversifying into other kinds of activity. This was especially true of those peasants who lived close to castle towns
- changing position of the merchants – supposed to be the lower caste, yet their wealth was increasing
- Samurai selling privileges to merchants
- division between upper and lower-level Samurai and the discontent of the latter.

**Other relevant factors:**

- inherent problem of a decentralised system of government with the Tokugawa only having direct control over 25% of land in Japan – as illustrated through the failure of the Tempo Reforms
- impact of Tempo reforms in strengthening other notable clans within Japan – notably the Choshu and Satsuma
- impact of policy of Sakoku. This policy of seclusion which meant most Japanese people could not leave and foreigners could not enter Japan (without the approval of the authorities). Sakoku was a lengthy period of stability and led to peace in Japan which helped its economy as there were fewer disruptions and no need to spend money on conflicts. Peace allowed farmers to focus on producing cotton, silk and handcrafted goods
- lack of a standing army. Samurai individual warriors attached to a lord. They did not operate as a national army and found it difficult to withstand any external threat
- dilution of alternate attendance system.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Kenneth Henshall</b>	Contends that the rise of the merchant class. . . ultimately helped undermine Tokugawa policy. Clearly, a class system that placed merchants at the bottom was losing touch with reality.
<b>Harold Bolitho</b>	Highlights the weakness of the Tokugawa system of government. ‘One by one the control mechanisms of the system failed: in the countryside the frequency, and the scale, of agrarian risings mounted. . . in the towns and cities reports of riots and looting told a similar story.’
<b>Janet Hunter</b>	Suggests that ‘the dynamic forces within society and in the economy eventually came into conflict with a national polity which sought to avoid change’.
<b>Richard Storry</b>	Contends ‘as. . . scholars examined the concept of loyalty, a corner-stone of Neo-Confucianism so firmly endorsed by the Bakufu, they began to think that after all perhaps the Japanese owed loyalty not so much to the Tokugawa Shogun as to the rather neglected line of emperors. . . Thus, among the educated. . . there was already, by the 1850s, a mental climate prepared for a return of the emperors to the centre of the stage’.

## **Question 34**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may support the argument that the Meiji were successful in achieving their aims:**

**Summary of aims:**

- the aims for the Meiji regime for their social reforms were achieved partly through their educational reforms linked to their desire to modernise Japan. The aims included training an educated, but pliable workforce
- they were also utilised to help galvanise a new sense of Japanese nationalism, united behind the position of the Emperor. This would also help consolidate their new regime. The inculcation of Neo-Confucianism values would help achieve this
- they wished to use educational reform, and the replication of western education infrastructure, to help in their quest to overturn the Unequal Treaties
- they issued a proclamation ‘no community with an illiterate family and no family with an illiterate person’
- they also wished to create an industrial working class and a middle class within society
- wanted to overturn the Unequal Treaties but careful selection and implementation of aspects of western society.

**Evidence which may suggest/support the argument that the Meiji were successful in achieving their aims:**

- in a desire to challenge the Unequal Treaties, the infrastructure of the reforms was heavily copied from the West
- initially education reform was influenced by the West
- there was an early influence of missionary schools, which particularly influenced the early education of girls
- Western works of literature were translated into Japanese in the early Meiji period
- a Ministry of Education was set up in 1871, which restructured primary, secondary and tertiary education along western lines
- co-educational schools established
- universities established, for example, Keio University in Tokyo
- influence of the Iwakura Mission – the delegation that became a fact-finding mission to western countries including America, France, Britain and Germany
- the delegates on the Mission were particularly interested in observing schools and the educational policy of the US and the French centralised education system
- influence of Mori Arinori in shaping the reforms. He was Japan’s first US ambassador and was heavily influenced by the education he saw there, which later helped shape educational reforms when he was recruited by Hirobumi to become the Minister for Education
- Arinori heavily promoted the English language
- in their desire to create an educated and compliant workforce, and ensure literacy embedded in all communities and families, they were successful with regards numbers receiving an education. Elementary school enrolments increased from about 30% of the school aged population in the 1870s to more than 90% by 1900, increasing to 100% when fees abolished. Education was clearly no longer restricted to the Samurai caste as had been the case prior to 1868
- in their desire to manipulate a new sense of nationalism through education, this was particularly successful after 1890
- Imperial Rescript of Education – 30 October 1890 – and its role in directing schools to place more emphasis on traditional moral education, developing a sense of nationalism and loyalty to the emperor
- the basis of the Rescript was rooted in the historic bond between benevolent rulers and their loyal subjects – inculcating those very familiar Japanese values of loyalty and filial piety
- it was clearly rooted in Neo-Confucianist ideology – highlights a clear continuity with her cultural past
- after it was issued, the Rescript was distributed to all schools in the country, along with a portrait of the Emperor

- part of the Rescript stated ‘always respect the constitution and observe laws, should emergency arise, offer yourself courageously to the State thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne’
- traditional Confucian and Shinto precepts were once more stressed, especially those relating to the hierarchical nature of human relations, respect for authority and commitment to the new state – clear parallels with the Tokugawa caste structure
- military success highlights the success of education loyal soldiers
- the abolition of the caste structure did create an industrial working class and allowed for migration to the growing cities
- a social entrepreneurial class was created largely by the former Samurai, keen to invest their stipend but not so keen on joining the conscript army.

**Evidence which may suggest/support the argument that the Meiji were unsuccessful in achieving their aims:**

- Arinori was assassinated in 1889 because his reforms were perceived by some to be too western – and too much of a cultural break with the past
- growing concern that education was becoming too westernised by the 1890s, and was breaking too much culturally with the past, led to a backlash
- continuing importance of agriculture suggests changes in society may have been exaggerated
- candidates which suggest populace not totally compliant – events such as the Rice Riots, development of different political parties, legislation required to suppress freedom of speech
- last vestige of the Unequal Treaty was not overturned until 1911 – 40 years after the abolition of the caste structure – suggesting social reforms alone did not contribute to achieving the aim of overturning the Unequal Treaty.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Mikiso Hane	Suggests that ‘the children were taught they owed three great obligations, to their emperor, to their parents and to their teachers’.
Janet Hunter	Argues the prime objective of the (education) structure was ‘the needs of the state and its main goals were the provision of skills and patriotic morality among the many to produce a literate and pliable workforce’.
Fahs	Suggests that ‘Japan’s strong feeling of national identity was helpful in preventing blind acceptance of everything western. To its due Japan succeeded in retaining her own rich traditions’.
Richard Storry	Takes the view that ‘the progress of education moulded the people into a nation of patriots. . . The government needed literate soldiers, factory workers, business employees and government employees to achieve its goal of enriching the nation and challenging the Unequal Treaties’.

## **Question 35**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may support the perspective that foreign expertise was significant in shaping military reforms in Japan after 1868:**

- the military was the first area to hire foreign advisors, adopt Western organization – served as a model for other areas such as shopping, mining, munitions
- didn't start from scratch – Choshu/Satsuma had taken military reforms from early 1860s, for example, Satsuma employed British advisors
- foreign military advisors were employed
- foreign shipyards constructed warships
- French and Prussians advised regarding the army
- Britain advised on the navy
- 1872 French military officers arrived to become the core of the teachers in the new military academy
- led by Choshu Yamagata Aritomo- in charge of the new conscript army who suppressed a rebel uprising from the Satsuma clan. Eventually Field Marshal and PM
- conscription introduced Jan 1873 – end Samurai monopoly of warfare – heavily influenced by the west
- 3 years' service from 20-year-old men and four more years (from 1883–1889) in reserves, exemptions given to those under 5 ft 1-inch, sick, senior officials and those with special skills as well as heads of households
- schools of artillery and engineering – training in modern warfare
- staff College for senior officers
- Army General Staff set up in 1878 to oversee a modern professional army
- Naval General Staff in 1891 and later a training school
- by 1893 – the standing army consisted of 60,000 men and there was a small, efficient navy
- by 1912, standing army was 250,000.

**Evidence which may consider other influences shaping military reforms after 1868:**

- armed forces occupied a special place in Japanese society – and many unique Japanese aspects of military reform emerged
- the Meiji Constitution attributed a privileged constitutional position to the army with the emperor himself being made the Supreme Commander of the armed forces
- military chiefs of staff, presiding over strategic and tactical issues, were free of legislative and cabinet control
- they were responsible to the Emperor alone
- they effectively had legal and constitutional sanction for military independent action – formidable position
- to ensure the loyalty of the soldiers, the Meiji government put in place measures to deprive soldiers of political rights and to create a national identification with the army
- the army became the bastion of loyalty to the Emperor, the guardian of the interests of the nation
- 1878 – Admonition to Soldiers and Sailors – spoke of the need for bravery, loyalty and obedience and warned against political activity
- the 1882 Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors reinforced this
- can be argued that the 1882 Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors was a very influential 'document in Japanese history'
- it spelled out the duties every soldier and sailor had to learn by rote
- they were to refrain from politics
- they were not to question imperial policies or even voice private opinions about them
- the aim was to remove the armed forces from politics, to lift them to a higher sphere where the only thing that mattered was the imperial will
- it was also hoped to reduce rebellions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Elise Tipton</b>	Argues ‘changes in military institutions provide an excellent example of the Western institutional borrowing characterizing the Meiji modernization drive’.
<b>Ian Buruma</b>	Contends that ‘National unity was armed unity. National education was military education. The Samurai virtues were now applied nationally. Loyalty and obedience to the emperor, who was paraded around the country in military uniform, was the highest form of patriotism’.
<b>Ian Buruma</b>	Argues that ‘The idea of an imperial God who was also commander in chief of the armed forces was already a radical departure from Japanese tradition’.
<b>E H Norman</b>	Argues that ‘The armed forces reorganised after the Meiji Restoration were merely a skeleton without flesh and blood and would have been helpless without modern industry’.

## Question 36

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the perspective that Japan was successful in defeating China because of the Formosa Incident:

**Emergence as a leading Asian nation:**

- the defeat of China, following on from the Formosa incident, was clear evidence that the balance of power in Asia was shifting from China to Japan
- tension mounted over the Ryukyu Islands
- from 1871, the Japanese government aimed to incorporate these Islands
- China protested (in vain) that they should own them and Japan had no right to do this
- in 1873, sailors from Ryukyu were attacked and killed on Chinese controlled Taiwan (known then as Formosa – so this is called the Formosa Incident)
- the Japanese government claimed them as nationals and demanded compensation from China
- China refused to pay up and Japan sent a troop of 3,500 troops were none was paid, staying on in Taiwan until the end of 1874 when China finally gave in and paid up
- this episode increased tension between the powers and demonstrated Chinese weakness, which was a factor behind further aggression by Japan over Korea
- the islands were formally conceded in 1879 – this was Japan's first overseas territory
- it shows a clear shift in the balance of power between China and Japan – gave Japan the confidence in other sources of conflict for, example, Korea.

Evidence which supports the perspective that Japan was successful in defeating China because of other contributing factors:

**Military reforms:**

- abolition of the caste structure and the Samurai monopoly on the military, allow the new Meiji regime to introduce conscription (1872) and establish a standing army
- schools of artillery and engineering – training in modern warfare
- staff College for senior officers
- Army General Staff set up in 1878 to oversee a modern professional army
- Japanese military units were uniformly armed and the navies used their rapid firing guns
- despite the French defeat at the hands of Prussia, the Meiji government regarded French theory and structure of military as preeminent, before later turning to German models
- the English model was used for navies
- by 1893 – the standing army consisted of 60,000 men and there was a small, efficient navy.

**Nationalism:**

- the newly centralised state after 1868, united in the name of the Emperor, espoused as a living deity, generated a new sense of Japanese nationalism, which was encouraged in the conscripted soldiers and sailors
- impact of Imperial Rescript of Education 1895
- the Imperial Army and Navy were the emperor's, creating a strong tie between ruler and army
- 1882 Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors – reinforced unquestioningly loyalty to the emperor – creating an armed force that was loyal, had total respect for superiors, valour, faithfulness, righteousness and simplicity.

**Strategic significance of Korea:**

- Korea viewed with immense strategic significance to the Meiji regime. It was the area of Asian mainland closest to Japan. The new regime feared this was the route by which an overseas power could threaten the integrity and autonomy of Japan. The peninsula was viewed as the 'dagger pointing at the heart of Japan'
- growing tension with Korea – Koreans had rebuffed a Japanese mission in 1872 – Takamori had called for action against Korea at this point, to support compliance
- after their violation of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1894, China was viewed as a threat to the autonomy of the Korean peninsula and therefore Japan. The war was fought with a clear vision to remove China from Korea's sphere of influence. Such a clear vision was pivotal in their victory.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Marius Jansen</b>	Argues ‘Japan’s victory over China could be credited in good measure to its greater speed in modernizing its society and armed services’.
<b>Mikiso Hane</b>	Suggests ‘The Japanese army and navy had been modernised and were better prepared for warfare than the Chinese. China had been beset by the intervention of western powers since The Opium War with Britain as well as by domestic uprisings’.
<b>William Beasley</b>	Contends that ‘political parties in the Diet, urged on by patriot-activists and a volatile public, claimed that national honour was at stake’.
<b>Elise Tipton</b>	Argues ‘settling the status of Korea was at the centre of Japanese military strategy’.

## Question 37

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the perspective that Japan's actions within the context of WWI contributed to Japan being perceived as a world power:**

- the impact of Japan's participation during WWI
  - Japan joined the conflict on the winning side, acquiring Germany's Chinese sphere of influence in Shantung, extending its control of Manchuria and its overall influence on China
  - Taisho years witnessed imperial expansion becoming more aggressive and planned – 21 Demands in 1915, which was interpreted by the West as an attempt to bring China under its control.
- Evidence of shifting perspectives within Japan – growing confidence about their ability to operate as a global, expansionist power
- from 1915 Japanese industry underwent considerable expansion because it was able to capture markets from European powers actively involved in the war, for example, the Indian markets for textiles had been dominated by Lancashire products before 1914
  - Japan took over trade routes in Asia that had been dominated by western powers prior to the war. The number of merchant ships dramatically increased over the period of WWI, from 488 in 1900 to 2,996 by 1920. All contributed to shifting perspectives to Japan as an economic power
  - Japan emerged on the winning side in 1918 virtually as a non-combatant without having incurred any of the costs of war, unlike Britain and America – in a strong position to compete on a global power
  - the expansion of other Japanese industries, for example ship building and heavy engineering. However the West intervened with their Twenty-One Demands and forced Japan to drop the most ambitious of their demands – clear evidence of western perspectives towards Japan and their ambitions
  - Japan was not directly involved in any of the conflict so the international reaction to their involvement was limited
  - the international economy was also very unstable after the war and Japan was forced to trade in a very uncertain political world
  - the growth that had taken place had only been possible because of the absence of competition and on the return to peace Japanese industry suffered severe dislocation
  - not all workers benefited equally as wages had not risen as fast as prices and high food prices led to Rice Riots in 1918.

**Evidence which supports the perspective that other events during the Taisho years contributed to Japan being perceived as a world power:**

**The impact of Japan's participation in the Paris Peace Conference:**

- confirmation of Japan's changing status as a nation and evidence of their increasing influence in international politics
- became a Council member of the new League of Nations
- secured control of German concessions

**However**

- Japan's desire for racial equality clause as part of League of Nations Charter was not accepted
- although maintained control of the former German Mariana Islands, it was through a League mandate rather than outright ownership.

**The impact of Taisho Democracy:**

- political parties in the Diet came to dominate the cabinets – influenced by other world powers and their interactions with them
- influenced by foreign developments (such as Russian Revolution, establishment of Labour Party) led to demands for more social justice and equality, advanced by social movements of the period
- First 'commoner' Prime Minister, Hara Kei, first to be an elected member of the legislature. Other global powers aware of these political developments

**However**

- there was no change in the attitude in USA to Japanese immigration – 1908 they attempted to limit the flow of Japanese migrants, not allowed to own land in California.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Kenneth Pyle</b>	Holds the view ‘The outbreak of WWI in Europe in the summer of 1914 provided (Japan) extraordinary opportunities to advance the twin objectives of empire and industry’.
<b>Ayira Iriye</b>	Contends that ‘the Japanese were rewarded by being invited to the peace conference, the first time Japan attended a conference as a fully-fledged member’.
<b>Benson and Matsumura</b>	Takes the view ‘The rejection by the Powers of Japanese proposals for the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the Versailles Settlement heightened the grievance of the Japanese towards the unequal treatment to which the coloured races were subjected by Western peoples’.
<b>Richard Storry</b>	Argues ‘It was not long before Japan became a creditor instead of a debtor among nations’ during this period.

## Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 38

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
February 11, 1889, was the date chosen for the constitution to be handed down by the Emperor to his subjects, as though it were a gift from the gods.	The new Meiji constitution was presented as a gift from the Emperor.
'The Meiji Emperor hastened to reassure his divine forebearers that the constitution would naturally preserve the imperial sovereignty that had been bequeathed to him, in fact, more than preserve the point of the Meiji Restoration was that it 'restored' the ancient form of Japanese imperial rule.'	The new constitution would continue to protect the power of the Emperor, as divine.
They would have remained in the dark even if they had attended the ceremony, conducted later in the day, in the European style devised by the Emperor's German adviser.	There was German input into designing the ceremony for the new constitution.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- imperial role was formalised within the Meiji constitution
- the constitution was a 'gift' from the Emperor to his people – but it was written by Ito Hirobumi – an example of how his name was used to make people respect the new constitution
- 1st clause – spoke of Japan being reigned over in perpetuity by line of emperors
- 3rd clause – talked of the Emperor as 'sacred and inviolable'. The Emperor was the source of absolute sovereignty – thus very important
- continues to be the 'living deity' – continuation from Tokugawa times but given more prominence and 'formal' establishment
- Hirobumi was heavily influenced by the German model of constitution. He visited Germany in 1882.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- political centralisation was focused on the Emperor – absolute if symbolic power
- he was the head of the government, possessing on paper a sweeping range of centralised executive, legislative, administrative and military powers such as the right to make war and peace, adjourn the Diet and make peace treaties
- ministers responsible to the Emperor and not to the Assembly. Emperor selected Cabinet, PM, Senior military personnel and advisors rather than from being drawn from political parties
- bi-cameral parliament established – heavily influenced by Germany – another recently politically centralised country
- two houses were established within the Diet – the upper House of Peers and the lower House of Representatives
- the lower house was selected by a very limited franchise – 5% of male population
- upper unelected house far more powerful
- argued that the constitution was a façade for democracy, as the new political oligarchy attempted to overturn the Unequal Treaties.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Mikiso Hane</b>	Argues ‘The Diet became an institution which provided the people with a voice in government’.
<b>Richard Storry</b>	Takes the view that after 1868 ‘the real controllers of power were men from much junior ranks from the western clans, not the Emperor’.
<b>William Beasley</b>	Argues the Emperor’s importance as a source of legitimacy for the Meiji leadership has never been in doubt’. To the Meiji leaders he was ‘useful as a symbol and occasionally as a weapon of last resort’.
<b>Carol Gluck</b>	Agrees that the role of Emperor maintained a ceremonial importance but emphasises that decision-making now relied on the assistance of ministers as a result of the Constitution.

### Question 39

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Prime land to the east of the palace was sold in 1890, to Iwasaki Yanosuke, who planned to build the headquarters there for the up-and-coming company that he had recently inherited: Mitsubishi.	Argues that Imperial land was sold to support new businesses, such as Mitsubishi, during the Meiji period.
... Mitsubishi was one of the four most powerful Zaibatsu, as they became known: family run, heavily hierarchical conglomerates comprising firms spanning a wide range of industries and services.	Contends that as Zaibatsu developed, which were often family run vertical monopolies encompassing a wide range of industries.
By coordinating their goals, capital, and expertise, and developing close links with Japan's political elite, they were able to take leading roles in industries like shipbuilding, chemicals, machinery and mining.	Argues that they contributed significantly to the economic development of Japan, especially heavy industries, through their scale and expertise and their links with politics.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- government favouritism resulted in the development of huge monopolistic concerns and from 1880s onwards Zaibatsu began to dominate manufacturing and commercial activities
- Mitsubishi conglomerate controlled 25% of shipping and ship building, 15% of coal and metals, 16% of bank loans, 50% of flour milling, 59% of sheet glass, 35% of sugar and 15% of cotton textiles
- developed networks of foreign contacts and gathered information in order to sell and purchase a wide variety of goods abroad
- they became influential in politics – so powerful that they could not be ignored.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Two fundamental conditions for modern economic growth were the 'Tokugawa legacy' and the role of the government.	Contends that there were two causes identified as being significant – the legacy of the Tokugawa period and actions taken by the Meiji government.
The contributions of the former in the socio-cultural fields, in attitudes to thrift, diligence and loyalty, has long been recognised, but it is only in recent years that the extent of economic development before 1868 is becoming fully appreciated.	Argues that although the attributes of the Tokugawa populace have been discussed as contributing to industrialisation – such as loyal and work ethic – more recently attention has been drawn to the actual economic development that occurred prior to 1868.
The role of the government was crucial, not so much in terms of pioneering industries and taxes and subsidies, but in its moulding of society to conform to its military and therefore economic objectives.	Perspective presented argues that the role of the government was most significant in articulating its military priorities, which were inextricably linked to economic development.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- government had a limited reliance on foreign loans. They took firm control over expenditure – provided partial funding of large-scale private enterprise and support for the Zaibatsu
- government initiation of the Iwakura Mission which turned into a fact-finding mission about western knowledge, including industrial expertise
- role of the state in industrial processes and policies – they built model factories such as Tomioka silk reeling mill
- they carefully deployed Yatoi – who then dismissed them once their knowledge was disseminated
- government initiated military reform which stimulated industrial development
- government improvements in infrastructure contributed to economic development.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- psychological impact of the Unequal Treaties provided great impetus for industrial growth
- details of industrial knowledge gained on the Iwakura mission
- use of Yatoi in Japan
- although not intentionally encouraged by the Tokugawa, economic foundations were laid during the Tokugawa period
- alternate attendance led to the creation of an extensive infrastructure, including the building of bridges
- alternate attendance also led to the dramatic growth in Edo to over one million inhabitants, who needed supplying with commercial goods. The peasants living in nearby villages began to diversify into commercial goods to supply Edo – stimulating a money-based economy
- this was replicated on a smaller scale across Japan following the stipulation of Samurai to live in the caste towns within their Han
- the transformation of Samurai from a warrior into an administrative caste led to them indulging in extravagant lifestyles, getting into debt to merchants, increasing the importance of merchants within Japan
- move from a rice-based to a money-based economy
- fairly literate population. The impact of educational reform
- but impact of Unequal Treaties in the Bakumatsu period stunted this economic development
- the role of women in industrialisation, notably in the textile and silk factories
- Government increased taxation in fund infrastructure
- reference to WWI: a) markets acquired; b) industry and shipping developed; c) foreign debt to Japan
- Imperial expansion - new markets and raw materials.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Edwin Reischauer	Argues ‘the great wealth and broad base of the Zaibatsu enabled them to finance promising new fields in the economy and thus increase their share in its fast-growing industrial sector’.
Michael Auslin	Suggests the Unequal Treaties played an important role in restricting economic development, such as the inability to set their own tariff rates.
Wataru Hiromatso	Argues that the foundations of Japan’s modernisation were to a large extent laid during the years of peaceful isolation.
Mikiso Hane	Takes the view that modernisation would depend heavily upon the adoption of western science, technology and industrialisation.

## Question 40

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	Admiral Togo.	Admiral Togo had become the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1903. He was termed by Western journalists 'the Nelson of the East'. He had been involved in fighting against the Tokugawa forces in the Boshin War and was clearly committed to the Meiji Restoration.
<b>Purpose</b>	To feedback on naval victory.	To feedback to Naval headquarters, the government and ultimately the country, this unexpected and decisive victory over a great global power.
<b>Timing</b>	1905	Report was written in the immediate aftermath of the Russian defeat at the battle of Tsushima, which took place on 27-28 May 1905.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
When the enemy's fleet first appeared, our squadrons adopted the strategy of awaiting him and striking him in home waters.	Outlining Japan's tactics here as the enemy is drawn further forward and by 'awaiting him and striking him' they had the home advantage.
... but at five minutes past two o'clock the squadron suddenly turned east and bore down the head of the enemy's column in a diagonal direction, the armoured cruiser squadron followed in the rear of the main squadron, and in accordance with the previously arranged plan of action, steered south to attack the rear of the enemy's column.	Details of the precisely organised and planned military strategy. By these tactics they 'suddenly turned' to attack not right angles but diagonally and 'bore down the head of the enemy's column.' And then to secure the rear the armoured cruiser squadron attacked the rear of the enemy's column.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
If, nevertheless, our combined squadrons won the victory, it was because of the virtues of His Majesty the Emperor, not owing to any human prowess. It cannot but be believed that the small number of our casualties was due to the protection of the spirits of the Imperial ancestors.	Showing here that the writer is deferring to the Emperor and giving due praise to his 'virtues' and the 'protection of the spirits of the imperial ancestors' as the real reason for victory. Suggesting the role of such patriotism and nationalism contributed to the conviction and bravery of the soldiers.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Togo engaged the Russian navy at Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea in 1904 and destroyed the Russian Baltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905
- Admiral Togo's ships performed the vital role of winning and holding control of the seas, allowing time to organise a steady flow of troops to the mainland
- the Japanese army had impressive discipline. Superior training techniques and logistical organisation adopted from Prussia
- Emperor was a living deity and the head of the armed forces – armed forces were answerable only to him
- soldiers and sailors took an oath of loyalty to him – the Imperial Rescript to sailors and soldiers stressed their loyalty to Japan and aimed to create a truly national army loyal to the Emperor and his government.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- Japan had protected dockyards and dry-docking facilities, which the Russians lacked
- Japanese were not quite as decisive on land
- won a notable victory to possess Mukden, but at a high human cost
- General Nogi controlled the Third Army and secured Port Arthur at a cost of 60,000 Japanese troops, including his two sons
- Nogi imposed an extremely high standard of discipline upon his troops, especially towards civilian life or property
- Japan had the assurance of the 1902 alliance with Britain
- Japan was benefitting from her military reforms, including the introduction of conscription in 1873
- naval reforms were based upon Britain's development: army on French then Prussian
- by 1894 Japan had 28 modern ships in the fleet which were proto-dreadnoughts
- the humiliation of the Tripartite Intervention after their defeat of China left a profound anti-Russian sentiment within Japan, which had only heightened following the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway
- in contrast, the Russian fleet was ill-equipped and badly led and lacked gunnery practice
- Russian general staff underestimated Japan's capability
- Russian lines of communication were poor.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Janet Hunter	Contends that 'Japan had for several years been building up her armed forces in anticipation of conflict with Russia'.
Kenneth Pyle	Highlights 'that taxes were progressively raised as military expenditures more than tripled in the decade 1893–1903'.
Benson and Matsumara	Highlight the important role played by the navy in victory. 'It was a conflict in which the navy did spectacularly well'.
Mikiso Hane	Argues 'Japan was in a more favourable position to fight because it had a well-trained army close to the battle zone'.

## Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939.

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 41

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest that the Republic's responses to the crises it faced between 1919 and 1923 were not successful:

##### Political:

- Ebert was opposed to radical reform – he had hoped to retain the monarchy in some form. He sought to build on Max von Baden's October Reforms. However, Scheidemann's proclamation of a republic from the balcony of the Reichstag on 9 Nov 1918 thwarted his efforts. Thus, the Republic's initial desire to retain a monarchy (in some form) as a moderating force was not a success
- Ebert's decision not to use the Soldiers' and Workers' Councils to begin a fundamental restructuring of society meant that an opportunity was lost, one that never came again, thereby convincing conservatives that they could limit any concessions they might make to the new regime
- the forces of conservatism were also assisted by the Republic's decision not to purge the civil service, the judiciary and academia
- 354 of the 376 assassinations during this period were carried out by right-wing extremists. Of the remaining twenty-two murders which were carried out by the Left, ten were solved and resulted in trials, many of which led to executions. However, of the 354 assassinations carried out by right-wing extremists, 326 were never solved and out of this total of 354, only one right-wing criminal was sent to prison – a lenient sentence considering how left-wing assassins were treated
- these questions of fairness and political bias were never fully solved between 1919 and 1923 and led to simmering resentment from the Left of institutional conservative bias in the republic. Ebert's decision not to purge conservative elements within the judiciary had profound consequences for the republic between 1919 and 1923 and beyond. The Left felt alienated from the Republic, and this cannot be considered to be a success
- similarly, the Republic's decision to deploy the *Freikorps* against the Spartacists in January 1919 resulted in simmering tensions between the forces on the left and certainly caused problems for the Republic between 1919 and 1923 and beyond. The KPD felt betrayed and never again fully trusted, nor cooperated with, the SPD. The use of the *Freikorps* ensured that the nationalist right came to see themselves as the saviours of Weimar and their influence was never really reigned in after this. Indeed, much like the KPD, the *Freikorps* were also counter revolutionary. This was important because it meant that these committed, anti-republicans were not only tolerated, but in fact legitimised by the new regime
- instead of curtailing action from the left, the crushing of the Spartacist revolt and the murders of Liebknecht and Luxemburg actually emboldened radical left-wing forces. In the spring of 1919, a wave of industrial unrest spread across Germany with strikes in the Ruhr and in Berlin
- during the revolution, the use the *Freikorps* to crush left-wing opponents became a recurring theme of Ebert's presidential rule between 1919 and 1923
- the Republic's over-reliance on the terms of the Ebert-Gröner Pact during the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 caused problems and as such cannot be considered a success for the Republic. When the *Reichswehr* refused to fire on their putschist comrades, Ebert was forced to seek the help of the general population in refusing to cooperate with Kapp. A Ruhr Army was formed to resist. However, when the danger of the Kapp incident had passed, Ebert ordered the *Reichswehr* to break up the Ruhr Army and in the ensuing action, 100 workers and several hundred policemen and soldiers were killed. In contrast, the Kapp putschists themselves faced the most lenient of punishments and thus, in one event, the Republic succeeded in alienating both forces of the Left and the Right.

