National Qualifications 2024

2024 History

Advanced Higher

Question Paper Finalised Marking Instructions

These marking instructions have been prepared by examination teams for use by SQA appointed markers when marking external course assessments.

General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.

(a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.

(b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.

(c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.

(d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.

(e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.

(f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.

(g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are:
- relevant to the issue in the question
- developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
- used to respond to the demands of the question (for example, evaluate, analyse).

Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions
The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

Marking criteria grids
The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria:
- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given **in bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

25 mark question — mark ranges and individual marking criteria

Mark ranges								
Marking criteria	STRUCTURE	**0–9**	**10–12**	**13–14**	**15–17**	**18–19**	**20–22**	**23–25**
		No attempt to set out a structure for the essay.	An attempt to structure the essay, seen in at least one of the following:	The structure displays a basic organisation but this may be loose. This would refer to:	The structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This would include:	Clearly structured, perceptive, presentation of issues. This would be included in:	Well—defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question:	Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout:
		No relevant functional introduction.	• relevant functional introduction	• relevant functional introduction.	• relevant functional introduction with main interpretations.	• relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument.	• relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument.	• relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument.
		No separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	• separate sections which relate to relevant factors.
		No conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues.	• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue evaluating the key issues.	• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.	• conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	THOROUGHNESS/ RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No evidence of relevant knowledge of the issue.	Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge. Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue.	Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue. The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis.	Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue. The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis and evaluation.	Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge. Evidence is linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge. Evidence is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge. Evidence clearly supports linked to points of analysis or evaluation.

		Mark range						
		0–9	**10–12**	**13–14**	**15–17**	**18–19**	**20–22**	**23–25**
Marking criteria	**ANALYSIS/EVALUATION/ LINE OF ARGUMENT**	No evidence of analysis. **OR** Analysis is not relevant to the question.	There is much narrative and description rather than analysis or evaluation. There is a weak sense of argument.	There is an attempt to answer the evaluative aims of the question and analyse the issues involved. This is possibly not deep or sustained. Argument is generally clear and accurate but there may be confusions.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and the candidate tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis. Argument is clear and accurate and comes to a suitable — largely summative — conclusion.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues. Argument is clear and directed throughout the essay. The conclusions arise logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body and attempts synthesis.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues. Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues and arguments. Clarity in direction of argument linking to evaluation. The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.	Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues with a detailed and effective analysis and evaluation which advances the argument and considers various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones. The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	HISTORICAL SOURCES/INTERPRETATIONS	**0–9**	**10–12**	**13–14**	**15–17**	**18–19**	**20–22**	**23–25**
		No discernible reference to historical works.	General reference to historical works.	There is some awareness of historians' interpretations in relation to the issue. Historians may be used as illustrative points of knowledge.	There is an awareness of historians' interpretations and arguments. Historians may be used as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments. There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent. There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. There may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography. Shows consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.

Marking the source-handling questions

There are three standardised stems used in the source questions:
- 'How fully . . .' or 'How much . . .'
- 'Evaluate the usefulness . . .'
- Interpretation of two sources

'How fully . . .' question (12 marks)

Candidates must
- establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to add knowledge as exemplification of interpretation points to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source does not reveal about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Up to 3 marks
- interpretation of points from the source.

Up to 7 marks
- contextual development which develops points from the source with the candidate's own historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information such as omissions
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks
- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Candidates should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is. They can gain up to **3 marks** by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. Candidates cannot gain marks for simply quoting points from the source; they must paraphrase or interpret them to gain marks.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual development they give in their overall evaluation of the source's comprehensiveness. This should include the views of two relevant historians (**2 marks** are available for this). Where a candidate includes the views of additional historians, award marks for wider contextual development.

There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question, and therefore no marks awarded for this.

'Evaluate the usefulness . . .' question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- consider the provenance of the **entire** source in light of the topic being discussed. At all stages of the answer the provenance should underpin commentary which should include analysis and evaluation of the source
  - source rubric provenance — comment on authorship, purpose and timing of the source in light of the historical event or issue in the question
  - source content provenance — establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points which illustrate provenance, and analysing and evaluating them in light of the historical event or issue in the question
- contextualise those points with historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Award **a maximum of 6 marks** for provenance comments based on **3 marks** for the rubric and **3 marks** for source content interpretation.

3 marks

- source rubric provenance — comments on provenance regarding authorship, purpose and timing as seen in the rubric.

3 marks

- source content provenance — comments on provenance regarding the interpretation of the content of the source.

Up to 4 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the sources with the candidate's own knowledge
- wider contextual development, for example other relevant information which provides more information about the historical issue, and significant omissions in the source
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Interpretation of two-sources question (16 marks)

Candidates must

- establish the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue within each source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to assess what the sources reveal about different interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue
- comment on how the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue in the two sources relate to other possible interpretations with wider contextual development.

Award marks as follows

6 marks

- comments on interpretation (**3 marks** per source).

Up to 8 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the sources
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about interpretations of a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information about other interpretations of a historical issue which have been omitted
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Marking instructions for each question

Section 1 — Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 1

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that settlements were built to display status in a hierarchical society:

- the quotation is taken from **Richard Hingley**'s *Settlement and Sacrifice*. Hingley is typical of the contemporary view and stresses that although small-scale raiding would have occurred, and that settlements such as brochs would have provided shelter on such occasions, they were not designed to survive prolonged sieges and were primarily intended to display the status of their occupants
- examples of monumental architecture — hillforts, brochs, crannogs and the larger roundhouses — were constructed to display power and social status: these settlements dominated the landscape
- the existence of broch villages such as Gurness, where a central broch is surrounded by lesser roundhouses, looks very much like a laird's house with his workers around him. They were a display of wealth and power — pottery fragments from Gurness suggest the occupants enjoyed imports of wine and olives from the Mediterranean at a time before the Roman invasions
- **Raymond Lamb** observes that constructing a broch required 'an engineer's understanding of force and stress'. The similarity of broch design across northern and western Scotland suggests the existence of a class of skilled, itinerant broch-builders, working to commission on behalf of an aristocratic class which was keen to display its status
- massive amounts of manpower would have been required to construct hillforts such as Eildon Hill North and Traprain Law in the Borders. This suggests the existence of powerful chieftains who displayed their authority by commanding (or coercing) a substantial labour force. **Ian Armit** describes such hillforts as 'the permanent seats of the sword-wielding aristocracy'
- the location of some hillforts makes little sense in defensive terms — eg Castlelaw in the Pentland Hills and Chesters in East Lothian are both directly overlooked by higher hills, which would have left them vulnerable to missile attacks from above. It therefore seems more probable that they were built primarily to display power rather than intended for actual warfare
- the location of crannogs on water may have served to emphasise the high status of their occupants vis-à-vis those who dwelled on land — a 'them and us' mentality
- **Nicholas Dixon** points out that crannogs could often be seen from miles around and that the inhabitants were making 'no effort to hide', suggesting that displaying prestige was at least as important as defence.

Evidence which supports the view that settlements had other purposes:

Defence in a warlike society:

- Brochs have no windows, one narrow entrance, and thick, high stone walls; some have 'guard cells' and many have outer defences. **Ian Blythe** contends that they were built to be defended
- writing in 1935, **Vere Gordon Childe** described brochs as 'castles' which would have provided an 'impregnable refuge' against attackers. They are often located by the coast, which might suggest that they were built as a defence against seaborne threats (eg Roman slave raiders)
- the location of crannogs on water would have made them harder to attack. They were only accessible via wooden causeways, sometimes with drawbridges which could be raised if required
- multivallate hillforts had layers of ramparts and ditches. **C M Piggott**, writing in the 1940s, argued that the increasing sophistication of hillforts such as Hownam Rings near Jedburgh was a response to increasing warfare as waves of Celts invaded from Europe
- other defensive features included timber-laced ramparts, gatehouses and chevaux de frise, as seen at Dreva Craig in Peebleshire. Some hillforts are vitrified, where the ramparts have been deliberately and systematically burned. **Ian Armit** argues that this may represent 'a premeditated act of intense symbolic power as the seats of a warrior aristocracy were permanently and spectacularly razed'

- however, many contemporary historians such as **Armit** and **Hingley** are now keen to point out the defensive weaknesses of such settlements — eg Armit argues that massive hillforts such as Traprain Law and Eildon Hill North covered too great an area for them to be defended effectively. This might suggest that defence was not the primary reason for their construction.

The homes of settled and successful farmers:

- although Roman writers such as **Cassius Dio** claimed that the inhabitants of Northern Britain were nothing more than nomadic hunter-gatherers and pastoral farmers, settlement evidence proves that they were in fact settled and successful farmers. The size of brochs, crannogs, wheelhouses and larger roundhouses suggests that they were built to accommodate extended families
- crannogs freed up fertile land by loch-shores for farming while protecting livestock from predators and crops from rodents. The discovery of grains of spelt and a butterdish at Oakbank on Loch Tay confirm that its residents practised a mixture of pastoral and arable farming
- brochs contain intra-mural cells for storage. Some brochs have a ground floor which is only roughly surfaced, suggesting that animals may have been kept here while people lived on the floors above
- some smaller 'hillforts' may simply have been animal pens. Evidence of Iron Age field systems shows farmland was intensively managed and that there were 'thriving farming economies' (**Armit**)
- **Charles Thomas** argues that souterrains were used as storage cellars for surplus agricultural produce. **Alistair Moffat** suggests that chieftains may have taken crops as a form of taxation in kind — further suggesting the existence of settled and successful farmers
- discoveries of numerous artefacts associated with agriculture on settlement sites across Scotland — such as ards, quernstones, spindle whorls and loom weights — confirm that these places were the homes of farmers who practised a mixed agrarian economy.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ian Armit	Contends that 'These buildings were as much about prestige and status as the practicalities of warmth and shelter' while 'the defensive capabilities of such sites (ie hillforts) were often of secondary importance'.
Nicholas Dixon	Argues that crannogs were 'a statement of strength and authority' and a deterrent to would-be attackers.
Tim Clarkson	Suggests that settlements were built for a variety of reasons, but that 'the ubiquitous type of dwelling was the family homestead'.
Richard Hingley	Stresses that all settlements — whether they were substantial roundhouses which housed an extended family, or more extensive settlements which housed larger communities — were, above all else, homes.

Question 2

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Romans used military might to control the native peoples:

- Rome launched three major invasions of the north during the Flavian, Antonine and Severan periods; these can be traced through the remains of marching camps
- **Tacitus** claims that in c.84 AD, Agricola won a crushing victory at Mons Graupius, in which 10,000 native warriors were killed. While such figures are likely to be exaggerated, native losses during periods of active campaigning must have reduced the tribes' ability to resist Rome
- the Antonine reconquest also saw active fighting. The Bridgeness distance slab shows a Roman cavalryman riding down native warriors; one has a spear in his back and another has been decapitated. Clearly there is an element of propaganda in this carving, yet it reflects Rome's ruthlessness against its opponents
- some native sites appear to show signs of Roman military action. **Fraser Hunter** believes that siege earthworks and firing platforms for catapults suggest that the hillfort at Burnswark was taken by force. Similarly, brochs at Torwoodlee and Leckie may have been destroyed by the Roman army
- Septimius Severus is believed to have brought Rome's largest ever force to Scotland in the early 3rd century, including his own Praetorian Guard. **Simon Elliott** believes Severus' army might have numbered as many as 50,000 troops. **David Mattingly** argues that Severus used 'shock and awe' tactics in an attempt to cow the native tribes into submission
- according to **Cassius Dio**, Severus ordered a slaughter of the Maeatae after they rebelled against Roman rule. **Alistair Moffat** speaks of 'the annihilation of war bands and the society which sustained them'. These brutal tactics appear to have been successful in the long term: **Hanson and Maxwell** note that 'an undisturbed age of tranquillity' appears to have followed the Severan invasions. **James Fraser** argues that if Severus did not succeed in conquering Caledonia permanently, he certainly left it 'remarkably subdued'
- conquest was usually followed by military occupation. Networks of forts were built to control annexed territory. The construction of a legionary fortress on the Tay at Inchtuthil during the Flavian period suggests that a permanent occupation of northern Scotland was envisaged at this time — although this was abandoned before completion, and **Lawrence Keppie** notes that all Roman forts in Scotland were ultimately 'overgrown and forgotten'
- the Roman walls were also used as a form of military control since they 'separated Romans and barbarians' and were a major obstacle to incursions into the Empire. However, as **David Breeze** notes, the long occupation of Hadrian's Wall ultimately symbolises Rome's failure to complete a permanent conquest of the north.

Evidence which supports the view that Rome used other methods to control the north:

Bureaucratic/political/diplomatic methods:

- Rome's influence extended far beyond Hadrian's Wall and it used treaties to control tribes indirectly. It was apparently because the Maeatae broke such an agreement with Rome that Severus acted so ruthlessly against them. Caracalla made new treaties with the northern tribes before he left for Rome, and these seem to have kept the peace
- Rome used client kingdoms as 'buffer states' against more hostile tribes. Two examples may have been the Votadini and Maeatae. Few Roman forts were built in the Lothians and Fife, possibly by mutual agreement as these areas accepted Roman rule
- following conquest, the Roman army acted as a police force, maintaining the *pax Romana* by patrolling the frontier zone, administering Roman laws and collecting taxes
- **David Breeze and Brian Dobson** argue that the Roman walls were intended to channel movement, not prevent it altogether — hence the liberal provision of gateways in Hadrian's Wall
- the Roman walls acted as a potent symbol of Roman power. **James Crow** believes Hadrian's Wall may have been whitewashed to make it even more imposing and **Thorsten Opper** argues that it must have had a 'deep psychological impact' on the native tribes, discouraging active resistance
- there were some attempts at 'Romanisation' — the promotion of Roman values among native leaders in order to encourage cooperation. The ABCD stone from Traprain Law shows that some natives at least gained knowledge of the Latin alphabet, and some early Christian communities may have been established in southern Scotland during the Roman period.

Economic incentives:

- **Ian Armit** observes that *vici* outside some of the larger forts (eg Newstead, Inveresk and Carriden) acted as local centres for manufacture and trade. However, he notes that it is impossible to tell how actively opportunistic natives participated in the life of the *vici*, and that whenever the Roman army withdrew from Scotland, the *vici* were abandoned. This might suggest that relatively few locals benefited significantly through selling goods and/or services to the Romans
- Rome's presence may have stimulated native agriculture eg cattle-breeding — hides for leather were needed for tents, shoes and saddles. **Birgitta Hoffmann** observes that pollen evidence suggests an intensification of pastoral farming in Lowland Scotland during the Roman occupation
- the apparent expansion of souterrains in Lowland Scotland during the 1st and 2nd centuries AD might suggest that local farmers were encouraged to produce surpluses to trade with the Roman army
- access to prestige Roman goods such as Samian pottery, glass and jewellery conferred status on native elites and encouraged cooperation with Rome. Roman goods are found on high-status native sites eg brochs as far north as Midhowe on Orkney and Clickhimin on Shetland
- **Antony Kamm** observes that gold and silver were regularly used to negotiate truces. Over 30 Roman coin-hoards have been found in Scotland eg Birnie and Falkirk. These may represent 'diplomatic gifts' (**James Fraser**) — subsidies which were used to buy the support of native leaders
- pro-Roman tribes prospered through their connections with Rome. **Armit** notes that the 'rich array' of Roman goods at Traprain Law suggests the Votadini thrived throughout the Roman period.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Lawrence Keppie	Observes that the impact of Rome's campaigns must have been 'dramatic and devastating' for those who resisted its advance.
Colin Martin	Believes Severus committed genocide against the Maeatae by systematically laying waste to fertile farmland and starving them into submission.
David Breeze	Argues that the Roman walls were 'bureaucratic in concept, not military'. They were an essential element of frontier control rather primarily intended as a bulwark against hostile northern tribes.
James Fraser	Contends that the tribes of both southern and northern Scotland were 'snug in bed with the Roman elephant' throughout the Roman Iron Age, suggesting that more tribal leaders sought to benefit through cooperation with Rome than has often been assumed.

Question 3

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that geographical factors were the main obstacle:

- Northern Britain was on the edge of the known world, far from the papal see in Rome — the chief centre for Christianity in early medieval Europe
- Christianity originally came to Northern Britain as a by-product of Rome's presence; it had been afforded legal protection by Constantine in AD 313. The earliest recorded Christian community north of Hadrian's Wall had been established by the late 4th century at Whithorn. However, Rome's withdrawal in the early 5th century further isolated communities in Northern Britain from the influence of Roman missionaries
- travel by land was slow and arduous due to the lack of a functional network of roads — those roads which had been built by the Roman army were few and far between and were poorly maintained. This hampered the progress of missionaries such as Ninian, who travelled on foot
- **Cassius Dio**, writing in the early 3rd century, commented on the 'untold difficulties' Severus had faced traversing the forests, rivers and marshes of Northern Britain. This situation had not improved. The barren, mountainous spine of the Druim Alban was an especial obstacle to conversion
- even travel by water could be perilous for missionaries — monastic records reveal shipwrecks involving monks from the monastic community at Iona
- nonetheless, the sea connected the peoples of Northern Britain to other societies in the British Isles and continental Europe. **Ewan Campbell** notes that there was a thriving trading network between western Scotland and France: Dunadd has the largest quantity of continental pottery of any site in Britain, and Whithorn has the largest quantity of glass vessels. There is evidence that wine and other foodstuffs from the Mediterranean were consumed at high-status sites such as Dunadd. If physical items could be imported via sea-routes, so could new religious ideas.

Evidence which supports the view that there were other important obstacles:

Native polytheism:

- 'Celtic' pagan religion was polytheistic, worshipping a pantheon of gods. Christianity, as a monotheistic faith, was an alien concept to native peoples
- Celtic paganism was strongly rooted in the natural and supernatural worlds — trees, hills, water, the sun and various animals were all regarded as sacred (note totemic animals such as bulls, boars, eagles and stags on Pictish symbol stones). It had a well-established annual cycle of festivals, which were tied to the agricultural year and the concept of fertility. Christian concepts seemed remote to peoples who were reluctant to abandon their own beliefs and traditions
- there was active resistance to the work of missionaries. **Adomnan** relates the story of a spiritual battle between St Columba and the chief druid of Pictland (which Columba of course won); **Alfred Smyth** notes the open hostility Columba met with from pagan priests in Pictland
- **Bridget Paterson** notes that in times of unrest, natives might backslide into paganism and seek refuge in the old gods. St Patrick referred to the 'wicked and apostate Picts', suggesting that the southern Picts had accepted Christianity but subsequently reverted to their old beliefs
- however, a process of syncretism would have aided eventual acceptance of the new religion. Christian churches were built on sites of pagan worship (eg Aberlemno and Meigle); sacred caves became holy caves (eg St Ninian's Cave at Whithorn); sacred wells became holy wells (eg Maelrubha's well on Loch Maree). This conscious blending of the new faith with native pagan traditions would have aided the gradual acceptance of Christianity
- similarly, Celtic festivals could be repurposed as Christian Saints' Days — eg Samhain became Halloween and Beltane became May Day.

Native socio-political structures:

- Rome's piecemeal presence beyond Hadrian's Wall meant Christianity was slow to take root during the late Roman period — little evidence of Roman conversion beyond the frontier zone
- native societies were tribal and fragmented, lacking the formal administrative structures which would have enabled large-scale mass conversion
- settlement was rural and scattered; the Christian message only spread slowly between small and isolated communities. (Latin *paganus* originally meant 'country-dweller' and was a derogatory term; its change in usage to mean 'heathen' suggests that people in rural areas were slowest to abandon their old beliefs)
- the Picts, who had most strongly resisted Roman influence, were particularly slow to convert. The extended process of conversion in Pictland is reflected in the Pictish symbol stones: Class II stones combine both pagan and Christian iconography, suggesting a transitional period where the old ways continued to co-exist with the new
- conversion was usually a 'top-down' process and needed the support of kings to succeed. The church needed access to power, land and privileges which only a ruler could confer. Kings had to be convinced that it was in their interests to convert, and to promote Christianity among their subjects. Columba led a mission to convert King Bridei of the northern Picts and it was subsequently King Nechtan's decision that the Pictish church should conform with Roman practices. However, Christianity's wider acceptance by the lower echelons of society would have been a protracted process.

Linguistic barriers:

- the Picts, Scots, Britons and Angles all spoke different languages — eg Q-Celtic Gaelic was spoken in the far west whereas the Picts and Britons spoke distinct P-Celtic Britonnic languages. Linguistic barriers would have further slowed the process of conversion
- **Adomnan** records that St Columba, a Gael from Ireland, needed a translator to speak with Bridei, King of the Picts
- the language of the church was Latin. However, the Latin scriptures would have been unintelligible to the native population of Northern Britain, which was illiterate
- indeed, Bede complained of secular clergy who were themselves unable to read Latin and were therefore unable to explain the scriptures to the laity. A shortage of educated missionaries, who were able to read Latin and translate it for the common folk, is likely to have further slowed the process of conversion.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Sally Foster	Highlights the continuity between pagan and Christian sites, indicative of the enduring hold of native paganism and the slow, extended process of conversion.
Alfred Smyth	Highlights the slow, gradualist nature of the conversion — particularly among the Picts, who were most resistant to Roman influences.
A A M Duncan	Suggests that conversion was the work of many decades and that for laymen, it meant 'a more powerful magic than any that had gone before'. Long-established pagan beliefs were a major obstacle to conversion.
Alex Woolf	Argues that the nominal process of conversion might have been relatively quick but that actual 'Christianisation' — the sincere adoption of a Christian way of life — was a very slow process.

Question 4

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the lure of trade was the most significant attraction for the Viking interest in Northern Britain.

- **Claire Downham** observes that trading was a major motive. Possession of the Northern and Western Isles opened up Atlantic trade routes to England, Europe and even Constantinople
- furs, walrus ivory, ropes and amber were exported from Scandinavia. Iron, slaves, wine, preserved fish and other foodstuffs were also transported in large quantities via the 'sea roads'
- **Anna Ritchie** argues that early contacts between Scotland and Scandinavia may have been through peaceful trading links — hence the discovery of Pictish combs made from imported reindeer antler in Orkney
- silver was the favoured means of exchange — hence discoveries of Viking 'ring-money'. Weights and scales found in a Norse grave at Kiloran Bay also show the importance of trading
- steatite (soapstone) was quarried at Cunningsburgh in Shetland, possibly for export to other areas of Norse settlement. It was used to make bowls, lamps and other household items
- while no historian seriously doubts the horror inflicted by the raids of the 790s-830s AD, **Olwyn Owen** observes that since churches were heavily targeted, monastic chroniclers understandably gave the Vikings a 'uniformly hostile press'. Not all Scandinavians came to pillage Scotland
- **Owen** points out that the Vikings were 'opportunists' and 'pragmatists with clear priorities' — ie amassing personal wealth, through various means. The monastery at Whithorn was a centre of manufacture which attracted British, Irish, English and Viking merchants.

Evidence which supports the view that other motives brought the Vikings to Northern Britain:

Raiding:

- by the 8th century Scandinavian shipwrights had designed ships (eg Gokstad ship) with large sails and shallow keels which meant they could be rowed up rivers and run onto beaches. These were ideal for swift hit-and-run raids, as **Downham** notes
- the prevailing winds helped facilitate raiding — easterlies at the start of summer, carrying Viking raiders to Northern Britain, and westerlies in the autumn, taking them home to Scandinavia at the end of the raiding season
- Christian monasteries tended to be in coastal locations; they were isolated, undefended and vulnerable to attack. **Edward Cowan** suggests that raiders viewed them as 'drive-in banks' and **Tom Muir** agrees that they presented easy pickings. As the quotation from **Ritchie** suggests, they were also wealthy — silver communion plates, reliquaries, gospel-books studded with precious stones
- monasteries were hit hard in the early raids — eg Lindisfarne (AD 793), Iona, Eigg and Applecross. Irish annals record the 'devastation of all the islands of Britain by the gentiles' in AD 794
- Christian relics from Northern Britain are found as grave-goods in pagan Viking graves in the Northern Isles and Norway — eg the Westness wolf. Such items would never have been traded and must have been looted
- protection money could also be extorted from terrified natives, who would 'buy off' the raiders. Irish annals record 'tribute' being taken from Northern Britain
- the Vikings also came in search of slaves. Dublin was a thriving slave market and the Annals of Ulster record that 200 ships carried off native captives following the siege of Dumbarton Rock in AD 870.

Settling:

- push factors for leaving Norway — overpopulation, land shortages, system of equal inheritance, 'youth bulge'
- **Barbara Crawford** notes that Norse settlers were 'attracted by a physical environment very similar to that which they had left behind in south western Norway' — mountains, islands, fjord-like sea lochs. Scotland was a home from home
- the Northern and Western Isles were perfect for settlers who were farmers and fishermen and practised a mixed rural economy — good stone for building, fertile farmland and well stocked seas

- similar conditions to Norway only better for farming — milder climate, longer growing seasons and animals could be outwintered, so less hay was needed for winter feed
- grave goods and finds from domestic sites such as Jarlshof confirm that settlers came to fish and farm — eg sickles for harvesting crops, shears for shearing sheep, bone fishhooks and steatite weights for fishing nets and weaving looms.

Political ambitions:
- the growth of royal power in Norway under King Harald Finehair in the late 9th century encouraged ambitious Vikings to establish new territories in Northern Britain and elsewhere
- the Earls of MØre established the Earldom of Orkney in the Northern Isles in late 9th century. **Orkneyinga saga** claims the islands were gifted to them by King Harald but many contemporary historians, eg **Olwyn Owen**, believe it is more likely they seized it for themselves
- another powerful Viking, Ketil Flatnose, carved out his own Kingdom of the Isles in the Hebrides
- the Vikings made serious attempts to dominate all the native peoples of Scotland. The capture of Dumbarton Rock in AD 870 led to an enduring Scandinavian influence in the British kingdom of Strathclyde — evidenced by hogback tombs at Govan. This opened up the Forth-Clyde route to Viking ships to move between Dublin and York
- there were concerted efforts by Viking armies to conquer Pictland — eg the Kings of the Picts and the Scots both fell in battle against an army of 'gentiles' in AD 839. Viking armies continued to threaten to dominate Scotland until the reign of Constantine II (AD 900-943).

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Alfred Smyth	Suggests Christian monasteries were like shop windows, crammed with the loot of centuries. This was irresistible to pagan raiders who had no Christian scruples about attacking churches.
Anna Ritchie	Contends that in the long term, opportunities to trade and to fish and farm may have been more significant motives for the majority of arrivals from Norway. She argues that the settlement of the Northern Isles may not have been entirely violent.
A A M Duncan	Has a similar view to Ritchie, noting that 'first and foremost these settlers were farmers'.
Barbara Crawford	Describes the Vikings as a thalassocracy — a sea-borne pirate empire. Some powerful individuals were clearly motivated by a desire to conquer territory and carve out their own personal empires.

Question 5

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the emergence Alba was a largely peaceful process of assimilation between the Picts and Scots:

- although they sometimes fought one another, the Picts and Scots also had a long history of political cooperation — eg they joined forces to attack Roman Britain during the 'Barbarian Conspiracy' of AD 367
- there had been centuries of intermarriage between the ruling elites of Pictland and Dalriada. **Sally Foster** believes that Gartnait, a King of the Picts in the late 6th century, may have been a Gael. **Michael Lynch** views any political disagreements between the two peoples as 'the quarrels of an extended family'
- there had been joint kings of both peoples since the late 8th century. Historians debate which kingdom was the dominant force — **Marjorie Anderson** and **Alfred Smyth** believed Uurguist/Fergus (AD 781) was a Scot who also ruled over the Picts, whereas more recently **Dauvit Broun** and **Alex Woolf** have posited that he was a Pict who also ruled over the Scots
- either way, as **Anderson** notes, 'such dual kingship . . . may show that by the early ninth century integration between the peoples of west and east had already gone pretty far'
- **Smyth** believes that the essentially Celtic make-up of Northern Britain in the Dark Ages helps explain how a united medieval Kingdom of Scotland came to be formed. Both peoples spoke Celtic languages, and **Woolf** believes that the Gaelic and Pictish languages converged over a long period of time to form a single 'Albanian' language
- **David Allan** calls this a process of 'acculturation . . . the steady seepage of one group's culture into another's, gradually eroding existing differences and encouraging greater homeogeneity'
- the influence of the Christian Church probably played a key role in the gradual 'Gaelicisation' of Pictland. **Bede** noted that Iona exercised supervision over monasteries in Pictland as well as Dalriada, and **Smyth** agrees that 'Iona provided the parent culture for Pictish Christianity'
- **Neil Oliver** observes that Christianity 'acted as a glue, bringing together disparate peoples' and helping to forge ever-closer bonds between the Picts and Scots.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors led to the creation of Alba:

Role of Kenneth MacAlpin/conquest:

- the traditional story is that in c.843 AD Kenneth MacAlpin invaded Pictland with an army of Scots and conquered the Picts. However, many contemporary historians now argue that it is far too simplistic to claim that Alba was the product of a Scottish conquest of the Picts
- it is possible that Kenneth had a claim to both thrones. His father, Alpin macEochaid, was allegedly a King of Dalriada, while his mother may have been a Pictish princess
- the Prophecy of Berchán claimed that Kenneth was the first King of the Scots to rule in the east, while the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) claimed that the Scots 'utterly destroyed' the Picts
- however, **Dauvit Broun** notes the 'extreme weakness in the evidential basis' for a Scottish conquest of the Picts, while **Stephen Driscoll** observes that even the earliest medieval accounts were written some 150 years after Kenneth's supposed conquest of the Picts
- **Sally Foster** observes that the legend of 'MacAlpin's Treason' is likely to be fictitious
- contemporary historians such as **Foster** have observed that Kenneth's origins are obscure at best. **Alex Woolf** has recently argued that Ailpin and Ciniod are Pictish names which had been 'borrowed' into Gaelic, and that Kenneth may therefore have been a Pict
- many historians now believe that Kenneth was not the creator of Alba. His real achievement was to establish Scotland's first royal dynasty, which endured until 1034.

Role of the Picts:

- many contemporary historians now stress that there was in fact a great deal of continuity from Pictland into Alba. **Driscoll** observes that 'In some ways, the most interesting point is the degree to which Pictish institutions persisted, even as the Pictish language disappeared.'
- Kenneth and his immediate successors continued to be called *rex Pictorum* — Kings of the Picts
- Pictish titles such as *mormaer* (earl) and *toiseach* continued to be used in the later medieval Kingdom of Alba. This suggests a degree of political continuity
- **Foster** notes that the continuation of Pictish forms of land organisation suggests considerable continuity in the population as a whole
- **Driscoll** observes that the ancient Pictish site at Scone became the 'ceremonial centre' of Alba while St Andrews, the head church of Pictland, continued to be the chief centre for Christianity
- **Woolf** argues that although the Pictish kingdom was taken over by a Gaelic-speaking group, it retained its integrity — much as England remained England after the Norman Conquest.

Role of the Vikings as a catalyst:

- **Sally Foster** and **Anna Richie** both regard the arrival of the Vikings as the 'decisive factor' in the creation of Alba
- a devastating battle between the 'gentiles' (Vikings) and the 'men of Fortriu' (Picts) in AD 839 seems to have crucially weakened the Pictish kingdom and created a political and cultural vacuum (**Crawford and Clancy**). **Driscoll** observes that the destruction of the royal houses of both Pictland and Dalriada may have allowed 'political opportunists' such as Kenneth MacAlpin to rise to power
- at the same time, Viking attacks on Dalriada meant that by the mid-9th century, 'Argyll had been relegated to the status of a dangerous frontier region' (**Smyth**)
- **Crawford and Clancy** believe that the 'displacement of the Gaelic political structures' may have forced the Gaels east, into Pictish territory
- the two peoples may have been encouraged to come together to repel the Viking onslaught. **Neil Oliver** argues that the Picts and Scots were 'fused together in the fires of adversity'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ian Walker	Argues that the creation of Alba resulted not from a single cataclysmic event, but rather that it was the product of 'a slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time'.
Alex Woolf	Contends that the Picts and Scots 'shared far more than held them apart'. Their shared Christian faith, in particular, was a force for unity at a time when they both faced the 'onslaught of pagan warriors whose presumptions and prejudices were entirely alien'.
Stephen Driscoll	Claims that 'The Viking predations caused nothing less than a remaking of the political landscape' in Northern Britain.
Sally Foster	Observes that 'The Picts themselves had not disappeared, but their identity was subsumed under the new terminology of Alba — they had become Scots' in the modern sense of the word.

Section 1 — Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 6

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
But he held back his main strength, the legions, as a reserve, and in the event they were not needed. The Caledonians had a large number of war-chariots; Roman cavalry soon dispersed them.	Suggests that Agricola won a relatively easy victory at Mons Graupius, using only his auxiliary forces without having to risk the lives of Roman legionaries.
Agricola unleashed a reserve force of 2000 cavalry in flank and rear; victory was his. Tacitus gives Roman casualties at 360 and Caledonian losses at about 10,000.	Suggests that Agricola was a skilled general who won a crushing victory at Mons Graupius — the native forces were routed and slaughtered at little expense to the Roman army.
After the battle Agricola instructed his fleet to sail round the north coast of Scotland, from east to west, as though to emphasise the totality of the conquest.	Suggests that symbolically at least, Agricola completed the conquest of the entire island of Britain during his tenure as Governor.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the native forces were no match for the superior equipment, tactics and discipline of the Roman army, which was made up of professional and highly trained soldiers equipped with full body armour. The description of Agricola's tactics given here is plausible — it was standard practice for Roman generals to employ their auxiliary forces whilst holding the heavy infantry (legionaries) in reserve
- Tacitus certainly presents Mons Graupius as a crushing victory, claiming that 'An awful silence reigned on every hand; the hills were deserted' on the morning after the battle. However, it might be noted that if his figures are correct, 20,000 native warriors escaped to fight another day
- Tacitus claims that Agricola completed the conquest of the whole island of Britain, only to see his gains given up by the Emperor Domitian a few years later — 'all Britain was conquered and immediately let go'. Finds of 1st century Roman pottery on sites such as the broch of Gurness appear to confirm contact between Rome and chieftains as far north as Orkney during the Flavian period.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
Examples of Agricola's supposedly excellent generalship are surprisingly rare. Some episodes are distinctly unimpressive.	Agricola was not the exceptional military leader Tacitus made him out to be.
Having divided his army late in his sixth campaign to avoid encirclement, a sensible precaution, Agricola does not seem to have taken sufficient care to avoid the obvious counter measure, a lightning strike against the weakest point.	Agricola was not an able commander and lacked basic military understanding.
After a forced march through the night Agricola brought help just in time. Tacitus does his best to describe it as a triumph of Agricola's generalship, but it was a very close call and could have been disastrous.	Agricola's incompetent leadership nearly resulted in the loss of an entire legion.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Tacitus was Agricola's son-in-law and he explicitly wrote the *Agricola* 'to honour my father-in-law Agricola', confirming his own personal bias. Many contemporary historians point out that Tacitus was more concerned with writing a eulogy to Agricola than a factual history, and as a result he is likely to have exaggerated Agricola's abilities and achievements
- many contemporary writers are now questioning Tacitus' reliability as a source and are critical of those historians who have accepted Tacitus' account almost without question. **Woolliscroft** argues that 'it is dangerous to put too much faith in the *Agricola'*
- to date, archaeological research has not been able to identify where either the night attack on the IXth legion or the battle of Mons Graupius took place. **David Breeze** notes that Tacitus was 'extremely sparing with geographical details', which has been a source of frustration to modern scholars, and **D J Woolliscroft** contends that the battle of Mons Graupius may have been 'little more than a skirmish'.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Tacitus certainly wants us to believe that Agricola was the conqueror of the north. He claims Agricola advanced to the Tay and 'opened up new nations' in his 3rd season, and that he 'subdued nations hitherto unknown' in his 5th season, apparently in SW Scotland
- the fact that Agricola was awarded an honorary triumph and that a statue was erected in his honour upon his return to Rome — the highest military honours which could be granted to anyone other than the Emperor himself — suggests that his contemporaries valued his achievements as Governor of Britain and held him in high esteem
- the existence of Tacitus' *Agricola* — a uniquely detailed source for this period of Scottish history — has inevitably greatly influenced subsequent historical research, and many traditionalist historians continue to credit Agricola with the conquest of Northern Britain — eg **Breeze** describes Mons Graupius as the 'pinnacle' of Agricola's achievements while **R M Ogilvie** claimed that 'no other governor achieved so much in terms of military expansion, construction of roads and the Romanisation of Britain'
- however, some contemporary historians, basing their arguments largely on archaeological research, are now arguing that Agricola's achievements were exaggerated by Tacitus to add posthumous glory to his father-in-law's reputation
- some Roman accounts suggest Agricola might not have been the first Roman Governor to reach the north. The poet **Statius** describes the construction of 'watchtowers and strongholds' on the 'Caledonian plain' during the Governorship of Vettius Bolanus (AD 68–71) and **Pliny the Elder**'s *Natural History* seems to refer to campaigns in Caledonia in the early 70s

- **Breeze** notes that dendrochronological study of timbers from the Roman fort at Carlisle suggest that it was built AD 72, when Petillius Cerialis was Governor. It is therefore likely that exploratory expeditions ventured into Scotland in the early AD 70s, before Agricola's appointment as Governor
- other archaeological evidence also suggests that there was a Roman presence in Scotland earlier than Tacitus would have us believe. **David Shotter**'s study of coins from Roman forts north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus have revealed that many date to the late 60s and early AD 70s, suggesting that there may have been a Roman presence in northern Scotland under Cerialis (AD 71–74). **Birgitta Hoffmann**'s study of Roman glass at Newstead (Scottish Borders) suggests a late AD 60s occupation, ie during the reign of Nero. **Ian Caruana**'s analysis of pottery finds from northern forts suggests that they may have been occupied in the early AD 70s or even earlier
- **Woolliscroft**'s excavations of Gask Ridge forts/watchtowers (eg Greenloaning, Shielhill South, Huntingtower) show 2-3 phases of occupation and it is therefore likely that their construction predates Agricola. He argues that the physical evidence suggests that the Romans may have occupied parts of northern Scotland for around 15 years, from c. AD 72 to c. AD 87.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
David Breeze	Largely accepts Tacitus' account, whilst noting that Agricola was 'singularly fortunate in his choice of son-in-law'.
Birgitta Hoffmann	Argues that 'First and foremost the *Agricola* is a piece of Latin literature' and that archaeological evidence now strongly suggests that Agricola was not the conqueror of the north.
D J Woolliscroft	Argues that Agricola was a bureaucrat and administrator rather than a military man, who was likely to have been appointed after Northern Britain had already been subdued.
James Fraser	Presents a counter-revisionist view, arguing that archaeological research is also open to interpretation and that it is unwise to dismiss Tacitus' account of Agricola's campaigns as a work of fiction.

Question 7

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Bede was an English monk based at the monastery of Jarrow in Northumbria.	As an Angle, Bede's view of the Picts is coloured by his own prejudices and he cannot be viewed as a reliable source of information regarding Pictish origins and customs.
Purpose	Bede's primary focus was to record the conversion of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms to Christianity.	Bede only touches on the Picts in passing and when he does, his chief interest is in their acceptance of the Christian faith. His account of the Picts is full of myth and misconception.
Timing	AD 731 — first half of the 8th century.	Bede was a contemporary of the Picts and was writing during what has recently been called the Pictish 'Golden Age' (**Sally Foster**), at a time when Pictland was the dominant force in Northern British politics.

Point in Source C	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
At the present time there are in Britain, in harmony with the five books of the divine law, five languages and four nations — English, British, Irish, and Picts. Each of these have their own language.	Suggests that Bede views the Picts as a separate people in their own right, with their own language and culture and distinct from their neighbours, including the Britons and Irish.
Having no women with them, these Picts asked wives of the Irish, who agreed to this.	Suggests that the Picts integrated with the Irish through marriage.
As part of this arrangement when any dispute arose, they should choose a king from the female line rather than the male, this custom continues among the Picts to this day.	Suggests that the Picts practised a system of matrilineal succession ie that the kingship of Pictland passed through the female line rather than the male (although Bede does suggest that this only happened when the succession was in dispute).

