



National
Qualifications
2025

2025 History

Advanced Higher

Question Paper Finalised Marking Instructions

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General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.

- (a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.
- (b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.
- (c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.
- (d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.
- (e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.
- (f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.
- (g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are:
 - relevant to the issue in the question
 - developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
 - used to respond to the demands of the question (for example, evaluate, analyse).

Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions

To gain more than 12 marks in a 25 mark essay question, candidates must make a reference (however minor) to historiography. If candidates do not refer to or quote from historians, or show that they have considered historical schools of thought, they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marking scheme and so will not achieve more than 12 marks.

The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

Marking criteria grids

The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria:

- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given in **bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

25 mark question – mark ranges and individual marking criteria

| Mark ranges | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marking criteria | STRUCTURE | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | No attempt to set out a structure for the essay. | An attempt to structure the essay, seen in at least one of the following: | The structure displays a basic organisation but this may be loose. This would refer to: | The structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This would include: | Clearly structured, perceptive, presentation of issues. This would be included in: | Well-defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question: | Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout: |
| | | No relevant functional introduction. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relevant functional introduction. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relevant functional introduction. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relevant functional introduction with main interpretations. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument. |
| | | No separate sections which relate to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> separate sections which relate to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> separate sections which relate to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> separate sections which relate to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> separate sections which relate to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> separate sections which relate to relevant factors. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> separate sections which relate to relevant factors. |
| | | No conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue evaluating the key issues. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points. |

| | | Mark range | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|---|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| Marking criteria | THOROUGHNESS/ RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | No evidence of relevant knowledge of the issue. | Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge. Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue. | Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue. The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis. | Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue. The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis and evaluation. | Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge. Evidence is linked to points of analysis or evaluation. | Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge. Evidence is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation. | Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge. Evidence clearly supports linked to points of analysis or evaluation. |

| | | Mark range | | | | | | |
|------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| Marking criteria | ANALYSIS/EVALUATION/ LINE OF ARGUMENT | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | <p>No evidence of analysis.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>Analysis is not relevant to the question.</p> | <p>There is much narrative and description rather than analysis or evaluation.</p> <p>There is a weak sense of argument.</p> | <p>There is an attempt to answer the evaluative aims of the question and analyse the issues involved. This is possibly not deep or sustained.</p> <p>Argument is generally clear and accurate but there may be confusions.</p> | <p>There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and the candidate tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis.</p> <p>Argument is clear and accurate and comes to a suitable – largely summative – conclusion.</p> | <p>There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues.</p> <p>Argument is clear and directed throughout the essay.</p> <p>The conclusions arise logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body and attempts synthesis.</p> | <p>There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues.</p> <p>Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues and arguments. Clarity in direction of argument linking to evaluation.</p> <p>The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.</p> | <p>Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues with a detailed and effective analysis and evaluation which advances the argument and considers various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones.</p> <p>The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.</p> |

| | | Mark range | | | | | | |
|------------------|------------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| Marking criteria | HISTORICAL SOURCES/INTERPRETATIONS | 0–9 | 10–12 | 13–14 | 15–17 | 18–19 | 20–22 | 23–25 |
| | | No discernible reference to historical works. | General reference to historical works. | There is some awareness of historians' interpretations in relation to the issue. Historians may be used as illustrative points of knowledge. | There is an awareness of historians' interpretations and arguments. Historians may be used as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation. | There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments. There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. | There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent. There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. There may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations. | There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography. Shows consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations. |

Marking the source-handling questions

There are three standardised stems used in the source questions:

- 'How fully . . .' or 'How much . . .'
- 'Evaluate the usefulness . . .'
- Interpretation of two sources

'How fully . . .' question (12 marks)

Candidates must:

- establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use **Contextual Development** to add knowledge as exemplification of interpretation points to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- use **Wider Contextual Development** to assess what the source does not reveal about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Up to 3 marks

- interpretation of points from the source.

Up to 7 marks

- Contextual Development which develops points from the source with the candidate's own historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- Wider Contextual Development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information such as omissions
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Candidates should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is. They can gain up to **3 marks** by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. Candidates cannot gain marks for simply quoting points from the source; they must paraphrase or interpret them to gain marks.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual development they give in their overall evaluation of the source's comprehensiveness. This should include the views of two relevant historians (**2 marks** are available for this). Where a candidate includes the views of additional historians, award marks for wider contextual development.

There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question, and therefore no marks awarded for this.

‘Evaluate the usefulness . . .’ question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- consider the provenance of the **entire** source in light of the topic being discussed. At all stages of the answer the provenance should underpin commentary which should include analysis and evaluation of the source
 - **Source Rubric Provenance** – comment on authorship, purpose and timing of the source in light of the historical event or issue in the question
 - **Source Content Provenance** – establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points which illustrate provenance, and analysing and evaluating them in light of the historical event or issue in the question
- contextualise those points with historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question – **Contextual Development**
- use **Wider Contextual Development** to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Award a **maximum of 6 marks** for provenance comments based on **3 marks** for the rubric and **3 marks** for source content interpretation.

3 marks

- Source Rubric Provenance – comments on provenance regarding authorship, purpose and timing as seen in the rubric.

3 marks

- Source Content Provenance – comments on provenance regarding the interpretation of the content of the source.

Up to 4 marks

- Contextual Development which develops points from the sources with the candidate’s own knowledge
- Wider Contextual Development, for example other relevant information which provides more information about the historical issue, and significant omissions in the source
- other points of view, including additional historians’ interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Interpretation of two-sources question (16 marks)

Candidates must:

- establish the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue within each source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use **Contextual Development** to assess what the sources reveal about different interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue
- comment on how the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue in the two sources relate to other possible interpretations with **Wider Contextual Development**.

Award marks as follows

6 marks

- comments on interpretation (**3 marks** per source).

Up to 8 marks

- **Contextual Development** which develops points from the sources
- Wider Contextual Development to assess what the source reveals about interpretations of a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information about other interpretations of a historical issue which have been omitted
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Marking instructions for each question

Section 1 – Northern Britain from the Iron Age to 1034

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 1 ‘Extremely warlike and bloodthirsty.’

How valid is this view of the nature of society in Northern Britain during the Iron Age?

Aim of the question To examine the nature of society in Northern Britain during the Iron Age. Traditional historians have emphasised the warlike and ‘barbaric’ nature of Iron Age society, whereas many contemporary historians argue that the extent of conflict has often been exaggerated and that other factors such as prestige, agriculture and religion were more important in shaping society. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that warfare shaped Iron Age society:

- the quotation is taken from the Roman historian, **Herodian**. Other Classical authors claimed the native tribes were warlike, for example, **Cassius Dio** stated that they had a ‘great liking for plunder’ while both **Dio** and **Tacitus** noted the use of chariots in battle
- artefactual evidence suggests a warlike society, for example, Mortonhall sword scabbard, Deskford carnyx (a war trumpet)
- inhumations are rare from Iron Age Scotland, yet the discovery of warrior burials suggests warriors held high status, for example, cist burials from Alloa and Dunbar
- the Newbridge chariot burial supports Roman claims that chariots were used by native tribes
- traditionalist historians believed settlements evolved to provide increased security in troubled times. **C.M. Piggott** (1940s) believed defences at Hownam Rings hillfort developed as a response to waves of ‘Celtic’ invasions from the continent; **Vere Gordon Childe** (1930s) described brochs as the ‘castles of a conquering aristocracy’
- hillforts have obvious defensive features, including ramparts and ditches and *chevaux de frise* (Dreva Craig). Multivallate hillforts had layers of defence, for example, Chesters, Woden Law
- brochs (for example, Mousa, Dun Telve) had thick, high stone walls, no windows and a single low, narrow entrance – often flanked by ‘guard cells’. Many brochs were further protected by ramparts and ditches
- crannogs may have been built over water to provide security. Many could only be reached on foot by crossing a narrow causeway and some may also have had drawbridges.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors shaped Iron Age society:

Hierarchy and prestige:

- classical writers observed the stratified nature of ‘Celtic’ society. **Julius Caesar** described the existence of a warrior aristocracy in Gaul; **Tacitus** stated that noblemen drove chariots while their dependents fought for them; **Dio** claimed that the northern tribes ‘choose their boldest men to be their leaders’, suggesting that tribal chieftains were war-leaders first and foremost
- prestige objects were used to display status, for example, Balmaclellan mirror, Torrs pony cap, gold torcs from Blair Drummond, massive bronze armlets from Aberdeenshire. Such artefacts demonstrate the existence of wide trading links and a ‘middle class’ of skilled local craftsmen (metalworkers)
- monumental architecture – hillforts, brochs, crannogs and larger roundhouses – was used to project power across the landscape. **Ian Armit**: ‘These buildings were as much about prestige and status as the practicalities of warmth and shelter’

- the construction of large hillforts (for example, Eildon Hill North, Traprain Law) required substantial manpower – suggests powerful chieftains commanding large labour forces in Southern Scotland
- brochs may similarly have been built primarily to ‘impress others’ (**Richard Hingley**). They were technologically sophisticated and similarities in their design across Scotland suggests a class of skilled, itinerant ‘broch builders’ – reinforcing the idea that there were professional craftsmen. Some brochs, for example, Gurness were surrounded by ‘broch villages’ – a chieftain and his vassals/workers?
- inhabitants of crannogs were making ‘no effort to hide’ (**Nicholas Dixon**) – may suggest that displaying status was at least as important as defence.

Agriculture:

- Roman writers stressed the lack of economic development among northern tribes, for example, **Dio** stated that although they hunted and kept livestock, they had ‘no cultivated land’
- **Stuart Piggott** (1958) famously characterised the northern tribes as ‘Celtic cowboys . . . footloose and unpredictable’ – suggesting a largely nomadic lifestyle and a lack of arable farming
- archaeology confirms the importance of animal husbandry, for example, bones of cattle, sheep and pigs are widely found on settlement sites. Some smaller ‘hillforts’ may actually have been animal pens
- however, archaeology has also proved that arable farming was widely practised, particularly in the fertile lowlands of Southern and Eastern Scotland – quernstones for grinding grain are common finds on Iron Age sites. On some waterlogged sites (for example, Oakbank crannog) organic remains of crops have been found, including barley, wheat and oats
- Iron Age field systems have been identified through aerial photography, for example, Castlesteads near Edinburgh – suggests systematic organisation of farmland and separation of animals from crops
- **Charles Thomas** argues that the primary function of souterrains (for example, Carlungie, Culsh earth house) was to store surplus agricultural produce – shows Celts were settled and successful farmers.

Other influences on Iron Age society:

- Iron Age Scotland was inhabited by numerous tribes – **Ptolemy** recorded 16 different tribes in Northern Britain (four south of the Forth-Clyde isthmus, 12 to the north)
- **Caesar** and **Herodian** both noted that native peoples painted or tattooed their bodies with woad; such decorations may have recorded tribal affiliations. Later Roman writers called the northern tribes ‘*Picti*’ – the ‘painted people’
- Celtic society was also familial – crannogs, brochs and large roundhouses could all have housed extended families. It is possible that familial/clan ties were reinforced through fostering children; **Dio** claimed that ‘they share their womenfolk and raise all their offspring in common’
- Celtic religion was polytheistic and ritual, and superstition were clearly important. **Armit** observes that religious beliefs would have ‘permeated all aspects of life’
- evidence of votive offerings (for example, Duddingston Loch, Edinburgh), animal and even human sacrifice, (for example, Sculptor’s Cave, Moray), ‘Cult of the Head’
- it is assumed that druids were present in Northern Britain, while the Ballachulish figure may be a representation of a Celtic goddess.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Antony Kamm | Argues for the warlike nature of Celtic society: 'war and fighting were inherent in their culture.' |
| Richard Oram | Equally argues: 'The emergence of inter-tribal warfare, raiding and cattle-reiving, all endemic characteristics of Celtic society, probably lie behind the appearance of defensive fortifications as significant features in the landscape for the first time.' |
| Ian Armit | Takes a more contemporary perspective, suggesting that projecting status may have been more important than actual warfare and that the defensive capabilities of settlements such as hillforts may have been of 'secondary importance' compared with their use as symbols of power. |
| Richard Hingley | Argues that until the arrival of the Romans, 'warfare was probably an occasional and small-scale activity.' He stresses that the Iron Age peoples of Scotland were primarily farmers who operated a mixed agrarian economy. |

Question 2

‘Scotland remained almost entirely untouched by Roman rule.’

How valid is this view of Rome’s impact on Northern Britain?

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which Northern Britain was changed by Rome’s presence. The traditional view is that Rome had a significant impact on the native population of Scotland, whereas many contemporary historians have claimed that Rome’s impact was limited; however, other contemporary historians adopt a counter-revisionist view and argue that Rome’s impact was greater than has recently been supposed. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Rome did not have a substantial social impact on Scotland:

- Rome’s presence was essentially a military occupation and Rome’s direct social impact was limited. The Roman army never penetrated the Highlands; even in the Lowlands of the south and east, its presence was temporary. Finds of Roman material on native sites further north are comparatively rare and this may suggest a conscious rejection of Romanitas (**Alan Wilson**)
- no evidence for the development of civilian infrastructure (towns or villas) in Scotland and when the forts were abandoned, so were the *vici*
- the vast majority of natives were largely unaffected by Romanisation – native settlement types, material culture and general lifestyles were essentially unchanged. **Keppie** argues that even the spread of Christianity was essentially a by-product of the Roman occupation and that it only became more widely established in the 5th and 6th centuries, after Rome’s withdrawal.

Evidence which supports the view that Rome did have a substantial social impact:

- the impact on those tribes which resisted Rome must have been ‘dramatic and devastating’ (**Lawrence Keppie**) in the short term – slaughter during military campaigns and starvation afterwards, for example, **Tacitus**’ account of Mons Graupius, evidence of military action during Antonine invasion, Severus’ alleged genocide
- intermittent Roman occupation of parts of Scotland exposed natives to Romanisation, particularly in the south (which was occupied for longer). Even when the Roman army was stationed on Hadrian’s Wall, Roman influence extended far to the north. Roman roads, for example, Dere Street, continued to be used centuries after Rome’s withdrawal
- *Vici* which developed outside Roman forts, for example, Inveresk and travelling merchants facilitated trade between Romans and natives, promoting Romanisation. Evidence of Roman artefacts on high-status sites (for example, Samian ware pottery, bronze brooches, glassware) suggests native elites were influenced by Roman material culture to some degree
- literacy – limited evidence of widespread adoption of the Roman alphabet during the Roman period (ABCD stone from Traprain Law a notable exception) but Latin inscriptions from sub-Roman period (for example, Latinus stone) reflect Romanisation in Southern Scotland. The development of ogham can also be seen as a native response to the Latin alphabet, while **Fraser Hunter** argues that even Pictish symbol stones were inspired by Roman examples of stone-carving
- religion – hybrid Romano-Celtic gods in environs of Hadrian’s Wall. Evidence of Christian communities in Southern Scotland during the later Roman period, for example, Whithorn. Changes in burial practices to unaccompanied cist burials, aligned east-west, suggest that Christianity was firmly established among the Britons by the end of the Roman period (**James Fraser**). From here it spread to the Gaels and Picts.

Evidence which supports the view that Rome did not have a substantial economic impact on Scotland:

- the relative scarcity of finds of Roman prestige goods on native sites beyond the frontier zone suggests that Rome's economic impact on lowland Scotland was limited
- the economic structure of native society remained fundamentally unchanged following Rome's withdrawal – it continued to be rural and based on a system of mixed arable and pastoral subsistence farming
- significantly, the northern tribes did not adopt a Roman-style monetary economy: no native Scottish coins were minted until the Middle Ages, and native societies continued to rely on a system of barter and payment in kind.

Evidence which supports the view that Rome did have a substantial economic impact:

- mixed economic impact in the short term. Rome's presence may have stimulated agricultural production (for example, demand for cattle for meat and leather, wheat and other cereal crops for bread). Supported by evidence of souterrains – native farmers producing a surplus to trade with the Roman army?
- pro-Roman native leaders benefitted economically through receipt of subsidies/'diplomatic gifts' (**Fraser**) – effectively, they were bribed for their cooperation. Examples may be coin hoards at Birnie (Aberdeenshire) and Falkirk (near the Antonine Wall) as well as the Traprain Law treasure
- however, Rome also had a negative economic impact, particularly on those tribes who were unwilling to cooperate – taxation, forced requisition of goods, large-scale plundering of natural resources (for example, timber and turf) for construction projects such as the Antonine Wall. Roman slave-taking and conscription meant the loss of economically productive natives and the Roman walls themselves were a barrier to free movement
- the introduction of large quantities of Roman silver had a significant long-term impact on the native economy – often melted down and repurposed by native tribes and their descendants. Massive Pictish silver chains were clearly powerful symbols of status and much of the material used in their manufacture is likely to have originated from the Roman Empire.

Evidence which supports the view that Rome had a substantial political impact on Scotland:

- in the short-term, those tribes which allied with Rome are likely to have seen political benefits as Rome repressed neighbouring tribes. The Votadini of the Lothians seem to have been a 'client kingdom' which acted as a 'buffer state' against the more hostile tribes further north. Their leaders seem to have been largely left to govern themselves and no Roman forts were built on the territory of the Votadini
- those tribes which opposed Rome were harried and subdued. **David Breeze** notes that native leaders had to conform or be ousted and that under Roman occupation, 'leaders and led were all now second-class citizens'
- Rome had a significant long-term impact on the political development of Scotland. The tribes of Southern Scotland – who had been exposed more deeply to Roman influences – emerged as the Britons of the post-Roman period and were the first to adopt Christianity and the Latin alphabet
- Rome's presence also encouraged a process of tribal amalgamation north of the Forth-Clyde line: the creation of a 'Caledonian confederacy' at Mons Graupius suggests temporary alliances, while **Cassius Dio's** reference to the emergence of two main tribal groupings – the Caledonii and Maeatae – by the early 3rd century suggests an increasing degree of political cohesion
- ultimately, the need for greater unity in the face of Roman imperialism led to the formation of the Kingdom of the Picts in Northern Scotland. The later Kingdom of Alba – the ancestor of modern Scotland – was firmly centred on the Pictish heartlands
- Hadrian's Wall essentially divided mainland Britain into two – with the more 'civilised' Roman province to the south and 'barbarian' territory to the north. Its extended occupation can be argued to have played a significant, if indirect, role in the subsequent development of two distinct political entities – England and Scotland.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Lloyd Laing | Asserts that Rome's impact on society in Northern Britain was very limited. He argues that even in Southern Scotland, 'Celts were still Celts in the north' and that 'only the ethos of Rome lived on into the Dark Ages.' |
| Lawrence Keppie | Contends that 'Whether the Roman presence did much to alter the traditional way of life for the great mass of the population may be doubted. We should not suppose that the tribesmen exchanged their cloaks for togas or began to speak Latin.' |
| David Breeze | Argues that Rome's political impact was most significant in the long term: providing the northern tribes with the impetus to unify was Rome's 'greatest gift' to Scotland. |
| James Fraser | Contends that Rome's impact has sometimes been underestimated. He argues that Rome's presence caused 'something of a revolution' and that as stronger, more coherent tribal elites emerged under Roman pressure, Rome greatly aided the process of state formation in Northern Britain. |

Question 3 **To what extent has St Columba's importance in the Christian conversion of Northern Britain been exaggerated?**

Aim of the question To evaluate the relative importance of different factors in the Christianisation of Scotland. St Columba is often regarded as the Father of Scottish Christianity but his direct contribution to the conversion is debateable. Other factors played a role, including the missionary work of other holy men (in particular St Ninian) and the influence of Rome. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that St Columba played a key role in the conversion:

- St Columba came from royal Irish stock (the Ui Neill dynasty); he established a monastery on Iona, in the far west of Scotland, in 563. His royal lineage gave him political influence with native rulers and in particular, he acted as a spiritual mentor to the Scottish Kings of Dal Riata
- Columba is widely regarded as the Father of Scottish Christianity and the first Patron Saint of Scotland. **Adomnan** claimed that Columba visited the court of King Bridei of Pictland and although widespread conversion of the Picts did not immediately follow, his expeditions helped pave the way for the acceptance of Christianity among the Northern Picts
- **Alfred Smyth** argues that Columba's monastery on Iona provided the 'parent culture' for Pictish Christianity. Iona also exercised influence among the Angles of Northumbria. Oswald, a prince of the Angles, spent time in exile there and became a devout Christian. When he became King of Northumbria he invited missionaries from Iona to assist him in converting his subjects to the faith. St Aidan, an Irish monk from Iona, became the first Bishop of Lindisfarne in 635
- Iona continued to be a powerhouse of the Christian faith long after Columba's death, not just in the British Isles but more widely across Northern Europe. It is probable that the Book of Kells – one of the finest examples of Insular Christian art – was produced there and it was also the burial place of the Scottish Kings; Donald III was the last King of Scotland to be buried there, in 1099.

Evidence which supports the view that St Columba did not play a key role in the conversion:

St Columba's importance has been exaggerated:

- sources such as **Adomnan's** Life of St Columba must be viewed as hagiography rather than reliable histories, for example, his account of Columba making the sign of the cross to frighten off the Loch Ness Monster seems highly implausible! The *Vita Sancti Columbae* was written a hundred years after Columba's death and as the ninth Abbot of Iona, Adomnan had every reason to exaggerate the achievements of Iona's founding father
- **Gilbert Markus** observes that Columba cannot be credited with the conversion of the Scots of Dal Riata, pointing out that Conall mac Comgaill, the King of Dal Riata who gifted Iona to Columba so he could build his monastery there, was presumably already a Christian
- it is also questionable whether Columba can be credited with converting the Northern Picts. Significantly, Adomnan does not tell us that Columba succeeded in converting King Bridei during his mission to Pictland. **Martin Carver's** excavations of the Pictish monastery at Portmahomack, northeast of Inverness, suggest there may already have been a monastic community there by the time of Columba's mission. **Markus** argues that it is likely that Bridei had already been baptised before Columba arrived at his court
- clearly, Columba was building upon the work of earlier missionaries and as **Bridget Paterson** observes, Christianity was already established in many parts of Scotland before his arrival. Moreover, it can be argued that much of the hard work of embedding the new faith among the ordinary folk of Pictland was done by Columba's disciples and successors.

Role of St Ninian and other missionaries:

- **Bede** states that Ninian was a Briton who trained in Rome and spent ten years with St Martin of Tours (in Gaul/France). In 395 he was sent as bishop to an existing Christian community at Whithorn in Galloway – establishing *Candida Casa*, the ‘White House’. This is the earliest recorded account of a Christian community in modern-day Scotland
- the local ruler, Tuduvallus, clearly tolerated Ninian and his community – suggesting an early acceptance of Christianity in Southern Scotland. Ninian was able to preach to the converted and develop the structures of an organised Church
- **Bede** credits Ninian with the conversion of the Southern Picts: ‘the Southern Picts themselves abandoned idolatry and embraced the faith by the preaching of the Word by Saint Ninian’
- churches dedicated to Ninian are found widely across Scotland, including in Pictland, up the east coast as far as Orkney and Shetland. While many of these sites may have been dedicated after his lifetime – and as **Paterson** notes, the suggestion that as many as 150 sites can be directly credited to Ninian is ‘surely implausible’ – it seems likely that British missionaries had introduced the Southern Picts to Christianity by the late 5th century
- Ninian’s role remains controversial. **Sally Foster** describes Ninian as an ‘elusive’ figure and notes that ‘Ninian’ might be a scribal error for Uinniau (St Finnian, d. 579), a Briton who was active in Ireland and was Columba’s teacher. **Tim Clarkson** observes that the *Vita Niniani* – our principal source, which was written hundreds of years later in the 12th century – was ‘essentially a marketing brochure produced by, or on behalf of, the primary cult-centre of a long dead saint’
- nonetheless, Columba was clearly following in the footsteps of others and earlier missionaries certainly played an important role in spreading the faith before his arrival, including Irish missionaries, for example, Brendan the Navigator and Britons, for example, St Kentigern/Mungo in Strathclyde.