**Economic:**

- Ebert's decision not to nationalise the economy and instead to work with industrialists may have been as pragmatic as his other decisions, but it also meant that capitalism was never seriously threatened or reformed, and it would only be a matter of time until the industrialists reassured their power
- the Republic's decision to call for passive resistance in the face of the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 may, at face value, appear an appropriate act. The decision, however, to continue to pay striking workers depleted an already strained treasury and was not a successful economic policy
- the decision to print more paper money at a time when inflation was rising was a significant problem, and one that was to have catastrophic consequences for ordinary Germans during the hyperinflation crisis of 1922 to 1923.

**Evidence which suggests that the Republic's responses to the crises it faced between 1919 and 1923 were successful:**

**Political:**

- Ebert's decisions in the early days of the Republic were reasonable and saved the Republic from collapse
- the Republic had little choice but to work with the industrialists because it had to ensure that the economy was rebuilt as quickly as possible
- the Ebert-Gröner Pact generally functioned as it was intended to do (to preserve the Republic) and can be considered a success. Only on one occasion (the Kapp Putsch) were the terms not adhered to – and this was due to the fact that it was army colleagues involved in the putsch, rather than any right-wing bias amongst the army elites. The army did do its job and defended the Republic from forces on the left and from the right, including Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923
- seeing that Ebert was pursuing a moderate path, one which would likely gather support from moderate left-wing elements in the working-class movement, the Spartacists saw that their moment was slipping away and acted. Ebert's decision to defend the Republic was the correct one
- the President's decision to crush the Spartacists may have been based on an overestimation of the threat they really posed to the Republic, but it was the correct decision based on the fact that the far Left was never going to be reconciled to the Republic because it had not resulted in a Bolshevik Germany.

**Economic:**

- the hyperinflation crisis was a crisis of capitalism, rather than one caused by the Republic through its decisions. The crisis was more the consequence of events in 1923 itself than of decisions made by the government in the early weeks and months of the Republic. Its root causes also lay in the actions of the allies who were, by this point, insisting on reparations
- Ebert's decision to organise elections for January 1919, and the constitution that the Reichstag subsequently agreed to in August 1919, meant that the government was able to deal highly effectively with attempts by extremists from the Left and from the Right to destroy democracy and the Republic itself between 1919 and 1923
- although Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution was later misused in the 1930s, Ebert used it successfully and, entirely as it was intended to be used between 1919 and 1923; namely to defend the Republic. The fact that the SPD and KPD were never reconciled was more due to the inability of Communists to accept democratic elections and a democratic constitution, than the actions of the *Freikorps* between 1919 and 1923.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Stephen J Lee</b>	Argues that that praise is due to the Republic's leaders such as Ebert for steering the Republic towards parliamentary democracy and who were not afraid to use military action against extremists to achieve this.
<b>Stefan Berger</b>	Argues that the SPD did more than any other party to establish and, subsequently, to defend the Republic against its enemies. The SPD aimed at building a social republic that would lead to a gradual transformation of capitalism and the emergence of a socialist state.
<b>William Carr</b>	Argues that the leaders of the Republic were successful in dealing with the Left and Right, but little was done to deal with the paramilitary formations of either Left or Right. These paramilitary formations had certain characteristics in common; they hated the Republic and democracy and were addicted to violence.
<b>Richard J Evans</b>	Recognises the efforts of the Republic under Ebert's leadership to maintain essential services, avert economic collapse, preserve law and order, and secure parliamentary democracy. But the willingness of the SPD leadership to compromise with the old order was to cost the Republic dear in years to come.

## Question 42

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest that the Republic did experience a 'Golden Age' of political and economic stability:

**Political:**

- there were no putsches, nor any attempts to overthrow the Republic, and the number of political assassinations fell, as did the number of right-wing paramilitary formations
- states such as Prussia, led by a succession of moderate, pro-Republican governments, bolstered the republic's overall stability and its progress in the May 1928 elections – by May 1928, 61% of members of Reichstag belonged to parties that supported the Republic
- the election of Hindenburg as President, in May 1925 was evidence that the old order could co-exist within the new democratic parties and democratic structures of the Republic
- the moderate parties seemed to consolidate their position and the vote for extremist parties of both the left and right seemed to be in decline, for example, in the May 1924 elections, the KPD's share of the vote declined to 9%. Similarly, right-wing parties like the DNVP saw their share of the vote decline from 20.5% in the May 1924 election to 14% by May 1928
- the involvement of the public in elections remained high – voter turnout was 76% in May 1924 and 82% in May 1928
- the last years of the period saw the return of the grand coalition of the early years of the Republic, with the collaboration of the SPD, Centre, DDP, BVP and DVP. This coalition of 5 parties held together until 1930
- Stresemann's foreign policies re-established Germany at the centre of European politics. Following the Locarno Pact and the pursuit of *erfüllungspolitik*, Germany was readmitted to the League of Nations in the autumn of 1926
- the cultural and artistic developments of the 'Golden Age' seemed a reflection of this stability.

**Economic:**

- as the German Chancellor from August 1923, Gustav Stresemann took decisive action by calling off passive resistance in the Ruhr and ended Germany's hyperinflation crisis. Stresemann appointed the financier, Hjalmar Schacht, and a new currency (the *Rentenmark*) was introduced. This was replaced shortly afterwards by the *Reichsmark*. This paved the way for new investments to flow into Germany following the Dawes Plan
- the Dawes Plan of 1924 seemed to be beneficial to Germany. The loans agreed under the plan helped to boost the economy and thus, enabled reparations payments to be met
- the Dawes Plan removed the threat of invasion if reparations payments were not made
- following the Dawes Plan, 16,000 million *Reichmarks* came into Germany, but only 7,000 million were paid out in reparations. This favourable balance of credit enabled industry to recover its pre-war level of output and to modernise factories and manufacturing
- the rationalisation of German industry led to a more organised division of labour and together these developments dramatically increased productivity
- workers benefited from the economic boom. Wages increased and the workers' share of the national income was 10% higher in the mid-1920s than it had been before 1914
- the number of strikes fell between 1924 and 1929, and industrial relations were improving
- the government was able to increase expenditure on welfare services – housing, health, and education – to 68% of spending by 1932. 17 million workers were covered by the Republic's unemployment insurance scheme
- reparation payments were further revised in 1929 as part of the Young Plan to underwrite German economic recovery – The Young Plan reduced further payments by about 20 per cent. Although the theoretical total was 11,000 million Reichsmarks, equivalent to approximately \$27 billion USA dollars in 1929, it extended reparations payments until they would be finally paid off in 1988.

## Evidence which may suggest that the Republic did not experience a ‘Golden Age’ of political and economic stability:

### Political:

- when Stresemann called off passive resistance in the Ruhr in September 1923, it was regarded as an act of betrayal by right-wing nationalists, who in turn, became more hostile to the Republic throughout the period 1924 to 1929
- political violence did not disappear, and the Republic was ineffective in dealing with it. Extremist parties may not have gained mass support at elections, but frequent fighting on the streets between the KPD’s Red Fighting League and the Nazis’ SA undermined the Republic’s efforts to establish political stability
- although there were only 2 elections (May 1924 and May 1928), there were still six different administrations between 1924 and 1929. Hardly the hallmark of a ‘Golden Age’
- politicians across the Reichstag often failed to cooperate and as a consequence, no Chancellor was able to hold a government together for more than two years
- the forces of the anti-republican right achieved greater cohesion during 1924 to 1929 – for example, the pro-republican DDP which had formed the basis for representing middle class interests in the parliamentary system lost support to more right-wing parties
- the DNVP came under the control of media tycoon, Alfred Hugenberg. He moved the DNVP from being indifferent to the Republic, to being openly hostile to it
- Ebert died in office in February 1925. Hindenburg’s election as President in 1925 was seen as major defeat for the supporters of the Republic since he was regarded as a right-wing monarchist, rather than as a keen supporter of the Republic
- whilst national elections brought results favourable to the Republic, regional and local election results show a drift to extremist parties of the Left and Right, even before the events of 1929
- the Young Plan of 1929 caused huge controversy and became a political rallying point for right-wing elements.

### Economic:

- Stresemann’s speech in November 1923 warned about the Republic’s reliance on short-term foreign loans. His ‘dancing on a volcano’ statement suggests real concerns about the merits of the Republic’s economic strategy
- industrial relations remained poor throughout the period 1924 to 1929 – in 1925, 3 million working days were lost due to strikes, which doubled to 6 million by 1925 and 20.3 million by 1928 – even before the Wall St. Crash
- in reality, real wages remained static, wages rose but so too did prices
- unemployment remained a persistent issue during the ‘Golden Years’ – this rose to 10% of the workforce in 1926 – higher than during the period 1919 to 1923. By 1929, 1.9 million workers were idle and, as a result social security payments exceeded government income
- only once during this ‘Golden Age’ (in 1926) did Germany’s level of exports exceed those of its imports
- Germany’s overall economic growth remained sluggish throughout the period 1924 to 1929. When compared to the growth of the economies of the UK and the USA, Germany’s economic performance showed minimal improvements
- only a few skilled industrial workers saw improvements between 1924 and 1929. The agricultural sector for example, remained depressed. Successive Weimar governments were seen as ignoring the plight of the farming sector – foot and mouth outbreaks, poor harvests, foreign competition, and lower prices.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Paul Bookbinder	Argues that by 1929, Germany had become the world's second largest industrial power behind the United States. Wages rose and the standard of living rose dramatically for many Germans.
Eberhard Kolb	Contends that: 'The years from 1924 to 1929 are commonly described as a period of 'relative stabilisation' of the Republic. This is true if the stress is laid on the word 'relative'. There was certainly progress in foreign affairs and in establishing law and order and consolidating the regime politically. The economy also revived to some degree. But this stabilisation was fragile and superficial. The Republic did not in fact succeed in consolidating its political and socio-economic system so as to be capable of facing a serious crisis'.
Detlev Peukert	States that: 'In describing the years between 1924 and 1929 as ones of relative stability, we should not forget that they seem stable only by contrast with the periods of crisis that preceded and followed them. The period 1924–1929 was marked by a good number of smaller and greater crises that were indicators of deeper structural tensions in German society'.
Stephen J Lee	Argues that recovery in Germany was highly fragile and was a system struggling to find an internal equilibrium between a series of conflicting developments.

## Question 43

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may support the view that the Nazis drew support from across the social spectrum and is a reason for their growth:**

- between 1919 and 1924, it is true to say that Nazism was a regional phenomenon. Its origins were in Munich in Bavaria, and they were one of a cluster of extremist nationalist groups, drawing on *Völkisch* traditions of the region
- after the failure of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch and Hitler's trial and imprisonment in 1924, the party entered a brief period of decline. However, after the re-founding of the party in 1925, the Bamberg Conference of February 1926 allowed Hitler to take full control of the party and establish a *Führer* party
- the macro to micro *Gauleiter* down to *Blockleiter* system created a nationwide party control and command structure. When the opportunity arose, the Nazis were well-placed in all parts of Germany to exploit their opportunity
- at the party's Nuremberg conference in 1927, and faced with party membership remaining static, propaganda began to be orientated towards the middle classes
- by the late 1920s, although party membership was predominantly middle-class, the membership of the Stormtroopers – *Sturm Abteilung* (SA) was, however, mainly from the working class – over half its members had working class origins
- by the 1928 election, progress was being made in northern rural areas, particularly among peasant voters who had lost out, due mainly to foreign competition. In Schleswig, for example, the Nazis doubled their share of the vote between 1924 and 1928; however, no significant breakthrough was made at that point
- by the 1930 'breakthrough' election, the Nazis increased their vote in multiple areas – both rural and urban. In Berlin, for example, the Nazis' share of the vote was 1.6% in 1924. By 1928 this had risen to 12.8%. In areas directly affected by territorial issues caused by Versailles, the increase was even more obvious. In East Prussia, the Nazi vote rose from 0.8% in 1928 to 22.5% in 1930
- although women were excluded from the upper echelons of the party, large numbers of female voters chose the Nazis and by 1933, in a number of districts, the percentage of females voting Nazi outstripped the percentage of males voting the same way. In other areas the reverse was true. Thus, it could be argued the appeal of the Nazis cut across the gender divide
- over 60% of Nazi Party members in 1931 were between the ages of 18 and 30. However, this is not to say that the party was solely one of youth. Large numbers of elderly and retired people also voted Nazi and their appeal cut across the generations
- although a large part of the Nazi membership was Protestant, the votes cast for the Nazis in areas of Germany which were predominately Roman Catholic also indicate that Nazi support cut across religious divides. Even in Lower Bavaria, an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic region, the Nazis still polled over 20% of the vote in 1932
- it is true that working class people were under-represented within the party. Whilst Germany's large cities such as Berlin and Hamburg continued to vote for leftist parties up to 1933, it was in Germany's smaller towns and cities, where the Nazis began to make significant inroads. It is estimated that in these areas by 1933, one in three workers were voting for the Nazis. Between 1928 and 1933 more generally, 25% of Nazi voters were drawn from the working class
- whilst they may originally have been a middle-class party, the sheer number of votes which the Nazis were receiving between 1930 and 1933, especially in the July 1932 election, meant that the Nazis must be regarded as a 'catch all' party appealing to Catholics and Protestants, men and women, urban and rural, workers and middle class, the youth and the elderly.

## Evidence which may suggest that the Nazis ability to draw support from across the social spectrum was not a reason for their growth:

- despite the Nazis' claim to be a 'catch all' party representing every German, the reality is somewhat different. Even as late as 1933, the party remained predominantly a rural, Protestant and middle-class phenomenon
- in areas of Germany which were mainly Roman Catholic, the party failed to make significant inroads. 25% of Germany's population lived in overwhelmingly Catholic areas, yet they represented only 15% of Nazi Party membership
- in the July 1932 election, the Nazis polled 37.3% of the national vote. However, in majority Roman Catholic areas such as Cologne-Aachen, the Nazis polled 20% of the vote – approximately half that of the national pattern. Conversely, 65% of the Nazi membership came from predominantly Protestant areas
- this can partly be explained by the existence of the Centre Party. The *Zentrum* (Centre) Party was established to represent the interests of Germany's Roman Catholics. Unlike other parties in the 1920s and early 1930s, the Centre Party did not see its support collapse when faced with the rising fortunes of the Nazis. Even as late as the November 1932 election, they still attracted the votes of millions of German Catholics
- many of the Presidents of the mid-1920s and early 1930s came from the Centre Party
- the Bavarian People's Party (BVP) was the Bavarian adjunct of the Centre Party. Similarly, their support did not collapse and when the votes of the two Catholic parties are combined, nearly 1 in 5 of Germany's voters in 1932 were voting for parties representing Germany's Roman Catholics
- although one-third of Nazi voters were from the working class, this is a great under-representation when compared to their position in German society. These voters tended to come from a white collar semi-managerial background, rather than blue collar manual or industrial workers. Overall, workers made up 46% of the population, so were therefore not proportionately represented within the party
- the greater part of Nazi support tended to come from peasant farmers, self-employed artisans, craftsmen, and small retailers – the *Mittelstand* and petty bourgeoisie
- support for the Communists, the KPD, rose steadily during the late 1920s and reached 16.9% in the November 1932 election. The Nazis failed to penetrate the large urban working-class districts in cities such as Berlin
- the KPD believed that the urban unemployed were often attracted to the Nazis by offers of clothing, accommodation, and food, rather than by a genuine belief in Nazi philosophy
- similarly, support from the skilled working-class translated into steady support for the SPD through the early 1930s. Although they never again reached the levels of electoral support seen in the early days of the Republic, nonetheless, the SPD still had over a million members by early 1933
- contemporary accounts suggest that many working-class people who voted for, or joined, the Nazis did so because they felt they were fighting the capitalism which had caused their impoverishment in the early 1930s, rather than through an affinity with Nazi ideology
- although large numbers of the 18 to 30 age group supported the Nazis, larger numbers in the 30s, 40s and 50-plus age groups supported the SPD. Here, the Nazis failed to have the same impact and thus, cannot be truly labelled as a party of all the people
- ultimately, the Nazis failed to break the traditional working-class links to Marxist parties
- big business and the *Junker* class, arguably the most powerful elites in the Republic, did not vote in large numbers for the Nazis.

## **Evidence which suggests other factors were important reasons for the growth of the Nazis between 1929 and 30 January 1933:**

- with the collapse of the five principal German banks in 1931, millions of Germans lost access to savings, accounts, and investments and with unemployment rising (to over 6 million by 1932), many ordinary Germans began to support the Nazis
- German industry and agriculture went into freefall and many industrialists became increasingly desperate for political solutions which included financial support for the Nazis. In the early 1930s, the Nazis put forward a series of economic policies offering a third way between Marxism and Capitalism which won a lot of popular support
- between 1929–1932 German production nearly halved. Mass unemployment undermined support for the Weimar Republic and many Germans concluded that it had to go
- the Müller coalition collapsed in 1930 when the SPD refused to support cuts to welfare and the government thereafter became increasingly undemocratic and under the influence of President Hindenburg
- Brüning's chancellorship failed to resolve the crisis quickly enough and indeed his policies were regarded as having made matters worse – the label of the 'Hunger Chancellor' due to cuts in welfare spending strengthening opposition to the Republic among extremists such as the Nazis but also among industrialists, the army, and large landowners in eastern Germany
- a result of the economic depression was social distress and in turn an increase in support for extremist parties as seen in electoral results after 1930
- Nazi propaganda and trained party speakers were also vital in converting large sections of German society to the Nazi message
- the role of the S.A. was also an important reason for the growth of the Nazis between 1929 and 30 January 1933. Their 'propaganda by deed' focused attention on the Communist threat and the Nazis' determination to smash it.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
Ian Kershaw	Argues that: 'the NSDAP were no mere middle-class party, as used to be thought. Though not in equal proportions, the Hitler Movement could reasonably claim to have won support from all sections of society. No other party throughout the Weimar Republic could claim the same'.
Jeremy Noakes	Proposes that: 'The Nazis did best in rural areas and small towns of the Protestant part of Germany, particularly in the north and east. They won much of their support from the most rooted and traditional section of the German population'.
Richard J Evans	Stated that: 'The unemployed flocked above all to the Communists.' Evans emphasises the collapse of 'the conventional political right.' Fear drove masses of such people towards Hitler and the Nazis. By 1932 the Nazis were 'a catch all party of social protest with particularly strong middle-class support and relatively weak working class backing at the polls.' The Nazis successfully projected an image of dynamism and salvation.
Frank McDonough	Argues that: 'The NSDAP was most successful where it did not have to cope with strong pre-existing ideological and organisational loyalties. Where these did exist, as in Social Democratic and Communist strongholds, it did far less well'.

## Question 44

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest that the ‘Hitler myth’ was the critical factor in maintaining Nazi rule in Germany:**

- the ‘Hitler myth’ portrayed Hitler as an individual who personified the spirit of the nation and projected him as an individual who had only the best interests of Germans at heart
- the Nazi Party itself had been rebuilt on the *Führerprinzip* (Führer Principle) and once in power, this philosophy was applied to the whole of Germany
- the Führer Cult or *Führerprinzip*, as portrayed in propaganda, cemented Hitler’s status as a builder of Germany’s strength and a bulwark against the nation’s enemies
- the image and myth of Hitler was carefully built by Goebbels within the party before 1933, and by the Ministry of Propaganda thereafter
- Goebbels was able to build on the propaganda image of Hitler as Nazi leader which had worked in the electoral campaigns of 1930 to 1932. Once Goebbels was appointed as Minister of Propaganda in 1933, radio, press, film, rallies, art and architecture and all other expressive mediums were harnessed to portray Hitler as a charismatic leader. He was projected as the embodiment of the national spirit
- the ‘Hitler myth’ contributed to Hitler’s great personal popularity after 1933. By the late 1930s, 90% of Germans admired him
- the ‘Hitler myth’ presented Hitler as the only person who truly understood the German people
- propaganda was a key aspect of the Nazi regime. Propaganda was responsible for the spread of the ‘Hitler myth’ but the Nazis also deployed propaganda relentlessly and sought to use all aspects of culture and society as vehicles of propaganda
- through the successful propagation of the ‘myth’, Hitler came to be viewed as the saviour of the nation: the leader who had wrought an ‘economic miracle’, the leader who represented selflessness and justice, the leader who understood the ordinary German people, the leader who would defend Germany against its enemies – external and internal. For example, Germans became convinced that Hitler had acted legally and properly during the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in 1934
- all major policy successes were attributable to Hitler, and to Hitler alone. All failures were, however, attributed to minor party leaders and functionaries, rather than to Hitler himself
- such was the strength of the ‘myth’ that it enabled Hitler to bypass the Civil Service, the Judiciary, and other institutions of the state so there were few restraints on him
- the ‘Hitler myth’ developed as a reaction to the weaknesses and divisions of the Weimar Republic. It satisfied Germans’ emotional need for strong government and reinforced the tradition of authoritarian government
- the ‘Hitler myth’ was successfully deployed in showing the Führer’s role in reducing unemployment. The success was attributed to Hitler alone. Between 1933 and 1936, unemployment dropped from 3.7 million to 1.6 million and those who were grateful to have bread once again on their tables and money in their pockets thanked the Führer.

## Evidence which may suggest other reasons for the maintenance of Nazi rule in Germany from 1933 to 1939:

### The German state:

- there can be little doubt about the centrality of Hitler in the Nazi regime, but he was not much involved in day-to-day decision-making and administrative matters. Nazi Germany was certainly dominated by Hitler, but it was not an efficient, nor smooth-running structure
- although Hitler himself was the ultimate arbiter within the regime, beneath him there was a confusing array of state and party institutions cutting across each other's jurisdictions but all seeking to 'work towards the Führer'. This, rather than the 'Hitler myth', seemed to drive policymaking in Germany
- this process of 'working towards the Führer' was crucial in the Nazi regime. It refers to the fact that other party leaders and officials competed to win Hitler's approval and often used their own initiative to come up with extremely radical plans and policies
- Hitler's own working style was haphazard. He kept unconventional hours and spent much time at the Berghof in Bavaria. Frequently, officials were kept waiting for his detailed instructions. When approval for policies did come from Hitler, it was often in the form of a broad verbal statement, rather than one which was written
- Hitler was, in fact, surrounded by party leaders and officials who set themselves the task of interpreting the Führer's broad vision statements and drawing up and implementing policies accordingly
- for the most part, traditional power structures were Nazified and went on to serve the Nazi state. Thus, for example, civil servants generally enacted Nazi laws, and the courts and the legal system adapted to the new regime. However, the Nazis increasingly operated outside these structures altogether so that the Civil Service was simply bypassed and acted outside the law
- other party leaders were central to Nazi rule including Goebbels (Nazi propaganda chief), Himmler (SS chief and 'de facto' head of all the apparatus of the police-state) and Göring (controlling economic planning) without whose support the Nazis would not have remained in control
- the SS-Gestapo was another important tool of Nazi rule. Not only did the SS-Gestapo instil fear, the SS and the Gestapo carried out brutal acts of repression and made no secret of it
- overall, the 'Hitler myth' merely created jealous rivalries, which served to enhance Hitler's power, but seriously undermined efficient government and did, to some degree, create a system of authoritarian anarchy
- Nazi Germany was certainly dominated by Hitler, but it was not an efficient nor smooth-running structure.

### Economic Revival:

- in many respects, Hitler was lucky in terms of Germany's economic fortunes. From 1933, the international economy was naturally recovering after the devastation of the worldwide economic slump precipitated by the Wall St. Crash of October 1929. International trade was improving, and this had nothing to do with Hitler. In addition, many of Brüning's economic policies in the form of Public Works Schemes had begun to remedy Germany's unemployment issues even before Hitler had assumed the Chancellorship in 1933. Hitler was merely the beneficiary of these improvements
- support for the Nazi regime was also generated by the apparent success of Nazi economic policies. For example, the Nazis were able to claim that their government's intervention in the economy had ended unemployment and had assisted economic recovery.

## **Foreign Policy:**

- Nazi foreign policies were popular since they began to redress the perceived inequities of Versailles
- the Nazis also gained popular support because there were real triumphs in Hitler's foreign policy. For example, Hitler had consistently said that once in power he would 'smash Versailles' and that is indeed exactly what he did. In March 1935, for instance, he announced that Germany now had a military air force and that he would be reintroducing conscription to build up an army of 750,000 – each of these actions was a clear breach of the Treaty of Versailles, but no action was taken by Britain or France or the League of Nations against Germany
- further success followed with the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the *Anschluss* with Austria in March 1938 and gaining the *Sudetenland* in September 1938. These were genuinely popular policies
- foreign policy successes headed off popular discontent of his 'guns before butter' campaign.

## **Political Factors:**

- Hitler's elimination of communism was largely welcomed by the majority of Germans
- Hitler's dismantling of the weak Weimar democracy and the creation of strong government was also positively supported by most Germans
- Hitler's role in establishing law and order through the SS, Gestapo and other agencies of the Police State were accepted by Germans as progression from the lawlessness of the period from 1929 to 1933
- Hitler had also dealt with the SA which had settled sections of German society who had feared their socialist aims and violent leadership.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
Ian Kershaw	Argues that 'Although the extremes of the personality cult had probably gripped only a minority of the population, elements of the personality cult had attained a far wider resonance and affected the vast majority of the population'.
Richard J Evans	Argues that the Hitler cult was built by Josef Goebbels' ministry, using the state's full resources.
David Welch	Argues that 'The cult of the leader was undoubtedly the most important theme cementing Nazi propaganda together. For many Germans he filled a vacuum caused by the loss of the monarchy in 1918'.
Jeremy Noakes	Argues that one explanation for the regime's initial relative success is that it created an 'overarching consensus by mobilising the German people behind a programme of national revival identified with Hitler's leadership.' Furthermore, the traditional German elites – army, civil service, business, and professionals – 'perceived in National Socialism some aims and values which they shared, most notably a strong German nationalism'.