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- at the time Bede was writing, Pictland had long been established as a distinct political entity within Northern Britain. That the Picts spoke a different language to the Scots/Irish is confirmed by **Adomnan**, who records that Columba needed a translator to speak with Bridei, the King of the Picts
- although there was often conflict between the Picts and the Scots/Gaels of Dál Riata, there were also political alliances, and intermarriage between the ruling elites of the two peoples would have been common. Intermarriage meant that candidates with Gaelic (and also British and Anglian) names were able to press claims to the throne of Pictland. **Sally Foster** suggests that as early as the late 6th century, a Pictish king called Gartnait may actually have been a Gael

- there is some evidence to support the idea of matrilineal succession — eg in the Pictish King-lists, no son inherits from his father. However, some historians contend that Bede's account that the Picts 'asked wives of the Irish' largely reflects propaganda fed to him by Irish clerics, who may have sought to strengthen Scottish claims to the throne of Pictland.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the name *'Picti'* was used by the Romans to describe the tribes north of the Forth-Clyde line who resisted Roman rule. It means 'painted people' and may refer to the fact that the northern Britons continued to tattoo their bodies when tribes further south had abandoned the custom
- traditionalist historians such as **Charles Thomas** and **Isabel Henderson** have argued that two languages may have been spoken in Pictland — a newer Celtic language which was spoken by an incoming Celtic aristocracy and an older, pre-Celtic non-Indo-European language which was spoken by the subject population. However, most contemporary academics now agree that the Picts spoke a P-Celtic language, closely related to that spoken by their southern neighbours, the Britons
- modern academics strongly argue that the Picts were native to Scotland rather than immigrants from 'Scythia', as Bede claimed. **Alfred Smyth** notes the continuity of settlement designs from the Iron Age into the Pictish period eg timber-laced forts, while Pictish 'cellular' houses are a natural development from earlier roundhouses
- **Smyth** contends that the Picts may have used an 'oscillating system' of succession, whereby the kingship alternated between a number of eligible royal kindreds. This might reflect the tribal origins of Pictish society and would resemble the system of tanistry practised in Ireland. It would avoid the succession of minors and ensure that the strongest candidate would take the throne
- the Pictish elite, at least, had converted to Christianity by the 8th century. This was apparently an extended process — note the transition from Class I symbol stones (pagan symbols only) through Class II stones (Christian crosses with pagan symbols) to Class III stones (no pagan symbols)
- the fact that symbol stones show warriors (eg Birsay stone, Orkney), battles (eg Aberlemno 2) and hunting scenes (eg Hilton of Cadboll) reflects that Pictland was dominated by a warrior aristocracy. This is confirmed by finds of prestige metalwork eg sword pommels and scabbard chapes from St Ninian's Isle on Shetland and Pictish silver chains such as that from Whitecleugh
- finely carved symbol stones and ornate metal artefacts confirms that Pictish society was sufficiently economically developed to support skilled craftsmen eg stonemasons, metalworkers
- most Picts would, like their Iron Age ancestors, have been peasant farmers, and agriculture was the mainstay of Pictish society. The abundance of symbol stones as well as the existence of *Pit* — placenames suggests that the 'Pictish heartlands' lay in eastern Scotland, from Fife and Perthshire north to Aberdeenshire and Moray — the most fertile farmlands in northern Scotland.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Frederick Wainwright	Edited a seminal study of the Picts in 1955 entitled 'The Problem of the Picts'. However, the idea that the Picts are somehow problematic and markedly more 'barbaric' than the other peoples living in Northern Britain in the post-Roman period is now widely dismissed.
Alfred Smyth	Contends that Northern Britain was essentially a Celtic land in the early medieval period, and that there were many cultural similarities between the Picts and their Celtic relations, the Britons and the Scots/Irish.
Sally Foster	Asserts that the Picts were indigenous to Scotland, the descendants of the Iron Age tribes living north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus which were first identified on Ptolemy's map dating from the mid-2nd century.
Leslie Alcock	Argues that the Picts were a typical northwest European barbarian society, with wide connections and parallels.

Question 8

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
The traditional story of the origins of the Scots relates that Fergus Mor mac Eirc, an Antrim prince, established his new kingdom in Argyll itself, Knapdale, Kintyre and Cowal.	The kingdom of Dál Riata was supposedly established by Fergus Mor ('the Great'), who crossed the Irish Sea and settled in the far west of Scotland.
The people of the Scottish kingdom of Dál Riata had very close relations with their nearest neighbours across the water, both politically and culturally — the similarity of the languages spoken on either side of the Irish Sea indicates that this was so.	Linguistic evidence suggests that there were close cultural and political links between the west of Scotland and the north of Ireland.
At a basic level, the prehistoric communities of the western seaboard remained intact, even if their leaders came from new Irish stock.	Although they may possibly have had new Irish rulers, the Scots were essentially descended from the indigenous peoples who had lived in the far west of Scotland for many generations — they were native to Scotland.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- later medieval sources, eg the Irish **Annals of Tigernach** and the Scottish **Senchus fer nAlban** (Genealogy of the Men of Britain) claim that the Kings of Dál Riata were descended from Fergus Mor, an incomer from Ireland
- the Goidelic/Gaelic language was spoken both in Ireland and Argyll, but not elsewhere in Northern Britain — suggesting close cultural connections between Ireland and the far west of Scotland
- the archaeology of Argyll does not show any significant changes in c.AD 500, which suggests that there was no large-scale settlement of Irish immigrants in western Scotland at that time.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- **Bede** gave an alternative story for the Scots' Irish origins. He claimed that they 'came from Ireland under their leader Reuda, and won lands from the Picts. . . they are still called Dalreudini after this leader.'
- the Scots clearly spoke a different language from their neighbours. The majority of placenames in Argyll are of Gaelic origin, whereas many P-Celtic Brythonic/Britonnic placenames survive in the former Kingdom of Strathclyde
- **Ptolemy**'s map records a people called the Epidii living in Argyll in the 2nd century; the name is P-Celtic and means the 'horse people'. The apparent disappearance of the Epidii from Argyll, and the lack of P-Celtic placenames in the area, has traditionally been cited as evidence of an invasion by Gaelic-speakers from Ireland. However, it is possible that Ptolemy's map simply recorded the P-Celtic from of a Q-Celtic name, and that Gaelic was always spoken in Argyll
- there are some archaeological similarities between Ireland and the west of Scotland. Crannogs are found in both areas; Argyll's duns have some similarities with Irish raths (ring forts); workshops for making penannular brooches have been found at Dunadd in Argyll and Dooey and Donegal in Ireland. This might suggest migration from Ireland to the west of Scotland
- numerous contemporary historians have challenged the traditional view. **David Dumville** has pointed out that neither Bede's Ecclesiastical History nor the Annals of Tigernach are contemporary with the events they purport to describe, and argues that they cannot be considered as reliable primary sources. Similarly, the Fergus Mor legends in the Senchus fer nAlban (Genealogy of the Men of Britain) may have been added when the king-lists were rewritten in the late 10th century, perhaps to bolster Scottish claims to territory in Ireland

- **Ewan Campbell** believes that Goidelic/Gaelic (the older, 'Irish' form of Celtic) continued to be spoken in the west of Scotland as a form of 'language conservatism' at a time when the other peoples of Northern Britain had adopted newer P-Celtic ('British') languages. A mere 20 miles or so of water connected Argyll with northern Ireland whereas it is cut off from the rest of Scotland by the mountains of the Druim Alban ('Spine of Britain'). This isolation would explain why the Scots continued to speak a more archaic language than their neighbours, the Picts and Britons
- the archaeological evidence of Irish migration is superficial at best. Scottish crannogs seem to predate Irish examples. Argyll's duns are built of stone whereas many Irish raths had earthen banks, and duns were being built in Argyll as early as c.AD 500 — a full millennium before Fergus Mor's supposed invasion. Most brooches found in Argyll have rectangular terminals with bevelled edges, whereas brooches from Ireland tend to have zoomorphic terminals (animal heads). Over 40 examples of spiral-ringed dress pins have been found in Ireland; only one is known from Argyll. Hundreds of ogham pillars exist in Ireland; there are only two examples in Argyll. Arguably, the evidence might suggest migration from western Scotland to Ireland rather than in the opposite direction.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Alfred Smyth	Takes a traditional view and suggests that Irish migration to western Scotland may even have begun earlier than the legends suggest, in the 3rd century AD.
Leslie Alcock	Highlights the lack of archaeological evidence for Irish settlement of Argyll, observing that if they came from Ireland, the Scots 'came without luggage'.
Ewan Campbell	Dismisses the legends of the Scots' Irish origins as dynastic propaganda. He argues that 'At best, the evidence shows a shared cultural region from the Iron Age.'
Sally Foster	Agrees that while there were close connections between Ireland and Argyll, the Scots of Dál Riata were indigenous to Scotland.

Section 2 — Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 9

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that John was unable to provide the strong leadership the Scottish kingdom needed:

- John gave homage and fealty to Edward I multiple times across the initial months of his reign
- John allowed Edward to alter the Scottish seal to reflect English overlordship
- Edward billed the Scottish king an inheritance tax to pay for the Great Cause
- John struggled to get homage from the Bruce family — he failed to get this from the elder 2 Bruces, and took 18 months to get homage from Robert Bruce (grandson)
- John did not dispense justice as king. Instead he relied upon his Comyn family members to travel Scotland dispensing justice on his behalf
- John's control over areas of his kingdom, such as the Western Isles, remained weak
- John could not prevent multiple cases of legal appeals being taken to Edward I, undermining his authority as king of Scots
- Scottish nobles petitioned Edward I on John's behalf over the Burgess of Berwick appeal
- John cancelled the Treaty of Birgham-Northampton at Edward I's request
- John initially agreed to military service for Edward against the French
- when summoned to attend English parliaments over the legal appeals, John attended
- when challenged by Edward I over his actions at the English parliament in 1293 and threatened with contempt and the confiscation of 3 castles, John capitulated
- John allowed Edward to appoint an official to manage the earldom of Fife during the legal appeal for MacDuff
- the Scottish nobility felt John needed significant support or replacement with the Council of Twelve
- the Auld Alliance negotiated with the French did not provide adequate guarantees of specific help for the Scots from their French allies
- John did not help defend his kingdom from English invasion in 1296, instead leaving the defence of the south-east to his nobles
- John failed to adequately prepare his kingdom's defences in advance of the English invasion in 1296
- John capitulated to Edward at Kincardine.

Evidence which supports the view that John was able to provide the strong leadership the Scottish kingdom needed:

- John held 7 parliaments in under 4 years to govern his kingdom
- John was able to force Robert Bruce (grandson) to give homage
- John used existing sheriffdoms and created 3 new ones to expand and enforce royal authority, especially in the West
- John rewarded his supporters, as Scottish kings traditionally did, such as the earls of Buchan and Ross
- John was able to bring trusted friends from England to help him rule, like Thomas of Hunsingore
- John signed the Auld Alliance with France, gaining an ally against the English
- John initially tried to stand up to Edward I over the legal appeals, asking to use a proxy and to consult with the wise counsel from his kingdom over Edward's demands
- John revoked his homage to Edward I and sought papal support for his actions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Penman	Argues that if John was a puppet king, he was a puppet of the Comyns who clearly ran most of his everyday government.
David Santiuste	Suggests that John's main problem was Edward, who seized every opportunity to assert his rights in Scotland.
Fiona Watson	Argues that John was not to blame for not standing up to Edward sooner as it was clear nothing short of war could have stopped the English king.
Steve Boardman	Contends that John tried to assert his own power as Scottish king and to govern effectively, but was faced with one of the most powerful kings in Western Europe in Edward I.

Question 10

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the loss of foreign support was vital to the Scots capitulation:

- Wallace is believed to have spoken with the Norwegians, before going to the French king and then the Papacy looking for aid
- Bisset argued convincingly at the Papal Curia about Scottish independence
- Pope Boniface VIII sent a Scimus Fili to Edward I condemning English invasions and demanding they cease in favour of negotiations with the Scots in June 1299
- the Papacy helped get the exiled Scottish king out of England and into France
- initially under papal jurisdiction, John Balliol was then released to the King of France, and able to live on his French estates
- the French used their Auld Alliance with Scotland to delay Anglo-French peace negotiations, increasing pressure on Edward I
- in 1302 the French lost to the Flemish at the Battle of Courtrai and were forced to make peace with England, abandoning the Scots
- in 1302 the Pope switched support to Edward against the French king, which led to the Pope turning on the Scottish bishops — blaming them for the ongoing Anglo-Scottish conflict
- Papal money (tax) was vital to Edward being able to raise an army and keep it in Scotland over winter 1303-1304, sustaining pressure on the Scots.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more important in the Scots capitulation:

Problems within Scotland:

- although the Scottish Guardianship was maintained, it saw considerable infighting and changing personnel, weakening their leadership of the resistance
- Robert Bruce and John Comyn came to blows at Peebles
- Bishop Lamberton was unable to keep the peace between Bruce and Comyn, leading to Bruce resigning from the Guardianship
- although John Balliol himself appointed a single guardian to run Scotland from 1302 — the neutral John de Soules — this did little to settle the Scottish administration
- John de Soules needed John Comyn as depute warden in Scotland
- John de Soules soon left Scotland on embassy, leaving John Comyn in charge once again
- Scots were often preoccupied with defending their own territory in Scotland, rather than creating a coordinated, sustained effort against the English
- Scottish guerrilla tactics could irritate the English, but not mount sustained pressure on the English in Scotland
- the failure of John Balliol to return to Scotland after being released to his family lands in France was a blow to the Scots resistance fighting in his name
- a growing number of significant Scots switched sides to support the English, including the MacDonalds, Campbells and the earl of Lennox
- Robert Bruce switched to support the English from 1302, having been guardian until 1300
- war-weariness was a significant problem for the Scots by 1304.

English pressure:

- although Edward I had faced significant military problems in terms of calling together an army or keeping his men in the field, by 1301 he was able to bring his son to Scotland, so they could split their army and mount multiple attacks
- Edward I made his son Prince of Wales — this meant he could utilise money raised in Wales to help pay for his Scottish campaigns
- Edward resolved problems in England over the issue of the Royal Forest, helping him gain money and support for further campaigns in the north
- Edward changed tactics, moving into northern Scotland to attack the Comyn heartlands, rather than attacking lowland Scotland

- in 1303, Edward was finally able to keep his army in the field and in Scotland across winter. This prevented the Scots from reversing his gains as soon as he had returned to England, significantly increasing pressure on the Scots
- by 1304, there were only a few pockets of Scottish resistance remaining, the war was effectively over
- Edward offered a more reasonable settlement for the Scots in 1304 than he had previously, making capitulation seem more reasonable
- Edward was able to pressurise the Scots into capturing and surrendering William Wallace to the English as a rebel and traitor.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
David Santiuste	Contends that the changes in the wider diplomatic situation had greatly simplified matters by 1302.
Ranald Nicholson	Suggests that Edward played on the fears of those who wavered, offering lenient terms if they submitted by February 1304.
GWS Barrow	Argues that the massacre of the French at Courtrai did more to make Scotland an English province than any other single event at the time.
Marc Morris	Argues that after 1304, Scotland had been invaded and laid waste so often that a settlement had to be found.

Question 11

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the death of Edward I was vital for Robert's success:

- Edward I was an incredibly experienced military leader and determined to retain control over Scotland
- Edward I employed capable men in Scotland to tackle Robert, such as Aymer de Valance.
- Valance was able to inflict significant losses on Robert during the initial months of his rebellion — with devastating attacks at Methven and Dalry
- Valance and the English forces were able to capture key members of the new royal family, including Robert's wife, sister and daughter, and execute the king's brother Neil
- early losses to the English forces forced Robert into exile. Returning in 1307 cost him two more brothers — Thomas and Alexander — who died in Galloway
- Edward II changed the Scottish leaders after his father died, employing John of Brittany over Valance despite being a weaker military leader
- the other candidates for the Scottish throne — particularly John Comyn — seem to have been biding their time until Edward died before challenging the Ordinance settlement of 1305
- Edward II inherited significant problems in England and huge debts, which made fighting the Scots much harder
- Edward II failed to campaign in Scotland after his father's death, leaving his allies dangerously isolated and lacking in even basic military or financial support
- Edward II did not return to Scotland until 1310, giving Robert plenty of time to deal with his Scottish opponents before having to face the English as well.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more important in Robert's success:

Robert's leadership, he:

- adapted guerrilla tactics and utilised the landscape to ensure victory eg at Glen Trool, Loudon Hill etc
- used the landscape to funnel his opponents and limit their often superior numbers
- razed castles to deny his opponents the chance to regain key holdings in Scotland
- attacked his opponents one at a time to ensure success
- was harsh when necessary — eg the herschips of Buchan, Galloway and Argyll
- was prepared to reward those who came into his peace at any point across the civil war, such as the Earl of Ross
- had key support, eg from the church, who preached that supporting Robert was a Christian duty akin to crusade
- gained absolution and support from the Bishops of Glasgow and St Andrews, who also fought with/for him against the English
- had loyal lieutenants such as Randolph, Douglas and his brother Edward Bruce who could all lead campaigns on Robert's behalf, utilising his tactics, widening his successes
- could leave Edward and James Douglas to campaign in the south-west while he went north
- was offered support, particularly soldiers, from the Bishop of Moray if he came north
- could entrust Edward to come north and lead the men while Robert was ill across 1307–1308
- had considerable support in the West Highlands and Islands, especially from the Campbells, Macruridhs and MacDonalds
- was able to use the forfeited titles and estates of his enemies to reward supporters, binding men and families to his success for their fortunes.

Weakness of his opponents:

- the death of John Comyn in 1306 deprived the Comyn family of their leader. Often, family members sparred for control rather than focussing on Robert
- the Comyns failed to act in a united manner at Inverurie to capitalise on Robert's illness
- geographically, the MacDougall's, earl of Ross and earl of Buchan were too remote from each other to work together
- Edward II of England did not provide any assistance for his supporters in Scotland
- the new English King even allowed his supporters in Scotland to make truces with Robert.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Colm McNamee	Argues that the death of Edward I heightened Robert's chances immeasurably.
Fiona Watson	Argues that the timing of Robert's rebellion was awful, reducing his support going in to the civil war.
Alexander Grant	Suggests that Robert's tactic of dividing his enemies meant that although outnumbered, Robert never faced more than a fraction of his enemies at any one time.
Michael Penman	Suggests that the death of Edward I was a watershed as Edward II did not have the inclination or leadership skills to reconquer Scotland.

Question 12

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the stubbornness of Edward II was the vital obstacle:

- Robert could not force Edward II to relinquish claims to overlordship having failed to capture the English king at the Battle of Bannockburn
- the Scots were able to raid the north of England very successfully, but the English king simply abandoned his people there
- Edward II was stubborn and unwilling to bend on the Scottish problem. He refused to acknowledge English loss of control in the country, or recognise Robert as King of Scots
- Edward II was humiliated by the loss at Bannockburn and being pushed out of Scotland, but this made him less willing to give up the lasting claim to control over Scotland
- for the Scots, Bannockburn proved that there was no chance of English control being resurrected in Scotland
- the loss of Edinburgh and Roxburgh Castles were a physical blow to Edward II, reducing him to tears
- Robert was strong enough to ignore Papal Bulls demanding an end to the Anglo-Scottish war and a truce in 1318 and instead re-took Berwick
- truces in 1316 and 1319 provided both sides with time to regroup before resuming hostilities
- the 13-year truce in 1323 prevented the Scots from taking further advantage of their superiority over Edward II while enabling the English king to retain his claim to overlordship over the Scots.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more important:

- Robert was much stronger as a leader after victory at Bannockburn, while Edward II was weakened by his failure
- several key supporters of English rule in Scotland, such as Gordon, changed to support Robert after Bannockburn, highlighting the scale of Edward II's losses in the kingdom
- Robert was able to strengthen his kingship by ransoms and loot from Bannockburn, including regaining his queen, daughter and other royal figures from English captivity
- Robert had been very successful at pushing the English out of Scotland, taking and razing castles across the country to prevent the enemy from re-taking them
- Robert regained all English-held territory subduing Lothian and regaining key locations including Edinburgh and Stirling and by 1318 had regained Berwick
- Robert was forced to alienate those who continued to oppose his rule after Bannockburn. This created a pressure group — the Disinherited — in England who pressurised the English king to continue to oppose Robert as King of Scots and Scottish independence
- Robert's loyal lieutenants led the annual raids into England, leaving the Scottish king to rule his country or join his brother campaigning in Ireland
- the Scots could raid deep into England, going as far south as York, but could not seriously threaten the English king who was safe in London
- people in the north of England felt abandoned by their king and looked to the Scots for protection
- the Scots were able to gain vital supplies — money, food, jewels etc. from their raids into northern England which helped to pay for the ongoing military campaigns, reducing the burden on the Scottish people
- the Scots attack in Ireland was largely ineffectual at pressurising the English despite attacking the 'breadbasket' of England
- the Scots campaigns in Ireland ultimately weakened the Scottish king as it resulted in the death of his sole surviving brother, leaving the kingdom without an heir
- English attacks into Scotland were unsuccessful, as a result of a policy of scorched earth. Being unable to engage the Scots in battle, the English were forced to withdraw, demoralised
- Robert was able to make local deals with English magnates, such as the earl of Carlisle (Harclay), recognising Scottish independence with Robert as king.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Fiona Watson	Argues that the failure to capture Edward II at Bannockburn meant that Scots could not gain an admission of their independence from the English.
Colm McNamee	Considers that while Robert hoped the English raids would force Edward II to concede, his hope was ill-founded.
Michael Brown	Contends that the terms of the 1323 truce were quite favourable to the English king, despite his losses.
Michael Penman	Argues that the length of the Bishopthorpe truce showed that despite their military dominance and Edward II's weaknesses, the Scots had little to show at the bargaining table.

Question 13

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Disinherited posed the greatest challenge to Scottish security after 1329:

- the Disinherited had been created in 1314 from those who refused to accept Robert as king of Scots. They lost all land and power in Scotland. They went into exile
- significant members of the Disinherited included David Strathbogie (who had a claim to Atholl and Badenoch) and the Mowbrays, the Umfravilles, the Ferrars and Henry Beaumont
- the 1328 Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton failed to deal with the ongoing issue of the Disinherited, but a secured Bruce dynasty with King Robert's son, David, ensured that they were not likely to regain their lands without intervention
- the Disinherited formed a significant group outside Scotland who were determined to oust David Bruce in favour of Edward Balliol to ensure a resumption of their former positions
- many of the Disinherited were willing to accept English overlordship over Scotland to regain their lands and power in Scotland which the Bruces had removed
- in 1332 they began preparations to invade Scotland to regain what had been lost
- after Edward Balliol was crowned king of Scots, he held a parliament at Perth in October 1333 where he reinstated the Disinherited to their former lands.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more important as a threat to Scottish security after 1329:

- the Guardians, established by the late King Robert I to govern for his infant son David, died within a few years of the late king, leaving a power vacuum in Scottish politics
- the next Guardian for David Bruce was an ex-Balliol supporter, Donald earl of Mar. He was followed by Andrew Murray, Archibald Douglas and Robert Stewart as Guardians
- the Scots were divided over the future after King Robert I died. Many changed sides depending on who was most successful, such as the Earls of Fife and Strathearn who switched to support Edward Balliol after the Bruce defeat at Dupplin Moor
- Edward III viewed the 1328 peace treaty as a humiliation which he refused to support, boycotting the marriage of his sister to David Bruce
- Edward Balliol returned to England in 1331 to gather support for an invasion of Scotland to gain his inheritance
- Edward Balliol won at Dupplin Moor and was crowned King of Scots on 24 September 1332
- Edward Balliol offered Edward III homage for the kingdom of Scotland in November 1332 in return for military aid to ensure he could retain control over Scotland
- in March 1333, Edward III launched military attacks into Scotland and in May the English King joined Edward Balliol in Scotland
- after defeat to the English at Halidon Hill (1333), David Bruce and his wife, Joan, were sent to France for safety.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Prestwich	Argues that Edward Balliol provided a rallying-point for the Disinherited after the 1328 treaty.
Colm McNamee	Suggests that the 1328 treaty was dubbed the 'shameful peace' in England and the young king was determined to avoid honouring the agreement.
AAM Barrell	Argues that the 1328 treaty contained the seeds of its own destruction and that the English king Edward III wanted to assume direct lordship in Scotland in the manner of his grandfather, Edward I.
Michael Penman	Contends that members of the Disinherited, including Beaumont and Strathbogie, travelled to visit Balliol in Picardy to persuade him to fight for his Scottish inheritance.

Section 2 — Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 14

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Scottish Guardians and the English King.	Written by clerics on behalf of both sets of rulers. They would have been educated and eyewitnesses to the negotiations, recording the final decisions.
Purpose	To secure the future of the Scottish kingdom after the planned marriage between Margaret, Maid of Norway and Prince Edward Caernarvon of England.	Legal record of the agreement reached between the two kingdoms in negotiations over the future of the Scottish kingdom once the two monarchies were united in marriage.
Timing	July 1290	Just over 4 years after the death of the late Scottish king, the Maid was still in Norway. This fell within the 1-year deadline issued to the Norwegian king to send his daughter to England as part of the Treaty of Salisbury (1289).

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to the source content provenance*
that the rights, laws, liberties and customs of the kingdom of Scotland in all matters and in all ways shall be preserved for all time throughout the whole of that kingdom and its borders.	Suggests that the existing situation regarding the legal status of the kingdom of Scotland was to remain guaranteed after the marriage.
if no children are born to Edward (Caernarvon) and Margaret (Maid of Norway), or to either of them and that it so happens that the kingdom of Scotland ought rightfully to revert to the nearest heirs, it shall revert and be restored to them wholly, freely, absolutely, and independently.	Suggests that should the marriage produce no children, the two countries would separate back to their own royal lines of succession, distinct from each other again.
the kingdom of Scotland shall remain separate and divided from the kingdom of England by its rightful boundaries and borders as has been observed up to now . . .	Suggests that the Anglo-Scottish border and the Scottish territory would remain as established at the death of King Alexander III in 1286.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Guardians were aware of the danger of closer ties to Edward I of England, as witnessed by his interactions with the Welsh, and looked to get guarantees of Scottish independence in legally binding documents
- the Scots knew that Edward I had already seized the Isle of Man from them in 1290, so wanted to secure their territory from further losses
- the Guardians had negotiated two treaties with the English and Norwegians to secure their Queen and organise their succession.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Treaty of Salisbury (1290) had secured guarantees that the Maid would be sent to Scotland, be educated in England, but free of all marriage contracts not agreed by all parties
- the Guardians managed to deal successfully with Robert Bruce's attempts to seize the throne in 1286 and 1290
- the Guardians maintained royal government, collecting taxes, defending territory, maintaining the law
- the Guardians successfully dealt with serious problems, including the murder of the Earl of Fife and the abduction of English widow Eleanor de Ferrers.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Brown	Contends that the cracks in the Guardianship were showing by 1289 as they lacked the stature of a king to do more than simply maintain the routine of royal administration.
Wendy Stevenson	Argues that the Treaty of Birgham was remarkable for its day, the first of its kind, and reflected a deep mistrust of Edward I from the Scots.
Fiona Watson	Suggests that while the Scottish nobility were not united, they managed to maintain control over the situation in Scotland.
Michael Prestwich	Considers that while Edward did not press claims for overlordship in 1290, he showed no respect for Scottish independence and was willing to intervene in the affairs of another realm.

Question 15

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
In the south, Wallace became the focal point of resistance after his murder of Heselrig, whether motivated by patriotism or passion, drew the disaffected to him.	Suggests that Wallace became leader of a gang of outlaws after murdering the English sheriff of Lanark.
Wallace was at Scone, 80 miles north, where he almost captured William Ormsby, Edward's justiciar.	Suggests that Wallace almost managed to capture the English justiciar of Scotia at Scone.
He then swept the English out of Perthshire and Fife, and by August had laid siege to Dundee.	Suggests that Wallace was successful at clearing large areas of English rule, including Perthshire, Fife and Dundee.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- Wallace joined with others for most of his military successes, including linking with MacDuff for the siege of Dundee
- Wallace worked with Sir William Douglas, Lord of Douglas, when trying to attack Ormsby at Scone
- Wallace was likely part of a gang who attacked Heselrig at Lanark, a gang which was probably led by Richard of Lundie.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:
- Wallace and Murray joined together their armies to fight the English, led by Warenne and Cressingham at Stirling
- Wallace and Murray became joint Guardians after their victory at Stirling Bridge, although Murray was mortally wounded and would be dead by November
- Wallace had to be knighted by the Scottish political community to become Guardian
- Wallace ruled in the name of King John and fought to clear remaining pockets of English control out of Scotland
- Wallace defied Comyn control to have William Lamberton confirmed as the Bishop of St Andrews
- Wallace sought to restore the Scottish economy, writing to Lubeck and Hamburg to restore economic trading links with Europe
- Wallace led the Scottish army to defeat at Falkirk in 1298 against an English army led by King Edward I himself.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ranald Nicholson	Argues that victory at Stirling Bridge gave the army precedence over the community and that Murray had precedence over Wallace. It was the death of Murray that left Wallace supreme in Scotland.
Edward Cowan	Contends that the seeds of Wallace's downfall lay in his background as a man of humble beginnings had no business leading armies and directing government policies.
GWS Barrow	Suggests that the three main achievements of Wallace's regime were the invasion of Northumbria, filling the St Andrews see and the revival of the idea of the guardianship.
Michael Prestwich	Argues that although Wallace had shown a great capacity for leadership, he had not conducted his campaigns according to the chivalric code of the day.

Question 16

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
When Soules was captured in the Borders he allegedly had 360 squires (fighters) in his retinue (followers), no mean force.	Suggests that the Soules uprising in 1320 was a serious threat to King Robert, as Soules had gathered a significant force with which to try and topple the king.
revolt can be traced back to the Scone Parliament in December, 1318. Robert was particularly vulnerable at that point because the recent death of his brother Edward in Ireland left the kingdom without an adult heir.	Suggests that King Robert's weakness dated to the death of his sole surviving brother, after which he did not have an adult male heir to succeed him.
The recognition at Scone in 1318 was an agreement that the son of the marriage between Marjorie Bruce and her husband, Walter the Steward, Robert the king's grandson, amounted to an oath of loyalty sworn to the king, thus alienating those who were still hopeful of a successful Balliol claim.	Suggests that many Scots were alienated by King Robert's repeated attempts to force oaths of loyalty upon the nobility in 1318 and 1320.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- several signatories of the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) proclaiming to support King Robert were involved in the Soules Conspiracy against the king only months later
- King Robert attempted to make his succession secure by establishing a Guardian and a back-up Guardian for his grandson if he had to rule through a minority
- the Declaration of Arbroath was an attempt to proclaim widespread support for Robert as the king who had saved Scotland, supposedly created and issued by the people — lay and ecclesiastical.

Point in Source D	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
Robert I rewarded his noble supporters with extensive lands and titles, he was not thereby neglecting his duty to the monarchy or reluctantly doing what was unavoidable, he was playing to one of the monarchy's established strengths.	Suggests that King Robert was securing rather than weakening his kingship by granting extensive lands and titles to his supporters, binding men's loyalty and futures to him and his successful rule.
the war effort of the kings of Scots seems to have demanded relatively little in the way of money or administrative organisation.	Suggests that King Robert continued a similar government to Alexander III, largely avoiding huge demands in taxation or central government control over society, as countries like England did.
The Scottish sense of national identity was sharpened, not so much through interaction between a demanding government and those it taxed, as by the response of a small, conservative society led by King Robert to the sustained threat to Scotland presented by an external enemy — Edward II.	Suggests that King Robert was able to create a sense of Scottish identity through unity against an enemy rather than a demanding monarch.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- King Robert tried to secure his kingship by exiling those who refused to acknowledge his authority as king, creating the Disinherited in 1315
- King Robert rewarded those who came into his peace, no matter when or how long they had fought against him
- his loyal lieutenants benefitted most, such as Thomas Randolph who became Earl of Moray and whose earldom had the status of a 'regality' — a petty kingdom, with unique powers normally reserved for the king or his law officers.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- in 1309 King Robert issued the Declaration of the Clergy — his first attempt to explain his usurpation of the Balliol throne as saving Scotland
- long-term opponents were rewarded, such as Adam Gordon, who had held out for the English king until Bannockburn. He received substantial lands in the north-east of Scotland
- King Robert redefined Scottish identity, especially by demanding an end to cross-border landholding, forcing families, including his own, to decide which country they owed loyalty to
- King Robert secured his kingship by improving his kingdom, for example replacing Berwick as the key trading port with Europe with Aberdeen and keeping vital trading routes open
- King Robert held 19 parliaments and councils to ensure royal authority was resurrected. He secured the position of the church and established new laws, including dealing with murder and rape
- King Robert's position remained tenuous — as evidenced by his need to pass a law preventing rumours against the king at his 1318 parliament
- King Robert ensured Scotland was militarily prepared to defend his kingship, prescribing equipment, insisting on annual inspections (wapinschaws) and clarifying the service required from landholders in 1315
- King Robert's first tailzie by-passed primogeniture (to his daughter) for nearness of degree to ensure his adult bother, Edward Bruce, would succeed to the throne upon the king's death.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Colm McNamee	Argues that 1320 offered a glimpse of the strength of opposition to king Robert and a sense of the potential for instability which existed in the realm of the hero-king.
Caroline Bingham	Suggests that the relative ease with which the Soules threat was quashed shows that it was not a significant threat to the regime.
Fiona Watson	Argues that King Robert was a usurper who suffered from an acute awareness of his own lack of legitimacy as king throughout his reign.
Michael Penman	Suggests that King Robert's kingship was never secure, and that he went to extraordinary lengths to try and secure loyalty.

Section 3 — Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 17

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the actions of the Earl of Mar were responsible for causing the 1715 rising:

The actions of the Earl of Mar:
- a career politician and former secretary of state, Mar was sufficiently politically connected and influential to proclaim a rising from his seat of power at Braemar
- a key Jacobite plotter during the summer of 1715, Mar personally corresponded with James Francis Stuart encouraging him to commit to a rising, by landing with a 'regular army' either in Northumberland or the North East of Scotland
- July, 1715 — his clandestine preparations for a potential rising continued, including the stockpiling of arms and ammunition
- from Invercauld castle Mar personally corresponded to Jacobite leaders inviting them to a tinchal (great hunt). A huge gathering of Jacobite aristocrats followed during which Mar agreed to rise with eleven senior Jacobite leaders at Aboyne, before he formally declared the rising on the 6 September
- determination to press his own vassals into service as confirmed by Mar's infamous letter to his baillie, Jock Forbes, in which he declared his intention to burn out reluctant tenants
- 6 September, 1715 Mar raised the standard at Braemar in front of the massed clans.

The Treaty of Union:
- deeply unpopular in Scotland in the years immediately preceding 1715, partly as a result of the apparent failure of economic provisions. Fear of a heavier tax burden upon vulnerable core industries, such as linen, coal and wool
- early British legislation was received negatively — 1712 Scottish Toleration Act antagonised the Kirk. 1713 malt tax increase impacted a key Scottish industry
- political impact — Scots politicians lost power and prestige — limited number of seats available at the new British Parliament at Westminster
- Mar's proclamation specifically stated that the reinstatement of the Stuarts would end the Union.

Religious factors:
- enduring strength of the Episcopalian church, particularly in the north east of Scotland, and the associated non-jurors adherence to the Divine Right of Kings which extended to ordaining the Stuarts to the head of the Church in Scotland
- over 75% of manpower mobilised for the Jacobites were Episcopalians (Andrew Mackillop) — as were many of the most militarily significant Jacobite clans, such as the Camerons of Locheil
- although it's importance was exaggerated by Whig and Hanoverian propaganda, Catholic loyalty to the Stuart cause generated some support including the MacDonalds of Keppoch.

Dynastic/Feudal Loyalty to the House of Stuart:
- the House of Stuart attracted particularly strong loyalty amongst Highland clans, which were remote from government authority and relatively easily mobilised
- some clan chiefs were prepared to rise in 1715 for reasons of local rivalry in opposition to the Hanoverian clans such as the Campbells and House of Sutherland
- others were more opportunistic, hoping to choose the winning side. Initially, the Jacobites looked like they would prevail
- the chief's authority was beyond question — his clan would follow his loyalty and would be forced to fight alongside him.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Argues Mar's role was central — 'Mar was able to muster around 10,000 foot and horse, the strongest ever Jacobite host to take to the field' but also emphasises the importance of both the Episcopalian and Catholic faiths.
Stuart Reid	Rebuffs the importance of dynastic 'loyalty to the Stuarts as the rightful lawful kings of Britain did not figure highly if indeed it figured at all as a significant factor in bringing men out'.
Andrew Mackillop	Emphasises the importance of the Treaty of Union — 'The Union. . . was a layer of grievance that helped focus and animate Jacobite opposition. It also prompted new areas of disaffection.'
Arthur Herman	Widens the causation of the rising beyond the impact of the Treaty of Union to a general antipathy towards England — 'Therefore, it is safe to say that negative attitudes to England won the Jacobites a fair amount of support, and in turn were a cause of the 1715 rebellion'.

Question 18

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Scotland was an industrialised nation by 1815:

- key developments during proto-industrialisation. For example, transport improvement (turnpike, estuary/harbour improvements and canals) and the application of new technology to established industry — water power and mechanisation
- emergence of key industries of textiles, coal and iron are associated with self-sustained economic growth. Expansion fuelled by growing domestic demand, access to English markets via the Treaty of Union and the strategic needs of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars
- textiles was particularly important — employed an estimated 257 000 by 1800 — represented 90% of all manufacturing employees (Sir John Sinclair). Linen, cotton and wool achieved enormous increases in output, and combined, the textile industries drove other industrial developments, in particular the chemical industry
- coal production expanded to exceed an estimated 2 million tons by 1800, achieving an output level significantly higher than the British average
- export success of key industries — linen particularly successful, by 1700 total exports to England exceeded 1.8million ells. Success of the tobacco industry stimulated demand for linen and other manufactures in the colonial markets as return cargo
- multiplier effect, stimulation of ancillary industries including glass making, brewing and milling by increased demand of key industries
- establishment of key manufacturing companies — for example Carron Ironworks, Rothesay cotton mill and New Lanark
- social impact of industrialisation — urbanisation occurred at a faster rate in Scotland than any other European country between 1750-1850. This was partly due to Highland migration to the central belt as a result of new manufacturing opportunities
- rising standards of living for some sections of society — the emergence of a new largely urban middle class and a much larger industrial work force
- evolution of school and university curriculum which increasingly included practical subjects compatible with and beneficial to commerce and industry including science and engineering.

Evidence which may not support the view that Scotland was an industrialised nation by 1815:

- continued pre-eminence of agriculture. Throughout the 18th century Scotland remained an overwhelmingly rural country in which agriculture remained the largest employer
- the same commercial forces which led to the expansion of industry also led to significant developments and an overall expansion of the increasingly monetarised agricultural sector
- Scottish agriculture became characterised by cash rents, the capitalist farming class and important regional specialisations — arable in eastern Lowlands, cattle in Galloway and the Highlands
- relative backwardness of industrial development in comparison with England
- continued dominance of landed society. Political power and wealth remained largely in the hands of aristocratic landed gentry
- most industrial development remained relatively small scale, for example the many linen mills located by the Clyde, and were essentially adjuncts to landowner's agricultural interests
- Edinburgh's growth was largely fuelled partly by a highly specialised service sector, rather than specifically industrialisation.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Argues that after 1760 Scotland's economy witnessed rapid industrialisation 'this traditional pattern. . . abruptly came to an end in the 1760s — there truly was an industrial revolution.'
Michael Lynch	Argues the expansion of emerging industries across most urbanised areas in the central belt within the manufacturing sector, including the printing industry — 'By the end of the eighteenth century almost every sizeable town in the lowlands had a printing press, and a newspaper as well.'
TC Smout	Maintains that industrialisation, characterised as 'take-off' took hold in the 1780's and was largely driven by the textile sector, as it was mainly 'associated in Scotland with the advent of the cotton textile industry.'
Bruce Lenman	Suggests that industrial development had begun at least as early as 1750. 'The period from 1750 saw a steady acceleration of industrial growth. . . the Board of trustees for Fisheries and Manufacture used it's funds to encourage technological progress. Scotland had an advanced banking system — this undoubtedly facilitated industrialisation.'

Question 19

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the rise of Scottish political radicalism was due to the impact of the French Revolution:

The French Revolution 1789–1793:
- geographic proximity and long history of close trade and cultural relations between France and Scotland
- the French Revolution proclaimed a new age of Enlightenment across Europe, demonstrating that 'other' classes could participate in government, and the possibility of constitutions made by men, not God. These values aligned closely to the principles associated with the Scottish Enlightenment
- the events of the French Revolution directly inspired acts of protest including planting of Liberty Trees, the symbol of the French Revolution, on Scottish market crosses which emboldened the emerging Scottish middle class and working class to demand reform
- the establishment of the Friends of the People (1792) — they held three major conventions, deliberately emulating the French National Assembly
- BUT February 1793, French declare war on Britain — lessened influence as 'unpatriotic' — Friends of the People and associated organisations, including the United Scotsmen, suppressed by the government as a result.

Evidence which supports the view that the rise of Scottish political radicalism was not primarily due to the impact of the French Revolution:

Long term decline of the moral economy:
- rise of industrial capitalism during early stages of agrarian change stressed established societal structures by replacing paternalistic, localised economies
- adversarial and impersonal relationships between the owners of the means of production and their workers created further tension and discontent.

Influence of the American War of Independence:
- established the principle of overthrowing monarchy and corrupt government — influenced the spread of democratic ideas championed by the Scottish Martyrs.

Impact of popular publications:
- Scotland's population was one of the most literate in Europe at a time when political pamphlets, broadsheets and newspaper circulation was increasing in terms of number of publications and circulation
- Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* — achieved significant sales in Scotland: May 1772 — proclamation against 'seditious' reading boosted sales further. Championed ideals of both American and French Revolutions while criticising unrepresentative government — revolutionary rather than reformist.

Underrepresentation and corruption of the political system:
- post Union British parliament left Scotland acutely underrepresented in terms of MPs and Peers. Scottish franchise was restricted to approximately 4000 of a population of 1.5 million in 1800. Elections were endemically corrupt, controlled ultimately by Dundas's use of patronage
- annual rejection of Sheridan's motion for burgh reform
- emergence of reform (not radical) movements in this context — from 1782 onwards national gatherings of freeholders in Edinburgh, ZENO's letters arguing for burghal reform and establishment of a committee of burghal reform in Edinburgh by leading advocates (1783).

Food Prices:
- rising price of basic staples from the early 1770's onwards — by 1792 corn prices reached a ten-year high
- government blamed due to the imposition of the 1771 Corn Law which prohibited grain imports until a trigger price was reached.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Emphasises that the British defeat following the American War of Independence created disillusionment towards government.
TC Smout	Argues that Scots became 'inflammable' due to the French Revolution.
Bruce Lenman	Emphasises the close links between Scotland, the American colonists and their revolutionary war, citing attempts by the tobacco merchants to achieve conciliation in 1775.
Michael Fry	Confirms the acute underrepresentation of the Scottish electoral system — noting the emergence of 'pocket counties' controlled by the dominant Scottish magnates.