Roman influence:

- like the Romans, the Britons, Gaels and Picts all worshipped a pantheon of gods. The polytheistic nature of pagan Celtic religion meant that the Christian God could more readily be added to an existing pool of belief systems, aiding the process of conversion
- Rome’s presence in the north opened the region to wider influences, including Christianity. In 380 Christianity became the official Roman religion, encouraging the development of Christian communities even on the furthest fringes of the Empire. Since Ninian was appointed as bishop to serve an existing Christian community at Whithorn, this suggests the faith had already spread north during the later Roman period, probably from Roman Carlisle
- **James Fraser** believes Christianity rapidly penetrated Southern Scotland during the early sub-Roman period. **Stephen Driscoll** agrees, noting that although almost nothing is known of the earliest missionary phase, the presence of Christian-style long-cist cemeteries in Galloway, Clydesdale (Govan Old Parish Church), Lothian (the Catstane, Kirkliston) and Fife (Hallowhill, St Andrews) indicates that by the end of the 5th century, Christian burial practices were already prevalent in the Scottish midlands. This suggests that Christianity first entered Scotland via the Romanised south rather than the Celtic west. (Indeed, it might be noted that St Patrick, the ‘Apostle of Ireland’, was himself a Romano-Briton)
- **Lloyd Laing** observes that although the Roman Empire collapsed in the early 5th century, *Romanitas* – the idea of Rome – endured, even on the fringes of the Empire. Three stones from a 6th century church at Kirkmadrine display Christian *chi-rho* symbols and one of these commemorates two *sacerdotes* – priests or bishops. The Latinus stone from Whithorn is another explicitly Christian monument (‘We praise you, the Lord’) which may date to as early as 450. Both suggest that Vulgar Latin was spoken in parts of Southern Scotland in the 5th century
- the existence of Eccles- placenames may suggest the presence of early sub-Roman churches not just south of the Forth-Clyde isthmus (for example, Ecclefechan), but as far north as Fife and the Tay estuary (for example, Ecclesmaline, Eglismartin). *Eccles-* derives from Latin *ecclesia* ‘church’, whereas the Gaelic term for an early church was *kil-* (from the ‘cell’ of a hermit). **Markus** notes that this suggests that Romano-British (as opposed to Celtic/Irish) Christianity played a key role in the conversion of the Southern Picts

- early medieval kings liked to see themselves as the successors of the Roman Emperors – the most powerful rulers the world had ever known. Despite the collapse of the Roman Empire, Rome continued to be the spiritual centre of early medieval Europe. By allying themselves with the Roman religion and carrying out a ‘top-down’ conversion of their subjects, native rulers sought to extend their political authority. For this reason, Rome’s influence endured.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Alfred Smyth | Argues that Columba played a key role in the establishment of Christianity in Scotland: ‘He is the man who more than any other person brought Christianity to Scotland and gave coherence to the Scottish people both spiritually and politically.’ |
| Tim Clarkson | Contends that Columba’s direct role in the conversion of Scotland has been exaggerated due to medieval hagiography and the enduring influence of the monastery he founded on Iona. |
| Bridget Paterson | Argues that Columba was a ‘Johnny come lately’ and that earlier missionaries, including Ninian, laid the foundations of Christianity in Scotland: ‘Ninian existed, was significantly earlier than Columba, and was a very important and influential man.’ |
| Gilbert Markus | Contends that Christianity first entered Scotland, including areas north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus, from the former Roman province of Britannia: ‘Even if we reject the claim that the southern Picts were evangelised by ‘St Ninian of Whithorn’, we may accept in a more general sense that they were influenced by sub-Roman British Christianity.’ |

Question 4

How justified is the view that the origins of the Scots of Dal Riata lay across the Irish Sea?

Aim of the question To examine the debate about the origins of the Scots. The traditional view is that they were immigrants from Ireland whereas some contemporary historians now argue that although they had close cultural and political links with Ireland, they were native to the west coast of Scotland. Candidates might review a range of evidence including literary sources, linguistic evidence and archaeological evidence. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Literary evidence which supports the view that the Scots came from Ireland:

- the **Irish Annals of Tigernach** state that in 500, 'Fergus Mor mac Erc, with the nation of Dál Riata, held part of Britain and died there' – suggesting that the west coast of Scotland was invaded and settled by a tribe from Northern Ireland
- the **Senchus fer n-Alban** ('Genealogy of the Men of Britain') lists all the Kings of Dal Riata, tracing their descent from Fergus Mor
- the Venerable **Bede**, in his *Ecclesiastical History of the English Peoples* (731), offers a different story: 'Britain received a third tribe, namely the Irish (Scotti). These came from Ireland under their leader Reuda, and won lands from the Picts . . . they are still called Dalreudini after this leader.'

Literary evidence which opposes this view:

- **David Dumville** has dismissed these traditional legends of Irish origin as unfounded, noting that neither Bede nor the Annals of Tigernach are reliable primary sources for the alleged migration from Ireland. **John Bannerman** observes that while both Bede and the Irish annals claim that the Scots originated in Ireland, they differ greatly in the details of their accounts
- the only manuscripts of the Annals of Tigernach which survive were compiled in the 10th–14th centuries – hundreds of years after Fergus Mor's alleged conquest. They may represent attempts by later medieval Irish scholars to assert that the contemporary Kings of Scotland owed their position to Irish ancestors
- the Fergus Mor legends in the Senchus fer n-Alban may have been added when the king-lists were rewritten in the 10th century and may reflect attempts by the Kings of Alba to bolster historical claims to the territory of Dal Riata in County Antrim
- Bede was writing in Northumbria, more than 400 years after the migration according to his own version of events. Bede's account may be the product of propaganda fed to him by clerics from Iona, and may again reflect a desire on the part of the Scots to lay claim to territory in Ireland
- **Ewan Campbell** argues that the 'historical' evidence should be discounted as dynastic propaganda and 'origin legends' which were 'constructed to show the descent of a ruling dynasty from a powerful mythical or religious figure. Such genealogies could be, and often were, manipulated to suit the political climate of the times.'

Linguistic evidence which supports the view that the Scots came from Ireland:

- the Scots of Dal Riata spoke Goidelic/Gaelic, a Q-Celtic language which was also spoken by the inhabitants of Ireland. This contrasts with the Brittonic/Brythonic P-Celtic languages which were spoken elsewhere in mainland Britain, including by the Britons and the Picts
- **Adomnan**, the late 7th century Abbot of Iona and author of the *Life of St Columba*, clearly saw the people of Dal Riata as being distinct from their British and Pictish neighbours. He calls the Dal Riata the 'Scotti in Britain' and records that Columba needed a translator when speaking with King Bridei of Pictland, confirming that the Picts and Scots spoke different languages
- modern placenames in Argyll are predominately Gaelic in origin. **Ptolemy's** *Geography* records that Argyll was inhabited by a tribe called the *Epidii* during the 2nd century. This is a P-Celtic, Brythonic name which means the 'horse people'. The apparent disappearance of the Epidii from Argyll, and the lack of Brythonic placenames in the area today, has been cited as evidence that the native British inhabitants of the region were driven out by Gaelic-speaking invaders from Ireland

Linguistic evidence which opposes this view:

- some contemporary writers now argue that the myths of Irish origin reflect attempts by the early medieval inhabitants of Argyll to understand why they spoke a different language from their neighbours on the Scottish mainland. Since they spoke the same Gaelic language as the Irish they naturally, but wrongly, assumed that their ancestors must have come from Ireland
- **Ewan Campbell** argues that this may reflect a form of linguistic conservatism. It is believed that Q-Celtic languages are older than P-Celtic languages. The mountains of the *Druim Alban* ('Spine of Britain') cut the Scots off from their eastern neighbours, whereas only 20 miles of sea separated them from Ireland. Their close connections with Ireland, and comparative isolation from the rest of Scotland, meant the people of Dal Riata continued to speak a more archaic language at a time when the Picts and Britons had adopted new language forms
- the Epidii may never have 'disappeared' from Argyll. As **Gilbert Markus** notes, Ptolemy's Geography may simply have recorded the P-Celtic form of a Q-Celtic tribal name (*Ekidii*), and the inhabitants of Argyll may always have spoken Gaelic.

Archaeological evidence which supports the view that the Scots came from Ireland:

- there are broad similarities in material culture between Ireland and the far west of Scotland. Crannogs are found in both regions and workshops producing penannular brooches have been found at Dooney and Donegal in Ireland as well as at Dunadd, the tribal capital of Scottish Dal Riata. Such evidence might suggest a migration from Ireland to Argyll. However, some contemporary writers believe that the archaeological evidence does not bear closer scrutiny.

Archaeological evidence which opposes this view:

- while Irish raths (ring forts) are superficially similar to the duns which are found in Argyll, many of the Irish examples had earthen banks whereas Scottish examples were built from stone. Furthermore, Argyll's duns have been dated to the early Iron Age, from as early as 500 BC – a full millennium before Fergus Mor's alleged migration from Ireland
- Scottish crannogs (for example, Loch Glashan) predate Irish examples. Many Scottish crannogs date back to the Iron Age whereas many Irish crannogs date from the early historic period, around 600. It seems likely that crannogs spread from Scotland to Ireland rather than the other way round
- there are significant differences between Irish penannular brooches and those commonly found in Argyll. Irish brooches usually had zoomorphic terminals (animal heads) whereas brooches from Dal Riata usually had rectangular terminals with bevelled edges
- over 40 spiral ringed dress pins have been found in Ireland; only one example has been found in Argyll. Similarly, hundreds of ogham pillars dating from the 5th–7th century exist in Ireland, yet there are only two in Argyll
- **Leslie Alcock** famously observed that if there was an Irish dynastic takeover of the far west of Scotland, the Scotti 'came without luggage'. There is no convincing archaeological evidence of a large-scale migration from Ireland to Argyll and indeed if anything, the archaeological record suggests a possible migration from the west of Scotland to Ireland.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Alfred Smyth | Argues Scottish Dal Riata was a 'colony' which was infiltrated by Irish settlers whose 'homeland' was in Ulster, and believes that the Gaelic settlement of Argyll may have begun as early as the 3 rd century AD. |
| Michael Lynch | Contends that the Scots of Dal Riata were immigrants from County Antrim in Northern Ireland. |
| Ewan Campbell | Asserts that there is 'no basis for suggesting any population movement between Antrim and Argyll in the 1 st millennium AD. At best, the evidence shows a shared cultural region from the Iron Age.' |
| Sally Foster | Agrees that although there were close cultural links between Ireland and the far west of Scotland, the evidence points to a continuity of occupation in Argyll: the Scots of Dal Riata were native to Scotland. |

Question 5

How far can it be argued that Scotland was a united nation by 1034?

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which Scotland was a unified country by the death of Malcolm II in 1034. The first reference to the Kingdom of Alba – the Gaelic term for ‘Britain’, but which came to be more narrowly applied to those northern regions which others called ‘Scotia’, the land of the Scots – was recorded in c 900. A range of factors might be discussed, including the extent of geographical/political unity; evidence of cultural unity; and the importance of Christianity as a unifying force. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that there was political/geographical unity:

- **Alex Woolf** argues that Viking attacks meant that power shifted from Fortriu, north of the Mounth, to Perthshire. The core of Alba lay in the old southern Pictish kingdom, with its ceremonial centre at Scone. Kenneth MacAlpin’s grandson, Constantine II (900–943) secured the future of the kingdom by seeing off threats from the Vikings (904) and King Athelstan of Wessex (934)
- the Kings of Alba were able to further centralise royal authority in the territories under their direct control. By bringing St Columba’s relics to Dunkeld, Kenneth I affirmed the close partnership between Church and state which was a key feature of successful early medieval kingdoms. Between 843 and 1034, the MacAlpin dynasty secured an (almost) unbroken succession to the throne. Former sub-kings of provinces such as Atholl and Moray were restyled as *mormaers* (‘great stewards’) and, nominally at least, served Alba’s rulers
- the old British Kingdom of Strathclyde in southwest Scotland gradually came under the control of the Kings of Alba. In 1018, Malcolm II of Alba placed his son and heir, Duncan, on the throne of Strathclyde. **Michael Lynch** observes that Strathclyde was effectively reduced to the role of a subordinate ‘dower kingdom’
- the Anglian territories in the Lothians were also absorbed into Alba. **Lynch** observes that Malcolm II’s victory at the Battle of Carham (1018) ‘turned occupation into annexation’ and after this point, the Anglo-Scottish border was fixed on the Tweed. **AAM Duncan** states that over time, ‘the kings of Scotia and of Scotland stamped unity upon the four or five disparate peoples north of the Tweed and Solway.’

Evidence of a lack of political/geographical unity:

- Alba’s control over the northern province of Moray was still superficial in 1034. Although the Gaelic-speaking Mormaers of Moray were nominally subjects of the Kings of Alba, they retained a great deal of autonomy and sometimes rebelled against the Scottish Crown
- the far north of the Scottish mainland and the Northern Isles were firmly under the control of the Scandinavian Earls of Orkney. As Earl of Orkney, Thorfinn the Mighty owed allegiance to the King of Norway while as Mormaer of Caithness, he owed allegiance to the King of Scotland; in practice, he was largely independent of both
- Argyll and the Western Isles were also outwith the control of the Scottish kings and were the domain of the *Gall Gaedhil* (‘foreign Gaels’) – Gaelic-speaking warlords of mixed native and Norse ancestry
- the Scottish Crown had limited control over Galloway, which had once been part of the British Kingdom of Cumbria but had been settled by Hebridean Vikings.

Evidence which supports the view that there was cultural unity:

- there were some broad cultural similarities between the peoples inhabiting modern-day Scotland: all societies were hierarchical and patriarchal in nature; warrior values remained important; the ruling classes feasted, hunted and displayed their status through ownership of prestige goods, as their ancestors had
- there were also broad economic similarities. There was limited economic centralisation and barter remained the primary means of exchange. Some monasteries (for example, Brechin, Whithorn) had emerged as centres of manufacture and trade. However, in all parts of Scotland the economy remained essentially rural and based largely upon subsistence farming
- within Alba, there was a growing sense of 'Scottish' identity. **Sally Foster** notes the extended process of Gaelicisation in Pictland: by 1034, the Pictish symbols had long fallen out of use and Gaelic was the dominant language of the kingdom, at all levels of society – not just at the royal court. **Dauvit Broun** argues that the first people who saw themselves as 'Scots' in the modern sense of the term were the 11th century inhabitants of Alba
- by the mid-11th century, Gaelic was widely spoken not just in most of mainland Scotland north of the Forth-Clyde line but also in Galloway, and in parts of the Western Isles.

Evidence of a lack of cultural unity:

- despite its political annexation, and although a process of Gaelicisation was underway, most people in Strathclyde probably continued to speak Cumbric, the old P-Celtic British language
- despite the presence of some Gaelic placenames in the southeast, the northern dialect of Old English which was spoken in the Lothians – the ancestor of modern Scots – was never supplanted by Gaelic. **Ian Walker** observes that the region retained its 'strong English culture' and indeed the men of the Lothians were long known as the King of Scotland's 'English subjects'
- Scandinavian culture – including longhouses and Norn (a dialect of the Old Norse language) – was firmly entrenched in much of the far north and west.

Evidence which supports the view that there was religious unity:

- the Christian faith entered Scotland from the south, as a product of Romanisation. The Britons of Southern Scotland were the first to embrace Christianity and the first recorded Christian community in Scotland was *Candida Casa* (the 'White House') at Whithorn. *Eccles-* placenames, Christian-style long cist cemeteries, and even poems such as *Y Gododdin* are all evidence of the early adoption of Christianity among the Britons, while **James Fraser** notes that the Latinus stone is 'an inscribed 5th century funerary monument that is unambiguously Christian'
- even before St Columba established a monastery on Iona (563), Christianity had reached the Scots of Dal Riata via Ireland. Iona rapidly became one of the foremost centres of Christian learning in early medieval Europe and even though it was regularly targeted by Viking raids, it was never abandoned and remained 'a Christian powerhouse of prayer' (**Crawford and Clancy**)
- the Picts were the last of the indigenous peoples to convert to Christianity but by the 9th century the Christian faith was firmly established in Pictland, from St Andrews in Fife to St Ninian's Isle in Shetland
- the Anglian rulers of Northumbria converted to Christianity during the mid-7th century. The monastery at Lindisfarne was another influential centre of the Christian faith while other important monasteries were established, including Jarrow (where Bede wrote his *Ecclesiastical History*) and Melrose and Abercorn in modern-day Scotland
- Scandinavian settlers in the Hebrides probably adopted Christianity earlier than those further north. Native culture survived despite Norse settlement in the Western Isles and **Smyth** notes that 'sustained contact with Hebridean Christianity and its clergy' would have aided conversion, for example, the Kiloran Bay boat burial, Colonsay
- even the Northern Isles had been converted by 1034. **Anna Ritchie** propounds the 'mother's milk' theory, whereby Norse incomers took native wives and their children were raised with at least an awareness of Christianity, while the traditional date for conversion is c 995, when Earl Sigurd the Stout was forcibly converted by King Olaf Tryggvason of Norway. His son, Thorfinn the Mighty, established Orkney's first bishopric at Birsay and went on pilgrimage to Rome.

Evidence of a lack of religious unity:

- continuing differences between the peoples of Scotland are reflected in the various saints' cults in different regions of Scotland, for example, Columba and Andrew in Alba, Ninian and Kentigern among the Britons of the southwest, Cuthbert among the Angles of the Lothians and Olaf among the Viking converts in the Northern Isles.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Keith Stringer | Argues that the case for a unified Scottish identity should not be overstated and that 'there was no country like today's Scotland and no nation such as today's Scots' by the mid-11 th century. |
| Michael Lynch | Contends that the foundations of Scotland had been laid by 1034, and that the MacAlpin dynasty 'oversaw the vital consolidation of the kingdom of the Scots.' |
| AAM Duncan | Argues that there was a growing sense of national identity. He observes that by the mid-11 th century, Scotia was 'a Celtic realm, remote, moneyless, but with a tradition of submission to one king which, however slender, was two centuries old and no longer fragile.' |
| Sally Foster | Argues that Christianity was a powerful force for unity. Spiritually at least, Northern Britain was 'united by the presence of Christianity . . . a force whose religious and intellectual links cut across national boundaries.' |

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 6 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons for the construction of Hadrian's Wall.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Author | Aelius Spartianus (allegedly). | Nothing is known about the author. Many contemporary historians believe Aelius Spartianus may not have existed at all and that the 30 biographies present in the <i>Historia Augusta</i> were all written by one unidentified author. Whoever wrote the <i>Historia Augusta</i> most certainly did not know Hadrian personally. |
| Purpose | Ostensibly written as a biography of Hadrian – part of a collection of 30 biographies of 2 nd and 3 rd century Emperors. | Many scholars now regard the <i>Historia Augusta</i> as being highly unreliable, arguing that it is primarily a work of literary fiction rather than a trustworthy source for Roman history. The purpose is to celebrate the Emperor. |
| Timing | Late 4 th or early 5 th century AD. | Although there are significant shortcomings this remains the only written source – it was written around 250 years after Hadrian's reign. |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| On taking possession of the imperial power Hadrian at once resumed the policy of the early emperors, devoting his attention to maintaining peace by taking actions to secure the frontiers throughout his empire. | Takes the view that Hadrian's priority was to preserve peace within the Empire. Emphasised by the use of the term 'maintaining peace'. |
| . . . the rebellious Britons could not be kept under Roman sway | Takes the view that there was unrest among the native British tribes and that Hadrian's policy may have been a response to this. Emphasised by 'rebellious Britons'. |
| . . . the first to construct a wall, eighty miles in length, which was to separate the barbarians from the Romans. | Takes the view that Hadrian's Wall was built as a political boundary to mark the edge of the Empire and/or as a defensive barrier to keep the northern tribes out of the Roman province. Emphasised by the term 'separate'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Hadrian's predecessor Trajan had overextended the Empire and Rome was struggling to hold what it had. Hadrian embarked upon a policy of consolidation, also building important frontier structures in Germany and North Africa
- there is evidence of major upheaval in Northern Britain in the early 2nd century, for example, **Cornelius Fronto** mentions the 'great numbers' of soldiers who were slain by the Britons during Hadrian's reign, while several forts in Southern Scotland and Northern England seem to have been burned and abandoned at around this time. The IX Hispana – the most northerly of the British legions, which was based at Eboracum/York – disappeared from the historical record at about this time and some commentators believe it was destroyed by native tribes in Southern Scotland
- Hadrian's Wall stretched from coast to coast, from the Solway in the west to the Tyne in the east. It effectively split the island in two, separating the Roman province of Britannia in the south from 'barbarian' Caledonia to the north.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Hadrian's Wall was the most strongly fortified border anywhere in the Empire: built of stone up to four metres high with numerous forts, milecastles and turrets, a deep ditch to the north and a Vallum to the south, which may have acted as additional security against an attack on the rear of the Wall by the troublesome Brigantes of Northern England. Outpost forts to the north (for example, Birrens, Netherby) provided advance warning of attack and coastal forts to its south helped prevent the Wall being outflanked by a seaborne attack
- it is unclear whether the Wall had further defensive features at its top, for example, crenellations and a walkway. **David Breeze** believes it was too narrow to fight from and was 'not a fighting platform', although some others disagree. **Brian Dobson** points out that the Roman army preferred to crush its enemies in open battle rather than fight from behind walls. **Breeze** argues that the Wall was ultimately unsuccessful since it marked an abandonment of the policy of *imperium sine fine* ('Empire without limits') and restricted the offensive operations of the Roman army, which became 'fossilised' on the frontier
- **Lloyd Laing** states that the Wall marked a 'symbolic edge to the Empire'. It was a statement of Roman authority as well as a monument to the Emperor who ordered its construction. **Mike Ibeji** describes the Walls as 'prestige projects' and **James Crow** believes Hadrian's Wall might have been whitewashed to make it even more visible and further project Roman power over the native peoples
- there were gateways every mile along the Wall, through forts and milecastles. The Wall was not designed to be an impermeable barrier, but it did ensure that everyone who crossed the frontier did so under Roman supervision. Some contemporary historians therefore argue that the purpose of the Wall was more bureaucratic than military. Out with periods of active military campaigning, the primary function of the Roman garrisons stationed on or near the Wall was to act as a police force, maintaining peace on the frontier and allowing the peaceful development of Roman civilisation further south. The Wall's day-to-day functions may have been rather mundane. **Stephen Johnson** notes that it would have prevented petty raiding and cattle rustling, while enabling the Roman authorities to raise revenues through the collection of taxes.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| David Breeze and Brian Dobson | Argue that the Wall was primarily bureaucratic in concept: ‘the purpose of the Wall was to control movement, not to prevent it, as the liberal provision of gateways demonstrates.’ |
| Nic Fields | Observes that the Roman army only fought from behind the shelter of walls as a ‘last resort’ and that its ‘guiding philosophy’ was to defeat an enemy in the open. |
| Thorsten Opper | Argues that the very presence of the Wall would have cowed rebellious natives. It was ‘an aggressive tool of Roman dominance’ which must have had a ‘deep psychological impact on the local tribes.’ |
| John H Reid | Contends that there has been a recent tendency to underappreciate the extent of conflict between Roman and native in Northern Britain. He argues the Wall was just one part of a ‘complex cordon of integrated military installations’ which was built to defend Britannia against the threat of large-scale invasions from the north. |