## Question 45

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which suggests that the extent of opposition to the regime has been exaggerated:**

- many Germans benefitted from, and appreciated, the regime's popular economic and foreign policies and thus, chose not to oppose Nazism
- consent was expressed not simply because of fear. The Nazis' economic policies were popular because they seemed to bring about recovery. People felt much better off especially in the period from 1933-1937
- Nazi foreign policies were also highly effective in securing support for the regime and especially for Hitler. His popularity reached a peak following the annexation of Austria in March 1938 and this limited the extent of any opposition
- there was no single, unified resistance movement. Each group who opposed the regime had their own reasons for doing so, and they failed to coordinate. This limited the extent of opposition. Opposition may have been wide-ranging, but it was not strong enough to pose any real threat to the regime and its role has been exaggerated
- the fact that Hitler had gained the Chancellorship through a legal election, led civil servants to obey the government's directives, rather than oppose the regime. Subsequent changes to the constitution and law-making were similarly legal and this too limited the extent of opposition
- the army was grateful for the removal of the threat from the S.A. after the Night of the Long Knives of June 1934. They were then tied to Hitler by the Blood Oath. This similarly limited the extent of opposition from the armed forces
- the *Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the Nation and the State* passed on 28 February 1933, was used immediately to repress the political threat posed by the KPD. By the end of March 1933, 20,000 Communists were in prison. This limited the potential for opponents of Nazism to gain an early foothold
- *The Law against the Formation of New Parties* was passed on July 14, 1933. All parties, bar the NSDAP, had been declared illegal and the law prevented any new political opposition parties
- in June 1934, SS leader, Heinrich Himmler was appointed head of the Prussian Gestapo and the expansion of the SS-Gestapo network covered all of Germany by 1936. In search of enemies of the state, the Gestapo was allowed to operate outside the law and take suspects into 'protective' custody. Such victims were liable to be tortured and sent to concentration camps. The Nazis never made any secret of the existence of concentration camps, and this acted as a powerful disincentive to those considering opposing the regime
- the courts adapted to the Nazi police state, and the establishment of the People's Courts in April 1934 ensured that 'treasonable offences' were dealt with harshly, and the range of capital offence was greatly expanded. This limited the extent of opposition activities
- the Police-SS and Gestapo terror successfully kept the opposition fragmented and the security police were able to penetrate resistance groups effectively
- the Gestapo relied on a wide range of informants and the threat of being exposed by friends, family, co-workers, and neighbours limited the extent of opposition
- opposition became limited to small, private acts and this limited both its extent and effectiveness.
- there was limited and uncoordinated opposition from religious groups, for example, the Protestant Confessional Church only opposed the regime on religious grounds. There was no vigorous opposition from them to policies that discriminated against Jews or political opponents of the regime and thus, the significance of opposition from religious groups has been exaggerated
- in July 1933, the Nazi government concluded a Concordat with the Vatican. Any opposition from the Roman Catholic Church was effectively neutralised
- opposition from youth groups such as the *Edelweiss Piraten* (Edelweiss Pirates), or *Swing Jugend* (Swing Youth) may have been widespread, but they can be seen in the context of rebellion, rather than opposition. At most they were a minor inconvenience, rather than a threat to the regime and their significance has been exaggerated
- many Germans were discontented with the regime, but only a few exceptional people dared to express their opposition openly. The harsh treatment of these opponents was a powerful disincentive for others tempted to follow their lead and this limited the extent of opposition
- although the resistance mobilized tens of thousands of people, it was not centrally organised and not coordinated.

**Evidence which may suggest that the extent of opposition to the regime has not been exaggerated:**

- prominent religious leaders preached against Nazism from their pulpits. For example, Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer were so concerned at the creation of the Reich Church and the perceived Nazification of Germany's Protestant Churches, that they formed the Confessional Church in 1934
- despite the Concordat, Pope Pius XI became appalled by the prosecution of Catholic clergy and the ban on Catholic youth groups and issued his '*Mit brennender Sorge*' statement ('With Burning Anxiety') in 1937
- with millions of parishioners, these statements from Protestant and Catholic churches would have resonated with their congregations. If they had supported the regime, German Christians may have stopped attending religious services. This did not happen
- the successful protest in 1937 against the Nazis' attempt to remove crosses from Catholic schools is a striking example of opposition that was extensive at least among German Catholics
- the numbers of those arrested or who had fled Germany by 1939 is evidence that there were extensive levels of opposition to Nazism from the German people. By 1939, 150,000 Communists, Social Democrats and trade unionists been jailed, 40,000 Germans had fled for political reasons and 12,000 had been convicted of high treason. The scale of these figures is evidence that although their acts of opposition may not have been effective, large numbers of Germans disapproved of Nazism and that the extent of their opposition has not been exaggerated
- although many German youths were initially won over by the range of activities, many came to resent the regimented nature of the Hitler Youth. Large numbers of children simply stopped attending. Attracted by the non-conformity, many joined the *Swing Jugend, Roving Dudes, Navajos, or Edelweiss Piraten* groups. One study in Krefeld suggested that 30% of Hitler Youth members were also secret members of the *Edelweiss Piraten*. This illustrates well the extent of opposition to Nazism from Germany's young people
- minor acts of resistance became more common in the latter years of the 1930s. Workers reflected their growing dissatisfaction at longer hours of work for only marginally improved pay, through increasing levels of absenteeism and go-slows in the workplace
- although officially banned, there were an estimated 400 strikes between 1933 and 1935
- many workers, especially among those who had long connections with the trade unions and the SPD or the KPD, continued to maintain their links with banned socialist organisations
- in 1933, the leadership of the SPD migrated to Prague in Czechoslovakia (and then Paris from 1938) and formed SOPADE. They organised underground resistance groups and arranged the printing and distribution of leaflets criticising the regime
- the KPD was not completely destroyed after 1933, and even organised resistance cells within the DAF
- despite their blood oath of loyalty, there was opposition from some officers within the armed forces. General Beck's plan to have Hitler arrested in 1938 was only foiled by Hitler's success at the Munich Conference
- there was also opposition in the German military intelligence organisation (the *Abwehr*) led from 1935 by Admiral Canaris
- even within the government, to begin with, there were some critics. Von Papen spoke out for greater freedom in June 1934 and Hjalmar Schacht criticised anti-Semitic violence in August 1935
- among some of the traditional elite there was considerable discussion of replacing Hitler. Count Helmut von Moltke's Kreisau Circle centred on a group of army officers and professionals who came together to oppose Hitler, beginning in 1933.

## **Historians**

### **John Hiden**

### **Perspective on the issue**

Argues that the sheer numbers of those who were jailed by the regime is evidence of extensive, yet ineffective, opposition. ‘The persecution of hundreds of thousands of Germans by the Hitler regime serves to illustrate that the dissent and nonconformity must have been widespread. Resistance, defined as an organised and sustained attempt to destroy the government, was not’.

### **Ian Kershaw**

Argues that resistance and opposition to Hitler acted without the active mass support of the population. Large proportions of the population did not even passively support the resistance but rather, widely condemned it. Resistance from groups hostile to the regime never ceased, but resistance was fragmented, atomised and isolated from any possibility of mass support. In any case, opposition was crushed and neutralised through the unprecedented level of repression by the Nazi state.

### **Tim Kirk**

Argues that only a tiny minority were involved in active resistance, but it seems that opposition to the Nazis: ‘occurred on a number of levels ranging from industrial sabotage in factories. . . to small principled acts of defiance, such as refusing the Hitler salute. . . Popular opposition was often a temporary and limited response to specific policies’.

### **Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul**

Argue that the National Socialist rulers could live with insubordination, superficial conformity, and insidious criticism as long as the consensus in political fundamental principles appeared secure and dissatisfaction, nonconformity and partial opposition did not coalesce and organise effectively.

## Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 46

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	Vorwärts newspaper.	Vorwärts (Forwards) was the official newspaper of the moderate socialist political party, the Social Democrats. The article would reflect the views of those such as Ebert and Scheidemann who were fearful of a more radical Communist revolution.
<b>Purpose</b>	The article is a summation of the situation in Germany in the closing days of 1918 and is a direct appeal to German workers.	It is an appeal directed towards the working-class majority in Germany not to follow a more radical Marxist agenda proposed by those such as Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.
<b>Timing</b>	24 December 1918.	It was written during a period of turmoil in Germany. The source was written eight days after the National Council of German Workers and Soldiers voted for Ebert's proposals for elections to a Constituent Assembly and Ebert's desire to avoid a Communist revolution, and only a week before the launch of the January 1919 Spartacist Revolt.

Point in Source A		Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to the source content provenance</i>
We want no more bloodshed and no Bolshevik militarism, because we simply want to achieve peace through work, and we want peace in order not to degenerate into a militarism dictated by the unemployed, as in Russia.		The author feared a return to a dictatorship if a Spartacist revolution was successful. It describes this as a degeneration showing the strength of feeling.
But we want no militarism of the right or of the left. So, do not follow the Spartacists, the German Bolsheviks, unless you want to ruin our nation by destroying our industry and trade.		The author regards both the Spartacists and right-wing forces as equally undesirable. The author makes a direct appeal not to follow the radical Spartacists if they wish to see Germany prosper and avoid the turmoil which was affecting Bolshevik Russia.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
<p>The collapse of German industry and trade means the downfall of the German people. So, say no to terror, say no to militaristic rule by loafers and deserters.</p>	<p>The author warns of the dire consequences on wages, living standards and jobs if Germany were not to follow a moderate path. The author's use of the terms 'loafers and deserters' exemplifies his scorn for the Spartacists and their followers and illustrates the intensity of political beliefs at the time.</p>

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- November 1918. Later that day in Berlin, Karl Liebknecht had attempted to declare Germany a Soviet Republic and by December 1918, the threat of a communist revolution was still present
- riots occurred in Berlin in December 1918 and sixteen Spartacists were killed when the *Freikorps* opened fire. This deepened the split in the Berlin working class movement
- on 16 December 1918, the National Congress of German Workers' and Soldiers' Councils met in Berlin and agreed with Ebert's demand to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly
- war production dropped after the Armistice of November 1918 and that, allied to the return of soldiers from the front, had increased unemployment levels. The Spartacists were attempting to capitalise on this growing unrest
- on 29 December 1918, more radical members of the Independent Socialists (USPD) resigned from Ebert's provisional government and the prospects of a revolution seemed to grow
- on 31 December 1918, the Spartacists declared themselves to be the KPD – the Communist Party of Germany and a few days later, the Spartacist Revolt commenced
- Ebert's primary aim was to prevent a more radical communist revolution from occurring in Germany.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- the Revolution from above – fearing carrying the blame for the loss of the war, the High Command handed power to Prince Max of Baden and the Reichstag in early October 1918
- the Revolution from below – Prince Max's October Reforms had seemingly not gone far enough and amidst the backdrop of mutinies at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven and the establishment of soviets across Germany, Max feared a Communist revolution and handed power to the moderate socialist Friedrich Ebert
- events came to a head with the forced abdication of the Kaiser on 9 November and the declaration of the republic by Philipp Scheidemann on the balcony of the Reichstag building. On the same day, Prince Max transferred the power of the Chancellorship to Friedrich Ebert
- although soviets had sprung up quickly, they were not dominated by Spartacists. However, the SPD leadership feared this is what might happen and thus, moved quickly to establish an interim government that included the radical USPD (which had broken away from the SPD in 1917) in an attempt to draw these radical members away from the Spartacists
- on 10 November 1918, Ebert and General Groener discussed matters by phone. A deal was struck – The Ebert-Groener Pact. The army would be left alone to run its own affairs without political interference and in return, they pledged their support for the Republic. The army, along with bands of returning soldiers – the *Freikorps* – would crush any Spartacist and Communist uprising. These latter groups felt betrayed by Ebert who was also a socialist – albeit a more moderate one
- the Stinnes-Legien Agreement. Between 8-12 November 1918, German trade unions, led by Carl Legien and big business, led by Hugo Stinnes met. They issued their agreement on 15 November – workers would resume full production in the factories and strikes would cease. In return the employers promised an 8-hour working day with no loss of pay. It was a clear attempt to draw workers away from the allure of Communism, but it alienated many of the powerful elites and big business
- part of the Stinnes-Legien Agreement was to create a Central Working Association or ZAG (*Zentral Arbeits Gemeinschaft*). The ZAG would meet to neutrally arbitrate in disputes and guaranteed workers' right in law

- on 6 January 1919, the KPD (Spartacists) began an uprising in Berlin – they declared themselves to be the new government of Germany. Ebert called in the army and the *Freikorps*
- neither Liebknecht nor Luxemburg were in favour of the uprising – they believed the time was not yet ripe for an insurrection
- in mid-January 1919, both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were murdered by members of the *Freikorps*
- elections on 19th January 1919 led to Germany's first fully democratic National Assembly with the SPD-led coalition government committed to consolidating and defending German democracy
- in March 1919, fighting again broke out in Berlin, with more than 1,200 killed in clashes between striking workers and the *Freikorps*
- between November 1918 and May 1919, a soviet republic was proclaimed by Kurt Eisner in Bavaria – the *Räterepublik*. In April 1919, the national government decided to put an end to this challenge to its authority. The Bavarian republic was suppressed, again using the *Freikorps*. Over 700 were killed.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Eberhard Kolb	Argues that the revolutionary mass movement was essentially a failure both in its moderate phase and in its second radical phase. One can speak of 'a revolution that ran aground, and one with which none of the main political groups wished to be identified. Scarcely anyone in Germany had wanted the revolution to develop and come to stop in the way it did.'
Detlev Peukert	Believes that Ebert's decisions from 9 November 1918 to January 1919 signalled that: 'the revolution was to be confined to constitutional and corporatist measures.' The existence of a democratic tradition in Germany before the revolution and the complexity of Germany's industrial and social structure, meant that any radical break with the past was impossible.
William Carr	Argues that the achievements of the revolution were undoubtedly limited. The structure of Germany was hardly affected by the revolution. The spirit of Imperial Germany lived on in the unreformed civil service, the judiciary and the officer corps. Nor did the powerful industrial barons have much to fear from the revolution.
Michael Hughes	Argues that 'In view of the fact that there was so little change – the removal of the Kaiser and the other German monarchs was of symbolic, rather than real significance – it is more accurate to talk of a potential revolution which ran away into the sand, rather than the genuine article'.

### Question 47

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The proposed Enabling Act would allow Hitler's government to introduce legislative measures independent of the Reichstag which included fundamental alterations to the Constitution meaning that government decrees had the force of law, but without the need for prior approval from the Reichstag, or the Reich President.	Argues that the powers which Hitler would gain through the Enabling Act effectively allowed him to alter the Weimar Constitution. Argues that Hitler could have his own way in passing laws without the need to consult either the President or the Reichstag.
At the Cabinet meeting on 7 March 1933, the Nazis, convinced of the opposition of the SPD to their plans, concentrated on trying to win over the Centre Party.	Argues that winning support from the Centre Party was key to the passage of the Enabling Act.
Then in April, the German states were centralised and Hitler appointed Reich governors.	Argues that Hitler used the Enabling Act to centralise power and remove political opposition from the German States.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- in a meeting with von Schleicher in August 1932, following on from the Nazis' strong performance in the July election, Hitler had previously demanded an Enabling Act which would give the Chancellor (Hitler) the power to close down the Reichstag if he so desired. This plan was resurrected in March 1933 in the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933, Hitler proposed a new Enabling Law
- the Vice-Chancellor, Franz von Papen, was a leading figure in the *Zentrum*, Catholic Centre Party and the 74 votes of his party were won by reassurances given by Hitler on the continuing rights which would be afforded to the Catholic Church
- acting illegally, Göring, as the Reichstag's Presiding Officer, reduced the required quorum from 432 to 378 by not counting the votes of the legally elected, yet absent, KPD deputies. This made it easier to secure the two-thirds majority required to fundamentally alter the Weimar Constitution
- to ensure the passage of the Act, various concessions were offered. The status of the Reichstag, the position and powers of the President, and the powers of the upper House were not to be affected. Additionally, a 'sunset clause' was inserted to make the Act more palatable, and the Act would be subject to renewal every four years. The Act was renewed in 1937 and again in 1939
- only SPD Deputies voted against the Act, and it was passed by 444 votes to 94
- the Enabling Act gave the destruction of parliamentary democracy the air of legality.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the pretext for the Enabling Act was the Reichstag Fire. On the night of 27 to 28 February 1933, the Reichstag burned down. Arrested near the scene was Dutch Communist, Marinus van der Lubbe. The Nazis used this event as the pretext that there was a plot to overthrow the republic and create a Communist republic
- on 28 February 1933, upon Hitler's request, Hindenburg signed 'The Decree for the Protection of the German People' – The Reichstag Fire Decree. The Decree cancelled freedoms and civil liberties enshrined in the Weimar constitution
- On 4 February 1933, the police were granted powers to stop any political meetings. On 14 February, the KPD's Berlin offices were raided by the police and on 24 February, they were permanently closed down. On 22 February 1933, thousands of SA and SS members were sworn in as 'auxiliary' police officers
- with the establishment of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on 13 March, all media formats in Germany came under the control of Josef Goebbels
- the 'Law for Terminating the Suffering of the People and the Nation' became law on 24 March 1933 and became the 'de facto' constitution of the new Reich

- the Nazis organised a boycott of Jewish shops and businesses on 1 April 1933. With the 7 April ‘Law for the Restoration of Professional Civil Service’, schools, courts and government departments were purged of Jewish and political opponents
- May Day holiday of 1 May 1933, the Nazis took over offices belonging to Germany’s trade unions. The next day, these unions were eliminated and replaced by the DAF (*Deutsche Arbeits Front*), headed by Dr Robert Ley. With the associated KdF (*Kraft durch Freude*) offering cruises, holidays (for example, Prora on Rugen Island) and the Beauty of Labour organisation (*Schönheit der Arbeit*) offering improved working conditions, the Nazis aimed to consolidate their power by winning over workers whose loyalty had traditionally been to the SPD or KPD
- by the summer of 1933, political opposition had been neutralised. On 22 June, the SPD were banned and shortly thereafter, the DNVP voted to dissolve itself. Finally, on 14 July 1933, the Law Against the Formation of New Parties was passed and Germany effectively became a one-party dictatorship
- the Nazis also pursued popular policies to consolidate their power. The regime concluded a Concordat with the Vatican on 20 July 1933. In return for the Catholic Church agreeing to remove itself from political activities, the position and status of the Church within Germany was guaranteed
- in January 1934, the power of Länder was destroyed, and Nazi governors were installed to run the various German states. The Nazification of all levels of government, both local and federal, was almost complete
- the Nazis also used fear and intimidation to consolidate their power. In April 1933, the secret police, the Gestapo, was established and the range of offences that carried the death sentence was vastly increased
- the most notorious event in the Nazi consolidation of power was the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ (Operation Hummingbird) which commenced on 30 June 1934. Leading members of the SA and other political opponents were murdered. Röhm had proposed merging the SA with the army and his execution met with approval from the army high command
- on 1 August, the ‘Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich’ was passed by the Reichstag, whereby the offices of Chancellor and President would be merged. Within an hour of Hindenburg’s death the following day, Hitler announced he had assumed the title of Führer – Chancellor and President combined in one role and the Nazi consolidation of power was complete.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Helmut Krausnick	Argues that the Reichstag Fire Decree was ‘the decisive stage in the consolidation of power’. It gave the government the power to silence any opponent.
Richard J Evans	Argues that: ‘the so-called Enabling Act passed by the Reichstag gave the cabinet the right to rule by decree without reference either to the Reichstag or the President. Together with the Reichstag Fire Decree it provided the legal pretext for the creation of a dictatorship’.
Tim Kirk	Proposes that: ‘the political change brought about by the Nazis during their first 18 months in power was rapid and far-reaching, much more so than that achieved by Mussolini’s Fascist regime. . . Although there had been no revolution, and although the country’s elites remained in place, retaining both their wealthy and their social status; Germany felt a very different place’.
Ian Kershaw	Argues that the Night of the Long Knives and the death of Hindenburg were the key events in the Nazi consolidation of power. He argues that Hitler: ‘was now institutionally unchallengeable, backed by the ‘big battalions’, adored by much of the population. He had secured total power’.

### Question 48

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Unlike family, church and school, the Hitler Youth was not weighed down by tradition and the consequent growth of the Hitler Youth was impressive, reaching over 100,000 by 1933, 2 million by the end of 1933 and 5.4 million by December 1936.	Argues that unlike other youth groups which operated in Germany, the Hitler Youth allowed their voices to be heard and as a result substantial numbers of German youths joined the Hitler Youth.
For many young people who joined the Hitler Youth, it provided exciting opportunities, making them feel respected and responsible.	Argues that the Hitler Youth seemed exciting and gave young people the opportunity to gain respect and a sense of responsibility.
The Hitler Youth conjured up an important sense of belonging which emphasised the importance of one small individual as an important part of a larger community, the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> .	Argues that here was a sense of belonging through the Hitler Youth and its members were encouraged to see themselves as true members of the national community.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- initially formed in 1922, Nazi youth groups were banned in the wake of the November 1923 Putsch and were re-created in 1926
- the Hitler Youth was briefly banned once again in 1932. This ban was reversed by Franz von Papen later that year
- from 1931, the HJ was headed by Baldur von Schirach. There were various branches of the HJ – the *Pimpfen* for boys aged 10 to 14 prior to their accession to the full *Hitler Jugend* between 14 and 18 years of age. For girls, there were parallel organisations – the *Jungmädel* for girls aged 10 to 14 and the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* for girls aged 14 to 18
- both the groups for males and females had very different activities. Boys were taught military matters and girls were taught how to be good Nazi wives and mothers
- despite the differing activities, the aims of the various branches of the HJ were very similar – to convert German youths into being loyal members of the national community
- in 1936, the *Hitler Jugend* became the only legal youth organisation in Germany
- with so much after-school time devoted to HJ activities, the educational achievement of Germany's young people began to suffer.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
After 1933, Nazi policies targeted women as part of the drive to cut down male unemployment and as a consequence, women were removed from many jobs and careers, reversing much of the progress they had made in the 1920s in the workplace.	Argues that one aim of Nazi policy towards women was to create jobs for men by removing as many females as possible from the workplace.
The Nazis mounted a campaign against ‘double earners’ – families in which both partners worked – which condemned married women workers on the grounds that they were failing in their womanly duty and depriving men of jobs.	Argues that Nazis initially targeted families where both the husband and wife worked. Married female workers were targeted as those who were both denying men of a job and who were also failing to produce children.
By their zealous demand that individuals sacrifice their lives for the state, the Nazis invaded the family as a place of safety and refuge from the outside world and they infiltrated women’s private lives.	Argues that the process of Nazification went all the way into the private freedoms of women.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- in 1933, marriage loans of up to 1000RM were offered to newlyweds on the grounds that the wife would not work outside the home. These loans equated to approximately 20% of the average yearly take-home pay. To fund the loans, taxes were increased by 2.5% for single people and childless couples
- these loans took the form of vouchers (given to the husband) for household furniture and other goods. With each child born, 25% of the loan was reduced and after four children, the loan was cancelled in its entirety
- by 1937, 70,000 married couples had received a loan. Despite this, Germany’s birth rate remained relatively static, and the policy did not meet its aim
- Nazi ideology stressed that women should be confined to the domestic sphere and that their duty was to produce healthy Aryan children, uphold conservative family values, and comfort their husbands in their service to the state, based on *Kinder, Kirche, Küche*, (Children, Church, Kitchen)
- in the initial years of the regime, the number of women in employment generally remained low. However, by 1939, the number of women in employment had risen from 11 million in 1933, to 14 million.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

**The impact of the policies to exclude ‘racial undesirables’ from the Volksgemeinschaft:**

- the overall aim of the Nazis’ *Volksgemeinschaft* was to control a population of healthy Aryans who were committed to the state. The impact of this vision was hostility to elements that threatened the supremacy of the German people
- the policy of exclusion led in turn to the persecution of those labelled as ‘gypsies’ (Roma and Sinti), homosexuals, religious sects, the mentally ill and so-called ‘asocials’ such as habitual criminals or alcoholics, and Jewish people
- policies to exclude, isolate and persecute Jewish people, e.g. boycotts, Nuremberg Laws and Kristallnacht
- the impact of this aspect of the *Volksgemeinschaft* was a raft of measures taken against so-called ‘outsiders’, including job discrimination, imprisonment, and compulsory sterilisation
- in this aspect, the impact of Nazi policies were broadly effective. However, in other aspects such as policies relating to children, workers, and women, Nazi policies were far less of an impact.

### **The impact of the policies of the Volksgemeinschaft on children and young people:**

- in April 1933, Bernhard Rust announced the creation of NAPOLAS – leadership schools for boys aged 10-18. This was followed in 1937 when HJ leader, Baldur von Schirach and DAF leader, Robert Ley, announced the creation of ‘Adolf Hitler Schools’. Pupils were enrolled here as the future ideological and military leaders of the Reich. Small numbers of Castles of Order schools were also established. The impact was the creation of a generation of ideologically committed Nazi youths who moved into the upper echelons of the party
- ‘coordination’ of schoolteachers: In 1929, the *NS-Lehrerbund* (National Socialist Teachers’ League) was founded. By 1937, 97% of teachers had joined the organisation. Members had to attend one month training courses that stressed Nazi ideology and physical fitness. By 1938, two-thirds of teachers had participated in these courses
- with the party in control of education after 1933, the Nazification of the curriculum soon followed. For instance, History and Biology became vehicles for the inculcation of nationalism and racism
- the Nazis attempted to use education to indoctrinate young people. Teachers were coordinated and the curriculum was revised to ensure that all subjects were organised around racial ideology
- initial enthusiasm for the youth organisations gave way to increasing disillusion with Nazi ideology and the repetitive, quasi-military aspects of activities.

### **The impact of the policies of the Volksgemeinschaft on women:**

- on 10 May 1933, Robert Ley announced the creation of the Women’s Front. As a direct result, all 230 of Germany’s women’s organisations had to expel Jewish members and integrate into the Women’s Front or be disbanded. Gertrude Scholz-Klink was appointed as its head in July 1934
- in 1933 nearly all of Germany’s 19,000 female civil servants lost their jobs as did around 15% of women teachers
- regressive policies towards women were introduced such as discouraging women from smoking and wearing makeup.

### **The impact of the policies of the Volksgemeinschaft on workers:**

- thousands of workers got jobs in public works schemes, labour service or, after 1935, in the army. Many German workers also benefitted from the removal of women and Jews from the labour force
- most workers enjoyed increases in real wages after 1933 and skilled workers prospered
- the DAF and associated KdF aimed to win over workers by improving their material conditions. However, despite contributing to ‘savings schemes’, few Germans gained cars (KdF Wagons) or holidays
- wages rose for many, but prices began to rise at a faster rate after 1936
- workers’ hours also increased but there was not an associated rise in real wages.

### **The impact of the policies of the Volksgemeinschaft on the *Mittelstand* and peasant farmers:**

- the *Volksgemeinschaft* attempted to cement the place of farmers and small craft industries as the backbone of traditional German society. However, the policy of rearmament after 1936 favoured big business and the small craft industries could not compete. As a result, the number of self-employed craft workers fell by half a million between 1936 and 1939
- the *Mittelstand* were also encouraged to support the Nazis through policies targeted at them such as the banning of cut-price competition between businesses
- the Nazis put forward a policy of *Blut und Boden* (Blood and Soil) in an attempt to protect a healthy and economically secure rural community
- after 1933, farming income did recover but from 1937, incomes fell yet again as labour costs rose, yet prices stayed fixed.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Jill Stephenson	Argues that the creation of a national community was an aspiration of the Nazi leadership that remained at best only partially fulfilled. In fact, the social classes, urban and rural, persisted, as did their members' attitudes towards themselves and to others.
Klaus Fischer	Argues that Nazi educational efforts, as a whole, turned out to be poorly thought-out and lacking in substance. However, Nazi education was able to miseducate and misuse a whole generation of young people.
Tim Kirk	Argues that the Volksgemeinschaft was a myth. Despite the ambitious rhetoric of its propaganda, Nazism did not in fact bring about a social revolution in Germany either in terms of real social change or in the way in which social reality was perceived. The effect of Nazi social and economic policies was to reinforce rather than transcend or overcome class divisions; the working class, for instance, was contained rather than integrated into a national community.
Lisa Pine	Argues that the Nazis utilised the family for its own ends. Marriage and childbirth became racial obligations, rather than personal decisions. The family was placed as a breeding and rearing institution completely in the service of the totalitarian state.

## Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 49

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may support beliefs about race as driving the policy of the South Africa Party:**

- traditional ‘racial’ explanation of segregation emphasises Afrikaner assumptions about race
- the contributions of Anglophone communities in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century as a basis for further segregation
- sanitation syndrome of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century
- the growing fear of ‘the black peril’ in the post-WWI depression
- fears of ‘miscegenation’ and ‘white degeneration’ – development of a laager mentality
- the views of ‘liberal segregationists’ and the desire to protect Africans from the dangers of over-rapid urbanisation
- migrant labour system was significantly shaped by the dynamics of African societies
- whites increasingly took skilled and supervisory roles following legislation including the Mines and Works Act and the 1918 Status Quo Act, promoting white economic supremacy
- legislation passed to restrict labour and secure the position of white workers including closed compounds for black workers
- 1911 Mines and Works Act: certificates of competency secured posts for higher paid whites
- increasing state intervention over housing and provision of more government relief for white workers
- although the 1911 Native Regulation Act banned strikes by African workers, this was not true for whites
- 1918 Status Quo Act establishes colour bar
- 1922 Apprenticeship Act gave unionised white workers security by introducing qualifications for apprenticeships.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for the introduction of policies:**

- ways in which segregation met the needs of industry and white farming (1913 Land Act)
- links between segregation and migrant labour – apparent advantages for mining and agriculture
- the ‘alliance of gold and maize’/The ‘reserve labour subsidy theory’
- creation of Native reserves
- impact of the Mines and Works Act 1911 in recognising Unions and imposing an 8-hour day
- establishment of the colour bar maintained racial divisions and higher wages for white workers
- 1914 Riotous Assemblies Act introduced to limit violence of white worker protests
- higher inflation after the First World War led to pressure on white jobs and wages.
- attempt to reduce white mine employment led to strikes
- whites able to assert pressure on mine owners through the ballot box arguably limits scope and therefore impact of government legislation
- 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act legalised bargaining power of trade unions
- strikes throughout period including 1914 general strike, 1919 Dock workers strike, 1920 Rand workers strike and 1922 Rand Revolt in response to the impact of legislation
- SAP legislation alienates many white workers as Botha and Smuts accused of working in collaboration with capitalism. After the Rand Revolt many former SAP supporters change allegiance to the National Party or Labour Party resulting in defeat for the SAP in 1924
- increase in number of urban poor partly as a result of legislation.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Saul Dubow</b>	Study in <i>Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid South Africa</i> challenges revisionist views by placing greater emphasis on the fear of the black peril and contemporary racial ideology.
<b>Leonard Thompson</b>	Presents a traditional view that emphasises Afrikaner values and preservation of white minority rule in determining government policy.
<b>William Beinart</b>	Argues that the dynamics of African societies contributed to the development of migrant labour, the demand for which shaped government policy.
<b>Nigel Worden</b>	Argues that legislation passed was for commercial interests and as a result of the developing towns rather than in the interests of the white labour force. The desire of white workers to maintain supremacy in the workplace and beyond and the fear of black workers provides the ideological argument for segregation.