Question 20

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the liberalisation of the Kirk was due to the rise of the Moderate Party:

- the Moderate Party used effective management to control the General Assembly for significant periods during the eighteenth century. In particular, the inspired leadership of Principal William Robertson allowed the Moderates to completely dominate between 1762–1780
- a succession of Moderate clerics held positions of considerable authority, both within the Kirk and as significant figures within Scottish society including William Robertson (Moderator of the General Assembly and Principal of Edinburgh University), George Baird (Moderator of the General Assembly), Thomas Reid (philosopher) and Adam Ferguson (Historian)
- the Moderate Party successfully asserted discipline in church government as the General Assembly overruled unwilling presbyteries using riding commissions to ensure the appointment of Moderate ministers. For example, in 1752 the Assembly censured the Presbytery of Dunfermline for refusing to appoint a Moderate appointee, deposing the minister in post
- the General Assembly dispensed harsh sentences to overly puritanical ministers, such as the twelve devout 'Marrow Men' who were publicly rebuked and admonished
- the Moderate Party's successful resistance to Erastianism gained it further support within the General Assembly
- the rise of the Moderate Party coincided with the emergence and increasingly influential philosophy associated with the Enlightenment with which it espoused clear links
- the Patronage Act 1712 encouraged the advancement of more moderate ministers, as it was unlikely to be in the interests of the landowner to appoint dedicated puritans. Rather, successful candidates tended to be moderates likely to share the landowner's wider beliefs and aims
- the General Assembly supported landowner's use of the Patronage Act which furthered the Moderate objective of an unfanatical ministry.

Factionalism of Dissenting Presbyterianism:

- the 1740 secession created four dissenting churches, initially guided by Erskine's devotion to
- the doctrinal values of the Covenanters
- the Old Licht Burghers, New Licht Burghers, Old Licht Anti-Burghers and New Licht Anti-Burghers remained disunited throughout the eighteenth century, though their congregations remained a significant minority
- thus the 1740 secession left those Evangelicals unwilling to secede from the Kirk without leadership within the established church. They remained too disunited to challenge the Moderate Party until the late 1780s
- non-Presbyterian churches, such as the Glasites and the followers of Robert Haldane failed to organise themselves into meaningful alternatives and ultimately lost what support they had.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Tom Devine	Confirms the importance of the Moderate Party's leadership and use of discipline within the governance of the Kirk in causing the liberalisation of the church.
TC Smout	Suggests that the liberalisation of the Kirk was linked to the state's refusal to bolster church discipline with civil penalties. 'The chances of the puritans making a deep and lasting impression on society was lessened by the fact that excommunication was not now accompanied by civil penalties.'
John Mackie	Contends that the impact of the Enlightenment was key to the liberalisation of the Kirk — 'churchmen and laymen, alike influenced by the dawn of 'reason', began to doubt whether restrictions upon life imposed in the name of piety were justified.'
Colin Kidd	Argues that the rise of Moderatism preceded the 18th century — 'before the formation of the Moderate Party proper, there had been expressions of moderation within the church.'

Question 21

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Enlightenment was primarily a practical movement:

- numerous examples of theoretical principles being practically applied in diverse fields such as medicine, science, agriculture and engineering. For example, the practical application of neo-classical architecture by Adam and Playfair to create Edinburgh's New Town
- wide dissemination of theoretical ideas by the press, pamphlets and books enabled the practical adoption of innovation across agriculture and industry
- the practical adoption of Scottish scientist's research (James Watt and Joseph Black) — for example improvements in the steam engine which was directly applied to industry, led to efficiencies and ultimately economic growth
- establishment of organisations which aimed to apply theory to practice — for example the Honourable Society of Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture in Scotland and the Gordon Mills Farming Club focused on practical farming improvement. The Political Economy Club attempted to stimulate cooperation between academics and merchants, whilst the Philosophical Society aimed to combine knowledge with the advancement of science
- the agricultural revolution was influenced by 'rational improvement', the belief of human intervention in the natural world through the practical innovation of enclosure and new crops. Lord Kames was notable amongst many Improvers who combined intellectual enquiry with agrarian improvement, in his case publicising both theory and practice in *The Gentlemen Farmer*
- the practical application of Enlightenment theory also improved rural architecture through model villages such as John Cockburn's Ormiston
- key figures, such as Adam Smith, 'practical moralists' who based their theories on practical experience — in Smith's case the *Wealth of Nations* was based on the commercial activity he observed in Scotland
- influence of intellectual enquiry associated with the Enlightenment in changing the curriculums taught by both schools and universities which were increasingly focused on social sciences and science teaching.

Evidence which supports the view that the Enlightenment was not primarily a practical movement:

- the Enlightenment was closely associated to theoretical academia, being dominated by a small number of intellectuals, 'literati', many of whom were employed by Universities
- key areas of advance, such as Hutcheson and Hume's pioneering philosophy and it's focus on moral considerations, are associated with theoretical academia and intellectualism, most famously depicted in Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*
- many of the most prominent figures, such as Hume, were men who were largely engaged in theoretical work using empirical thought to study reason. Academic fields such as astronomy, mathematics and philosophy were studied with the aim of exploring the human intellect for that purpose alone in the closed society of Edinburgh's private clubs
- many of the Enlightenment's 'great men' were financed by aristocrats who were willing to fund intellectual enquiry as part of private tutor's remit — Adam Smith resigned his chair at the University of Glasgow to tutor the Duke of Buccleuch. Artists (Raeburn and Ramsay) and poets (Burns) benefitted from the patronage of the landed elite.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
TC Smout	Argues that the Enlightenment had a close relationship with the elite landed classes of Scotland, who acted as key patrons rather than featuring as the actual great minds. 'It was surely one of the necessary preconditions for the cultural golden age that the landed classes should be its friendly patrons, even if they could not be its finest participants.' These great minds, he goes on to describe as being 'in the great majority' from the professional middle classes.
Tom Devine	'The Scottish Enlightenment was much more than a period of unparalleled creativity by a small number of 'great men'. . . Nor was reason confined to the lecture theatre or the scholarly textbook. It affected all aspects of human behaviour.'
Michael Lynch	Whilst accepting the growth of improving societies, he argues that the number of individual landowners who actually implemented new practises was limited. 'Only a few improving landlords, such as the well-known cases of Sir Archibald Grant of Monymusk and John Cockburn of Ormiston, practised what so many preached, and usually with little profitable result.'
Alexander Broadie	Argues that the terminology used by the great minds of the European Enlightenment of the 18th century was self-congratulatory — the thinkers believed it was they rather than the wider population who had become enlightened.

Section 3 — Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 22

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source AND for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Lord George Murray Lieutenant-General of the Jacobite forces.	Lord George Murray was one of Charles's most senior officers. His military prowess was demonstrated at Prestonpans, on the retreat from Derby and at Falkirk. A committed Jacobite, he took part in the risings of 1715 and 1719, for which he was pardoned by the Hanoverian government in 1726.
Purpose	A combatant's personal memoirs. The description is direct and literal.	In common with many other primary sources detailing the events of the 1745, 'Marches of the Highland Army' sought to justify the author's actions, whilst apportioning blame to others.
Timing	Around 1750.	Murray's memoirs taken from his experiences during the eight months of the rising and was finally written as a letter to a Jacobite friend after the collapse of the rising, as recriminations began in the context of Charles's request that his father, James, imprison Murray in spite of Murray's continual pledges of loyalty.

Point in Source A	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
Yet it was now spring, time to plant crops, and therefore many in our army deserted, returning to their homes. It was not an easy matter to keep them together.	Suggests that the consequences of the Jacobite army's financial difficulties which resulted in their inability to pay wages to their soldiers. Exacerbated by the need to seed crops, this led to desertion, weakening the army.
. . . we assembled in a line of battle, on a moor near Culloden. I did not like the open ground and said so — it was certainly not best for our Highlanders' charge to be effective.	Suggests the disadvantages of choosing to fight on Culloden moor in terms of the Highland army's preferred style of fighting, specifically their Highland charge.
Unfortunately, those who had the responsibility of providing provisions for the army were so unaccountably negligent, that there was nothing to give the near starved men, and they were given very little food that day.	Suggests those officers tasked to quartermaster the army failed to do so, and as a result the Jacobite soldiers were given almost no food and were on the brink of starvation.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- desertion beset the Jacobite army throughout the campaign. Specifically, Murray's reference is within a context of economic collapse, which contributed to military capitulation, as retreat into the Highlands ensured the Jacobites were no longer able to finance the campaign by taxing richer Lowland counties and towns
- Drumossie Moor exposed the Jacobite army to the advantages the Hanoverian army had in terms of artillery and musket fire, whilst diluting the effectiveness of the Highland charge over rough, boggy ground
- O'Sullivan, Quartermaster-General responsible for arranging the food and provisions for the Jacobite army, and Lord George Murray detested one another. Murray's comments reflect a dysfunctional relationship which was to divide the Jacobite high command and hamper its effectiveness.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Lord George Murray has been widely viewed as the most competent member of the Jacobite council of war. He vehemently disagreed with the decision to fight at Culloden and resigned his commission the following day
- Charles's leadership has been equally widely criticised; specifically his inability to unite his senior officers, arguably he exacerbated divisions due to his favouring of 'the Irish'. His personal qualities were ill-suited to leadership — for example his belief in the invincibility of his Highland army following victory at Prestonpans
- Charles' assurances of French support has also been linked to the failure of the 1745 rising as has the lack of French support
- the effectiveness of the Hanoverian response after Cumberland returned from Europe deploying superior weapons, logistics and manpower was a key factor including the role of the Royal Navy's patrols in maintaining control of the seas, and therefore preventing assistance arriving from France.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Stuart Reid	Emphasises the impact of the unsuccessful night raid prior to Culloden. 'Unfortunately, on the morning of the 16th of April hundreds of stragglers were still missing after the previous night's abortive attempt to surprise the Duke of Cumberland's camp at Nairn.'
Christopher Duffy	Contends that the impact of both the Hanoverian artillery and cavalry at Culloden were critical — 'their artillery exacted a remorseless toll on the Highland Army, and the cavalry worked around the flanks.'
Michael Fry	Blames defeat at Culloden on poor tactics and the scattered Jacobite force, he estimates only 60% of Charles's total force took the field. However, he also argues the outcome of the battle was not final confirmation of the end of the rising, but rather Charles' final order which instructed his army to disperse.
John Roberts	Determines that the command and positioning of the Jacobite army was pivotal in the final outcome of the battle — 'only as the Jacobite right wing advanced did it become clear just how bad its position was. . . the Highlander's charge was hopeless. The impact of the Jacobite attack was shattered.'

Question 23

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
He opted for a scorched earth policy, and as a result, numerous settlements throughout Glenelg, Kintail, Lochaber and Morvern were burnt and laid waste.	Suggests that the Duke of Cumberland chose to completely destroy indigenous settlements across a large area of the Highlands.
Cattle, the main source of wealth held by the clans, were confiscated on a massive scale which inevitably led to impoverishment.	Suggests that as a punishment the clan's cattle were taken from them and as a result they became poorer.
The state committed to military control by extending Wade's road system and the construction of Fort George, east of Inverness, which was the most formidable fortress in Europe, all of which was a physical demonstration of the Hanoverian government's determination that the clans would never rise again.	Suggests that the Hanoverian government installed significant infrastructure to ensure clans could no longer rise.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- May 1746 — the Duke of Cumberland established his headquarters in Fort Augustus from where he conducted a military campaign against the most committed Jacobite areas. His stated objective was to punish the indigenous population
- cattle was the most valuable asset owned by clans in the north west. Confiscation denied clans their only real source of relative wealth, and specifically their means to buy grain
- Fort George and the extension of military roads completed a vast infrastructure which ensured military control of the Highlands.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
As the Annexing Act of 1752 made clear, the promotion of the Protestant religion was an integral part of a wide–ranging programme, which was achieved by the provision of financial assistance to the Scottish Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge.	Suggests that government legislation financed the SSPCK to advance Protestantism.
. . . improvements included the stimulation of 'good government and industry' which resulted in the building of prisons at Stonehaven and Inverness and subsidising the manufacture of linen and salt panning at Brora.	Suggests that some of the physical legacies achieved by the Annexing Board, including new prisons and financial assistance benefitted Highland industry.
An absentee landlord which failed to delegate to agents on the spot, the Board lost touch both with it estates and reality. By the time it was dissolved in 1784 it had essentially left little permanent mark on the Highland economy.	Suggests that ultimately the Annexing Board failed in its objective of stimulating the Highland economy.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the SSPCK determined to 'extirpate the Irish language'. By definition it was hostile towards Gaelic language and culture. It established 116 schools by 1755, and 149 by 1792, though the majority were in the southern Highlands, Moray and Easter Ross
- funds collected by the Board of Annexed Estates were used to improve and construct settlements in the Highlands such as Beauly
- the standards of improvements to the Highlands estates varied significantly. Lord Kames, an advocate and agricultural improver, said large amounts of money spent on the Highlands and annexed estates was 'no better than water spilt on the ground'.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

Government action can be divided into short term as follows:

- atrocities — numerous descriptions of alleged executions including the deaths of prisoners held at Culloden House and a policy directed by Cumberland of brutal repression across the Highlands in the months following Culloden
- the Act of Proscription (1746) — the first of a series of acts which attempted to legally assimilate the Highlands into the rest of Great Britain, therefore ending the clans ability to rebel. It largely restated the Disarming Act (1716), though with significantly more severe punishments. Unlike in 1716, the act was rigorously enforced
- the Dress Act (1746) — technically part of the Act of Proscription. Declared the wearing of Highland Dress, including the kilt, illegal. Imprisonment and transportation were sentences faced by offenders
- the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act of 1747 — abolished the judicial rights of clan chiefs, removing their legal hold over their clan members
- the extension of Wade's network of military roads — when completed, these roads extended to nearly 1200 miles — enabled relatively small detachments to patrol the Highlands. Also, the renovation of Fort Augustus and the construction of Fort George.

In the longer term, government action demonstrated a change in policy away from punishment and military control of the region — for example:

- the establishment or expansion of Highland regiments and the large-scale recruitment of Highlanders into the British army to fight in the American and Napoleonic wars
- the Board of Annexed Estates diverted assigned significant funds to assist the expansion of the linen industry at three manufacturing stations across the Highlands
- the establishment of modernised infrastructure — most famously the construction of Ullapool (1788) by the British Fisheries Society.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
John Roberts	Argues Cumberland's personal antipathy towards the Highlanders fuelled the ferocity of reprisals in the immediate aftermath of Culloden. 'Cumberland shared the anti-Scottish prejudice of many who held high office. . . his forces also took to cattle raiding, which threatened the rebels with starvation'
Christopher Whatley	Determines the importance of the connection between legislation which followed Culloden and the creation of a more law-abiding society. 'With the abolition of heritable jurisdictions, it is argued, the problem of law and order became gradually more tractable.'
Christopher Duffy	Acknowledges the impact of government legislation following the Jacobite's defeat, particularly the abolition of Heritable Jurisdiction which he states, 'severed the ties of mutual obligation that bound (Highland) society together.'
Murray Pittock	Contends that the motivation of government policy following Culloden was punishment, not long-term improvement — 'Really this whole idea of improvement was window dressing. It was really hit or miss. The whole reason for forfeiture was, quite transparently, to punish those who had taken part in the 45.'

Question 24

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
For example, Orkney doubled its agricultural exports between 1770 and 1790 without reorganising holdings, but instead by using more sophisticated techniques like the use of systematic crop rotation.	Suggests that change occurring across Scottish agriculture to meet increased demand, including regions as remote as Orkney, was primarily achieved by adopting newly emerging techniques.
Nonetheless, the fact is that until agricultural prices rose further, improvement did not always pay returns on capital invested, and agricultural innovation was therefore often only piecemeal and inconsistent across the country, so that in this respect Scottish agriculture was comparable with much of Europe.	Suggests that improvements were not always immediately profitable, resulting in varying patterns of improvement across Scotland.
enclosing, consolidation and the enlargement of farms did eventually gather momentum, especially in fertile Lowland areas near big urban markets like Edinburgh and Glasgow.	Suggests that a further expansion of improvements occurred around the largest cities, stimulated by urban demand.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Scotland's rapid rate of urbanisation (by 1800 nearly 1 in 4 Scots lived and worked in towns or cities) created an unprecedented demand for agricultural produce and acted as a catalyst for the introduction of agricultural change
- regional variations were pronounced — fertile areas close to Scotland's largest cities were amongst the first areas where improvements become commonplace
- the viability of improvements was dependent on the price of produce. The adoption of new technologies did not guarantee success, as confirmed by Cockburn's infamous bankruptcy.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- agriculture remained Scotland's biggest employer throughout the 18th century, partly as a result of increased demand fuelled by both urbanisation and industrialisation
- many of the new technologies and techniques were imported from Holland or England
- regional variation produced specialised geographic areas — East Lothian, north east Fife and Moray became cereal producing areas whilst cattle became dominant in Galloway
- the activities of The Improvers had a significant impact on the nature and rate of change in Scottish agriculture. Very much a part of the Scottish Enlightenment, the Society for Improving the Knowledge of Agriculture (1723) embodied the practical application of theory to husbandry
- the overall pace of change was particularly gradual prior to the 1740s
- many 18th century changes represented a continuation of earlier patterns beginning in the 17th century — the reduction in the number of multiple tenancies, increasing use of longer, written leases and the expansion of land under cultivation through drainage of marsh and the removal of peat
- increased yields were already being achieved during the 17th century by liming, manuring and four-crop rotations. Tree planting introduced by some landed gentry.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Confirms the impact of rising demand as a stimulus for agrarian change. 'Commercial forces were now undeniably having a much greater impact. . . in many parts of the Lowland countryside market forces were becoming dominant.'
TC Smout	Distinguishes between before and after 1780. 'Only after 1780 did prices and rents rise merrily, and thus change in the countryside became much more general and far reaching.'
John Prebble	Argues that it was landowners who played the pivotal role in actioning agricultural change. 'The impetus to improving agriculture came from the nobility and gentry. . . in general advances it was the aristocracy who led the way.'
Christopher Whatley	Determines the importance of the sheer number of Improvers who contributed to change. 'Landowners such as John Cockburn of Ormiston, and other progressive lairds who included urban merchants and lawyers were common.'

Section 4 — USA: 'a house divided', 1850–1865

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 25

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Tariff was the most significant issue:
- a high tariff was seen as beneficial by some sections of US society, particularly the Northern states, as it raised revenue and protected the developing US industries from foreign competition
- domestic industries were able to charge more and make more money on sales that they may have previously lost to foreign competition due to cheaper prices before the Tariff. This benefitted the North as they were vulnerable to imports from Industrial Britain, whereas the South exported the majority of its produce
- the Tariff was of annoyance to the South as this impacted on the profits in the South. The Southerners feared a reactionary tariff would be imposed by the USA's trading partners for example Britain
- 15%-20% was viewed as acceptable to all 'sections' of the USA, however the fluctuating rate at which the Tariff was set depending on the party in government led to conflict. The Morrill Tariff of 1861 increased the rate to 37% which was to be increased again to 47% in 3 years was seen as one of the final triggers for Southern secession
- control of government meant representation for the controlling section and the dominance of their ideology, for example, the Tariff in the North meant potentially lower profits in the South therefore the economy of the South would be threatened
- the 1857 economic depression had a significant impact on the Northern economy. Hence the speech by James Hammond to the Senate in 1857.

Evidence which supports the view that economic differences were important:
- Northern industrial strength; greater industrial development than the South
- greater railway mileage in the North with journey times significantly reduced. The South tended to rely on their river network more than railways
- argument that the North was industrialising rather than industrialised but still more industrialised than the South. For example, four Northern manufacturing industries employed more than 50,000 people
- inequalities in wealth distribution
- Southern agricultural dominance
- cotton comprised 50% of US exports
- limited urbanisation in the South. By 1860, only 20 towns had more than 5000 inhabitants. Charleston and Richmond only had a population of 40,000
- South had 35% of US population but produced only 10% of manufactured output
- inequalities in wealth distribution with society dominated by the planter class which made up approx. 5% of the Southern population.

However:
- development of industry in South, eg Tredegar Iron Works. The Upper South was traditionally along the same lines as the North — although perhaps not industrialising at the same rate as the North
- predominance of agriculture regardless of the section. The North West was known as 'the larder of the USA' producing food crops whereas agriculture in the South was focused on cotton, tobacco etc but agriculture nevertheless in both sections
- growth of railways and eagerness in both sections to ensure the construction of the trans-continental railroad which would bring trade between the east coast and the Orient.

Evidence which supports the view that cultural differences were important:

- it has been argued that the more 'progressive' North was more willing to embrace change and new ideas. Competition with other industrial powers meant Northerners required to engage with education and new ideas
- majority of immigration to the North — very few immigrants in the South. Cultural diversity was therefore greater in the North and particularly within the Northern cities
- Northerners better educated with illiteracy levels significantly higher in the South
- Northerners responsive to new developments and initiatives. Northerners encouraged Federal intervention to improve Northern society eg schools, railway construction etc
- limited freedom of speech in the South in comparison to the North with the 'planter' class dominating society and decision making
- South arguably a more violent society with duelling remaining common in solving disputes.

However:

- shared pride in their common heritage and history
- shared language and shared religion
- faith in the Constitution and a shared pride in the success of the 'Great Experiment' in democracy
- a strong belief in the values of the 1776 Revolution and the 1787 Constitution.

Evidence which supports the view that the role of slavery was an important issue:

- divisive vote on admission of Texas in 1845
- Wilmot proviso, 1846, in context of war with Mexico
- the concept of 'popular sovereignty' introduced by Lewis Cass in election campaign 1848
- the 'great debate' 1850 and initial rejection of Henry Clays proposals for the admission of California as a state
- the idea that slavery underpinned all other differences eg A. Craven, 'the part which slavery played loomed large.'

However:

- the tenuous acceptance of the Missouri Compromise since 1820
- willingness to find the compromise in 1850 led by President Fillmore and Senator Douglas
- failure of the Nashville Convention following the 1850 Compromise.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Phillip W Magness	Takes the view that tariffs did not 'cause' the Civil War. Tariffs did however play an important role in the early development of secessionist constitutional theory. Of equal significance, the re-emergence of the Tariff issue after the Panic of 1857 added additional stresses to the existing national fissure over slavery.
Charles and Mary Beard	Contends sections were divided — agricultural South and industrial North.
David Potter	Takes the view that there was no economic gulf between North and South and therefore rejects the views of Charles and Mary Beard.
James Freehling	Takes the view that the Lower South politicians cared more about perpetuating slavery than the Union, while Border South leaders would compromise on slavery in order to save the Union. Slaveholders overwhelmingly controlled the Lower South but less solidly controlled the Middle and Border South.

Question 26

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that lack of unity was the most significant reason for the limited success:

- one of several reform movements at the time eg temperance, women's rights
- several abolitionist organisations in existence ranging widely in their strategies and approach
- in the 1850s many abolitionist groups functioned only at local and state level
- the aims of the differing groups were divided leading to arguments: some favoured gradualism and some wanted immediate action
- influence of William Lloyd Garrison and the Liberator advocating immediate action and repudiating gradualism
- the Liberator's circulation did not exceed 3000, of whom 75% were free African Americans
- the breakaway American and Foreign anti — slavery Society formed to oppose the radicalism and feminism of the Garrisonians
- abolitionists were divided over the issue of whether the Constitution protected slavery
- role of Frederick Douglass
- some abolitionists were from a strongly evangelical tradition not shared by all, others advocated women's rights alongside the abolition of slavery.

Evidence which supports the view that the limited success was due to other factors:

Political limitations:

- 'Gag rule' limited the political impact of abolitionism until 1844 the Gag rule had forbidden the discussion of slavery in the House of Representatives
- lack of political forum to achieve their aims
- 1850 Fugitive Slave Law reflected the divisiveness of the slavery issue politically, 9 northern states passed liberty laws in response to the Fugitive Slave Act — but others did not
- lack of Liberty Laws in some Northern states
- the failure of the Dred Scott Case which ruled against the abolitionist case. The Supreme Court ruling in the Dred Scott case undermined the abolitionist argument
- failure to win the support of either Whigs or Democrat Parties
- limited impact of the Liberty Party
- many abolitionists rejected political involvement and so lacked a political forum to achieve their aims
- slavery was embedded in the Constitution
- abolitionists failed to win the support of either the Whigs or the Democrats
- by the mid-1850s the Democrats were increasingly identified with the Slave Power
- the Liberty Party and the Free Soil Party had very little impact
- 1856: Fremont, running on a free soil, free men ticket won support in the North but almost none in the South.

Lack of interest:

- limited appeal of the group in the free states
- complete failure of the movement in the South
- background of Northern hostility towards blacks
- Northern fears
- fire-eaters vehemently defended slavery
- actions of John Brown at Potawatomie Creek and at Harpers Ferry reinforced hostility to abolitionists
- anti-abolitionist mobs threatened Garrison's life
- Irish immigrants in New York feared jobs competition from free African Americans
- abolitionist literature inflamed hostility to the issue
- the African Colonisation Society advocated sending free African Americans back to Africa, reflecting widespread apathy to integration.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Howard Temperley	Takes the view that the abolitionist movement found it more difficult to agree upon how to achieve its aims, rather than the aims themselves, and this handicapped its effectiveness.
Avery Craven	Attacked the abolitionists as he believed their militant strategies were inadmissible and unacceptable.
James Freeling	Has highlighted the practical implications of abolitionist strategy. The Federal Government had limited powers, states' rights were seen as sacrosanct, and autonomy was fiercely guarded. As long as slavery was maintained in 15 states, it could not be abolished by amendment.
Leon Litwack	Has pointed out the indifference of Northerners on the question of race.

Question 27

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the 'slave power conspiracy' was the most important reason for the emergence of the Republican Party:

- Southern political power, Anti-Slavery sentiment and 'slave power conspiracy'
- many Northern Democrat voters sought a new political party as the Democrats were dominated by Southern opinion
- Democrat control of the Presidency for nearly fifty years
- five out of nine Supreme Court judges were from Southern States
- the Democrats appeared to be committed to advancing the cause of slavery; hence the 'slave power conspiracy' theory which dominated Northern thinking
- 'Bleeding Sumner'
- Northerners opposed slavery's extension into the territories
- Republicans viewed slavery as restricting the South's economic growth
- the Republicans were one of a number of anti-slavery coalitions in the North.

Evidence which supports the view that Nativism was the most important reason for the emergence of the Republican Party:

- mass immigration from Europe to Northern cities
- rise of the American Party or 'Know Nothings'
- strong link between the hierarchy of the Democratic Party and the Catholic Church
- most Catholics voted Democrat
- religious and political opposition to immigration but critically, social and economic motivations also
- however not all Republicans held Nativist views. Lincoln famously stated his opposition to the 'Know Nothings' in 1855
- perhaps a degree of inevitability that the 'Know Nothings' would be dominated by a Northern coalition movement.

Evidence which supports the view that the Kansas-Nebraska Act was the most important reason for the emergence of the Republican Party:

- the Kansas-Nebraska Act awakened the spectre of the slave power
- prompted a coalition of anti-slavery groups eg Anti-Nebraska Party, The People's Party and Republicans
- Stephen Douglas' repeal of the Missouri Compromise caused outrage in the North
- the competition for control of Kansas sparked a race between pro-slave and free-soil settlers giving a focal point for the Northern political voice
- Lecompton versus Topeka state legislatures in Kansas
- 'Bleeding Kansas'.

Evidence which supports the view that the collapse of the Whigs was the most important reason for the emergence of the Republican Party:

- the rise of new political movements in the North won mass support in 1854 elections — Whigs ceased to be a main political force
- Division of Whigs into sections following Kansas-Nebraska Act — Issues of temperance, anti-immigration, anti-Catholicism fatally divided Whigs.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
William Gienapp	Suggests that the Republicans united in opposition to 'slave power'. Know-Nothings had eroded previous party loyalties.
James McPherson	Takes the view that the Republican Party developed a free-labour rationale for their vision of capitalist development. Counter Southern attacks upon system of wages and division of labour. Republican support came from upwardly mobile Protestants and farmers operating within the national market.
Hugh Tulloch	Suggests that the birth of Republican Party occurred in the aftermath of the Kansas-Nebraska controversy. Republicans attracted those opposed to Southern determination to maintain slavery.
Brian Holden Reid	Takes the view that political evangelicalism permeated the developing Republican Party. Sectional issue crucial to Republican philosophy.

Question 28

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the strengths of the Republican Party in 1864 were the critical factor:

- Lincoln did have the support of the Republican Party and the Republican voters on the whole. Chase and Fremont, the challengers for nomination failed to mount any serious challenge
- renaming the Republican Party, the National Union or Union League enhanced the potential for re-election as it presented a united front
- Republican radicals that were opposed to Lincoln's nomination began to actively support Lincoln's re-election following McClellan's nomination as Democrat candidate. As Charles Sumner put it privately 'Lincoln's election would be a disaster, but McClellan's damnation.' Thaddeus Stevens played an important role in quietly persuading Carl Schurz to repair the split in the Republican Party by swinging the Fremont Radicals to Lincoln's side
- Grant made great efforts to make it easier for soldiers to vote in the election. This proved critical to Lincoln's victory as the soldiers voted overwhelmingly in favour of Lincoln's re-election.

Evidence which supports the view that the failings of the Democrat Party during 1864 Presidential Election ensured Lincoln's victory:

- Democrats chose McClellan as their candidate but could not agree on a platform for election being divided by peace and continuation of the war effort
- Democratic campaign lacked serious political challenge, resorting to calling Lincoln names to discredit him
- 'Copperheads' continued to emphasise the themes that did little to persuade voters: the financial and human costs of the war, the suspension of habeas corpus, the presence of the draft, the fact that this had become a war about emancipation, Lincoln was a tyrant who had contempt for the Constitution.

Evidence which supports the view that Union military success ensured Lincoln's victory:

- siege and capture of Atlanta by Sherman and the capture of Mobile by Farragut reduced casualties and placed Union troops closer to success
- capture of Atlanta was a significant morale boost to Northern morale and Lincoln's campaign
- military success eventually reduced problems on the home front
- Grant's perseverance resulted in a change of fortunes from June 1864 threatening Petersburg and Richmond forcing Lee and the Confederates into a defensive formation
- success of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley.

However:

- Union forces enjoyed limited success in Western and Eastern Theatre at start of the year eg Grant's Wilderness Campaign, Sigel in Shenandoah, Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain
- army of the Potomac had mixed degree of success in early 1864 despite superior manpower eg Grant's Wilderness Campaign, May/June 1864 and Cold Harbor, June 1864
- casualty figures very high, 32,000 between 5 to 12 May 1864 — 'Butcher' Grant and apparent failure of 'total war' tactics
- enlistment difficulties and use of 'green' African American troops.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Timothy P Townsend	Argues that a vote for McClellan would invalidate all of the sacrifices that the soldiers and their comrades had made. He supports this with reference to a soldier who said, 'I cannot vote for one thing and fight for another.' Another wrote saying, 'I do not see how any soldier can vote for such a man, nominated on a platform which acknowledges that we are whipped.'
Stephen Sears	Takes the view that McClellan devoted most of his campaign efforts to the army vote however, no other segment of the electorate rejected his candidacy so strongly.
James McPherson	Suggests that Northern domestic gloom in May 1864 was changing to optimism by September 1864 as a result of Union military victories.
Reid Mitchell	Takes the view that the failure to capture Atlanta would probably have led to Lincoln and pre-war party defeat.

Question 29

Evidence which supports the view that the issue of States' rights was crucial in the defeat of the Confederacy:

States' rights:
- the notion of States' rights, which many Southern states used as their justification for secession, hindered the government of Jefferson Davis and their ability to wage war
- governors Brown of Georgia and Vance of North Carolina were particularly obstructive towards the government of Jefferson Davis
- Southerners resisted the war measures of conscription and martial law
- large plantation owners who were well represented in the political arena were particularly resistant to the centralised policies of the Confederate government eg the impressment of enslaved people
- Davis created a strong centralised government whose bureaucracy was greater in proportion to the Confederate population than the Union bureaucracy.

Evidence which does not support the view that States' rights was an important issue in the defeat of the Confederacy:

Lack of will and loss of morale:
- the Southerners had more of an American identity than a Confederate identity and therefore found it challenging in the short time of their existence to create a sense of Southern nationalism that could have maintained their war effort
- the large non-slaveholding white population were not always fully in support of secession and although they may have fought for the Confederacy grew in frustration as the war continued. This is evident in the 'rich man's war poor man's fight' thesis as a result of the clauses within the 1862 Conscription Law
- the high casualty rates demoralised many Southerners and their willingness to fight decreased as the war progressed
- the Union blockade and the subsequent shortages impacted on morale. Women in particular lost heart leading to a sense of defeatism which featured in letters to soldiers on the front line and increasing levels of desertion from Confederate ranks.

Ineffective Confederate leadership:
- Confederate military commanders were too attack-minded leading to the argument that the Confederacy bled itself to death in the first three years of the war. Confederates attacked in 8 of the first 12 major battles of the war losing 97,000 men, 20,000 more than the Union
- Davis and Lee concentrated too much on the Virginian theatre and ignored the Western theatre which would ultimately cost them the war
- the command structure of the Confederate forces and the use of the department system led to coordination problems and the poor distribution of supplies and military resources
- Jefferson Davis is criticised for being an ineffective President. His personality and style led to high profile feuds with Johnston and Beauregard which harmed the Confederate war effort
- Davis and his government mismanaged the Confederate economy. Printing money led to inflation which destroyed the Confederate economy and contributed to the loss of morale
- poor management of Confederate military supplies harmed the war effort.

Union Strengths:

Northern industrial capacity:
- superiority of Union industrial base
- three times the railway capacity
- nine times industrial capacity
- ability to produce superior naval strength; allowing the naval blockade to be imposed
- superior management of military supplies by Stanton, Gideon Welles etc ensured this advantage.

Northern military leadership:

- role of Grant and Sherman
- total war strategy
- exploitation of manpower and resources of the Union
- strategy aimed at destroying the South's will to continue the war
- refusal of Grant to retreat after reverses, eg Cold Harbor and the Wilderness
- excessive Confederate military focus in the Virginian theatre
- Confederate generals too attack-minded.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Frank Owsley	Argues that the epitaph 'Died of States' Rights' should be written on the tombstone of the Confederacy.
David Donald	Argues that the Confederacy 'Died of Democracy.'
Merton Coulter	Takes the view that the Confederacy lost the war because 'its people did not will hard enough and long enough to win'.
Richard Current	Takes the view that Southern defeat was the result of 'God and the strongest battalions.'

Section 4 — USA: 'a house divided', 1850–1865

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 30

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views that the candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	From *the Georgia Declaration of Causes of Seceding States.*	The state of Georgia's written statement on secession by political delegates who attended a secession convention and voted to leave the United States.
Purpose	Public statement.	To outline and justify the reasons for the state of Georgia's decision to secede from the Union.
Timing	January, 1861.	Georgia was the fifth state to secede following South Carolina's lead on 20 December 1860. The war started on 12 April 1861.

Point in Source A	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
. . . hostile policy of the non-slave holding states towards slavery has been pursued with every circumstance of aggravation which could arouse the passions and hatred of our people and has placed the two sections of the Union in the condition of virtual civil war.	Suggests that the state of Georgia seceded from the Union as they perceived that the Northern States were actively pursuing policies to end slavery and that this has led to two sections emerging in the USA. Pro-slave versus Free State sections. Emphasised by 'hostile policy' and 'arouse the passion and the hatred'.
The party of Lincoln, called the Republican Party admits to being an anti-slavery party and anti-slavery is its mission and its purpose.	Suggests that the election of Lincoln as President and the dominance of the Republican Party in Congress was at odds with the views of the state of Georgia and the South as the Republicans were against slavery. Emphasised by 'mission'.
An anti-slavery party must necessarily look to the North alone for support, but a united North is now strong enough to control the Government in all of its departments, and a sectional party has been forced upon us.	Suggests that the Republican Party's victory in the elections based only support from the Northern states has led the state of Georgia and the South as a whole to feel that they did not have representation in Federal Government. Emphasised by 'forced upon us'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- perceived Northern aggression against slavery and the rise of the abolitionist movement from 1835 and the abolition of slavery by the Mexican government in Texas, prompting the outbreak of the Mexican War. There was a perception that agitation against slavery had increased so much that it had gained the support of the government
- Republicans formed in 1854 — anti-slavery movement purely with a Northern support base
- the Republicans controlled the House and Senate in 1858
- Lincoln elected President in 1860. His views were clear and well-known across the South following the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858
- prevention of slavery in the territories, Topeka government and Lincoln's views.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- slavery was arguably at the heart of the differences between North and South
- Southern fears of becoming a minority within the federal Union
- Southern press hostile to all Northern actions, for example portrayal of Republicans as the party of the African Americans, which would encourage social and racial chaos
- Lincoln portrayed as a direct threat to the social and economic status of the South, and this justified immediate secession when he was elected
- impact of John Brown's raid — struck a sensitive nerve in the Southern psyche
- splits within the Democratic Party that allowed for the election of Lincoln
- political disagreements over the future nature of the American republic
- issue of slavery and, more importantly, slavery expansion
- doctrine of States' rights
- Davis: the South seceded in defence of States' rights. The Republican Party had engineered war to further their political and economic domination over the South.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Hugh Tulloch	Takes the view that Lincoln's election triggered off secession because the Republican Party threatened the extension of slavery and because Lincoln threatened the honour and survival of the planter class. 'It was the coming of the Republican Lincoln to power in 1860 that triggered off secession and a civil war.'
Brian Holden-Reid	Suggests that sectional issues were crucial to the Republican victory. The message received in the South was not one of compromise or union.
William Gienapp	Takes the view that the Republicans had united in opposition to the 'slave power.' If they directly opposed the institution that formed the foundation of Southern economic and political life, Southerners could not see a future within the Union.
David Donald	Suggests that tensions and paranoia between North and South intensified. The politicians were to blame for failing to respond with clear policies that would reduce tensions and calm the escalating conflict.

Question 31

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
. . . McClellan believed that the war was a business to be carried on by military professionals without interference from politicians, and when he conceived his Urbanna plan, he did not tell Lincoln about it for months.	McClellan did not consult Lincoln on military strategy and did not see it necessary for military and political leaders to work together. This brought conflict between the two men.
. . . while he was determined to see an all-out attack on the South, Lincoln's early generals believed that the war should be fought one fort at a time in one theatre.	Lincoln wanted a full and direct attack on the South whereas the early generals disagreed and pursued one battle at a time strategy.
Lincoln implored McClellan to make a move, even a small diversionary one, to inspire public opinion with the belief that more decisive action was contemplated later.	Lincoln, knowing the importance of public opinion, wanted an attack on the South but McClellan refused to follow Lincoln's orders for an attack on the South until he was ready.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- frustration of Lincoln at McClellan's disregard for his orders who declared that 'I can do it all'. He was overly confident and optimistic about the war effort and his own abilities. McClellan was arrogant and took credit for victories that were not necessarily his. For example, in West Virginia at the start of the Civil War
- political differences between Lincoln and McClellan. McClellan was a Democrat who did not want to emancipate enslaved people and described Lincoln as a 'well-meaning baboon. . . the original gorilla' highlighting differences in their views regarding the purpose of the war
- McClellan wanted to outmanoeuvre the Confederacy and avoid 'total war' that Lincoln favoured. McClellan wanted to ensure that he did not create a lasting division between North and South, hence his desire to avoid frontal assaults. Despite having a large army which outnumbered the Confederacy, he was reluctant to attack. He was over cautious and indecisive. He exaggerated the size of the enemy. For example, the Peninsula Campaign 1862.

Point in Source C	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
Although not a natural strategist he worked hard to master military strategy. . .	Lincoln made up for his lack of experience with hard work and determination as he learnt quickly about the role of Commander-in-Chief.
. . . he pored over the reports from the various departments, held long conferences with eminent military men, and astonished them with his knowledge, grasp of military strategy and operations and the keen intelligence of his questions.	Lincoln studied military strategy and was aware of all aspects of the Union war effort demonstrating his development as a military leader.
. . . he proved to be a more hands-on Commander-in-Chief than any other president, improvising and stretching his powers beyond normal practice to give the Union an early advantage in the war.	Lincoln was involved in all aspects of policy making, decision making and strategy to win the war and stretched the powers of Commander-in-Chief as far as they could go.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Lincoln had no formal military education or training but was pragmatic and flexible throughout the war. His pragmatic approach was crucial in maintaining the war effort and progressing his military knowledge and understanding as the war evolved
- Lincoln was a consummate politician, working diligently to enhance his understanding of military strategy
- Lincoln did not avoid his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, but instead involved himself in every aspect of the Union war effort.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Lincoln initially recruited 75,000 volunteers to add to the 16,000 regular soldiers. They would serve for 3 months which reflected the feeling that the war would be over by Christmas. The soldiers were inexperienced. Lincoln described the soldiers and their leadership as 'green.' This was a significant underestimate forcing Congress to increase this to 400,000 over 3 years.
- in theory, the Union had 90 ships in 1861, but only a few were actually ready for sea. These ships were designed for deeper water. Lincoln planned for more ships which could access the river networks such as the Mississippi
- Lincoln wanted a quick and decisive victory to what he viewed as a domestic insurrection. He regularly changed his military leaders until he appointed Grant who would deliver the decisive and direct warfare that he had demanded
- Winfield Scott at the start of the war, but as also most other military leaders in the North, was less optimistic! From a military perspective, he and other leading generals believed it would take months to train and equip the volunteers. Lincoln therefore supported the Anaconda Plan
- Lincoln's military appointments were often politically motivated rather than militarily motivated ie the 'political generals.' Many proved to be incompetent and did not inspire confidence. General McClellan, the Democrat candidate in 1864, is a good example
- however, even Grant and Sherman were sponsored by key political figures rather than for their military background. Generals such as Halleck were fiercely critical of this approach.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Neely	Argues that Lincoln went to extremes to avoid partisanship in selecting battlefield commanders and argues this was an admirable trait, crucial to Union victory.
James Simon	Argues that Lincoln was reluctant to remove some of his political generals, for example, Nathanial Banks.
James Ford Rhodes	Takes the view that 'Lacking him (Lincoln) the North would have abandoned the contest. His love of country and abnegation of self, make him a worthy leader.'
James Randall	Takes the view that 'No president has carried the power of presidential edict and executive order (independently of Congress) so far as (Lincoln) did . . . It would not be easy to state what Lincoln conceived to be the limit of his powers.'