Question 7 **How fully does Source B explain the relationship between Norse settlers and the native population in the Northern and Western Isles?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|--|--|
| . . .Norse do not appear to have taken over the best land, but to have settled alongside the native Picts who remained in possession. | States that Viking settlers did not replace the indigenous peoples entirely and that native communities survived in the Isles. |
| . . .any native survivors did not exercise enough influence to pass on their names for settlements or the features of the surrounding countryside which showed that they were not the dominant linguistic group. | States that the native population of the Northern Isles were essentially reduced to the status of 'second class citizens' and that the Norse language quickly took over. |
| It is not possible to reach such a conclusion about the situation in the Western Isles, where the literary and historical evidence gives us some positive indications that there was a mingling process with the native Gaelic speakers. | States that there was more cultural interaction between Norse settlers and natives in the Western Isles, where the two peoples mixed to a greater degree. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- there is some evidence for continued native survival in the Northern Isles, for example, *papar* placenames may suggest the survival of Christian communities. **Olwyn Owen** argues that the placename evidence suggests that the earliest Norse settlers adopted native forms of land organisation, but that in succeeding generations Norwegian names were imposed 'wholesale' on the landscape — suggesting increasing depth of settlement and increasing Norse domination
- **AAM Duncan** believes as many as 99% of the placenames in Orkney and Shetland are Scandinavian in origin. Norn, a dialect of Old Norse, was spoken in the Northern Isles until the 18th century. This may not mean that the native population was replaced altogether but it does suggest that Scandinavian culture was entirely dominant
- clearly there was extensive survival of the native population in the Western Isles, where a hybrid Gaelic-Norse culture emerged. This was the territory of the *Gall-Gaedhil* or 'foreign Gaels', a people of mixed native and Norse ancestry.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- clearly there was an element of violence in the Norse takeover of the islands. **Duncan** suggests that the existence of hastily-dug defensive earthworks on promontories in Shetland ‘could well represent the early Viking landfalls among a hostile populace’, while the hiding of Pictish silver under the floor of a church on St Ninian’s Isle – and the fact that its owner did not return to claim it – further suggests conflict between native Picts and Norse incomers
- **Owen** notes that Pictish culture in the Northern Islands effectively disappeared altogether and argues that although native Picts might have been ‘absorbed into the new mainstream culture’, it is hard to believe that this was achieved peacefully
- however, **Anna Ritchie** argues that the presence of native artefacts in early Norse houses, for example, Buckquoy and Brough of Birsay, may suggest a survival of the Pictish population and some degree of peaceful interaction between natives and incomers. If, as she believes, some Viking settlers in Orkney and Shetland took native wives, it is possible that Christianity may have started to take hold among the incomers long before the traditional date of c.995 given in the sagas
- although there was clearly extensive Norse settlement in the Western Isles (they are still called *Innse Gall*, the Islands of the Foreigners, in Gaelic today), this was less dense than in the Northern Isles and Scandinavian culture was less dominant
- unlike in the Northern Isles, where Gaelic was never spoken, Norse placenames in the Western Isles were often Gaelicised, for example, on Skye, Norse *Vik* ‘Bay’ was Gaelicised to *Uig*. This suggests that native culture endured and that within a few generations Scandinavian settlers were speaking Gaelic rather than Old Norse
- the emergence of a hybrid culture in the Western Isles is reflected by surnames with the Gaelic prefix *mac* ‘son of’ and a Norse personal name, for example, MacSween, MacIver and MacAskill. Moreover, the proportion of Scandinavian DNA is much higher in the Northern Isles than the Western Isles, which suggests a greater degree of continuity of the native population in the Hebrides
- similarly, **Alfred Smyth** asserts that Norse settlers in the Western Isles are likely to have converted to native Christianity earlier than those in the Northern Isles, due to sustained contact with Hebridean Christianity and its clergy. At Kiloran Bay, a 9th century Viking grave was accompanied by two crudely carved Christian crosses – **Owen** suggests that a Scandinavian settler was ‘hedging his bets’ and that while his burial was essentially pagan, he was keen not to offend the Christian God.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|---|
| Frederick Wainwright | Argues that the Northern Isles were ‘overwhelmed and submerged’ beneath the sheer weight of Scandinavian settlement. |
| Alfred Smyth | Contends that the Northern and Western Isles became ‘an integral part of the Old Norse world’ and quickly came to be regarded as ‘wholly Scandinavian lands.’ |
| Brian Smith | Argues that the total absence of native placenames in the Northern Isles suggests that the existing inhabitants of Orkney and Shetland were entirely supplanted by the Norse incomers, who committed genocide against the native Picts. |
| Anna Ritchie | Contends that even in the Northern Isles, some continuity of the native population was likely as many settlers may have taken native wives. |

Question 8 **How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the creation of Alba, up to AD 900?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretation given</i> |
|---|---|
| The Gaelic-speaking Scots were the minority therefore their territorial conquest over the Picts must have involved some violence. | Suggests that the Scottish takeover of Pictland was for territorial expansion and must have involved military force to some degree. |
| Certain attractive Pictish estates offering personal advancement and were taken over lock, stock and barrel by Gaelic speakers, or, at least, by people with Gaelic names thus creating a Gaelic aristocratic ascendancy. | Suggests that the Scots (or at least, people with Gaelic/Scottish rather than Pictish names) came to form the ruling class in Pictland because they took over the most attractive land. |
| The spread of Christianity was encouraged by the Gaelic-speaking clergy associated with St Columba and this helped develop the Gaelic cultural ascendancy. | Suggests that the drive to spread Columban Christianity to Pictland helped Gaelic culture become dominant in the former Pictish heartlands. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- between AD 843-848, Kenneth MacAlpin defeated a number of rival claimants in order to secure the throne of Pictland. Contemporary sources call him *rex Pictorum* 'King of the Picts' but in fact his authority seems largely to have been confined to the Southern Pictish kingdom
- *Pit*— placenames are common in eastern Scotland; this was an old Pictish term meaning a share of land. The fact that they are often associated with Gaelic personal names (for example, *Pitcarmick* 'Cormac's share') may suggest a political takeover of Pictland by a Gaelic-speaking elite, yet it also suggests that there was considerable continuity from Pictland into Alba, for example, in how terms of how the land was organised
- Christianity played an important role in uniting the two peoples – particularly in the face of the onslaught of the pagan Vikings. Iona played a key role in the conversion of the Picts and Gaelic clergy continued to wield great influence in Pictland; the influence of Columban Christianity is reflected on later Pictish cross-slabs, and Gaelic was the chief language of the Church in Pictland as it was in Dal Riata. This helped bring about the gradual 'Gaelicisation' of Pictland.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i> |
|--|--|
| A vast force of Scandinavians landed in Fortriu and fought a major battle against the combined forces of Pictland and Dál Riata, undermining both existing kingdoms. | Suggests that a Viking army launched a major attack on Pictland in AD 839, which had a significant impact on both the Picts and the Scots. |
| The Norse won the day, killing both Uuen, king of Fortriu, and Aed, king of Dál Riata, along with a great number of the Pictish aristocracy and the Picts never fully recovered. | Suggests that the kings of the Picts and Scots fell in battle against the Vikings, together with many Pictish nobles, and that Pictland was unable to recover. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| Rather than fight the Vikings, what was left of the Pictish nobility engaged in a bloody civil war for ten years and at the end of this time a nobleman from Dál Riata, Cinead son of Alpín (d. AD 858), known to posterity as Kenneth MacAlpin, emerged as King of the Picts laying the foundations of the dynasty. | Suggests that Kenneth MacAlpin became King of the Picts following an extended period of civil war in Pictland. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the early Viking raids were classic ‘hit and run’ attacks on isolated coastal sites, particularly monasteries. However, by the middle of the 9th century, increasingly large Viking armies had formed, threatening all the different kingdoms of Northern Britain. Irish annals record a major battle between native forces (apparently under Pictish leadership) in Fortriu (Northern Pictland?) in 839
- the Vikings played an important role as a catalyst in the creation of Alba since their crushing victory – in which King Uuen of Pictland, his brother and heir Bran and their ally Aed, King of Dal Riata, all died – created a political vacuum. As **Driscoll** observes, ‘The Viking predations caused nothing less than a remaking of the political landscape’
- Kenneth’s own origins, and his claim to the Pictish throne, remain controversial. **Driscoll** describes him as a ‘warlord’ from a ‘marginal Gaelic kindred’ while **Alfred Smyth** calls him a ‘usurper’. **Alex Woolf** believes Kenneth may actually have been a Pict and that he was the victor in a bloody civil war between rival Pictish factions.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- later medieval sources were unequivocal in stating that the Picts were forcibly conquered by the Scots, led by Kenneth MacAlpin, for example, the **Prophecy of Berchan** claimed that Kenneth became King of Pictland ‘after violent deaths, after violent slaughter’, while the **Huntingdon Chronicle** claimed that Kenneth defeated the Picts and was the ‘first of the Scots to obtain monarchy over the whole of Albania’. The legend of ‘MacAlpin’s Treason’ similarly claims that Kenneth killed his Pictish rivals
- however, both **Dauvit Broun** and **Stephen Driscoll** observe that even the earliest ‘historical’ accounts of Kenneth’s conquest were written 150 years after the events they purport to describe. While there would undoubtedly have been an element of violence in Kenneth’s accession, **Sally Foster** points out that the story of MacAlpin’s Treason is ‘likely to be fictitious.’ The Picts were not ‘utterly destroyed’ as was traditionally claimed (for example, **Declaration of Arbroath**, 1320). Rather, they evolved, and made an important contribution to the new ‘Scottish’ identity of Alba
- many contemporary writers now dismiss the traditional claims of a Scottish conquest of the Picts as oversimplistic. While the Picts and Scots were often at war, they also had a long history of political cooperation, dating back to their participation in the ‘Barbarian Conspiracy’ of 367. Many historians now believe that Kenneth’s real achievement was not to lead a conquest of the Picts, but rather to establish a new royal dynasty in Pictland/Alba which endured for nearly 200 years
- a number of kings had ruled over both Picts and Scots since the middle of the 8th century – including Oengus son of Fergus/Onuist son of Uurguist (AD 729–61) and his descendant Constantin son of Uurgust (AD 789–820). While there is debate about whether such powerful individuals were, Scots ruling over Picts, or Picts ruling over Scots (which is the view of some contemporary historians for example, **Alex Woolf**), what is clear is that ‘such dual kingship . . . may show that by the early 9th century integration between the peoples of west and east had already gone pretty far’ (**Marjorie O Anderson**)
- as well as political connections, there were also many cultural similarities between the Scots and Picts; the two peoples had far more in common than held them apart. **Smyth** observes that ‘Northern Britain was essentially a Celtic land in the Dark Ages’ and **David Allan** describes a slow process of ‘acculturation’ as over an extended period of time, as Pictish society became increasingly Gaelicised. **Neil Oliver** observes that Christianity in particular ‘acted as a glue, bringing together disparate peoples’
- the provincial name Atholl (from *Athfotla*, apparently meaning ‘new Ireland’) is first recorded in AD 739, when its sub-king was drowned by his Pictish overlord, Oengus/Onuist. This suggests there may already have been significant settlement of parts of Pictland by Scots from Dal Riata by this time
- Viking attacks on Dal Riata accelerated the eastward movement of the Scots. **Sally Foster** comments that Argyll became ‘something of a backwater’ after this time; in fact it was the Kingdom of Dal Riata, not Pictland, which disappeared off the political map
- Pictland itself did not disappear; it was rebranded using new terminology. *Alba* was simply the Gaelic word for ‘Britain’. Adopting this new terminology may have encouraged a greater sense of unity at a time when the native Celtic peoples of Northern Britain faced considerable threats both from the English to the south and Scandinavian Vikings to the north and west. In fact, evidence suggests considerable continuity from Pictland into Alba. Political power in Alba continued to be focused on old Pictish centres such as Scone in Perthshire, while the Pictish monastery of St Andrews in Fife remained the preeminent church in Alba. As **Kenneth Jackson** observes, further evidence of continuity is the ongoing use of Pictish titles such as *mormaer* (a royal representative in the provinces; the equivalent of later earls) and *toiseach* (the commander of the royal army).

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Barbara Crawford and Thomas Clancy | Contend that the Viking attacks caused massive disruption to the existing political structures in Northern Britain: Alba emerged from the ‘maelstrom of Viking turbulence’ during the 9 th century. |
| Ian Walker | Argues that the emergence of Alba was the result of an extended process of political and cultural assimilation – the ‘slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time.’ |
| Alex Woolf | Contends that the Pictish contribution to Alba has been underestimated: Pictland ‘suffered a political takeover by a Gaelic speaking group but retained its integrity – much as England remained England after the Norman conquest.’ |
| Sally Foster | Observes that ‘The Picts themselves had not disappeared, but their identity was subsumed under the new terminology of Alba – they had become Scots’, in the modern sense of the word. |

Section 2 – Scotland: Independence and Kingship, 1249–1334

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 9 ‘William Wallace was vital to Scottish resistance from 1297 to his defeat at Falkirk in July 1298.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To explore the importance of William Wallace to Scottish resistance after the English victory over John Balliol in 1296. Was Wallace an essential leader for the Scottish resistance? How important and impactful were his military, political and economic contributions to maintaining Scottish resistance to the overlordship of Edward I? Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Wallace was vital to Scottish resistance:

- Wallace was so important that the political community knighted him before making him a Guardian
- Wallace was able to continue as Guardian even after Andrew Murray died due to his position leading the Scottish army
- Wallace was able to work with a range of important Scots to further the resistance, including William Douglas and Andrew Murray
- Wallace and Murray led the Scots to a famous victory over the English at the Battle of Stirling Bridge
- Wallace was able to unite the political community behind a resumed Guardianship by always acting in the name of the exiled King John Balliol
- Wallace was able to resurrect an independent Scottish government and administration which would outlive his position as Guardian of Scotland
- Wallace appointed William Lamberton as Bishop of St Andrews over the preferred Comyn candidate. He would go on to become a key figure for the Scottish resistance
- Wallace and Murray sent the letter to Lubeck and Hamburg declaring that Scotland was independent of English control and available for trade once again, helping to resurrect the Scottish economy
- Wallace had a seal of regency and left 4 known writs or charters – likely just a sample of the business of his government as Guardian of Scotland
- the English claimed Wallace held parliaments and assemblies. He clearly had access to a cleric who knew the style used for the business of government.

Evidence which supports the view that Wallace was not vital to Scottish resistance:

- even during his early risings, Wallace never led the Scottish resistance. Instead, he was always subordinate to natural leaders like Murray and Douglas
- Wallace was at best co-leader under Andrew Murray at Stirling Bridge. When he led the army alone, they lost heavily at Falkirk
- noble support for Wallace was never complete or unconditional. It is questioned whether the Comyns may have abandoned Wallace at Falkirk
- Wallace and his men failed to capture William Ormsby, justiciar, at Scone. In comparison, Andrew Murray was able to clear the north east of Scotland of English influence as far south as Dundee
- Wallace was only Guardian of Scotland for 9 months, initially alongside the more influential Andrew Murray
- Wallace was unable to control his army when raiding into Northern England – he could not prevent unnecessary violence or pillaging.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|--|
| Peter Traquair | Contends that Wallace waited too long to capitalise on victory at Stirling Bridge by invading Northern England. |
| GWS Barrow | Argues that Wallace was actually a very conservative leader, only using guerilla tactics when necessary and preferring pitched battles. |
| Edward Cowan | Suggests that Wallace's downfall was his humble background which meant he should not be leading armies or government. |
| Fiona Watson | Argues that Wallace did everything he could to prepare his forces at Falkirk, but his position was dependent on his ability to lead the army to success against the English. |

Question 10

To what extent was the Scottish struggle for independence effective against Edward I between autumn 1298 and 1302?

Aim of the question To explore how effective the Scots's resistance to English overlordship was from 1298 to 1302. This allows the opportunity to evaluate whether the Scots were able to resume their resistance in the aftermath of defeat at Falkirk, resuming more traditional guardianships and sustaining resistance across the country, or if the English lack of success was more due to the problems faced by Edward I in England. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Scots were able to maintain effective resistance to 1302:

- the Scots managed to maintain constant leadership of their administration despite changes in personnel or an overall lack of unity. The Comyns remained the backbone of Scottish politics
- the Scots managed to hold parliaments to sustain their independent government, including at Rutherglen in 1300 and Peebles in 1299
- the Scots achieved some military victories against the English, such as at Stirling Castle in 1299
- Scots looked after their own regions against the English, applying their knowledge of the people and landscape to hold off English attacks. They largely avoided pitched battles after Falkirk
- the Scots were able to re-establish the post of chancellor, appointing Master Nicholas Balmyle. He would maintain political documents of the Scottish government in the name of King John
- Scottish sheriffs in places such as Aberdeen, Forfar, Stirling, Lanark and Roxburgh were able to gather revenue which were used to pay government salaries
- the Scots used guerilla tactics successfully, attacking by surprise, raiding English supply routes etc
- the Scots got the French applying pressure on the English king in support of the Auld Alliance
- the Scots sent a successful delegation to Rome for papal support. Baldred Bisset convinced the Pope to support the Scots over Edward I. The Pope sent Edward the *Scimus Fili* condemning the English invasions and occupation of Scotland, ordering the English king to desist
- Papal support included convincing Edward to release John Balliol from the Tower of London into Papal and then French custody, opening hopes that he might return.

The Scots benefitted from English weaknesses across the period:

- after Falkirk, Edward I was unable to consolidate his victory. He sent most of his army to Carlisle for supplies. Edward sought Bruce in Carrick but then left Scotland. He did not return to Scotland until 1300
- Edward ordered an expedition to Scotland in 1299 but only 2,500 of 16,000 infantry answered the writ
- Edward's campaign north in 1300 was limited to only the south-west of Scotland as his army was only 1300 strong. Half then deserted and Edward was forced to retreat
- the English campaign in 1301 was unable to force the Scots to fight a pitched battle and was affected by English desertions as the English king could not afford to pay his army
- the English were unable to keep their campaigns going across winter. This allowed the Scots to reverse any gains the English had made in the intervening months
- the Scots ability to maintain their rebellion was significantly aided by Edward I's inability to attack the Comyn strongholds in the north-east.

Evidence which supports the view that the Scottish struggle for independence against Edward I was ineffective to 1302:

- although the Scots maintained their guardianship across this period, they were hindered by infighting and repeated changes in leadership
- Robert Bruce left the Guardianship in part to dedicate his time and focus to defending his own lands, rather than wider Scottish independence
- increasing numbers of Scots submitted to the English king, including the MacDonalds, the MacDougalls, the Campbells and the earl of Lennox. Finally, Robert Bruce submitted in 1302
- the Scots were never able to turn international diplomatic support into actual aid – money, soldiers, etc. to help them beat the English
- the Scots never managed to get their exiled King back to Scotland – John Balliol had to promise to remain in his family lands in France.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|--|
| Marc Morris | Argues that the English campaigns were limited by a deliberate political boycott by the English. |
| Michael Brown | Suggests that the Scots successfully utilised a decentralised approach against the English. |
| ADM Barrell | Argues that the lack of money and supplies made it difficult for Edward I to recruit or retain soldiers necessary to occupy Scotland. |
| GWS Barrow | Suggests that the Scots struggle was a single, national effort and that while the Scots were not a happy band of brothers, they had a dogged persistence in their common enterprise against the English. |

Question 11

How far was support from the Scottish Church the key reason for Robert Bruce usurping the Scottish throne in March 1306?

Aim of the question To explore the different factors which encouraged Robert Bruce (the grandson) to usurp the Scottish throne in March 1306. They should analyse whether the Scottish church was vital in encouraging Robert to act, or whether other factors such as the weakness of his opponents, the situation in England or his own position in the Bruce family were more influential. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the support for the Scottish Church was vital:

- Bishop Wishart of Glasgow gave Robert absolution for his sins, particularly the murder of John Comyn, before Robert went to Scone for his coronation
- Robert had made a pact with Bishop Lamberton of St Andrews at Cambuskenneth in 1304
- the Scottish Church were prepared to offer Robert support in regaining Scottish political independence as part of their desire to maintain Scottish ecclesiastical independence
- it is possible that Robert also made a pact with Bishop Wishart of Glasgow
- Bishop Wishart provided Robert with robes required for the coronation
- both the Bishop of Glasgow and the Bishop of St Andrews attended Robert's coronation
- the Church was prepared to provide spiritual support for Robert, liking his fight against the English to going on crusade
- the Church was prepared to provide Robert with military and financial support, including weapons of war and soldiers.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were more important:

The situation in England:

- Edward I was elderly, and his health was ailing
- Edward II was far less militaristic or interested in politics. He did not have his father's burning desire to conquer and control Scotland
- the Ordinance of Scotland (1305) reflected Edward I's desire to create a more lasting settlement for English control over Scotland
- Edward I was prepared to compromise slightly and involve the Scots more in their government, especially compared to the settlement imposed on Scotland in 1296
- Scotland was officially reduced to a land rather than a kingdom
- ongoing campaigns in Scotland had almost bankrupted the English crown. Neither Edward I nor his successor could afford further revolts or warfare in the north
- if the Ordinance of Scotland was successful, the likelihood of Robert ever becoming king were remote.

Weakness of Scottish opponents:

- if John Balliol had effectively resigned his claim to the throne in 1303, the next in line to the throne was John Comyn
- it was possible that other claimants to the throne were waiting for Edward I to die before acting, to take advantage of the weaker rule of Edward II
- John Comyn had a stronger presence in Scottish politics, having consistently fought for Scottish independence and been part of the Scottish Guardianship since 1298. He was also more popular than Robert Bruce
- the death of John Comyn left the Comyn family divided and weakened, with in-fighting over who should next lead the clan
- the Comyns and their allies were geographically divided around Scotland
- the murder of John Comyn likely escalated plans to seize the throne, with the necessity to act before the Papal excommunication might be sent out, or the Comyns could regroup and retaliate.