## Question 50

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that the ineffectiveness of resistance to segregation before 1939 was due to poor leadership:**

- early ANC leaders aimed for equal opportunity, not political power, or African domination. Most were mission educated (Dube, Plaatje, Gumede, Seme) and accused of being out of touch
- they hoped improved understanding, and greater justice, would allow Africans to make a growing contribution to South African society
- most of the early ANC leaders (Dube, Plaatje, Gumede, Seme) were mission educated and, as doctors, lawyers, ministers etc they were from the African middle class
- by the 1930s ANC leadership was divided into warring cliques
- lack of agreement about aims and methods
- financial scandals and internal disputes which destroyed the ICU
- early ANC leadership disdainful of popular agitation so failed to link up with other resistance groups
- women played little part in the ANC
- however, the ANC did co-operate in the 1920s with the CPSA before Gumede advocated full co-operation with them in the 1930s
- some leaders, including Dube, were reluctantly prepared to accept rural segregation as long as there was a just distribution of land
- the failure of the ICU leadership to identify with the problems of everyday Africans
- the influence of Garveyism and those who favoured a more co-ordinated approach and opposed Garvey's ideas
- the failure of the All-African Convention to reach agreement about how to act in the face of Hertzog's legislative attack on African rights: petition and deputation versus mass action
- by the 1930s the ANC leadership was bitterly divided and split into warring cliques, not least due to Gumede's flirtation with the Communist Party which deeply divided the ANC
- the failure of the CPSA to create a mass movement
- early ANC leaders hoped improved understanding and greater justice would allow Africans to make a growing contribution to South Africa, they aimed for equal opportunity rather than political power or African domination.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for the ineffectiveness of resistance organisations:**

- between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s the ANC had lost its coherence following the collapse of the ICU
- black intellectuals maintained support for education and working within the existing system despite the impact of the Depression
- failure of international delegations such as that at Versailles
- resistance at this time is described by Beinart as being localised in issue and often in action
- most believed that if they were economically successful then whites would give them political representation therefore limiting their methods
- economic success would only be possible with good (and equal) education for blacks
- methods of early resistance organisations including petitions and delegations
- diversity of African resistance movements
- the methods of the early ANC including delegations and petitions
- by the 1930s ANC membership probably did not exceed 1000. The more radical ICU was far more significant in the 1920s because they attempted to establish a mass movement, although this was not the view of the ANC
- ANC radicals in the Cape mounted a campaign of civil disobedience to achieve the native republic, further exacerbating splits within the organisation
- opposition to Hertzog's Native Bills was led by the All-African Convention, not the ANC, demonstrating lack of cohesion and competition over which would be dominant
- the ANC's policy of working with those who had political power bound them more closely to the ruling class, alienating others
- failure to capitalise on rural resistance
- the nature of white rule in South Africa after 1910 and the economic, political and social difficulties of resistance.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Tom Lodge</b>	Argues that ANC leaders were middle class men who 'feared being thrust back into the ranks of the urban and rural poor'.
<b>Andre Odendaal</b>	The early ANC leadership mistakenly pursued a policy of 'hopeful reliance on the common sense of justice and love of freedom so innate in the British character'.
<b>Dale McKinley</b>	A Marxist historian, argues the ANC in particular failed to establish grassroots organisations among the masses in South Africa, that they were preoccupied by their petty bourgeois interests such as obtaining a free market. Trade unions were more effective in this.
<b>Nigel Worden</b>	Describes the limitations of the ICU due to leadership and regional struggles and an unwillingness to move focus away from the countryside until the late 1920s where it obtained most of its support. In general, he attributes the ineffectiveness of early resistance as being that <i>African protest lacked the link with political mobilisation</i> .

## Question 51

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which supports the view that an increasing sense of confidence facilitated Separate Development after 1959:**

- the economy was quick to recover in the months following Sharpeville, in the wake of government repression and control
- South Africa was still surrounded by friendly countries before the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola. White controlled Rhodesia and newly independent African nations such as Zambia relied on South Africa for trade and access to ports
- South Africa's anti-communist stance in the Cold War increased ties with Western governments in spite of anti-apartheid movements – the USA saw South Africa as a bulwark against communism
- increased foreign investment in South Africa by the mid-1960s
- growth in Afrikaner wealth, for example Afrikaner ownership of financial concerns had increased from 6% in 1948 to 21% by 1964
- growth in white population from 3.09 million to 3.77 million over the course of the 1960s, largely a result of immigration
- per capita income among whites rose by almost 50% in the 1960s
- by the end of the 1960s, South African foreign reserves had quadrupled from the 1960 figure of \$240 million
- during the 1960s, trade with the USA grew by 79%, with the UK by 88% and with Japan by a staggering 379%
- the value of gold grew by 85% in the 1960s
- relative prosperity was growing for Afrikaners compared to English-speaking South Africans – from half that of the incomes in 1946 to two-thirds by 1970
- statistics on quality of life suggested that white South Africans as a group were among the most comfortably off in the world (health, education, life expectancy)
- the Granite Response to the perceived onslaught against white minority rule saw the likes of a Publications Control Board, the Defence Act (1961) extending military training and the requirement of the South African Broadcasting Corporation to openly support the government
- aim to secure white dominance in a smaller white state by the move to self-government of the homelands
- Verwoerd saw apartheid of the 1960s as the self-defence of the white race
- the establishment of the South African Republic (1961).

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for Separate Development:**

- Homeland/Bantustan development linked to industrial decentralisation of the 1960s relocating industry to the edge of the reserves as an alternative to migrant labour
- increasing manufacturing demands for a stable workforce
- many continued to live and work outside their 'registered' homelands
- restricting numbers of workers entering cities was redescribed as part of the government's drive to boost productivity in the reserves
- Verwoerd describes Separate Development as 'Political independence and economic interdependence' (1959)
- aim to mechanise industries in white areas as far as possible to limit requirement for black workers in cities
- more industries to be developed on borders of the Bantustans so labour could commute daily and therefore avoid residence in white areas
- Broederbond increasingly influential (Wet Nel, Botha, Eiselen) so stricter Separate Development and a resultant rapid decline in practical apartheid
- eight homelands (later ten) were established by the legislation of 1959. Four of these (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were granted independence
- Separate Development stimulated ethnic differences, even where this ethnic identity was based on created, rather than historic, tribalism – led to forced relocation of millions
- 3,500,000 Africans forcibly removed from homes to rural slums
- approximately a million Africans deported from farming areas consequently given to white farmers

- Verwoerd had promised that by 1978 South Africa would be an all-white country – key to this vision was the black homelands/Bantustans. ‘If South Africa was to choose between being poor and white or rich and multiracial, then it must choose to be white’ (Verwoerd)
- 1963 – new housing legislation saw black people moved out of Sophiatown to outside the cities. Urban removals increasingly prominent in the mid-1960s
- possibly a tactical reaction to the decolonisation of Africa
- some argue that the commitment to Separate Development was largely the ideological means to legitimise the denial of the franchise to Africans
- ideological shifts away from treating reserves as reservoirs of African labour to the state’s defence against increasingly severe international condemnation of Apartheid after the Sharpeville shootings of 1960.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>James Barber</b>	Argues that Verwoerd’s change in policy to Separate Development came as much from pragmatism and practical concerns as it did from ideological convictions.
<b>Deborah Posel</b>	Challenges the idea that apartheid of the 1960s was mainly an extension of the migrant labour system, rather it was a discrete ‘second phase’ driven by a desire to maintain white supremacy and, ultimately, Afrikaner political and socio-economic supremacy.
<b>Harold Wolpe</b>	Subsistence farming according to radicals had all but disappeared in the Reserves in the 1950s and therefore so was the basis of migrant labour in spite of the government seeking to maintain cheap labour for manufacturing.
<b>Rob Skinner</b>	Argues the Bantustans became the centrepiece of a huge effort of social engineering designed to maintain white privilege and based upon a highly bureaucratic form of racial domination. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was thus an attempt to provide a political solution to African ambition, based on ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘racial’ division.

## Question 52

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may suggest the Black Consciousness Movement led to the resurgence of resistance in the 1970s:**

- the role of the Black Consciousness Movement as a source of inspiration for the Soweto students
- the role of the South African Students' Movement (SASM) and discontent resulting from twenty years of 'Bantu' education
- Biko helped set up the Black Communities Programme in 1970, establishing black self-help groups for black communities
- the influence of the BCM in strikes and protests of 1972-1973
- spread of Black Consciousness ideas among the ANC in exile as large numbers of activists joined ANC training camps
- Black Consciousness failed to penetrate the working class or peasant communities
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness
- by the late 1970s the ANC was increasingly focusing on urban areas and building mass organisations
- role of Biko forming SASO, as president of the Black People's Convention and death in 1977 in police custody
- poor living conditions and reaction to oppression, contributed to BCM objectives
- the Soweto Uprising originated with a small group of BCM affiliated High School students
- 1975 SASO banned
- Biko rejected policies of violence adopted by ANC/PAC in the 1960s
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness
- vague and undefined political and economic policies.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for resurgence of resistance in the 1970s:**

- demonstrations after Soweto continued in various forms until the end of apartheid in 1994
- most demonstrations after Soweto localised and spontaneous rather than being directed centrally. This was a new feature of anti-apartheid protests
- traditional leaders of opposition to apartheid seemingly becoming less relevant
- ANC and PAC beneficiaries of Soweto as it enhanced sympathy for the armed struggle as a result of the revulsion at the brutal response of the security forces
- Government Total Strategy a response to the 'Total Onslaught' or fear of co-ordinated attack orchestrated by Communists to destroy apartheid following Soweto. Total Strategy saw an escalation in the response from MK and POQO
- thousands of young people slipped away to join the armed struggle
- many joined the ANC/MK training camps in Tanzania, Angola and elsewhere
- widespread international condemnation of Soweto bolstered international support for the anti-apartheid campaign from publicly organised events. India and Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, provided aid and support
- Soweto uprising and death of Biko in police custody (1977) marked the end of a point at which many considered the chance of a peaceful solution to problems caused by apartheid. Increasing militancy
- increasing resentment of government integrationist policies saw many more prepared to see all whites as enemies
- Mandela and others comment on the contacts between ANC prisoners on Robben Island and the student leaders sent there after 1976
- the Azanian People's Organisation in 1978 bringing together BPC, BCP and SASO, all organisations which had been banned in 1977 after the Soweto riots
- the organisation of the ANC in exile and tenuous links with South Africa
- the Cillie Commission report blamed the Soweto riots on outside 'agitators' and ANC activists later claimed that the ANC had played a major part in organising the revolt
- in 1978, the ANC and SACP set up a small group to ensure greater co-operation with internal political meetings, although the armed section was still envisaged as forming the cutting edge. This amounted to recognition that they failed to take full advantage of Soweto
- increased worker militancy from c. 1973; 160 strikes in March alone. Between January and September 1973 more than 70,000 workers involved in industrial action

- ‘The labour troubles of 1973 were forerunners of a revival of militant African political activity’ (Barber)
- developments in other African countries, especially the liberation of Angola and Mozambique and their subsequent support of the armed struggle
- increased size of the African urban workforce, including skilled and semi-skilled workers. Rebirth of African trade unions
- growing unpopularity of the homelands policy of the National Party
- decline of the ANC in the early 1970s, focus on winning external legitimacy in Africa and wider world.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Francis Meli</b>	Relates the emergence of Black Consciousness to the international student protest of the late 1960s/early 1970s, as well as to the process of decolonisation. He denies that Black Consciousness was anything new, but rather sees it as a manifestation of African nationalism, descending directly from the organisations that the government had banned earlier.
<b>Saul Dubow</b>	Argues that it was the Soweto Uprising that was a key event in the fight against apartheid. He argues that it far exceeded the scale and intensity of the 1960 insurrection, heralding the demise of white supremacy and made real the possibility of liberation, perhaps for the first time.
<b>Tom Lodge</b>	Identifies the wider generational conflict in the aftermath of Soweto as key for the development of resistance as it was young people who had taken the initiative in Soweto and driven the protests in response to education legislation rather than BCM initiatives.
<b>William Beinart</b>	Argues the BCM extended the bounds of possibility and that anger, and the symbols of resistance survived the death of Biko and BC banning.

### **Question 53**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may suggest/support pressures from the United Nations influencing policy:**

- UN aimed to exert international political and economic pressure on the apartheid regime
- UN passed resolution 1761 in November 1962 setting up a Special Committee against apartheid and supporting economic sanctions. However, many Western countries refused to join the committee, with the Security Council maintaining the power of veto
- UN had called for an oil embargo as early as 1960
- issue of apartheid raised frequently in the UN but, as a result of vetoes in the Security Council, it was not until 1977 that an arms embargo was imposed
- economic sanctions, disinvestment and trade boycotts
- even the Labour governments of the 1970s were not prepared to support UN calls for sanctions
- UN condemned apartheid routinely and regularly advocated sanctions: an attempt to expel South Africa from membership in 1974 had been defeated by the veto of France, Britain and the USA in the Security Council
- UN called for a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa in 1963, it became mandatory in 1977 as a result of the condemnation of the way the regime had dealt with the Soweto Uprising
- limited impact of economic sanctions until the 1980s
- South African control of Namibia incurred the increasing hostility of the United Nations, culminating in the 1977 Security Council vote in favour of an arms embargo
- between 1965 and 1980 British governments were preoccupied with Rhodesia. Even under Thatcher Britain continued to oppose sanctions
- pressure from the United Nations including 1968 – General Assembly requested all States and organisations ‘to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime’.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons behind South African government policy making:**

- black majority rule in front line states meant South Africa faced ‘total onslaught’ from neighbouring African states
- the French had relinquished control over colonies in west and central Africa and Belgians withdrew from Congo after 1960
- loss of ‘buffer zone’ of friendly neighbours Angola and Mozambique when Portuguese granted independence in 1975, following the coup in Lisbon
- after 1975, only Rhodesia remained as an enclave of white minority rule, although by 1978 it was barely surviving a fierce civil war and international sanctions
- collapse of Portuguese Empire meant that South Africa was virtually surrounded by African states, all potentially hostile to apartheid
- the ANC set up guerrilla bases within easy reach of Johannesburg and Pretoria – MK organised raids from Mozambique in the early 1980s
- establishment of MK training grounds/supply routes through former Portuguese colonies
- fear of Communist influence over neighbouring black states and consequent communist support of black resistance movements operating in South Africa
- withdrawal of South African police force from supporting Smith’s minority white government in Rhodesia in 1974. Mugabe wins election – strongly anti-South African
- Zimbabwe’s Mugabe was regarded as a hard-line Marxist and terrorist
- by 1977 the South African government was admitting it had few diplomatic links in Africa and Vorster was forced to concede that ‘some bridges had collapsed’
- under Botha, the government’s commitment to ‘total national strategy’ was at least partly a response to the deteriorating situation within Southern Africa
- Leonard Thompson points out, between 1981 and 1983 South African commandos carried out undercover operations against every one of its neighbours
- frontline states economically dependent on South Africa and this limited their capacity to threaten South Africa directly
- continued support from West as South African seen as a bastion against Communism and the requirement to maintain trade of uranium for nuclear weapons – a valuable ally
- after 1979, Reagan and Thatcher governments shared the determination to oppose the spread of communism in Africa. Pressure declines during 1980s as a result of Détente

- large amounts of western capital – over \$26 billion – were invested in South Africa
- BUT – Labour government of 1970s and the USA veto sanctions and largely follow a pro South African policy allowing capital and investment in the country
- successive South African governments worked hard to convince the West that only a stable, white minority government could resist communism getting a hold in South Africa
- only in the mid-1980s, during the latter stages of Détente, did coverage of township violence and the brutality of security forces result in significant change from the West
- migrant labour remained important with over a quarter of a million workers from other countries working in South Africa
- media showed clashes of police and protestors and government became increasingly in the spotlight and criticised. 1980s often seen as a decade of funerals
- economic problems such as the falling price of gold, rising price of oil, the balance of payment crisis and rising inflation drives necessity of continued negotiations.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Adrian Guelke</b>	Provides a balanced evaluation, claiming that changes in the region of Southern Africa, and the end of the Portuguese empire in Africa, had weakened the position of the SA government.
<b>Saul Dubow</b>	The arrival of the Cold War on South Africa's 'doorstep' created 'the spectre of the country being surrounded by hostile states directed by Moscow'. This provided opportunities for South Africa's reformers to downplay apartheid as a system of racial rule by emphasizing the country's commitment to the defence of Western interests.
<b>Tom Lodge</b>	1970s – Disinvestment by the West was 'critical leverage'. He describes the UN as having ' <i>weak expression of concern about violence</i> ' but this did signify an advance in the UN's opposition to apartheid.
<b>Merle Lipton</b>	Argues that capitalist interests were already working to undermine apartheid by the late 1970s and early 1980s.

## Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 54

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Milner had established a customs union to stimulate an expansion of markets.	Argues that there were economic benefits already being found through trade agreements.
To most political leaders in South Africa's four colonies, unification made good sense because four governments, four parliaments and four railways, customs and legal systems were a recipe for waste and conflict.	Argues Union was a logical next step for the leadership of the four colonies. Contends it would be more efficient to unite the infrastructure of the four colonies.
Union appealed to two of the colonies, the Transvaal and the Free State, as they had no outlet to the sea and were in the hands of the Cape and Natal when it came to customs and freight charges.	Argues Union was advantageous to colonies without ports of their own as they would gain access to the sea through the remaining colonies.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- union would aid expansion of markets into whole British Empire/global markets
- increased access to larger pool of cheap labour
- gold and diamond industries able to pool resources, share profits and expand markets
- revisionist historians argue that socio-economic factors encouraged union, that union was for economic advantage
- widely recognised that mining was the lifeblood of the Union
- the importance of gold as a source of revenue
- Botha and Smuts recognised the primacy of ensuring favourable conditions for mining and efficient agriculture.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . many white South Africans to believe that some form of political union was urgently necessary.	Contends that to secure ongoing white minority rule, political union was essential.
Although all the chiefdoms were formally subject to white overrule, most of them were very lightly controlled. The white administrators were few and far between and had to rely on influence rather than force to exert authority which the white communities believed a union might resolve.	Suggests that fears over maintaining control of African population due to nature of pre-union system of administration.
Nevertheless, in the eastern half of South Africa the white communities still felt insecure and looked to the formation of a closer union.	Argues that growing insecurity amongst white communities stemming from proximity to heavily populated African areas.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- African majority – over 75% of the population in the early 1900s
- growing fears of African uprisings fuelled by 1906 Bambatha Rebellion
- constitutional discussions – desire by Transvaal and Orange Free State to keep non-whites disenfranchised under union
- fears from white minority – desire to maintain white economic and political supremacy
- traditional view of union to preserve white minority rule and quell fears of social miscegenation
- residential segregation originated in towns dominated by merchant and commercial interests.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- Liberal Party gain power in Westminster, 1906 – happier to negotiate with Afrikaners
- self-government already happening under Selborne as a steppingstone to Union. Het Volk, Oranigia Unie already in limited control of former Afrikaner republics
- world context – Liberals focus on economic advantages of South Africa with introduction of welfare reforms and Dreadnought building programme, growing tension in Europe, the Irish Question all on the political agenda as higher priorities
- German control in South West Africa – Britain competing in Africa to control the region
- Britain wants to maintain access in the Cape for naval interests in the region
- reparations made by the British after the Boer War improved relations with Afrikaners
- post Boer War reconstruction administration worked towards union to bolster the economy
- Boers believed imperial connection would enhance economic progress
- Milner needed Boer agriculture to provide food for urban areas (and to ensure economic stability through reconstructed agriculture)
- Cape Prime Minister Jameson advocated increased cooperation between white races as advocated by his mentor Cecil Rhodes
- Botha and Smuts supported Union in the belief it would weaken the influence of the British – by 1908 this seemed likely as Afrikaners had taken power in 3 colonies
- Milner hoped that political union would prove attractive to all whites in South Africa
- contemporary views of Smuts (1907): ‘Two such peoples as the Boers and the British must either unite or they must exterminate each other’
- victory in the Boer War not decisive – Boers had to be promised internal self-government
- more radical Afrikaners believed Union would change nothing in terms of British control
- union would see the promotion and possible expansion of Afrikaner culture, such as Dutch being made an official language with English
- Botha knew the Transvaal had been the most powerful of the 4 colonies and believed union was therefore in Afrikaner interests to dominate the dominion
- Boers realised they would be a majority and would not lose out in ethnic politics.

**Historians**

**Perspective on the issue**

<b>Rodney Davenport</b>	Argues that union was pursued by the British through a desire to control the Transvaal.
<b>Nigel Worden</b>	Also agrees that union was driven by economic interests arguing that it was political unity for the sake of economic growth.
<b>Robert Ross</b>	Suggests that political union was a result of the social and economic union that had already happened prior to 1910. While economic incentives triggered the union, to focus solely on this factor is to oversimplify the issue.
<b>John Omer-Cooper</b>	Argues union arose from the British who washed their hands of any moral obligation in South Africa, hoping for the best. The origins of union lie in the appeasement of the Boers under Milner during his period of reconstruction.

### Question 55

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	D F Malan.	Leader of Purified National Party after Fusion in 1933. Former minister of the DRC, editor of Die Burger, Education Minister in 1920s and member of the Broederbond. Future NP Prime Minister after 1948.
<b>Purpose</b>	Speech emphasising the tradition of struggle for Afrikaners.	A rallying call to Afrikaners to support the National Party and Afrikanerdom, based on the rhetoric of the Dutch Reformed Church which highlighted the continued struggle of Afrikaners and mythologised Afrikaner history as 'God's chosen' to govern South Africa. Known as Malan's 'Blood River' speech.
<b>Timing</b>	December 1938.	Delivered as part of the Eufees celebrations during the centenary of the Great Trek/Battle of Blood River. Estimated that one in ten Afrikaners witnessed the speech.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
... about Christian civilisation in our land, and about the continued existence and responsible power of the White race.	The desire to maintain white minority rule/political supremacy in South Africa is emphasised by the impassioned and divisive language such as 'continued existence' suggesting fear.
Today Black and White jostle together in the same labour market.	Highlights the plight of white workers competing for jobs with Africans. The use of terms such as 'jostle' suggests that Malan believes this is undesirable.
At this moment, as you must surely realise, it is your sacred duty to safeguard South Africa as a White man's land and this is now ten times more important than ever before.	Malan urges his audience to take responsibility for making South Africa a country dominated by whites. There is vehemence in the expression of 'ten times more'.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- influence of the Dutch Reformed Church
- pressures on job market from changing demands on labour with increase in manufacturing
- National Party agenda of maintaining white minority rule
- Christian National Education and promotion of shared history and culture in Afrikaner schools
- the mythology of Afrikaner nationalism elaborating history of the Volk – 'Civil Religion' with rituals, ceremonies, martyrs
- efforts made by extreme nationalists to exaggerate commonality and create sense of identity among Afrikaners by playing on prejudices and fears
- examples of alleged status of Afrikaners as 'God's chosen people' – including God's Covenant with Voortrekkers at Blood River 1838.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- impact of the Great Depression and devaluation crisis 1931–1932 on poor whites, Carnegie Commission findings on poverty
- establishment of the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge) in 1929 to promote Afrikaner culture (music, poetry etc)
- language movement and recognition of Afrikaans as an official language promoted ethnic identity. Use of Afrikaans to create and increase sense of national identity and exclusivity
- Afrikaner magazines including Die Huisgenoot and Die Burger intended to reach all
- Gustav Preller as the ‘populariser of history’ translating books in Afrikaans: distortion of Afrikaner history
- Hermann Giliomee’s emphasis on ethnic mobilisation
- Ossewa Brandweg (1939) – cultural organisation which grew from Voortrekker celebrations
- origins of attitudes to race in DRC/neo-Calvinist theology
- role of the Broederbond after 1918 largely drawn from the intelligentsia fostered ethnic identity through economic activity
- Afrikaner nationalism as political force appealing to ‘poor whites’ and white working class
- significance of Malan’s Purified National Party including growing awareness the inequality of poor Afrikaners and Malan’s commitment to the poor white question
- new leaders in Afrikanerdom: Purified National Party leaders young, urban intellectuals. Party founded on Christian-Nationalist principles
- half of Afrikaners urbanised by 1936
- establishment of Afrikaner Trade Unions to win allegiance of workers (Spoorbond for Railway workers, 1934)
- exaggeration of effects of British imperialism and the fear of being overwhelmed by the ‘black drift’ to the cities by Afrikaner intellectuals
- anti-capitalist stand of Afrikaner politicians including Hertzog
- failings of the United Party in combating increasing onslaught from National Party
- falling demand for South African exports led to overcrowding in reserves and black squatter communities on the edge of towns heightening white fears of ‘the black peril’
- new financial institutions to support Afrikaners including SANTAM and SANLAM
- Volkskongres of 1939 organised by FAK for the investigate Afrikaner poverty levels.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Hermann Giliomee</b>	Describes the importance of the development of Afrikaans in the growth of nationalism and the role of ‘language manipulators’ including Malan and the DRC who help foster ethnic identity and ethnic mobilisation. ‘Professionals in education, the media and the Church took on the massive task of building a nation from words’.
<b>Rob Skinner</b>	The development of Afrikaner nationalism was most deeply connected to the formation of class identities in an urbanising and industrialising South Africa.
<b>Merle Lipton</b>	‘An umbrella under which all Afrikaners could find shelter’, Lipton identifies the broad appeal of Malan’s National Party and argues that economic concerns ‘were always a prime concern of the Afrikaner nationalist movement’.
<b>William Vatcher</b>	Argues the development of a ‘laager’ mentality foster feelings of Volk against external onslaughts.