Question 32

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
. . . the proclamation only freed enslaved people in select geographical areas, emancipation arrived piecemeal, leaving thousands still enslaved at the moment of Lincoln's death.	Suggests that the Emancipation Proclamation was limited and only freed enslaved people that were within Confederate territory.
The Emancipation Proclamation shattered the Northern pro-war coalition, while conservative Republicans eventually returned to support the Lincoln administration, many war democrats did not.	Suggests that the issue was contentious and divided the various party factions that made up Lincoln's coalition war government.
. . . the proclamation did assure Lincoln of the continued support of Radical Republicans in Congress.	Suggests that the more radical wing of the Republican Party united behind Lincoln as they had been calling for Emancipation for some time.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Emancipation Proclamation had no effect on slavery in Union slave states. By September 1862, no enslaved person had been liberated. British Prime Minister, Palmerston, was critical as was the world's media. Emancipation depended on the advance of Union armies. Freedom did not reach many African Americans until well after the end of the war
- the proclamation was not met by the approval of all members of the Northern coalition. Conservative Republicans withdrew their support for a period. War Democrats did not approve
- radical Republicans had been calling for Emancipation for some time and Lincoln had allowed former enslaved people to fight in the Union army as a result of their continued pressure on him.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Kentuckians resisted the proclamation fiercely, even keeping 65,000 enslaved peoples captive while challenging the decision legally
- the Emancipation Proclamation required Republicans to pass a constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery as the Proclamation lacked the necessary force in legal terms
- in the 1862 elections, the Republicans lost control of five states and thirty-five congressional seats
- African American recruitment came at a critical point in the war as white men were less willing to volunteer and in 1864 when 100,000 white men did not re-enlist, the 125,000 African American soldiers were essential to the end of the war
- Lincoln argued — 'freedom has given us the control of 200,000 able bodied men, born and raised on Southern soil. It will give us more yet. Just so much has it subtracted from the strength of our enemies'. Indeed, there were 179,000 African American soldiers in the Union armies at the end of the war, most of whom were former enslaved people
- an eighth of Union troops around Petersburg were African American. This was critical to the strategy of 'total war'
- Britain could not be seen to recognise a nation that supported slavery, despite the benefits the Confederacy brought to Britain
- Lincoln did turn the war into a revolution with the Emancipation Proclamation
- Emancipation boosted Northern morale adding a humanitarian ideal as well as a preservation of the Union to the war effort
- Lincoln described the Emancipation Proclamation as 'an act of justice' as well as 'military necessity'
- the Proclamation meant that the Confederacy could no longer look for a peace settlement if it insisted on retaining slavery.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Benjamin Arthur Quarles	Argues that African American recruits entered at a time of real shortage, which swung the war in favour of Union.
James McPherson	Takes the view that the Proclamation was more important than Congressional Acts, African American enlistment was one of the most important acts of the war and without it, the victories of 1864/65 would have been unachievable.
David Donald	Takes the view that the war took a new turn as a result of the Proclamation.
James Rawley	Argues that the Emancipation Proclamation widened the war's purpose.

Section 5 — Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 33

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Daimyo were the most significant social grouping within late Tokugawa society:

- Daimyo were the lords in charge of the individual domains (Hans) in Japan
- although they were a caste, they were responsible for enforcing the caste structure within their own domains, so arguably very significant within late Tokugawa society
- the Tokugawa were dependent upon the loyalty of those Daimyo who were in charge of the 75% of the land over which they had no control
- the Daimyo were ultimately responsible for law and order and tax collection within Japan
- the Daimyo were responsible for the public works schemes within their domain, especially those that were to do with the infrastructure
- the Daimyo were potentially capable of organising a rebellion against the Tokugawa regime, so control of this group was crucial
- Daimyo were classified into two groups, depending upon their previous loyalty to the Tokugawa — the Tozama and the Fudai
- the Tozama were carefully positioned in strategically and geographically less important Hans within Japan
- Daimyo had to seek permission to marry
- importance of Alternate Attendance — the fact they had to be so controlled is evidence of their potential power.

Evidence which supports the view that the Samurai were the most significant social grouping within late Tokugawa society:

Samurai:

- one important group were the Samurai, from which the Daimyo were drawn. This was the only caste allowed to bear arms so careful control over them was imperative
- they were forced to live in the castle towns separate from peasants, so they were easier to keep an eye on
- they were expected to be unquestioningly loyal to their lord, their Daimyo, and were expected to commit suicide if they were not
- the Samurai had become largely administrators by the mid-19th century, and were crucial in the administrative running of their domains and therefore the control of Japan
- the fact they were the only caste permitted to bear arms meant they were crucial in enforcing the stability of Japan.

Evidence which supports the view that other groupings within late Tokugawa society were the most significant:

- arguably, the theoretical head of the caste structure, the Emperor, was the most significant aspect of late Tokugawa society, as he was the figurehead that provided stability and legitimacy
- the Tokugawa Shogun, the military leader, had a pivotal role within the system
- alternatively, although relatively low, the peasant caste had a fundamental role to play in providing the staple crop for the country and also the main currency, which formed the foundation of the Tokugawa socio-political structure
- the merchant class were emerging as a powerful force and were unhappy that they had such a modest position in the caste system, despite financing the Daimyo and Samurai.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Elise Tipton	Contends that 'the Tokugawa delegated administration of the rest of the country to the Daimyo, who governed and obtained income from their domains more or less did as they pleased as long as they did not display disloyalty to the Shogunate.'
Janet Hunter	Believes that 'the Tokugawa confirmed their hold on power by a complex structure of physical, political and economic controls over several hundred local lords whose domains made up the rest of the country, the Samurai class who constituted their followers and the populace who resided within their domains.'
Christopher Goto-Jones	Argues 'one of the most powerful features of Tokugawa society was the establishment of the system of stratification that determined the status and functions of the vast majority of the population, as well as their relationship with the Daimyo.'
William Beasley	Believes 'Overwhelmingly, the most important distinction was that between the Samurai and the rest.'

Question 34

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest/support that the contribution of foreigners was crucial to the transformation of Japan's educational system:

- first official document written by the new regime was the Charter Oath, which publicly stated that Japanese officials wished to seek knowledge throughout the world to bring back to Japan
- immediately after the Restoration and the Iwakura Mission there had been a somewhat westernisation of the education system in Japan
- Mori Arinori was highly influenced by the American model of education during his visit there from 1871-1873
- Mori was impressed how education had been used to try and unify America
- a society based upon the western influenced idea of meritocracy demanded reforms to its education system to permit this social mobility
- school system introduced in 1872 had followed a centralised French model, but had within it considerable diversity
- Christian-based school were also established
- western-style universities established
- development of western-influenced commercial institutes.

Evidence which may contradict the view that the contribution of foreigners was crucial to the transformation of Japan's educational system:

- there was a backlash against the perceived westernisation of education
- Mori Arinori, the Minister of Education, was assassinated in 1889
- more traditional Imperial Rescript introduced in 1889
- Imperial Rescript highly influenced by Neo-Confucianist principles and ideas. Notions of loyalty and filial piety apparent
- Rescript firmly rooted in the desire to use education as a means of developing and a sense of Japanese identity
- moral education based upon a combination of traditional cultural values and modern nationalism which became the core of the school curriculum
- the divine position of the Emperor was very much exploited within the Imperial Rescript to enforce a compliant attitude and unquestioning sense of responsibility towards the Japanese state
- according to Rescript, Japanese people were defined as subjects of an absolute monarch rather than citizens in a democratic state.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Galen Fisher	Contends 'Mori saw in the American system a possible model for Japan which could weld together a nation of well-educated men and women dedicated to serving their country'.
RG Grant	Argues that 'The government's attempt to define Japan and Japaneseness with the imperial institution at its core may be seen in the shift in education policy which took place in the late 1880s'.
Sidney Wood	Argues 'Western activity was to be critically evaluated and shaped to suit Japan'.
Charles Fahs	Suggests that 'Japan's strong feeling of national identity was helpful in preventing blind acceptance of everything western. To its due Japan's succeeded in retaining her own rich traditions'.

Question 35

Candidates might refer to:

The extent to which the military and naval reforms had a political impact on Japanese society:
- Fukoku-Kyohei — 'rich country — strong army'
- military enjoyed greater success than political parties in acquiring both power and legitimacy
- culmination of domination in 1890 when the military enjoyed its own set of constitutional advantages when the Emperor was put in supreme command of the army and navy
- constitution also states that those ministers responsible for the military had direct access to the throne under Emperor's supreme command
- each military service had complete control over its own internal affairs and over the conduct of wartime operations with no constitutional accountability to cabinet
- armed forces deemed to occupy a special place in Japanese society — for much of the Meiji period the army and navy as institutions had little political role — as institutionalised by Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1892)
- in contrast, military leaders wielded significant political influence as members of the ruling oligarchy.

The extent to which the military and naval reforms had an economic impact on Japanese society:
- industrialism was inextricably linked with military reform
- reform of public finances made it feasible to increase public spending on the armed forces — helped stimulate industrial development
- Japan moved steadily to manufacturing her own rifles and artillery
- one third of government revenue devoted to developing a modern army
- industrial impact of the reforms — long hours, low wages and working in bleak conditions
- Land Tax paying for the reforms — farming families worked hard for long hours and little remuneration, which saw them benefitting little from the government's plans for the military and navy.

The extent to which the military and naval reforms had a social impact on Japanese society:
- impact of the introduction of conscription — three-year service for 20-year-old men followed by four years subsequent service in the army reserve. Exemptions were highly limited. Impact upon many families
- impact of conscription upon Samurai, combined with abolition of caste structure, ended Samurai monopoly on warfare and undermined their warrior status
- conscription unpopular as it deprived families of their sons for labour
- conscription contributed to the development of a sense of nationalism as conscripts travelled the country for the first time
- impact upon women — military priorities meant that women were important as the bearers of sons who would fight in future wars.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Rebecca Wall	Contends that the importance attached to the armed forces is shown in the fact that in the 1870s the Japanese government invested as much in the navy and twice as much in the army, as in industrial enterprises as a whole.
Janet Hunter	Argues in the interests of both domestic unity and efficiency the new leadership decided to start afresh with the building of a conscript army.
Ann Waswo	Believes the military enjoyed greater success than political parties in acquiring power and legitimacy.
Takao Matsumaro	Argues it should never be forgotten that domestic politics, military policy and foreign affairs were intertwined in the most intimate fashion.

Question 36

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Zaibatsu were the most significant factor:
- government favouritism resulted in the development of huge monopolistic concerns
- these were the heart of economic and industrial activity within Japan
- they were large family controlled vertical monopolies consisting of a holding company on the top, with a wholly owned banking subsidiary providing finance, and several industrial off-shoots, often dominating specific sectors of a certain market
- they were able to benefit from economies of scale — and provide their own finance, raw materials and transportation which certainly helped contribute to speed and scale of Japan's industrial development after 1868
- 1880s onwards the Zaibatsu began to dominate manufacturing and commercial activities. Most had their own bank
- by the early 20th century control was becoming a problem
- these huge conglomerates were led by four giants — Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda
- Mitsubishi conglomerates controlled 25% of shipping and ship building, 15% of coal and metals, 16% of bank loans, 50% of flour milling, 59% of sheet glass, 35% of sugar and 15% of cotton textiles — stimulating growth in all these areas
- they developed networks of foreign contacts and gathered information in order to sell and purchase a wide variety of goods abroad
- they became influential in politics — so powerful they could not be ignored.

Evidence which supports the view that other contributory factors were important:

The role of the government, westerners and the international environment:
- government had a limited reliance on foreign loans. They took firm control over expenditure — provided partial funding of large-scale private enterprise and support for the Zaibatsu. Many historians argue Zaibatsu could not have developed without the encouragement and support of the government
- government initiation of the Iwakura Mission which turned into a fact-finding mission about western knowledge, including industrial expertise
- role of state in industrial processes and policies — they built model factories such as Tomioka silk reeling mill
- they carefully deployed Yatoi — who they then dismissed them once their knowledge was disseminated
- government initiated military reform which stimulated industrial development
- government improvements in infrastructure contributed to economic development
- psychological impact of the Unequal Treaties provided great impetus for industrial growth
- lives of many peasants largely unchanged politically.

Tokugawa foundations:
- although not intentionally encouraged by the Tokugawa, economic foundations were laid during the Tokugawa period
- alternate attendance led to the creation of an extensive infrastructure, including the building of bridges
- alternate attendance also led to the dramatic growth in Edo to over one million inhabitants, who needed supplying with commercial goods. The peasants living in nearby villages began to diversify into commercial goods to supply Edo — stimulating a money-based economy
- this was replicated on a smaller scale across Japan following the stipulation of Samurai to live in the caste towns within their Han
- the transformation of Samurai from a warrior into an administrative caste led to them indulging in extravagant lifestyles, getting into debt to merchants, increasing the importance of merchants within Japan
- move from a rice-based to a money-based economy
- fairly literate population
- BUT impact of Unequal Treaties in the Bakumatsu period stunted this economic development.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Edwin Reischauer	Argues 'the great wealth and broad base of the Zaibatsu enabled them to finance promising new fields in the economy and thus increase their share in its fast-growing industrial sector'.
W J Macpherson	Contends that the role of the government was crucial.
Wataru Hiromatso	Argues that the foundations of Japan's modernisation were to a large extent laid during the years of peaceful isolation.
Mikiso Hane	Takes the view that modernisation would depend heavily upon the adoption of western science, technology and industrialisation.

Question 37

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the perspective that China's violation of Tainjin was the most important cause:

- according to the Treaty which was signed in 1885, following increased tension between Japan and China over interests and interventions in Korea. Under the terms of this agreement both countries agreed to withdraw their troops and military instructors and in future to provide written notification before sending any troops to Korea
- perceived violation of this agreement led to the Sino-Japanese war, when in 1884 Chinese troops were sent to Korea in response to the Korean king's request for help against the domestic rebellion led by the powerful Tonghak religious sect. Japan saw this as a violation of the 1885 agreement and sent her troops in. Both refused to withdraw
- context of the treaty viewed through the lens of long-standing concerns over the strategic importance of Korea — it was the closest area of the Asian mainland to Japan and the main area from which an attack could be launched
- described as 'dagger pointing into the heart of Japan'
- Korea was a semi-autonomous kingdom over which China exercised a significant amount of influence, which made Japan uncomfortable
- in the early Meiji era there were imperialistic designs on Korea which were revealed in Saigo Takamori's plans to launch a campaign against Korea.

Evidence which supports the perspective that the desire to overturn the Unequal Treaty and become the leading Asian nation was a significant cause:

- the motivation for war was to try and gain an overseas empire, to become more like the west, and help overturn the Unequal Treaties
- observations from the Iwakura Mission highlighted the fact the great world powers embarked upon imperialist actions and had overseas empires. There was a desire to emulate this.

Evidence which supports the perspective that socio-economic factors to support industrial development were a significant cause:

- lack of natural resources demanded Japan become aggressive in its foreign policy
- Japan wanted access to overseas markets
- Japan had an expanding population and wanted additional land overseas to accommodate them.

Evidence which supports the perspective that a developing sense of nationalism and military reforms were significant causes:

- increasing sense of nationalism, united behind the divine position of the Emperor, increased a sense of national identity and the desire to show Japanese strength
- process of political centralisation firmly embedded and the new regime secure, which meant politically Meiji leaders began to feel more confident to engage in international affairs
- by the 1890s, military reforms had been embedded and conscription introduced, which meant that Japan could confidently begin to exert herself within an international context
- Japan wanted to replace China as the leading Asian nation.

Evidence which supports the perspective that increased confidence following the Formosa incident contributed to the outbreak of war between Japan and China:

- the Formosa Incident of 1871 had highlighted the shifting balance of power away from China to Japan when the former agreed to pay compensation to Japan for 54 Ryukyuan fishermen shipped wrecked upon Taiwan — a formal acceptance from China that the Ryukyuan Islands were now a Japanese (as opposed to Chinese) sphere of influence
- the Japanese army and navy were successfully deployed in the occupation of Taiwan, to exert the compensation from China, boosting military confidence
- there was growing concern regarding expanding Russian influence in Asia. If Japan secured Korea, it would prevent this happening there.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Janet Hunter	Contends that 'the 1885 agreement failed to resolve the question of foreign influence in Korea, which a decade later led to war between China and Japan'.
William Beasley	Argues 'Japanese leaders of almost all shades wanted to draw Korea into the Japanese orbit'.
John Benson and Takao Matsumura	Suggest 'The European powers' growing interest in Asia could scarcely be overlooked and this encouraged Japan's development of a more aggressive foreign policy'.
Bonnie B Oh	Argues 'For Japan, imperialism was a means of attaining equality with the west'.

Section 5 — Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 38

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
It was during the later Tokugawa shogunate, in the 1850s, that religion became crucial in promoting loyalty to the state, because the shogun of the Tokugawa line, though often sincere patrons of Buddhist institutions, made Confucianism — or, more strictly, later Chinese reinterpretations of Confucianism — into the orthodox ideology of the state.	Suggests that Confucianism became very significant within the hierarchy of beliefs as it became the ideology promoted by the Tokugawa state.
Confucian scholars were favoured by the shogunate who declared that in essentials Shinto and Confucianism were identical.	Argues that scholars associated with Confucianism became influential in shaping ideological thought and tried to highlight similarities between Shintoism and Confucianism.
Buddhism and Shinto, which were often closely related, were still practised and Buddhism was usually regarded by the authorities as the most praiseworthy religion, especially for the lower classes.	Suggests that Buddhism was regarded as a significant belief system, but particularly for the peasant caste.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- Confucianism was arguably the most significant belief system promoted by the Tokugawa state because it was the ideological foundation of the caste structure, one of the key control mechanisms employed by the Tokugawa
- Buddhism continued to be significant in the lives of many within Japan, with homes having a Buddhist shrine
- the key tenets of Shintoism were often downplayed or overlooked, because of the centrality of the emperor figure at the apex of the belief system.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- there were three belief systems intertwined in Tokugawa Japan, which had an impact on people's lives, but there was a hierarchy within this with regards emphasis from the government
- Confucianism was grounded in the key tenets of unquestioning loyalty and filial piety to those perceived to be socially superior to you
- Japanese Samurai assumed the role of Confucian scholars, who both modelled and policed this behaviour
- in the Tokugawa decentralised system of government, where they only had direct control over 25% of the land, promoting a belief system that led to universal loyal, compliant and predictable behaviour, was highly beneficial
- Shintoism, with its promotion of the Emperor as a living deity and the apex of the system, was suppressed by the regime as it potentially posed a threat to the universal acceptance of the Shogun as the apex of the Japanese regime
- Shinto shrines were underfunded
- the Japanese population were all expected to register at their Buddhist temple, adding a further dimension of social control
- the Samurai also had their own ethical code which they followed, Bushido
- Christianity was heavily suppressed during this period, because of the connections between missionary work and colonisation.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Anne Waswo	Suggests that 'neo-confucianism stressed the ethical nature of the government, stressing obedience to one's superiors'.
Ryusaku Tsunoda, Theodore De Bary and Donald Keene	Contends that 'True, during the long centuries of Buddhist and Confucian dominance Shinto had shown little intellectual vitality, and even its most ardent defenders, in contending with these more highly articulated systems of thought, had been forced to draw heavily on them for ideas. Nevertheless, on a more basic level the native cult continued to make itself felt in the lives of the people'.
Peter Duus	Contends that 'In their Confucian vision of society, all people could be divided into four classes — officials, peasants, artisans and merchants'.
Marius Jansen	Believes that 'Buddhism was also intimately related to the power structure. At the higher reaches of society court nobles were closely intertwined with the priestly hierarchy'.

Question 39

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
The early 1880s witnessed the founding of political parties that could look forward to constitutional politics and the possibility of real influence.	Clearly highlights that the early Meiji period did witness the emergence of two political parties, who hoped to influence the new constitution within Meiji Japan.
Itagaki, founder of the Jiyuto Party, remained the leading light of the popular rights movement throughout the 1880s and he was strongly influenced by the thoughts of Rousseau and other French thinkers who called for the extension of the democratic principles of liberty, equality and happiness.	Jiyuto was founded in 1881 by Itagaki. This was heavily influenced by western ideas, especially French philosophers, and was clearly focused on issues connected to the popular rights movement, such as liberty, equality and happiness.
. . . there was a widening of engagement with politics and democracy as seen by the fact that the core membership comprised discontented intellectuals, ex-bureaucrats and personal followers of Okuma.	The following year a less extreme liberal party developed, the Kaishinto, established by Okuma. The core membership comprised discontented intellectuals, ex-bureaucrats and personal followers of Okuma. The party retained throughout an urban basis.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- both parties emerged as the Meiji regime began to prepare for a possible draft constitution
- Itagaki was from the Tosa clan, who had initially been a member of, then left, the Meiji Government
- Jiyuto party was the freedom or liberal party — clearly influenced by western thought and the language of the French Revolution — developed ideas surrounding the national rights of sovereignty
- Kaishinto was strongly influenced by British Constitutional thought and practice.

Point in Source C	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
A series of suppressive laws was expanded in the 1870s as the government attempted to control both the formation of political associations and the free discussion of politics in meetings, publications and the press.	The Meiji regime introduced a series of legislation in an attempt to suppress political freedom of speech.
In 1889 Japanese men of opinion felt that the emperor's bestowal of a constitution enhanced the nation by establishing a modern political system.	Many within the Meiji Oligarchy felt a constitution was essential in Japan's journey to becoming viewed as a modern political state.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
In regard to socialism, it was argued that since the German Kaiser was using every possible means to crush socialism, it seemed appropriate for Japan to adopt the same policy, which led to Yamagata's Home Minister, Suematsu Kenchō, advocating the use of suppressive legislation as a means to control the danger to the state, in this case invoking the Peace Police Law of 1900 to ban the Social Democratic Party.	Peace Police Law of 1900 gave the Meiji authorities the power to ban the newly established Social Democratic Party.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- highlights that the emergence of political parties were viewed as a threat by the Meiji authorities, who introduced legislation, such as the Peace Police Law, to suppress them, as the fear of socialism was spreading
- other legislation included the Peace Preservation Order, 1887
- in their desire to overturn the Unequal Treaties and be viewed as an equal by western states, political reform and a western-style constitution was viewed as essential by many within the Meiji regime.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Peace Preservation Ordinance gave the authorities the power to halt meetings at their discretion
- the Ordinance also gave the authorities complete autonomy to censor any political publications
- the Meiji authorities were also given the power to force any perceived troublemaker to leave Tokyo, which could have a huge impact upon the emerging political parties
- the Peace Preservation Ordinance was followed up by the Peace Police Act (1900) which gave the government powers to prohibit any association which attempted to organise labour, which put a damper on left-wing political activity
- in Japan 1906 another socialist party was established, but banned within a year
- the government campaign against the left-wing movement culminated in the so-called High Treason Incident in 1911. A group of left-wing socialists and anarchists were found guilty of plotting to assassinate the Emperor. 12 were executed
- political party politics continued to be dominated by clan allegiance — especially the Satsuma-Choshu domination during the Tokugawa period
- political parties were not given a huge amount of influence within the new constitution. The elected Diet had some budgetary powers, but no say in the formation of cabinets and other important political affairs
- the focal position of the Emperor as a living deity at the centre of Japanese politics also made it very difficult for any sustained political dissent
- new constitution was designed to protect the imperial institution from popular radicalism. The Imperial House was removed from politics
- from 1885-1900 all prime ministers came from the Satsuma-Choshu grouping in Ito Hirobumi's first cabinet of 1885
- during the Taisho period political parties became more dominant within cabinets
- influenced by foreign developments (such as the Russian Revolution, establishment of the Labour Party) led to demands for more social justice and equality, advanced by the social movements of the period
- Hara Kei — first 'commoner' Prime Minister — from the House of Representatives
- common institutional features with Western democracies (Bicameral chamber, franchise).

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Kenneth Pyle	Argues 'the most noteworthy change in the political system was the growth in power and influence of the parties'.
Mikiso Hane	Contends that 'the diet became an institution which provided the people with a voice in government'.
Benson and Matsumura	Believes that 'this was no western-style liberal democracy. As Article 3 of the Constitution implied, the basic aim of those drawing up the Meiji Constitution was to retain absolute (if symbolic) sovereign power in the hands of the Emperor, and actual political power in the hands of the ruling elite who acted as his advisors'.
Ian Buruma	Suggests that the Meiji constitution was 'a sickly child from the beginning'.

Question 40

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks.**

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Anglo-Japanese Alliance.	This was a joint declaration by the Japanese and British governments, an official treaty that built on the cooperation established by the 1894 Treaty of Commerce between the two nations. This was the first military treaty between a Western and Eastern Power.
Purpose	Treaty.	This warning was especially aimed at the Russians, who had been trying to establish an anti-Japanese consensus amongst the Great Powers. Both Britain and Japan had an interest in curtailing Russian expansion in the East. To indicate to the other Great Powers that Britain was not prepared to join any multinational force against Japan (such as the Tripartite intervention of 1895).
Timing	1902	This was at a time when tension between Russia and Japan was escalating. That tension would increase so that almost exactly two years later, Japan declared war on Russia. Arguably, the Treaty encouraged Japan to pursue more aggressive diplomacy with Russia, hence the outbreak in February 1904.

Point in Source D	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
Having mutually recognised the independence of China and of Korea, the High Contracting Parties (Great Britain and Japan) recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests . . .	An acknowledgement that action taken to preserve interests in China and Korea against an aggressor (Russia) would be deemed legitimate by each party.
If either Japan or Great Britain, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality . . .	Neither Britain nor Japan would enter an alliance against each other should either become engaged in war. This would deter other Powers becoming involved.
If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that Ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.	Any power that joined an attack on Britain or Japan would find itself at war with the other party. This was a firm military commitment.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- both Britain and Japan had reason to suspect Russian activity in the Far East. Britain had significant economic and imperial interests in China; and Japan viewed the Trans-Siberian railway as a direct threat to her sphere of influence, namely her favoured status in Korea, and her ambitions in Manchuria
- other countries would be far less likely to join a multinational force against the Japanese without British support. In particular, France would be unwilling to alienate Britain, and negotiations began that would end with the Entente Cordiale in 1904. This made it much more likely that an isolated Russia would have to face Japan alone, which was one of the key motivations behind the alliance for the Japanese
- this more or less guaranteed that no Power would assist Russia: neutrality would be applied in the event of a bilateral conflict; but should another nation join, they would be subject to the military provisions of the Treaty
- Russia refused to withdraw their troops from Manchuria at the end of the Boxer rebellion, as previously agreed according to the Eight Nation Occupation, thus seen as an act of aggression
- this action followed on from other perceived acts of aggression and expansion, such as the lease of the Liaodung peninsula
- geographically, Japan felt very vulnerable, especially following on from the Russian completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata took the lead in organising and manning the international force of European, American and Japanese troops
- the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900) led to an 8 nation occupation of Beijing to re-establish stability
- Russian troops failed to withdraw and occupied part of Manchuria, threatening Japan's position in relation to Korea
- 6 February 1904 — Japan cut diplomatic relations and launched attacks on Russian-held territory
- 10 February 1904 — war declared
- Russian occupation of Manchuria was certainly a catalyst to war, but arguably Japan had been looking for an excuse to challenge and prevent what they perceived to be long-term Russian expansionism in Asia
- there was a strong anti-Russian sentiment in Japan, a consequence of the profound humiliation caused by the Tripartite Intervention after the defeat of China. Russia instigated this intervention, with France and Russia, and forced Japan to hand back their recently won foothold on the mainland — the Liaodong Peninsula
- Japanese public opinion was behind a firm stance against Russia
- alliance with Britain in 1902 led to an increase in Japanese confidence when assessing getting involved in conflict. Mistrust of Russia was widespread in Britain
- the alliance with Japan was seen as a means of containing Russian expansion in the East
- another identified cause was the desire to be perceived as an equal with the west
- some elements of the Unequal Treaties were still in place — belief that a decisive victory against a western power would assist a profound change in perspective towards Japan
- the Iwakura Mission had raised awareness about global powers and their empires — inspiring imperial expansion in Japan
- there was still a fear of being colonised
- an expansionist foreign policy would also give Japan access to raw materials and overseas markets to aid industrial expansion.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Benson and Matsumara	Contends that 'the European powers' growing interest in Asia could scarcely be overlooked and this encouraged Japan's development of a more aggressive foreign policy'.
Ian Buruma	Argues that the Russo-Japanese war was the high point of Meiji militarism. Japan had been feeling bruised after the western powers had forced them to hand over some of their victory spoils in 1895, including the southern tip of Liaotung peninsula in Manchuria, which was then leased to Russia.
Bonnie B Oh	Argues that 'for Japan, imperialism was a means of attaining equality with the west'.
Andrew Gordon	Argues that 'The Russians came to rival the Japanese position on Korea. They challenged it in Manchuria as well as by seizing the leasehold for the tip of the Liaodong peninsula in 1898'.

Section 6 — Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939.

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 41

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that there was a revolutionary situation in Germany between 1918 and 1919, but there was not a revolution:

- on 30 September 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II announced the democratisation of government, and on 3 October 1918, Prince Max of Baden was appointed as the head of Germany's new civilian government. With support from moderate parliamentarians, Max's October Reforms changed Germany from a military dictatorship into a parliamentary monarchy
- the day after his appointment, Prince Max opened peace negotiations with the USA. However, the terms offered by the Allies were consistently rejected by the High Command. With his efforts being thwarted by these conservative elements, Max threatened to resign. Ludendorff was summoned by the Kaiser and relieved of command on the morning of 26 October 1918
- Max's October Reforms had seemingly not gone far enough and on 29 October 1918, sailors mutinied at Wilhelmshaven. This spread to Kiel on 3 November and then to Bremen and to Hamburg. Soviets were quickly established across Germany
- on Saturday 9 November 1918, Prince Max and the Kaiser spoke by telephone. For the first time, the Kaiser seemed to accept the inevitability of abdicating as Kaiser, but hoped to retain the Prussian throne. With no reply to a further pre-arranged call with the Kaiser, Max (in an illegal move) issued a communiqué announcing the abdication of Wilhelm II both as Emperor and as Prussia's king
- events came to a head with the declaration of the republic by Philipp Scheidemann on the balcony of the Reichstag building. On the same day, Prince Max transferred the power of the Chancellorship to Friedrich Ebert
- although soviets had sprung up quickly, they were not dominated by the revolutionary Spartacists. However, the SPD leadership feared this is what might happen and thus, moved quickly to establish an interim government that included the radical Independent Socialists (USPD) in an attempt to draw these more radical members away from allure of the Spartacists
- Ebert set up this Provisional Government — the Council of People's Commissars — made up of three men from the SPD and three from the USPD
- on 10 November 1918, Ebert and General Gröner discussed matters by phone. A deal was struck — the Ebert-Gröner Pact. The army would be left alone to run its own affairs without political interference and in return, they pledged their support for the Republic. The army, along with bands of returning soldiers — the *Freikorps* — would crush any Spartacist and Communist uprising. These latter groups felt betrayed by Ebert who was also a Marxist — albeit a more moderate one. The Ebert-Gröner pact was used on several occasions to prevent any revolutionary situation from further developing
- the Stinnes-Legien Agreement. Between 8–12 November 1918, German trade unions, led by Carl Legien and big business, led by Hugo Stinnes, met. They issued their agreement on 15 November — workers would resume full production in the factories, and strikes would cease. It was a clear attempt to draw workers away from the allure of Communism, but it alienated many of the powerful elites and big business
- on 15 November the Central Working Association (Z.A.G.) was created which established the principle of workers' rights, trade union negotiating rights with binding arbitration on disputes and an eight-hour day with no loss of pay. However, the structure of the economy remained unchanged. Capitalism was left intact
- Hugo Preuss had been appointed to draft a constitution as early as November 1918 by the provisional government — The Council of People's Commissars. The Constitution was generally well received by the German people and was later ratified by the National Assembly in August 1919 by 262 votes to 95
- the judiciary and the civil service remained unreformed, and the bureaucratic functions of the new republic continued as before. Here, there was no radical change and no revolution
- in December 1918 the National Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils voted to support Ebert's preference for elections to a constituent assembly thereby endorsing his moderate views

- Ebert's moderate position was challenged by Spartacists (and other radical socialists) who argued that he was stopping the revolutionary impetus which defeat had set in motion
- in December 1918, the USPD left the government because they felt the revolution was stalling under Ebert's leadership
- in January 1919, the Spartacists attempted to initiate a Bolshevik-style revolution, but this uprising was crushed by Ebert's government using the army and the *Freikorps* — as per the Ebert-Gröner pact. This permanently alienated the Communists (KPD) from the more moderate SPD.

Evidence which supports the view there was not even a revolutionary situation, but simply widespread discontent:

- rather than being revolutionary in nature, the widespread discontent in the autumn of 1918 was more due to prolonged war weariness. Following the 'Turnip Winter' of 1916 to 1917, by the autumn of 1917, Germans had faced even more significant food shortages at home. The situation had worsened both on the home front and on the military front by the autumn of 1918
- by 8 August 1918, Operation Michael (the Ludendorff Spring Offensive) had collapsed, and the German army was in full retreat. Ludendorff himself recorded this in his diary as the 'black day of the German Army' and with the entry of the USA into the war in 1917, Germany now faced a foe with limitless resources and materiel
- the sailors' revolts were not a politically motivated revolution — they had learned of plans to send them to sea to engage the Royal Navy. At the same time, they had learned of the on-going peace negotiations and many sailors objected to being sacrificed in a now pointless engagement
- SPD deputy Gustav Noske arrived in Kiel and was enthusiastically welcomed, but he had orders from the new government and the SPD leadership to bring the uprising under control. He had himself elected chairman of the soldiers' council and reinstated peace and order
- by 1918, the impact of the Spanish Flu pandemic was being acutely felt in Germany with its undernourished and underfed population
- by the autumn of 1918, Germany faced no realistic prospect of winning the war and Germans were desperate for peace.

Evidence which suggests that there was a revolution in Germany between 1918 and 1919:

- Germany became a republic on 9 November 1918. This was indeed a revolutionary change to the fundamental structures of power with the country
- similarly, the Kings and Princes of the German states were also toppled. On 7 November 1918, the nearly 800-year-old Wittelsbach monarchy in Bavaria collapsed. This was replicated in all German states and marks a revolutionary change in the power structures of the country
- on 9 November 1918, Philipp Scheidemann declared Germany to be a republic on the balcony of the Reichstag building. Later that day, Karl Liebknecht announced the creation of Germany as a Soviet Republic. Although Scheidemann's proclamation thwarted Ebert's attempts to retain the monarchy in some form to draw workers away from Communism, the more radical threat that Liebknecht posed was a more pressing consideration. Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg formed the Spartacist League on 11 November 1918
- sixteen Spartacists were killed in Berlin in 1918 when the Freikorps opened fire. This deepened the split in the Berlin working class movement
- on 29 December 1918, more radical members of the Independent Socialists (USPD) resigned from Ebert's provisional government and the prospects of a revolution seemed to grow
- on 31 December 1918, the Spartacists declared themselves to be the KPD — the Communist Party of Germany and a few days later, the Spartacus Revolt commenced
- on 6 January 1919, the KPD (Spartacists) began an uprising in Berlin — they declared themselves to be the new government of Germany and were actively agitating for the overthrow of Ebert's government. Ebert called in the army and the Freikorps. On 7 January, over 500,000 Berliners marched to overthrow Ebert's moderate government. This certainly constitutes an attempted revolution. Two hundred people were killed in Berlin during the Spartacist Revolt
- in mid-January 1919, both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were murdered by members of the *Freikorps*
- in March 1919, fighting again broke out in Berlin, with more than 1,200 killed in clashes between striking workers and the *Freikorps*

- between November 1918 and May 1919, a soviet republic was proclaimed by Kurt Eisner in Bavaria — the *Räterepublik*. Following Eisner's assassination in February 1919, a further Bavarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed by Max Levine in April 1919. The national government decided to put an end to this challenge to its authority. The Bavarian republic was suppressed, again using the *Freikorps*. Over 700 were killed
- the ZAG was also revolutionary because it meant that for the first time in Germany there was a radical shift in the balance of power away from industrialists and towards trade unions and workers
- Preuss' constitution must also be regarded as revolutionary. For the first time, the structures and rights of the republic and its citizens were enshrined in law.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Stephen J Lee	Argues that Germany had all the ingredients necessary for revolution, yet there was a surprising degree of continuity within Germany's transition from Empire to Republic.
Detlev Peukert	Argues that Ebert's decisions from 9 November 1918 to 19 January 1919 signalled that 'the revolution was to be confined to constitutional and corporatist measures'. The existence of a democratic tradition in Germany before the revolution and the complexity of Germany's industrial and social structure 'meant that any radical break with the past was impossible.'
William Carr	Argues that the achievements of the revolution were undoubtedly limited. The structure of Germany was hardly affected by the revolution. The spirit of Imperial Germany lived on in the unreformed civil service, the judiciary, and the officer corps. Nor did the powerful industrial barons have much to fear from the revolution.
Eberhard Kolb	Argues that the revolutionary mass movement was essentially a failure both in its moderate phase and in its second radical phase. One can speak of 'a revolution that ran aground, and one with which none of the main political groups wished to be identified. Scarcely anyone in Germany had wanted the revolution to develop and come to stop in the way it did.'

Question 42

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that German hatred of the Treaty was entirely justified:

Territorial:
- there were strong objections to the territorial clauses of the treaty. Germany lost 10% of its land and c.13% of its territory. 12.5% of its citizens were also lost (c.6.5 million Germans)
- Alsace-Lorraine was lost to France and the creation of a Polish Corridor divided Germany. The corridor also left Germans trapped in what became Polish territory and therefore under a foreign government, and large numbers of Sudeten Germans immediately became citizens of the new Czechoslovakia
- Ebert believed that the Allies would return Alsace-Lorraine to France, Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium and Schleswig to Denmark — but he believed that the amount of territory to be taken to create Poland would be small. Clause 80 was inserted into the Treaty to prevent Germany from uniting with Austria (the Austrians had voted for this on 12 Nov 1918.) This was felt to be vindictive
- the Saar industrial region was to be controlled by the League of Nations (until 1935 when it voted to re-join the greater Germany) the loss of this territory resulted in Germany losing 48% of its iron ore capacity, 16% of its coal production capacity and 15% of its agricultural capacity
- Germany lost all its overseas colonies. These were handed to the victors under the overall authority of the League of Nations
- Germans complained bitterly that they had not been accorded 'equal power status' at the peace conference. What emerged was not negotiated, but a *Diktat*.

Military:
- the military terms of the treaty were detested by Germany because they left the country vulnerable to attack and wholly unable to defend itself. For example, Memel was seized by Lithuania in 1920
- the army was reduced to 100,000 men and conscription was banned
- the navy was stripped of ships and was only allowed 12 small vessels overall, ostensibly to control its coastline
- Germany was allowed no airforce, no tanks and no submarines
- the Rhineland was demilitarised to create a buffer zone between France and Germany and to allow France to invade Germany easily if the German government breached the terms of the treaty. Germans detested this
- traditional elites and the upper echelons of the armed forces hated the military clauses.

War Guilt:
- Clause 231 — the 'War Guilt' Clause — was regarded by Germans as humiliating. Germans believed that the causes of the war were international and that no one country was to blame
- war guilt was also psychologically damaging for Germans because it meant that German troops, sailors, and airmen had died in vain and were dishonoured. No other country was forced to sign an admission of War Guilt
- by accepting the Treaty — even though it had no choice but to do so — the newly elected democratic government was blamed for Germany's humiliation and war guilt, perhaps more than any aspect of the treaty, and became a focal point for right-wing nationalist opposition to the republic and to democracy
- resentment of the Treaty enabled conservatives and extreme nationalists such as the Nazis to argue that democracy was un-German and parliamentarianism weak and ineffectual and a foreign imposition.

Reparations:
- Clause 232 — Reparations — by accepting Clause 231, there was a legal basis for imposing reparations payments upon Germany
- Germany's economic crisis in 1923 was also blamed directly on the Treaty and reparations were viewed as little more than an attempt to destroy Germany
- the terms of the reparations had not been agreed in 1919 and Germans felt it had been vindictive to make them wait two years, until the Inter-Allied Conference in London in 1921
- compared with previous reparations payments, the 132,000 million Marks to be paid angered many Germans and would have a significant impact on the German economy during the 30-year period of reparations.