The Bruce family claim to the throne:

- Robert had become head of his family with the death of his father in 1304. He inherited the Bruce claim to the Scottish throne
- Robert was a very ambitious man and had frequently acted to advance his own position regardless of his personal beliefs regarding Scottish independence
- despite changing to support Edward I in 1302, Robert had not been rewarded in the 1305 Ordinance. Rather, Edward's actions suggested he did not trust Robert
- after the Ordinance, Robert lost his sheriffdoms and faced investigations into the lordship of Annandale and the earldom of Carrick and the extent of power Robert had the right to in these lands
- fear that Edward might be about to strip Robert of all of his lands and power in Scotland and reward his enemies, the Comyns, despite their long-standing resistance against English control.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Michael Prestwich | Argues that resentment at the way he had been treated by Edward I in 1305 must have played its part in Robert's decision to usurp the throne. |
| Fiona Watson | Suggests that the Ordinance of Scotland was designed to secure a lasting settlement which would destroy Robert's plans to become king. |
| Colm McNamee | Suggests that the support provided by Bishop Wishart suggests a pact between the Bishop and Robert Bruce before the murder took place. |
| Alexander Grant | Suggests that the Comyn claim to the throne was better than Robert Bruce's, forcing the two to meet and Robert to act. |

Question 12 **‘Robert I was able to govern successfully over his Scottish kingdom, between 1309 and 1320.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To determine how successfully Robert I was able to reestablish royal authority in Scotland, governing as successfully as his predecessors, such as Alexander III, and securing the Bruce dynasty with a clear and supported royal succession. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Robert was able to govern successfully and establish his Bruce dynasty:

- Robert issued two Declarations – Clergy (1309) and Arbroath (1320) – to highlight support for his kingship from the laity and the church
- Robert learnt of the Soules Conspiracy from recent converts to support him, enabling his survival and successful dealing with the perpetrators
- Robert showed his abilities to rule effectively in the 1320 Black Parliament – harsh punishments for the rebellion’s leaders, but leniency for those made to rebel due to their feudal ties
- Robert was able to successfully govern, holding a series of 19 parliaments and councils to rule the country
- Robert passed a significant body of new laws in 1318, including legislation against any who conspired against him
- Robert was able to issue the ultimatum to his opponents in 1313 which he enforced in 1314 at the parliament of Cambuskenneth, creating the Disinherited and exiling those who continued to oppose him as king
- success at Bannockburn proved Robert’s ability to defend his people – a key attribute of a medieval king
- Robert was able to modernise and clarify the military service men were expected to undertake as part of their feudal duties
- Robert was able to utilise lands and titles confiscated from his enemies to reward his supporters, no matter when they changed sides. He created a class of people beholden to him and his family for their titles and positions
- Robert was able to rebuild the Scottish economy, rarely burdening his people with taxation
- Robert issued tailzies in 1315 and 1318 to rewrite the royal succession to secure a male succession – his brother and then his grandson
- Robert learnt from the mistakes of Alexander III – his tailzies were much clearer with definite guardianships established in the event of a minor taking over the kingdom when he died.

Evidence which supports the view that Robert was not able to govern successfully and establish his Bruce dynasty:

- Robert remained a usurper king to many of his contemporaries
- Robert was unable to convince significant sections of Scottish society that he was the rightful king – he was forced to exile his enemies rather than neutralise the situation
- the remaining threat of Edward Balliol continued to plague Robert – to the extent that he tried to reimagine the 1320 threat to be from William de Soules rather than Edward Balliol
- the Soules Conspiracy was not a small threat from a minority – it involved significant numbers, many with ties to the Comyns, some who brought hundreds of followers with them
- Robert continually had to fabricate support for his regime, from stolen seals on the Declaration of the Clergy in 1309 to the Soules Conspirators appearing on the Declaration of Arbroath (1320)
- Robert had to use hereships to terrorise people into supporting his regime, in Buchan and Galloway especially
- many switched to support Robert not through support for the Scot, but out of fear that Edward II was not strong enough to protect them and their lands
- Robert gave away too much land and titles to his supporters, weakening the Scottish crown. In particular Randolph gained the earldom of Moray as a ‘regality’ – a petty kingdom

- 1318–1320 saw a series of crises for the king, with the death of his brother and escalation of resistance to his rule. He would not have needed to issue laws in 1318 against rumours against the king if his position had been secure
- the lack of an adult male heir to succeed Robert left the establishment of a Bruce dynasty in jeopardy, particularly as Edward Balliol remained a constant threat.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Colm McNamee | Argues that opposition to Robert was significant and often sponsored by the English government. |
| Michael Penman | Suggests that the Declaration of the Clergy was choreographed loyalty. |
| Roland Tanner | Believes that Robert resorted to coercion and seal abuse in both of his Declarations. |
| Fiona Watson | Suggests that Robert was a usurper who suffered throughout his reign from an acute awareness of his own lack of legitimacy as king. |

Question 13

To what extent was the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton (1328) the result of the strengthening position of King Robert I from 1326?

Aim of the question To explore the background to the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton and determine the key reasons why this gave the Scots the independence they had sought for so long but been unable to wrestle from Edward I or Edward II, exploring whether Robert had sufficiently strengthened his position as king to be able to impose his will on the English government or if other factors were key, such as the changing international situation and its impact on support for Robert as King, or the unsettled situation in England, with the deposition of Edward II. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Treaty came about as a result of Robert I's strengthened position in Scotland:

- Robert had secured his succession with the birth of twin boys in 1324, with David surviving
- Robert set up a clear guardianship of strong, experienced political and military leaders to rule as Guardians during his son's minority
- the Pope lifted the excommunication on Robert and recognised him as King of Scots from 1324
- the Pope granted the Scottish king the rite of coronation, recognising that Scottish rulers were not subject to the superior lordship of the English kings
- the French support for the Scots was revived with the Treaty of Corbeil in 1326
- French support for the Scots in a future conflict would include aid and counsel
- Robert was strong enough to break the 13-year truce in 1327, renewing the war against England
- Robert resumed raids into Northern England to increase pressure on the English regency. The Scots came very close to capturing the young Edward III
- Robert had now regained all Scottish territory, leaving the English king with little prospect of regaining control in Scotland
- Robert had successfully resurrected the Scottish economy, building up Aberdeen as a key port, and exporting goods like wool, leather and timber
- international pressure increased on the English to find a lasting settlement with the well-established Scottish king.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were key in causing the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton:

- Edward II was removed from power by a rebellion led by his wife, Isabella, and her lover Mortimer, at the head of an English army
- they set up a regency in England to rule in the name of Isabella's 14-year-old son, Edward III
- by September 1327, Edward II was dead, likely murdered
- the death of Edward II cancelled the 13-year Anglo-Scottish truce, enabling the Scots to resume hostilities
- the regency faced significant problems in England where their power was uncertain, and they faced mounting financial problems
- the Treaty included a payment of £20,000 for Scottish independence, a sum which would considerably aid the ailing English finances
- the English position was weak when going into negotiations with the Scots over a peace treaty. This let Robert issue them with a set of demands which led to a lasting peace settlement
- Robert re-opened the second front in Ireland, increasing pressure on the English
- Robert was able to extend Scottish authority in parts of England, taking tribute over 100 miles south of the border
- the Scots were able to attack English strongholds, seeming to annex Northumberland and grant lands to the Scottish King's followers.

| Historian | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Colm McNamee | Argues that the terms of the 1328 treaty were insufficient to reconcile the English to what they referred to as the 'shameful peace.' |
| Michael Penman | Suggests that the peace treaty of 1328 was an anti-climax surrounded by anxiety and doubts over whether it would hold. |
| Michael Brown | Argues that the regency government was more vulnerable to military pressure than Edward II had been. |
| GWS Barrow | Suggests that Scottish attempts to annex Northumberland were designed to terrorise the English into agreeing to make peace. |

Section 2 – Scotland: Independence and Kingship, 1249–1334

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 14 **How fully does Source A explain the success of Alexander III in establishing royal authority during his adult reign between 1260 and 1286?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|---|--|
| Alexander III was in his forties, apparently healthy and had a granddaughter, the possibility of whose inheritance of the throne had already been contemplated without obvious opposition. | States that Alexander retained a clear succession with society prepared to accept his granddaughter as heir. |
| It has been suggested that Alexander's reference to the 'good' that might come through the infant Maid of Norway was an early statement of intent towards a marriage alliance between Margaret and an English husband. | States that Alexander was possibly trying to arrange a marriage for his granddaughter to an Englishman to further secure the succession, with the likelihood of eventual heirs from the marriage. |
| Although the relations between England and Scotland remained apparently cordial, tensions on the border and possible suspicion of English royal ambition regarding Scotland would seem to make it unlikely that a marriage proposal between the Maid and Prince Edward of England would have come from Alexander. | States that proposing a marriage between the Scottish and English heirs was unlikely from the Scottish king given the underlying tensions which remained between the two kingdoms despite his own good relationship with the English king. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Scottish succession had appeared the most secure in several generations, as the king had three children, two of whom were adults and married
- Alexander is often criticised for failing to remarry during the 10 years from his first wife's death to the death of all three of their children
- within days of Prince Alexander's death, King Alexander III had called a parliament to gain support for his granddaughter as heir in return for promising to remarry immediately.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Alexander was able to successfully defend his kingdom from Norwegian attack which culminated at the Battle of Largs
- the Treaty of Perth (1266) settled the dispute with Norway, with Alexander III regaining the Scottish Isles for his kingdom and securing the deal with the marriage of his daughter
- Alexander III resisted English demands for overlordship at Edward I's coronation
- Alexander III did not impose heavy or regular taxation on the Scots
- Alexander tamed much of the political upheaval amongst the squabbling nobility from his minority through strong, personal leadership
- Alexander created a number of new lords to offset the existing noble families' dominance of Scottish politics and to secure his own authority
- Alexander remarried in 1285 to Yolande of Dreux and attempted to secure the succession with further royal children, preferably male.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| Richard Oram | Argues that Alexander III was a successful ruler who governed over a stable and peaceful realm, working in alliance with the nobility. |
| Edward Cowan | Contends that Alexander's preparations for war against the Norwegians were impressively thorough. |
| Nicholas Mayhew | Suggests that Alexander achieved greater trading prosperity which stimulated Scottish economic life. |
| Alan Young | Argues that the nobility played a leading role in defending the kingdom and extending royal authority alongside the king. |

Question 15 **How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of how well the Guardians were able to deal with the crises which affected the Scottish kingdom between 1286 and 1292?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|---|
| The perpetrator, Hugh Abernethy, was quickly arrested and imprisoned, notwithstanding his own considerable status and ties to the Comyns. | Suggests that the Guardians could not prevent serious crimes occurring, but dealt well with the aftermath, securing swift and appropriate justice for the crime. |
| Earl Duncan was not replaced as a Guardian and indeed, the failure to replace any of the Guardians who died in office may provide evidence of political disagreements and increasing factionalism. | Suggests that the authority of the Guardians was limited and their ability to unify the kingdom lacked the natural authority of a monarch, reducing their ability to secure constant good government. |
| The Guardians suggested that Margaret should marry Edward I's heir, Edward of Caernarfon, on the assumption that until he reached his majority his father would be happy to protect Margaret's interests. | Suggests that the Guardians invited Edward I of England to gain more power in Scotland as a result of the succession crisis. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the first Guardian – the Bishop of Dunkeld – died within months of the Guardianship starting but was never replaced
- the Guardians attempted to get Edward I's involvement in Scottish affairs almost as soon as Alexander III died, sending envoys to him in Gascony
- the Guardians were cautious about the prospect of the involvement of Edward I in Scottish affairs after his son married the Maid, creating significant safeguards for Scottish independence in the Treaty of Birgham (1290).

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| Parliament imposed a carefully vague oath on all parties, and six Guardians administered it in the name of the community of the realm; this group included sympathisers with both the Bruce and Balliol/Comyn parties. | Suggests that the Scots set up a Guardianship to rule the country and represent as much of the political community as possible until the succession issue was settled and they had an adult monarch once again. |
| . . . so the oaths of 1284 to acknowledge the 'Maid of Norway' as heir-designate came back into prominence. | Suggests that the Scots returned to their oath from 1284 once it became clear that the Queen would not provide a posthumous heir to Alexander III. |
| . . . the Bruce faction had prepared by agreeing the Turnberry Bond on 20 September and they seized the royal castles of Dumfries and Wigtown and attacked the Balliol estates in Galloway and while the Guardians quickly brought the situation under control, tension remained. | Suggests that the Scots successfully quashed the Bruce rebellion of 1286–1287 and forced the Bruce family to give homage to the Maid as the heir. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Guardians represented the key areas of Scotland, and the different levels of ecclesiastical and secular society
- the Guardians delayed any decision on the royal succession for 6 months after the late King's death in the hope that Yolande might be pregnant
- the Bruce rising in 1286–1287 reflected the continued Comyn dominance of politics in the early phase of the interregnum.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Guardians were able to continue regular government, including collecting taxes, dealing with their neighbours
- the Guardians dealt with several law and order issues, including the abduction of the English widow Eleanor de Ferrers and the Comyn rivalry with the Earl of Atholl
- the Scots successfully negotiated with the Norwegians to have the Maid of Norway sent over to become queen, and to remain free and quit of all marriage contracts
- by allowing Edward I to be part of negotiations with Norway for the Maid, they gave the English king power over Scotland, especially to be part of negotiations for her marriage
- the Scots accepted Edward gaining papal dispensation for a marriage between the Maid and Edward's son, even though he had this carried out in secret
- the Scots failed to react to Edward attempting to interfere in Scottish affairs, including seizing the Isle of Man and putting a Guardian in Scotland for the royal couple, before their marriage or her travelling from Norway
- the Guardians were unable to prevent Edward I gaining acknowledgement of his right to overlordship over Scotland from the contenders to the Scottish throne
- the Guardians fatally compromised their own position after the Award of Norham by resigning their positions and being reappointed under the English King's authority.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

ADM Barrell

Contends that the Guardians needed Edward I's support for stability and security.

ELG Stones

Argues that there was little feeling of crisis after the death of Alexander III.

Michael Prestwich

Suggests that Edward I had clearly decided to exercise power in Scotland from 1289.

Norman Reid

Suggests the choice of Guardians took into account the main political and social interests of the country and could therefore maintain stability.

Question 16 Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of King John's ability to exercise his royal authority to govern Scotland.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Author | Record of the Parliament held at Scone, written by Scottish clerics. | Written by clerics who worked for the Scottish Government. They would have been educated, likely churchmen, and eyewitnesses to the events of this parliament. |
| Purpose | Official government record of John's first parliament. | Legal record of the decisions made at the first parliament from the reign of King John. |
| Timing | 9 February 1293. | This was held quickly, within 3 months of John being crowned king. It would have been his first opportunity to bring his political community together, try to unify the country after the divisions of the interregnum, and reignite royal authority by governing his kingdom. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|---|
| MacDuff has been arrested and is now made to answer to the king why he violently took the lands in Fife – Rires and Creich, whose farms and profits were the possession of the king following the death of Duncan Earl of Fife in 1288, which has been to the disinheritance and harm of the king. | Takes the view that John is asserting his power as king by dealing with MacDuff who is accused of violently taking land from him. John used his parliament to deal with legal disputes. Emphasised by the phrases, 'disinheritance' and 'harm'. |
| MacDuff should be committed to prison, saving his right of appeal [to King Edward I] to seek the said lands according to the laws and customs of the kingdom against Duncan, son of Duncan Earl of Fife and his heirs, when that child shall come of age. | Takes the view that the king jailed MacDuff for his actions but left open the chance for redress from the earl once he turned 21. Emphasised by the phrases, 'should be committed to prison' and 'according to the laws and customs of the kingdom'. |
| John de Soules, knight, who is heir to Margaret, wife of Hugh de Perisby, for part of the barony of Ardrossan, comes before the king, and offers his homage, because de Soules inherited during the vacancy in the kingship, at which time it was not possible for him to come before any king of Scotland, he is now prepared to satisfy the king for his entry into the said lands, begging the king's grace. | Takes the view that the new king used his first parliament to hear oaths of homage from his subjects. Emphasised by the phrase, 'now prepared to satisfy the king' and 'begging the king's grace'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- John held 7 parliaments in under 4 years, showing his efforts to expand and consolidate royal authority
- John created three new sheriffdoms to improve royal authority
- John rewarded his supporters like the Earls of Buchan and Ross, just as previous kings would have.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- it took John 18 months to get the Bruce family to accept his rule and get Robert Bruce (the grandson) to give homage to him as King
- John could not prevent Scots going to his overlord, Edward I, to appeal against his legal decisions, the most famous was the MacDuff case
- John initially agreed to the Scots, including himself as king, undertaking military service in France for the English king
- John relied on his Comyn relatives to help him govern, particularly to travel the country dispensing justice on the king's behalf.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|---|
| Peter Traquair | Argues that John was a weak king, unable to face up to the overbearing Edward I or the hopes of those Scots whose support he relied upon. |
| Richard Oram | Suggests that while John was closely involved in government, he failed to impress a personal stamp on his regime which was led by his Comyn relatives and their allies. |
| AAM Duncan | Argues that John was an ineffectual monarch with no stomach for his responsibilities. |
| Amanda Beam | Contends that John attempted to rule effectively but was hindered by his inexperience. |

Section 3 – Union to Enlightenment 1707–1815

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 17 **To what extent was the success of the tobacco trade based on the tobacco lords' legal business methods?**

Aim of the question To establish the relative importance of legitimate business practice used by the Glasgow tobacco merchants which contributed to their supremacy over competitor ports. The candidate may choose to compare the significance of these methods against other factors including the importance of illegal smuggling and the geographic location of Glasgow. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the success of the tobacco trade was based on the tobacco lords' legal business methods:

- the Glasgow tobacco barons were renowned for pioneering and investing in efficient business methods, for example, the development of naval architecture – pioneering hull design enabled transatlantic vessels to navigate the shallow coastal waters of Chesapeake
- employment of experienced ship's captains reduced voyage time and freight cost which often enabled two round trips a year, a feat rarely achieved from other British ports
- faster passages enabled the quicker return of investors' money and thus encouraged further investment
- 1762 – First dry dock opened in Glasgow, enabling ships to be careened, resulting in quicker, cheaper repair and ultimately more ships being seaworthy at any one time
- the store system allowed lower purchase prices and faster turnaround times, while increased ownership rather than chartering of ships reduced costs further
- improved port facilities allowed merchants to abandon satellite ports of Greenock and Port Glasgow by the 1750s as over 200 wharves and jetties were able to support ocean-going ships
- effective consolidation of relationships with Scots-American emigrants who were often pivotal figures in the plantation economies of Virginia and Maryland
- established firms increasingly owned rather than chartered ships, resulting in lowered costs. By 1775 over 90% of the Clyde's tobacco fleet were 'company ships'
- Glasgow merchants were able to draw credit from newly established banks. They also invested profits into high yielding bonded loans, providing further capital for investment
- lobbying of burgh politics by the city's Merchant House ensured favourable local policy making resulting in the dredging of the Clyde and the improvement of harbouring facilities.

Evidence which may not support the view that the success of the tobacco trade was based on the tobacco lords' legal business methods:

Illegal business methods:

- illicit methods which pre-dated the Union included smuggling and fraud on a huge scale enabling Glasgow firms to accumulate capital quicker than their rivals, thus allowing investment in infrastructure and innovation
- under weighing incoming cargoes by custom officers resulted in Scottish merchants paying duty on as little as 2/3rds of the tobacco imported in the 20 years following the Treaty of Union
- however – protests from rival ports and government concern resulted in new legislation (1723 and 1751) and the reform of the customs authority resulting in a sharp decline in fraudulent practice.

Treaty of Union:

- the Union guaranteed free trade to the colonies and the English home markets, providing a context within which the growth of the industry was possible
- continuation of illicit practices tolerated partly because Scotland was now within the Union. Benign British rulers would've been unlikely to have afforded such an attitude to foreign competitors
- Scottish ships now sailed under the protection of the Royal Navy's cruisers.

Geography:

- the position of Glasgow was advantageous to harness the prevailing trade winds enabling shorter, cheaper voyages in comparison to British and European rivals
- during the War of Jenkin's Ear, the passage around the north of Ireland was significantly safer than more southern routes, advantaging Glasgow
- Glasgow's location gave fortuitous access to Atlantic trade, enabling shorter sea crossings and resultantly lower freight costs across the Atlantic
- however, Glasgow's location was further from European markets where 90% of all tobacco was re-exported.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Stana Nenadic

States the importance of the legal business practices, innovations and willingness to take risks which contributed to the success of the tobacco trade and the unprecedented wealth of the Glasgow tobacco lords.

Michael Lynch

Argues that the illegal methods were instrumental to the success of the industry, particularly in the early 18th century. 'The tobacco trade until the mid-1720's grew not through the new opportunities offered by free trade but through the long-honed skills of Scottish merchants of carrying on an illicit trade evading customs regulations. The enterprising Scot in the 1707 generation was often the smuggler or black marketeer.'

Tom Devine

Argues that while the Union was important in providing a context where growth of the tobacco trade was possible and smuggling played a role, it was business methods which were pivotal – 'The Union did not cause growth in the Atlantic trades; it simply provided a context in which growth might or might not take place . . . the golden age of the tobacco trade was based on efficient business practice rather than clandestine smuggling.'

Christopher Whatley

Emphasises the opportunities which were afforded by the Union which provided a context in which spectacular success was possible.

Question 18 **How far can it be argued that the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1745 was due to internal divisions?**

Aim of the question To analyse and assess the various factors which contributed to the failure of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion. The candidate may choose to focus on the effectiveness of the leadership of the rebellion and its ability to overcome the factions within the Jacobite army. The candidate may also choose to compare this with other factors associated with the failure of the rising, such as the response of the Hanoverian state and the lack of domestic and European support. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1745 was due to internal divisions.

- factionalism, rivalry and distrust was an established trait of Jacobite politics hampering the unsuccessful campaigns of 1708, 1715 and 1719
- at the outset of the 1745 rising clan chiefs resented the influence of the Irish who had little to lose in contrast to the chief's precarious position in the event of defeat
- Charles Edward Stuart's selection of Irish senior officers, led by Sir Thomas Sheridan, exacerbated pre-existing tensions within the officer council. Increasing perception of an inner circle as the rebellion progressed
- pivotal positions given to favoured but incompetent officers with calamitous repercussions, such as O'Sullivan's inability to secure adequate provisions prior to Culloden which led to widespread desertion
- the prince's officer council was typically split between those who unquestioningly supported his decisions and others who frequently dissented
- Charles' aloof manner exacerbating an increasingly factionalised officer core. Charles often refused to listen to all representations from any member of his officer council including those he was alleged to favour
- a functioning officer council ceased to exist after Charles dissolved it following retreat from Derby. His adoption of a unilateral command led to poorly judged decisions such as the garrisoning of Carlisle. Drunk, erratic and ill-tempered Charles ability to lead the rebellion appeared to diminish after retreat from England
- ill-fated decisions, such as the selection of Culloden moor were made by Charles, ignoring opposition from senior officers led by Lord George Murray
- military successes of Prestonpans and Falkirk are generally credited to Lord George Murray, yet for nearly half the duration of the rising Charles barely spoke to him
- Charles's assurances of French and English support which failed to materialise undermined his leadership, dividing his officers further.