### Question 56

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Migrant labour, they claimed, was cheap for the mining industry because employers did not have to pay a wage that would support a whole urban family.	Apartheid would enable the maintenance of cheap African labour for white employers to ensure low overheads.
... the government hoped to extend the benefits of migrancy to manufacturing industry through tight influx controls which would inhibit the development of a black urban working class since only a limited number of black Africans would be given the right to live in towns.	Apartheid would expand the use of cheap migrant labour to the new manufacturing sector by restricting urban settlement of non-white families, again keeping their wages low.
At the same time, this would take pressure off the labour hungry commercial farmers who would benefit as workers would be bottled up in rural areas.	Economic benefits of maintaining migrant labour would also satisfy the demand for cheap African labour on white farms by ensuring workers still lived in rural areas. Identifies nationalist attitudes to an uncontrolled urban black population, seeing it a threat to Afrikanerdom. A fear of 'black swamping'.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- in 1946 black people made up 79% of the population. By 1970 it was 89% resulting in an increased fear of '*die swart gevaar*' ('black menace')
- the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and views of Afrikaner academics such as Cronje who advocated complete racial separation in order to secure the long-term survival of the Afrikaner people
- belief in white supremacy at the heart of ideology – that social miscegenation would lead to racial decline (Immorality Act and Mixed Marriages Act)
- economic or practical reasons for the development of apartheid including Bantu Education Act 1953 giving state control over education
- apartheid as a means of extending the benefits of the migrant labour system to manufacturing
- influx control legislation would restrict the process of black urbanisation and therefore the development of a black urban proletariat
- fear over strikes, squatter camps and increasing crime in cities.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Population Registration Act 1950 registered everyone according to race
- Grand apartheid's overall strategy of keeping the races separated as much as possible
- Group Areas Act 1950 designated specific areas for racial groups
- territorial segregation through the Bantu Self-Governing Act 1952 which set up eight 'self-governing' homelands for Africans
- many examples of segregation had preceded National Party victory such as carrying of passes however it was all formalised in national law
- Separate Representation of Voters Act 1951 removed coloured voters from Cape electoral register resulting in an all-white electorate
- state increasingly dominated by Afrikaners as English civil servants retired and were replaced by Afrikaners. By 1959 only 6 out of 40 heads of government departments were English speakers
- apartheid intensified during the premiership of Hendrik Verwoerd in the later 1950s
- evidence of growing African resistance including growth in ANC membership and examples of resistance increasingly put down with force
- establishment of SABRA (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs)

- details of relevant 1950s legislation such as the Native Laws Amendment Act 1952 with closer regulation of passes and conditions of residence, Bantu Authorities Act 1951 etc
- commercial farmers guaranteed a supply of labour from the Reserves
- influx control to protect interests of white workers threatened by lower wages of black workers
- by 1945, 158,000 black people were trade union members
- increasing strikes destabilising workforce: 1943 – 60 large scale strikes, 1944 – African Mineworkers Union saw 25,000 strikes demanding a minimum wage supported by the Council for Non-European Trade Unions dominated by the Communist Party of South Africa
- white South Africans felt threatened by black political aspirations
- decentralisation of industry would enable manufacturers to exploit cheap labour from the reserves – gradual relocation of industry to the fringes of reserves
- theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and influence of Abraham Kuyper
- belief that the volk was an organic identity deriving from creation
- influence of Diederichs, Verwoerd and Cronje who studied in Germany in the 1930s
- NP justified policies as not only being to safeguard the whites; it would also protect black people.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Harold Wolpe</b>	Argued that apartheid ideology was a way of justifying the extension of the economics of cheap labour to manufacturing industry. ‘Influx policies not only helped manufacturing industry, but also ensured that sufficient Africans remained in the rural areas where their labour was needed by commercial farmers’.
<b>Deborah Posel</b>	Argues that apartheid was more practical in response to changing socio-economic demands. However, apartheid was initially to preserve the dominance of the white race, primarily the Afrikaners themselves.
<b>Tom Lodge</b>	Describes the 1940s as a ‘watershed in African Politics’ whereby African resistance in the aftermath of the Second World War brought greater pressure on the White governing minority.
<b>Hermann Giliomee</b>	Afrikaner historian describes apartheid as a ‘radical survival plan’ rooted in the Dutch Reformed Church.

## Section 8 – Russia from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 57

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that lack of leadership undermined the Tsarist regime:

The nature of Tsarism by 1917:

- actions of this Tsar, his strengths and weaknesses, including his role in the War
- after the premature death of his father, Nicholas II became Tsar with little political experience and a hesitancy to relinquish any power
- he relied on political advisors who abused this trust and resulted in poor decisions. On one side the intelligent senior Liberal Conservative advisors trying to persuade him that Russia had a sophisticated literate intelligent population whose demands for civil rights and political representation was justified. On the other side the Conservative authoritarian group saying the majority are not like that and that the threat from the peasants over land was significant. In their view rights would destabilise the regime to the extent that the extreme left-wing will come in
- the weak nature of Nicholas made them question his authority. He was not as physically imposing as his late father, nor did he possess intellectual dynamism needed for an effective autocrat – ‘a well-mannered country squire’
- pressure to subdue the 1905 revolution and Nicholas had reluctantly agreed to the October Manifesto set in place the Duma. The left leaning Duma’s powers were limited by the Tsar and became dominated by the right wing – which agreed with him. Stolypin’s ability to work with the Duma undermined by conservative courtiers, the Tsarina and the Tsar himself
- the Dumas sparked a greater national interest in politics; emergence of those such as Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and SRs who represented urban workers and peasants
- the ‘Progressive Bloc’ tried to convince the Tsar to create a ‘government of public confidence’ to save the regime
- possible palace coup – Yusupov plot to detach Tsarina from the Tsar to save the monarchy in late 1916 degenerated into plot to murder Rasputin
- military failures - discredited by the failures in the Great War. Nicholas in 1915 takes decision to go to Mogilev to be with ‘Stavka’ – he is now blamed for the massive defeats the Imperial Army experienced especially from the German Army
- the effect of the Tsarina’s rule and influence of Rasputin. His reputation as a drunkard and lecher made for a growing lack of respect for the Imperial Family from the Russian public – both elite and non-elite opinion. Leaked letters from the Tsarina to Rasputin hinted at intimate relationship – ‘I wish to rest my head on your shoulder’ – revolutionary parties made crude propaganda out of this to undermine the Tsar and his rule
- political influence of Rasputin 1915-1916: ‘German’ Tsarina in charge of the Government when the Tsar left for Stavka in 1915. Sought out Rasputin for advice on ministerial appointments – ‘dark powers behind the throne’ – became public debate
- Tsarina viewed as ‘German spy’ and Rasputin seen as being in favour of a separate peace with the Germans. Both seen as being against Russia war effort, seeking to bring victory to the invader
- resulting ‘Ministerial Leapfrog’ – 4 Prime Ministers, 5 Ministers of the Interior, 3 different War Ministers in 16 months. Led to increasing governmental/administrative instability
- elite disaffection – the Palace Coup-Grand Duke Felix Yusopov plot to kill Rasputin in December to ‘save the throne’ from the influence of Rasputin on the Tsarina and the Tsar. Rasputin was seen as destroying the Romanov dynasty
- radical Right-wing, anti-Semitic, politician Purishkevich criticised both Rasputin and the Tsarina in a speech in the Duma. Coined the phrase ‘Ministerial Leapfrog’ on 19 November 1916 speech in the Duma
- killing of Rasputin on 30 December 1916, further isolated the Imperial Family from society as Tsarina’s grief allowed her to retreat into private grief.

## Evidence which may consider other reasons for the failure of autocracy:

### Military Defeats:

- 1914 – January, 1917 – Russia had approximately 7 million casualties of dead, wounded and prisoners of war
- loss of Western Provinces/Great Retreat of 1915 led to decline in status/support for Tsar's rule. Refugees pour into Petrograd increasing overcrowding and disease spread
- lack of artillery shells, rifles, and ammunition by late 1916 had been largely solved due to domestic production and foreign procurement
- Nicholas II personally blamed for military defeats because he took personal command of the Army in late 1915. Tsar isolated at Stavka in Mogilev, Belorussia
- Brusilov Offensive in 1916 almost destroyed the Austro-Hungarian Army but costs over 300,000 Russian casualties. Increased desertion and insubordination in autumn 1916. This affected rear garrisons and some frontline units
- German Army much better trained, led and equipped for the Imperial Army to defeat – different when facing Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian armies who were not as effective in fighting the Imperial Army.

### Economic Problems:

- inflation and failure of wages to keep pace – estimated 250-300% increase in prices from 1914-January, 1917 but only an average of 100% increase in wages
- workers were not able to feed families and maintain standard of living led to political discontent with regime
- lack of consumer goods – both peasants and workers experienced decline of consumer goods. Factory production geared for military/war production. Peasantry started to withhold food supplies from the market as they had money but cannot buy necessary consumer goods from factory producers
- bread queues lengthened in the cities – by late 1916 women queuing for bread for 12 hours per day. These queues become politicised as the women begin to blame the government for lack of food supplies
- vodka sales banned in 1914 – a government monopoly which produced 10% of government revenue. Moonshine vodka produced in peasant homes which gave no revenue to the state
- railway system was breaking down in late 1916 – food supplies not being delivered in sufficient regular amount to northern cities due to railways being used to transport massive military supplies westwards to the Front
- increased worker militancy – strikes at Putilov, New Leissner, Anglo-Baltic shipyard in Petrograd examples of increased frustration at declining economic conditions. Strikes take on political overtones very quickly. Influence of Bolshevik, SR and Menshevik Shop Stewards/radical workers and unskilled workers from the peasantry not long arrived in Petrograd.

### Political disaffection:

- Revolutionary Parties – Mensheviks, SRs and Bolsheviks – were active in the factories and in the military garrisons. Role of Shop Stewards in organising strikes and agitating against Tsarist rule
- 'Progressive Bloc' in Duma were rebuffed by Tsarist government as they refused to cooperate with Progressive Bloc to seek successful outcome in the war effort
- Liberal politician Guchkov conspires with General Alexeev to overthrow Tsar – evidence of elite disillusionment
- rise of Zemgor and Zemstvo shows alternative to Tsarist administration failures
- Duma at odds with Imperial regime as both Left and Right by late 1916 were calling for change – but hoping for differing outcome.

## Historians

### Orlando Figes

### Perspective on the issue

Argues, ‘Nicholas was the source of all the problems. . . a Tsar determined to rule from the throne yet incapable of exercising power’. He points to Tsar’s indecisiveness during the First World War (1914–1917), when the Russian Front experienced huge losses and radical actions were needed.

### Peter Kenez

Argues ‘There was not to be found anywhere in the country any groups of the population . . . which were ready to put up a fight for the old regime’.

### Simon Sebag Montefiore

Contends that Nicolas was handsome and blue-eyed but diminutive and hardly majestic, and his looks and immaculate manners concealed an astonishing arrogance, contempt for the educated political classes, vicious anti-Semitism, and an unshakable belief in his right to rule as a sacred autocrat. He was jealous of his ministers, and he possessed the unfortunate ability to make himself utterly distrusted by his own government. His marriage to Princess Alexandria of Hesse only exacerbated these qualities.

### Dominic Lieven

Argues that the Russian military was full of tensions against the Tsar, despite it supposedly being his biggest supporter. . . it kept losing and this was blamed on the government; military expenditure declined. As industrialisation was not as advanced as the west Russia became poorly trained, equipped and supplied in the new methods and lost. The soldiers and self-aware officers were being demoralised.

## Question 58

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the weaknesses of the Whites responsible for their defeat in the Civil War:

### Political/ideology/ill-discipline in White movement:

- White cause viewed as reactionary – seeking to undo the social revolution that had taken place in the countryside since 1917
- White armies associated with the return of the landlord – the Sharaban – to reclaim land and punish peasants for their taking land and destruction of property. Deniken's Volunteer Army helped landlord to recover land in southern Russia
- Whites needed peasant conscripts to man the armies but during the war troops very likely to desert or go over to the Reds when they got the chance. Green armies also were made up of deserters from White armies (and Red Army too)
- White military leaders were men who sought to return to values of the Tsarist-era of obedience. This had been shattered since 1917 upheavals. By the time of the Civil War peasantry had become active in local politics/agricultural settlement. The prospect of a return to status quo ante was not one that appealed. Reds recognised this and legitimised peasant revolution in the countryside
- Baron Wrangel recognised peasant land settlement but too late to effect outcome of the Civil War
- ill-discipline in Whites – pogroms against Jewish settlements in Ukraine, corruption widespread – Foreign Interventionist uniforms and equipment sold – officers living in ‘haze of vodka and cocaine in brothels in Omsk
- Whites unable to communicate, co-ordinate attacks or value propaganda to persuade masses to support them
- Cossacks in the south were ethnically cleansing ‘ingorodnie’ – peasants from other areas of Russia who had moved to Cossack ‘stanitsas’ on the Don. Attacks demonstrated the desire to reimpose subordination of peasants.

### Military Reasons for White Defeat:

- Red Army – 35,000 ex-Tsarist officers recruited, 125,000 ex-NCOs recruited into Red Army – Zhukov, Budenny, Timoshenko—all future Red Army Marshals were NCOs in the Tsarist Army promoted to Commanders in the Red Army in the Civil War. Experienced leaders recruited and gained command posts in Civil War
- Whites had too many ex-officers – 120,000 ex-Tsarist officers fought against Bolsheviks during course of the Civil War. Not enough NCOs or privates enlisted from ex-Tsarist Army
- Trotsky’s leadership used oratory, propaganda, train, united organisation, ideology, to unite Red Army. Lenin’s support for Trotsky crucial for building a conventional army as opposed to military opposition who favoured militia/partisan warfare
- White movement was based on periphery of Russia – Yudenich in Estonia, Kolchak in Siberia, Denikin in the south. They were unwilling to recognise national autonomy/independence for minorities which cost them support.

### Bolshevik/Red strengths political/ideology/discipline:

- recognised peasant social revolution in Sovnarkom decrees
- Decree on Land, 26 October 1917 – SR land policy adopted by Bolshevik government – abolished private property in countryside
- spring 1918 – peasant revolution still continued with gentry, Church land and prosperous villagers who had established consolidate farms still being seized
- 19 February, 1918 – Sovnarkom Decree on ‘Socialisation of Land’ – household and communal land tenure recognised as right for peasantry
- Bolshevik regime was focused on the industrial working class, but they recognised the need to conciliate peasants to their rule.

### **Bolshevik/Red strengths geography/infrastructure:**

- Red heartland of ‘Sovdepiā’ contains Moscow, Petrograd, railways, factories, ex-Tsarist military arsenals as well as Military Districts where recruits could be mustered, trained and motivated
- War Communism – helps Red Army as Home Front mobilised for victory
- Red Terror-Cheka very violent in combatting opposition – ex-Tsar and his family killed on 17 July, 1918. Political opponents outlawed and ‘bourgeois’ enemies imprisoned, used as labour battalions and given third-class ration books – starvation ration. Labour camps established for opponents
- food supplies for cities and Red Army secured by violent grain requisitioning from peasants – despite this peasants would not give support to the White cause
- peasant risings against the Bolshevik government broke out in many provinces when the Whites were finally defeated in 1920–1921, for example, Tambov revolt, Ural-Volga region and Moslem Basmachi rebels in Turkmenistan.

### **Other Factors leading to White Defeat:**

- foreign intervention on Whites side was weak, ineffective and gave the Bolsheviks opportunity to portray themselves as defending Russia from foreign capitalist/imperialist powers
- Makhno and Greens – were willing to fight Whites more often than Reds due to land issue for peasants
- Czech Legion were wanting to leave Russia to travel to France to fight Germans not stay in Russia to fight for White cause
- Kolchak handed over to SRs in December, 1919. Reds executed him in February, 1920.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Evan Mawdsley	Argues that Reds had inherited an ‘Aladdin’s Cave’ of military supplies, weapons and arsenals from the Imperial Army.
Robert Service	Contends that Trotsky’s brilliance as leader of the Red Army was central to Red victory.
Orlando Figes	Argues that Reds were able to motivate support by claiming to be defending the gains of ‘the Revolution of 1917’.
Laura Engelstein	Argues that Bolsheviks were able to win due to leadership of Lenin and Trotsky.

## Question 59

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence that Stalin was underestimated by his opponents:**

- Trotsky was naive in not pressing for ‘Lenin’s Testament’ to be read at 13th Party Congress in May 1924, as this would have potentially ended Stalin’s leadership campaign
- being ‘Peoples Commissar’ gave Stalin all-union influence in both Party and State
- control of Rabkrin gave Stalin the chance to sack opponents and to promote those who were supporters
- Stalin presented himself as a moderate figure who would seek to reconcile opponents in the interests of party unity. Stalin promoted himself as a unifying figure, seeking to maintain unity among contenders over power. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev vilified for breaking Party unity
- opponents were defeated by the very Party disciplinary policies they had helped forge – Stalin used these against them – accusing them of ‘factionalism’
- Stalin’s ability to use Cheka loyalists to gather information on opponents, Personal Secretariat gathered information on opponents
- post-Civil War era saw a decline in electing leaders as institutions such as local Soviets lost popular authority due to increasing centralisation. Stalin was able to appoint leaders in the provinces who were loyal to him.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for Stalin’s victory in the leadership struggle:**

- luck – deaths of both Sverdlov and Dzerzhinsky who were potential opponents of Stalin who could have thwarted his rise to power if they had lived
- ruthlessness – Stalin able to ally with both Right and Left of the Party – destroys both factions by 1929
- Stalin at the centre of the growing power of the Party bureaucracy – Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat – he was able to ensure his power-base would vote for his policies
- Leninist inheritance supported Stalin in the leadership struggle – Vanguard Party, Democratic Centralism all aided Stalin over opponents
- Lenin’s funeral in 1924 where Stalin takes central role – presumptive heir
- political weaknesses of opponents – Trotsky – arrogant, Jewish background, and danger of military coup from the Red Army, Zinoviev and Kamenev had refused to support Lenin’s decision to seize power in 1917. Bukharin-theorist without powerbase
- ‘Socialism in One Country’ viewed as patriotic, sensible and achievable. Trotsky’s ‘Permanent Revolution’ viewed as too adventurous for an exhausted population
- Lenin Enrolment brought into the Party more proletarian members who were not so tolerant of Marxist debate but preferred clear orders from a strong leader
- effect of the Civil War on party members – culture of obedience to the leadership, fear of intra-party splits weakening both Party and the Soviet state.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Pipes	Argues that Stalin was in an unrivalled position that assured his future career for some time before Lenin’s death.
Robert Conquest	Argues that Stalin simply outmanoeuvred his opponents.
Isaac Deutscher	Contends that Trotsky under-estimated Stalin more than anyone. Stalin used his immense power to gain a majority.
Steven Kotkin	Argues that as Lenin’s faithful disciple Stalin emerged in 1924–1925 as both an ideologue and a geostrategic thinker.

## Question 60

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest the policy of collectivisation was successful in meeting its aims:

### Ideological justification for Collectivisation:

- peasants mostly thought of as ‘petit bourgeois’ — Kulaks influential leaders, therefore enemies; too often holding the country to ransom
- socialist solution not to have private holdings (NEP), but ‘socialist agrotowns’
- the administrative weakness in the countryside contradicts the dictatorship of the proletariat
- strengthening control of Central Party apparatus over provinces
- sorting out Party cliques at local level
- needed to prepare for potential war and to support industrial expansion as threat from Nazi Germany and Japan grow in the mid-1930s
- to compete with the capitalist West in building a modern, industrial society where socialism would triumph as an inevitable historical process
- destroy deeply-held religious beliefs of the peasantry and the hold the Orthodox Church, Catholic Church had on peasant life in an atheist society.

### Force used to enforce Collectivisation:

- force, propaganda and terror was used to promote and enforce Collectivisation of agriculture
- liquidation of the Kulak class, to make the middle peasants obey Stalin
- ‘Twenty Five Thousanders’ rounded up families, and deported some 10 million people (some estimate 20 million dead or deported) OGPU armed units used to inflict terror on peasants but not regular/territorial Red Army units as they were drawn from the peasantry
- the extent of denunciations by neighbours reflects the success of the propaganda machine inflaming class hatred
- armed resistance and riots, crops destroyed, animal slaughtered, tools and houses burned rather than hand them over
- women’s protests were significant and effective in organisation and outcome but violence used to disperse them.

### Economic justification for Collectivisation:

- 1917–1918 agrarian revolution seen as a step backwards economically
- many crops suited better to larger farms — small farms meant poor use of labour, unable to benefit from mechanisation. Too much consumed by the farm, not enough going to market
- larger units of land means efficiency via mechanisation — tractors and machinery supplied through MTS
- fewer peasants needed to work land-releasing labour for industry
- easier for state to take grain for cities and export — controlled by Communist supporters
- grain procurement crisis 1928–1929 — peasants resisted government policies, not sending goods to market, bread and meat therefore rationed in the cities
- building a social and economic system to make USSR a great power to build socialism in a still peasant -majority society — ‘Revolution from Above’.

### Outcome for peasantry in Soviet countryside:

- by end February 1930 claimed 50% collectivisation but agricultural was a disaster, significant numbers of animals slaughtered, enterprising peasants had left the country, fled to city to seize opportunity of upward mobility
- those left were in no mood to begin work, and passive resistance was the order of the day — referred to this as second serfdom
- statistics in 1930s distorted to show alleged success
- ‘Dizzy with success’ speech (2 March 1930) meant pace slowed down and return to voluntary principle indicates limitations of policy
- life was the same for most, same wooden huts, outdoor toilet, no electricity
- tractors were largely imaginary — 2,500 MTS in first three years, but this was a proletarian bastion in the countryside, staffed by workers and OGPU

- famine 1932-1934 because high targets at time of huge drop in grain production due to collectivisation, OGPU were vicious. 1.73 million tons exported and 7 million died from a man-made famine
- ‘Holodomor’ in Ukraine – famine killed estimated 3-7 million peasants due to imposition of Stalin’s policy of forced Collectivisation. Deliberate use of hunger to ‘break the back’ of recalcitrant peasants
- estimated 70% peasants households collectivised by 1934, and 90% by 1936; 120 million people, 600,000 villages, 25 million holdings consolidated into 240,000 state-controlled collective farms
- but peasants had private plots, condoned because desperate for food. Stalin agreed that ‘people like to have their own cow and pig’. Peasants able to sell produce in private markets in towns and cities in the 1930s/early 1940s. Peasant markets provided enough food to keep population fed in the war years when official rations were not always guaranteed.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Evan Mawdsley</b>	Argues that Stalinist Russia did face real external threats but this led to a continuation of the industrial and military build-up that had already begun.
<b>Robert Conquest</b>	Argues that collectivisation was the weapon used to break peasant resistance and that the human toll was ‘higher than the total deaths for all countries in WWI’.
<b>Stephen Cohen</b>	Argues that the peasantry was seen as ‘a vast inert and yet somehow threatening mass of people, barring Russia’s path to industrialisation, modernity, socialism: a kingdom of darkness that must be conquered before the Soviet Union could become the Promised Land’.
<b>Moshe Lewin</b>	Argues that Collectivisation created a ‘quicksand society’ where the state was in control of everyone and all were ‘equal’.

## Question 61

Candidates might refer to:

- Western Allies sent military/economic/humanitarian supplies from Great Britain and the USA – June 22nd and June 24th respectively – which sought to bolster the Soviet war effort. USA aid offered before they actually entered the war
- agreement made in June 1941 by both British and USA to supply the Soviet Union with weapons, raw materials, and credits. USA agreed to this before they officially joined the war on December 7th, 1941
- aluminium from USA and UK sent at 2,500 tonnes per month to compensate for German seizure of Soviet Zaporozhia and Tirkivin where smelting of aluminium took place – needed to build aeroplanes, tanks and aeroengines
- Soviet Air Force receives 400 Hurricane fighters, 1,250 USA Airacobra P-39 fighter-bombers from 1941–1945 plus Rolls-Royce Merlin engines for Soviet YAK and ILLUSHIN Fighter/Ground Attack planes
- 8,500,000 pairs of army boots sent to Red Army, Red Army receives 32,000 radio sets communications for tanks and aeroplanes which improve combat efficiency
- Soviet Union received food supplies from USA, for example in November 1942 alone, 112,000 tons sent from Eastern ports to Vladivostock. USA and Canada able to provide massive supplies to compensate for loss of Soviet loss of Ukrainian ‘breadbasket’
- USA supplied 75,000 Willys Jeeps and Studebaker 2.5 ton lorries in 1942–1943 to allow Red Army to become mobile, for example, for the launch of ‘Operation Uranus’ to encircle German 6th Army in Stalingrad
- tanks – medium USA/GB tanks – M-3 and Valentine – supplied to Red Army for fighting in the Caucasus. Supplied via Iranian ports and driven into Soviet Union by Red Army personnel
- USA and Britain supplied 4,500 tons of TNT explosives for Red Army and Air Force per month from 1942 onwards
- convoys arrived regularly to Archangel, Murmansk, Vladivostok and Iranian ports despite losses in the North Atlantic. PQ-17 convoy in 1942 took large losses due to U-boats and Luftwaffe bombers going to Archangel only 11 ships out of 35 survived
- tins of ‘Spam’ – sent to Soviet Union called ‘Second Front’ in ironic comment on lack of western invasions of western Europe to aid Soviet Union before 1943–1944
- Lend-Lease aid given unconditionally – Soviet Union not asked for payment for millions of dollars and pounds of aid
- Soviet Purchasing Commissions in USA given free access to engineering, aeroplane, metallurgy, textile plants/research facilities – industrial espionage opportunities freely taken to gain access to latest American research and development, production techniques which advanced Soviet military/economic resources
- Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, visited both GB and USA to negotiate aid from Allies to keep Soviet Union in the war in 1941–1942.

Evidence which may support alternative reasons for Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War:

**Red Army resilience/skill:**

- Red Army resilience displayed by recovering from the disasters of 1941–1942, 2.5 million Soviet POWs taken, 1.5 million dead/wounded in first 6 months of the war
- skilled commanders such as Zhukov, Konev, Vatutin, Rokossovsky emerge to defeat the Wehrmacht from 1943 onwards. Able to master Blitzkrieg/Deep Operations techniques which enabled the Red Army to defeat the Wehrmacht from 1943–1945. Operations in Manchuria, 1945, displayed Red Army excellence against weakened Japanese forces. Highly mechanised, mobile armoured forces make huge gains in taking land mass and taking over 500,000 prisoners.

### **Stalin his rule and the regime:**

- STAVKA established 23 June 1941 – military operations to be organised and coordinated with Front Commanders
- 30 June 1941 – State Committee for Defence established – political, economic, military affairs to be controlled and organised. Met daily with Stalin as chairman
- Stalin provided a figurehead the Soviet people could rally behind in the war years. Showed defiance of the invader by staying in Moscow in December, 1941 when Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow
- Stalin had competent individuals he used to good effect. Molotov in Foreign Affairs, Khruschev in Administration, Zhukov in Military and Voznesensky in Industry
- Stalin was used to working in crises situations – Civil War, Collectivisation, Purges before the War
- Purge of Armed Forces in 1937/1938 did weaken the Red Army – demonstrated by poor performance in first year of the Great Patriotic War
- Stalin was able to gain skill in military planning/strategy – Zhukov's view that by 1943 Stalin was 'a competent strategist who listened and learned'.

### **Soviet economy:**

- command economy suited to demands of total war compared with the German economy not fully mobilised until 1943 when Speer took command of co-ordinating industry for war production
- factories evacuated in 1941 from western USSR to beyond the Urals – begin production in later 1941/early 1942. New tank production plants such as Chelyabinsk were safe behind Urals
- 34,000 T-34 Tanks produced in 1942–1945, best medium tank of the war. Could be up-gunned and improved radio, transmission, engine reliability without slowing production
- women and adolescents used in industries to replace men who are drafted into the Red Army
- agriculture able to produce vital products such as cotton, food, wheat in sufficient amount to keep the Armed Forces and urban areas fed
- workers allowed one day off per month – 'All for the Front' was more than a slogan
- due to extensive Allied Lend-Lease aid Soviet war production can concentrate on finished goods such as tanks, artillery, aeroplanes as raw materials, capital goods are supplied already
- Kaganovitch – 'Iron Lazar' – was Commissar for Railways 1942–1944 managed to bring railways into good order to aid despatch of supplies and reinforcements to the Red Army.

### **Axis weaknesses:**

- Operation Barbarossa was too ambitious – objectives not fully realised by December, 1941 – 'the rotten structure did not collapse when the door was kicked in.'
- Soviet Union was too vast for Blitzkrieg tactics to succeed as they did in Poland and France as the Red Army was able to trade space/manpower for time
- Nazi racist policies of 'Untermenschen Slavs' failed to effectively nurture anti-Communist Soviet citizens who had suffered under Stalin's rule – Ukrainians especially were not offered freedoms, concessions to fight against Soviet Union
- German 6th Army led by Field Marshal Paulus failed to take Stalingrad and this led to the turning point of the war as the Red Army are victorious
- Germany by 1943 was facing Allied heavy bombing and invasion of Western Europe which severely weakened their forces on the Eastern Front. 2/3 of the Luftwaffe are re-deployed to the defence of Germany, 150,000 troops stationed in Germany to man anti-aircraft defences instead of being deployed to the Eastern Front in 1943/1944.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Sean McMeekin	Argues USA government fuelled Stalin's war machine blindly indulging every Soviet demand to the detriment of the American military supplies.
Anthony Beevor	Argues Red Army generals were hampered by fear of responsibility and by the political demands of the state leadership.
Robert Service	Argues Red Army generals were vital for Soviet victory in the war – more important than Stalin's leadership.
Catherine Merridale	Contends that strange mixture of courage, fear, patriotism and hatred of the ordinary Red Army soldier led to victory over the Nazi invader.