Evidence which supports the view German hatred of the Treaty was not entirely justified:

Territorial:
- although Germany lost a significant amount of territory in the east and the west and her overseas colonies, the country was otherwise left intact. Germany generally retained its territorial integrity and had not suffered any significant damage to its land or industry during the war
- Germany did declare war on three separate nations — France, Russia, Great Britain
- although Germans complained about the impact which the Polish Corridor would have, the majority population living there were Polish
- the territorial losses Germany suffered were nothing like the territorial confiscations imposed by Germany on Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918
- in the war with France of 1870–1871, Alsace-Lorraine had been taken by Prussia. Could Germany realistically have expected any other outcome from Versailles, especially after their treatment of Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918?

Military:
- although the German military machine was stripped back by Versailles, this meant that Germany could concentrate on building up a crack military elite
- there was never any real prospect of Germany being invaded by France or by Russia in the short term. Indeed, the chaos caused by France's miscalculated occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 meant that the French were unlikely to do something similar again without the support of other European powers, especially Britain
- after the war and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, middle and eastern Europe was a jumble of politically weak states, none of which presented any threat to Germany at all.

War Guilt:
- war guilt may have been experienced by Germans as humiliating and dishonourable, but there is little doubt that Germany's actions on the run up to 1914 were indeed the main cause of the war
- Germany encouraged Austria to go to war with Serbia, and Germany failed to understand that Britain would defend Belgian neutrality
- German aggression was also evident in its attempts, from 1908, to overtake Britain in the building of Dreadnoughts. This caused an arms race
- war guilt was far less important as a principle to the Allies than it was to the Germans. For the Allies it was thought to be essential to have war guilt to be able to rationalise punishing for Germany in the form of, for example, reparations.

Reparations:
- although the final figure for reparations — 132,000 million marks — was a huge sum, it was comparatively a much less harsh fine than that imposed on France by Germany in 1871, with a greatly reduced timescale for repayments (5,000 million Francs to be paid back in five years)
- Germany was supposed to pay about 7% of its annual income per annum, but in fact never paid more than 3%
- German industry had been left wholly undamaged by occupation in the war
- the reparations clearly did not have a huge economic impact as by 1927, the Gross National Product (GNP) of the Weimar Republic (with its reduced resources and population) exceeded that of the entire German Reich of 1913.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
A J Nicholls	Argues that the terms of the Treaty were justified and stated that 'On the whole, the German vision of the peace would have left their country rather more powerful vis-a vis its European neighbours than when it entered the war.'
Richard J Evans	Proposes that Treaty of Versailles was greeted with incredulous horror by the majority of Germans. The sense of outrage and disbelief that swept through the upper and middle classes like a shockwave was almost universal and had a massive impact on many working-class supporters of the moderate Social Democrats as well.
Stephen J Lee	Contends that 'Objectively, the terms of the Treaty of Versailles can largely be seen as justified by the need to safeguard against the very real threat posed by Germany and to give viability to the new democracies of Europe.' However, because the Allies excluded Germany from the peace negotiating process, 'Germany came to see itself as a victim without actually being destroyed.'
Ruth Henig	Argues that Versailles meant that the parties of the moderate left and centre found themselves 'increasingly on the defensive against nationalists and supporters of the former regime.' The treaty was a significant factor in the recovery of right-wing political forces from 1919.

Question 43

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Nazis successfully consolidated their power and that a dictatorship had been created by the end of 1934:

- within days of Hitler gaining the Chancellorship in January 1933, the Nazis began consolidating their power. On 4 February 1933, the police were granted powers to stop any political meetings. On 14 February, the KPD's Berlin offices were raided by the police and on 24 February, they were permanently closed down. On 22 February 1933, thousands of SA and SS members were sworn in as 'auxiliary' police officers
- on 28 February 1933, upon Hitler's request, Hindenburg signed 'The Decree for the Protection of the German People' — The Reichstag Fire Decree. The Decree cancelled freedoms and civil liberties enshrined in the Weimar constitution
- with the establishment of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on 13 March 1933, all media formats in Germany came under the control of Josef Goebbels
- on 21 March 1933, a church service was organised at the army garrison church in Potsdam — The Day of Potsdam. Hindenburg and the Kaiser's son attended. Hitler appeared to have blessing of Germany's old conservative elites and furthered the Nazi consolidation of power
- two days later, the 'Law for Terminating the Suffering of the People and the Nation' was proposed by Hitler in a speech at the Kroll Opera House — the Enabling Act. It became law the next day on 24 March 1933 and became the 'de facto' constitution of the new Reich
- despite his reservations, the Vice-Chancellor, Franz von Papen, the leader of the *Zentrum,* Catholic Centre Party and the 74 votes of his party were won by reassurances given by Hitler on the continuing rights which would be afforded to the Catholic Church. To ensure the passage of the Act, various concessions were offered. The Act was renewed in 1937 and again in 1939
- acting illegally, Göring, as the Reichstag's Presiding Officer, reduced the required quorum from 432 to 378 by not counting the votes of the legally elected, yet absent, KPD deputies. This made it easier to secure the two-thirds majority required to fundamentally alter the Weimar Constitution. The Law became an Act on 24 March 1933 by 444 votes to 94
- with the 7 April 1933 'Law for the Restoration of Professional Civil Service', schools, courts and government departments were purged of Jewish and political opponents
- on the May Day holiday of 1 May 1933, the Nazis took over offices belonging to Germany's trade unions. The next day, these unions were eliminated and replaced by the DAF (*Deutsche Arbeits Front*), headed by Dr Robert Ley. The associated KdF (*Kraft durch Freude*) offered cruises, holidays (eg Prora on Rugen Island) and the Beauty of Labour organisation (*Schönheit der Arbeit*) aimed to improve working conditions. The *Gleichschaltung* of labour organisations had been completed
- by the summer of 1933, political opposition had been neutralised. On 22 June, the SPD were banned and shortly thereafter, the DNVP voted to dissolve itself. Finally, on 14 July 1933, the Law Against the Formation of New Parties was passed and Germany effectively became a one-party dictatorship
- the regime concluded a Concordat with the Vatican on 20 July 1933. In return for the Catholic Church agreeing to remove itself from political activities, the position and status of the Church within Germany was guaranteed. This won over many Catholics in Germany. Hitler also removed Germany from a Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations in October 1933
- in January 1934, the power of the Länder was destroyed, and Nazi governors were installed to run the various German states. The *Gleichschaltung* of all levels of government, both local and federal, was almost complete
- the Nazis also used fear and intimidation to consolidate their power. In April 1933, the secret police, the Gestapo, was established and the range of offences that carried the death sentence was vastly increased. Role of the SS and Gestapo
- the 'Night of the Long Knives' (Operation Hummingbird) commenced on 30 June 1934. The Nazis were fearful of Röhm's intentions with his 3 million-strong S.A. Leading members of the S.A. and other political opponents were murdered. Röhm had proposed merging the S.A. with the army, and his execution met with approval from the army high command. A potential leadership rival, Gregor Strasser, met a similar fate, as did former Chancellor, von Schleicher. On 5 July 1934, the Reichstag voted to change the law and legalised the purge. Through legal means, Hitler had further consolidated Nazi power

- by the summer of 1934, the terminally ill Hindenburg still had the power to dismiss Hitler and was the titular head of the German armed forces, with the power to declare war and make peace. On 1 August, the 'Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich' was passed by the Reichstag, whereby the offices of Chancellor and President would be merged. Within an hour of Hindenburg's death, the following day, Hitler announced he had assumed the title of Führer — Chancellor and President combined in one role and the Nazi consolidation of power was complete
- the question of the combined office of Führer and Chancellor was put to the German people in a plebiscite on 19 August 1934. In the vote, 89.9% of Germans voted in favour of the merged titles. Shortly after, it became compulsory for both members of the armed forces and civil service to swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler.

Evidence which supports the view that the Nazis had not successfully consolidated their power and that a dictatorship had not been fully created by the end of 1934:

- despite the raft of legal measures, there were limitations which restricted the Nazis' consolidation of power by the end of 1934
- Hitler avoided making any large-scale changes to the original Cabinet of January 1933. Several members of this, including von Papen, were critics of Nazi extremism
- many workers, especially among those who had long connections with the trade unions and the SPD or the KPD, continued to maintain their traditional links with banned socialist organisations. Despite the creation of the DAF and the KdF, the Nazis did not succeed in breaking the traditional party loyalties of workers, and workers expressed their dissatisfaction through strikes and go-slows
- in 1933, the leadership of the SPD migrated to Prague in Czechoslovakia (and then Paris from 1938) and formed SOPADE. They organised underground resistance groups and arranged the printing and distribution of leaflets criticising the regime which were then smuggled across the border for dissemination. SOPADE also organised underground socialist groups such as the Berlin Red Patrol and the Hanover Socialist Front who distributed leaflets and organised a 'whispering' propaganda campaign against the regime which hindered the Nazi consolidation of power
- in May 1934, German Protestants met at Barmen to discuss a new church — the Confessional Church. Members of the Confessional Church felt that the new Reich Church had corrupted Christian teachings, and by making it subservient to the state, it had introduced aspects of Nazi ideology that contradicted the Christian gospel. There were high levels of religious observance in Germany in the 1930s and the creation of a rival church hindered the Nazi consolidation of power
- despite its popularity, many young people quickly came to resent the uniformity and regimentation of the various branches of the Hitler Youth and formed counter-culture groups that rejected Nazism
- although they were initially enthusiastic about Nazism, many small farmers and artisan workers (the *Mittelstand)* quickly became ambivalent to Nazism. Factors such as the tight control of credit, the preference for awarding contracts to big business and the slowness of official agencies to pay their bills meant that many *Mittelstand* businesses went bankrupt
- the aristocratic officer class within the armed forces remained suspicious of Hitler and Nazism. Hitler had inherited two officers from the Weimar era who led the army — von Blomberg and von Fritsch. Hitler regarded them as hindrances in his consolidation of power, but he could not dismiss them for fear of alienating the army's aristocratic officer corps. This hindered the consolidation of power
- among some of the traditional elite there was considerable discussion of replacing Hitler. Count Helmut von Moltke's Kreisau Circle centred on a group of army officers and professionals who came together to oppose Hitler, beginning in 1933
- for the first few years of the regime, Hitler was forced to move cautiously for fear of upsetting these old elites. This limited the Nazi consolidation of power.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Neil Gregor	Argues that 'The early years of Hitler's rule were characterised by a substantial degree of cooperation between the Nazis and the conservative establishment which did much to stabilise the regime in the initial period.'
Jeremy Noakes	Argues that one explanation for the regime's initial relative success is that it created an 'overarching consensus by mobilising the German people behind a programme of national revival identified with Hitler's leadership.' Furthermore, the traditional German elites — army, civil service, business, and professionals — 'perceived in National Socialism some aims and values which they shared, most notably a strong German nationalism.
Robert Gellately	Argues that 'Hitler wanted to create a dictatorship, but he also wanted to support the people. In the short term, Hitler conveyed a sense of strong leader who was in charge. . . after the years of upheaval that marked the Weimar Republic. . . he soon won patriotic acclaim.'
Ian Kershaw	Views the Night of the Long Knives and the death of Hindenburg as pivotal moments in the Nazi consolidation of power and argues that: 'Hitler was now institutionally unchallengeable, backed by the 'big battalions', adored by much of the population. He had secured total power.'

Question 44

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Hitler's rule was chaotic:

- chaos resulted from the charismatic nature of Hitler's leadership. Everyone relied on the leader with no clear power structures, nor command structures
- power was concentrated in the hands of the Führer, but beneath him there was a confusing array of state and party institutions cutting across each other's jurisdictions but all seeking to 'work towards the Führer'
- just as barons owed loyalty to a feudal monarch, so Nazi leaders owed loyalty to the Führer. Hitler saw loyalty in personal not institutional terms, so he did not mind Göring or Himmler building up great power so long as they remained completely loyal to him. The result was that the Nazi leaders constantly quarrelled with each other, and the overall structure of government was reduced to a mess of constantly shifting power bases, or warring factions. There were, for example, multiple offices within government which claimed to speak for the Führer
- this system created jealous rivalries, which served to enhance Hitler's power, but seriously undermined efficient government
- although there was a complex police system, its efficiency was dependent on the willing cooperation of millions of Germans
- government was fragmented and the requirement for Hitler's approval in decision-making meant overlapping and competing agencies had to work against each to gain access to Hitler and receive his approval
- Hitler was lazy and preferred to spend time in his mountain retreat rather than get involved with the routine business of government. These habits caused confusion and resulted in contradictory policies and chaotic government.

Evidence which supports the view that Hitler's rule was, to a degree, efficient:

- internal rivalries generated a degree of efficiency as rivals sought to outdo each other in pursuit of policies of which Hitler would approve
- the extensive police machine and the popularity of Hitler's policies made opposition very difficult
- Hitler inherited, and used effectively, an already well-established administrative and industrial structure which he did not disrupt, and which continued to function
- traditional institutions such as the civil service cooperated with the regime
- the Nazi Party had a series of sections reaching right down to local block units seeking to ensure that all Germans complied with the regime. The key positions were the *Gauleiter*, at the top of the regional structure, and the block leader at the bottom. But although the component organisations of the party greatly expanded, the party's power did not develop to pose any threat to Hitler
- although Hitler's style of leadership created fierce rivalry among his underlings, this was a calculated policy of divide and rule. People were dependent on Hitler's approval and so his intentions were decisive
- Hitler's place at the centre of the regime was never seriously challenged.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Martin Brozsat	Argues that the Hitler state was chaotic and polycratic and he had to operate against a background of changing structures and institutional circumstances.
Tim Kirk	Proposes that powerful leading figures in the party built personal empires, which were semi-independent of any other control than Hitler's approval. The result was chaotic government characterised by internal rivalries and conflicts.
Frank McDonough	Argues that, in some ways, Nazi rule was indeed remarkably efficient.
Jeremy Noakes	Argues that Hitler's tendency to create new offices and agencies without establishing clear lines of demarcation of responsibility with existing government departments produced a continual struggle for dominance over spheres of responsibility. The outcome was an extreme fragmentation of government.

Question 45

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Nazi economic policies were successful:

- public work schemes introduced by Brüning, von Papen and von Schleicher were continued by the Nazis through the Law to Reduce Unemployment of June 1933
- prior to the Nazis taking power in 1933, Brüning introduced deflationary policies which drastically cut the government deficit and lowered prices
- public work schemes included the building of new roads — the *Autobahnen*
- the so-called 'Battle for Work' also included the government lending money to private companies so they could create jobs
- the Labour Service and Emergency Relief Schemes put thousands into work and were labour-intensive
- the regime's attempts to reduce unemployment were a success. In 1933, unemployment stood at 26%. By 1936, this had fallen to 7.4%. By 1938, there were only 0.2 million unemployed workers in the Reich
- the agricultural depression, which pre-dated the Great Depression, was dealt with by the Reich Food Estate (Sept 1933) which took control of the planning and organisation of agriculture, and in the same month, the Reich Entailed Farm Law attempted to improve the security of ownership of land for the owners of small farms
- in the summer of 1934, Hjalmar Schacht, who had been appointed President of the Reichsbank in May 1933, launched his New Plan, the aim of which was to make the German economy independent of the world economic system — autarky
- in 1934 Schacht negotiated a series of bilateral trade agreements between Germany and countries in South America and south-eastern Europe aimed at preventing Germany running up a foreign currency deficit while still being able to acquire raw materials
- the volume of imports into Germany dropped and by 1938, were lower than the 1928 level
- Schacht also introduced Mefo Bills, bills issued by the government as payment for goods — these were promissory notes used for a system of deferred payments to finance and hide German re-armament
- by 1936, the economy had recovered sufficiently to allow Hitler to pursue rearmament. However, Schacht expressed doubts that Germany could afford this. He was replaced by Göring, who set about making Germany more self-sufficient. The 'guns versus butter' debate
- Göring's Four Year Plans were launched to increase production of oil, rubber and steel and the production of synthetic substitutes
- between 1937 and 1938, the money spent on the military rose to 10 billion RM. By 1938 to 1939 this had risen to 17 billion RM
- between 1933 and 1938, income levels for key groups in society rose — farmers by 41%, big business by 141% and industrial workers by 25%
- on average, real wages were higher in 1938 than a decade earlier
- in 1929, government revenue was 9 billion RM. By 1939, this had risen to 17.7 billion RM.

Evidence which supports the view that Nazi economic policies were not entirely successful:

- the reduction of unemployment was in part the result of an upturn in world trade, rather than because of Nazi policies. However, Nazi policies that encouraged women to leave the workplace, forced Jewish people out of their jobs and the introduction of conscription did help reduce unemployment levels
- some credit might be given to the coming to fruition of pre-1933 measures taken by Brüning
- the 'Battle for Production', which had aimed to increase the production of foodstuffs, ultimately failed
- there was also a growing lack of consumer goods — the 'guns versus butter' debate
- agriculture continued to be in difficulty. It suffered from a lack of machinery and manpower, particularly as resources were diverted to war production and conscription denied farming of manual labour
- Germany continued to import key raw materials such as copper to sustain rearmament and by 1936, had used up its reserves of raw materials and thus, was forced to buy raw materials, such as oil on the open market. As a result, the cost of Germany's imports began to rise again by 1939 — from 4.2 billion RM in 1933 to 5.4 billion RM in 1938

- Schacht's 'New Plan' never solved the problem of Germany's ability to afford to import large quantities of food and of raw materials for rearmament
- Göring's attempt to make Germany self-sufficient (autarky) via the Four-Year Plans was not a success. For example, by 1938 Germany was running a trade deficit of 432 million RM
- despite the acquisition of foreign territory and resources (eg, The Anschluss with Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938), none of the industrial targets laid out in the Four-Year Plan was achieved by 1939
- increasingly from 1936, national debt rose significantly with the Nazi government spending far more than its revenue. For example, by 1939, national debt had risen from 13.9 billion RM in 1933, to 41.7 billion RM by 1939
- considerable sums were spent on the manufacture of ersatz synthetic goods which were more costly than their natural counterparts. For example, Buna rubber and the use of coal to produce oil
- most workers did not hugely benefit from Nazi economic policies. Whilst the incomes for big business more than doubled, incomes for workers rose by a more modest 25%
- the *Mittelstand* failed to benefit, despite Nazi promises. Small business and artisans became increasingly squeezed and were unable to compete with larger firms in fixed price markets
- the rise in real wages was very modest. These gains were offset by the average working week rising from 43 hours in 1933 to 47 hours by 1939
- autarky, in terms of foodstuffs, Germany only met its target for grain and potatoes. The self-sufficiency in terms of the production of vegetables, meats and fats was not achieved, still leaving the nation reliant on imports by 1939.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Tim Kirk	Argues that many of the policies associated with the Nazi economic recovery were products of the Weimar Republic and were not unusual in other countries. The Nazis had the good fortune to come to power at a time when the world economy was beginning to recover anyway but took measures to promote and accelerate the recovery in Germany.
Adam Tooze	Argues that 'the German economy, like its American, British and Japanese counterparts, began its recovery in the summer of 1932.' The economic impact of measures taken after January 1933, therefore, 'should not be exaggerated.' Tooze downplays work creation and motorisation policies. Instead, it was rearmament that from the outset propelled Nazi economic recovery.
Wolfgang Benz	Argues that the German economy recovered more quickly from the depression than the economies of other countries. In part this was 'the result of long-term economic cycles, but mostly it was due to the effect of the government's path towards autarky and rearmament, pursued and guided with the help of state contracts from 1934 on.' Moreover, Schacht's financing schemes 'were as ingenious as they were adventurous.'
Richard Overy	Argues that 'By any long-term measurement, the achievement of the 1930s was not very remarkable. Even by 1937, the country was only just above the level reached some 25 years before. From 1936 onwards, all the indices of growth began to slow down.'

Section 6 — Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 46

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
The government, always a heavy borrower, benefitted as the national debt was virtually wiped out.	Suggests that the German government was able to eradicate most of the nation's debts caused by borrowing, mainly during the war.
However, unable to cope with the growing economic and social problems facing Germany, Cuno's government resigned after only 9 months in office on 12 August 1923.	Suggests that the inability of the government in dealing with the hyperinflation crisis had a political dimension and ultimately led to the collapse of Cuno's government.
Workers in the factories and on the farms found life very difficult since prices always raced ahead of wages, and workers faced a steadily diminishing standard of living.	Suggests that prices rose ahead of wages and for the working classes, this meant declining standards of living and purchasing power.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- following the French and Belgian invasion of the Ruhr on 11 January 1923 (resulting from Germany's failure to deliver a consignment of telegraph poles as part of reparations payments), the government of Wilhelm Cuno announced a programme of passive resistance towards the occupying forces. With Cuno's failure to control inflation during 1923, the SPD withdrew their support from his coalition government and Gustav Stresemann was appointed as Chancellor
- the Ruhr was Germany's industrial heartland and produced 71% of its coal and 80% of its steel
- by simply printing more money, inflation took over and the German Mark quickly lost value against foreign currencies. In 1914, there were twenty Marks to one Pound Sterling. By 1922, the exchange rate was 35,000 Marks to the Pound, and by late 1923, there were 16 billion Marks to the Pound.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Germans who had invested in War Bonds after 1914 saw their value diminish to miniscule amounts. Those who lived on fixed pensions, state employees who lived on fixed weekly or monthly wages, and those who relied on annuities, suffered greatly. For workers, wage rises to compensate for hyperinflation never kept pace with retail price rises and unskilled workers had lost 50% of their purchasing power by September 1923
- by the summer of 1923, farmers were hoarding food and not placing it on the market for sale; people in towns and cities across the country began to experience serious food shortages. Bartering for food became commonplace. Contemporary reports in 1923 reported rises in food poverty, fuel poverty, incidences of scurvy, and a significant rise in suicide rates. Crime rates rose and seven times the number were convicted of handing stolen goods in 1923 than in 1913
- however, some Germans fared well in the hyperinflation crisis; those who rented their property through long-term rental schemes were able to pay their rents with near worthless currency. Farmers also had easy access to food supplies and did not suffer to the same extent as their city-based compatriots. Those who borrowed to buy their own home found they could easily afford to pay off the balance of their mortgage. The aristocratic Junker class was barely affected since most of their capital was tied up in land, which did not lose its value to the same extent as paper currency

- by using worthless currency, large corporations such as Krupps and Thyssen were able to buy up struggling factories and repay debts. The government was also able to repay debts by using an increasingly worthless currency and more affluent Germans with access to foreign exchange were able to convert their Marks to more stable currencies such as Sterling or the US Dollar and were not significantly impacted. Industrialists such as Hugo Stinnes were able to acquire cheap credit and bought up struggling competitors. Such was the growth in Stinnes' companies during the hyperinflation crisis that by the end of it, he owned 1,535 companies and 20% of all Germany's industries
- the Bavarian government opposed the ending of passive resistance and in September 1923, briefly considered marching on Berlin to seize power. Bavaria's northern neighbours, Saxony and Thuringia, with far-left governments, appeared to be heading for Communist insurrection, until thwarted by the federal government and the *Reichswehr*. Hitler's attempted Putsch in Munich in November 1923
- there was a wave of Communist-inspired strikes across Germany in the summer of 1923 and the crisis provided extremists on the left and right (KPD and NSDAP) with an opportunity to increase their support
- in November 1923, Stresemann appointed financier, Hjalmar Schacht, to the Reichsbank. Schacht established the *Rentenmark* currency (replaced by the *Reichsmark* in 1924), and the crisis quickly ended. The Finance Minister, Hans Luther, tried to balance the budget and control inflation by sacking nearly 1 million public sector employees.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Mary Fulbrook	Argues that the 'savings, hopes, plans and assumptions and aspirations of huge numbers of people were swept away in a chaotic whirlwind. . . the psychological shock of the experience was to have longer lasting effects.'
Richard J Evans	Suggests that 'hyperinflation became a trauma whose impact affected the behaviour of Germans of all classes long afterwards.'
Alan Bullock	Argues that 'The French occupation of the Ruhr still continued (by August 1923), but the initial mood of national unity had gone. The intensification of the inflation, the desperate economic position of millions of Germans and the growth of extremism, both on the Right and on the Left, seemed to have brought the country close to civil war.'
AJP Taylor	Contends that the hyperinflation crisis 'stripped the middle classes of their savings and made the industrial magnates the absolute dictators of German economic life.'

Question 47

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
The greatest beneficiary of the international financial crisis which triggered a financial crisis in Germany in 1930 was Adolf Hitler who for many years had consistently spelled out the link between Germany's debts and a looming economic crisis.	Suggests that Hitler had been a long-standing opponent of Germany's precarious financial situation and reliance on debts.
Now that the Young Plan and Germany's debts were about to collapse under the weight of Germany's financial crisis, Hitler was in a strong position as he could claim that he had always been right, and this time people were willing to listen.	Suggests that the effects of the financial crisis enabled Hitler to politically capitalise on the widespread public anger at the financial chaos.
There are many reasons for the Nazis' triumph in the September 1930 election. The Nazis ran a well-organised campaign with effective propaganda and Hitler's image ensured an appeal to all classes.	Suggests that as well as capitalising on the effects of the financial crisis, the Nazis succeeded in the election as they had a well-run campaign, and propaganda that targeted all sections of society.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Germany's economy had been dependent on loans before 1929 (the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929) and one consequence of this was that when the slump hit Germany, American loans were withdrawn, especially from 1931 onwards. Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann had warned of this over-reliance on American capital in a speech when he warned that Germany was 'dancing on a volcano'
- between 1929 and 1932, production nearly halved and unemployment rose to 6 million. This mass unemployment was a powerful signal that the Weimar Republic was in deep crisis and many Germans concluded that it had to go
- the slump led to rapidly growing support for extremist parties and seemed to confirm all their criticisms of the democratic republic and thus, fuelled disillusion and resentment of it.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
Von Papen's industrialist friends had been terrified at the possibility of a left-wing government with army support.	Suggests that leading industrialists were instrumental in pursuing intrigue in the interests of Hitler because they feared a left-wing government supported by the army.
However, one after another, Hjalmar Schacht the financier, and Krupp, Thyssen, Bosch and Siemens the industrialists, lobbied Hindenburg and von Papen on Hitler's behalf and used their influence to gain support for Hitler.	Suggests that Hindenburg was lobbied by the industrialists because he had the final say in the appointment of a new Chancellor.
Von Papen wished to associate the Nationalists, under himself and Hugenberg, with the Nazis in a coalition which would have some two-fifths of the Reichstag seats.	Suggests that Papen wanted to harness nationalist support under himself and Hugenberg and so was prepared to enter a coalition with the Nazis.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Hindenburg from the outset of his presidency pledged to uphold the Constitution but he yearned for authoritarian government and did not like democracy. Hindenburg's use of Article 48 and the presidential system used to govern from the fall of the Müller administration until the appointment of Hitler was fundamental in ending democracy well before Hindenburg appointed Hitler in January 1933
- Papen was sure that because by the end of 1932 the Nazis were running out of money and their support at the polls had fallen, he could control Hitler and the Nazis as vice-Chancellor with Hitler as Chancellor. Papen was instrumental in getting Hitler appointed. Hindenburg had always disliked Hitler intensely ('the Bohemian corporal') and earlier on had point blank refused to appoint him as Chancellor
- in late January 1933 Hindenburg allowed himself to be persuaded to make Hitler chancellor (or was perhaps approaching senility and no longer cared?). Hitler's refusal to compromise made him seem stronger than he actually was. He called the elite's bluff by refusing to accept any office apart from the chancellorship.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- democratic government was discredited not least because little action was taken to counter the Depression between 1929 and January 1933. The social fabric of the country was breaking down and there was an increasing demand for strong, decisive government
- Brüning's chancellorship had failed to resolve the crisis quickly enough. Indeed, the fact that his policies made matters worse, strengthened opposition to the Republic among extremists like the Nazis, but also among industrialists, the army, and large landowners in the east (the *Junkers*). Brüning became known as the 'Hunger Chancellor'
- even before the 1929 crash, there were clear signs that Germany was in a vulnerable state. In particular, the agricultural depression beginning in late 1927 to early 1928 created a substantial minority of voters in the countryside who were embittered by the failure of the Republic and expressed their bitterness by voting for the Nazis after 1929 — the 'farmers' revenge'. Long before the Depression of 1929, support for, and confidence in, the Republic had been eroded because of continuing resentment of the Treaty of Versailles. Nazi propaganda capitalised on this
- the Right were able to capitalise on resentment of the Treaty and were able to present the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929 as further examples of the Republic's willingness to capitulate to the demands of Versailles and to the allies. The inability of the KPD and the SPD to work together ensured that the Nazis were never seriously opposed in the Reichstag
- frequent changes of Chancellor from 1930 to 1932 made democratic parties and democracy appear weak and ultimately, this was the second financial crisis to hit Germans within the space of six years. The anger of the electorate was directed towards Weimar politicians
- the election of November 1932 was a setback for the Nazis. Their support dropped from 37% of the vote to 33% and they lost 34 seats in the Reichstag. However, Hitler refused to settle for anything other than the Chancellorship. This was refused by Hindenburg who offered Hitler the post of Vice-Chancellor in Papen's administration
- close to bankruptcy by late 1932, the Nazis had support from powerful individuals — Thyssen along with Bosch, Krupp and Hjalmar Schacht all petitioned Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. This gave Hindenburg the impression of a far wider base of support among business elites than the Nazis had. Schleicher himself was replaced as Chancellor by Hitler on 30 January 1933.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Detlev Peukert	Argues that the end of the Republic did not happen overnight and was not the product of any single set of causes. But after 1930, the presidential regimes destroyed the Republican constitution.
Mary Fulbrook	Contends that 'the elites were not prepared to uphold democracy at any cost; most wanted some form of authoritarian government.' The NSDAP no longer seemed dangerous, and in these circumstances, Hindenburg was persuaded, by a small group including his son and von Papen, to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.
Klaus Fischer	Believes that Hindenburg, Von Papen, Von Schleicher and others tried to bypass the constitution to create a government of their own choosing hoping to control and manipulate Hitler.
Stephen J Lee	Argues that 'the Nazis came to power largely through a conspiracy.'

Question 48

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Julius Streicher.	Julius Streicher was an established and influential Nazi who proposed and organised the boycott of Jewish-owned businesses. He was one of the most anti-Semitic Nazis and owned and published the anti-Semitic newspaper *Der Stürmer*. He was also Gauleiter of Nuremberg.
Purpose	The article is a notification of the planned boycott of Jewish businesses.	It is an appeal directed towards the German public not to shop in Jewish shops or to use the services of Jewish professionals such as doctors or lawyers.
Timing	31 March 1933	The timing of the source is useful as it was written seven days after passage of the Enabling Act and one day before the Nazis planned a nationwide boycott of Jewish-owned businesses, on 1 April 1933.

Point in Source D	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
In defence against the criminal activities of Jews, and to retaliate against the insane crime committed by Jews, the Reich leadership of Germany have decided in defence against these criminals, to impose a boycott of all Jewish shops, department stores and offices beginning on Saturday 1 April 1933 at 10am.	Suggests that a boycott of all Jewish-owned business was in retaliation for crimes committed by Jewish people. The author's view is that such action was necessary because of crimes committed by Jewish people. This is emphasised by the author's description of 'criminal activities' and 'insane crime'.
We are calling on you, German women, and men, to comply with this boycott. Do not go to Jewish lawyers and do not go to Jewish doctors and do not buy from Jewish shops or stores. Show the Jews that they cannot damage Germany and disrespect its honour without punishment.	Issues an appeal to Germans to boycott all Jewish-owned businesses. His firm view is that Jewish people had acted in a disrespectful manner towards Germany and that they deserve to be punished. This is emphasised by the author's use of words such as 'honour without punishment'.
The Jews stand on the side of Germany's enemies, and we will prevent these liars from attending our schools and universities to protect us.	Argues that German Jewish people are siding with Germany's enemies. His language is threatening and suggests the state would retaliate by excluding Jewish people from formal education. The author uses language such as 'enemies' and liars'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the boycott marked the start of the Nazis' attempts to remove Jewish people from German economic life
- on the morning of 1 April 1933, S.A. members stood outside Jewish-owned businesses and shops and persuaded Germans not to use them. The Star of David was painted in front of these businesses and was often accompanied by anti-Semitic slogans. The boycott was largely unsuccessful and many Germans, despite intimidation, continued to shop in Jewish-owned businesses throughout the day
- both the President, von Hindenburg and the Foreign Minister, von Neurath, insisted that the boycott should only last one day for fear of international reaction and damage done to Germany's own economy.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service was passed on 7 April 1933. It banned all Jewish people from government employment and the Reich Entailed Farm Law of 29 September 1933 forbade Jewish people from owning farms
- the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 banned marriage between Jewish people and 'Aryans' and deprived German Jewish people of their citizenship. In August 1936, Himmler was put in charge of Jewish emigration
- on 26 April 1938, The Decree for the Reporting of Jewish Property was passed. It forced Jewish people in Germany and Austria to declare all property or assets valued at more than RM 5000
- between June and October 1938, Jewish medical practitioners were banned from having any Aryan patients. Jewish people were excluded from some commercial activities. Jewish people were forced to add 'Sara' or 'Israel' to their names and stamp their identity card with a 'J'
- the '*Kristallnacht'* pogrom of 9 to 10 November 1938 symbolised the radicalisation of the regime's anti-Semitic policies. Thousands of Jewish schools, hospitals and businesses were ransacked and destroyed. Synagogues were burned down, and at least 91 Jewish people were murdered and hundreds died because of brutal treatment in jail. Over 30,000 Jewish people were deported to concentration camps and Jewish people were forced to pay over RM 1 billion for the damage that was caused
- the Decrees for the Exclusion of Jews from Economic Life of 12 November 1938. Jewish people were banned from jobs, schools, cinemas, universities, and sports facilities. Public contracts were no longer to be awarded to Jewish-owned businesses
- on 24 January 1939, the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration was established by Göring and was headed by Reinhard Heydrich. 150,000 Jewish people were deported once punitive taxes and fees had been extracted from them
- by 1939, Jewish people had been completely excluded from all aspects of German society and from German economic, political, social, and cultural life and out through the yellow Star of David.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Tim Kirk	Suggests that 'racism was the fundamental guiding principle of Nazi ideology, and the effects of racial ideology on policymaking were pervasive. The focus of the regime's obsessive racism was the relentless persecution of the Jews.'
David G Williamson	Argues that Nazi anti-Semitic policy and actions were often 'hesitant and contradictory.' Even so, Nazi anti-Semitic policy between 1933 and 1939 was increasingly aggressive and was marked, too, by 'an increasingly accelerating tempo. . . '
Roderick Stackelberg	Contends that 'Anti-Semitism was not the main reason for Hitler's popularity, but his brutal campaign to oust Jews from German society in no way diminished his appeal to the mass of the German population.'
Lisa Pine	Argues that after 1933, Hitler's persecution of Jewish people in Germany 'became central to state policy.'

Section 7 — South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 49

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the demands of the mining industry determined government policy:

- ways in which segregation met the needs of the mining industry (1913 Land Act and migrant labour)
- creation of Native Reserves
- 1914 Riotous Assemblies Act introduced to limit violence of white worker protests
- strikes throughout period including 1914 general strike, 1919 Dock workers strike, 1920 Rand workers strike and 1922 Rand Revolt in response to the impact of legislation
- SAP legislation alienates many white workers as Botha and Smuts accused of working in collaboration with capitalism
- after the Rand Revolt many former SAP supporters change allegiance to the NP or Labour Party resulting in defeat for the SAP in 1924, suggesting the SAP had not addressed demands of poor whites
- increase in number of urban poor partly as a result of legislation
- 1911 Native Labour Registration Act set conditions for African employment, recruited Africans rurally. If job contracts were broken it could result in 2 months hard labour
- 1911 Native Regulation Act — Strikes by African workers hired under contract became criminal offence
- whites increasingly took skilled and supervisory roles following legislation including the Mines and Works Act and the 1918 Status Quo Act (establishing the 'colour bar'), promoting white economic supremacy
- 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act — Black workers not allowed Trade Unions so lack bargaining power.

Evidence which supports the view that the interests of poor whites determined government policy:

- impact of the Mines and Works Act 1911 in recognising Unions and imposing an 8-hour day
- establishment of the colour bar maintained racial divisions and higher wages for white workers
- higher inflation after the First World War led to pressure on white jobs and wages
- attempt to reduce white mine employment led to strikes
- whites able to assert pressure on mine owners through the ballot box arguably limits scope and therefore impact of government legislation
- 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act legalised bargaining power of trade unions
- 1922 Apprenticeship Act gave unionised white workers a secure position by introducing educational qualifications for apprenticeships — Africans unlikely to have met conditions due to lack of educational opportunities.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors determined government policy:

- 1913 Land Act prohibited Africans from owning or renting land outside designated Reserves
- Reserves allocated 7.5% of land in South Africa initially (extended to 13% by 1936)
- Africans could live outside of Reserves only if employed by whites
- 1920 Native Affairs Act — administrative segregation established Tribal Councils for the administration of Reserves and Advisory Councils for Africans in urban areas — all under control of the Native Affairs Department
- 1923 — Natives (Urban Areas) Act — Africans residing in cities carry passes or are liable to arrest / be expelled to the Reserves.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Harold Wolpe	Argues that the subsidisation of migrant workers in the mines and urban areas by rural areas allowed employers to pay wages below the cost of reproduction. Rural areas performed a social security function by providing welfare for the old, sick and young.
Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido	Argue that a 'union of gold and maize' was the lifeblood of the South African economy and therefore legislation was designed to support both mining and agriculture.
Thula Simpson	Contends that early segregationist legislation, including the Native Land Act and Native Affairs Act, were 'originally motivated in large part by the desire to unstitch the racial patchwork of settlement emerging in South Africa's urban areas.'
Saul Dubow	Contends that social eugenics and attitudes to race were fundamental in determining government legislation.

Question 50

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the growth of Afrikaner nationalism was due to cultural factors:

- eventual success of the campaign to recognise Afrikaans as an official language in 1925
- Malan's contribution including role as Minister in the Dutch Reformed Church and as Education Minister in Pact Government
- Gustav Preller as the 'populariser of history' translating works into Afrikaans
- perceived martyrs and Boer War heroes written into music and literature
- establishment of the FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge) in 1929 to promote Afrikaner culture (music, poetry etc)
- celebrations for the centenary of the Great Trek and Malan's 'Blood River' speech
- Afrikaner magazines including Die Huisgenoot and Die Burger intended to reach all, including isolated farms
- efforts made by extreme nationalists to exaggerate commonality and create sense of identity among Afrikaners by playing on prejudices and fears
- Ossewa Brandweg (1939) — cultural organisation which grew from Voortrekker celebrations.

Evidence which supports the view that the growth of Afrikaner nationalism was due to other factors:

Political factors:

- establishment of the National Party under Hertzog in 1914, then the Purified National Party under Malan in 1933
- role of the Dutch Reformed Church and Christian National Education — attitudes to race and neo-Calvinist theology
- establishment and influence of the Afrikaner Broederbond, 1919 and continuing influence
- Afrikaner nationalism as a political force with appeal to 'poor whites' and the white working class
- significance of Malan's Purified National Party including growing awareness the inequality of poor Afrikaners and Malan's commitment to the poor white question
- new leaders in Afrikanerdom: Purified National Party leaders young, urban intellectuals. Party founded on Christian-Nationalist principles
- exaggeration of effects of British imperialism and the fear of being overwhelmed by the black drift to the cities by Afrikaner intellectuals. Anti-capitalist stand of Afrikaner politicians including Hertzog
- failings of the United Party in combating increasing onslaught from National Party.

Socio-economic factors

- origins of attitudes to race in DRC/neo-Calvinist theology
- half of Afrikaners urbanised by 1936
- 1932 Carnegie Commission findings revealed extent of urban poverty
- establishment of Relief Funds for Afrikaners including the Reddingsdaadbond
- establishment of Afrikaner Trade Unions to win allegiance of workers (Spoorbond for Railway workers, 1934)
- impact of Great Depression and devaluation crisis 1931-1932
- falling demand for South African exports led to overcrowding in reserves and black squatter communities on the edge of towns heightening white fears of 'the black peril'
- new financial institutions to support Afrikaners including SANTAM and SANLAM
- Volkskongres of 1939 organised by FAK to investigate Afrikaner poverty levels.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
T Dunbar Moodie	Contends that cultural and religious factors contributed to the development of a 'Civil Religion' that mobilised Afrikaners, developing a sense of 'volk'.
Hermann Giliomee	Emphasises the importance of 'language manipulators' in the development of Afrikaner nationalism and cites the importance of the print media, literature and music in Afrikaans as fostering greater unity amongst Afrikaners, describing their ethnic mobilisation. Gilomee emphasises ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners.
Rob Skinner	Is of the view that the development of Afrikaner nationalism was most deeply connected to the formation of class identities in an urbanising and industrialising South Africa.
Merle Lipton	'An umbrella under which all Afrikaners could find shelter', Lipton identifies the broad appeal of Malan's National Party and argues that economic concerns 'were always a prime concern of the Afrikaner nationalist movement.'