Evidence which may not support the view that the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1745 was due to internal divisions:

Charles Edward Stuart's leadership:

- charismatic, good looking and inspirational Charles was sufficiently influential to persuade individual clan chiefs with divergent interests to form a Highland army to rise despite obviously unlikely odds
- Lord George Murray was not always ignored by Charles. The abortive night raid on Cumberland's camp prior to Culloden was Murray's plan, not the Prince's
- although at times alienated by Charles's autocratic leadership, Lord George Murray recorded on a number of occasions his unwavering support for the cause
- single minded and persuasive, it could be argued Charles was remarkably successful in leading a unique army which was not united by contemporary military conventions of discipline, remuneration and nation state. As such, Prestonpans, the occupation of Edinburgh and the decision to invade England can be seen as decisive outcomes achieved at least in part by a force which was remarkably united.

Response of the Hanoverian State:

- although initially impotent, the Hanoverian military response evolved into a very effective force as British troops returned from Europe
- tactics of the Government forces improved. Battle hardened troops, well supplied and equipped enjoyed technical and numerical superiority. Specifically, Cumberland's bayonet drill and the use of grape shot at Culloden were celebrated examples of these improved methods
- Hanoverian propaganda portrayed Charles as a 'popish' Italian, reducing the chances of Jacobite recruitment across the lowlands and England
- The Royal Navy's blockade ensured that what French assistance there was became largely irrelevant. French soldiers and munitions were forced to return to France after bombardment by HMS Lion. Further French assistance was negligible.

Lack of British and European Support:

- support within Scotland was highly regionalised. Highland clans and the Episcopalian north-east were split. Recruitment in the lowlands and particularly in Glasgow and the west was very limited
- English Jacobites who actually took up arms were almost non-existent – only a few hundred men from Manchester saw active service
- French assurances of support remained ambiguous throughout the campaign. Irrespective of whether Charles was ever promised military assistance from the continent, it never materialised, fundamentally lessening the chances of Jacobite success
- the relevance of internal divisions impact upon the ultimate failure of the rebellion may become questionable in the context of the Jacobite army never exceeding eight thousand men.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Tom Devine

Argues that the lack of domestic support for the Jacobites was key. 'Scottish backing during the rising was remarkably thin . . . it was this together with the virtual disappearance of support in England rather than force of arms in itself which ultimately ended the last hopes of restoration.'

Murray Pittock

Argues that the shortcomings of Charles Edward Stuart's leadership and tactics throughout. Specifically dismisses the 'fortress Scotland' policy as strategically inept.

Christopher Duffy

Offers a revised case for the defence, whilst casting doubt on the effectiveness of Lord George Murray. Duffy states 'I have to say that I found him (Prince Charles) to be an extraordinarily impressive character. The same process has . . . somewhat diminished the lustre of Lord George Murray.'

Rosalind Mitchison

Argues that the failure of various nominal adherents of the government was responsible for what Jacobite successes there were rather than as a result of Charles's leadership.

Question 19 'Government intervention after the Jacobite risings was responsible for change in the Highlands up to 1815.'

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To analyse and assess the various factors which contributed to change in the Highlands. The candidate may choose to define and analyse the impact of government intervention in response to the Jacobite risings. The candidate may then compare this with the impact of other factors associated with change in the Highlands, such as the evolution of clan society, clearance and the establishment of industry. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that change in the Highlands was due to government intervention in response to the Jacobite risings:

Intervention in response to the Jacobite Risings:

- precedent of the Glencoe massacre, 1688
- Disarming Acts (1716,25) – enacted to disarm the clans, though ineffective as they were not enforced rigorously. In addition, those clans supportive of Hanoverian rule generally complied, whereas clans sympathetic to a Stuart restoration simply concealed their arms
- Wade's roads and bridges, largely constructed in the 1720s and 1730s, though never finished – aimed to improve transport of Hanoverian troops, inadvertently aided trade and communication
- Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act (1746) – ended clan chief's control of justice
- Act of Proscription (1746) – included the Dress Act and restated the Disarming Act. Prohibited 'instruments of war' including arms and the bagpipes; banned the wearing of tartan
- punishments for breaking post Culloden legislation was harsh, ranging from transportation for minor infringements to execution for major offences
- Hanoverian reprisals in the immediate aftermath of Culloden – a campaign of terror which evolved from bayoneting injured soldiers to systematic repression of the Highlands characterised by arbitrary executions, harassment and looting
- for example, Fort Augustus briefly became Scotland's largest cattle market as confiscated livestock were sold to the highest bidder, in a policy specifically targeting the clans' primary source of food and wealth. Not fully effective, partly due to the refusal to comply of Hanoverian officers including the Earl of Loudon
- deportation of Highland Jacobite prisoners of war to the Caribbean
- 1747 Vesting Act enabled thirteen estates formerly held by Jacobite supporting clan chiefs to be controlled by the government, with rents accruing to finance attempts to improve transport and encourage industry
- should be noted that all legislation introduced in response to the Jacobite risings was inactive by the 1780s.

Evidence which may not support the view that change in the Highlands was due to government intervention in response to the Jacobite risings:

Changing clan society:

- evolving relationship between clan (*clann* – children) and clan chief (*Duathchas* – father) to tenants and commercial landlord, as confirmed by rapidly increasing rents across the region – during the course of the 18th century rents tripled in Skye and rose tenfold in Torridon profit imperative applied pressure to traditional feudalistic clan society which was largely cashless
- changes included the erosion of class structure, the position and role of tacksmen who became uneconomic middlemen, and the value and relevance of rent in kind and specifically military rent. The last inter clan battle was fought at Mulroy, near Spean Bridge in 1688
- growing aspiration amongst clan chiefs to assimilate with southern nobility's lifestyle, which came at considerable cost (education, property in Edinburgh or London) accelerated this trend, confirmed by increasing landlord absenteeism. Resultantly Highland estates become highly indebted, further increasing rents.

Emigration and clearance:

- introduction of large-scale sheep ranching, uniquely suited to the mountainous topography of the Highlands accelerated from the 1750s. Fundamentally incompatible with traditional forms of agriculture such as run-rig – single tenancies were expanded
- during the mid to later 18th century some clan chiefs adhered to mercantile principles – and were actively opposed to losing inhabitants who they wished to retain to work on bi-employments such as fishing and kelping. Thus, communities were displaced from inland river valleys (*straths*) to the crofts on the coast, rather than cleared
- poverty due to rising rents and the inability of traditional forms of agriculture to cope with an increasing population, led some Highlanders to opt for emigration. Devine argues that the vast majority of Highlanders who left, did so for economic reasons and opportunities elsewhere rather than because of eviction and clearance
- actions of individual chiefs, for example, the infamous proposed sale of clans folk into indentured labour in the Carolinas by MacDonald of Sleat and Macleod of Dunvegan. The Duke of Argyll was an early adherent of commercial landlordism, auctioning leases for clan Campbell land from the 1720s – by the 1780s the abandonment of traditional paternalism was widespread
- early 19th century attempts to retain the population replaced by clearance – infamous example of Patrick Sellar and the clearance of Strathnaver in 1814.

Impact of the American and Napoleonic Wars:

- Army Recruitment – the Highlands provided significant manpower for the British army fighting in overseas colonial conflicts
- servicemen (often former tacksmen) were rewarded with tracts of land in the North America, encouraging emigration from the Highlands as former tacksmen encouraged other clans folk to emigrate
- labour intensive kelping industry an important bi-employer was sustained by industrial demand for glass and soap manufacture. Expanded by artificial demand created by Napoleonic wars – prices peaked in 1810, but collapsed after the end of the Napoleonic war
- Bonawe iron works – established by English industrialists, employed 600 workers, supplied pig iron and finished products including cannonballs during the Napoleonic wars
- cultural impact – acceptability of Highlandism, kilted Scottish soldiers returning from France marched through Edinburgh in 1813.

Attempts to support economic development:

- British Fisheries Society (1786) – establishment of Ullapool and Lochbay, state directed attempt to diversify and strengthen the Highland economy.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Allan MacInnes | Underlines the lasting impact of government intervention following Culloden which he argues was an attempt to starve out entire areas of the Highlands. |
| Tom Devine | Argues that the impact of commercialisation was key in causing change in the Highlands during the 18 th century. 'Market forces from the Lowlands and England for cattle, sheep, kelp, soldiers and seasonal workers was the vital factor which increasingly made clanship redundant.' |
| Marjory Harper | Argues against an over simplified interpretation of the impact of clearance. She states that many chiefs attempted to stick to mercantile principles, which prized the number of clans folk in order for the chief to be able to benefit from their labour as they worked in bi-industries from which he could benefit. |
| Andrew Mackillop | Maintains that the impact upon the Highlands of the recruitment of men to the British army was very important during the latter part of the 18 th century. 'Army recruiting as a large-scale phenomenon occurred simultaneously with the rapid decline of clanship.' |

Question 20

To what extent was industrialisation responsible for creating a range of social issues in lowland Scotland between 1707 and 1815?

Aim of the question To establish the extent to which lowland Scotland's social issues were caused by industrialisation. Candidates may choose to analyse the relationship between industrialisation and urbanisation in relation to the causation of social issues. Additional factors that may be considered include the structure of Scottish society, the prevalence of social issues in non-industrialised Scotland, the impact of rural clearance and political instability. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that lowland Scotland's social issues were caused by industrialisation between 1707–1815:

Industrialisation – working conditions:

- employment opportunities in textiles, ironworks and coalmining were often exploitative. Working conditions were characterised by low wages and long, physically demanding hours
- working conditions were frequently dangerous
- the labour force consisted of all sections of the population who were physically able to work, including children
- unequal distribution of the wealth generated by industrialisation – a minority of industrialists became wealthy, whilst the majority remained poor, exacerbating existing inequalities of income.

Industrialisation – living conditions:

- large urban centres such as Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee developed as a consequence of early industrialisation
- rural inhabitants were attracted to urbanised industrial employment, creating and exacerbating social issues including overcrowding, public health problems, a lack of sanitation and poor living conditions
- resultantly, social inequality and poverty became rampant in rapidly growing Scottish cities
- scale and rapidity of the expansion of Scottish cities and their unregulated slum areas which housed the newly created industrial workforce. In 1750 – 9% of the population lived in towns – by 1800 this figure had doubled, by which time nearly 1 in 4 Scots lived in towns or cities
- growth of towns was most pronounced in the western burghs of the Clyde valley. Between 1755 and 1801 the populations of Falkirk and Kilmarnock doubled, while Glasgow, Greenock and Paisley more than trebled. This spectacular growth was largely due to the initial stages of industrialisation.

Evidence which may not support the view that lowland Scotland's social issues were caused by industrialisation between 1707–1815:

Continued importance of traditional societal structure:

- social issues existed prior to industrialisation. Majority of population continued to live in rural environs, and were employed in agriculture. Poor quality housing, overcrowding and expressions of discontent (for example, Levellers Revolt, 1724) were not exclusive to areas of industrial development
- impact of the agrarian revolution – the decline in the importance of some forms of rural employment, such as agriculture and weaving, disrupted traditional patterns of living, displacing thousands of rural workers who were compelled to work in newly emerging industries
- land ownership was highly concentrated – landowners were powerfully positioned to evict, dispossess and remodel rural society. Destruction of traditional social structures – associated breakdown of community and family structures
- rigidity of established class structure meant opportunities for social mobility remained limited for many.

Industrialisation:

- can be argued that early industrialisation *generated* economic growth and new job opportunities, including those for female employment. Regularly paid, cash employment replaced unpaid agricultural work which did not guarantee fixed payments
- sustained increase in real wages of the industrial skilled labour market, for example Glasgow mechanics' wages increased by over 50% between 1777 and 1793. Edinburgh printers and stonemasons experienced similar wage increases
- textile workers, Scotland's largest industrial labour force in the second half of the 18th century, benefitted from sustained increases in their wages
- much early industrial development occurred in rural environments. Thus, early industrialisation was not necessarily an urban phenomenon with associated urban social issues – in 1795 rural Renfrewshire had more cotton spinning mills than Glasgow. Water powered mills often required rural locations including New Lanark and Deanston. Steam power not widely adopted until after 1800.

Political Instability:

- enduring political instability during the 18th century created social disruption and economic dislocation – for example, the Jacobite rebellions and unrest during the Dundas Despotism
- social and economic impact of the Union linked to the marginalisation of Scottish interests within the British state.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|--|
| Christopher Smout | Provides the established narrative by arguing that industrialisation created significant social issues including rapid urbanisation and resultant urban poverty and associated public health issues. |
| Tom Devine | Recently argued that Lowland Clearance (as distinct from the Highland Clearances) was a major cause of social issues in Scotland, as tenant farmers and labourers were evicted from their traditional homes and were forced to migrate to unfamiliar, inhospitable urban areas as a result of landowners attempting to maximise their incomes by introducing sheep ranching. |
| Stana Nenadic | Emphasises the resultant social issues arising because of the system of land ownership in Scotland, which empowered landowners at the expense of tenant farmers and landless agricultural labourers. |
| Michael Lynch | Questions the link between industrialisation and urbanisation for much of the 18 th century, noting that much early industry was rural rather than urban. Further, he argues that the working hours for some sections of the workforce, such as textile workers, had reduced from around 15 hours a day in 1700 to between 10 and 12 by the end of the century. |

Question 21 **How far can it be argued that the influence of the Kirk was the reason for the development of Scottish education between 1707 and 1815?**

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which the Kirk influenced the development of Scottish education between 1707–1815. Candidates may compare the influence of the Kirk with other factors including urbanisation, the Enlightenment and the emerging demand for a modernised curriculum. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may supports the view that the development of Scottish education between 1707 and 1815 was due to the influence of the Kirk:

Schools:

- establishment and expansion of parish schools as required by the Education Act 1696; an Act of the Scottish Parliament at the direction of the Kirk's General Assembly
- parish schools were supervised by the Kirk, appointing school masters and overseeing religious instruction, with costs being met by the heritors
- establishment of the SSPCK increased the Kirk's control over the education of Highland parish's populations.

Universities:

- numerous examples of the influence of Presbyterianism and Calvinism upon the governance of Scottish Universities, for example, the trying of John Simson, Professor of Divinity at the University of Glasgow for heresy, a charge dropped after he accepted the truths of Calvinism
- religion remained at the heart of the University teaching. Some of the Universities most celebrated academic staff were committed Calvinists – Calvinist moral and social principles feature in David Hume's influential works, despite his atheism
- ministers and elders often held authoritative positions within universities.

Evidence which may not supports the view that the development of Scottish education between 1707 and 1815 was due to the influence of the Kirk:

Urbanisation and Industry:

- growth of urban specific schools - burgh schools, funded by fees paid by students. Urban universities were also largely funded by student's fees
- urban location of four of the five Scottish universities was significant. Subjected to the forces of urbanisation, and to urban situated industry and its needs which emphasised course delivering 'useful learning'
- demand for a modernised curriculum due to proto-industrialisation and the associated growth of commerce led to an increased emphasis on new subjects including bookkeeping, and the development of various types of schools outside the Kirk's control, including Private, Adventure and Burgh schools
- urbanisation diluted the ability of the Kirk to control the local populations.

Influence of the Enlightenment:

- majority of the Enlightenment's leading thinkers taught at Scotland's Universities including William Cullen, Adam Smith and John Millar. They were well placed to influence educational ideals, disseminated ideas including Newtonian methods and Locke's principals associated with the Enlightenment, rewriting the University curriculum to emphasise values including improvement, practical benefit and virtue
- growth of University subjects of direct vocational relevance – medicine and law. Range of new chairs included chemistry, botany and history. By the end of the 18th century there were more chairs in medicine than theology at Edinburgh University
- major figures personally responsible for significant reforms. For example, Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow adopted English, not Latin, as the language of instruction
- 'Hutchesonian' thought changed the core principles of moral philosophy, emphasising tolerance, charity and morality
- many of the Enlightenment's 'great works', including Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* were based on tuition notes.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Tom Devine | Argues that the Kirk exerted a significant influence over the development of education, particularly through its role in establishing parish schools. 'Above all, the Church was still the dominant force in both schools and the universities, the twin cradles of the Enlightenment.' However, also notes the influence of secular thought – 'The universities had been seen as divinity schools, but by the 18 th century a much more secular emphasis was apparent.' |
| Christopher Smout | Although he accepts that the role of the Kirk was central to the establishment of parish schools, he argues that the role of Enlightenment luminaries was important in shaping a modernised University curriculum noting the contribution of both Hume and Smith. |
| Christopher Whatley | Acknowledges the importance of the Kirk's role in shaping the development of Scottish education, but also argues that it conflicted with some of the Enlightenment's ideals, for example, through literal interpretations of biblical scripture. |
| Donald Withrington | Argues that the regional variations in the Kirk's influence over the development of Scottish agriculture were significant, suggesting that the church remained in a strong position to influence rural populations. |

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 22 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the failure of 1715 Jacobite rising?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| Yet Mar's losses were in fact high, they crippled the Jacobite army, which was in no condition to continue fighting and in this sense, there was no doubting it was Argyle's victory. | Suggests that the casualty rate amongst the Jacobite force was higher than generally thought, and significant to the point that Mar's army was not in a position to continue fighting in the aftermath of the battle. |
| Although his force still outnumbered Argyle's, the Jacobite force was effectively shattered, partly as, during their hurried retreat, Highlanders had abandoned irreplaceable muskets and ammunition. | Suggests that the Jacobite army's inability to continue fighting was also due to the poorly ordered retreat, which resulted in the loss of invaluable weapons and munitions. |
| By the time they reached Perth the Jacobite commanders found that there had been wide scale desertions which were now commonplace and therefore key to a further weakening of the Jacobite's overall position. | Suggests that significant rates of desertion eroded the Jacobite army's ability to continue to fight on. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Mar's losses, which largely occurred on his left wing, were significant and included senior commanders such as Brigadier Patrick Lyon of Auchterhouse and four battalion commanders
- Mar's army departed the battle ground allowing Argyle's troops to recover their surviving wounded, eighty prisoners, a large quantity of muskets, four cannons and Mar's entire bread supply train of six wagons
- Mar's Highland army suffered from desertion throughout the campaign. Contemporary accounts describe Tullibardine's Athollmen and other clansmen who had fought on the left wing fleeing to Auchterarder immediately after the battle.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| . . . they were slow to respond, and by September only the MacDonalds of Glengarry had answered – the western clans had mostly failed to appear. | Suggests that very few of the western clans, except the MacDonalds, were prepared to fight the Hanoverians. |
| . . . the element of surprise was lost when this plan was aborted, since Hanoverian spies learned of them. | Suggests that Hanoverian intelligence prevented the Jacobites from following their preferred battle tactics, and thus they lost the advantage of launching an unexpected attack. |
| Argyll amassed over 3000 troops to fight at Sheriffmuir who were battle hardened officers and men and, along with Argyll's cavalry, were more experienced than their Jacobite counterparts. | Suggests that Argyll's force consisted of seasoned soldiers who had previously participated in war, and therefore had an advantage over the Jacobites. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- infamously, the Earl of Mar earned his moniker ‘Bobbing John’ due to his reputation for untrustworthiness and his changing of sides. Also, he did not receive a commission to lead the rising from James until October 1715. He failed to win universal backing from the clans
- Mar’s preparations for the battle of Sheriffmuir betrayed his inability to organise his army. He procrastinated, not only losing the advantage of surprise but to the extent that Argyll was able to gather and organise a significant force
- Argyll’s army was made up of professional soldiers from both Scottish and English regiments. Mar’s hesitation allowed reinforcements to arrive from Ireland. Some of these soldiers were veterans of the War of Spanish Succession.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Hanoverian army was commanded by John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, a seasoned military commander who had fought in the War of Spanish Succession
- the Earl of Mar had no previous military experience. An adept politician, it is possible that he envisaged his role as being more political than a hands-on military leader
- during the battle of Sheriffmuir Mar made several mistakes. He prematurely withdrew from the field back towards Perth. This allowed Argyll to regather his troops, and withdraw back to Dunblane whilst claiming a strategic success as the Jacobites had failed to advance
- thus, a numerically superior Jacobite army failed to defeat a Hanoverian army they outnumbered almost 2:1 – the rising was effectively over
- James Francis Stuart’s leadership was ineffective – he remained in France until the 22 December, two months after Sheriffmuir by which time momentum had been lost. He sailed to France on the 4 February having contributed little to the cause
- his lack of presence throughout ensured rebellion lacked effective leadership
- although Mar’s army was the largest Jacobite army ever assembled (estimated to be 16,000 strong at its peak) few western clans played an active role and no Highland chief gave the rising unqualified support
- lowland support for the rising was regionalised, especially in the Clyde valley and Glasgow due to the benefits of the Union. The Stuarts were opposed to the Union, yet the Union guaranteed the Presbyterian Church. Thus, the Jacobites failed to gain the support of the Kirk which enjoyed a near total control of the lowland population in the early 18th century.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Murray Pittock | Confirms the shortcomings of Mar’s leadership – ‘Mar waited and waited. He waited for French help, he waited for the Duke of Berwick, he waited for the King, he waited for yet more recruits. His sense of timing was admirable – his soldiers undutifully failed to admire it and started to drift home.’ |
| Bruce Lenman | Emphasises the importance of the Hanoverian response, and the leadership abilities and experience of the Duke of Argyll. |
| John Mackie | Argues that Mar’s rising was dependent on support which was in fact regionalised, and that important areas such as the far north of Scotland and parts of the Lowlands supported Argyll. ‘Glasgow was quick to raise a company, the Earl of Sutherland raised the extreme north for the Crown.’ |
| Andrew Mackillop | Confirms the inadequate response from English Jacobites – ‘in England Jacobitism was nearly always a social form of political disaffection which preferred getting on the wrong side of a claret bottle than a bullet or bayonet.’ |

Question 23 Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence for the impact of the Improvers upon Scottish agriculture.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Author | Written by a parish minister for The First Statistical Account, compiled by Sir John Sinclair. | A structured response by a parish minister to Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster's questionnaires sent to all 900 parish ministers across Scotland. Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster was an Enlightenment figure who believed in the value of surveying the state of agriculture, and other aspects of Scottish life in order that they be improved upon. |
| Purpose | A national collection of data relating to Scottish agriculture. | To gather statistical evidence regarding the state and standard of Scottish agriculture, industry and education. Attempt to assess the state of the nation by a series of questionnaires containing 160 questions distributed to 900 parishes. |
| Timing | An eyewitness account written in 1791. | Published between 1791 and 1799, the First Statistical Account was written at the time when the impact of the Improvers across Scotland's parishes was well established and their impact could be reported on. |

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| As a result of their practice much farming land was brought into good order which increased its value due to the advantages of draining, enclosing and fertilising and as these improvements were introduced, the nature of farming became utterly changed. | Takes the view that land which was cultivated by using the updated techniques described became, as a direct result, more productive and ultimately of more worth. Emphasised by 'brought into good order' and 'the nature of farming became utterly changed'. |
| However long-established prejudices cannot be immediately eradicated, and reluctance to adopt these new methods has lingered among some to the detriment of advancement. | Takes the view that the impact of the Improvers was limited. Emphasised by 'reluctance to adopt' and 'has lingered' and 'to the detriment of advancement'. |