## Section 8 – Russia from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 62

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
For several weeks the bakeries in Petrograd had been running out, especially in the workers' districts, and long bread queues began to appear.	Due to growing shortages of food supplies women in the working-class districts were becoming radicalised.
February 23rd was International Women's Day; an important date in the socialist calendar and towards noon, huge crowds of women began to march towards the city centre in protest for equal rights.	International Women's Day was used to organise a protest in Petrograd to get equal rights.
But in the afternoon the mood changed. Women textile workers from the Vyborg district had come out on strike that morning in protest against the bread shortages and they were joined by their menfolk from the neighbouring metal works. By the end of the afternoon some 100,000 workers had come out on strike.	Women had already come out on strike in the Vyborg district and took the initiative to encourage the male workers to come out on strike to demonstrate their grievances against shortages of food as the decline in living standards was on-going. Mass participation of workers becomes quickly apparent.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- fears of food being rationed was increasing in Petrograd by late January, 1917 despite official denials that there were enough supplies to feed the urban population
- women had been striking and demonstrating during the war due to growing shortages which highlights the failure of the Tsarist regime to maintain supplies of food as queues and price rises become a regular feature of working class life
- lower-level revolutionaries were active in the factories of the Vyborg District of Petrograd during the war. They were represented in Shop Stewards of factories where pre-war support for the Bolshevik Party was increasing. Inter District Committee was active in keeping revolutionary politics alive when support for the Tsarist regime was weakening in 1916
- Tsarist authorities had suppressed strikes before by using police and/or military units from the garrison in the Petrograd Military District in 1916.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- industrial action took place on 18 February as workers strike for higher wages on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, 1905
- 19 February authorities announced bread rationing will begin on 1 March, 1917. Fears grew that food would become unobtainable by working class residents of Petrograd
- Tsar Nicholas II left Petrograd to return to Stavka in White Russia on 22 February taking him 400 miles away from Petrograd. Isolated from growing crisis and relied upon Tsarina for news
- railways were unable to deliver enough food as transport system was breaking down due to demands of the military and decline in track and engine maintenance becoming chronic
- cost of living had increased for working-class families by 300% as wages only increased by 100% since August 1914
- International Women's Day march attracted support from students and middle class women as well as factory workers on 23 February, 1917
- warm weather on 23 February, 1917 saw temperatures rise to -5 degrees allowed march to go ahead on International Womens Day. Photographs show marchers walking in the sunshine as weather warms

- 24 February, 1917 strikes gained momentum with over 200,000 workers on strike. Workers were armed with bolts, hammers and spanners from factories. Food shops on Nevsky Prospekt looted. Don Cossacks sent to disperse strikers fraternised and showed signs of disaffection – ‘Comrade Cossack’- refused to use sabres and whips against strikers. Don Cossacks from the poorer areas of the Don region showed sympathy with strikers
- 25 February, 1917 General Khabalov, Military Governor, ordered by the Tsar to use force against strikers. Tsarina sent letter to Tsar to reassure him there is little danger of these marches/strikes as ‘some bread will send them home and back to work’
- Red flags carried and slogans of ‘Bread’ and ‘Down with the Tsar’ heard from marchers
- general strike broke out in Petrograd which paralysed the city as services, transport and factory production were at a standstill. War production stopped as armament factories at a standstill and military were being mobilised to shoot strikers
- 25 February police and Army units opened fire on demonstrators with 50 killed on Nevsky Prospekt when the Volhinsky regiment opened fire
- 26 February the Volhinsky, Preobrazhensky Guards regiment and Finland regiments began to rebel after being ordered to shoot demonstrators. Junior NCOs took lead in rallying their men to disobey orders. Senior officers could no longer control soldiers. Rifles taken from regimental arsenals and used to fire on the police and still loyal units of the garrison. Demonstrations turned into revolution as Army units refuse to obey orders
- 27 February crowds gathered outside Tauride Palace where SRs Chkheidze, Skobelev and Alexander Kerensky announced the formation of a ‘Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies’ had been formed. Order No.1 published by the Soviet to offer protection to the mutinous troops from any reprisals
- 1 March Duma formed a Provisional Government, and the Soviet agreed to support the government as long as it kept to agreed democratic behaviour
- 1 March General Alexeev called off mission of soldiers to head for Petrograd to restore order. Tsar’s train delayed at Pskov as he tried to return to Tsarksoe Selo
- 2 March Front Commanders and Admirals of the fleets asked the Tsar to abdicate to save Russia and keep the Army in the war. Tsar abdicated for himself and the Tsarevitch Alexei in Abdication Manifesto with Guchkov and Shulgin from the Duma present as witnesses. Nicholas wrote of ‘treason all around him’
- Grand Duke Michael refused regency on 3 March and the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty ended.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Rex Wade	Argues that the long-awaited revolution had come swiftly, arising out of strikes and popular demonstrations.
Orlando Figes	Contends that it all began with bread. For weeks there had been long queues at the bakeries in Petrograd.
Peter Kenez	Argues that there was not to be found anywhere in the empire any groups who were prepared to put up a fight for the old regime.
Richard Pipes	Contends that the February Revolution was basically an anti-war revolution not initially an anti-Tsarist one. There were shortages of everything and the people were suffering.

### Question 63

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Lenin and Trotsky did their best to conceal their bid to install a one-party dictatorship with slogans calling for the transfer of power to the soviets and the Constituent Assembly. Only a handful of leading Bolsheviks knew the truth behind these promises and slogans: few realised that the so-called October Revolution was a classic coup.	Contends that it was the Bolshevik leadership use of slogans of soviet power and convoking of the Constituent Assembly to justify their seizure of power, and in doing so conceal their real intention which is the coup and a one-party dictatorship.
They formalised their actions through a fraudulently convened Congress of Soviets where the coup was given an appearance of legitimacy as a consequence of the walk out of Mensheviks and SRs who had protested at this illegal act and were ‘sent into the dustbin of history’.	Argues that due to the other socialist parties disagreeing with Lenin’s taking power the Bolsheviks were able to gain a majority agreement for the coup in Petrograd and in doing so legitimised what was in fact a coup.
The preparations for the coup were so secret that, when Kamenev disclosed in a newspaper interview a week before the event took place that the party intended to seize power, Lenin declared him a traitor and demanded his expulsion.	Contends that Bolshevik leadership was divided upon the coup plan. Kamenev leaked the Bolshevik plan and it was published in a local newspaper. Lenin had wanted him expelled from the Bolshevik Party demonstrating this was a coup d'état not a popular revolution.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Lenin’s April Theses were popular policies for gaining support of the workers, soldiers and peasantry but were being used to conceal Lenin’s desire for Bolshevik rule to complete the socialist revolution to defeat bourgeois Provisional Government
- Military Revolutionary Committee chaired by Trotsky was able to mobilise enough units to seize assets such as railways, bridges and seize the Winter Palace where the Provisional Government was located. The majority of the garrison of 250,000 men were not involved – at most 10,000 Bolshevik supporters involved in the coup
- Lenin was able to persuade Bolshevik Party Central Committee meeting on 16 October from his hiding place in Finland that the Bolsheviks must seize power. Lenin’s wishes were accepted by 10-2 as both Kamenev and Zinoviev disagreed. Trotsky persuaded Lenin that seizure of power should coincide with the meeting of 2nd Congress of Soviets. The coup was disguised as a transfer of power to the soviets – ‘All Power to the Soviets’
- Kamenev and Zinoviev were not in agreement with the plan to seize power as they feared there would be civil war as there was not enough support for a Bolshevik only – government as the other socialist parties would be excluded. They exposed the plan in Gorki’s newspaper ‘New Life’ on 18 October 1917. Both offered their resignation from the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in protest.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
<p>. . . the magnetic appeal of the party platform as embodied in the slogans ‘Peace, Land and Bread’ and ‘All Power to the Soviets’ as embodied in Lenin’s ‘April Theses’, which was viewed as extreme in the spring, but was now becoming popular. . .</p>	<p>Argues that Lenin’s policies were viewed in the Autumn of 1917 by the workers, soldiers and peasants as being in their interests. The demand for Soviet power was growing as the Provisional Government was proving unable to satisfy their aspirations. There is growing popularity now for the Bolsheviks.</p>
<p>The Bolsheviks also conducted an energetic and resourceful campaign for support of the Petrograd factory workers, soldiers and Kronstadt sailors and among these groups the aim was the creation of a democratic, socialist government representing all parties in the Soviet. . .</p>	<p>Contends that an exclusively socialist government was the demand of the groups in Petrograd who had been the subject to Bolshevik propaganda to gain their support. The Bolsheviks are responsive to the demands for social reforms, land reform and an end to the war which are recognising the radicalisation of popular opinion by the workers, soldiers and sailors from the Kronstadt naval base. Hence growing popularity.</p>
<p>Economic conditions deteriorated considerably and showed no signs of stopping which drew further popular support to the Bolshevik cause.</p>	<p>Argues that the Provisional Government was unable to meet demands of the people which led to increased support for the Bolshevik Party by the summer/early autumn of 1917. Workers faced unemployment, inflation and declining living standards. This furthers Bolshevik popularity.</p>

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Lenin’s April Theses were initially seen by other socialist parties and some Bolsheviks as too radical when they were articulated – wanting a second revolution was viewed as un-Marxist and no cooperation with the Provisional Government as leading to chaos and defeat
- Bolshevik propaganda among the workers, soldiers and sailors proved effective through their newspaper – Pravda and agitators among these groups were coming around to the Bolshevik viewpoint by late Summer of 1917
- the Provisional Government, which from 8 July was led by Kerensky and 25 July included socialist ministers from the SR and Menshevik parties, was keeping the war going, refusing the peasants the right to seize landlord land and overseeing a decline in urban living standards. These socialist parties involved in the Provisional Government are losing the support of their constituencies who were migrating to the Bolshevik Party.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- Provisional Government policies were becoming more conservative in July – Kerensky appointed General Lavr Kornilov as Commander in Chief of the Army, re-instituted the death penalty in the Army, and sought to restrict public gatherings. This was due to the demands of the bourgeois Kadet party
- Summer – June Offensive proved disastrous as the Russian Army is defeated, casualties increase, Officer authority further undermined as the soldiers refused to obey orders to advance. Desertion rates increased as morale and authority broke down further. Provisional Government authority eroded
- Kornilov Affair – began on 27 August – attempted coup on the Right led to further decline in Army morale, cohesion and alienation of support for the Provisional Government from working class, peasantry and soldiers Bolshevik status was rising as their Red Guard is armed by Kerensky’s government to help defend Petrograd from rebel army units. These armed units will lead the October Revolution assault

- peasantry were taking control of landlords' land, burning manor houses with armed deserters coming back from the Front with rifles and leading the assault. After failure of June Offensive thousands of peasant-soldiers deserted to return to their village to take part in land seizures. Landlords asked for Provisional Government support to stop the peasants
- worker control gained ground in the factories in towns and cities. Miners in the Donbas took control of mines and evicted managers/foremen. Ukraine saw increased worker control of factories
- Provisional Government lacked the force of an established police force and the former Okhrana to counter internal subversion as these institutions had been abolished after the February Revolution
- Provisional Government lacked authority and prestige as it had not been elected by the Russian peoples
- 26 September, 1917 Third Coalition of the Provisional Government saw six Kadets entering the government taking ministerial portfolio with only seven socialists in ministerial posts out of a total of seventeen
- Democratic Conference met and selected Provisional Council of the Russian Republic which met on 14 October and was known as the 'Pre-Parliament' Kadets, Mensheviks and SRs – took part but no actions were taken as Kerensky refused to listen to their advice. This brought these parties into further disrepute with the population
- Lenin, in August, wrote 'State and Revolution' in Finland where he urged the Bolsheviks to take power. He outlined the strategy of labelling other socialists – Mensheviks and SRs as being 'bourgeois' due to their cooperation with Kadets and capitalism of the Provisional Government. September Bolsheviks had majorities in Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. By 24 October towns of northern central and south-eastern Russia were returning Bolshevik majorities in Soviet elections
- Left SRs formed in October as a breakaway from the official SRs they seek to institute socialist coalition government and establish Soviet rule – Lenin was willing to negotiate with them but not with what remained of the Mensheviks and SRs
- Right-wing neutralised as Army generals were still in shock after Kornilov Affair failed. Middle class was too small to oppose Bolsheviks in the cities and towns. Administration of the state was disintegrating all over Russia, national minorities already seeking self-rule. Soviets existed all over the former empire- they wanted a break from failed policies of Kerensky's government.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Robert Service</b>	Argues popular uprisings have never been organised by a people as a whole. Lenin could argue by mid-October that soviets all over Russia were acquiring Bolshevik majorities and following the example of Petrograd and Moscow.
<b>Orlando Figes</b>	Argues the October Revolution was no more than a military coup, it passed unnoticed by the majority of the population of Petrograd.
<b>Peter Kenez</b>	Argues the Bolsheviks seized power because the country was in a state of anarchy. The Provisional Government could not defend itself.
<b>Nikolai Sukanov</b>	Takes the view 'by our own irrational decision to leave the Congress of Soviets we ensured the victory of Lenin's whole line'.

### Question 64

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	The Peoples' Commissar Moscow, Lubyanka Headquarters.	Nikolai Yezhov, Head of the NKVD who replaced Yagoda in September, 1936.
<b>Purpose</b>	Launch of NKVD purge of anti-Soviet elements throughout USSR.	Anti-Soviet 'wreckers, Kulaks, spies' to be targeted by NKVD repression of shooting and imprisonment in Gulag.
<b>Timing</b>	30 July, 1937.	At the height of the Great Purge/Terror from 1936–1939.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The organs of state security are now ordered to mercilessly crush anti-Soviet gangs throughout every republic, oblast and region as it has been established by investigation that a significant number of former Kulaks who had earlier been subjected to punitive measures and who had evaded them have settled in the countryside.	Soviet citizens living in the countryside who are perceived as being dangerous. Former political opponents and Kulak farmers are active in the agricultural sector of the economy. These elements are perceived as being 'anti-Soviet'. Language used to heighten need to act 'mercilessly crush'.
Significant cadres [small groups of activists] of anti-Soviet political groups – SRs, Mensheviks, Whites, religious believers, and so on – have left the countryside for the cities, where they have infiltrated into industry, transport and construction.	emphasising the extent of the problem by giving lists of all opposition 'cadres'. Wide spectrum of opposition groups mentioned, and infiltrating key sectors of industry.
Other anti-Soviet elements including thieves and criminals, who are now in hiding are the instigators of crimes of sabotage and wrecking in both agriculture and industry.	In industry dangerous elements as groups such as ordinary criminals and political opponents are engaging in sabotaging and wrecking. These are acting in secret and are posing a danger to the security of the state. Linking of dangerous elements and suggesting that they are 'thieves' and 'criminals' to justify the actions taken.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- Soviet society had people who were involved in anti-Bolshevik politics and fighting from the time of the October Revolution, Civil War and the forced Collectivisation of Land
- mass repression of the peasantry had left many disaffected by the mid-1930s. Religious believers were persecuted in the 1930s as churches closed or secularised, Orthodox clergy and lay faithful imprisoned. By 1939 90% parish churches closed
- economic problems in the First and Second 5-Year Plans were blamed on ‘wreckers and spies’ not on the idea of rapid industrialisation with increased speed of production
- NKVD integral to Purges as they run the Gulag penal camp/labour camp system. NKVD used to repress perceived opponents of Stalin’s rule by shooting, torture, and imprisonment. Yezhov used by Stalin to widen the purge and destroy opponents
- Kulaks and the other anti-Soviet groups were classified as Category 1 – to be shot and Category 2 – to be sent to the Gulag camps. Region and social class quotas were set as targets for the NKVD to be fulfilled
- to exceed these targets permission was needed but was easily obtained from Yezhov in Moscow. Stalin always approved new enlarged numbers to be repressed/killed/tortured.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- Purges used frequently in Bolshevik Party – 1919, under Lenin in 1921. Chitski in 1933 – after Collectivisation crisis 200,000 members purged from the Party but did not suffer repression/execution
- Stalin had recognised there was opposition to his rule within the Party. Ryutin Platform, 17th Party Congress in 1934 where there was the rise of Kirov as a potential replacement for Stalin
- Bolshevik Party had long-standing jealousies and rivalries which went back before the Great War and these simmered on into the 1920s/1930s – Kamenev, Bukharin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Trotsky established bases of support to intrigue against others
- Purges increased in violence following the assassination of Kirov in 1934 in Leningrad
- Show Trials staged in Moscow – 3 trials of senior Bolsheviks who confessed to spying for foreign powers, attempting to restore capitalism and working with Trotsky to kill Stalin
- 1936 -Trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev – ‘Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre. 1937 – ‘Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre – Pyatakov – Karl Radek main victims and final trial 1938 – Bukharin-Rykov trial who are part of a’ Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites’. Trials staged as accused give confessions and admit their guilt except Bukharin who defends himself skilfully. Yagodai-ex head of the NKVD sentenced to death in the final show trial
- NKVD troikas established in every republic, region, krai and oblast of the Soviet Union to pass sentence on those who were charged with anti-soviet activity
- NKVD had by the end of 1938 killed 386,000 soviet citizens officially, true figure was certainly higher as there were many NKVD units which exceeded their quotas and not all returns were forwarded to Moscow.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
J Arch Getty	Purges spun out of control as denunciations by Party functionaries, ordinary citizens etc led to more arrests and executions.
Robert Conquest	Sees there were internal threats from former opponents of the regime who were perceived to be a danger and had to be eliminated.
Richard Sakwa	Stalin bears responsibility alone for the scope, range and violence of the Purges.
Alan Bullock	Believes that the Purges were on Stalin’s authority alone. He bears the responsibility for the terror that consumed the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

## Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: Causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 65

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may support the view that the unpopularity of the army was the most important problem, including:**

- the army was desperately seeking a role and a new identity in the 1920s. A former colonial power, Spain's colonies were reduced to little more than Spanish Morocco, where a disastrous war raged in the early part of the decade
- the Spanish army was extremely expensive, consuming around 40% of GDP. This was unsustainable and clearly a block on progress as it diverted funds which could have been used for social improvement. It was also the most top-heavy army in Europe, with a ratio of officers to men which made no sense in military terms and was responsible for wasting much of the money spent on the armed forces
- since the Spanish army had played no part in WWI, it had not modernised in the way that others had. Horsemanship was still prized among officers
- the army was generally resented by the working class as they were seen as an arm of the repressive state and were used to break strikes and protests. They were also resented for conscripting young men from rural and working areas into the army to fight in Morocco, with scant regard to their welfare. Disasters like the Battle of Annual in 1921 cost the lives of around 10,000 men and caused uproar in Spain
- the imposition of what was effectively a military dictatorship in 1923 emphasised that the army saw itself as the final arbiter in Spain. The army intervened to 'rescue' the King from political embarrassment and overthrew the flimsy democracy that had existed.

**Evidence which may consider other problems which were important in Spain in the 1920s including:**

**The Church:**

- the Church was part of the Spanish establishment, one of the pillars of the traditional Spanish state and heavily linked with the Monarchy
- the status of the Church was in contrast to its day-to-day relevance among ordinary Spaniards. Attendance at church services was in decline, down to around 20%, and in some urban parishes, priests said mass to empty churches
- the Church still had a virtual monopoly on education but had little interest in improving the high rates of illiteracy among the population, particularly the rural poor
- there was a growing anti clerical movement in Spain which existed among both the middle class who wanted social and political reform and who viewed the Church as a barrier to this; and the working class who resented the oppressive role the Church played in conjunction with the State authorities.

**Agrarian issue:**

- the nature of the Spanish agricultural system meant the land was unproductive. The problem, at its simplest was Spain's inability to feed and nurture its population due to inefficient, unfairly maintained rural economy
- especially in the South, there were vast unproductive estates, latifundia. Instead of producing much needed food they often used large amounts of land to raise prize bulls
- Spanish aristocracy felt little impetus to improve their land or become more efficient. Their status came from owning the land and their family name
- half of Spain went to bed hungry. There was a general lack of suitable food for much of the population. In many of the rural areas, the farm labourers had no land or even common land to grow anything on for themselves; and in the urban areas, periods of depression or bad harvests would mean a lack of money or increase in food prices resulting in malnutrition

- most of the peasant class lived an existence which was below subsistence due to under employment. Most were day labourers, hired when there was work to be done but with no obligation on the part of the landowners to relieve their poverty when there was no work
- the lack of industrialisation elsewhere in Spain meant there had not been the same rural to urban migration that had occurred in many other countries. Many historians have pointed to this as the greatest block to progress in Spain. The push and pull effects of an overpopulated countryside and a need for workers in factories which had fed industrialisation elsewhere was lacking in Spain
- the landed aristocracy were part of the Spanish establishment and their power in the countryside was supported by the forces of the State, including the Guardia Civil
- the growing resentment at their plight led to many rural workers joining the agrarian arms of the trade unions which had blossomed in the urban areas, although some of these were repressed by Primo de Rivera which often led to more countryside unrest.

#### **Regional issues:**

- there had long been regional tensions in Spain, but these became more acute in the 1920s. There was a disparity in the needs of the more industrialised areas such as Catalonia and the Basque country and the rural economies elsewhere in the country, especially in the south. The traditional Spanish establishment was comprised of the landowners and aristocratic families. This brought tensions with the emerging capitalist class
- particularly in Catalonia, there was a growing political movement that linked social reform with greater regional autonomy. Unlike earlier in the century when much of Catalan nationalism was right-wing, there was a growing Catalan left movement which agitated for social progress and decentralisation of the Spanish state
- there was an upsurge of pro-devolution in other areas too, including the Basque country and Galicia
- the Dictadura meant an entrenching of the centralist nature of Spain, which led to regional pressures being suppressed and along with those for other social progress. This helped to link them clandestinely.

#### **The Monarchy:**

- the Monarchy was increasingly viewed as a bulwark against social progress. As the embodiment of the Spanish establishment, Alfonso XIII was seen by opponents as the epitome of all the wrongs in the country
- the links between the Monarchy and the Church meant that the opponents of either became the opponents of both
- the King was held to be personally responsible for the disaster at Annual both by the public and in an official report which only the usurping of democracy by Primo de Rivera prevented being published. The quote from Alfonso that, 'chicken meat is cheap' is response to the deaths of the soldiers in that battle led to him being a hated figure among the families of the conscripts and elsewhere
- the King accepting the Dictadura, he called Primo 'my Mussolini' meant that there could be no restoration of democracy under Alfonso.

#### **The political situation:**

- in the early part of the decade, the 'turno pacifico' produced relatively stable but democratically corrupt government with a limited franchise
- even this sham was swept away with the pronunciamiento and imposition of the Dictadura in 1923, under Primo de Rivera, in what was effectively a military coup d'etat
- the growth of left wing movements, including the socialists and the anarchists coincided with the increasing demands of an anti-clerical and pro-republican middle class who were agitating for parliamentary democracy
- the Dictadura went through different stages, including some initial acceptance and a reduction of overt political strife but by the end of the decade was clearly failing.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert</b>	State ‘The Army was in the forefront of internal and civil disputes’.
<b>Paul Preston</b>	Argues ‘Repression had intensified the hatred of the braceros for the big landowners and their estate managers’.
<b>Antony Beevor</b>	Contends ‘The Church was detested by the workers and labourers for preaching acceptance of poverty while amassing vast riches’.
<b>Gerald Brenan</b>	Believes: ‘The Army had become increasingly sensitive to any criticisms. . . ’

## **Question 66**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may support the view that the Bienio Negro reversed the reforms of the previous two years:**

- Lerrroux was not content only to halt land reform but his Government also cancelled the confiscation of land belonging to the Grandees. He also repealed the protection which had been given to agricultural workers meaning that they no longer enjoyed the same rights as industrial workers
- those who complained were supposedly told to ‘Eat the Republic’
- reactions to FNTT strikes-banning on grounds of harvest being ‘sacred’, suspension of El Obrero de la Tierra and suspension of strike meetings. This reversed the political freedoms gained under previous two years
- following the backlash unleashed after the defeat of the Asturias uprising, the Government of Catalonia was disbanded and the Statute of autonomy suspended. The Right wanted to remove any decentralising measure and keep the integrity of Spain
- martial law was introduced following the Asturias uprising. This brought the country under the control of the army and quasi-military forces, re-establishing the status of the army as the guardians of Spain. This reversed the previous policy where ‘no one spoke of the army nor did the army speak for itself’
- another action taken in the aftermath of the failed uprising in the Asturias region was to abolish many left-wing councils on the pretext that they were fermenting revolution. Over a thousand municipal governments were unseated and replaced by unelected right-wing nominees. This was taken by some as an attempt to undermine democracy and return Spain to an authoritarian, centralised state and was directly opposed to the freedoms which had been brought in by the 1931 constitution
- re-establishing the domination of the Catholic Church. Virtually all of the special treatment that had previously been given to the Catholic Church and which were then removed by the previous Government, were restored. This was the price Lerroux had to pay for the support of CEDA.

**Evidence which may support the view that the Bienio Negro did not reverse the reforms of the previous two years:**

- the Cortes was not disbanded and there was no right-wing coup. The Governments of the Bienio Negro acted through the Cortes, not in spite of it. The President was allowed to make and dismiss Governments and leaders throughout this period and to call fresh elections for 1936. All of these provisions had been introduced during the previous two years and throughout the Bienio Negro the rule of democracy through the Cortes was not challenged
- the rule of parliamentary law and the democratic reforms of the constitution were not seriously threatened even after the Asturias uprising. Socialist Parties and Trade Unions were not proscribed. Despite clear indications that the Socialist leadership, including the supposedly moderate Prieto, had been involved in armed insurrection, the Socialists were allowed to continue and many of the politicians who had been involved in the Asturias uprising were dealt with surprisingly leniently
- government urged arbitration boards to quickly agree favourable contracts for workers. The government also strengthened legislation forcing landowners to hire local labour wages established high as Azaña era. Indeed, when the CEDA had greater control they attempted to introduce a socially reforming agrarian policy which included the ‘Access to Ownership’, allowing tenants the right to buy land they had farmed for twelve years. This and other reforms brought open hostility from landowners and some other right-wing Deputies. This shows that not only were not all reforms reversed but some attempt was made to further
- declaration of Catalan State on announcement of CEDA delegates was undemocratic so the reversal of the Statute of Autonomy was only done once the devolved government had acted unconstitutionally
- Lerroux was anti-clerical and would have kept at least some of the Church reforms but they had to be reversed as a matter of expediency due to the electoral mandate gained by CEDA
- some of the army reforms were not reversed, including some of the republicanisation of the army.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Considers that ‘The new Government (after October 1934) turned back the Republic’s clock’.
Paul Preston	Argues that ‘Despite CEDA’s much vaunted aim of beating the revolution with a programme of social reform, proposals for moderate land reform and tax reforms were defeated by right-wing intransigence’.
Raymond Carr	Believes that during the Bienio Negro, ‘the Republic was in the hands of the conservative classes. . . the Left could not tolerate the idea that the conservative classes should be able to reverse the content that they had given the Republic’.
Helen Graham	States that ‘The elites sought to roll back even the small amount of redistributive change that had been pushed through in the localities’.

## Question 67

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the idea that Franco became leader of the Nationalists due to good fortune:

- Sanjurjo's death at the beginning of the War, when he was due to fly to Spain to take over the Nationalist uprising no doubt paved the way for another leader to emerge. Mola's death was similarly well timed for Franco. The fate of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, first imprisoned and then killed also suited Franco as it meant another contender for leadership was eliminated
- during Jose Antonio's absence, Franco kept the Falange leaderless and with the death of Sanjurjo and the defeat of Gil-Robles' tactics, there was a political vacuum on the Right which could realistically only be filled by a General during the conflict
- Franco cleverly manipulated the remaining Falangist would-be successors to Primo, using and then imprisoning Hedilla. Hedilla had thought that he would be the de facto head of the Government with Franco a symbolic head of state. Franco used him to eliminate his rivals before arresting him for doing this. Hedilla's miscalculations played into Franco's hands
- Mola was more concerned with the successful conclusion of the war than with personal aggrandisement. He wanted to establish a Directory which would eventually oversee fresh elections. However, Mola was considering establishing himself as the political leader (with Franco the military one) shortly before his death. Mola being killed in a plane crash in 1937 was another piece of good fortune for Franco
- the lack of an effective rival was an extreme piece of good fortune for Franco.

Evidence which may consider other reasons for Franco becoming leader of the Nationalists:

Franco's links with Germany and Italy:

- the Germans in particular refused to deal with anyone except Franco, giving him prominence at home and abroad. This gave Franco an unassailable position in negotiations with other Generals over tactics and command. The Condor legion was directly responsible to Franco. Having strategic leadership over foreign troops meant that Franco could effectively lead the direction of the war. He could deploy troops to suit his strategy, making him the leading General
- Germany had a unified central command; the political head was also the effective head of the armed forces: it seemed logical that once Franco had assumed military leadership, thanks to his allies, he would also become the political head of the Right. Ideologically the Right in Spain were predisposed to having one leader
- the international dimension was crucial during the Spanish Civil War, especially the view others took of the events. Franco emerged as the de facto leader in the court of international public opinion due to his links with Germany and Italy before he actually took complete control
- Italy and Germany had shown reluctance to be involved directly in the Spanish conflict initially; it was only through Franco and his emissaries that they came on board. This raised him up in the eyes of the other conspirators.