Question 51

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the role of Jan Smuts was important in the United Party's 1948 defeat:

- split over UP and Smuts' support of 'England's war' as many Afrikaners wanted to align with Hitler and the Germans or remain neutral
- Smuts — in favour of maintenance of white control but relaxation of segregation, while supported by liberal whites, increased resentment from Afrikaners/those fearful of black influx
- NP Sauer Report seen as Afrikaner retaliation to the 'liberalism' of the UP Fagan Report
- rural producers (mostly Afrikaner) alienated by Smuts' price control policy
- Smuts' government favoured profitability of the mines over the interests of the working class (Nancy Clark and William Worger)
- Smuts increasingly criticised by Nationalists as an 'apostle of the kaffir state'
- anger at Smuts being 'absent' during war years and leaving Hofmeyer in charge of domestic affairs — Smuts criticised as being 'too international' and neglecting South Africa
- argument economy improving under the watch of Smuts as the increase in demand led to a post-war industrial boom: gross output doubled 1939-1945, white employment rose by 20%, though inflation was high
- white workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions in industry felt threatened by the breaches in the 'colour bar'
- post-war immigration schemes to attract European workers (1946). Nationalists felt this would 'plough the Afrikaner under'
- Fagan Commission appointed to assess urban Blacks/labour provisions.

Evidence which supports the view that the outcome of the 1948 election was driven by other factors:

The role of Malan and the National Party:

- war years saw Hertzog and Malan reunify the party with Hertzog speaking of 'cooperation between the two parts of national minded Afrikanerdom'
- National Party rejects Hertzog's proposal that in any new constitution English and Afrikaners should be given equal rights. Hertzog left parliament convinced his brand of nationalism no longer had a future resulting in formation of the breakaway Afrikaner Party subsequently dividing the NP
- Malan rejected the Ossewa Brandweg as a 'foreign ideology', further dividing Afrikanerdom given the OB had 250,000 members by 1942 (a quarter of Afrikaners)
- division over language — NP and supporters increasingly in favour of bilingual teachers
- increasing division during war years over relations with Britain as Malan promotes his republican message. Subsequently moderated in 1948 to aid attraction of 20% of the English-speaking electorate. National Party agreement with the Afrikaner Party
- Malan's restructuring and financial reforms of the National Party
- commissioning of the Sauer Report and recommendations including physical separation of the races.

The impact of WWII:

- tensions increase as a shortage of basic commodities, adequate housing and servicemen gaining little support in finding jobs after WWII
- 1940s saw an attempt at renewal and radicalisation of the ANC under Alfred Xuma, by 1945 there were 4000 members
- 'African Claims' published in 1943 by the ANC — written as demands rather than a polite appeal
- in the 1940s however, resistance leaders still struggled to respond to popular struggles such as the Alexandria bus boycotts
- by 1945, 158,000 Blacks were trade union members
- increasing strikes destabilising workforce: 1943-1960 large scale strikes, 1944 — African Mineworkers Union saw 25,000 strike demanding a minimum wage supported by the Council for Non-European Trade Unions dominated by the Communist Party of South Africa
- 1946 Blacks made up 79% of the population increasing fear of '*die swart gevaar*' — 'the black menace'

- Apartheid was seen by some as a policy of self-preservation. Fear that equality of the races would lead to the eventual disappearance of the white nation of South Africa
- influx control would restrict process of urbanisation, which had grown rapidly in the 1940s and threatened to create an urban proletariat
- fear over strikes, squatter camps and increasing crime in cities
- War Measures Act (1940) increases division between industrialists and workers as legislation designed in part to curb industrial unrest/control work force
- Ossewa Brandweg anti-English, sympathetic to National Socialism
- struggles to reabsorb returning troops into society along with acute housing shortage resulted in growing divisions between whites, most notably about race. Views became entrenched
- African urban population grew at an annual rate of 3.4% 1936-1946. This increased to 6.6% over the next 6 years.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Saul Dubow	Argues that Malan's anti-Smuts rhetoric was significant in the election outcome, including 'the perception that Afrikaners had been discriminated against by the Smuts' administration.'
Rodney Davenport	Highlights the importance of the Boundary Commission in the outcome of the election citing that rural voters (and therefore Afrikaners) had an electoral advantage.
Dan O'Meara	Emphasised the economic mobilisation of Afrikaners during and immediately after the war to create a single economic identity by 1948. He argues that the war enabled Malan, and not Smuts, to create a new class alliance.
Albert Grundlingh	Argues the solidarity engendered by common wartime experiences was not translated into a common post-war consciousness. 'Once out of uniform, old differences and distinctions in political outlook emerged.'

Question 52

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the contribution of the ANC was important to the growth of organised resistance between 1948 and 1960:

- number of Youth League advocated a move to militancy in the 1950s. Mandela and Sisulu had discussed prospect of an armed struggle as early as 1952
- role of the CYL in the Congress and writing of the powerful 10 point Freedom Charter in 1955
- platform and publicity for CYL leaders including Mandela to promote their ideas during the Treason Trial of 1956
- Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize
- Mandela's 'M-Plan' to tackle organisational difficulties of the ANC
- evidence of growing factions within the ANC throughout the 1950s — resulting in ANC/PAC split
- rise to prominence of Mandela and the Youth League — ideas of mass and increasingly militant action
- ANC membership grew rapidly in the 1950s from approximately 5000 in 1948 to more than 100,000 by the end of the 1950s
- as the 1950s progressed, and especially after the adoption of the Freedom Charter, the PAC provided a clear alternative to the ANC aiming — like the ANC — at the creation of a mass movement for Africans
- 1 May 1950 — National Stay Away. Violent clashes in Transvaal. First example of combined worker action/country-wide
- Mandela and others in the CYL believed they needed to act if they were to keep up with the popular mood of increasing strikes
- 1952 Defiance Campaign — jointly organised with Communist Party — established the impetus for a mass campaign. 8000 arrested
- Boycott of Bantu Education Schools in 1954. Initially successful but collapsed due to government threats
- ANC '£1 a day' campaign for improved working conditions and minimum wage — limited success
- arguably Sharpeville exposed the failings of the 1950s movement — Charterists versus Africanists.

Evidence which supports the view that other organisations contributed to the growth of organised resistance between 1948 and 1960:

- opposition organisations still divided in terms of ideology such as readiness to work with other groups, disagreements over aims and the Freedom Charter
- formation of the Congress of the People (1953)
- the Freedom Charter (1955) — brought diverse groups together
- growing African nationalism — led to formation of PAC under Robert Sobukwe in 1959
- Communist Party reforms in 1953 having previously dissolved itself
- pressure for violent action coming from across political spectrum
- Federation of South African Women founded in 1954 co-ordinated campaigns against the pass laws — demonstration of 26,000 in Pretoria
- growing trade unionism and strikes to improve working conditions and rights.

Evidence which supports the view that other organisations contributed to the growth of organised resistance between 1948 and 1960:

- evidence of armed resistance before 1960 in a number of rural uprisings
- localised resistance — Zeerust in Western Transvaal (1957) chiefs appointed by Bantu Affairs Department deposed. Similar action in Natal and Transkei
- external influences on growing resistance including Malcolm X and Che Guevara
- opposition to re-location of Sophiatown
- frustration over limits of resistance/ANC in the 1950s
- Treason Trial 1956-61 led to international publicity
- discussion of United Nations sanctions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Saul Dubow	Argues that the schisms that developed in the ANC in the 1950s could not be contained, resulting in the formation of the PAC. However, the challenge represented by the PAC to the ANC and Congress Alliance did nothing to weaken the liberation movement.
Francis Meli	Argues that the more radical ANC of the 1950s was vital in mobilising the masses to resist apartheid.
Tom Lodge	Plays down the role of the ANC in the 1950s and has instead emphasised the importance of localised and particularly rural protest.
Nigel Worden	Contends the 1950s was a decade of heightened defiance but also of lost opportunities.

Question 53

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa was the most significant influence:

- black majority rule in front line states meant SA faced 'total onslaught' from neighbouring African states. Fear of Communist influence over neighbouring black states and consequent communist support of black resistance movements operating in South Africa
- the French had relinquished control over colonies in west and central Africa and Belgians withdrew from Congo after 1960
- loss of 'buffer zone' of friendly neighbours Angola and Mozambique when Portuguese granted independence in 1975, following the coup in Lisbon
- after 1975, only Rhodesia remained as an enclave of white minority rule, although by 1978 it was barely surviving a fierce civil war and international sanctions
- collapse of Portuguese Empire meant that South Africa was virtually surrounded by African states, all potentially hostile to apartheid
- the ANC set up guerrilla bases within easy reach of Johannesburg and Pretoria — MK organised raids from Mozambique in the early 1980s
- establishment of MK training grounds and supply routes through former Portuguese colonies
- Leonard Thompson points out, between 1981 and 1983 South African commandos carried out undercover operations against every one of its neighbours.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more pressing in terms of shaping South African foreign policy:

The Cold War:

- continued support from the West as South Africa seen as a bastion against Communism and the requirement to maintain trade of uranium for nuclear weapons. SA regarded as a valuable ally
- after 1979, Reagan and Thatcher governments shared the determination to oppose the spread of communism in Africa. Pressure declines during 1980s as a result of Détente
- influence of Cold War in limiting Western pressure on SA government — failure of arms embargoes related to Cold War
- large amounts of western capital — over $26 billion — was invested in South Africa
- BUT — Labour government of 1970s and the USA veto sanctions and largely follow a pro-South African policy allowing capital and investment in the country
- successive South African governments worked hard to convince the West that only a stable, white minority government could resist communism getting a hold in South Africa
- the USSR was supplying arms to resistance movements but her involvement may have been exaggerated as a result of Cold War paranoia
- under Reagan, South Africa was seen as a key player in the struggle against the USSR. The US government sought 'constructive engagement' with the South African government
- only in the mid-1980s, during the latter stages of détente, did coverage of township violence and the brutality of security forces result in significant change from the West. The South African government fought hard to prevent Western disinvestment by starting to moderate the regime — Botha's 'adapt or die'.

Pressures from the international community:

- by 1970 process of granting independence to former British colonies in Africa was almost complete. Britain had transferred power to Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia by 1965. Between 1965-1968, power was transferred to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. Hopes that the defiant South African government could create a peaceful anti-Communist 'constellation' of southern states were dashed
- by 1977 the South African government was admitting it had few diplomatic links in Africa and Vorster was forced to concede that 'some bridges had collapsed'
- South African control of Namibia incurred the increasing hostility of the United Nations, culminating in the 1977 Security Council vote in favour of an arms embargo against South Africa
- migrant labour remained important with over a quarter of a million workers from other countries working in SA
- churches and Christian based organisations significant in spreading awareness. Sporting questions like Basil D'Oliveira affair encouraged white sympathies
- UN sanctions — pressure from the United Nations including 1968 — General Assembly requested all States and organisations 'to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid'
- media showed clashes of police and protestors and SA government became increasingly in the spotlight and criticised. 1980s often seen as a decade of funerals where violence often erupted
- economic problems such as the falling price of gold, rising price of oil, the balance of payment crisis and rising inflation drives necessity of continued negotiations
- the formation of the National Forum (NF) and the UDF in 1983. Introduction of National Service.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Thula Simpson	Suggests that the 1974 election was the last in which the apartheid government was able to campaign on a peace and prosperity platform as events in Mozambique the following year represented a huge opening for the ANC resisting the apartheid regime.
Saul Dubow	Contends that the arrival of the Cold War on South Africa's 'doorstep' created 'the spectre of the country being surrounded by hostile states directed by Moscow'. This provided opportunities for South Africa's reformers to downplay apartheid as a system of racial rule by emphasising the country's commitment to the defence of Western interests.
Leonard Thompson	Argues that whilst South Africa helped foster the argument about her role as a defender against communism 'South African foreign propaganda was well tuned to the Cold War fears and prejudices of Europeans and Americans.' But Thompson also recognises that 'Southern Africa never had a high priority on the Soviet agenda.'
James Barber and John Barratt	Argue that the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 meant that 'security was now clearly the overriding factor in regional policies' and 'the influence of the military on policy was thus strengthened.'

Section 7 — South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 54

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Jan Smuts.	Boer War General and signatory of the Treaty of Vereeniging. Deputy to Louis Botha of Het Volk in the Transvaal, Smuts was instrumental in drafting the constitution of South Africa and became Deputy Prime Minister in the South African National Party government of 1910.
Purpose	Letter.	Putting forward in a direct letter the point of view about the Transvaal's interest in this declaration of willingness. Emphasises the disagreements over what shape a union between the colonies of South Africa should take.
Timing	July 1907.	Following the granting of self-government to the Transvaal by Britain in 1906, as set out initially in the terms of Vereeniging, this letter was written a few months after Het Volk's general election win in the February 1907 Transvaal election. Constitutional discussions towards union started the following year.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to the source content provenance*
Economically the strongest, the Transvaal is also largely independent of any particular colony and because of this the chief danger and opposition will always come from the Transvaal, where you have a strong section who would prefer to snap their fingers at the rest of British South Africa.	Suggests that resistance from the Transvaal, with stronger anti-British sentiment, will be the main obstacle to union. Smuts is urging his electorate not to sacrifice future unity for Transvaal interest alone.
There is an equally strong section within the Transvaal who see in Federation only a consolidation of the 'Dutch' influence.	Suggests that there are those who fear Union would result in Afrikaner dominance. Smuts is mindful of a perceived Afrikaner bias in unity.
There are those who say that federation amounts to extreme nationalism, and that it would be far better to devote our energies to less showy tasks, to repair the losses of the recent war, to further the material welfare of the people, before we begin a federation policy.	Suggests that others see Union as just furthering their political agenda while neglecting the socio-economic problems resulting from past losses. Smuts acknowledges longer term grievances but envisages Union as a way to solve these.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- socio-economic impact of Boer War, also called the South African War, including the destruction of 30,000 farms and human costs. Failure of Milner's policy of Reconstruction to bolster the region's economy after the Treaty of Vereeniging
- Milner's protestations that union would give 'All power to the Boers' and that it would remain with them
- many (especially in Natal) were worried that 'responsible government' would be anything but — it would be a re-run of Afrikaner dominance seen before the war. Divisions within Afrikanerdom — wartime generals (and national heroes) Louis Botha/Jan Smuts pro-union, Christiaan de Wet/Koos de la Rey fiercely anti-union.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Cape Colony, Orange River Colony, Transvaal and Natal were totally separate entities with different systems of government and laws. The emergence of party politics, especially Het Volk and Orangia Unie had the potential to make the problem of governance and union more complex
- no uniform race policy existed between the four colonies. The Lagden Commission was just that — a report on paper. Many Afrikaners were worried that 'soft' British attitudes would be given free rein in their areas. The Bambatha Rebellion in Natal didn't help
- deep-rooted hatred of the British, made worse by the scorched earth policy and concentration camps. How could they ever co-operate? British attitudes to Afrikaners as 'poorly educated religious simpletons' exacerbated tensions
- simmering resentment to both white communities from Blacks who had been armed, organised and politicised by the war.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
James Barber	Argues that by 1908 'the political balance across South Africa had swung against the old imperialism' and acknowledges the role of Afrikaner parties including Het Volk in the Boer Republics in increasing opposition to British rule.
Denis Judd and Keith Surridge	Contend that Afrikaners were 'not a beaten army' in 1902, therefore Union, within the British Empire, remained too unpalatable to many 'bitterenders.'
Albert Grundlingh	Argues that the 'bitter legacy of the Boer War' entrenched a bitterness between Afrikaners and the British which remained decades later. This meant foundations for Union were rocky.
Nigel Worden	Argues that Milner and his 'hawkish expansionist goals' contributed to the growth of Afrikaner nationalism in this period and the strengthening of Afrikaner political mobility.

Question 55

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
The left alliance that was showing early signs of making progress soon disintegrated.	Suggests that the ANC was factionalised and these factions were unstable, resulting in disunity.
There was pushback from the congress chair who mentioned communism's revolutionary goals and warned chiefs against signing their collective death warrant.	Suggests that Gumede's pro-communist stance was not supported by all in the ANC who saw it as too dangerous.
The underlying hostility nonetheless remained, and with the ANC facing the prospect of repression from the state on account of Gumede's approach, it resurfaced. In the leadership election in April, Gumede lost to Pixley Seme by 39 votes to 14.	Suggests that the threat of state repression stymied the actions of the ANC.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- by the 1930s the ANC leadership was divided into warring cliques with a lack of agreement about aims and methods
- the 1920s had seen growing co-operation between the CPSA and the ANC
- Gumede's flirtation with the CPSA deeply divided the ANC.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
The ANC's own ambitions had, from its very foundation in 1912, been essentially reformist in nature, involving an expectation of emancipation through growing African unity and self-help which they mistakenly believed would lead to the participation of an increasing number of individuals in the European-dominated economy and established political institutions.	Suggests that early ANC methods were focussed on lifting themselves up to achieve freedoms.
In the 1920s, ANC leaders were not men with vision or any expectation of real political power.	Suggests that the failings of the ANC leadership to be ambitious enough in their aims rendered actions ineffective.
The protests of these leaders, even when passive resistance was resorted to, were aiming at transforming European opinion by the sheer strength of their moral assertions, by the justice of their case.	Suggests that the reliance of ANC leaders on the government's sense of what was 'just' to lead to achieving their aims was tactically misguided.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- early ANC leaders aimed for equal opportunity, not political power, or African domination. Most were mission-educated (Dube, Plaatje, Gumede, Seme) and accused of being out of touch
- they hoped improved understanding, and greater justice, would allow Africans to make a growing contribution to South African society
- most of the early ANC leaders (Dube, Plaatje, Gumede, Seme) were mission-educated and, as doctors, lawyers, ministers etc they were from the African middle class
- some leaders, including Dube, were reluctantly prepared to accept rural segregation as long as there was a just distribution of land.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- financial scandals and internal disputes which destroyed the ICU
- early ANC leadership disdainful of popular agitation so failed to link up with other resistance groups
- women played little part in the ANC
- the failure of the ICU leadership to identify with the problems of everyday Africans
- the influence of Garveyism and those who favoured a more co-ordinated approach and opposed Garvey's ideas
- the failure of the All-African Convention to reach agreement about how to act in the face of Hertzog's legislative attack on African rights: Petition and deputation versus mass action
- Black intellectuals maintained support for education and working within the existing system despite the impact of the depression
- methods of early resistance organisations including petitions and delegations. Failure of international deputations such as that at Versailles
- diversity of African resistance movements
- by the 1930s ANC membership probably did not exceed 1000. The more radical ICU was far more significant in the 1920s because they attempted to establish a mass movement, although this was not the view of the ANC
- failure to capitalise on rural resistance
- the nature of white rule in South Africa after 1910 and the economic, political and social difficulties of resistance.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
William Beinart	Contends the ANC's failure to capitalise on, or co-ordinate with rural protests to be a key reason for the ineffectiveness of resistance, hampering the development of mass mobilisation.
Andre Odentaal	Argues that the early ANC leadership mistakenly pursued a policy of 'hopeful reliance on the common sense of justice and love of freedom so innate in the British character.'
Dale McKinley	Argues the ANC in particular failed to establish grassroots organisations among the masses in South Africa, that they were preoccupied by their petty bourgeois interests such as obtaining a free market. Trade unions were more effective in this.
Saul Dubow	Assesses the ANC more leniently than other historians 'The resort to oral persuasion was a pragmatic strategy that had to be exhausted before being abandoned'. Nevertheless, he describes the ANC as 'moribund' by the 1930s. Argues that Africans and Communists were trying to pull the ANC in different directions by 1930.

Question 56

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
London became the centre of its external mission, and widespread diplomatic connections were cultivated by Oliver Tambo.	Suggests an increase in the international operations of the ANC under Tambo who was rallying support.
Forward bases were established in front-line states.	Suggests the ANC was operating outwith South Africa itself, in armed camps in neighbouring states.
The ANC's intimate relationship with the Communist Party meant that it could rely on substantial ideological, military and financial help from the Soviet Union.	Suggests a close connection between the ANC and Soviet Union as a result of the ANC's collaboration with the Communist Party.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- the ANC was banned after Sharpeville
- Tambo led operations as many of the ANC leadership were imprisoned after the Rivonia Trial
- Cold War context saw Soviet aid to the ANC which had the potential to destabilize a Western ally in South Africa. Suppression of Communism Act in South Africa used to condemn the ANC
- operating bases of ANC and POQO in Mozambique and Angola.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:
- government use of force against protestors at Sharpeville highlighted to many that peaceful protest was no longer an option
- some members of the Congress Youth League had been advocating a move to armed struggle in the 1950s
- the establishment of MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe) under Mandela to lead the armed struggle in the early 1960s
- MK largely organised in townships. Examples of MK sabotage campaign including attacks on Bantustan administration offices, electricity pylons, post offices etc
- banning of the PAC and their establishment of POQO
- Granite Response of the National Party following Sharpeville with measures forcing resistance underground and/or outside of South Africa (for example training camps in Angola)
- POQO aimed to lay the foundations for a general rising
- POQO's tactics involved the murder of police officers and informants, of tribal chiefs 'collaborating' with the government and random attacks on whites
- in the 1960s the resistance movement was largely transformed from a loosely organised movement into a clandestine revolutionary elite
- early developments of Black Consciousness including SASO and the role of Steve Biko
- rebirth of African trade unions — increased size of African urban work force.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Dale McKinley	Argues that the ANC was out of touch with popular resistance and therefore the methods used by the ANC were also criticised. 'The ANC was no closer to seizing power than it had been in the late 1950s.'
Nigel Worden	Suggests that the resistance movement in the 1960s was largely ineffective as it 'was infiltrated and broken up.'
Francis Meli	Argues that the ANC continued to heighten its political influence despite exile. This is contested by Nigel Worden who argues that a vacuum was left by the banning of the ANC, which the Black Consciousness Movement went some way to fill.
James Barber	Is critical of 1960s resistance achievements, contending that 'both MK and POQO suffered from internal weakness. They were penetrated by informers, and POQO in particular was plagued by factionalism and weak leadership.'

Section 8 — Russia from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 57

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the February Revolution was spontaneous:

Days of February:
- February 23 (March 8) International Women's Day women demanded bread. Further rationing provoked 'Bread Riots', bakeries were broken into and all bread stuffs looted. Women queued up to 40 hours on average per week to get bread. Certainly, privations borne of a harsh winter, prioritising of food for the army caused unrest 'born in bread queues'
- urban workers faced lock-outs and poor pay. Strikes grew in number and became more political eg radicalised Putilov workers. Young men in factories, literate, single and living in horrendous hostels were easily persuaded of the cause — to strike for better working and living conditions and so workers joined the demonstration
- as the days unfolded the thousands on the streets marching were civilian citizens — women, workers, peasants, and industrialists. The number grew day by day as it became more political in nature
- this was the beginning of the spontaneous revolution from below.

The role of the military (medium term but spontaneous on the day):
- Russia's economy and administration too weak to equip soldiers at Front properly, 1/3 of troops no rifles, terrible losses: 1914–1916, 1/2 of 15 million army casualties, battle failures
- 25 February onwards — soldiers going over to crowd, some unpopular officers shot, orders to fire on crowds disobeyed in part because of brutal discipline and remoteness of officers common in Imperial Army especially garrison troops, and these were peasant soldiers
- low status of soldiers — not allowed in public parks, ride trams: wages low and conditions of service harsh, peasants traditionally reluctant to serve in the Armed Forces of Imperial Russia
- wartime officer change in Imperial Army-by 1917 had junior officers from student or lower-class background sympathetic to Radical politics. Not the usual army officers — not enough regular officers left from standing army due to huge loss in combat of frontline officers
- Army garrison — 160,000 soldiers in Petrograd Military District; wounded, recovering soldiers, newly drafted reservists. Many garrison NCOs educated townsmen not sympathetic to Tsarism
- loyalty of Tsar's Guard — eg Preobrazenski Regiment not loyal to regime from 25 February 1917. 1st Machine Gun Regiment — NCOs trained soldiers from the urban working-class. Had experience of strikes and socialist politics before army service. Not recruited in large numbers to the standing army as they were suspected of disloyalty to the Tsarist regime
- Cossacks — Don Cossacks in Petrograd from poorest areas of the Don. They were reluctant to attack crowds before 25 February — signs of disaffection already apparent in the armed forces in early stages of the revolution — 'Comrade Cossack'.

Evidence which supports the view that the February Revolution was not entirely spontaneous:

Socio economic discontent:
- protests motivated by economic issues rather than political concerns, demanded higher wages, more land and decent living standards
- countryside — less agricultural output, farm horses requisitioned, cut in chemical fertilisers supply. Inflation made trading unprofitable, peasants hoarded grain instead of trading. Peasant army by 1917, their families suffering under Tsarism, more likely to mutiny eg soldiers in Petrograd garrison. Hard winter 1916–1917, bad harvests meant starvation for the peasants
- towns — terrible living conditions everything went into war effort: widespread hunger, lack of fuel, unemployment, inflation (cost of living rose 300%). Influx of rural migrants and refugees fleeing German occupation. More and more notes put into circulation, money worthless and inflation high especially in 1916. Army given food and transport priority: food distribution to civilian areas unreliable, hunger bordering on famine for much of Russia during war, shortages

- particularly bad in towns. Petrograd overcrowded by February 1917 — war refugees from western provinces and increased number of workers from countryside resulted in an over-crowded city. Increased pressure on housing, health and food supplies. Typhus danger
- strikes and International Women's Day March — began by socio-economic demands but soon these become political demanding change to Government. This demonstrated long-term discontent with the Tsarist regime
- war-weariness of urban population, lack of patriotism/dissatisfaction evidenced by Okhrana interception of mail — lack of support for Tsarist regime.

Russification and discontent among national minorities:
- Russification (imposing Russian language + culture) resented, more rigorous late 1800s
- Nicholas II actively supported Russification and lost support of loyal nationalist minorities
- Russia's population 170 million, 1/2 non-Russians: Poles, Finns, Ukrainians
- 19th century saw more and more uprisings from nationalist minorities for autonomy
- Russification of education increased national consciousness, monarchy was seen as oppressive.

Political discontent:
- February Revolution was evidence of long-term weakness of autocracy which failed to democratise Russian Empire and relied solely on force and obedience of population. Reputational damage to Tsar Nicholas II — Russo-Japanese War, withdrawal from society because of Tsarevich, influence of Tsarina and Rasputin. Weaknesses and mistakes of the Tsar; his role in war, the effect of the Tsarina and Rasputin's influence upon her Home Front decision-making from 1915 when Tsar at Stavka HQ
- alienation of elites — army generals responded positively to coup proposals in late 1916, conspiracy between Duma politician Guchkov and General Alekseev. Tsarist autocracy brittle and resisted opportunity during War to work with elected representatives from Duma; 'Progressive Bloc' 1916/early 1917. Aristocrats welcomed assassination of Rasputin
- revolutionary leaders abroad or in exile — the spontaneous revolution not guided by Bolshevik, Menshevik or SR leadership
- role of Shop Stewards in Putilov factory organising strikes, increasing political nature of the days of February. Revolutionary parties at lower level had influence on the February Revolution but limited in importance.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Lynch	Contends that army's 'crippling weakness' lack of equipment, not lack of spending, but due to poor administration, poor resource distribution, due to weak central leadership. Soldiers barefoot, boot shortage, hospitals in excellent condition but disorganised, groups not working together, (one region had leather, one nails, one soles). That strikes in Petrograd did not in themselves cause revolution, but defection of Tsar's previous supporters and Tsar's failure to resist caused fall of Tsarism, it 'collapsed from within.'
Peter Kenez	Argues that the soldiers' refusal to obey was more important than workers' demonstration, as once the chains of command were broken, the imperial regime collapsed and therefore the revolution then began.
Antony Beevor	Contends that the drift towards revolution was clear to all except the wilfully blind. The only question was whether it would come during the war or just after the end.
Laura Englestein	Argues 'the revolution that began in February 1917 had a long fuse but a short, explosive trigger. The combination of a general crisis, which the government was powerless to stem, and the legacy of collective militancy set the stage for worker radicalism in 1917.In confronting the forces of order, Petrograd workers were guided by traditions derived from the experience of 1905, which included the habit of self-organisation and a set of symbols and rituals that continued to resonate in society at large.'

Question 58

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view the Provisional Government responsible for its own downfall:

Internal problems:

- its composition and selection — at first the Provisional Government contained 12 ministers, 7 were liberal Kadets, many members of the old Duma, middle class men. First Prime Minister Prince Georgy Lvov, a minor royal, supported a transition to a liberal-democratic government, but not popular as one soldier remarked, 'you mean all we did was exchange a Tsar for a Prince'. Only socialist in Lvov's cabinet Alexander Kerensky, Socialist-Revolutionary lawyer who led the *Trudovik* labour faction in the Duma
- positive achievements in the 'honeymoon period' first month : immediate and complete amnesty all political and religious cases, including terrorist acts, military revolts and agrarian offences, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and right to form unions, to strike, 8 hour day recognised and political freedom extended to armed forces, abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality, called for Constituent Assembly election based on universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. Impact of freedoms granted not always positive — opened floodgates to criticism
- the impact of election declaration and constitutional problem (the Constituent Assembly) no action was felt to be indecision
- different groups in Duma with conflicting demands difficult to meet, resulted in splits (eg over the national minorities)
- legitimacy challenge — unelected compared to the Soviets made up of elected deputies, so from start they lacked loyalty of the people even if Milyukov reasoned the 'revolution had appointed them'
- authority undermined in the army by Order No 1 and reasons why the Soviet did not take power at this time
- most Russians wanted an end to WWI but a dishonourable exit which resulted in lost territory and reparations unacceptable. The Soviets and many of the Provisional Government took the stance of 'revolutionary defensism' but Foreign Minister Milyukov still believed in expansion and 'imperial ambitions' largely unpopular with the people as war strained the fragile regime, more unnecessary. Even if those in dual power wanted war to end, the country relied on Allies' resources and credits as well as being, 'faithful to the treaty that links her by her indissoluble ties to her glorious Allies' as Milyukov argued
- the peasant demand for own land, but Provisional Government deferred this to the Constituent Assembly to ensure landowners were compensated. Lack of action resulted in revolts, with 237 reported cases of peasant land seizures. Military desertion contributed to militancy as peasants now armed. Minister of Agriculture Chernov tried to pass reforms but these were blocked
- National Minorities called for greater autonomy, Lvov favoured this for Ukraine (wanted independent farmland) and caused outrage as this might lead to the downfall of the empire
- economy and infrastructure — food shortage, August 1917 grain price increased 100%, railway prioritised the Front, peasant riots.

Evidence which supports the view that downfall came as a result of external factors:

Government actions which served to exacerbate the problems:

- the impact of WWI — potential argument to lead with underestimation of the social revolution in 1917, citing desertions from the army after the June Offensive and blamed government and looking at the July Days as a catalyst for more
- continuation of WWI meant the resources and effort prioritised to sustain it, therefore government unable to deal fully with other matters effectively, created criticism and further issues for them
- Milyukov, Minister for War wanted to continue an offensive war to hopefully make gains but was forced to resign because of this
- Menshevik (Tsereteli) and Socialist Revolutionary (Chernov) leaders in the Soviet who were committed to a defensive strategy
- forces of the Right (Kadets, Liberals, and Generals) hoped the Generals now back in control of the armed forces would hopefully temper pace of change in Russia

- June Offensive intended to result in a speedy end to the war on the Eastern front and victory would strengthen Provisional Government position
- Kerensky held responsible as Minister for War — but he was very popular and it was hoped that he could inspire popular support for the continuation of the War
- Provisional Government wanted to negotiate a 'peace without annexation or indemnities' but too militarily weak to bargain
- desertions from the army in their thousands, soldiers turning the transport into chaos by commandeering trains. Desertions over 2 million by 1917
- the June Offensive 1917 — Provisional Government commit Russian troops on the Eastern Front to take pressure off British and French in the West. Losses of around 400,000 men
- role of Kerensky and assessment of how his actions served only to bring the Bolsheviks back after the July Days (although short-term gains) due to his mishandling of the Kornilov Affair, ie Kerensky was now loathed by right and completely distrusted by left.

External political developments –the question of the Bolshevik challenge:
- significance of Lenin's return, the April Theses and the radicalisation of the workers policies from that time: ie 'Peace Bread and Land!' and 'All Power to the Soviets!'
- Kerensky's actions served only to bring the Bolsheviks back in the aftermath of the Kornilov Affair
- by September the Bolsheviks were in control of both the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, though they were still in a minority in the country as a whole
- Bolshevik membership increased by 200,000 to 350,000 by October
- discussion about the seizure of power in October: the roles of the main leaders, Lenin and Trotsky
- the issue of the popular revolution as evidence of the complete failure of the Provisional Government
- the coup d'état by the Bolsheviks as further evidence of limited opposition
- the Bolsheviks offered exactly what the Russian people wanted and no-one else did — Peace, bread and land
- The July Days are evidence of Bolshevik failure to carry out a revolution. BUT so much was learned from this failure
- but objections by Zinoviev and Kamenev would support the view that not all Bolsheviks felt October was the right time.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Orlando Figes	Argues that the Soviet, 'were given power without responsibility, while the Provisional Government had responsibility without power.'
Alexander Rabinowitch	Argues that the long-term causes of unrest made 'the desire for an end to the coalition government very nearly universal.'
Ronald Kowalski	Contends that the system was also victim to 'a number of unpredictable accidents and improbable coincidences. . . such as, for instance, the attempted coup by General Kornilov.'
Robert Service	Argues that 'the timing of the collapse of the Provisional Government was more of his (Lenin) work than the consequence of the socio-political environment, or of the actions of the Soviets.'

Question 59

Candidates might refer to:

The main promises made by the Bolsheviks:
- sweeping away the 'pillars of Tsarism'
- rejecting liberal democracy, as represented by the Provisional Government
- moving towards the ideal of proletarian democracy as embodied by the Soviets and introduced by the leadership of the Party
- ideology may be considered by referring to the main works (eg 'What is to be done', 'April theses', 'State and Revolution', 'War and Revolution'.

Evidence which considers the extent to which Bolshevik ideals were sacrificed:

Political consolidation:
- banning opposition press
- banning parties — Kadets, November 1917 and all right-wing, left SRs joined Sovnarkom in December 1917, June 1918; right and centre SRs and Mensheviks expelled from central and local Soviets
- the compromise from the beginning ie the idea of 'All Power to the Soviets' was denied by setting up the Sovnarkom and the intention was to place power in the hands of the Bolsheviks alone
- Secret Police — Cheka — one of first acts of all twentieth century revolutionary governments. To persecute counter-revolutionaries, establish Revolutionary Tribunals, but largely independent of the centre
- the Red Terror, Autumn 1918, after attempted assassination of Lenin
- creating the one-party state justified ideologically to avoid the counter-revolution, the Party being
- the vanguard of the revolution; hence development of bureaucracy and the use of Terror. To promote the development of socialism harsh measures and strong leadership were required before the dictatorship of the proletariat. A discussion of the nomenklatura and their role in the development of authoritarian government. The RSFR (January 1918), the assertion of the urban and proletarian dictatorship and the relationship with 'non-Russian' areas (given varying degrees of autonomy), which some may contend was reminiscent of the tsarist empire
- the Constituent Assembly moment of democracy lost: removal of freedoms granted by the Provisional Government because it was the instrument of the bourgeoisie or this is dictatorship
- the Ban on Factions in 1921 and its impact.

Peace not war:
- politically the Bolsheviks were justified in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk — not a duty to fight for the capitalist imperialists and could claim the ending of WWI as symbolic of the working class
- revolution. But the reality was Bolshevik support needed to be extended beyond the cities, the army was not fit to fight, but territory lost would be regained in the international proletarian revolution
- Red Army Left Communists may have been against a standing army — favouring the idea of a revolutionary volunteer militia, electing officers, democratic decision-making etc. Trotsky imposed traditional discipline and employed 'military experts' (former tsarist officers).

Agriculture:
- economics — even from the start the 1917 Land Decree — abolishing private ownership but also simply recognising what was
- the Civil War — link here the change from workers' councils to War Communism — is both ideological and circumstantial. It's nationalisation and, perhaps more importantly, responding to production needs during the Civil War. . . and worker power had not been too effective (Supreme Council of National Economy)
- the retreat to the NEP — controversial because not communist and brought great divide to the party. Lenin said to go forward they must 'take two steps forward and one step back', There was a good chance the Bolsheviks would have been overthrown if they had continued with War Communism.

Industrial democracy:

- Lenin reverts to type — strict hierarchy, discipline and even re-imposition of piece rates (detested by workers). Workers' Control Decree November 1917, 'kontrol' means supervision not control
- Lenin brought back rudiments of capitalism 'state capitalism' — one-man management, labour discipline, bourgeois specialists 'spetsy'. 'Accounting and control' became the new slogan associated with the role of women, but the laws were to bring them into the workplace, no high-ranking women in the Party. Alexandra Kollontai exception.

Church and State:

- religion reduced in power but softer approach after 1921 showing a compromise in ideology, but 'civic duty' came first
- more conciliatory when dealing with Islam because it was not associated with Tsarism and had a strong hold over the peoples of Central Asia. Sense here of compromise to ensure support.

Women:

- Aleksandra Kollontai, became Commissar of Social Welfare one of the few who understood the deeper connections between revolution and gender. A delegate to the First Congress of the Communist International, and an activist in the newly-formed Women's Section of the Communist Party 'Zhenotdel' with Inessa Armand and Nadezhda Krupskaia. Argued for special forms of party work for women before the revolution, and for Zhenotdel after. In *Woman and the Family in the Communist State* (1918) she outlined how communism would transform the place of women in the home and workplace
- December 29, 1917 Decree on Divorce gave women the right to divorce their husbands without obtaining his or any other permission, and ensured a proper alimony (often not paid)
- December 18, 1917 the Decree on Marriage abolished Church control of marriage
- Registration of Civil Status, gave legal status to civil ceremonies conducted by ZAGS (Zapiska aktov grazhdanskogo sostoianiia, or Civil Registration Bureau). Bare surroundings and ceremonies very functional, ZAGS became the home to new rituals in conformance with the socialist family, such as the 'Octobrina,' which replaced the Christian baptism.

Democratic centralism:

- debate here about ad hoc policies showing more had been destroyed than they had created with even some Bolsheviks becoming disillusioned and against democratic centralism as the source of Bolshevik discipline, with the pyramid of power — Politburo at the top, to eliminate opposition in order to maintain the revolution
- the Party Programme 1919 demonstrated the achievements of RCP — democratic in nature, limited bureaucracy, condemning religion, stressing role of TUs and bourgeois 'specialists'
- ABC of Communism evidence of theories still being promoted in this 'manual of communism for the masses'
- 9th Party Congress saw the movement for party reform at peak, but lacked focus and the drive became TU issues the development of bureaucratic centralism where the tight knit group in Moscow made the decisions and the rest of the country had to agree
- state control over economy, communication, large-scale use of terror, ousting by the population of 'enemies', imposition of a single ideology and the adulation of a single leader.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ronald Kowalski	Argues that 'a democratic form of socialism was unlikely to emerge.' He further contends there was 'an even greater centralisation of power in the hands of the Sovnarkom and its spawning bureaucracy at the expense of the power of the local soviets' and 'they lost whatever legitimacy they had in October and clung to power by dictatorial means', 'by 1921. . . the foundations of what we now term Stalinism appear to have been firmly laid' — **Cohen** disputes this.
Orlando Figes	Contends War Communism was a political response to the urban crisis of 1918.
Sheila Fitzpatrick	Wonders how far it was a radical measure to cope with a desperate situation.
Geoffrey Hosking	Argues even Lenin had no clear conception of how he was going to run the enormous, divided, war torn country.

Question 60

Candidates might refer to aims:

Part of Stalin's 'Great Turn':
- strengthening control of Central Party apparatus over provinces. Sorting out Party cliques at local level
- controlling the people, breaking the peasantry and creating a subservient urban proletariat. State more important than people
- needed to prepare for potential war and to support industrial expansion
- to compete with USA as a superpower, create a 'Soviet America'.

Agriculture:
- concept of the peasant collective was ideologically correct
- peasants mostly thought of as petit bourgeois — kulaks influential leaders, therefore enemies; too often holding the country to ransom. Socialist solution not to have private holdings (NEP), but 'socialist agrotowns'
- the administrative weakness in the countryside contradicted the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Industry:
- Russian industrial output by 1926 had risen to just about what it had been in 1914. This had largely been achieved by repair and restoration of old plant. This strategy for growth had therefore now run its course; any future growth would have to come from more radical economic methods.

Candidates might refer to evidence such as:

In Agriculture
Statistical Evidence:
Successes:
- by end of February 1930 claimed 50% collectivisation
- estimated 70% peasant households collectivised by 1934 and 90% by 1936; 120 million people, 600,000 villages, 25 million holdings consolidated into 240,000 state-controlled collective farms
- 1930 witness bumper year in grain harvest — 83.5 million tons compared to 73.3 million tons in 1928
- many crops suited better to larger farms — small farms meant poor use of labour, unable to benefit from mechanisation. Too much consumed by the farm, not enough going to market
- larger units of land meant efficiency via mechanisation — tractors and machinery supplied through MTS
- fewer peasants needed to work land — released labour for industry
- easier for state to take grain for cities and export — controlled by Communist supporters.

Limitations:
- statistics in 1930s distorted to show alleged success even though grain harvest had fallen, grain procurement still increased — 10.8 million tons in 1928 with 73.3 million tons harvested but by 1933 22.6 million tons procured from only 68.4 million tons harvested
- 'dizzy with success' speech (2 March 1930) meant pace slowed down and return to voluntary principle indicates limitations of policy
- tractors were largely imaginary — 2500 MTS in first three years, but this was a proletarian bastion in the countryside, staffed by workers and OGPU
- agriculture was a disaster: significant numbers of animals slaughtered, enterprising peasants had left the country, fled to city to seize opportunity of upward mobility. Livestock production did not recover until post WWII.

Living Conditions Evidence:

Successes:
- living conditions the same for most, wooden huts.