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|--|
| . . .through their advice, it became necessary to enforce new leases to tenant farmers which demanded, annually, the building of stone dykes, liming to fertilise land and the planting of turnips and potatoes. This had the desired effect, resulting in change. | Takes the view that landlords, acting upon guidance from informed farm managers, introduced new leases which obliged tenants to improve their land. Emphasised by 'necessary to enforce'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- much of the initial impact of the Improvers was regionally specific, particularly though not exclusively in southern areas of Scotland such as East Lothian and parts of Fife. Other areas, often more geographically remote were affected to a lesser extent and what impact there occurred later in the 18th century
- numerous examples of large tracts of agricultural land which was improved by using updated farming techniques – arguably most celebrated was the drained 'sour bogs' of Galloway, or Lord Kames transformation of Blair Drummond
- new leases were initially associated with the work of the Improvers in East Lothian, for example, John Cockburn of Ormiston, and became wide-spread as a mechanism to oblige tenants to adopt new forms of husbandry. Tenants insufficiently committed to improving their land were evicted.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- both as a group (The Honourable Society of the Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture) and as individuals the Improvers actively sought to disseminate their husbandry primarily through the prolific publication of literature
- although many aspects of husbandry including draining, enclosing and reforestation were the result of the influence or actions of the Improvers, many of these developments were established in the 17th century, and so predated them
- agricultural change was both regionalised and occurred at differing rates during the course of the 18th century. The pace of change was particularly gradual prior to the 1740s, whilst the 1760s are often identified as a watershed when an acceleration in change is linked to innovation (for example Small's plough) and increasing urban markets
- reflecting the threatened dislocation of traditional lifestyles, some tenants, most commonly through low level resistance.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------------|--|
| Michael Fry | Argues that the impact of the Improvers was relatively limited until the end of the 18 th century – 'One of the ironies of that age is that although there were many improvers, there was comparatively little improvement – until economic circumstances made it profitable in the last two decades of the 18 th century. |
| Christopher Smout | Stresses the lack of uniformity which characterised agricultural change in Scotland during the 18 th century. 'It is wrong to imagine the agricultural revolution as something that hit a district in a given decade, and in an intense storm of enthusiasm and upheaval left it all transformed in a few years.' |
| Michael Lynch | Argues that the Improvers were a 'rage' that followed on from long term agricultural change which began in the mid-17 th century. |
| Christopher Whatley | Emphasises the limited nature of Scottish agriculture development during the 18 th century whilst acknowledging the impact of the Improvers – 'The efforts of some ambitious landowners notwithstanding, the period prior to 1760 was not one of significant rural reorganisation, and changes in farming systems proceeded slowly.' |

Question 24 **How fully does Source D explain the causes of political radicalism in Scotland in the late 18th century?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| From 1782, freeholders interested in reforming the county franchise held a national gathering in Edinburgh in which most of the Scottish shires were represented, motivated by one grievance, the abolition of fictitious votes. | States that initial interest in reform came from property owners and was focused on the eradication of electoral corruption by addressing fictitious votes. |
| . . .triggered by a series of letters to the press by a rich Edinburgh merchant, Thomas McGrugar, who wrote under the name ZENO whose attacks were focused on the closed corporations of the towns, because they gave no voice to the intelligent and propertied middle classes. | States that an additional form of lobbying for political reform was led by the activist Thomas McGrugar was an attempt to meet the demand of the urban middle classes to expand the electorate. |
| the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 changed everything and set the scene for an unprecedented challenge to the existing regime. | States that a further cause of popular discontent was the French Revolution which raised the intensity of demands for meaningful reform. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- agitating for county reform was associated with forms of corruption which included fictitious votes created by landowners and assisted by lawyers which were then sold off to those who lived elsewhere. Represented nation-wide concerns, they met in a national convention in Edinburgh in 1782 at which almost all shires in Scotland were represented
- agitation for burghal reform including the expansion of the electorate came from the middle classes; Thomas McGrugar stated that ‘the dregs of the populace are disqualified by ignorance’
- radical, anti-establishment ideas originated from the French revolution. Impact of the concepts was pronounced – ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity directly influenced the establishment of groups such as The Friends of the People.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the scandal of notorious corruption associated with elections was widely acknowledged in contemporary Scottish society. Even Dundas accepted the need to address what he referred to as ‘made votes’
- demand for reform in an urban context was associated with rapid urbanisation and the recent emergence of a literate middle class
- the Scottish population was amongst the most literate in the world, at time when in the late 18th century political ideas were being disseminated by increasing numbers of pamphlets and newspapers
- the influence of Enlightenment philosophy – Francis Hutcheson argued that natural law trumped the laws of individual countries, and therefore individuals had the right to resist oppressive government
- political awareness also heightened through the work of other luminaries such as Robert Burns
- impact of the French Revolution – leading figures of the radical movement including Thomas Muir and William Dalrymple talked openly of inspiration from events in France
- the dissemination of the events of the French Revolution preceded the dramatic growth of reform societies across Scotland. Optimism and political fervour led to the establishment of branches of The Friends of the People in all Scottish towns south of Aberdeen by the December 1792
- disillusion with incompetent government following the humiliating loss of the American War of Independence.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------|--|
| Christopher Smout | Represents the orthodox interpretation that Scottish radicalism was essentially 'awakened' by transformative events which acted as a catalyst to mobilise the radical movement. |
| Gordon Pentland | Argues that the impact of the French Revolution was magnified by the expansion of the newspapers and political pamphlets. 'Growing numbers of people from the 1790's were interested in politics and had access to an exponentially increased volume of printed matter.' |
| Andrew Murdoch | Maintains that the French Revolution was a turning point in Scottish radicalism but also argues that American Independence also influenced popular protest. |
| Michael Fry | Confirms the significance of the French Revolution but suggests the impact on Scottish politics was relatively modest – 'the appetite for liberty grew, unleashed on Europe by the French Revolution. In Scotland they met a minimal response.' |

Section 4 USA: 'a house divided', 1850–1865

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 25 **'The South had the same level of economic development as the North.'**
How valid is this view of America in the 1850s?

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which the South had the same level of economic development as the North in the 1850s. Candidates might discuss the wider economic similarities in agriculture, food crops, cotton and tobacco and in industry, ironworks and railroads and differences, for example, financial and trading centres, factories and rail infrastructure. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the South had the same level of economic development as the South:

- economic development in agriculture dominated the economy in both North and South. While the North West was known as 'the larder of the USA' producing food crops, agriculture in the South was focused on cotton, tobacco etc. Both were successful in their approach but profits in the South were unparalleled. Southern crops made up three-fifths of total American exports. Cotton was by far the country's largest export comprising 50% of American exports
- the production of cotton in the South in the 1850s had accounted for 77% of the 800 million pounds of cotton used in Britain demonstrating significant enterprise in this aspect of the economy
- economic development in industry was evident in the South, for example Tredegar Iron Works. The Upper South was traditionally along the same lines as the North – although perhaps not industrialising at the same rate as the North
- there was economic development in the Southern railroad construction also with Southern investment to ensure the construction of the trans-continental railroad which would bring trade between the east coast and the markets of Asia.

Evidence which supports a contrast in economic development between South and North:

- the North had a more progressive and diverse economy. The financial and trading centres in the North East, an industrial based economy in the North East and food producing farms in the North West
- there was a strong economic bond between the North West and the North East based on beneficial trading arrangements
- there was greater industrial development in the North than the South. There were approx. 140,000 factories in the USA in 1850, of which only approx. 20,000 were found in the South. Suggesting there was more economic progress and diversity in the North compared to the South in economic development and diversification
- by 1860, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had nearly \$100 million each invested in manufacturing industries. The most industrialised of the Southern states, Virginia, had invested less than \$20 million. The other states in the South had less than \$5 million invested in manufacturing industries
- the value of goods manufactured in these states also suggests a lack of economic enterprise and diversity in the South in terms of industrial production. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania production were valued at more than \$150 million. Virginia was valued at less than \$30 million. Alabama was valued at less than \$5 million
- the North had greater economic development in railroad investment with railway mileage and journey times significantly shorter in the North which also enhanced trade and economic development. The South tended to rely on their river network more than railways
- while there was some industrial development in the Upper South, the Southern economy as a whole was dominated by agriculture

- there was limited urbanisation in the South. By 1860, only 20 towns had more than 5,000 inhabitants. Charleston and Richmond only had a population of 40,000. This was compared with the heavily populated northern industrial cities (New York, 813,000, Philadelphia, 565,000, Boston, 177,000, Chicago, 112,000)
- the South had 35% of US population but produced only 10% of manufactured output.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Charles and Mary Beard | Take the view that the sections were divided into an agricultural South and an industrial North. |
| David Potter | Takes the view that there was no economic gulf between North and South and therefore rejects the views of Charles and Mary Beard. |
| James McPherson | Takes the view that the North were superior in economic enterprise as the proportion of Northerners in business was three times greater than the South, and among engineers and inventors it was six times as large. |
| Avery Craven | Takes the view that the South had the same level of economic enterprise as the North. |

Question 26

To what extent did Frederick Douglass play the most significant role in the development of the abolitionist movement in the 1850s?

Aim of the question To allow the candidate to assess the extent and importance of the role played by Frederick Douglass in the development of the abolitionist movement. Responses might include an analysis of the role of others, such as William Lloyd Garrison, Harriet Beecher Stowe, John Brown, Wendell Phillips and events in the 1850s. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view Frederick Douglass played the most significant role:

- Douglass was born into enslavement, self-educated and escaped to the North in 1838 where he started speaking at abolitionist events, sharing his first-hand experiences
- powerful orator and writer. His narratives and speeches gained attention and support for the movement. His speeches were powerful and he had persuasive communication skills as he was able to articulate the harsh realities of enslavement, leading to outrage in the north
- he promoted the moral arguments against enslavement
- his speeches sparked debates and encouraged activism among listeners
- 'Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass' exposed the horrors of enslavement. Detailed his life as an enslaved person and escape to freedom
- the written word reached a wider audience, including international readers
- he advocated for political action and unity within the movement. He initially supported the Free-Soil Party and later, the Republican Party
- he focused on legal and political strategies to bring about emancipation, using his influence to connect with politicians and advance the abolitionist cause and bridge divisions in the movement
- he advocated for women's involvement in the movement
- he worked to unite radical and moderate abolitionists for a common goal, for example he collaborated with prominent abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and John Brown who had varying strategies and was able to provide a unifying voice. This ability to work with diverse individuals was critical to the development of the movement
- he contributed to the broader anti-enslavement sentiment that emerged during the 1850s and increased pressure on the politicians to address the issue of enslavement.

Evidence which supports the view that other figures and events played an important role:

William Lloyd Garrison:

- founder of the American Anti-Slavery Society (1833) and editor of 'The Liberator,' a prominent abolitionist newspaper
- promoted immediate and uncompensated emancipation
- firmly believed in moral arguments against enslavement
- strong advocate for nonviolence and the moral arguments against enslavement
- his influence attracted many to the cause, but also sparked debates within the movement
- Some argue that he was a divisive figure in the movement.

Harriet Beecher Stowe:

- author of 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' (1852), a fictional work that portrayed the harsh realities of enslavement
- stirred emotions and humanized enslaved individuals
- widely read in both the North and the South, polarizing opinions
- contributed to the emergence of a more widespread anti-enslavement sentiment.

John Brown:

- radical abolitionist with a militant approach
- advocated for armed insurrection to end enslavement
- notorious for leading the raid on Harpers Ferry (1859) often referred to as John Brown's raid
- although his actions were controversial, they intensified debates over enslavement
- some saw him as a martyr; others condemned his methods.

Events in the development of the movement

Kansas - Nebraska Act 1854 led to the outrage in the North and increased support for the movement

Impact of the Fugitive Slave Act led to support for Abolitionism in the North, for example the Anthony Burns Case 1854

'Slave Power Conspiracy' in the north led to the increase in involvement with the movement

Wendell Phillips:

- abolitionist and orator
- co-founder of the American Anti-Slavery Society
- advocated for immediate emancipation and equal rights for all
- supported nonviolent direct action and boycotts
- influential in promoting civil disobedience and moral suasion.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Eric Foner

Highlights Douglass's importance as a spokesperson for the abolitionist cause. He sees Douglass as a key figure in shaping public opinion against enslavement through his speeches, writings, and autobiographies.

Ira Berlin

Takes the view that Douglass was a symbol of self-emancipation and resilience, emphasizing his personal journey from enslavement to becoming a leading abolitionist.

James Stewart

Takes the view that Garrison was a radical and moral crusader who used the power of the press to advocate for abolition. He emphasizes Garrison's influential role in shaping public opinion and mobilizing support for the anti-enslavement cause.

David Blight

Takes the view that 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' ignited discussions about enslavement, influenced public opinion and ignited anti-enslavement sentiment.

Question 27 **‘Compromise was still possible following Lincoln’s election in 1860.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To allow the candidate to assess the crisis of 1860 and the extent to which a compromise solution was possible. Responses might draw on the issues in the period 1860–1861 such as the Crittenden Proposals, the Virginian Peace Convention and the importance of the southern Secession Ordinances. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Compromise was still possible:

- Lincoln did denounce John Brown’s raid and offer assurances to the South that he was not an abolitionist
- Lincoln reassured the south that he would not interfere with enslavement where it already existed
- Northern Democrats and representatives from the Upper South in particular were hopeful of achieving a compromise
- House Committee of 33 and Senate Committee of 13 were established to explore a potential compromise
- compromise plans were drawn up with Senator John J. Crittenden’s attracting most attention
- proposal; permanence of enslavement in the states was to be guaranteed; federal compensation to be paid to owners who did not recover their fugitive enslaved people; Missouri Compromise line was to be re-established (enslavement prohibited north of 36 30’ and protected south of it) would be discussed as a potential compromise
- support for secession by no means unanimous in the South
- Virginia Peace Convention met in February 1861 was attended by 133 delegates and explored options which would encourage the seceded states to return to the Union.

Evidence which supports the view that Compromise would be difficult to achieve:

- in 1860, the Republicans and Lincoln ran on a platform of non-extension of enslavement; many in South interpreted this as abolition of enslavement. Lincoln was a sectional candidate representing Northern views
- republican platform was almost entirely focused on Northern issues
- Lincoln only achieved votes in Northern states. His name did not appear on the ballot paper of a single Southern state
- southern press hostile to all northern actions, for example, portrayal of Republicans as the party of African Americans
- Lincoln portrayed as a direct threat to the social/economic status of the South, and this justified immediate secession if he were to be elected
- the movement for secession had gathered pace before Lincoln had come to power. This made Lincoln’s task of appealing to the Southern states incredibly difficult when in office
- Lincoln was however, accused of alleged inactivity between his election and inauguration
- regardless of his views, Lincoln as a Republican would also be linked to pledge to reverse Dred Scott decision
- Lincoln’s theme during his debates with Douglas in 1858 was not just enslavement’s immorality or the danger of it spreading but the continuing danger of a malignant conspiracy against the North. The Southerners could not ignore this following Lincoln’s election
- ‘House Divided’ speech had widened the gap between the sections
- abolitionists, John Brown and Harpers Ferry. Northern approval meant point of no return, many in South pushed for secession before a Republican administration acted aggressively
- the South Carolina Ordinance consisted of a list of the ways in which the non-enslaved-holding states had violated the rights of enslaved-holders
- role of abolitionists and fire eaters in keeping the pot boiling.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| David Potter | Takes the view that compromise was impossible from the start. |
| James McPherson | Takes the view that while President Buchanan set the agenda for possible compromise after the November 1860 election, his message to Congress was inflammatory and made impossible demands of the incoming Republican administration. |
| William Gienapp | Takes the view that Lincoln was slow to grasp depth of crisis after his election as President in 1860. |
| Peter Geyl | Takes the view that Lincoln showed greater wisdom by his appreciation of the inevitable tragic events. |

Question 28 **How important was popular patriotism as a reason why men from the North and the South signed up to fight during the Civil War?**

Aim of the question To allow the candidate to assess the importance of patriotism as a reason which motivated men to sign up to fight in the Civil War. Responses might include the communality of motivation in both comradeship and community, as well as specific motivation, for example, the Southern defence of homeland and the Northern desire to revenge and punish. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that men signed up due to popular patriotism:

- men from both sides signed up due to a sense of patriotic duty: the strong belief that Southern society was distinctly different to the rest of the Union as noted in the letters of many Southern soldiers. There was a Northern identity which also led to patriotism. Men from both sides signed up due to the sense of honour and belief in their side's cause
- Southerners signed up with a sense of duty to defend the doctrine of State's Rights in the South or to protect the right of enslaved holders
- Southerners signed up to defend Southern liberty
- Southerners viewed the fight as a war of independence
- Northerners fought as their duty to save the Union and the 'Great Experiment'
- Emancipation Proclamation altered the war aims of the North to a war about emancipation as well as restoring the Union

Evidence which supports the view other factors motivated men to fight:

Southern motivations:

- simply about defending homeland against invader
- the election of Lincoln as President in 1860 and the dominance of the Republican in Federal Government terrified Southerners as they were perceived as abolitionist and a real threat to the South
- resist perceived Northern oppression
- the South felt they had no political representation in Federal Government given that Republicans represented the Northern values and had received no support in the South
- John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry, 1859, convinced many Southerners that there was a northern attempt to incite an insurrection from enslaved people.

Northern motivations:

- desire for revenge as war continued
- punish treason
- African Americans were motivated to fight for Emancipation. The Emancipation Proclamation had a significant impact on recruitment
- runaway enslaved people motivated to join the Union ranks.

Common motivations:

- comradeship
- community
- masculine identity ie a desire not to let your family down
- conscription: After 1862 in the South and 1863 in the North, men were forced to fight
- use of bounties to encourage recruitment.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| Reid Mitchell | Takes the view that the Northern soldiers were imbued with ideology. Men enlisted due to youthful high spirits, community pressure and overpowering enthusiasm. As war continued anti-enslavement sentiment grew among Union soldiers. Soldiers' ideology motivated them through the hellish second half of the war. Loyalties to fellow soldiers were important. |
| Peter Parish | Takes the view that combined forces of nationalism and democracy produced a massive increase in commitment to the cause of one side or the other, which made this a people's war. Huge response of 1861 was the product of individual enthusiasm, state action and local initiative. Men joined due to the encouragement of family and friends, motivated by a mixture of patriotism, fear of being thought a coward and anxiety that it would all be over before they could get involved. |
| James McPherson | Argues that the abolition of enslavement became linked to preservation of the Union. Few fought to achieve racial equality. Confederate soldiers tacitly supported defence of southern institutions. Northern soldiers supported emancipation as this hurt the enemy. |
| Alan Haughton | Takes the view that men filled with thoughts of excitement and the drama of war. Hope and expectation of demonstrating courage and ability on the battlefield. In the North, patriotic sentiment was based on pride of democratic system. In the South, many fought for independence and defence of their own institutions and laws. Real affinity towards their community and section. Immediate stimulus to fight was group loyalty to men on either side of the soldier. |

Question 29 'The contribution of women in the South was more significant than women in the North in sustaining the war effort.'

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To assess the role that women played in the Civil War and to evaluate the extent to which women in the South played a more significant role in sustaining the war effort than their Northern counterparts. Responses might refer to their roles in the home front, for example, plantations, industry, farming, and nursing among others. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Southern women made a significant contribution:

- role of women in the South has been underestimated, positive impact on the war effort
- women kept plantations going. With men fighting for the Confederacy, women were forced to take on the role of maintain the plantations and the home front
- women dealt very effectively with shortages
- women largely maintained control of enslaved people in the South
- women led civil unrest. The Richmond Bread Riots in mid-summer 1862 were led by Mary Jackson and Minerva Meredith. More than 100 women armed with axes, knives, and other weapons took their grievances to Governor John Letcher on April 2
- Confederate spy Rose O'Neal Greenhow had an extensive spy network and included 48 woman and two men. The network used a sophisticated cipher to code and decode messages. She sent at least eight coded messages to Beauregard regarding Union fortifications around Washington, D.C.

Evidence which supports the view that the contribution of Southern women has been exaggerated:

- Southern women had a negative impact on the Confederate war effort as they played a crucial role in undermining the morale of the Confederate army from autumn 1864 onwards with letters to soldiers pleading for the latter's return
- the severe hardships led to a sense of defeatism amongst women in the South for example, paying for food on a private's pay of \$11 a month when a barrel of flour cost \$100 in the Confederacy.

Evidence which supports the view that Northern women made a significant contribution:

- the role of women in the North has been underestimated, positive impact on the war effort
- they played a vital role in US Sanitary Commission which raised approximately \$25 million to support sick and wounded soldiers
- Clara Barton provided nursing care for wounded Union soldiers immediately after the Baltimore Riots of 1861, she treated the wounded on numerous battlefields including Antietam and in 1864, she was appointed by Union General Benjamin Butler as the 'lady in charge' of the hospitals at the front
- their increased role in industry and farming which was vital to maintaining the war effort
- they replaced men, who had volunteered, in many professions
- they played a vital role in increasing food and factory output which was critical to ensure supplies reached the front line
- women like Union spy Elizabeth van Lew and Belle Boyd created a spy network that provided information on Confederate movements.

Evidence which supports the view that the contribution of Northern women has been exaggerated:

- as the war dragged on, Northern women grew weary of the sacrifices that they and their families were making. When riots against the military draft took place in Northern cities such as Boston and New York in 1863, working class women joined in the mob violence
- the impact of inflation, cause significant problems for women on the home front. Poor families, those on fixed incomes, and women subsisting on soldiers' wages often found it impossible to pay for food.