Franco's military leadership:

- Franco was beloved by the Army of Africa due to his previous service with them. He led them during the coup and brought them to the Peninsula. The reputation they enjoyed for both brilliance and brutality gave Franco's views more weight and he could begin to gain the upper hand in negotiations with other Generals
- he had risen through the ranks on merit. He had become the youngest General thanks to his bravery and leadership skills in North Africa
- Franco was meticulous, although some criticised him for this, it meant that he always secured the areas he had taken thoroughly. He was in undisputed control of his zone which helped him when looking to lead
- although he was criticised for making a detour to relieve the Alcazar at Toledo, it was a terrific propaganda coup which gained Franco both international recognition and made him even more popular with his troops and others on the Nationalist side
- Franco was the only one through whom Hitler and Mussolini wanted to channel their aid. This gave Franco a prestige and made him the natural leader of the Nationalists. Franco was chosen because of his leadership of the Army of Africa.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Raymond Carr</b>	Argues ‘Franco’s claims (to be leader) were outstanding. . . he was in charge of the best Nationalist army’.
<b>Julian Casanova</b>	Asserts: ‘Franco, with Sanjurjo dead, used his privileged position as commander of the Morocco garrison to prepare the ground for (becoming). a Generalissimo’.
<b>Paul Preston</b>	States ‘Italian and German assistance would be channelled exclusively to Franco’ ‘With his major political rivals all dead, Franco was free to control. . . the political direction of the Nationalists’.
<b>Antony Beevor</b>	Believes ‘(Franco) had no effective rival and the very nature of the Nationalist movement begged a single, disciplined command’.

## **Question 68**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which may support the view that the battle of the Ebro was the most significant turning point in the war:**

- after the defeat at Teruel, the Republicans regrouped and were aided by fresh supplies from across the French frontier when it was temporarily opened. They also increased the age range for conscription meaning more troops were available
- the Republican strategy was to hold on to what they had in order to last until a wider European war began, however they also wanted to show the world that they were still a powerful force
- the offensive on the Ebro was initially successful with carefully planned river crossings establishing a barge beachhead on the other bank. However, they were eventually pushed back after the worst fighting of the war
- the four-month long battle resulted in both sides being back exactly where they had started however there had been huge casualties
- the Nationalists had casualties of 60,000 and the Republicans 75,000 of whom 30,000 had died
- almost all of the weapons the republicans needed to defend Catalonia had been destroyed or lost
- the republican air force lost most of its planes
- the battle of the Ebro was the longest and bloodiest of the war. It also encapsulated the failings of the leadership of the republic, in launching an offensive with no clear longer-term objectives because of their need for a propaganda victory
- it was clear to virtually everyone inside and outside Spain that after the battle of the Ebro there could only be the swift demise of the Spanish republic.

**Evidence which may consider that the battle of the Ebro was not the most significant turning point in the war:**

- the Ebro followed a similar pattern to other Republican offensives in the war, such as Brunete, Belchite and Teruel
- the intervention of Germany and Italy could be considered as the major turning point in the war as without that the Nationalists would not have been successful in battles such as the Ebro where the Condor legion played such a large part
- others would point to the decision of the democracies, especially Britain and France, to pursue non-intervention, even denying the republic belligerent rights, was the most significant turning point of the war
- the Italian defeat at Guadalajara meant that Mussolini was committed to a Nationalist victory to restore some pride
- the Munich agreement postponed war in Europe until after the republic were defeated and showed that Britain and France were not going to confront fascism.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Anthony Beevor</b>	Argues that '(The Republican offensive on the Ebro) was beyond military stupidity, it was the mad delusion of propaganda.' and 'The Battle of the Ebro exceeded even that of Brunete in its disastrous attempts to create a spectacular success. It led directly to the final destruction of the republican army'.
<b>Helen Graham</b>	Contends that 'The Ebro offensive was the Republic's last throw of the dice'.
<b>Hugh Thomas</b>	Argues that 'The pattern of Brunete, Bechite and Teruel was followed in the Ebro, though on a larger scale and with more terrible consequences'.
<b>Julian Casanova</b>	Contends that following the battle of the Ebro 'The Republic seemed to have been defeated, particularly because the Munich Pact broke Negrin's resistance strategy and showed that the democracies had no intention of changing their policy of appeasement of the Fascist powers'.

## Question 69

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which may support the validity of the view that the Republic was defeated due to internal divisions:**

- from the outset, the parties comprising the Popular Front had little in common. There was a wide range from centre-left middle-class republicans to communists and pro-revolutionary socialists. Within the politicians of the Popular Front the gap was arguably even wider and even within the PSOE there was open disagreement between Prieto and Caballero. his lack of unity in command was in contrast to the singularity of the Nationalist leadership once Franco had become Generalissimo
- in the civil war the divisions within the Republican side were even wider as there were also anarchists and the POUM. The growth in importance of the Communists set them on a collision course with these two groups. This caused disagreements over strategy and different parts of the armed forces pursuing different objectives
- the war or revolution debate dominated Republican thinking during the early stages of the war. In the areas where the revolution had taken hold in the summer of 1936, in Catalonia and Aragon in particular, there was a creeping ‘Republicanisation’ of the armed forces as regular divisions replaced militia. Although some argue that this meant the army was more efficient, defending the gains of the revolution was what many on the Left were fighting for, causing a drop in morale among some on the Republican side
- Soviet aid was channelled through the communists and meant that they were increasingly important on the Republican side. It also meant that some parts of the army were better equipped than others
- the events of May 1937 in Barcelona showed that the divisions on the Republican side were deep. The clashes between the anarchists and POUM on one side and the Government/communists on the other resulted in the ousting of Caballero and the virtual takeover of the Republican side by the communists. This can be seen as a turning point in the war
- battles such as the Ebro were dictated by communist thinking and it could be argued that their strategy meant that the republic suffered unnecessary defeats by taking risks and officers being unable to give realistic assessments due to a fear of giving bad news.

**Evidence which may consider other reasons for the defeat of the Republic:**

**Advantages on the Nationalist side:**

- Franco's leadership, although criticised has also been interpreted as cleverly controlled to ensure total political control and ensure a sustainable victory
- Franco also merit's acclaim for personal involvement in securing aid without conceding much
- although the Republic had key industrial areas, the Nationalists had more raw materials which proved to be increasingly important as the war went on. As they took more land their advantage increased
- non-intervention was a crucial element in determining the outcome of the war. In particular, Britain's role was central in effectively condemning the Republic to a slow death. Britain was aware that non-intervention was at best ineffective and at worst directly aided the Nationalists
- Franco was able to equip his army largely on credit so that his troops could get up to date and plentiful armaments. This was in sharp contrast to the Republican side which had difficulty getting supplies and had to pay for them. The Nationalists were well funded by rich supporters, including the ex-Royal family
- as well as the Axis powers military assistance, The Texas Oil Company also supplied the Nationalists due to the political leanings of the company's owner
- Franco enjoyed a tactical advantage because of the geographical position of Portugal, where Nationalist aircraft could refuel. The British stationed in Gibraltar also gave assistance to the Nationalists while denying this to the Republicans
- most of the experienced Generals in the Spanish army joined the rebellion, especially those who had spent the most time in the conflict in Spanish Morocco. This often showed on the battlefield when the Republican side could not always organise their supply lines to match their advances. Although there were exceptions, such as General Rojo, Nationalist Generals often proved better and more experienced in the field

- Franco had at his disposal the Army of Africa. Consisting of experienced Spanish troops, Moroccan mercenaries and the Legionnaires, they were by far the best fighting – and most feared – soldiers in the Spanish Army. In the war in the South, in the first few months, the Army of Africa swept across vast areas of land, deliberately terrorising the defeated areas in order that Republican defenders further ahead were demoralised
- Republicans were denied the means to obtain weapons, increasing the gulf between the two sides. Ammunition was often in short supply for the Republic, but not for the Nationalists. At the start of the war the sides were roughly evenly matched in terms of numbers, whereas, as the war went on, the Nationalists were able to reinforce and expand their military might greatly.

#### **German and Italian aid for the Nationalists:**

- German aid was far superior to anything else in Spain in the latter part of the war. The Condor Legion eventually gave Franco total air superiority. This was displayed at Guernica and most of the successful battles for the Nationalists. The Germans provided an air force, artillery, technicians and ammunition among other support
- although there is some evidence that the Germans were happy to prolong the war, they were prepared to put enough support into Spain to ensure Franco's eventual success. They used Spain as a testing ground for their new air force and weaponry, meaning that the Nationalists had access to the most up to date equipment
- Italian aid was not always as great technically, but was large in terms of troops. By February 1937 there were 50,000 Italian troops serving in the Nationalist army. The Italians also provided aircraft and tanks, among other supplies. The Italian navy also helped in the Mediterranean. It was said that Italy was effectively at war with the Spanish Republic. Especially after the Italian defeat at Guadalajara
- Mussolini could not afford to suffer a Republican victory, so were prepared to give any amount of military support needed.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Antony Beevor</b>	Argues that ‘German and Italian regimes were at least reassured that France, as well as Great Britain, would do nothing to hinder their intervention in Spain’.
<b>Paul Preston</b>	Contends that ‘Western democracies betrayed Spain’.
<b>Gerald Brenan</b>	Argues that ‘Foreign intervention was crucial’.
<b>Raymond Carr</b>	Contends that ‘Axis fears of rebel defeat led to extra aid in November 1938. Republican government blamed lack of unity’.

## Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 70

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . there was indeed much comment but nonetheless as a result of this, Lerroux found himself increasingly popular with Right.	Quote reflects his growing popularity with the Right.
Sanjurjo fled from Seville and was arrested by one of his own carabineers near the Portuguese border. He was sentenced to death and reprieved.	Sanjurjo was tried and convicted but not executed.
Mobs rioted in various parts of Spain by way of answer to the revolt and monasteries and convents went up in flames.	There was popular outrage against the Sanjurada as riots were seen in various parts of Spain and religious orders were attacked.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Lerroux had been a part of the ruling coalition from 1931 but had resigned. His association with the Sanjurada, even if he had not actually played a part, endeared him to the Right. In this way, the Sanjurada paved the way for the Right-wing coalition which would go on to win the election of November 1933
- Sanjurjo was not executed, unlike the military conspirators against the Monarchy had been two years earlier. He was available to plot against the Republic and from exile in Portugal in 1936 become the leader of the planned coup
- there was fury among the working class that there was a threat to their hard won, still fledgling democracy. This was vented against one of the remaining pillars of the previous regime, the Church.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- there was an outpouring of popular support in favour of the Republic and the Left coalition
- the government was able to introduce legislation which included the confiscation of land from the largest landowners on the pretext that they had supported the Sanjurada (there is little evidence that many of them had)
- the Government enjoyed an easier time in the Cortes for some months following this and was able to proceed with some of its most controversial legislation
- the attacks on the Church compounded those which had taken place spontaneously the year before and the anti-clerical legislation brought in by the government. This helped to bring about the founding of CEDA, ostensibly to protect the Church
- the uncoordinated and poorly planned attempted coup taught lessons which would be vital in the future. One was that the working class would resist and attempt by the army to destroy democracy. Another was that any army generals trying to repeat this in future would have to plan much more thoroughly. Both lessons were important in 1936.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Antony Beevor</b>	Argues that 'The immediate effect of Sanjurjo's rebellion was to speed up the pace of legislation in the Cortes'.
<b>Hugh Thomas</b>	Believes that (following the Sanjurjada) 'There were an ominously large number of preventative arrests of monarchist politicians and officials'.
<b>Paul Preston</b>	Asserts that 'The defeat of Sanjurjo did nothing to calm social hatred in the south'.
<b>Raymond Carr</b>	Discusses the aftermath for the Right in opposing the attacks on the Church, was to create 'Accion Popular... later to be the core of CEDA'.

### Question 71

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
When the army and the fascists rose against the Republic in July 1936, their most vigorous opposition was the labour movement in the big cities, in whose front ranks were the Anarchists and the CNT.	Contends the revolution began with violent opposition to the attempted coup.
The workers and their unions lost no time taking control of the factories and the farms, the railroads, utilities, municipal services, the schools, hospitals, bakeries and dairies. Everything was collectivised.	Argues there was widespread collectivisation in both rural and urban enterprises in these areas.
. . . met in open assemblies and freely voted to organise collectives and enter into a new way of life.	Argues that decisions were taken democratically with everything being voted on.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the attempted coup was defeated in large part by the resistance of the working class in cities such as Barcelona where they fought on the streets with soldiers in July 1936
- in Catalonia, Aragon and elsewhere there was collectivisation. 70% of businesses in Barcelona were collectivised
- the local, democratic control of all decision making was characteristic of the anarchist way of decision making. This extended to decision making in the militia.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . some collectives were installed forcibly by Anarchist militia, especially the Durruti column.	Argues there were a number of collectives which were imposed rather than created spontaneously.
Their impatience to get the harvest in to feed the cities, as well as the fervour of their beliefs, sometimes led to violence since the Aragonese peasants resented being told what to do by over enthusiastic Catalan industrial workers and many of them had fears of Russian-style collectives.	Argues the example of Russian collectives worried some of the peasants.
Overall studies of the collectivisation conclude that the experiment was a success for the poor peasants of Aragon.	Argues the collectives were deemed a success.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- there was resentment of the imposition, at the point of a gun. Not all the areas wanted to collectivise in the Republican zone and though many were left to their own devices, others were not
- the fate of the Kulaks and the example of forced collectivisation which resulted in food shortages worried many of the peasants
- overall, this experiment in anarchism has been shown to be a success, which, allowing for the war, produced food and other material in greater quantities as previously.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:**

- the revolution was limited to some parts of the Republican zone and was much stronger in some areas than others. In contrast to Barcelona, only 30% of businesses in Madrid were collectivised
- there was tension between those who wanted to pursue and defend the revolution and those who wished to concentrate all the Republican efforts on the war
- the militia, who were at the forefront of the revolution, were aligned with political parties and trade unions, in particular the anarchists and the POUM
- there was a noticeable difference between Barcelona and Madrid. The government was in control in Madrid but in Barcelona, as George Orwell put it, ‘the worker was in the saddle’.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Paul Preston</b>	Argues ‘Communist efforts against the revolutionists had let their own control in the war effort slip. Their efforts led to a second civil war within the Civil War’.
<b>Antony Beevor</b>	Contends the CNT and UGT rapidly filled the vacuum, creating revolutionary organisations in republican territory.
<b>George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert</b>	State ‘The revolutionaries were not defining crimes according to the laws of the Second Republic, which they proclaimed abolished’.
<b>Raymond Carr</b>	Believes the mass reaction which helped to defeat the Generals’ rising weakened, if it did not destroy, the conventional structures of command in the Republican zone.

## Question 72

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	Dolores Ibarruri.	Communist deputy in the Cortes and renowned speaker. Known for her passion and ability to inspire. Called La Pasionaria because of her speeches and her legendary role in exhorting the Spanish people against fascism. 'Better to die on your feet than live on your knees'.
<b>Purpose</b>	Farewell address.	She is justifying the involvement on the International Brigades, praising their contribution to the Republican side. She lauds their heroic example of fighting for the solidarity and universality of democracy. Propaganda speech.
<b>Timing</b>	November 1938.	This is when the decision had been taken to pull the International Brigades out.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
When the capital of the Spanish Republic was threatened, it was you, gallant comrades of the International Brigades, who helped save the city with your fighting enthusiasm, your heroism and your spirit of sacrifice.	Using such emotive languages such as 'heroism' and their 'spirit of sacrifice.' To emphasise and praise the contributions made by the International Brigades.
And Jarama and Guadalajara, Brunete and Belchite, Levante and the Ebro, in immortal verses sing of the courage, the sacrifice, the daring, the discipline of the men of the International Brigades.	Highlights their key role in the most significant conflicts of the war focussing on their courage and sacrifice as well as their discipline.
You can go proudly: you are history: you are legend!	Celebrates their contribution in the highest praise.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the International Brigades had made an important contribution to the defence of Madrid, alongside loyal army units and militia
- at Jarama, the British Battalion and the American Lincoln Battalion had suffered heavy casualties but defended the Madrid to Valencia road. At Guadalajara, the Garibaldi Battalion had fought fellow Italians of the CTV
- the International Brigades had a tremendous propaganda impact, in Spain and abroad.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- Brigades were crucial in certain campaigns including the defence of Madrid (11 Brigade under Miaja). They also gave the impression of foreign support which was lacking in any real terms for the Republic
- Brigades were organised by Communists and were not universally popular with Spaniards but were better ‘drilled’ and equipped than Militias
- support deliberately withheld from POUM militias – difficult to compare their success with Brigades
- speech is made as Brigades leave and many would argue defeat was inevitable
- Brigades no real match for support given by Fascists in the shape of 100,000 Italian troops, German Condor Legions etc
- casualties high amongst Brigades (for example, defending Madrid-La Coruña road)
- around 60,000 Brigaders altogether, by October 1938, 12,673 still in Spain
- mention could be made of the biased nature of many of the sources on the Brigade. . . this has helped shape their view in history; did they keep the war going and save the Republic from an earlier demise, or it is just propaganda?

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Antony Beevor</b>	Argues that ‘So successful was the Comintern propaganda that the British Ambassador was convinced that only foreigners defended Madrid’.
<b>Harry Browne</b>	Contends that ‘They gave the impression of an international community which favoured the Republic – an impression which was false’.
<b>Paul Preston</b>	Considers that their part in the defence of Madrid should not be exaggerated; it was part of a heroic effort.
<b>Arthur Koestler</b>	Argues that ‘Spain became the rendezvous of International left. Leftist bohemia – the Bloomsbury set went on a revolutionary junket’.

## Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

### PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

#### Question 73

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that much of Britain was experiencing socio-economic despair by 1939:

##### Economic conditions:

- the Great Depression intensified problems which already existed within the British economy resulting in unemployment within the traditional industries
- heavy industry in the north of England, south Wales and the west of Scotland was adversely affected because of the global economic downturn of the Depression years
- the coal industry, which was a huge employer was being challenged by oil, resulting in unemployment in the coal industry
- increased competition from abroad had a major effect on the iron and steel, textiles and shipbuilding
- the ancillary services for these industries were badly affected by the decline of traditional industries
- the effect of the decline in British overseas trade resulting in a loss of jobs in Britain.

##### Social conditions – workplace:

- with high unemployment tax revenue was reduced and government spending on welfare increased. This became a serious political issue for the National Government
- arguably the government needed to expand the British economy to stimulate growth and in turn increase employment
- this was at a time when countries such as Germany and Italy were mobilising their unemployed to complete government funded projects to improve their infrastructure, a route we didn't follow in Britain
- high unemployment caused stagnation in social mobility; it allowed many to descend into poverty, especially those workers who were on or teetering around the breadline
- rents were sometimes not met, and choices were made about the quantity, and quality of food bought
- an evaluation might be made of how the unemployed were provided with an income and how they were incentivised to work by government and non-governmental organisations
- high unemployment gave rise to political unrest. Riots and demonstrations by the unemployed were not uncommon in the industrialised heartlands of Britain
- example(s) of any political pressure which highlighted the effects of unemployment, for example, the 1936 Jarrow Hunger march
- however, the UK avoided the social and political upheaval seen in some other countries. Extremist parties made little headway in the UK unlike other European countries most notably in Germany and Italy.

### **Social conditions – living conditions:**

- the falling standard of living for many resulted in a poor diet for millions and subsequent decline in the population's health
- Britain's housing stock was mainly owned by private landlords, not council housing. This housing was occupied in the main by the working class. Housing conditions were often poor, rents were high, and overcrowding was common. These conditions had effect on the overall health of the population
- rents were frequently not met and harsh choices were made about the quantity, and quality of food bought
- government slum clearance plans to provide better housing for the working classes were shelved due to poor economic conditions
- soup kitchens became common
- a government report in the mid-1930s estimated that around 25% of the UK's population existed on a subsistence diet
- child malnutrition, scurvy, rickets and tuberculosis existed.

### **Evidence which contradicts the view that much of Britain was experiencing despair by 1939:**

- within depressed areas certain industries were thriving, individuals employed outwith the heavy industries usually did well
- light engineering, plastics, chemicals and electrical engineering, motor vehicle and the aircraft industry were expanding rapidly
- white collar employment increased, the banking sector including building societies grew providing employment and mortgages for many
- growth of national chain stores Woolworths and Boots the Chemist, which not only provided employment but also demonstrated that many people had more disposable income
- the National Government introduced the Special Areas Act to attract light industries to industries to distressed areas
- local councils built 500,000 council houses, which pumped money into the economy
- from 1937 onwards increased armaments production created employment
- many workers were forced to move home to find employment unemployed workers from Wales moved to Oxford to work in the car industry.

### **Social conditions – working and living conditions:**

- in general, family sizes fell which gave many more disposable income
- interest rates were low during the 1930s which encouraged borrowing for both businesses and homeowners
- Britain left the gold standard which reduced the cost of British exports and contributed to a fall in prices
- prices fell in the Depression, which meant more money for luxuries for those in employment
- there was a growth in leisure activities which indicates general higher disposable income
- the 1930s was a golden age for advertising and the cinema. The popularity of professional sport especially football, dance halls, and a thriving fashion industry aimed at the middle classes
- sales of ice-cream and confectionery increased during the 1930s (Mars Bar 1932, Milky Way 1935, Smarties 1937)
- improvements at work such as reduction in working hours, holidays with pay
- seaside holidays for many
- huge increase in car ownership but it was still not the norm
- television began in Britain in 1936 when the BBC began broadcasting
- during the 1930s, for most people with a job, living standards rose significantly
- by 1939 about 27% of the population owned their own house
- three million new houses were built in the 1930s
- there was a 1200% increase in homes with electricity
- more than half of all households had a radio by 1939
- hire-purchase allowed people to pay up luxury items
- vacuum cleaners and washing machines became more widespread
- a better diet and improved health for many
- free school milk was introduced after 1934.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Tony Mason</b>	Is critical of the unequal distribution of wealth in Britain at this time despite Britain's position as one of the richest countries in the world.
<b>Robert Pearce</b>	Argues new industries were increasing the demand for skilled labour in the period before 1939.
<b>Martin Pugh</b>	Argues that the Depression was a regional issue. Hardship was concentrated in central Scotland, the north of England and south Wales, where mature industries such as coal mining and ship building were in very serious decline.
<b>John Stevenson</b>	Points out that the interwar years were marked by substantial economic growth.

## **Question 74**

**Candidates might refer to:**

**Evidence which supports the argument that Churchill was a successful wartime leader:**

**Churchill's personal attributes/actions:**

- Churchill recognised the dire threat which Hitler and Nazi Germany posed to the peace of Europe, making him the only credible Prime Minister after Chamberlain was forced to resign in May 1940 Churchill was a great orator who possessed a charismatic personality
- his inspiring speeches boosted the morale of the country including, 'blood, toil, tears and sweat,' 'we shall fight on the beaches,' 'finest hour' and 'end of the beginning' speeches Churchill provided strong and decisive leadership skills at a time of national crisis, leading Britain when she was fighting Nazi Germany alone (June 1940 to June 1941)
- he had a single-minded pursuit of victory at all costs and he embodied the British spirit of resistance in the face of formidable odds
- Churchill made it clear that he had no intention of negotiating with Hitler in May/June 1940 despite the advice of some senior politicians. This galvanised the whole country
- Churchill visited bombed areas and was visibly moved by the scale of destruction he witnessed, his empathy was well received by the British public
- he led Britain to victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, an outcome which seemed very unlikely when he became Prime Minister in May 1940.

**Churchill's military decisions:**

- Churchill had an experienced military background with a firm grasp of military matters and was therefore eminently suitable to the post of Minister of Defence in addition to his position of Prime Minister
- his willingness to make extremely difficult decisions was demonstrated when he took the extremely difficult decision to attack the French navy at Oran/Mers El-Kebir, Algeria in July 1940 (Task force led by HMS Hood). This action was said to have impressed President Roosevelt as it demonstrated Churchill's and Britain's determination to continue the fight against Nazi Germany.

**Churchill's political decision making:**

- the Grand Alliance – it was Churchill's skill as a negotiator and diplomat which bound together the vital alliance of Britain, USA and USSR and forged victory in the war
- Churchill made friendships and alliances with countries that were decidedly more powerful than Britain, USA (more natural) and the USSR (overcoming his anti-communism)
- Churchill was a skilled diplomat who improved Britain's chances of success such as securing Lend Lease from the USA
- Churchill persuaded Roosevelt that the defeat of Germany was the first priority of the Allies even after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour in December 1941
- Britain borrowed huge sums of money from the USA \$4.3 billion (£2.2 billion) were borrowed at two per cent interest rates – a triumph for Churchill who had exerted considerable diplomatic pressure in his efforts to win the loan from the Americans.

**Churchill and the Home Front:**

- he established and led an effective coalition government for five years
- his War Cabinet included important Labour politicians most notably Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin.

**Evidence which is more critical of Churchill's wartime leadership:**

**Churchill's personality/leadership:**

- Churchill had an excessive ego and believed in his own manifest destiny
- he was impulsive, so much so he had to be reined in by his closest advisors such as Sir Alan Brooke
- Churchill was often brusque. He had a poor relationship with De Gaulle, leader of the Free French
- he was so single-minded and stubborn it prevented him seeing the big picture of the war.

### **Churchill's military decisions:**

- Churchill's military strategy was often suspect, for instance in Norway, Greece and Italy. Arguably Churchill's decision to defend Greece helped to delay victory in North Africa by two years
- Churchill's reluctance to open a Second Front against Germany infuriated Stalin who accused Britain of being cowardly
- that far from being a reckless adventurer, Churchill may even have been overly cautious in his approach to military matters to preserve lives and prevent significant disasters
- in Singapore 130,000 Allied troops became prisoners of war. This defeat at the hands of the Japanese was the largest surrender in British military history
- Churchill was ultimately responsible for the actions of Bomber Command which laid waste many of Germany's cities even when it was clear that the Allies were close to victory, the controversial bombing of Dresden in February 1945 which caused huge loss of civilian life
- argument that Churchill made a serious military mistake in advocating the bombing of Germany before giving resources to Coastal Command to defeat the U boats
- Churchill dismissed several senior military officers if they did not agree with his military strategies.

### **Churchill's political decisions:**

- Churchill's lack of enthusiasm and allowing Labour Ministers to organise the Home Front led to the Conservative defeat at the 1945 General Election.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>John Charmley</b>	Is a severe critic of Churchill. He believes that in winning the war Churchill betrayed his core values of British independence, Empire, and his anti-socialism. He also argues that this betrayal was further shown when Churchill made Britain subservient to America, and that Halifax would have made a better Prime Minister.
<b>Nigel Knight</b>	Argues that, Churchill employed Britain's commitment to the bomber offensive as a ploy to deflect the Soviet desire for the western Allies to mount a Second Front in France.
<b>Samantha Heywood</b>	Argues that he did accept advice on military matters, 'Unlike Hitler or Stalin, however, Churchill did not overrule any of his Chiefs of Staff. He bullied them, and his generals, but he only got his way if he managed to persuade them that his idea was right'.
<b>Jonathan Schneer</b>	Praises the manner in which Churchill managed the War Cabinet, 'He exhorted and encouraged them when necessary, congratulated them when appropriate, and sympathized with them in their troubles'.

## Question 75

Candidates might refer to:

**Evidence which suggests that the British Empire and Dominions gave support to Britain:**

- the Empire fell into two distinct parts. There were the self-governing ‘White’ Dominions – Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. There were also those regions that were wholly or partly governed from London, including India, which had its own viceroy, as well as the West Indies and British colonies in Africa and the Far East
- at the start of the war there was reluctance on the behalf of the ‘White’ Dominions to support the United Kingdom. The wounds of the First World War were still evident in Australia, New Zealand and Canada
- at the start of the Second World War, only Canada and South Africa fully supported Britain, with the Anzacs joining later
- at the outbreak of war in 1939, India and the other colonial parts of the Empire had no choice and automatically joined in the war on the side of Britain
- Dominions such as India were mobilised not only for manpower but for their invaluable raw materials and for the production of war goods
- the contribution of the Empire and Dominions was invaluable especially before the Soviet Union and the USA joined the war in 1941.