Limitations:
- those left were in no mood to begin work, and passive resistance was the order of the day — referred to this as second serfdom
- some peasants had private plots, condoned because of desperation for food
- best farmers were those most resistant to the policy and were therefore shot or deported thus effecting yields as through loss of expertise
- famine 1932–1934 because high targets at time of huge drop in grain production due to collectivisation, OGPU were vicious. 1.73 million tons exported and 7 million died from a man-made famine

Evidence of use of Force, Propaganda and Terror:

Successes:
- 'Breaking the peasantry'
- liquidation of the kulak class, to make the middle peasants obey Stalin
- 'Twenty-Five Thousanders' rounded up families and deported some 10 million people (some estimate 20 million dead or deported)
- the extent of denunciations by neighbours reflects the success of the propaganda machine in inflaming class hatred.

Limitations:
- armed resistance and riots: crops, tools and houses burned rather than hand them over
- women's protests were significant and effective in organisation and outcome.

Industry

Statistical Evidence:

Successes:
- Gosplan — state planning organisation worked out production needs, top-down method of management
- party via government set priorities for plans and targets
- People's Commissariat worked out detail in 4 main areas: heavy industry, light industry, timber and agriculture
- workers control receded, TUs told not to interfere, focus on productivity. Piece Work increases as does wage differentials from unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. Increase in stringent labour discipline to encourage ex-Peasants to conform to factory norms larger units of land meant efficiency via mechanisation — tractors and machinery supplied through MTS
- senior party officials appointed and dismissed planners, often done for political not economic reasons
- Stalin and Supreme Economic Council; Vesenkha take control
- appalling backwardness therefore unrealistic targets designed to achieve the impossible and drive people forward. Focus of the Five-Year Plans:
  - 1928—1932: coal, steel, iron focus because infrastructure needed
  - 1933—1937: move to consumer goods but quickly moved to defence because of rise of fascism in Europe
  - 1938 onwards: arms production increases because of build up for war.

- resources were directed to key industries amazing achievements, even if Soviet estimates grossly falsified
  - largest rises: coal, iron, electricity
  - smaller rises: chemicals (esp. fertilisers)
  - providing machinery for agriculture — tractors and harvesters
  - plans declared achieved one year ahead of time, better, than West, psychologically beneficial to demonstrate the superiority of Socialism over Capitalism. Time of Great Depression
  - new industrial centres; Magnitogorsk, Kuznetz, most east of Urals in strategically safer areas of the USSR
- 'Gigantomania': Dnieprostroi Dam, Moscow Metro and Volga Canal.

Limitations:
- command economy had major weaknesses: unrealistic targets, use of bribery, corruption, crooked deals to achieve targets, major shortages and products of dubious quality. Failure to produce enough for agriculture
- reports of large projects ruined by workers' ignorance
- 'target mania', Gosplan's targets had started off optimistic, but increased by astonishing amounts, eg coal up from 35 to 75 million tons — seemed unachievable to many. High targets put strain on industry — some parts underproduction due to shortages; other parts over production (wastage) and sub-standard products
- foreign input of technicians and materials at Gorky, Dams, power stations etc — eg Ford designed cars in Gorky. Vickers designed arms factories in Ukraine
- the Stalingrad Tractor Factory rolled out its first tractor with much fanfare in June 1930, but instead of the projected 2000 tractors expected by September a mere 43 were produced. And these began to fall apart after seventy hours of operation.

Working Conditions Evidence:
Successes:
- shock workers exceed targets — rewarded with higher pay, better working conditions food supplies, housing, celebrated in newspapers and on work notice boards. Stakhanovite Workers see material benefits.

Limitations:
- forced labour creation of the Gulag in mining, timber and forestry in Siberia and Arctic North of the Soviet Union, Magnitogorsk and some of transport infrastructure
- 1940: absenteeism became a crime, 2 offences led to imprisonment; no striking
- 1938 onwards — labour books and internal passports issued
- skilled workers were at a premium so competition for them meant bonuses introduced; egalitarianism in wages abandoned by 1931. This could be viewed as Socialism in retreat
- intimidation and terror used by NKVD on Managers and Directors of enterprises as scapegoats for alleged 'Wrecking' — decline in production or failing to raise production levels
- 'Quicksand society' (Moshe Lewin): peasants forced off land by collectivisation; poor discipline and punctuality, resentful, high rate of absenteeism.

Living Conditions Evidence:
Successes:
- consumer industries downgraded and citizens sacrificed standard of living for long-term objectives

Limitations:
- not well organised or planned — costs could have been avoided, priority to heavy industry, urban standards of living never improved — in Leningrad and Moscow, 1929–1933, meat, milk and fruit consumption declined by two — thirds, shortages of water, shops and catering facilities, queues. Consumer goods, chemicals and transport and consumer goods neglected.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Service	Argues 'Stalin and his associates aimed to turn the USSR into an industrial and military megalith. They were militants. They wrestled to change society from top to bottom.'
J N Westwood	Suggests that 'By 1927 there were additional reasons for industrialisation: there was a genuine fear of war following setbacks in foreign policy and the policy of maintaining low prices on goods in short supply was simply encouraging Nepmen to buy cheap and sell dear.'
S Sebag Montefiore	Contends that the Five-Year Plan would make Russia a great power, never again to be humiliated by the West, their war on the countryside would forever exterminate the internal enemy, the kulaks, and return to the values of 1917.
Alec Nove	Argues that the phoney superlatives may have existed but we must remember that thousands (many young) did participate in the 'great construction projects of socialism' and were willing to sacrifice, to accept hardship as comrades. Sees Stalinism as effective.

Question 61

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Purges and Terror were simply the result of Stalin's paranoia:

- Stalin's personality — vengeful and paranoid especially after suicide of his wife in 1932 — as he believed others around him would try to betray him. Described by Premier of Russia Khrushchev, 'Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious'
- Stalin's self-image — hero of the revolution who must have no challengers
- Purges sustained the importance of the NKVD and they increased the scope of purges
- Stalin thought/argued he was acting in the interests of the party
- Stalin had to save the revolution from external threats — war looming
- no master plan — response to circumstances in the USSR
- first substantial evidence of paranoia was the murder of Kirov
- the Show Trials saw prominent members of the Bolshevik Party face public trials, then jailed or executed included former associates of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, who were viewed as traitors
- Trials were publicly shown — Stalin used it as an intimidation technique to warn opposers what would happen if you were to cross Stalin and his party; accused of spying for foreign powers, for being part of the conspiracy of Kirov's murder
- all were later found guilty and eventually executed, despite being obviously innocent
- reinforces paranoia as he removed elements of Bolshevik Party that threatened his rule.

Evidence which supports the view that there were other reasons for the Purges and Terror:

Political justifications:

- had always been a part of the system. Lenin also purged the membership in the Chistka
- Stalin replaced Yagoda criticised for not finding enemies of the people quickly enough. Terror prevented criticism of the leadership
- debatable who was behind the Kirov murder — the murder provided a good excuse for the purges — if the Party leadership (Stalin) was behind it, purges came from above, if not, Party members destroying each other — leadership forced to cover-up inner destruction of the Party and carry out the purges
- caused by Lower Party (Local Level) — little control from top people denouncing others for their own advantage
- Show Trials not from thin air: Trotsky formed 'bloc' = threat
- the '*top down*' view — Stalin intended to kill his opponents to increase his personal power. Use of high-profile Show Trials such as Zinoviev and Kamenev and Bukharin
- Stalin simply followed Lenin's lead from the Red Terror.
- wanted party to be always insecure so kept control — especially with the *nomenklatura* around the Central Committee: lieutenants not sure who Stalin would adopt as 'his people'
- Central Party's lack of control over local party branches
- Local Party often had conflicting interests with the Central Party, eg to find Kulaks, valuable men to community: local party bosses wanted to reach production targets
- the elimination of Party members who were not 'faithful' — Stalin worried about spies and traitors and the effect of denouncing was to allow old grudges to be settled and to the extent purging of the military — executed those with influence in the military and might use this to betray him, such as Admirals and Generals old Bolshevik commanders such as Tukhachevsky, he risked getting rid of his best commanders to maintain control — no critics or challengers
- out of the 103 Admirals and Generals in the Russian army in 1936, 81 were executed
- can be argued he resorted to purging army as paranoia over an armed revolution by a powerful collective grew which reinforces his paranoia of conspiracy amongst those with influence etc that by 1939, less than 1/5 of the membership at the beginning of 1921 remained — but, over 70% of 1939 members had been recruited since 1929
- encouraged lower levels of the party to criticise those higher up — this led to a rush of accusations which got out of control and developed momentum of their own
- Stalin wanted to remove anyone who could form an alternative government.

Economic justifications:

- Purges provided enforced labour in and from the Gulags
- external threats, reaction to the threat of war. Strong heavy industry base needed for arms industry
- the pace of industrialisation had to quicken and more workers/prisoners needed
- mid-1930s, Five Year Plans falling behind schedule — downturn in the Soviet economy after 1936 because of technical problems, Stalin's management of the economy, and a bad harvest that year
- Purges used to blame 'scapegoats' for economic failures — managers or workers
- poor economic progress and conditions were enemy sabotage and wrecking
- Purges used to push an unwilling people to work even harder already suffering from impact of First Five Year Plan
- BUT, some did not denounce managers: did not want production rates to fall
- tension between workers and managers because of Stakhanovite campaign of 1936 — centre wanted to encourage workers to produce more and to put pressure on managers by demanding tools and materials: if managers did not respond denounced by workers.

Purging wider society:

- controlled society by use of 'the other'. Stalin signed a decree in 1934 that held the family of the prisoner as guilty as they were. Children over the age of 12 could be executed due to the crimes of their father. Stalin attempted to justify these killings stating, 'The apple didn't fall far from the tree'. He didn't want the family members of those executed to rebel against his rule, so he used his decree to justify the killing of the family so that there was no conspiracy to end his rule
- purging of 'class enemies' such as the Kulak peasants who were considered wealthier and more bourgeois
- deportation of dissidents — authors, film makers eg Ossip Mandelstam, Solzhenitsyn — quota system by 1937 28% to be shot
- Yezhov instigated period of terror called Yezhovshchina (known by Western historians as the Great Purge) — reached height in mid-1937 and lasted until 1938
- NKVD quota system led to desire to overachieve the quota because they were competing with each other to stay in favour with Stalin
- people looked for personal gain from purges — denounced others
- government worried about loss of support/control of the masses
- Purges caused so much social instability that impossible for society to challenge government
- Purges induced fear and submission, like under Lenin and the Tsars
- campaign encouraging people to criticise officials — deflect criticism from government
- people forced to look after their own interests, so difficult to unite with each other
- in some ways responsible for the spread of terror to such an extent as people encouraged to denounce others.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Service	Considers that Stalin's personality determined the form the Great Purges took.
Stephen Cohen	Argues that Stalin knew old Bolsheviks could see he was not Lenin's equal. By end of the 1930s, the party was completely different — most members had joined since 1929.
Isaac Deutscher	Contends that due to threat of war, Stalin purged the opposition who might interfere with his war plans and war could unite people against Stalin and overthrow him.
Dmitri Volkogonov	Argues that Lenin was 'true father' of the terror, camps, executions — created organs used by Stalin for Great Purges (gave him idea as well).

Section 8 — Russia from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914-1945

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 62

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
The Whites lost the Civil War largely because of their inflexibility to contemplate land reform until it was far too late.	Suggests that one main reason was White unwillingness to consider land reform.
It also is true to say that they were determined not to allow any autonomy to the nationalities of the Tsarist Empire.	Suggests that the Whites would not agree to giving any independence to National Minorities.
The fighting right across the Eurasian land-mass was violent beyond belief, especially the unspeakable cruelty of Cossack leaders in Siberia, and even the arch-conservative politician V V Shulgin believed that this 'moral collapse' undermined support for the Whites among the peasants.	Suggests that the actions of the Whites were extremely violent to the point that they had lost any sense of good or decent behaviour as this had completely collapsed.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- land reform was a key demand by the peasantry and the Land Decree had been issued by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Peasants believed support for Whites would be return to Tsarism and landlords. Wrangel's Land degree came too late in 1920. Kolchak returned land to pre-revolution landlords
- Whites lost the support of the nationalist groups by their pre-1917 policy on the borders which would deny autonomy to some. White Great Russian nationalism caused problems, as did anti-Semitism, which was endemic
- Kolchak's soldiers sold uniforms for money to drink and carouse.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- leadership- at the beginning the Volunteer Army (3000) was largely an officers' army, and much better organised — Denikin's defeat of the Red Army in the Don region. However never coordinated their attacks, in theory they had Reds surrounded. Inability of the Whites to forge a common purpose or military front against the Reds, the inadequacies of the White leaders' policies and methods eg disunity between White leadership and soldiers — Denikin 'I can do nothing with my army'. The organisational skills of the Bolsheviks strong leadership, role of Trotsky, his use of the train covered 65,000 miles to deliver speeches, give awards for bravery and bring a sense of unity, and the skill of the Red Army. Tough discipline of Red Army — death penalty for desertion or cowardice
- propaganda, Red exploitation of White weaknesses (eg efficient use of propaganda, terror)
- difficulties at the front — with the Whites having problems maintaining a cohesive front-line force, given the variety of people involved — conscripts, workmen, peasants, colonists
- limited impact of foreign interventionists and their half-hearted attempts did little to aid the White cause. Allied intervention backfired and gradually dwindled resulting in patriotic support for the Bolsheviks who used it to gain patriotic support as defenders of Mother Russia from foreign invaders
- the motivation of the Greens and Makhno's Insurgent Army. G Swain described 'the unknown civil war' and notes that their influence and potential success is greater than previously thought

- geography and access to resources — Whites had little access to raw materials to pursue war effort or build an economic base. Initially Whites controlled more land, but it was a case of quantity not quality. Superior economic resources led to Red victory. Geographical advantages of Reds were marked as they has control of central Russian 'Sovdepia' including Moscow (now capital) and Petrograd. Access to raw materials to make armaments/heavily populated for conscription. Infrastructure — Control of railway network making it easier to transport troops, armaments and propaganda tools
- economic policy — War Communism, whereby the Bolsheviks requisitioned grain from the peasants, gave priority to the Red Army. Industrial plants were taken over by the government. The regime had at its disposal the entire national resources to carry on a war against its enemy.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Evan Mawdsley	Argues that the advantage of the 'Aladdin's cave' regarding the territory of 'Sovdepia' was significant.
Orlando Figes	Contends that the crucial advantage the Reds had, which meant more men volunteered to be part of the fighting force, was the claim that they were defending 'the Revolution.
Bruce Lincoln	Considers the significance of Wrangel's argument that land should be offered to the peasants. A lone voice in the White camp.
Richard Pipes	Considers that the objective factors (like the territory the Reds controlled) were the cause of victory, rather than leadership or motivation.

Question 63

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source B		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Trotsky.	As the expected successor to Lenin, he believed that he was the intellectual best that the Party had but was thwarted by Stalin.
Purpose	Article.	Prolific writer of articles on many areas of communism and Soviet rule. Written in a very polemical style. To provoke questioning of decisions made. To get his revenge by criticising the regime in a worldwide publication.
Timing	25 February 1929.	In January (either 20th or 22nd) 1929, he was expelled from the Communist Party by the Stalinist faction of the Party and in the first month he travelled by boat across the Black Sea and this is when he reached the first city he stayed in.

Point in Source B	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
. . . yet he is gifted with practical sense, which appears as a strong will and perseverance in the pursuit of his aims.	Suggests that Stalin has a determination to succeed and will maintain this attitude. This is emphasised by 'perseverance.'
His political line is a series of zig-zags; he has an extraordinary attitude towards facts and people, where he never finds it awkward to call something white today which yesterday he called black.	Suggests that Stalin is quite willing to alter his views on political issues to suit his cause. The language used by Trotsky is forceful and condemning about Stalin's so-called pragmatism. This is emphasised by 'extraordinary attitude'
. . . where Stalin was now prepared to create as poisonous an atmosphere as possible in the party to achieve his ends.	Suggests that Stalin is a manipulator and will create tensions among his opponents in the party to achieve victory. This is emphasised by 'poisonous an atmosphere'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- determination in pursuit of power — General Secretary when no-one wanted that position and made it his own, Commissar of Nationalities — developed his administrative skills called Comrade Card Index, becomes patron in the Lenin Enrolment
- throughout the leadership struggle he positioned himself with different groups both the left and the right wings of the Party, use of Ban on Factions to help Stalin keep opponents quiet. His policies became 'Leninist'
- his manipulation of Trotsky was seen at its best not when Trotsky did not attend the funeral- Trotsky knew about it, perhaps too late- but in getting Trotsky to agree not to have Lenin's Testament read out.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- policies — The economic debate — NEP dominated party conferences in the mid-1920s, all realized that this was not to continue but when would it be ended was the debate. The Left — Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev — wanted rapid industrialization, not NEP, and to break the peasantry. The Right wanted to keep NEP — Bukharin — rich peasants would spend more on consumer goods and would stimulate industrial growth Political policies — *Permanent Revolution* or *Socialism in One Country* Trotsky v Stalin here. Stalin moved to *Socialism in One Country* in 1925 and argued that world revolution was not possible. He advocated autarky — solve their own problems and build create a workers' society and Russia would be better than the West
- his positions in the Party — General Secretary — responsible for the Agenda which gave him control over Politburo business because he controlled what was or was not it; positions in the Orgburo and the Secretariat — gave him control over who was given positions of importance- and he placed his supporters in them, such as the party secretaries for example Ukraine was a powerful region, and the secretaries controlled voting system. Narkomnats gave him the breadth of power across the USSR. Control of Rabkrin allowed promotion of friends, and dismissal of enemies
- Stalin better at politicking — knew how to work the system; presented himself as the heir of Lenin, organized the funeral and made a speech to establish himself, he wanted Lenin mummified, gave lectures at Sverdlovsk University 6 weeks in a row, making Leninism and Stalinism interchangeable
- control of Party organization — he influenced who was selected to go to annual party congresses where matters of policy were debated and the Central Committee chosen; the Lenin Enrolment 1924-1925 when the party almost doubled its membership and he selected malleable recruits who wanted to follow orders and were loyal to him for the opportunity they were given, not radicals who followed Trotsky
- weaknesses of opponents — 'To the leading groups in the party he always seemed destined to play secondary or even more subsidiary roles' — **Trotsky** first a Menshevik, Jewish, wealthy and in character very intellectual but seemed aloof even if the charismatic leader of the Civil War but his powerbase was the army and therefore he was seen as a Napoleon figure; **Zinoviev** old Bolshevik, the closest to Lenin out of all of the contenders, Leningrad party leader so strong power base there. But opposed Lenin in 1917, underestimated his rivals, left it too late to support Trotsky against Stalin. **Kamenev** Lenin's closest ally after Zinoviev prior to 1917, Lenin's most trusted assistant in Lenin's final years. But inconsistent originally with Stalin then changed sides to support Trotsky. He opposed Lenin in 1917. Zinoviev was more popular than him, was regarded as too soft and lacked the drive to be a sole leader, underestimated his rivals. Moscow party leader meant a strong power base there. **Bukharin** popular within the party, regarded as best theoretician in party, expert on economics and agriculture but no power base, avoided confrontation, underestimated Stalin, made tactical mistakes eg left too late to side with Kamenev and Zinoviev. **Rykov** old Bolshevik, showed administrative ability implementing War Communism, NEP, supported by Sovknarkom but overshadowed by Bukharin, underestimated Stalin, put high tax on vodka which turned some Bolsheviks against him. **Tomsky** an old Bolshevik, chief spokesman of the trade unions so strong power base. But hated Trotsky which blinded him to danger of Stalin, trade union support made him a target for Stalin, support NEP used against him in 1927 when the grain procurement crises started
- luck — Lenin's illness, death of Sverdlov in 1918 and of Dzerzhinsky in 1926.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Isaac Deutscher	Argues that Stalin always followed the majority viewpoint.
Christopher Ward	Contends that 'Socialism in One Country' appealed to most people.
Robert Conquest	Argues that Stalin simply outmaneuvered his colleagues.
Stephen Kotkin	Contends that Party culture favoured ruthless men who were ready to act against their opponents with 'ultimate tactical flexibility'.

Question 64

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
For instance, the massive territorial losses of the early years of the war caused a collapse in food supplies, and although no directive was issued, the authorities slackened off in their efforts against the black market in agricultural produce as market economics more widely crept back into the Soviet order.	Suggests that there was an unspoken acceptance of the black market in agriculture, using 'crept' to highlight this and market economics in general.
He also understood the need to widen the limits of cultural expression, and many intellectuals who had once been considered suspect by the authorities were now told that the state welcomed their creative services.	Suggests that there was a broadening of cultural expression. Here noting that these people were 'welcomed' now, to serve the needs of the state in war.
Still more important were Stalin's decisions on the Russian Orthodox Church where he welcomed Acting Patriarch Sergei's patriotic stance, whereby the offertories (offerings) collected in the church paid for the production of armaments.	Suggests that religion was now accepted — by saying 'welcomed' the 'patriotic stance' but with a qualification that monies in offerings went to armament production.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- 1941–1942 territorial losses precipitated a collapse in food supplies such as wheat from Ukraine and potatoes and sugar beets fell into the hands of the Germans. Black market not accepted in Leningrad where NKVD punished anyone caught trading on the street. Market economics crept in more widely into the Soviet economy as party and municipal government accepted that the peasants bringing sacks of vegetables for sale helped alleviate urban malnutrition. Stalin, who had fumed at the flouting of the trading laws in the 1930s kept silent about this during the war
- the poet Anna Akhmatova's work was read over the radio and in concerts but preference was given to those which emphasised Russian achievements. The composer Dmitri Shostakovich wrote his seventh (Leningrad) symphony while working as a night warden and it was recognized for its greatness by the first night audience in 1942. Cheap editions of Russian classics were distributed at the front. Internationale dropped and new national anthem had a genuine emotional resonance for the wartime generation
- by 1939 only around 100 places of worship open to believers. 1937 census 55% rejected atheism and were true believers, buildings were quietly allowed to open, and in return the Church asked to acknowledge legitimacy of Soviet state, to avoid criticism of any policies — internal or external.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
The gravity of Stalingrad finally concentrated Stalin's mind; he realised that the road to survival and glory lay with professional generals instead of his own impatient amateurism.	Suggests that Stalin was aware of the need to open up decision making to his experienced generals.
At GKO [State Defence Committee] meetings Stalin exuded power and energy; he drove the pace, he never ceased issuing instructions, talking on the phone, signing papers and personally drafted every press release.	Suggests that Stalin himself had such energy and was constantly issuing orders that he was the reason for victory using 'exuded power and energy' and 'drove the pace.'
. . . Stalin's commissars and generals had inevitably been up since dawn; a life that demanded enormous physical and moral resources. Beria and Mikoyan, were expected to spend most nights with him while achieving a herculean (impressive) workload, yet they managed it, running sprawling and sleepless administrative empires.	Suggests that it actually was the commissars and generals who were working to the point of exhaustion but still managed to run on the adrenalin of war and patriotism to see them through to victory.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Stalingrad brought about a revolution in his conduct of the war. On 27 August Stalin ordered Zhukov to rush to Stalingrad. Promoted to Deputy Supreme Commander, although Zhukov did not think they could work well together, they in fact did very well. There was evidence of their fierce resistance under General Zhukov in September 1941 and by the end of November the Germans called off their advance on Moscow
- Stalin issued all orders, slept only 2 hours at a time. He supervised the front with Zhukov and Vasilevsky in active command and Malenkov was his spy
- Stalingrad showed there was a role for the political commissar. Generals and Commissars also had to play their part. Stalin sent Beria with entourage to stop the Transcaucasus commanders from surrendering to the Germans, famously declaring to them 'I'll break your back if you mention a word of this retreat again. You WILL defend this town.' Views are he saved the day or, it was all noise and showiness and interrupted their work.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the War for the Russian Motherland, now not the USSR, and loyalty to the Motherland and to Stalin
- eventual efficiency of War economy, allowing the supply of the military with adequate materiel, the relocation of industries to beyond the Urals (evacuation of approx. 10 million people) and the scorched earth policy
- geo-strategic issues (size of the country, climate etc., making it difficult for the Wehrmacht)
- role of propaganda and the Orthodox Church, turning the negatives around of rationing, conscription, loss of homes
- the constant upgrading of the Red Army opening up new fronts and Allied support; Kursk evidence of Russian military development enough to beat the Germans in tank battles
- Stalingrad may be discussed in terms of the type of fighting required; suiting the Russians; the use of snipers; manipulating the war zone. Stalingrad is seen at this level as 'a matter of prestige between Hitler and Stalin', which alongside the 'dogged, rugged, Siberian obstinacy' and 'the stamina of Soviet soldiers was incredible' shows the determination involved
- weather played as significant a part — Winter 1941 was one of the harshest on record, German forces unprepared, caused significant enemy weaknesses (dealing with Russian climate, land mass meaning Germans over-stretched and cannot apply same tactics as in France, effects of Allied bombing of Germany; Allied invasion in the West — two fronts
- the speeches were effective but in highlighting German racism. Many were fighting German racial policy rather than fighting for Stalin. The Germans might well have been welcomed as liberators (for two years Hitler had been portrayed as a friend) but they were worse than the Soviets — reference here could be made to treatment of peasants.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
John Laver	Argues that the suitability of Russia economically to the demands of total war was significant.
Richard Overy and Geoffrey Hosking	Argue that the reconciliation with the Church and religions played a significant part, turning the negatives around of rationing, conscription, loss of homes.
Peter Kenez	Contends that Nazi policy gave the people no option, they were fighting against Nazism, not for Stalinist Russia.
Michael Lynch	Argues after Barbarossa Stalin provided inspiring and resolute leadership which carried the USSR through four years of bitter attrition.

Section 9 — The Spanish Civil War: Causes, conflict and consequences, 1923-1945

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 65

Evidence which suggests that the fall of the monarchy was due to the Pact of San Sebastian:

- the Pact of San Sebastian in 1930 coalesced the Republican forces into a coherent force. Now all of those who wanted reform of virtually any type in Spain were united and the monarchy was left increasingly on the other side
- very broad support as virtually all republican parties were represented at the meeting, including *Accion Republicana*, the Radical Republican Party, *Derecha Liberal Republicana* (including Zamora and Maura), Catalan republican parties
- Prieto and de los Rios were also there
- members of the armed forces were also involved, particularly younger officers
- the coup they planned for December 1930 was called off but two officers who supported the Pact rose without knowing this and were executed, creating martyrs for the cause and moving more against the monarchy
- the Pact represented a culmination of work by disparate groups and as such was a necessary step towards replacing Alfonso
- the Pact created a credible alternative government, which included a respected, conservative politician at its head. This showed many that another regime for Spain was possible and within its grasp.

Evidence which suggests that the fall of the monarchy was due to other reasons:

- the monarchy had failed to act on fundamental problems in Spanish society, including agrarian reform, regional tension and the power of the church
- Alfonso appeared increasingly aloof. Alfonso was viewed as someone completely out of touch with the Spanish people
- the growing political unrest increasingly focused on Alfonso and the monarchy as a barrier to reform
- Alfonso became the personification of the problems of Spain and his removal a necessity. The anti-monarchic sentiment became a rallying point for all those who wanted to progress, with Alfonso as the villain-in-chief
- the actions of Alfonso in his private life meant that he was perceived as being incompetent and unworthy as a leader and out of touch with his people. His adulterous, playboy lifestyle showed both his own hypocrisy and that of his position as Spain's 'Most Catholic Majesty'
- the secularisation of Spanish society went hand-in-hand with the growth of republicanism and Alfonso's downfall was therefore as much a result of the tide of events as anything else
- Alfonso was 'His Most Catholic Majesty' and had become linked to an increasingly anti-liberal institution, now dominated more than ever by the large landowners. Those who were anticlerical were therefore anti-monarchy
- the King had supported Primo's de Rivera, calling him 'My Mussolini'
- the King had also changed dictators twice, conceding nothing to those demanding democracy
- the municipal elections showed the overwhelming support for the pro-republican parties in Spain. After these, no one could argue that the King still enjoyed, 'the love of his people'
- the army was one of the pillars of the Spanish establishment and for the King not to be able to rely on them meant that he had to go
- Sanjuro was paying the King back for snubbing him for the dictator's post.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Raymond Carr	Contends that 'the Republicans rejected monarchy as an illegitimate and outmoded form of government; the Carlists rejected the Alfonsine branch . . . The Socialists considered (it) reactionary . . . The anarchists rejected it. To the regionalists it. . . strangled local interests . . . the radical regenerationists believed (in) root and branch reform . . . (it was) the personal unpopularity of the king himself (which brought down the monarchy). The conservative classes, during 1930, lost confidence in the monarchy.'
Gerald Brenan	Argues 'the ease with which the dictator had been brought down encouraged the middle classes . . . to think that Alfonso could be got rid of too. Since 1788 not a single Spanish sovereign had had a natural reign. The Army had become increasingly sensitive to any criticisms. . . '.
Antony Beevor	Contests 'Alfonso treated the ruling of Spain as little more than a fascinating hobby. The Spanish Church was said to have owned up to one-third of the total wealth of Spain. (The Latifundias') subjects were treated almost as a subject race.'
Paul Preston	Argues that the 'loss of Imperial power coincided with emergence of left-wing movements. (The monarchy) had fallen into disrepute by the time Primo de Rivera seized power.'

Question 66

Evidence which may suggest that the new constitution was an attack on the Spanish establishment:

Religious:
- arguably the most radical of all the changes brought about by the new constitution, Article 3 stated that Spain had no official religion. For a country that until earlier that year had been headed by 'His Most Catholic Majesty' this was a huge change
- Article 26 provided for the ending of financial support for the church, dissolution of religious orders and also contained provision for the nationalisation of church property
- Article 27 further limited the scope of the church and ensured that Catholicism was treated the same as all other religions, not ahead of them
- the church was not to educate the youth of the republic. This was another massive change.

Social conservatism:
- the constitution allowed for universal adult suffrage (over 23 years of age) for both men and women, a radical change from before. Divorce and civil marriage were allowed which horrified the traditional, conservative establishment.

Military:
- Article 6 of the new constitution renounced war as an instrument of national policy
- the constitution did not reserve any special place in the new Spain for the army. In this way, the constitution paved the way for the army reforms which were to follow
- the lack of mention for the army supported the claim made by Azaña that, 'No one now speaks for the army, nor does the army speak for itself.'

Other:
- there was more in the constitution on the regions than on any other matter
- regional languages and culture were protected by the constitution and it set up means by which different areas could become autonomous. This was an anathema to the traditional, centrist establishment
- Article 44 of the constitution allowed that the farms and utilities affecting the common interest can be nationalised 'where the social necessity so requires.' This was perhaps the most inflammatory clause which caused the resignation of Miguel Maura.

Evidence which may suggest that that the constitution was not an attack on the Spanish establishment:
- the constitution brought Spain into the 20th century and its provisions were not radical for any modern democracy
- the church had been in an extremely privileged position and changes had to be made. The separation of church and state allowed Spain to become a progressive European state
- the aim of the constitution was the secularisation of Spain not a vindictive attack on the Catholic Church, which was how some tried to portray it
- the changes to the suffrage propelled the country from being one of the most backward to the forefront of European democracies
- the electoral system was designed to give representation to a wide range of opinion and reward those who could work cooperatively. This should have been welcomed by all democrats
- the army had been the drivers of change, including regime change, for some time. A constitution which did not reserve a special place for them in the country's affairs should have been welcomed by modern democrats
- the most controversial part, Article 44, only provided an opportunity to nationalise land in the future and was dependent on circumstances. Agrarian reform was recognised by almost everyone as the most urgent problem facing Spain. Having this provision showed that the new Republic was serious about land reform
- the regional provisions could be seen as very modern in recognising the linguistic and cultural diversity within the country.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Underlines the importance of the debate over Article 44, Zamora nearly resigned 'The centre and the right were deeply concerned about where such measures could lead.'
George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert	Emphasises the importance of the changes to the position of the army, 'Military men continued to dominate police posts and that the army was in the forefront of internal and civil disputes.'
Hugh Thomas	Argues that 'The religious clauses (of the constitution) brought dismay. They were ambitious but foolish, whatever the merits of the case may be.'
Paul Preston	Stresses the importance of media, stating 'The Catholic press made frequent references to the Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy who they said were behind the constitution.'

Question 67

Evidence which may suggest that there was far more opposition from the right than the left:

- the opposition to the reforms was far greater from the right than from the left. Most of the left opposition was that the reforms were too timid, or that the right were not allowing the reforms to be implemented. The majority of the left were therefore not opposed to the reforms, they wanted them to go further and they wanted them to be properly introduced
- the agrarian reforms are a good example of this. Opposition from the right constantly opposed the reforms, even the most modest ones at every turn. They opposed them in the Cortes, in the right-wing dominated press, in the actions of the landowners and in the actions of the Civil Guard in the countryside
- the army reforms were extremely moderate but were lambasted by the right and resented by the privileged officer class. Some on the left saw the need to go further but did not oppose the reforms
- the regional reforms were broadly welcomed on the left and the statute of autonomy for Catalonia was what many on the left in that area had worked for some time
- the right was outraged by the reforms of the church. They used this as a rallying point to garner opposition to the Republic, including the establishment of the CEDA
- the church reforms were not opposed by the left, although some thought the priorities of the government were incorrect as much time was devoted to these
- the right were particularly concerned by the compulsory expropriation of land allowed under the constitution and enacted after the Sanjurada
- the regional reforms were opposed by the right who wanted a strong, centrist Spain
- Sanjurjo's revolt shows the level of opposition by the right, where they attempted a coup against the government to bring down the whole republic.

Evidence which may suggest there was opposition from the left:

- the agrarian reforms were opposed by the landowners but also by much of the left. Caballero called Azaña's land reform, 'an aspirin to cure appendicitis'
- many of the attempts at agrarian reform were ignored by landowners and in this they were supported by the Civil Guard
- there was an increase in support for agrarian anarchist trade unions. They promised opposition to the reforms by agitating for revolutionary change. The Socialists responded to this by further distancing themselves to the reforms in order to stop losing potential members
- although the left was almost all anti-clerical, many were critical of the reforms to the church as they seemed to be more important to the government than the more pressing reforms such as the army reforms were considered inadequate by many on the left and most of the old guard were still in place, including in charge of the paramilitary police. The right was disdainful of any meddling in army affairs by civilian politicians
- although regional reforms were welcomed by most of the left in Catalonia, the same statute of autonomy was not granted to other areas, such as the Basque country, where the political make-up was different
- although the PSOE had differences with the government, the left opposition was mainly from the anarchists, who were opposed to any form of state control or reform.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Paul Preston	Argues 'the response of big landowners had been rapid. Their press networks spouted prophecies of doom and the law of obligatory cultivation was effectively ignored.'
Martin Blinkhorn	Contends that 'By 1933, it was evident how successful the holders of local socio-economic power had been in retaining it and in evading or openly flouting unwelcome legislation.'
Raymond Carr	Emphasises the importance of 'The conservative interests consistently blocked even modest social reform and thus disabused Socialists with the bourgeois Republic.'
Antony Beevor	Contends that 'The FAIistas believed passionately in the struggle against the state, with strikes and risings designed to bring about the social revolution.'

Question 68

Evidence which may support the view that opposition to Gil Robles and CEDA was the most important reason for the victory of the Popular Front:

- CEDA had been formed to fight the 1933 elections as a unified right-wing party and had done so successfully, they were not in charge however and this is what people feared if they won in 1936
- Gil Robles was an admirer of both Mussolini and Hitler, so the Left were correct in fearing him
- the entry of CEDA members into the cabinet proved to be a catalyst for action for the Left. This included not only the Asturias rising but also positive action to galvanise the Left into working together to defeat the threat from CEDA
- the reversal of reform during the Bienio Negro accelerated greatly after the inclusion of CEDA into the government
- the rhetoric of Robles aped that of the fascist dictators elsewhere in Europe
- the fear of Robles and CEDA made it much easier for the Popular Front to frame the election as between the forces of democracy and those of fascism
- many of the agrarian workers who had abstained or otherwise not voted for the Left in 1933 now saw the difference a right-wing government could have.

Evidence which may consider other reasons for the victory of the Popular Front:

The experience of the Bienio Negro:

- the limited gains made in tackling the agrarian issue during the Bienio Reformista had been undone since 1933
- the army had not been democratised as the initial reforms had intended. During the Bienio Negro the army had regained some of its former prestige and place in society. Only a united effort by the left could reverse this
- the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia had been repealed. Catalan nationalists therefore joined the Popular Front to regain lost constitutional ground
- the actions of the governments of the Bienio Negro showed the Left that they could not repeat the mistakes of the election of 1933 where their disunity had allowed the election of those who sought to dismantle the gains made.

The electoral system:

- the election of 1933 had proved how the creation of unified blocs of parties brought electoral benefits in the shape of members in the Cortes. It was clear to those on the Left, still smarting from that defeat, that only a mass joint effort could propel them to victory in future
- the previous abstention by anarchists had been shown to be counter-productive. Although they may not officially join the Popular Front, the creation of the Front was helped by the change of stance of anarchist supporters to anyone with a more progressive programme.

The international situation:

- the defeat of the German Left, including the elimination of the strongest socialist party in Europe had a sobering effect on the Left in Spain. The PSOE did not want to follow the fate of the SPD who suffered from a divided Left
- the Soviet Union had changed policy. The bourgeois parties of Western Europe were no longer to be regarded as social fascists but were to be worked with in united fronts against actual fascists
- the Popular Front movement was also to see success in France and in both countries the official Communist parties, backed by Moscow, joined in
- Western Europe was dividing between the forces of fascism and those of democracy
- the Popular Front saw themselves as defenders of the fledgling Spanish democracy against the forces of fascism. In this emergency, all progressive, democratic elements had to come together.

The events of the Asturias uprising:

- the uprising had only taken hold in Asturias because different factions of the Left worked together there. This pointed the way forward for coordinated efforts from the Left
- the defeat showed the brutality of the regime and what could lie in store if the Right won again
- it was clear from the aftermath of the defeat that the Right would dismantle all of the benefits of the Republic — the repeal of reform accelerated massively — and that winning the next election was crucial. The Left could only do this if they were united.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Raymond Carr	Argues that 'Robles had declared . . . that socialism must be defeated at all costs. When it (the Asturias Rising) was over the nation was morally divided between those who favoured repression and those who did not.'
Paul Preston	Argues that Robles' speeches were often filled with 'anti-democratic and anti-Semitic innuendo', the oppressive, anti-reformist nature of his government partnership with Alejandro Lerroux's Radicals, and the frank admiration offered to foreign fascist regimes helped lead to the Right's defeat in the 1936 elections.
William Phillips and Carla Rahn Phillips	Contend 'Given the constitutional structure of the Republic, a small shift in the popular vote could mean a substantial change in the composition of the Cortes.'
Antony Beevor	Argues that 'The new Government (after October 1934) turned back the Republic's clock.'

Question 69

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view Spain was a broken country in the years after the end of the Civil War have been exaggerated:

- Spain possessed some raw materials vital to other countries in their war effort
- Franco laid the foundation for a future 'economic miracle' in Spain
- Spanish neutrality in WWII meant that, far from being isolated, Franco was courted by both sides in the WWII
- left Spain in position to secure reasonable relations with West and to maintain them in the post-war period due to its anti-Communist nature
- Franco's staunch anti-communism would stand him in good stead with either the western Allies or the Axis powers, regardless of which was victorious
- unity was secured in Spain
- eventual recognition by all major powers
- regime was to be the basis of Spain's most economically successful period for centuries
- the regime was popular with many
- Franco was never removed and his appointed monarch was popular enough to remain through the transition to democracy.

Evidence which may support the view Spain was not a broken country in the years after the end of the Civil War have been exaggerated:

- return to dictatorship and strict social control
- military courts in place until 1943
- Franco's troops behaved like an occupying army rather than one in its own country
- widespread retaliation, killing and imprisonment of those who had sided with the Republic
- Secret Police system along with official party — FET y de las JONS intelligence brigade
- social welfare linked to regime loyalty — power of party official
- bribery and corruption rife
- documentary evidence used to persecute individuals connected to Trades Unions
- 26,000 political prisoners by mid-1940s
- re-establishment of the power of the church, army and landowners
- repression of opposition in Basque area and, particularly in Catalonia
- repressive systems of education, employment, policing, courts
- widespread killings
- Franco's maintaining of polarisation
- Spain was a dictatorship when almost all the rest of Western Europe was winning a war against dictators
- Franco rebuffed his erstwhile allies, Hitler and Mussolini, by not supporting them more actively.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Argues that the period between 1939 and 1945 would have been desperate, whatever government was in power.
Paul Preston	Contends that 'Wages were slashed, strikes treated as sabotage'. The CNT and UGT were crushed. Travel and search for jobs were controlled. Every effort was made to maintain the division between the victors and the vanquished.
E H Carr	Argues that Franco's aim was 'to destroy the 19th century'; that is, parliamentary liberalism.'
Sheelagh Ellwood	Contends that plurality and diversity were replaced in every sphere. . . acts of individual cruelty, however brutal, were easily surpassed by the collective cruelty of the Dictatorship: 'even children who had participated in union-organised picnics were listed.'

Section 9 — The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923—1945

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 70

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
left-wing strongholds of industrial Spain and in the great estates of the South, the uprising was defeated by the spontaneous action of working-class organisations.	Suggests that the coup failed in many places because of the organised opposition of the working class.
In the navy, left-wing sailors had mutinied against their right-wing officers and because of this, at first the rebels' strongest card, the ferocious colonial army under Franco, was blockaded in Morocco by Republican warships.	Argues that most of the navy stayed loyal meaning the Army of Africa was stranded in Morocco.
The Republic also had a numerical advantage in both the number of aircraft and the number of ships.	Suggests that the armed forces did not all rebel, many stayed with the Republican government, including most of the air force.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- the organisation of the working class meant that every major city bar one (Seville) remained loyal to the government
- the refusal of most of the navy to transport the Army of Africa left the best Nationalist forces stranded
- around three-quarters of the navy and almost all of the air force remained loyal.