Women contributed equally to both sides during the Civil War:

- women volunteered to be nurses with Clara Barton founding the American Red Cross and provided medical aid to both Union and Confederate soldiers throughout the war
- Dorothea Dix helped to improve nursing standards and treated both Union and Confederate soldiers
- women on both sides helped raise funds by sale of bonds etc
- women on both sides set up relief organisations
- women on both sides kept up morale by letter writing, tending to the sick or sending additional supplies to men in camp.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Clement Eaton | Takes the view that at the beginning of the war, Southern women were great supporters of the rebellion and that it gave them opportunities to enter new occupations in support of the war effort. |
| Drew Faust | Takes the view that women faced severe hardship on the home front, and this led to the growth of defeatism as seen in the content of letters sent to the fighting men of the South. |
| Lisa Frank | Highlights that women demonstrated determination and bravery and in some cases defied traditional gender roles to participate in the conflict. Some even disguised themselves as men to serve as soldiers during the war. |
| Reid Mitchell | Takes the view that historical judgements on Confederate women have ranged from them as more devoted to the Cause than their men folk, to arguing that their withdrawal of support doomed the Confederacy. |

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 30 How fully does Source A explain the challenges James Buchanan faced during his Presidency between 1856 and 1860?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|--|--|
| This reignited the sectional divide as Republicans argued that the decision was part of the Slave Power conspiracy between the executive and judiciary. | States that the ‘Slave Power conspiracy’ was further fuelled in the North with the Dred Scott decision providing Northerners with the evidence for the conspiracy. This exacerbated the divisions along Northern and Southern sectional lines. |
| This intensified the sectional divisions in the territories as Kansans remained divided in their loyalties to the Topeka and Lecompton governments. | States that the worsening sectional divide between North and South in Kansas was evident in the split between the pro enslavement Lecompton government and the Free-Soil Topeka government in Kansas. |
| Here was a Democratic president ignoring the party's commitment to popular sovereignty, bowing to Southern pressure and attempting to ram enslaved labour down the throats of Kansans, which was completely at odds with the wishes of the people of Kansas and the Democrat supporters and simply added to support for the Republicans. | States that James Buchanan’s decision to ignore the final election result in Kansas, attempt to push through the Kansas application to join the Union as a state permitting enslavement furthered the sectional divide, split the Democrat Party and enhanced the Republican support in the North. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Buchanan had claimed to have no knowledge of the supreme court verdict but declared that it would provide a 'final settlement' to the dispute over enslavement in the territories. The announcement was highly divisive
- Lecompton vs Topeka state legislatures in Kansas continued the divisions over the status of enslavement in the territories. Buchanan had exacerbated the divisions by attempting to support the pro-enslavement Lecompton constitution despite the alleged issues over the legality of the vote
- Stephen Douglas had fallen out with Buchanan who was determined to ruin Douglas which in turn further divided the Democrats.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Buchanan faced the challenge of unifying his party that suffered division during the 1856 election campaign. Bringing together his party was crucial as finding agreement on their 1856 platform demonstrates
- 'Bleeding Kansas' exacerbated tensions between North and South
- 'Bleeding Sumner' - violence in Congress as Preston Brooks attacked Charles Sumner demonstrating the depth of sectional division
- the 'Panic of 1857' which had significant economic consequences in the USA added to the divisions. There was little impact in the South but a depression in the North
- the Lincoln and Douglas debates between August and October 1858 largely focused on enslavement and the spectre of the 'slave power'. The debates were widely covered by the media. This would shape Southern attitudes towards Lincoln in the 1860 Presidential election campaign
- although the Democrats would win the 1858 mid-term elections, their representation in the House fell from 53 to 32 allowing the Republicans to take control of the House. If voting trends continued in the 1860 Presidential election, the Republicans would also win control of the Presidency
- John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry in October 1859 intensified Southern fears of an abolitionist rising in the North
- when Congress met on 5 December 1859, a 2-month struggle to elect a speaker would follow as the House divided along sectional lines
- the 1860 election campaign and the rise of Lincoln during this period was a challenge Buchanan did not manage well

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|---|
| David Donald | Argues that Lincoln's House Divided speech during the Lincoln and Douglas debates not only attracted national attention but sounded very radical. It came five months ahead of William H. Seward's prediction of an 'irrepressible conflict' between enslavement and freedom. Donald believes it was the most extreme statement made by any responsible leader of the Republican party. |
| Hugh Tulloch | Has argued that the 1857 decision simply re-affirmed the view that enslaved people were mere property. |
| John Stauffer | Takes the view that the impact of Harper's Ferry transformed the nation. The tide of anger that flowed from Harper's Ferry traumatized Americans of all persuasions, terrorizing Southerners with the fear of massive rebellions from enslaved people, and radicalizing countless Northerners, who had hoped that violent confrontation over enslavement could be indefinitely postponed. |
| James McPherson | Takes the view that the Dred Scott case verdict did not remove issue of enslavement in territories but made it a political issue with Republicans seeing Scott as a free man. Problems from interpretation of enslaved people's property not being excluded from territories and citizen rights. |

Question 31 Evaluate the usefulness of Source B as evidence of criticisms of Lincoln's approach to the issue of emancipation.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source B | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Author | Horace Greeley. | The founder and editor of the New York Tribune, a journalist, and political figure in the 19 th century. He was a strong advocate for abolitionism and pressured Lincoln for emancipation throughout the Civil War. |
| Purpose | An open letter published in the <i>New York Tribune</i> . | A highly influential newspaper known for its progressive and reformist stance and played a significant role in promoting the anti-enslavement movement. The open letter under the title of 'The Prayer of Twenty Millions' was published in Greeley's newspaper to pressure Lincoln into emancipation. |
| Timing | 20 August 1862. | The letter was published shortly before Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on 22 September 1862, stating that if the Confederacy did not end the rebellion by 1 January 1863, all enslaved people in Confederate territory would be declared as free. On 1 January 1863, Lincoln issued the full Emancipation Proclamation. |

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| . . . extremely disappointed and deeply pained by the policy you seem to be pursuing with regard to those enslaved by the Rebels. | Takes the view that Greeley was upset and frustrated with Lincoln's approach to Emancipation, demanding much quicker and more sweeping action. Emphasised by 'deeply pained' and 'enslaved by the Rebels'. |
| . . . deeply mistaken in the manner in which you are carrying out your official duties as President with regard to the emancipating provisions of the recently passed Confiscation Act, which were designed to fight slavery with liberty be giving freedom to those enslaved by the rebels who join Union forces. | Takes the view that is critical of the actions taken by Lincoln for not executing laws passed by Congress that included emancipation provisions to those who had joined the Union forces. Emphasised by 'deeply mistaken in the manner'. |

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| We now complain that this Confiscation Act which you approved is habitually disregarded by your generals and that no word of rebuke about this from you has yet reached the public ear. | <p>Takes the view that complaints suggest the Confiscation Act – approved by Lincoln – is being ignored by the generals and that Lincoln has not taken any action to discipline them – to the public knowledge.</p> <p>Emphasised by ‘habitually disregarded’ and ‘no word of rebuke’.</p> |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Lincoln had been under pressure from abolitionists, radical Republicans and the actions of Generals in the border states. Many argued that emancipation would provide a psychological and ideological boost for the North and a blow to the South. Lincoln issued a preliminary proclamation the following month
- the Second Confiscation Act passed by Congress on 17 July 1862 authorised the seizure of property owned by people that supported the Confederacy
- in August 1861, General John Fremont imposed martial law in the state of Missouri and declared all rebel-owned enslaved people to be free. Lincoln, fearing the loss of a loyal border state, rescinded Fremont's order and relieved the General of his command. In May 1862, General David Hunter also issued an order to emancipate enslaved people. Both rulings were overturned by Lincoln.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Lincoln was always under pressure to transform the Union war aims from ‘Union as it was’ to ‘Union as it should be.’ Radical Republicans were critical of Lincoln and put considerable pressure on him. There were a number of differing reasons for their view, but all agreed that it would weaken the Southern war effort
- Lincoln had adopted a pragmatic approach to enslavement. He was aware that there were a range of views on enslavement and therefore he believed in gradual emancipation. This approach was always under pressure from the more radical elements of the Republican Party. Lincoln was personally against enslavement but perhaps not as an abolitionist which led to criticism from the radical elements of the Republican Party
- Lincoln was under pressure from Seward to delay announcement until some military success was achieved. As the war dragged on, recruitment was always an issue for the Union. White volunteers were less willing thus emancipation would allow for wide scale African American recruitment. Lincoln argued that African Americans were ‘a resource if vigorously applied . . . will soon close the contest.’ Not everyone in the North fully agreed with Lincoln and his approach here
- Lincoln didn’t have the constitutional power to abolish enslavement therefore he was under pressure to use it as a war measure. Emancipation was therefore used here as a war aim which was designed to weaken the Confederacy’s manpower if enslaved peoples fled to Union lines while swelling Union ranks with former enslaved peoples. In addition, as the southern economy based on enslaved labour – emancipation would potentially weaken the South’s ability to fight. Foreign involvement: Emancipation would ensure that the war remained a domestic conflict and essentially a war of attrition.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|--|
| Kenneth M Stamp | Argues that Lincoln was reluctant to emancipate the enslaved peoples, but the war demanded such drastic action. |
| Hugh Tulloch | Contends that Lincoln's actions were those of a politician having to change tack due to the evolving nature of the conflict. In this case, Lincoln's actions are viewed not only as necessary but also as just. |
| Barbara J Fields | Takes the view that the actions of the African Americans themselves in both North and South put pressure on Lincoln leaving him with no option but to issue a proclamation in effect recognising the legality of the existing circumstances. |
| La Wanda Cox | Takes the view that Lincoln's actions looked towards long-term racial equality. |

Question 32 **How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of why the North won the Civil War?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|--|
| . . .the Union won the Civil War because of overwhelming numbers and there is truth to the North's preponderance of strength since the Federal Government in the North employed over two million soldiers, while the Confederacy mustered close to 900,000. | Suggests that the North won the civil war as it had a larger level of recruitment which was a critical superior strength over the Confederacy. |
| . . .the Union did in fact successfully harness those resources, transforming them into military might and focusing that power on the critically weaker aspects of the Confederacy defences. | Suggests that the North had superior resources and used these effectively to defeat the Confederacy. |
| The Union had begun to adopt the raiding strategy which would prove the decisive tactic and overwhelmed the stubborn Confederate resistance for much of the war. | Suggests that the raiding tactics used by the Union eventually proved too much for the Confederacy and ensured Union victory. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Confederacy was simply overwhelmed by the superior size of the Union army which was swelled by the later recruitment of African American soldiers
- Lee announced to his troops 'the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources' following the surrender to Grant
- union blockades on land and sea meant that no further supplies would arrive to support the Confederate defence. Combined with the total war tactics adopted by Grant and Sherman in 1864, the two issues would ensure Northern victory.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| Lincoln's remarkable abilities gave him the edge over Davis as a war leader, while in Grant and Sherman the North acquired commanders with a concept of total war and the necessary determination to make it succeed. | Suggests that the Union had superior leadership during the civil war. Lincoln was an extremely effective war leader and Grant provided the leadership on the battlefield. |
| This was critical to decisive decision making in the Union, as the opposition provided by the Democrats compelled the Republicans to close ranks and unify in support of war policies. | Suggests that the decision to continue with democratic two-party politics in the North ensured that effective decision making was made by the Republicans to win the war. |
| Grant's leadership on the battlefield and Lincoln's political abilities came together at the most critical point after August 1864 transforming northern will from defeatism to a determination to fight to the last. | Suggests that the Union was losing the war until Grant and Lincoln came together to form a highly effective partnership in the summer of 1864. They were able to adopt the tactics which delivered the critical victories that would unite the Northern war effort to victory. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Lincoln is widely respected for his superior abilities as a war leader which ensured a real strength existed in the Northern political system to manage the crises that emerged during the war and while it took him a while to find the most effective General in Chief, he appointed Grant who was critical to the final victory
- the Democrats effectively held the Republicans to account throughout the war with the 1864 election proving a critical test of Lincoln's leadership
- Grant and Sherman's total war strategy was aimed at destroying the South's will to continue the war. The refusal of Grant to retreat after reverses, for example, Cold Harbour and the Wilderness demonstrates his effectiveness.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- 22 million Northerners gave them a substantial population advantage over the South who had 9 million of which only 5.5 million white
- 7 million men of fighting age versus 2 million men of fighting age in the South. Eventually the South were forced to use the enslaved population to balance the sides a little more
- the pockets of unionism that existed within the Confederacy proved an advantage to the North. The area around the Appalachian Mountains was loyal to the Union but in Confederate territory
- West Virginia's split in favour of the Union added to the Northern manpower at the expense of the Confederacy as did the relatively large numbers of enslaved people that fled to the North during the Civil War
- superiority of Union industrial base was evident overall; the Union had three times the railway capacity, nine times industrial capacity, the ability to produce superior naval strength; allowing the naval blockade to be imposed
- the Union superior management of military supplies by Stanton, Gideon Welles etc ensured this advantage
- the Union had superior diplomacy and diplomatic success
- the Confederacy also had weaknesses including, the issues of states' rights, the failure of King Cotton diplomacy to win foreign recognition, the collapse of Confederate morale, the excess of democracy in the Confederate ranks and financial pressures on the Confederate treasury.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Richard Current | Takes the view that the idea of 'God and the strongest battalions' was the key explanation for Southern defeat. |
| T Harry Williams | Takes the view that Northern victory was the result of the superiority of Northern military leadership towards the end of the conflict. |
| Emory Thomas | Takes the view that that the Confederacy's hopes depended on the success of its armies. But the lack of success prevented European recognition which was essential if Southern armies were to succeed. It was a vicious diplomatic circle. However, he also argues that the role of CF Adams in London and WL Drayton in Paris ensured good US relations in Europe. Emancipation introduced a moral dimension which could not be ignored. |
| Frank Owsley | Takes the view that Southern defeat should be attributed to the issue of states' rights. |

Section 5 Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 33 **‘The extent to which Japan was truly isolated before 1854 has been exaggerated.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the extent to which the Tokugawa actually implemented a policy of complete isolation during its regime. Although the policy was ostensibly rigorously enforced, the view that Japan was ‘truly isolated’ is somewhat exaggerated, and the extent of isolation varied over time and was not uniform across the entire country. Responses might refer to foreign trade and travel, religion, literature, foreign influence and visitors. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Tokugawa Japan was isolated:

- in the 1630s, Japan adopted a policy of isolation, which aimed to limit foreign trade. This was done to mitigate political threats linked to Western missionaries and to deprive Daimyo of potential income
- central to this policy was Japan's stance on Christianity, as there was a fear that missionaries would pave the way for full-scale colonialism. Japanese Christians and converts faced severe persecution, including crucifixion
- throughout most of the Tokugawa period, all Western books were prohibited
- foreign visitations were consistently rejected, and shipwrecked sailors could face execution
- travel outside the country was heavily restricted, with many individuals who left not permitted to return. This served as a means of social control, preventing the influx of potentially revolutionary Western ideas
- this policy ultimately led to the development of a highly indigenous socio-economic structure
- despite changing socio-economic conditions, the Tokugawa Bakufu exhibited a deep reluctance to reconsider this policy, resulting in a sense of inertia
- James Biddle's arrival in 1846 was met with a resolute refusal to engage from the Bakufu.

Evidence which supports the view that Tokugawa Japan was not isolated:

- some argue that the level of isolationism has been over emphasised due to a lack of understanding about Tokugawa society
- Japan maintained significant historical connections with China, retaining diplomatic and cultural ties. This was especially evident in areas like Confucianism, literature, and art. Additionally, there was limited trade with China
- the Dutch were allowed to remain in Japan, albeit under strict control. They were solely interested in commerce and were confined to a man-made island, Dejima, in Nagasaki harbour
- the Dutch also played a pivotal role in disseminating medical knowledge through Rangaku
- there was also some trade with Korea and the Ryukyu islands
- Japan had interactions with her indigenous Ainu population in Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Kingdom (modern-day Okinawa), which did not face the same level of isolation
- western books were permitted from 1720, except for the Bible
- there were exceptions for specific groups, allowing some individuals to travel abroad. Additionally, there were occasional interactions with shipwrecked sailors and castaways.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|---|
| Conrad Totman | Suggests Japan was not isolated, 'Sakoku is often seen as the supreme example of Japanese isolationism, but this view can be misleading. In many respects Japan remained deeply involved with the rest of the world during these two and a half centuries.' |
| Ronald Toby | Argues that total isolation wasn't the aim of the government, 'Sakoku was not a total shutdown of Japan to the outside world, but rather a series of measures that were intended to control the kind of people and activities that came into contact with the country.' |
| Peter Kornicki | Contends that the extent of isolation has been exaggerated, 'It is commonplace to assert that it was Commodore Perry who was responsible for opening Japan in 1853–1854, but this is misleading . . . Japan was never completely closed, owing to the Dutch presence in Nagasaki and the active trade conducted by Japan with China and Korea.' |
| Ian Buruma | Argues that the Japanese were in fact well aware of the outside world, 'Perry's assumption of Japanese ignorance (in 1853) could not have been further from the truth. At the time of his arrival in Edo bay, the Japanese knew more about America than the Americans knew about Japan.' |

Question 34 **How far can it be argued that foreign intervention was the crucial factor in bringing down the Tokugawa regime in the 1860s?**

Aim of the question To consider the relative importance of external factors in the collapse of Bakufu control in 1868. This could focus on the *Bakumatsu* years (1853–1868) after the arrival of Perry, though candidates may opt to take the isolated factor approach and discuss the domestic pressures that undermined support for the regime such as and were catalysed by the arrival of the Americans. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that foreign intervention was crucial to the decline of the Tokugawa in the 1860s:

- Commodore Perry's arrival in 1853 with a third of the American navy, leaving the Tokugawa feeling threatened, set off a chain of events that demonstrated Japan's technological and military deficiencies
- the delivery of a letter from President Fillmore by Perry, demanding Japan open her ports to American ships, with the implication of military action if the response was unfavourable, heightened the sense of urgency for modernisation and military reforms, which many believed the shogunate was incapable of achieving
- pressure from America to open its ports left the Tokugawa Bakufu in a state of uncertainty, prompting them to consult the Emperor on state matters, marking a significant departure from previous practices
- the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa (1854) with the USA opened up Japanese ports, followed by the Harris Treaty in 1858, codifying the unequal trading relationship and introducing the humiliation of extraterritoriality. This triggered similar Unequal Treaties with other nations
- unequal Treaties imposed by Britain, France, Russia, and the Dutch further weakened the Bakufu's control and provoked outrage among supporters of the new nationalist school of thought (*Shishi*).

Evidence of foreign influence on domestic rebellion:

- the assassination of Charles Richardson led to the British attack on Kagoshima (Satsuma), illustrating that the Bakufu's authority was no longer recognised internationally
- the Choshu and Satsuma clans, initially played off against each other, signed the Satcho Alliance in 1866 with the support of Western advisors
- western powers provided support to various rebel factions that sought to overthrow the Bakufu. For example, the Choshu and Satsuma domains, which were key players in the rebellion, received assistance in the form of military training, arms, and strategic advice from Western advisors
- thus, Western technology and tacit support were instrumental in the final defeat of the Tokugawa in 1868/69
- the influx of foreign goods and ideas disrupted traditional Japanese society. It led to economic dislocation, as some industries struggled to compete with foreign imports. This contributed to social unrest and discontent, especially among those adversely affected.

Evidence of internal/domestic causes being responsible for the Tokugawa downfall:

- the inherent weakness of a decentralised government was apparent before foreign pressure from America
- socio-economic changes, including the weakening of the caste structure, debt accumulation among Daimyo and Samurai, and increased peasant discontent and rioting, contributed to societal unrest
- the failure of the Tempō Reforms exposed Bakufu weaknesses.

Nationalist thought:

- manipulation of the Emperor's theoretical authority and Shinto revivalism from the late 18th century onwards created a connection with the new national school of thought
- the disregard of Imperial opinion in dealings with America fuelled demands for the restoration of the Emperor's authority, accusing the Tokugawa regime of usurping imperial power. This gave additional dynamism to the *Sonno Joi* movement
- there were also progressive nationalists, who embraced Western ideas such as democracy, individual rights, and modern governance structures. These ideas provided intellectual ammunition for rebels who sought to replace the traditional feudal system with a more centralised, modern state.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|--|
| Thomas Huber | Contends that foreign influence catalysed resistance 'it was Perry's arrival which finally made it possible for serious reformers in Choshu and elsewhere to convert their theoretical understanding into an urgent public demand for change.' |
| Peter Kornicki | Suggests that pressures were multinational, rather than specifically American, as per conventional thinking, 'it is commonplace to assert that it was Commodore Perry who was responsible for 'opening' Japan, but this is misleading. Japan was under pressure not solely from the United States, but from several nations whose territorial and other interests were leading them to converge in Japanese waters.' |
| Janet Hunter | Argues that external forces merely accelerated domestic decline, 'the dynamic forces within society and in the economy eventually came into conflict with a national polity which sought to avoid change.' |
| Harold Bolitho | Contends that security was a key issue in domestic opposition to the Bakufu, 'One by one the control mechanisms of the system failed: in the countryside the frequency, and the scale, of agrarian risings mounted . . . in the towns and cities reports of riots and looting told a similar story; the foreign crisis after 1853 make it clear the Tokugawa government, entrusted with the duty of protecting the emperor and empire from foreign aggression, was unable to do anything of the kind.' |

Question 35

To what extent were government policies the main cause of Japanese economic success during the Meiji Era between 1868 and 1912?

Aim of the question To enable the candidate to evaluate the significant influence of the government on Japan's economic progress. Reference can also be made to additional contributing factors such as the Zaibatsu, the impact of Western influences, the involvement of women, and the economic groundwork laid during the Tokugawa era. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the role of the government was instrumental in Japan's economic development:

- the Meiji government implemented a series of strategic policies and reforms aimed at modernising the economy. These included the abolition of the feudal system, the establishment of a centralised bureaucracy, and the creation of a legal framework conducive to industrial development
- the government exercised control over expenditure and supported large-scale private enterprises, particularly the Zaibatsu. Many historians contend that the Zaibatsu's development was facilitated by government encouragement and support
- the government established a modern banking system and provided financial support to emerging industries through subsidies, loans, and grants. This ensured a stable financial environment for industrial ventures
- the initiation of the Iwakura Mission initially aimed at fact-finding about Western knowledge, including industrial expertise
- the state played an active role in industrial processes, exemplified by the establishment of model factories such as the Tomioka silk reeling mill
- the government strategically deployed *Yatoi* (foreign advisors) and later dismissed them once their knowledge had been disseminated
- the government invested heavily in infrastructure development, including the construction of railways, telegraph networks, ports, and roads
- the government prioritised education, sending students abroad to acquire knowledge and technology
- military reform was closely tied to industrial expansion, creating a military-industrial complex that spurred innovation and industrial advances
- however, government intervention had limits and did not extend to all spheres of industry.

Evidence which supports the view that the Zaibatsu were the critical factor.

- the Zaibatsu were distinctive vertical monopolies that came to dominate Japanese industry post-1868, encompassing production from raw materials to distribution of finished goods
- most Zaibatsu entities had their own banks and, from the 1880s onward, began to dominate manufacturing and commercial activities
- some specialised in specific fields, while others diversified into various activities
- four major conglomerates — Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda — held considerable sway over industries like shipping, shipbuilding, coals and metals, bank loans, flour milling, sheet glass, sugar, and cotton textiles
- Mitsubishi conglomerate controlled 25% of shipping and ship building, 15% of coals and metals, 16% of bank loans, 50% of flour milling, 59% of sheet glass, 35% of sugar and 15% of cotton textiles
- they developed extensive networks of foreign contacts and gathered information to facilitate the sale of a wide variety of goods abroad
- while some were private enterprises, others developed due to government favouritism
- the Zaibatsu entities benefited significantly from economies of scale and became influential political players, successfully influencing government policy
- however, some of the most pivotal commercial and industrial developments were driven by private enterprises rather than state sponsorship.

Evidence of the role of Westerners and foreign influences:

- the Unequal Treaties had a profound psychological impact that greatly accelerated industrial growth
- the Iwakura Mission yielded valuable industrial knowledge
- the employment of *Yatoi* to bring their commercial and industrial expertise – though this was heavily controlled by the government
- the international environment prompted Japan to adopt new industrial technologies, enabling her to catch up with Western advancements
- cultural borrowing, including shipbuilding, iron and steel mills, banking, commerce, and textiles, had a positive impact, particularly in response to the silkworm disease in Europe.

Evidence regarding the Tokugawa legacy:

- economic foundations were unintentionally laid during the Tokugawa period, with alternate attendance leading to the creation of extensive infrastructure, including bridges
- *Sankin-kotai* also contributed to the dramatic growth in Edo to over one million inhabitants, who needed supplying with commercial goods. The peasants living in nearby villages began to diversify into commercial goods to supply Edo – stimulating a money-based economy
- the transformation of Samurai from a warrior into an administrative caste led to them indulging in extravagant lifestyles, getting into debt to merchants, increasing the importance of merchants within Japan
- the shift from rice-based to money-based economy and highly developed agriculture with inter-regional trade were significant developments
- Japan possessed an abundance of well-educated and loyal human labour
- contact with the Dutch also contributed to foundational economic structures.