**The British Empire at War:**

- as early as December 1939, for example, Canadian troops were despatched to Europe and in January 1940 Australian and New Zealand forces bolstered military commitments in the Middle East. By war’s end these three nations had made vital contributions in each the three major theatres of war: Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific
- during 1940–1941 Australian troops served in campaigns in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Palestine, Crete, Greece, Malaya and Singapore. After repelling menacing advances by the enemy in Europe and the Pacific, by 1942 Australian forces had contributed impressively to Allied successes on a range of battlefronts including the deserts of North Africa, the jungles of Papua New Guinea, and the seas of the Pacific Ocean
- the Royal Australian Navy played an important and diverse role in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. At the peak of the war, out of a population of seven million more than 500,000 served in the armed forces with hundreds of thousands more engaged in munitions or building roads and airfields. In total Australian battle casualties amounted to 72,814
- in all, more than 200,000 New Zealand men and women served in the armed forces during the war. Of these 140,000 were despatched overseas largely to fight in campaigns in the Middle East and Italy. In total 11,625 sacrificed their lives during the Second World War
- Canada’s involvement in World War II was equally impressive. Serving in every major theatre of war Canadian troops witnessed action in, for example, Hong Kong, Sicily, Italy, and North Western Europe
- Canadian forces also stood on vital guard duty in Britain during the period of greatest threat of German invasion and Canadian naval vessels proved invaluable during the vital Battle for the Atlantic. Most notably Canadian forces made a huge contribution to the D-Day landings of June 1944 and the subsequent Allied advances into central Europe during 1944 and 1945. At its maximum strength in 1943 Canadian armed forces amounted to half a million, of whom 43,000 tragically were killed in combat
- Canada was the site of the first British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme flying school, where many pilots from the Empire and Dominions were trained
- there were 1,440,500 troops from India (which included Pakistan and Bangladesh), 629,000 from Canada, 413,000 from Australia, 136,000 from South Africa, 128,500 from New Zealand
- colonial troops saw service in military campaigns across the globe. During the course of the war, for example, the Fifth Indian Division fought against the Italians in Sudan, the Germans in Libya, and the Japanese in Burma, Malaya and Java
- the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) fought against the Japanese, while Royal Indian Navy ships fought in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There were around 40,000 Indian servicemen in the British Merchant Navy

- about 15 percent of all the Victoria Crosses during the Second World War went to Indian and Nepalese troops
- in the West Indies, thousands of men joined the local home guard and the British Army. They were eventually sent to Europe for training, but few were allowed to fight on the front line
- approximately 5,500 West Indian RAF personnel came to Britain in 1944-1945. From 1944, West Indian women served in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) and the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) in Britain. Over 40,000 West Indian workers volunteered to live and work as agricultural labourers in the USA
- the financial contribution to the war by the Empire and the Dominions may be referred to
- Canada also gave the British 4 billion C\$ worth of money and supplies, second only to the United States and top on a per capita basis. In 1946 it cancelled Britain's war debt
- in total 170,000 Commonwealth men and women lost their lives or were missing as a result of the war.

<b>Historians</b>	<b>Perspective on the issue</b>
<b>Lizzie Collingham</b>	Argues that the British Empire sustained Britain in terms of 'supplies of men, arms and ammunition, raw materials and, above all, food'.
<b>Ashley Jackson</b>	Contends that by 1941 only a quarter of the troops of the British Eighth Army in North Africa were British, the rest came from India, Sri Lanka, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Uganda, Tanganyika, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Bechuanaland, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Palestine, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Cyprus.
<b>Yasmin Khan</b>	Britain didn't fight the Second World War, the British Empire did.
<b>David Olusoga</b>	Believes that Churchill's references to the Empire in many of his most famous speeches are small reminders of a big reality. Britain fought the Second World War with men and money partly drawn from the Empire and that, after the defence of the home islands, the survival of the Empire was a fundamental war aim.

## Question 76

Candidates might refer to:

### Aims of the Allied Bombing Campaign against Germany:

- the reasons for bombing Germany were to disrupt and reduce industrial production of weapons, to wear down German morale and to force the German Army and Air Force to defend against the bombing over a wide area
- Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State commented that, ‘the objective of our bombing offensive in Germany is to destroy the capacity of Germany to make war’
- after the evacuation at Dunkirk, arguably bombing was the only feasible method of taking the war to Germany
- by August 1941 ‘only about one in five of Bomber Command’s aircraft was putting its bombs within five miles of its target’
- Bombers encountered serious difficulties flying in darkness and frequently in bad weather in autumn 1941 the decision was taken by Air Ministry planners to switch the order of target priority: Area bombing was to be the first priority and precision raids would be carried out when appropriate
- the bomber force needed more aircrews, bigger and better bombers and improved navigation equipment to be effective
- in October 1940, the War Cabinet agreed, ‘the civilian population around the target areas must be made to feel the weight of the war’
- Bombing was justified on the grounds that the Germans were employing similar tactics against Britain and retaliation in kind was a morale booster for the British public.

Evidence which suggests that Allied Bombing on Germany was a failure:

### German reaction to Allied Bombing:

- there is an argument that German morale may even have been strengthened rather than damaged.
- wholesale defiance on the part of the German civilian population was not expected. British analysts thought the German population would capitulate, it did not
- politicians may have been arrogant to think that the reaction of the German civilian population would be any less patriotic than the reaction of Londoners during the Blitz
- German war production actually increased until 1944
- Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production of Germany, wrote: ‘In the burning cities we daily experienced the direct impact of war. . . Neither did the bombings and the hardships that resulted from them weaken the morale of the populace. . . I carried away the impression of growing toughness’
- there was further criticism of the bombing strategy when economists looked at the amount of men and material involved. They surmised that the resources employed could have been better used elsewhere in the war effort at this time as the war came to an end, it became harder to argue that raids were saving the lives of Allied soldiers.

### **Evidence which supports the view that the Allied bombing campaign was not a failure:**

- Arthur Harris was appointed to lead Bomber Command in February 1942, he continued Churchill's policy of area bombing
- Sinclair supported Bomber Harris and believed that strategic bombing of Germany was an effective way of destroying Germany's war effort and morale. Sinclair argued that the targets were industrial rather than residential
- Harris stated that, 'They sowed the wind, and they are going to reap the whirlwind' May 1942
- Harris saw civilian death (or the 'dehousing' of the German workforce) as entirely necessary
- by the end of the war, 3.37 million German homes were destroyed
- 593,000 German civilians were killed by bombing
- he argued that 1,000 bomber raids could destroy industrial cities in hours
- crucially Harris argued that area bombing would render the ground invasion of Europe unnecessary. He pointed to the Cologne raid of May 1942 as an example of what could be achieved: in one night, 1,046 aircraft dropped more than 2,000 tons of bombs on the city, reducing 13,000 houses to rubble
- the capabilities of RAF bombers improved during the war, the Lancaster heavy bomber was a very effective bomber
- Lancasters could also be used for precision bombing targets such as bridges using 10-ton Grand Slam bombs
- repeated attacks on Germany caused the diversion of industrial war production to defensive rather than offensive weapons
- as there was no Second Front until D-Day in June 1944, Churchill promised heavy bombing of Germany to placate Stalin
- US Army Air Force bombed German cities during the day. They attempted precision bombing, the RAF bombed at night
- in May 1943, the Dambusters raids against dams in the Ruhr Valley, in the German industrial heartland
- although the economic impact of the Dambusters raid was negligible, the operation had a great impact on public morale
- the defeat of the German Air Force coincided with improvements in accuracy making the combined bomber force a valuable asset against an expanding German war economy
- by 1945, the major cities of the Third Reich had been razed to rubble
- Churchill was very much committed to the Allied Bombing Campaign. However, Churchill's attitude towards the campaign changed after the destruction of Dresden, February 1945
- by the end of the war, RAF Bomber Command had dropped nearly one million tons of bombs in the course of 390,000 operations
- no major German city escaped bombing, and many German cities were more than half-destroyed, including Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Dresden
- forcing the Germans onto the defensive through bombing was a critical factor in the liberation of Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945
- Bombing was vital to British victory, 'bombing placed a ceiling on the expansion of German war potential'
- German bomber production was cut back and one-third of the production of heavy guns, electrical and radar equipment went to anti-aircraft defences
- seventy-five percent of German heavy anti-tank guns, manned by 900,000 soldiers, had to be used as anti-aircraft guns, scattered across the country
- German factories had to concentrate on producing aircraft which were used in a defensive role Churchill, in the final volume of his memoirs said: 'In judging the contribution to victory of strategic air power. . . before the end, we and the US had developed striking forces so powerful that they played a major part in the economic collapse of Germany'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Basil Collier:</b>	Believed that destroying cathedrals and hospitals and killing non-combatants of all ages and both sexes, either in the course of impracticable attempts to bomb strictly military objectives. . . [was]. . . both legitimate and sound.
<b>Max Hastings</b>	Argues that bombing failed in its attempt to destroy German morale as it never came near to collapse until the very end. If anything, the continuous bombings of German cities only strengthened morale.
<b>Richard Overy:</b>	Argues that bombing was vital to British victory, bombing placed a ceiling on the expansion of German war potential. Germany mounted a huge effort to protect itself from Bomber Command and this, in turn, deprived their army and air force of men and equipment. Arguing the bombing campaign diverted a great deal of Germany's war effort away from the war at sea or the main fighting fronts.
<b>Detlef Siebert:</b>	Is sceptical about the effectiveness of area bombing on German war production and on the German population.

## Question 77

Candidates might refer to:

### Evidence about the economic state of Britain in 1945:

- an analysis of Britain's financial situation in the immediate aftermath of the war
- from being a great creditor nation with the world's most powerful currency, Britain ended the war in debt to the tune of £3,700 million, a huge balance of payments deficit and an enormous loss of overseas markets
- by July 1947, sterling was freely convertible to dollars, threatening to wipe out Britain's dollar reserve and virtually destroying the £ as a trading currency
- after the financial crises of 1947, 1949 and 1951, Britain's economic capacity to remain a world power, even with US financial aid, was severely challenged by the fragility of her trading and financial position
- faced with financial ruin, Britain was forced to reduce some of her overseas commitments, resulting in military withdrawal from Greece, Turkey and Palestine
- however the sterling area still accounted for over half the world's trade in the immediate post-war years and Britain retained close commercial ties with her Dominions despite interference from the USA.

### Evidence of the achievements of Ernest Bevin, Labour Foreign Secretary:

- the extent to which Bevin's abrasive personality and forthright views dominated British foreign policy and whether his personal intervention in a number of key areas secured for Britain, a more satisfactory outcome than at first appeared possible
- Britain found itself in a difficult position relative to the new world order of the competing superpowers of USA and USSR and there is an argument that Bevin himself was in some way responsible for the onset of the Cold War mentality
- specific foreign policy issues may be referred to including the breakdown in relations with the USSR and the abandonment by Bevin of the Labour philosophy of 'left speaking to left' in our relations with the USSR
- Bevin's attitude towards the Soviet Union in comparison with the USA
- Bevin's important role in helping to create NATO, April 1949, and to tie the USA to European security for the first time; this strengthened Britain's position as a key element in a Western European security system.

### Evidence of the handling of British decolonisation:

- Indian independence, 1947. Creation of Pakistan
- Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel, 1948
- the loss of India was a major blow to Britain's military and political presence east of Suez. Indian independence was successfully achieved and a noble foreign policy initiative or was it an abandonment of the Indian sub-continent to civil war with undue haste?
- how far was Britain's decision to decolonise forced upon it by the superpowers or how far was it a rational decision taken for sound political reasons?
- the issues facing Britain in the Middle-East, particularly Palestine. Did Britain pursue an appropriate policy in this area?
- ultimately Britain was relieved to withdraw from Palestine, an area it had governed under a League of Nations Mandate since 1922
- after Britain left, fighting immediately broke out between the Jews and the Arab League.

### The remaining Empire:

- Britain still retained control over substantial parts of Africa as well as islands in the Caribbean, Hong Kong and had interest in the Suez Canal
- reference to specific examples of decolonisation, Transjordan (1946), Burma and Ceylon (1948) and Libya (1951)
- by 1951, Commonwealth relationships had undergone a fundamental transformation, the full effects of which were only just becoming apparent and in Malaya and Iran the emerging conflicts there clearly marked out some of the limits of British world power status in the post-war world.

## Evidence of Britain's role in relation to Europe, the Cold War and the Marshall Plan:

### Evidence about the economic state of Britain in 1945:

- rearmament and British involvement in the Korean War, 1950–1953
- Britain was a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and as such wielded considerable influence in international affairs
- the onset of the Cold War and Britain's alignment with the USA led many critics to suggest that the concept of an independent British foreign policy had been subverted by the necessity of following the lead of the USA, a notion which seemed to gain credence after Britain's entry into the Korean War in 1950.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
John Darwin	Is less convinced that world power status had been lost by 1951, citing the fact that Britain's continued influence on the development of world affairs was still considerable.
Corelli Barnett	Is, of course, disparaging about Britain's dreams and illusions of continued great power status and cites this misguided pursuit of a seat at the top table as primary cause of the country's decline as an industrial nation in the post-war decades. Candidates may be familiar with the criticism of Corelli Barnett who accuses Britain of global overstretch and clinging on to the dreams and illusions of power we neither had nor could afford.
Peter Hennessey	Still sees much value in considering Britain as the third superpower at least, that is, until the Suez Crisis, 1956, which finally did dispel any notions of world power status.
Steven Fielding	Bemoans Britain's subservient position between the two superpowers and focuses on the degree to which Britain followed US foreign policy.

## Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

### PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

#### Question 78

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Churchill navigated the minefield of parliamentary discontent with skill, aided throughout by the growing unease about the conduct of the war and by an increasing desire for a more determined leadership than that shown by Chamberlain.	Many MPs were critical of Chamberlain's war leadership and the call for a more dynamic leadership was growing.
Discontent with Chamberlain's government came to a head in a two-day Commons debate on Norway on 7–8 May and Hugh Dalton told Halifax that Labour would not join a government that included Chamberlain, Hoare and Simon, whom they regarded as the arch-appeasers.	Halifax was informed by Dalton that Labour would not join a coalition government which comprised certain individuals who were closely associated with appeasement.
Chamberlain made the tactical mistake of saying that he 'still had friends in this House', thereby turning it into a personal vote of confidence.	Chamberlain made a serious political error by turning the Norway Debate into a vote of confidence on himself.

#### Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the poorly planned and executed Norway Campaign which resulted in the Germans occupying Norway
- Chamberlain, as Prime Minister, had ultimate responsibility for the Norway Campaign
- the failure of the Norway Campaign was seen as an indictment of Chamberlain's lacklustre wartime leadership
- Churchill rather surprisingly emerged blameless for the failed Norway Campaign and was a prime candidate to replace Chamberlain.

#### Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the resultant vote in parliament at the conclusion of the Norway Debate – Chamberlain's usual huge majority of over 200 was reduced to 81 – 60 Conservatives abstained and 41 Conservatives voted with the opposition
- however Chamberlain was still reluctant to resign as Prime Minister
- the changing attitudes of numerous members of the Conservative Party, including members of the Watching Committee, towards Chamberlain by May 1940
- mutual long-standing Labour Party distrust and dislike of Chamberlain
- Labour Party's refusal to serve in any coalition government led by Chamberlain.

### **Chamberlain's management of the economy to May 1940:**

- to prepare for war the British workforce had to be organised in such a way to maximise its potential. One of the major criticisms levelled at Chamberlain was his inability to organise the workforce
- whilst there was a demand and a need for extra workers to provide the manpower for rearmament there was still an estimated one million unemployed by April 1940. This reflected badly on Chamberlain's organisational skills at a time of national emergency, when full employment was not only achievable but necessary
- the consequence of this economic mismanagement was the failure of essential industries to work at peak capacity because there was a lack of manpower, especially skilled workers
- throughout the 1930s, the relationship was poor between Chamberlain, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer before becoming PM, and the Trades Union movement due to the austere government policies and the consistently high unemployment
- when Chamberlain needed the unions' cooperation to fulfil his economic targets they refused to work with the man that many believed was responsible for causing so much misery during the 1930s
- the Trades Unions had a close relationship with the Parliamentary Labour Party
- arguably Chamberlain's overall failure in the management of the economy was his failure to appoint a Cabinet member with overall control for the economy. The result was that there was no holistic view of the economy. Therefore, the transition from a peacetime economy to wartime economy was slow and uncoordinated
- these issues exposed failings in Chamberlain as a wartime Prime Minister at a time of national emergency putting his leadership under increasing scrutiny.

### **Chamberlain's foreign policy:**

- appeasement was criticised by some at the time as an attempt to avoid conflict by using inappropriate concession and negotiation that led the country to the verge of defeat
- Chamberlain was closely associated with this failed policy which was one of the main reasons for his unpopularity when war broke out
- belief that Chamberlain was still prepared to negotiate with Hitler in 1940, not a popular position
- Cato argued that appeasement had made war inevitable by allowing Germany to rearm
- Chamberlain was criticised for adhering to the policy of appeasement as it gave Germany and her allies the time to rearm and prepare for war
- whilst the argument about the importance of appeasement continues we need to consider the fact that at that time it was not the policy of appeasement which was the issue, because it had cross party support, it was the leadership style or the lack of leadership of Chamberlain himself
- once Germany violated the ultimatum over Poland there was a two-day silence from the government which led Chamberlain's opponents to believe that he was preparing to negotiate with Germany once again. This belief reduced his credibility even with his own party
- whilst fears were allayed on the 3 September, the preceding weeks and months of inactivity led his critics to question his appetite for war.

### **Allies:**

- with war a distinct possibility Chamberlain tried but was unsuccessful in gaining meaningful alliances to fight a successful war in Europe
- Chamberlain has been criticised over his leisurely negotiations with the Soviet Union. He stated that he had a 'most profound distrust of Russia'
- Chamberlain did not give the French Government enough support during her period of political instability. Addison stated, 'he seemed to treat the French with as much contempt as he showed for the Labour Party'
- the USA confirmed their isolationist policy and were determined to stay clear of European conflicts through Neutrality Acts passed in 1935, 1936 and 1937
- Czechoslovakia, with its large army, was conceded after the Munich agreement of September 1938.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Paul Addison	Argues that the major criticism of Chamberlain centred on his refusal to institute stronger coordination of the economy.
Angus Calder	Suggests that it was not Chamberlain alone who contributed to difficulties faced by Britain but that his optimism, which now seems so misplaced, was shared by other leaders of both major parties.
Mark Donnelly	Argues that the Norway Campaign was seen as a manifestation of the deeper malaise which the Prime Minister's consistent failures of leadership since the outbreak of war had produced.
Robert MacKay	Contends that absolute readiness for war is probably an unattainable ideal for any country, not least because of the uncertainty about the exact circumstances in which a future war might take place.

### Question 79

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . with considerable adverse effects on road safety including fatalities.	Argues that Government wartime restrictions had a negative effect on road safety.
Every householder was caught up in the nightly routine of ensuring that his house was fully 'blacked out'; failure to do so was more than likely to draw on him the anger of the air raid warden and the neighbours.	Contends that each house was responsible for ensuring that their windows were completely covered and that no light could escape from them; failure would lead to reprimand from authority or neighbours.
The blackout made people feel vulnerable to attack by thieves taking advantage of the improved cover.	Believes that the blackout worried many as it was easier for criminals to operate under the cover of darkness.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- from the 1 September 1939 the blackout was enforced
- blackouts were generally unpopular and the ARP wardens who enforced them were considered to have excessive power and were routinely disliked
- curtains, cardboard and paint were used to prevent light escaping from houses, offices, factories or shops, which it was believed might be used by enemy bombers to locate their targets
- the blackout, when regulations required streetlights to be turned off and traffic signals and headlights to be dimmed, led to a dramatic increase in road casualties. The number of deaths peaked in 1940 at 9,169
- civilians who contravened the blackout restrictions were fined
- criminals used the cover of the blackout for their nefarious purposes. Crime rates increased benefiting the black economy and aiding profiteering.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
For the hard-pressed war factories each false alarm was as bad as a real raid as workers filed into their shelters and vital production was lost.	Argues that crucial war production was lost when the air raid siren went, irrespective if it was an actual raid or false alarm.
It was not uncommon for rescue teams to spend hours digging out survivors trapped in a cellar, only to find that the victim had drowned.	Contends that often rescue teams would find that bombing victims had drowned in their cellar.
In order to convey bombing casualties from the incident to first aid posts or hospitals, a huge expansion of the normal ambulance service was required.	Believes that the ambulance service was greatly increased in size to convey casualties to first aid posts or hospital.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- 70,000 civilians died largely due to German bombing raids during the Blitz: 40,000 civilians died in the seven-month period between September 1940 and May 1941, almost half of them in London
- effectiveness of government initiatives in civil defence
- the role of the various civilian services
- the effectiveness and sacrifice of the fire service. It was one of the services that were vital in keeping the country's infrastructure functioning after the bombings
- effectiveness of the medical services and its structure.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- the Air Raid Wardens Service was established in 1937. Wardens were responsible for providing Air Raid Precautions advice. They were expected to extinguish small fires, administer first aid and report unexploded bombs
- the Women's Voluntary Service was set up in 1938 to involve women in the ARP
- an analysis of the positive or negative impact of evacuation
- the use of London Underground Stations (the Tube) as shelters and the government's actions concerning them
- an evaluation of the success of the shelter provision. The effectiveness of Anderson and Morrison shelters
- those with gardens were supplied with 'Anderson' shelters of metal, half-buried in the soil, and proof against most damage short of a direct hit
- later in the war 'Morrison' shelters, strong metal cages big enough to take a large mattress, became available for indoor use
- many people sheltered at home or at work
- there was a class difference in shelter provision and access to shelters. Included in this evaluation there may be a consideration of their distribution, affordability and effectiveness
- government actions to deal with a potential attack using chemical or biological weapons. The consequences of advanced German weaponry such as the V1 and V2 rockets, (1944 and 1945) and the ability of the government to counter their threat
- provision of gas masks by Chamberlain's Government
- the impact of the Blitz not only in London but also in places such as Coventry and Clydebank
- the effectiveness of the Home Guard and the plans put in place to provide protection in the event of invasion by Axis forces
- Home Guard comprised men between the ages of 17 and 65. They acted as sentries, removed road signs and also checked that people were carrying their Identity Cards
- Anthony Eden established the Home Guard and changed its name to Local Defence Volunteers and by August 1940 had a membership of 1.5 million men
- the effectiveness of the Observer Corps and the Anti-aircraft defences
- the work done by General Ironside in creating significant coastal defences in support of the civilian population and supported the prevention of Operation Sealion (during early war)
- German bombers dropped a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs. To combat incendiaries, people were encouraged to volunteer as fire-watchers
- air raid wardens issued stirrup pumps and trained people how to use them
- almost 7,000 Civil Defence workers were killed during the war.

**Historians**

**Perspective on the issue**

**Angus Calder**

Critical of the lack of deep shelters, particularly in the East End of London.

**Stuart Hylton**

Is critical of the government for not adequately protecting the British public against bombing.

**Charles Loch Mowatt**

Argues that civil defence measures were generally effective.

**Andrew Roberts**

Maintains shelter provision was as effective as it could have been under the pressures of war.

### Question 80

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
<b>Author</b>	Sir William Beveridge.	Author of the Beveridge Report in 1942, 'Social Insurance and Allied Services' that provided the blueprint for social policy in post-war Britain. His vision was to battle against what he termed the Five Giants; Idleness, Ignorance, Disease, Squalor and Want. Beveridge stood at the 1945 General Election and lost a safe Liberal seat.
<b>Purpose</b>	Memoirs.	To demonstrate that the electorate wanted his recommendations to be implemented as soon as possible. Popular support for the Beveridge Report was an extremely important factor to the Labour Party's overwhelming victory at the 1945 General Election.
<b>Timing</b>	1953	Written eight years after the 1945 General Election but only a few years after some of his recommendations came to fruition for example, the NHS. Also able to look back on the reasons with reflection etc in the memoir.

Point in Source D		Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
During the Second World War society realised that we must go forward and not back, because the times between the wars were not good which the Labour Party manifesto recognised.		Argues that the interwar years were very difficult years, there was an acknowledgement during the Second World War that Britain must move forward and not regress after the war was over. This strong emphasis on moving forwards appealed to electors.
The Beveridge Report gave shape to the longing of many people for getting something quite different after the war and Attlee suggested that it was possible to do so.		Believes that the Beveridge Report gave hope for a much better future after the war and indicated that it was achievable, emphasising the powerful desire for this change in the words 'longing of many people'.
The voters acted on the advice which I gave in the first of my speeches at Manchester. They have shown that they wanted Churchill for war, but most emphatically did not want him, or any of his friends, for peace.		Contends that the electorate have shown that they wanted Churchill as a wartime leader but neither him or any other Conservative politician as the peacetime Prime Minister, using the words 'most emphatically'.

**Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:**

- the Beveridge Report, published in December 1942, sold a hugely impressive 635,000 copies
- Churchill said that decisions about the Beveridge Report must await the outcome of the election at the end of the war which was not what many voters wanted to hear
- Churchill rather disparagingly called Beveridge a ‘windbag and a dreamer’ the contrasting response of Labour and the Conservatives to the Beveridge Report of 1942
- Labour firmly tapped into the mood of the nation for a ‘New Jerusalem’, a better future for all post-war
- the Conservatives appeared reluctant to engage in a national discussion about future welfare reform
- the perceived success of large-scale government intervention in all aspects of daily life during the war led many to believe that such an approach to government should be tried in peacetime and that Labour was the only party advocating such an approach
- the Conservatives led by Churchill, took for granted a public gratitude for winning the war which they wrongly assumed would result in support at the polls.

**Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:**

- details of Labour War Cabinet Members-Clement Attlee Deputy Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison Home Secretary, Ernest Bevin Minister of Labour and National Service, Hugh Dalton Minister of Economic Warfare, Arthur Greenwood and Sir Stafford Cripps
- the popular view was that they had the experience to run the country after the war as they had gained a great deal of experience during the war of organising the Home Front
- Churchill broadcast a very negative speech about the Labour Party in the run-up to the 1945 election, his ill-judged ‘Gestapo Speech’. He expressed views that the public largely rejected and subsequently the Conservatives lost votes at the election
- however, the decline in electoral support due to this is hard to quantify but there is evidence to suggest that these ideas were abhorrent to the majority of the public who could scarcely believe that Churchill would round on his Coalition colleagues with such venom a few weeks after VE Day
- the Conservatives wrongly, focused too much on Churchill’s charismatic leadership
- the Conservative and Labour manifestos were very different in emphasis
- the Conservatives were associated with the discredited policy of appeasement and the poverty and unemployment of the 1930s, ‘the ghost of Neville Chamberlain.’ There is little doubt that the ‘never again’ mentality was well to the fore in 1945 and that fears of a return to mass unemployment and the hungry 30s persuaded many to vote Labour
- the Labour Party ran a coordinated election campaign
- Labour campaigned in favour of full employment, nationalisation of industry, social security and housing
- the Conservatives complained that the Labour Party’s election agents had been in place throughout the war whilst theirs had been serving in the forces. Hence the Conservatives were not well organised when an election was called
- the Labour Party was much more organised than the Conservatives, indeed some constituencies were not contested by the Conservatives and the prospective candidates effectively were handed a seat in parliament
- the General Election of 1945 was not a betrayal of the greatly revered Winston Churchill, rather it was a positive vote in favour of a dream – the New Jerusalem that so many wanted to build, and they trusted Labour to build it
- the collapse of the Liberal Party, they put up 306 candidates but only won 12 seats
- the importance of the armed forces votes which generally went to Labour
- the influence of organisations such as ABCA which were accused by the Conservatives of encouraging the members of the armed services to vote Labour
- the significance of the ten-year election gap. Prior to 1945 there had not been an election since 1935 due to war. Arguably if there had been an election in 1940 the Labour Party would have won many seats. The number of Labour MPs was ‘artificially low’
- the role of the media. Left-wing ideas and beliefs were increasingly promoted, for example, JB Priestley Postscript on the radio
- the Conservatives were blamed for the military defeats at the beginning of the war
- The Labour Party was associated much more with central planning than the Conservatives were.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
<b>Paul Addison</b>	The Tories were unlikely to win any general election after the evacuation of British forces from Dunkirk in June 1940.
<b>Steven Fielding</b>	Believes that the winner of the election would simply be the party who whole heartedly advocated the social change proposed in the Beveridge Report regardless of label and campaign style.
<b>Kevin Jefferys</b>	Contends that the responsibility for the ‘Home Front’ held by Labour members of the Coalition Government was a major vote winner for Labour in 1945.
<b>Henry Pelling</b>	Justifies the overwhelming support for Labour as a reaction to Conservative rule in the 1930s.

[END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]