Point in Source B	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
Barrio spent the evening of 18 July and the night of 19 July telephoning every important garrison and this was not time wasted as it probably saved Malaga and Valencia for the government.	Suggests that the actions of Barrio helped to secure places for the Republic.
the workers' militias had taken over the railway stations, the communications system and the streets.	Argues that the workers were able to safeguard strategic places for the Republic through organised militias.
At this point, Barrio handed power to Giral, who had no alternative but to arm the workers in order to resist the military uprising.	Suggests that the Republican government opened the arsenals and armed the workers who opposed the coup.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- many cities were in the balance and local commanders unsure. Barrio was able to persuade some to remain loyal
- the militias, often organised around their trade unions, took over the places they worked, like railways and telephone exchanges. They also fought in the streets against rebelling troops
- once armed properly, the militias were able to properly combat the Nationalists and this helped to secure some cities for the Republic.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:

- in total, around 90,000 men from the army and paramilitary forces remained loyal to the Republic
- the person who was meant to be head of the new state, Sanjurjo, died in a plane crash when trying to get to Spain
- Franco decided to relieve Toledo instead of marching on Madrid. This delay meant that the Nationalists could not take Madrid in 1936
- the main industrial areas including Barcelona, the Asturias and around Bilbao were in Republican hands
- in addition to the industrial areas, they also had most of the railways and motorised infrastructure
- the Republic had the French border and the Northern sea ports, both vital for supplies
- in Asturias, Republicans controlled the coal of the country, as well as the chemical and explosive plants
- the Republic had the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain. This meant they could buy weapons if anyone would sell them to them, which France at first agreed to do.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
G Esenwein and A Shubert	Argue that a number of factors mitigated against a quick insurgent triumph.
Antony Beevor	Suggests that 'The failure to take Valencia was a grave blow to the plotters because they could not advance on Madrid from the east.'
Paul Preston	Argues that 'The plotters had not foreseen that their rising would turn into a long civil war.'
Julian Casanova	Contends that 'Sanjurjo's accidental death forced the rebels to rethink their plans.'

Question 71

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Henry Buckley, correspondent in Spain for the Daily Telegraph.	An eye-witness writing for a conservative British newspaper who was not someone predisposed to side with the Left.
Purpose	Article from his book, *The Life and Death of the Spanish Republic*.	He is giving an account of the attitudes of France, Britain, Germany and Italy from his point of view.
Timing	1940	Buckley was present throughout the period and knew the attitudes which underpinned action and inaction.

Point in Source C	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
The French government was struggling to contain the warring factions within its own country and looked to be headed for civil war over the issue of aid to the Spanish Republic.	France was a divided country and non-intervention was seen as a compromise to prevent civil war in France using language such as 'to contain the warring factions'.
The British Government were determined to take no action which would have put Britain on the same side as 'the Reds' in Spain as the government had decided Giral was not a 'nice person' but was in their view a 'Red hooligan'.	There was a distrust among the Conservative leaders of anyone on the Left. They did not want to intervene in any way which could be seen as supporting the Republican Government using language such as 'the Reds' and was not a 'nice person' but a 'Red hooligan'.
Meanwhile, for the time being, Germany and Italy were stringing the democracies along, playing the anti-communist record every day and smiling with glee as they prepared more shipments for Spain with natural indifference to their own official pledges.	For Germany and Italy, non-intervention meant that the Nationalists were more likely to win, which was part of their overall plan for Europe using language such as 'stringing the democracies along, playing the anti-communist record every day'.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Baldwin told his Foreign Secretary, Eden, not to do anything that would get us into a conflict on the same side as the Reds
- the French were keen to embrace non-intervention as their original plans to aid the Spanish Republic were pounced on by the right-wing press and tensions were running high in France, with fears of civil war breaking out there between the left and right
- the Germans and Italians could agree to non-intervention as they had no intention of sticking to it.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- there were a number of arguments in Cabinet about the correct path to take. As Eden became more wary of Franco and his allies, he was often defeated at Cabinet meetings by Hoare and Chamberlain, eventually leading to his resignation
- part of the Pan-European British foreign policy at the time was not to force Italy into a position where it felt Germany was its natural ally. Britain wanted to avoid a military alliance between the two
- for the Americans, non-intervention was in keeping with their isolationist views, but support was still given by companies to the Nationalists
- Stalin agreed to non-intervention as he wanted to maintain good relations with Britain and France and keep an anti-German front, however when it was clear that non-intervention was being ignored by others, he did the same.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Raymond Carr	Believes that Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union were not deterred by the activities of the Non-Intervention Committee.
Antony Beevor	Stresses the position of the USA ambassador on the role of the Non-intervention Committee, 'Each movement of the Non-Intervention Committee has been made to serve the cause of the rebellion.'
Helen Graham	Takes the view that almost no-one in the British government felt that a Francoist victory really posed a threat to British interests.
Jill Edwards	Suggests that in the first weeks of the rebellion it was the thread of anti-communism which formed the warp of British Government attitudes.

Question 72

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to interpretations given*
The officers who rose up in July 1936 won the war because they had the best trained troops in the Spanish army.	The Nationalists won because they had the best of the army.
Although the Republic was not short of money or armaments, the war materiel that the Republic acquired using Bank of Spain gold reserves was inferior in quality to that which the Fascist powers supplied to the military rebels.	Both sides were supplied from abroad but the Republic received less and poorer equipment than the Nationalists.
The most important factor during the war was that Franco received his aid constantly, while the Soviet aid depended on the entente between Moscow and the Western democratic powers.	The timing and dependability of the aid supplied was important to the defeat of the Republic.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:
- the Army of Africa, led by Franco, contained the best trained and most experienced troops
- the aid from the Soviet Union to the Republic was often inferior and much older than that given by the Germans and Italians to the Nationalists
- the ability of the Republic to receive aid was dependent on the enforcement of the Non-Intervention Committee and the internal politics of France who controlled the northern border meaning that Soviet aid could often not get through.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:
- the vast majority of the junior officers joined the rebellion. This was a layer which the Republic found very hard to replace
- the Republic's air superiority lasted a very short period of time. The new aircraft of the Condor Legion and Italian planes dominated the skies for most of the war
- many of the Republic's troops, including the militia and many of the International Brigades had very little military training
- the Republic had both civilian and military commands, with the civilian leaders changing throughout the war. The Nationalists had a unified command structure
- Franco was supplied with oil by American companies which refused to do the same for the Republic
- non-intervention, 'the supreme farce of our time' prevented the Republic being supplied legitimately while allowing the Germans and Italians to supply the Nationalists virtually without reproach
- internal divisions plagued the Republic throughout the war. The events of May 1937 in Barcelona and the subsequent persecution of the anarchists and the POUM typified the infighting.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Gerald Brenan	Argues that foreign intervention was crucial. 'Stalin saw to it that the arms which he supplied. . . should secure the predominance of the Communist Party'.
Sheelagh Ellwood	Argues that 'inhibition on behalf of the western democracies, together with the active involvement of Italy and Germany, undoubtedly swung the balance decisively in favour of Franco.
Paul Preston	Contends communist efforts against the revolutionaries had let their own control in the war effort slip. Their efforts led to a second civil war within the Civil War.
Raymond Carr	Believes that Axis fears of rebel defeat led to extra aid in November 1938. Republican government blamed lack of unity.

Section 10 — Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

PART A — HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 73

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view Chamberlain's leadership was fatally damaged by his foreign policy:

Appeasement:
- appeasement was criticised by some at the time as an attempt to avoid conflict by using inappropriate concession and negotiation that led the country to the verge of defeat
- Chamberlain was closely associated with this failed policy which was one of the main reasons for his growing unpopularity as the phoney war progressed
- Cato argued that appeasement had made war inevitable by allowing Germany to rearm. Chamberlain and the 'Guilty Men' in particular were criticised for this as it gave Germany and her allies the time to rearm and prepare for war and
- once Germany violated the ultimatum over Poland there was a two-day silence from the government which led Chamberlain's opponents to believe that he was preparing to negotiate with Germany once again. This belief reduced his credibility even within his own party
- whilst fears were allayed on 3 September, the preceding weeks and months of inactivity led his critics to question his appetite for war
- belief that Chamberlain was still prepared to negotiate with Hitler in 1940, not a popular position
- whilst the argument about the importance of appeasement continues, we need to consider the fact that at that time it was not the policy of appeasement which was the issue because it had cross party support, it was the leadership style or the lack of leadership of Chamberlain himself.

Allies:
- with war a distinct possibility Chamberlain tried but was unsuccessful in gaining meaningful alliances to fight a successful war in Europe
- Chamberlain has been criticised over his leisurely negotiations with the Soviet Union. He stated that he had a 'most profound distrust of Russia' exacerbated once Soviet Russia invaded Finland in December 1939
- Chamberlain did not give the French Governments enough support during their period of political instability. Addison argues, 'he seemed to treat the French with as much contempt as he showed for the Labour Party'
- although, counter arguments pertain to Chamberlain securing at least 'benevolent neutrality' the USA confirmed their isolationist policy and were determined to stay clear of European conflicts through Neutrality Acts passed in 1935, 1936 and 1937
- Czechoslovakia, with its large army, was conceded after the Munich agreement of September 1938.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more significant in leading Chamberlain to resign:

Chamberlain's ineffectiveness as a wartime leader:
- to prepare for war the British workforce had to be organised in such a way to maximise its potential. One of the major criticisms levelled at Chamberlain was his inability to organise the workforce
- whilst there was a demand and a need for extra workers to provide the manpower for rearmament there was still an estimated one million unemployed by April 1940. This reflected badly on Chamberlain's organisational skills at a time of national emergency
- the consequence of this economic mismanagement was the failure of essential industries to work at peak capacity because there was a lack of manpower, especially skilled workers. Control of Employment Act — while aiming to reappropriate labour, still had to contend with private industry poaching workers

- throughout the 1930s, the relationship was poor between Chamberlain, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer before becoming PM, and the Trades Union movement due to the austere government policies and the consistently high unemployment
- when Chamberlain needed the Trades Unions' cooperation to fulfil his economic targets they refused to work with the man that many believed was responsible for causing so much misery during the 1930s
- the Trades Unions had a close relationship with the Parliamentary Labour Party, with Ernest Bevin as conduit
- at the beginning of the war there was a concern that the government would limit access to resources and goods usually needed by the domestic market. The consequence of this was a serious threat of uncontrolled inflation which would ultimately increase the cost of living thereby making people poorer. After the lean years of the early 1930s this was not popular
- arguably Chamberlain's overall failure in the management of the economy was his failure to appoint a Cabinet member with overall control for the economy. The result was that there was no holistic view of the economy. Therefore, the transition from a peacetime economy to wartime economy was slow and uncoordinated
- these issues exposed failings in Chamberlain as a wartime Prime Minister at a time of national emergency putting his leadership under increasing scrutiny.

The Norway campaign and subsequent parliamentary debates:
- the poorly planned and executed Norway Campaign which resulted in the Germans occupying Norway. As Prime Minister, Chamberlain had ultimate responsibility for the Norway Campaign
- the failure of the Norway Campaign was seen as an indictment of Chamberlain's lacklustre wartime leadership
- Churchill rather surprisingly emerged blameless for the failed Norway Campaign and was a prime candidate to replace Chamberlain
- the resultant vote in parliament at the conclusion of the Norway Debate — Chamberlain's usual huge majority of over 200 was reduced to 81-60 Conservatives abstained and 41 Conservatives voted with the opposition, however, Chamberlain was still reluctant to resign as Prime Minister
- the changing attitudes of numerous members of the Conservative Party, including members of the Watching Committee, towards Chamberlain by May 1940
- mutual long-standing Labour Party distrust and dislike of Chamberlain
- Labour Party's refusal to serve in any coalition government led by Chamberlain.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tim Bouverie	Argues that the move to oust Chamberlain was led by Tory anti-appeasement rebels. Even though Chamberlain won the vote of no confidence, such a large Tory defection was widely considered a resounding defeat.
Tony Corfield	Contends that Chamberlain was ultimately brought down by the Labour rank and file who refused to any participation within a national government which had Chamberlain as PM.
Paul Addison	Argues that it is inaccurate to view Chamberlain as having been doomed from the start due to his association with appeasement. The major criticism of Chamberlain centred on his refusal to institute stronger coordination of the economy.
Kevin Jefferys	Contends that disaffection from within the Tory ranks was a major contributory factor to Chamberlain's downfall.

Question 74

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the wartime economy was managed successfully:

Management of workforce, industry and agriculture:

- the candidate may offer a brief explanation of the many shortcomings in the British economy at the outbreak of war
- as soon as war broke out the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 was passed allowing greater management and control of industry. Subsequently, the British economy transitioned from a market orientated economy to a centrally managed economy in which the state allocated the most important resources, decided what should be produced and determined how much should be paid for it. Yet issues surround poaching of workers from private industry
- the Government set up Ministries for Food, Shipping, Information, and Economic Warfare. A Ministry of Aircraft Production and a Ministry of Labour were established, followed in 1942 by a Ministry of Production
- Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, oversaw the allocation of labour. Bevin's ministry saw an increase of 2 million in the total workforce. 10,000,000 people employed in armed forces/employed in the munitions industries
- key workers were prevented from joining the armed forces to ensure war materials were produced
- unions reluctantly accepted dilution to ensure productivity. Bevin consulted both unions and employers over policy to avoid industrial unrest, (although strikes did take place). Only 250,000 men and 90,000 women were directed into wartime industrial work which they had not chosen
- across the whole economy from 1938 to 1943 output per worker rose by 10%
- 'shadow factories' produced 500 planes a month
- new industries such as rayon, dye stuffs and electrical wires flourished during the war
- the significant increase in agricultural production brought about by food shortages through the U-boat campaign and increased mechanisation
- new methods of food production, the increased use of fertiliser and animal husbandry to produce more food for the domestic market. In five years, the domestic production of food almost doubled, despite at the start of the war only 5% of the population working in agriculture
- the use of public space to grow food as well as the 'victory garden' as a morale booster to combat the growing disaffection towards rationing.

Management of finance:

- financing the war was an issue of major concern. The war cut earnings from exports and from overseas investments which had to be sold off
- fiscal policies such as increasing the basic rate of tax and the use of excess profits tax (raised to 60%) to inject much needed capital to the war effort. 'Finance is the fourth arm of defence', said Chancellor Sir John Simon in the first war Budget
- income tax was raised to 50% in 1941 and nearly all workers now paid income tax; 4 million new taxpayers were brought into the system
- to make collection of taxation easier and fairer the Pay-As-You-Earn system was introduced in 1943
- a detailed analysis of government policies on import and export controls. This may include a discussion of exchange controls to keep capital in Britain. The decision to sell gold and dollar reserves as well as the curtailment of luxury goods to concentrate on war manufacture
- through the sale of war-bonds to the British public, the government was able to raise £8,500 million in government borrowing to help pay for the war. This also reduced inflationary pressure by removing excess money from the economy whilst supply of consumer goods was restricted
- Roosevelt instigated Lend-Lease in March 1941, as Britain was running out of money
- Britain was the greatest recipient of Lend-Lease, $27 billion worth of purchases during the war which proved vital in helping Britain pay for the war
- Canada gave Britain a gift of $1,000 million as well as interest-free loans (a considerable amount of money during the war)
- in 1943–1944 Lend-Lease was supplying about one quarter of the armaments received by British and Empire forces.

Evidence which supports the view that the wartime economy was not managed successfully:

- until May 1940 the there was little mobilisation of industrial manpower to fulfil government orders due to a shortage of skilled labour and some materials
- arguably hostility from trade unions ensured that the Control of Employment Act was in fact useless
- whilst the common view is that the country pulled together at this time of need it has been recognised that there were disputes over pay and working conditions at this time which may have had a negative effect on overall production
- there are also other factors such as war fatigue, bad management and a reluctance to adopt contemporary working practices that also affected overall productivity
- in the coal industry, still the main source of Britain's fuel and power, total output and productivity remained disappointing. As a result, Britain had to rely on imports of oil, making the economy vulnerable to the effects of U-boat attacks on shipping
- the reliance on the USA for machine tools and other essential production tools even prior to the programme
- the official economy was shadowed by a black-market economy which could have been a factor in the country not meeting optimum output
- shortages of some foods and consumer goods due to restriction of imports
- rationing — complaints that individuals involved in heavy manual work did not have sufficient rations
- the impact of the war on the balance of payments
- Lend-Lease ended suddenly after the defeat of Japan which left Britain facing a 'financial Dunkirk'(Keynes).

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Peter Howlett	Emphasises the success of the industrial wartime economy and its rapid shift from a 7% GDP spend on wartime activities at the start of the war to 55% spent by 1943. This would suggest a corresponding increase in war productivity during this timeframe.
Jim Tomlinson	Praises the success of the management of the wartime economy taking into account its vulnerability to shortages.
J K Bowers	Contends that British agriculture during the war prospered. Prices and productivity of cereal crops increased for some 16% more than pre-war levels. However, he does record that livestock production remained stagnant for cattle whilst the production of sheep actually declined.
Correlli Barnett	In 'The Audit of War' is critical of Britain's economic performance citing poor productivity, poor worker/management relations and out-dated machinery and working practices.

Question 75

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that war led to no lasting changes for women:

Economic/Employment:
- the number of women remaining in full-time work after the war fell significantly thus contradicting the notion that war work was an emancipating experience
- trade union opposition to women members and to women in skilled occupations remained and whilst career opportunities for professional women expanded in the fifties, social norms still centred round a woman as a carer and housewife
- economic opportunity was limited for women due to restrictions that prevented women from accessing credit. Women were denied the right to apply for a hire-purchase agreement or mortgage without the signature of a male guarantor. Disparity in salary remained prevalent throughout the war.

Social/Homestead:
- the marriage rate increased both during and after war and the post-war baby boom would seem to indicate a significant return to the pre-war notion of domesticity and motherhood as women's primary preoccupation
- Mass Observation surveys tend to reinforce the point of view that war work was seen as a temporary phenomenon and that women expected to return to their more traditional roles in society once the conflict ended
- the Beveridge Report proved to be a socially conservative document in introducing Family Allowances as a 'reward' for childbearing and in making the retrieval of missed national insurance contributions for women, who took time out to have children, more difficult than for men who returned to work after a break
- the education reforms introduced through the 1944 Butler Education Act reinforced the notion of training for motherhood as a substantial part of the education of those who failed the 'eleven plus' test/'qually', IQ test, in Scotland.

Evidence that the view that war led to no lasting changes for women is not valid:

Economic/Employment:
- for some, war work was emancipating, drew women, traditionally housebound, into the world of work, giving them a financial independence and an enhanced sense of their status in society
- during the war many women were employed in 'new to them' jobs and the range of jobs they were called upon to do eg work in shipbuilding, heavy engineering, munitions and on the land
- by mid-1943 almost 90 percent of single women and 80 per cent of married women were working in factories, on the land or in the armed forces. Yet much was lost by 1951
- some employers even went as far as to increase wages for women to the level of men's in like-for-like non-skilled jobs and there was an increase in the female membership of trade unions
- although equal pay was a long way off, the differentials had been eroded during the war.

Social/Homestead:
- psychologically, women may have developed an alternative view of their subordinate role within marriage after having coped with their enforced position as head of the household, main breadwinner, disciplinarian and family decision-maker, in the absence of the male figure in the home. Spiralling divorce rates tend to reinforce this notion
- educational opportunities certainly opened up for all girls post-1945 and an increasing number of girls were attending university by the late fifties.

Popular culture:

- the role of 'utility fashion' in breaking down class barriers
- Board of Trade Publications promoted 'Beauty as your Duty'
- fashion trends reverted to the ultra-feminine post-war — Christian Dior's 'New Look'
- the portrayal of female characters within Hollywood post-war
- frequenting public houses and smoking created social environment that was not completely removed

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Arthur Marwick and Nicholas Timmins	Argue that the war had a profound social impact and that its effects were to be felt long after its conclusion.
Harold L Smith	Contends that war failed to lead to any real lasting impact and in this respect he is partly supported by Penny Summerfield.
Penny Summerfield	Suggests that many women did have a different attitude toward marriage after the war but rejects the idea of war work encouraging a 'feminist dawn.'
Peter Hennessy	Argues that women were more influenced by the community in which they lived with regards to their expectations of life and that the prevailing norm of the fifties was a return to domesticity and motherhood.

Question 76

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Labour's Party's commitment to the Beveridge Report was decisive:

- the Beveridge Report sold a very impressive 635,000 copies, published December 1942
- the contrasting response of Labour and the Conservatives to the Beveridge Report of 1942
- Labour firmly tapped into the mood of the nation for a 'New Jerusalem', a better future for all post-war
- the Conservatives appeared reluctant to engage in a national discussion about future welfare reform
- Churchill called Beveridge a 'windbag and a dreamer'
- Churchill said that decisions about the Beveridge Report must await the outcome of the election at the end of the war
- the perceived success of large-scale government intervention in all aspects of daily life during the war led many to believe that such an approach to government should be tried in peacetime and that Labour was the only party advocating such an approach
- Labour manifesto in 1945 'Let us face the future' — fully reflected Beveridge's proposals.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors contributed the Labour Party victory:

The Labour Party and the 1945 General Election:

- the Labour Party ran a coordinated election campaign
- Labour campaigned in favour of full employment, nationalisation of industry, social security and housing
- the Labour Party was much more organised than the Conservatives, indeed some constituencies were not contested by the Conservatives and the prospective candidates effectively were handed a seat in parliament
- details of Labour War Cabinet Members: — Clement Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister; Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary; Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service; Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare; Arthur Greenwood; and Sir Stafford Cripps
- the popular view was that they had the experience to run the country after the war as they had gained a great deal of experience during the war of organising the Home Front. Evidence of democratic reform reinforcing domestic commitment — milk — maternity reform etc.
- the General Election of 1945 was not a betrayal of the greatly revered Winston Churchill, rather it was a positive vote in favour of a dream — the 'New Jerusalem' that so many wanted to build, and they trusted Labour to build it.

The Conservative Party and the 1945 General Election:

- the Conservatives complained that the Labour Party's election agents had been in place throughout the war whilst theirs had been serving in the forces. Hence the Conservatives were not well organised when an election was called
- Churchill broadcast a very negative speech about the Labour Party in the run-up to the 1945 election, his ill-judged 'Gestapo' speech. He expressed views that the public largely rejected and subsequently the Conservatives lost votes at the election. The decline in electoral support due to this is hard to quantify, but there is evidence to suggest that these ideas were abhorrent to the majority of the public who could scarcely believe that Churchill would round on his Coalition colleagues with such venom a few weeks after VE day
- the Conservatives took for granted a public gratitude for winning the war which they wrongly assumed would result in support at the polls. Churchill was reliant upon his war reputation to attract votes from the electorate
- the Conservatives focused too much on Churchill's charismatic leadership
- the Conservative and Labour manifestos were very different in emphasis
- the Conservatives were associated with the policy of appeasement and the poverty and unemployment of the 1930s, 'the Ghost of Neville Chamberlain.' There's little doubt that the 'never again' mentality was well to the fore in 1945 and that fears of a return to mass unemployment and the 'Hungry 30s' persuaded many to vote Labour.

Wider context which may have influenced the outcome of the 1945 General Election:

- the influence of organisations such as ABCA which were accused by the Conservatives of encouraging the members of the armed services to vote Labour
- the significance of the ten-year election gap. Prior to 1945 there had not been an election since 1935 due to war. Arguably if there had been an election in 1940 the Labour Party would have won many seats. The number of Labour MPs was 'artificially low'
- the role of the media. Left-wing ideas and beliefs were increasingly promoted, eg JB Priestley's Postscript on the radio
- Conservatives were blamed for the military defeats at the beginning of the war, 'Tories were unlikely to win any general election after the evacuation of British forces from Dunkirk in June 1940,' Paul Addison
- the Soviet Union had a planned economy and the Red Army had been pivotal in defeating Nazi Germany. The Labour Party was associated much more with central planning than the Conservatives were.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Steven Fielding	Contends that the winner of the election would simply be the party who wholeheartedly advocated the social change proposed in the Beveridge Report regardless of label and campaign style.
Paul Addison	Argues that the 'Gestapo' speech had only minimal impact on the election and that the result was decided long before the war ended. He points to a consistent Labour lead of 10 points in the polls from 1943 onwards. The success of anti-Conservative parties in wartime by-elections is often seen as a sign of a swing to the left in British politics between 1940 and 1945 with the collectivism of wartime government policies being hugely approved by the public.
Henry Pelling	Contends that the overwhelming support for Labour was a reaction to Conservative rule in the 1930s.
Kevin Jeffreys	Argues that the responsibility for the 'Home Front' held by Labour members of the Coalition Government were a major vote winner for Labour in 1945.

Question 77

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view Ernest Bevin was successful in preserving Britain's status as a world power:

- Britain's position relative to the competing Superpowers of USA and USSR
- Bevin was a firm supporter of the USA in the early years of the Cold War and a leading advocate of British involvement in the Korean War. The extent to which Bevin was successful in maintaining a place for Britain at the top table of international affairs and if so, how was it done and at what cost to our economy and global standing
- the extent to which Bevin himself was personally responsible for the onset of the Cold War mentality by his attitude to the Soviet Union
- Bevin was scathing about the USSR and arguably saw through Britain's former allies
- before the US did

- the abandonment by Bevin of the Labour philosophy of 'left speaking to left' in Britain's
- relationship with the USSR. Bevin's stance angered many of his own left-wing MPs, the Keep Left Group, but was generally supported by the Conservatives

- Bevin's prominent role in the foundation of NATO and enthusiastic supporter of the Marshall Plan and his success in tying the USA permanently to the preservation of European security rather than seeing the USA return to her traditional isolationist role in world affairs
- Bevin understood that Britain's days of imperial greatness were over, something he did not regret, for, in his view, the working class had never benefited from the Empire.

Evidence which supports the view that Bevin failed to preserve Britain's status as a world power:

- some discussion of the extent to which critics have suggested that British foreign policy became an extension of the USA's due to our financial dependency on America. A successful partner in a joint attempt to secure world peace and reshape the world geopolitically or merely 'airstrip one' and an obedient junior, dominated by a significantly more powerful ally and forced to follow her lead in world affairs
- the extent to which the decision to decolonise was forced upon Britain by the Superpowers for different reasons and how far it was a rational decision taken for sound political and ethical reasons
- the whole issue of decolonisation and retreat from overseas commitments in places like Palestine and Greece and Turkey. The extent to which it was a questionable example of abrogating responsibility for previous commitments or a realistic re-appraisal of our capabilities
- Bevin has been accused by some of his critics of being anti-Semitic as he refused to remove restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine at the end of the war
- the extent to which Indian independence and the issue of further decolonisation, successfully achieved was a noble foreign policy initiative or an abandonment of the Indian sub-continent to civil war with undue haste
- the extent to which the creation of a British unilateral nuclear deterrent was a significant statement of British foreign policy independence given the refusal of the USA to engage in further nuclear co-operation or was a futile and costly example of Britain trying to retain world power status when it had already evaporated.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Allan Bullock	Contends that Bevin was a truly great Foreign Secretary and one who clearly preserved Britain's independent status as a world power.
Kenneth Morgan	Argues that Britain faced significant difficulties in determining a new role in the changed post-war circumstances and credits Bevin with significant success in carving out such a role.
Michael Howard	Argues that Bevin is placed with Palmerston as two of the greatest British Foreign Secretaries in defining Britain's global power.
John Saville	Argues that Bevin's anti-communism and strong belief in the intrinsic value of the British Empire were significant factors which shaped our foreign policy in this period.

Section 10 — Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

PART B — HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 78

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
In the aircraft industry there had been a step change in production, as factories solved the problems of adapting to modern aircraft construction, laid out their assembly lines and expanded their workforce.	Suggests that Britain's preparedness in military-industrial capacity had improved. Adaptations to factories and expansions in labour had resulted in increased productivity within the aircraft industry.
British monthly aircraft production exceeded the equivalent German figure for the first time in September 1939 to the extent that 26 of the RAF's 39 squadrons had been re-equipped with the most modern aircraft.	Suggests that Britain's preparedness in air strength had significantly improved. The RAF was in a much better position having been both enlarged and modernised.
Critically, these were now incorporated into an air defence system with an operational set of radar stations that would provide early warning of incoming raids.	Suggests that Britain was prepared to defend itself against air attack having developed an air defence system that incorporated the RAF and radar stations.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- British peacetime rearmament was implemented under 'Scheme F'. This involved expansion of production within munitions and component parts industries through the creation of 'shadow factories'; William Hornby's 'new basic industries' supplying alloy frames to the aircraft industry; and machine tools and adjuncts. German annexation of Austria necessitated the approval of 'Scheme L' which made provisions for 12,000 aircraft over two years
- at the outbreak of war, the first-line strength of the RAF was about 2000 aircraft. Bomber Command consisted of 55 squadrons (920 aircraft). However, only about 350 of these were suitable for long-range operations. Fighter Command had 39 squadrons (600 aircraft), but the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance aircraft. Impressive new RAF fighters (which replaced biplanes) Spitfires and Hurricanes were introduced, which were a match for the Luftwaffe
- at the outbreak of war, the Chain Home and Chain Home Low early warning radar systems were fully operational (although later adapted) and able to detect incoming aircraft to 120 miles providing roughly 20 minutes warning.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

Civil Defence preparations:

- in 1935 the Government made it the responsibility of the local authorities to set up ARP services in their area and train local volunteers to be Stretcher Bearers, man First Aid Posts and form Rescue Parties. Fire Brigades and Ambulance Services were expanded, and auxiliaries were recruited
- ARP Act of 1937 made the taking of ARP measures mandatory by the local authority and that the Government would pay for most of the costs incurred
- after the Munich Crisis of September 1938, the Government distributed 38 million gas masks. Exercises took place to deal with the possible effects of a poison gas attack
- in 1939 new hospitals opened to deal with potential bombing casualties. 140,000 patients sent home from hospitals to make way for expected air raid casualties
- the Government sent every household in the country a leaflet outlining methods to cope with air raids, 'How to Prepare Your Home for. . . '

- Blackout procedures and the role of the ARP wardens
- Women's Voluntary Service for Civil Defence (February 1939), did a variety of jobs including medical support and staffing public kitchens
- Anderson and Morrison shelters. Numbers, affordability and effectiveness of these
- use of the London Underground (the tube) for sheltering
- Plans for Evacuation in September 1939, commenced on Friday 1 September and within three days 1.5 million children were evacuated. Codename Operation Pied Piper.

The economy and industrial capacity:

- if Britain was to field the promised army of 32 divisions before the end of the first year of war, and at the same time reach its targets of aircraft and ship production, a much more rapid and extensive imposition of economic controls was required
- the government did move early on to take over the importation of raw materials, but allocations to industry allowed too many inessential goods to continue to be made. Inessential goods could be imported only under licence, but licences were not difficult to obtain
- the extent to which Chamberlain's ideological opposition to government intervention in the economy led to failings in economic planning
- the government's failure to consult with the trade unions over mobilisation of labour and production targets resulted in spare industrial capacity in the economy which still existed into 1940. One and a quarter million people were still unemployed by January 1940
- an export drive was promoted in the belief that a balance of payments surplus might provide the resources needed for the war
- shipping space was not rigorously rationed; inessential goods were still being imported
- ration books had been ready since 1938, were issued at the end of September but food rationing did not begin until January 1940.

Diplomatic preparations/Appeasement:

- Chamberlain's extreme reluctance to engage in any meaningful negotiations with the USSR over a possible alliance against Hitler and his distrust of the French as allies
- the debate over Churchill's assertion that Britain could have been instrumental in creating a Grand Alliance against Germany in the late 1930s and whether such an outcome was ever possible
- government was repeatedly advised by its Chiefs of Staff during the 1930s that they could not fight against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously and therefore Britain should not become involved in a conflict in which she would not have the resources to fight
- apparent reluctance of the Empire to become involved in another conflict
- the isolationist policy of the USA during the 1930s.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Robert Mackay	Contends that Britain was unprepared for a role in land warfare, half-prepared for war in the air. Only for naval warfare was Britain equipped like a Great Power and ready for action.
David Dilks	Argues that the RAF's requests for appropriations were over-fulfilled and this pattern of emphasis on the RAF remained more or less constant until 1939.
Paul Addison	Contends that Chamberlain demonstrated economic complacency and a deep-seated desire not to let the Trade Unions have any say in manpower distribution or production targets nor to upset the normal workings of market forces in the economy.
Andrew Roberts	Contends that civil defence was as effective as it could have been under the circumstances.

Question 79

Candidates may be awarded up to **a maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
Bletchley Park's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic — though far from negligible — was at best intermittent and therefore significantly less critical to the outcome of the struggle than in other theatres.	Suggests that Ultra was of less importance to the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic than it was to the other theatres of war.
In the early days, Ultra was often marginal in use and effectively out of action at crucial periods because decrypts were either incomplete or out of date by the time they reached the Submarine Tracking Unit.	Suggests that the value of the intelligence was limited. Decrypts were often incomplete and the war in the Atlantic progressed at such a pace that intelligence became quickly out-dated.
At a stroke it became impossible for Turing's team to break the German code, a blackout which was to last for ten months, during which the U-boats enjoyed their longest 'happy time' of the war.	Suggests that German adaptations to the Enigma machine resulted in periods where Ultra was out of action and, therefore, played no role in mitigating the devastating impact of U-boat threat during the 'happy time', a period of significant German success.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- a team of top mathematicians was recruited to work at Bletchley Park in the south of England and a bank of early computers was built to work out the Enigma's vast number of settings
- the Germans were convinced that Enigma output could not be broken, so they used the machine for all sorts of communications: on the battlefield, at sea, in the sky and within its secret services
- British described any intelligence gained from Enigma as 'Ultra', Ultra was top secret
- only a select few commanders were made aware of the full significance of Ultra and used it sparingly to prevent the Germans from realising that their code had been broken
- 'Ultra' intelligence had the potential to give the British a priceless advantage as they were able to divert convoys away from where the 'wolf packs' were operating.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) *in regard to interpretations given*
Yet its role in Britain's survival was at least as important as that played by Fighter Command, and its contribution to victory as significant as that of Bomber Command.	Suggests that Coastal Command's contribution to Britain's success was vital and equal to that of the other branches of the RAF (who have received greater recognition).
By the end of the war, the Leigh Light fitted aircraft had attacked 218 U-boats by night and sunk 27 of them because the beam had not only made the night day but tended to blind the German gunners as the attacker moved in for the kill.	Suggests that technological improvements, such as the Leigh-Light (a powerful searchlight) improved the efficacy of Coastal Command aircraft in sinking U-boats.
Coastal Command was in continuous action and by the end of the war, by their own efforts, they had sunk 169 enemy submarines and seriously damaged another 111.	Suggests that Coastal Command played a significant role in Britain's eventual victory in the Atlantic having successfully sunk or damaged a number of U-boats.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- after initial limited success against the U-boats from 1942 onwards Coastal Command proved to be very successful against the U-boats
- by January 1943 Coastal Command had effective long range and very long range aircraft in service including: Catalinas, Halifaxes, Liberators, Sunderlands and Wellingtons. VLR aircraft forced U-boats to patrol in the mid-Atlantic which was further from their bases
- by the end of the war in Europe, air power had sunk more U-boats than surface vessels.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- in 1939 the Admiralty believed that U-boats could be defeated by a combination of asdic and convoys. This faith proved to be misplaced
- corvettes, small warships of less than 1000 tons, were added to the convoys to help plug the gaps in the Royal Navy's escort capability
- although these ships were slow and not very well-armed they did have considerable success against the U-boats
- convoy system was improved throughout the war
- the use of High Frequency Direction Finding equipment (Huff-Duff) on escort ships further improved U-boat detection on the convoys
- improved radio communication from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore helped significantly in avoiding lurking U-boats
- ASV (air to surface) radar helped detect surfaced U-boats at a far greater distance and aircraft could be directed towards them speedily
- the deployment of VLR aircraft in the shape of Liberators with centimetric radar helped to close the mid-Atlantic gap and helped immensely in the detection of U-boats
- the development of the 'hedgehog' multiple mortar system, fired from the front of escort vessels instead of the rear as depth charges were, was a big improvement in U-boat destruction
- the 250 pound depth–charge introduced in 1941 was an improvement on the earlier anti-submarine bomb which was a failure.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Overy	Argues against pinpointing any one factor over the other as a specific reason for victory, but commends highly the energy, drive and invention of Admiral Horton as being significant.
David Syrett	Argues, contrary to the interpretation of the source, in support of the huge importance of intelligence in winning the battle and in particular, the cracking of the Enigma code.
Jim Lotz	Suggests that the Canadian Navy made an enormous contribution to ultimate victory.
John Keegan	Suggests the importance of the revamped convoy system as an integral part of the success against the U-boats.

Question 80

Candidates may be awarded **a total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		**Possible comment on the source rubric provenance**
Author	Home Intelligence.	The Home Intelligence Unit was created in December 1939. Run by civil servants, and concealed from the public, this organisation collated intelligence gleaned from a wide range of sources and reported to the Government.
Purpose	Official report to the Government.	To monitor and report on the state of popular morale in wartime. The reports have their value in that they sought to describe and inform.
Timing	March 1941.	Written around 6 months after the onset of the Blitz when a number of cities and industrialised areas beyond London, such as Clydebank, were experiencing significant bombing, indicating the spread of the attacks. The height of the Blitz is considered to be May 1941.

Point in Source D	**Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)** *in regard to the source content provenance*
However, the general atmosphere after the Clydeside raid is described as one of 'carrying on with a sense of relief at having been able to stand up to the ordeal'.	Suggests that the people of Clydebank expressed relief that they had withstood the difficult experience of the Blitz and maintained a spirit of 'carrying on' in the face of adversity.
The official announcement was then made on Wednesday morning of the 19th, of the casualties over the whole area as being 500 dead and 800 injured.	Suggests that the Blitz on Clydebank resulted in significant loss of life with official figures recording 500 killed and 800 injured.
A great deal of the very extensive damage that was done was caused by fire, particularly in the Parkhall Housing Estate, and as a result very few of the houses in that area are now in a habitable state.	Suggests that the Blitz on Clydebank led to great fire damage in the area which rendered the homes uninhabitable and resulted in increased levels of homelessness.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Clydebank Blitz took place on the 13th and 14th March 1941. The town was targeted by the Luftwaffe for its high industrial profile that included the armaments factory in the Singer Sewing machine works, John Brown's shipyard and Beardmore's engine works. However, the Clydebank raids were not considered a success from the German perspective
- German bombing had little effect on British morale and there is an argument that bombing may have, in fact, helped morale — the 'Blitz Spirit'

- nevertheless, the Clydebank Raids did have a significant impact on the people of the town. Almost every street in Clydebank suffered a fatality. Most of the 12,000 homes were damaged in some way with 4,300 destroyed, largely by fire. This resulted in 11,350 people made homeless and industrial production was affected by the casualties and evacuations that followed. Significant evacuation took place as many sought refuge in neighbouring towns; many never returned.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Blitz commenced in September 1940 and finished in May 1941
- London was bombed for 57 nights in a row. 10 May 1941 London suffered its worst night, but this was the last night of the Blitz
- 30,000 people were killed during the Blitz
- Coventry was bombed in November 1940 and was the single most concentrated attack on a British city in WWII. In Coventry, over 550 people were killed and more than 43,000 homes, just over half the city's housing stock, were damaged or destroyed in the raid
- many other industrially significant cities such as, Southampton, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Belfast and Plymouth were bombed. However, German bombing did not seriously hamper British war production
- contemporary newsreels show the spirit of the Blitz, people pulling together and helping each other in their hour of need
- Ministry of Information newsreel films for public consumption in cinemas both at home and abroad, especially for the USA's consumption
- some would argue that the theory that there was unity at this time was indeed a myth
- the argument that the government were slow to make available Anderson Shelters to those who couldn't afford them. Overall, shelter provision was poor in the areas most affected and class was used as a barrier for people to access air raid shelters in the more expensive London hotels, where only customers and guests were allowed to use the facilities
- the Blitz caused widespread homelessness and medical care for the victims had to be planned carefully to offer the best service
- 'trekking' involved civilians in cities which were threatened with air attack during the Blitz leaving their homes at night to sleep in nearby towns and rural areas. These movements were not officially organised. Trekking was more common among residents of secondary cities due to the relatively limited provision of deep shelters (compared with London)
- in areas of extensive bombing (London, Clydebank and Coventry), people had to be recruited as fire crews and air raid wardens to prevent large scale damage to infrastructure.

Historians	**Perspective on the issue**
Andrew Roberts	Argues strongly in favour of the 'finest hour' argument, insisting that the British people were indeed at their best in this period of crisis and that morale was rock solid.
Nick Tiratsoo and Stuart Hylton	Suggest that morale was nowhere near as high as presented. They cite widespread panic and anger in the East End of London at inadequate shelter provision as well as the widespread incidence of industrial unrest (especially on the Clyde where workers often saw their employers as a greater enemy than Hitler).
Angus Calder	Contends that there was a gap between reality and the 'Myth of the Blitz.' The origin of this was not purely rooted in propaganda but emerged from within the national consciousness of the British public.
Juliet Gardiner	Stresses how concerned government was about morale and the success of their efforts to gauge the mood of the people.

[END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]