Evidence regarding the role of women:

- the abolition of the caste structure liberated women, making them the predominant workforce in the textile industry
- women consistently formed the majority of the workforce in Japanese factories
- despite their crucial contributions, women often endured harsh working conditions and suffered physical and emotional impacts
- many were contracted into factories by their parents and resided in dormitories attached to the workplaces
- although predominantly in the textile industry, some women transitioned to roles like typists, telephone operators, and store assistants
- it took until 1911 to limit their working day to twelve hours
- women also remained vital in agriculture, the most significant commercial activity during the Meiji period, particularly in the paddy fields.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Marius Jansen | Argues that the govt played the pivotal role, 'The single greatest force for change was the Meiji government itself, which, by its very presence and its plans for national defence and economic development, altered the expectations and thereby the behaviour of the Japanese people.' |
| Edwin Reischauer | Makes the case for the Zaibatsu, 'the great wealth and broad base of the Zaibatsu enabled them to finance promising new fields in the economy and thus increase their share in its fast-growing industrial sector.' |
| Carol Gluck | Credits the influence of the West, 'The Meiji leaders' deliberate embrace of Western knowledge, technology, and institutions was a key factor in Japan's rapid economic development.' |
| Mikiso Hane | Highlights the importance of the textile industry – within which women formed the dominant workforce. The industry that developed rapidly from the early Meiji years and remained a key component of the economy was textile manufacture . . . by 1904 it had become the world's largest producer with a 31% share. |

Question 36 **How justified is the view that war with China was a deliberate aim of Japanese foreign policy after 1868?**

Aim of the question To weigh up the arguments about the nature of early Meiji foreign policy towards China and come to a conclusion about whether it was clearly defined; opportunistic; or a series of broad aims that were realised as circumstances arose. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the argument that the Sino-Japanese War was planned:

(a) Disputes over Korea:

- there were long-standing concerns over Korea's strategic importance as the closest area to Japan from the Asian mainland, potentially serving as a launching point for an attack
- Korea was described as a 'dagger pointing into the heart of Japan', highlighting Japan's intention to secure control in the region
- Japan's discomfort with Korea's semi-autonomous status under Chinese influence, indicating a desire for increased strategic control
- early Meiji era imperialistic designs on Korea, exemplified in Saigo Takamori's plans for a campaign against Korea, showcasing Japan's clear intention to pursue her own interests
- Japan's persuasion of Korea to establish diplomatic relations and accept an Unequal Treaty (1876), demonstrating a concerted effort to ensure Korean actions aligned with Japanese interests. This led to Korea asking China to intervene, thereafter both nations agreed to inform one another if they were to dispatch troops to Korea - this was the *casus belli* of the Sino-Japanese War.

(b) Imperialism and expansionism:

- Japan's motivation for war to gain an overseas empire, aligning with the prevailing trend of imperialism
- the necessity for Japan to adopt an aggressive foreign policy due to a lack of natural resources
- Japan's pursuit of overseas markets and additional land to accommodate her expanding population.

(c) Desire for regional hegemony:

- Japan's ambition to supplant China as the leading Asian nation. She was contemptuous of China's submission to Western colonisation, which ended the centuries of reverence in which she had held her larger neighbour
- the rapid military and naval reform and expansion by the Meiji oligarchy indicates preparation for potential conflicts
- growing concern about expanding Russian influence in Asia, emphasising the strategic importance of securing Korea.

Evidence which challenges the perspective that the Sino-Japanese war was planned:

(a) Diplomacy and opportunism:

- Japan initially pursued diplomatic means to secure her interests in East Asia. This is evident in the Treaty of Ganghwa with Korea in 1876, which aimed to open Korea to Japanese trade
- The Formosa Incident, which Japan exploited to shift the balance of power in Asia, could not have been predicted, indicating a more opportunistic approach
- Takamori's isolated plans to invade Korea, halted upon the return of members of the Meiji oligarchy from the Iwakura Mission, suggesting it was not part of a coordinated government strategy
- Japan could not have foreseen Korea's violation of the Treaty of Tianjin – which gave her the justification to launch a war against China
- Japan's approach to foreign policy evolved over time. While there were elements of strategic planning, there were also significant factors that shaped Japan's actions opportunistically rather than as part of a preconceived, deliberate war plan.

(b) Desire for stability and modernisation:

- Japan's caution about overextending herself militarily, particularly against a larger and more populous country like China, challenges the notion of a blueprint for war
- the primary focus of the Meiji government was on internal reforms and modernisation, potentially making engagement in a costly war with China counterproductive to domestic objectives.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|--|
| Bonnie B Oh | Suggests that there was a broad plan to secure Korea's independence, 'Korea was perceived to be especially dangerous for Japan's security at the end of the nineteenth century for it remained weakened, dominated by a third power.' |
| Ian Nish | Argues that foreign policy, although broadly defined, developed according to opportunities, 'Japan's actions leading up to the First Sino-Japanese War were driven by a combination of strategic interests and responses to evolving diplomatic situations, rather than a premeditated plan for conflict.' |
| Kenneth Pyle | Agrees about the opportunistic nature of foreign policy, 'Japan's leaders did not have a predetermined plan for war with China, but rather responded to a series of events and strategic considerations.' |
| Edward McCord | Contends that the War was driven by domestic, rather than imperialistic aims, 'Japan's leaders were primarily focused on domestic reforms during the Meiji era, and the war with China emerged as a consequence of their efforts to modernise.' |

Question 37 **‘By 1920 Japan was still not regarded as a full equal by western nations.’**
How valid is this statement?

Aim of the question To provide an assessment of the effects of events spanning from 1912 to 1920 on Japan's global standing. Although the Unequal Treaties had been nullified, there is evidence that Japan was not yet regarded as an equal participant in global matters. To address this, candidates might analyse the repercussions of pivotal incidents during the Taisho period – in particular the impact of WWI. Candidates should reach a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Japan was making progress in being regarded as a full equal by western nations in the pre-War Taisho period:

- Japan forged alliances with countries like Britain, which culminated in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1911), reinforcing Japan's position as a significant player in global geopolitics
- Japan's economy experienced steady growth, and she actively sought economic opportunities in neighbouring regions. Japanese investments and businesses expanded in Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia
- Japan continued to modernise her military, investing in naval power, which helped project its influence across the Pacific and maintain regional stability
- Japan engaged in cultural and educational exchanges with neighbouring countries, fostering goodwill and mutual understanding. This helped build regional influence through soft power
- Japan played a role in mediating conflicts among regional powers, such as the resolution of the Manchu Succession Crisis in 1912, which showcased Japan's diplomatic capabilities
- Japan promoted the concept of Pan-Asianism, emphasising a sense of solidarity among Asian nations against Western imperialism. This rhetoric resonated with many Asian nations seeking independence and autonomy.

Evidence which supports the view that Japan remained a largely regional power in the pre-War Taisho period:

- in comparison to established Western powers like Britain, France, and the United States, Japan's military, economic, and geopolitical influence was seen as relatively limited
- Japan faced economic difficulties during this period, including inflation and strikes. These challenges, alongside some economic dependence on Western countries, contributed to the perception of Japan as a second-rate power
- Japan's primary strategic concerns were centred around Asia, including its interests in Korea, China, and the Pacific. This regional focus contributed to the perception of Japan as primarily a regional power.

Evidence that WWI helped Japan emerge as a global power:

- Japan aligned with the victorious side, gaining Germany's Chinese sphere of influence in Shantung, while extending control over Manchuria and overall influence in China
- leveraging the conflict, Japan issued the 21 Demands in 1915, seen by the West as an endeavour to assert control over China. This signified a shift in Japan's perspectives and a burgeoning confidence in its global, expansionist capabilities
- starting in 1915, Japanese industry experienced significant growth by capturing markets from actively involved European powers. This was especially notable in the Indian textile market, previously dominated by Lancashire products before 1914
- Japan assumed control of trade routes in Asia previously dominated by Western powers. The number of merchant ships surged from 488 in 1900 to 2,996 by 1920, solidifying Japan's image as an economic powerhouse
- in 1918, Japan emerged on the winning side virtually as a non-combatant, avoiding the costs of war incurred by Britain and America. This placed Japan in a strong position for global competition
- other Japanese industries like shipbuilding and heavy engineering also experienced substantial expansion.

Evidence that this interpretation has been exaggerated:

- the West's intervention on the 21 Demands forced Japan to relinquish her most ambitious demands, indicating Western attitudes towards Japan's ambitions
- Japan wasn't directly involved in the conflict, leading to limited international reaction to its involvement
- the post-war international economy was highly unstable, forcing Japan to navigate a politically uncertain trading environment
- the growth witnessed was largely due to the absence of competition during the war, and upon return to peace, Japanese industry faced substantial disruptions.

Arguments about the post-War settlement:**Evidence that the Paris Peace Conference marked Japan's ascension to world power status:**

- Japan secured a seat as a council member in the newly formed League of Nations, symbolising her pivotal role in global affairs
- the Japanese government celebrated its position at the apex of international diplomacy.

Counterpoints to the notion that the Paris Peace Conference represented Japan's improved status:

- Japan's push for a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Charter was rejected
- although Japan retained control of the former German Mariana Islands, it was under a League of Nations mandate rather than outright ownership
- the Japanese government faced resistance on other claims made during the talks, reinforcing a sense of being treated as a second-class player. This sentiment was widespread among the Japanese public
- there was no shift in the U.S. attitude towards Japanese immigration. In 1908, attempts were made to restrict Japanese migrants, and they were prohibited from owning land in California.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****Marius Jansen**

Suggests that there was more to Japan's emergence than simply her dividend from the War, 'The Taisho era was characterised by a confluence of factors, including political shifts, socio-cultural dynamics, and economic progress, all of which propelled Japan onto the global stage.'

Kenneth Pyle

Argues that the War was pivotal, 'The outbreak of WWI in Europe in the summer of 1914 provided (Japan) extraordinary opportunities to advance the twin objectives of empire and industry.'

Ayira Iriye

States that the Paris Peace Conference marked Japan's recognition as a world power, 'the Japanese were rewarded by being invited to the peace conference, the first time Japan attended a conference as a fully-fledged member.'

Benson and Matsumura

Argue that Japan remained in the second tier of global nations after the War, 'The rejection by the Powers of Japanese proposals for the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the Versailles Settlement heightened the grievance of the Japanese towards the unequal treatment to which the coloured races were subjected by Western peoples.'

Section 5 Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 38 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the structure of society in Japan by 1850?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|--|
| By adopting the social theories of Confucianism, the Tokugawa gave support to a rigid social structure as a result of which they had created a hierarchy of four social classes – the warrior administrator, the peasant, the artisan, and the merchant and this late feudalism represents one of the most conscious attempts in history to freeze society. | Suggests that society had a rigid structure and was divided into four distinct classes. |
| At the same time this social order imposed upon those in authority the expectation that they exercise their authority impartially and humanely which offered the protection of a particular status to each individual. | Suggests that those in authority should be impartial and humane in their actions which necessitated reciprocal respect and duty. |
| Every social class, and every subdivision within it, had its own regulations covering all the minutiae of clothing, ceremony, and behaviour which had to be strictly observed on pain of punishment. | Suggests that society was regulated, further subdivided and closely controlled with punishment of those who did not adhere to the rules. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Bakuhan system was based on Neo-Confucian ideas of loyalty and piety
- Samurai had the right to cut down lower classes for failing to show adequate respect
- there were four main classes in the system, with the samurai at the top, and the merchants at the bottom. There was also an Eta underclass that had very few rights under the system (legally only worth 1/7 of any other Japanese).

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| While the merchant class increased its real power with the progress of time and unmistakably became a powerful social class, this caused widespread dismay amongst the samurai noblemen. | Suggests that there had been an ascension of the merchant class, to the dissatisfaction of the samurai noblemen. |
| The samurai were placed in economic distress and had to bow before the commoners whose financial assistance enabled them to meet their economic needs. . . | Suggests that samurai were often in thrall or even subservient to commoners who helped them financially. |

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| . . .many a samurai could not employ domestic servants because of poverty, and had to do the household work, and sometimes engaged in some side work at home. | Suggests that in order to stave off poverty and maintain their appearances, some samurai had to do their own household work. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- by the 19th century, the merchant class had grown in power. At the same time, peasants were overtaxed, and many samurai had had their stipends cut to a level which precluded them from being able to maintain their lifestyles
- many samurai borrowed heavily from merchants, and would even allow merchants to marry into their families, elevating their class and eroding the principles of the caste system
- some samurai were so poor that they had to pawn their armour and take jobs that were seen as beneath them. Even the Daimyo ended up in debt to the merchants.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- while the Shogun in Edo held significant political power, the Tokugawa maintained the emperor as a nominal figurehead to legitimise their rule within this social structure
- some peasants diversified into commercial activities, and merchants, despite being theoretically low in caste, gained increased power and control by 1850
- notably absent from the source is the mention of the Daimyo (Fudai and Tozama), crucial landowners within the Tokugawa social structure and control mechanisms
- the source also neglects to mention the Eta caste, which played a role within the social structure by performing 'unclean' tasks such as tanning or funeral services
- the significance of Neo-Confucianism, along with Shintoism and Buddhism, in shaping Japanese society
- some samurai were compelled to sell off privileges to merchants to settle their debts
- increasingly, Daimyo who could no longer afford to pay their samurai released them from service. These 'masterless' samurai became *Ronin* who would roam the country seeking work or mercenary positions
- the blurring of the caste system meant that there was increasing discontent amongst all classes, with overtaxed peasants resorting to rice riots, and disillusioned samurai engaging with nationalist schools of thought.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------|--|
| Ann Waswo | States that 'conditions in Japan most closely resembled those of high feudalism in Europe.' |
| Mikiso Hane | Is of the belief that 'in order to ensure political control and social stability the Tokugawa Bakufu set out to fix a rigid class system.' |
| Janet Hunter | Argues that 'a rigid hierarchy of hereditary caste continued to prevail both in theory and to a large extent in practice.' |
| Richard Storry | Highlights the blurring of caste divisions that were occurring by the mid-19 th century. 'The whole regime had been under indirect attack for many quarters inside Japan long before 1850.' |

Question 39 **How fully does Source C explain political developments in Meiji Japan?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|---|--|
| . . . the political authority of the new regime was symbolised and articulated by the emperor. By this combination of political power (samurai) and political authority (Emperor), the basis of the Meiji political regime was established. | States that a new oligarchy held political power but relied on the Emperor for its legitimacy. |
| While the government was not a supporter of liberal democracy, it was keen to introduce western ideas and institutions. | States that the new government wanted to present the façade of democracy. |
| When Japan introduced its first modern constitution in 1889, it followed a German-type authoritarian regime which created a unitary and centralised government. | States that Japan's constitution was based on the German authoritarian model. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the 'Restoration' had been achieved ostensibly to put the Emperor back in charge, though in reality there was merely a transfer of power from one oligarchy to another, and the Emperor was a largely symbolic figure
- in order to impress the West and try to gain revision of the Ansei Treaties, the Meiji govt attempted to create the illusion of a democracy whilst retaining power in the hands of the Genro
- having researched western political systems, the Japanese decided to adopt the Bismarckian model which concentrated power in the nobility. They even consulted two Germans – Roesler and Mosse – to help them write it.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the shift towards a centralised government began with the dismantling of the caste system. This change meant that all individuals were directly accountable to the emperor and his representatives, rather than to the social class immediately above them
- in 1889, the government introduced the Imperial Japanese Constitution, heavily influenced by the Prussian model. This constitution created a bicameral legislature, comprising the House of Peers and the House of Representatives, significantly centralising control in Japan. Only 1% could vote
- the constitution formalised the Emperor's authority over the military, including the power to appoint the prime minister, cabinet ministers, military chiefs of staff, and other senior advisors, though this power was symbolic
- democracy was often considered a surface-level display designed to make an impression on Western observers
- specifics of the Charter Oath's content and significance
- political parties began to form as the Meiji regime prepared for the potential drafting of a constitution – details of each and the limits of their influence
- suppression of Left-wing Movements: The Peace Preservation Ordinance, followed by the Peace Police Act in 1900, granted the government powers to suppress labour organising, curbing left-wing political activity.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Kenneth Pyle | Argues ‘the most noteworthy change in the political system was the growth in power and influence of the parties.’ |
| Janet Hunter | States that ‘(The Meiji statesmen) did not create a unified nation under an absolute emperor, nor a parliamentary democracy, but a series of major groupings, each of which could utilise the imperial position to impose its policies on the rest of the population.’ |
| Benson and Matsumura | Believe that ‘this was no western-style liberal democracy. As Article 3 of the Constitution implied, the basic aim of those drawing up the Meiji Constitution was to retain absolute (if symbolic) sovereign power in the hands of the emperor, and actual political power in the hands of the ruling elite who acted as his advisors.’ |
| Ian Buruma | Suggests that ‘Japanese democracy was a sickly child from the beginning.’ |

Question 40 Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the reasons for the military and naval reforms in Meiji Japan.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Author | Yamagata Aritomo | One of the key architects of military reform in Meiji Japan. Aritomo was Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army – he was known as the ‘father of Japanese militarism’. Was Prime Minister twice. |
| Purpose | A Report to the Meiji government. | Aritomo was laying out the threats to Japanese security, and the military reforms needed in order to stave off potential colonisation. |
| Timing | 1872 | This was in the infancy of the Meiji period, and at a time when western powers had imposed the Ansei Treaties on Japan, and before Japan was in a position to challenge them militarily. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| This is the time to establish a firm national policy, and to adopt as our purpose the defence of our country against foreign threats; for this purpose, two categories of soldiers are required, a standing army and those on the reserve list. | Takes the view that in order to ensure security against an aggressor, Japan needed to create a conscript army. Emphasised by ‘a firm national policy’. |
| In our opinion Russia has been acting very arrogantly by previously placing her warships in the Black Sea so it is worryingly inevitable that she will move eastward sooner or later by sending troops to Hokkaido, and then move to the warmer areas. | Takes the view that Russia was seen as an existential threat to Japanese sovereignty which led to reforms. Emphasised by ‘acting very arrogantly’ and ‘worryingly inevitable’. |
| In order to decisively advance our own Japanese imperial ambitions, we must rigorously modernise our defences. | Takes the view that Japan needed modern military reform before she could embark on any aggressive foreign policy. Emphasised by the words ‘decisively’ and ‘rigorously’. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Aritomo's recommendations were accepted, and the feudal system was abolished in 1873, allowing for non-samurai to be recruited into the army
- Russian expansion in the Far East was viewed as a significant threat, and this was amplified by the Tripartite Intervention and Russian plans to extend the Trans-Siberian railway
- Japan implemented a hugely expensive programme of militarisation, utilising Western expertise and technology, as well as modern organisation of the armed forces.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- by 1904, Japan boasted a formidable, modernised army, indicating prior preparations for potential hostilities with Russia, especially after the Tripartite Intervention
- apprehensions regarding Russian expansion in Asia were compounded by the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russia's 25-year lease on the Liaotung Peninsula, previously Japanese territory relinquished after the Intervention
- Russia's failure to withdraw troops from Manchuria after the successful international quelling of the Boxer Rebellion was seen as a breach of established accords
- the 1902 alliance with Britain influenced Japan's decision to go to war, as they believed major powers, including Britain, would not support Russia in case of conflict
- preparation was needed for imperial design on Korea and China.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Niall Ferguson | Suggests that 'Their underlying and deadly earnest aim was always to wipe the smile off European faces. There was only one certain means of doing so, and that was by winning wars.' |
| William Beasley | Contends that 'in the field of foreign affairs Korea continued to be a problem area, since the events of 1895 had substituted Russia for China as Japan's competitor there.' |
| Bonnie B Oh | Takes the view that 'the problem was caused by Russia leasing from China the very territory that was denied to Japan and Russia's procrastination in withdrawing troops from southern Manchuria in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion.' |
| Ann Harrington | Suggests that 'there was also fear for Japan's national security as Western powers penetrated further into China. Unless she achieved equal status with the Western powers, Japan thought she would be unable to maintain her Independence.' |

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 41 **How justified is the view that there was a period of domestic recovery for the Weimar Republic between 1924 and 1929?**

Aim of the question To allow candidates to examine the political and economic aspects of Germany between 1924 and 1929 and consider whether these developments were a period of domestic recovery for the Weimar republic. Candidates may also consider that these developments were superficial, and that the period 1924 to 1929 was not a period of domestic recovery for the Weimar republic. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the years of 1924 to 1929 was a period of domestic recovery for the Weimar Republic:

Political:

- unlike the period of 1919 to 1923, there were no putsches, no attempts to overthrow the republic, and the number of political assassinations fell, as did the number of right-wing paramilitary formations
- states such as Prussia were led by a succession of moderate, pro-republican governments and this bolstered the republic's overall political stability and by May 1928, 61% of members of Reichstag belonged to parties that supported the republic
- the election of Paul von Hindenburg as President, in May 1925, was evidence that the old elites could peacefully co-exist within the new order
- moderate parties seemed to consolidate their position and the vote for extremist parties of both the left and right seemed to be in decline. For example, in the May 1924 elections, the KPD's share of the vote declined to 9%. Similarly, right-wing parties like the DNVP saw their share of the vote decline from 20.5% in the May 1924 election to 14% by May 1928. The involvement of the public in elections remained high – voter turnout was 76% in May 1924 and 82% in May 1928
- the last years of the period saw the return, in 1928, of the grand coalition of the early years of the republic, with the collaboration of the SPD, Centre, DDP, BVP and DVP. This coalition of 5 parties held together until 1930.

Economic:

- after the hyperinflation chaos of 1923, Gustav Stresemann called off passive resistance in the Ruhr and ended Germany's hyperinflation crisis. Stresemann appointed the financier, Hjalmar Schacht, and a new currency (the *Rentenmark*) was introduced. This was replaced shortly afterwards by the *Reichsmark*. This paved the way for new investments to flow into Germany following the Dawes Plan
- the Dawes Plan of 1924 economically stabilised Germany. The loans agreed under the plan helped to boost the economy and thus enabled reparations payments to be met. The Dawes Plan removed the threat of invasion if reparations payments were not made – 16,000 million *Reichmarks* came into Germany, but only 7000 million were ever paid out in reparations
- industry recovered to its pre-war level of output and factories and manufacturing were modernised. Productivity improved and German Gross National Product (GNP) was higher in 1927 than in 1913 (even taking into account losses at Versailles)
- average wages increased and workers' share of the national income was 10% higher in the mid-1920s than it had been before 1914
- the number of strikes fell between 1924 and 1929, and industrial relations improved
- Weimar's artistic developments in art, architecture and music seemed proof of the domestic stability of the republic.

Evidence which supports the view that the years of 1924 to 1929 was not a period of domestic recovery for the Weimar Republic:

Political:

- when Stresemann called off passive resistance in the Ruhr in September 1923, it was regarded as an act of betrayal by right-wing nationalists, who in turn became more hostile to the republic. It led to the resurgence of extremist politics with both the Nazis and KPD increasing their share of the vote even during of this period of stability. The DNVP came under the control of Alfred Hugenberg and the DNVP became more hostile to the republic. The middle class and pro-republic DDP also began losing ground to more extremist parties
- political violence did not disappear, and frequent fighting on the streets between the KPD's Red Fighting League and the Nazis' SA undermined the republic's efforts to establish political stability
- although there were only 2 elections (May 1924 and May 1928), there were still six different administrations between 1924 and 1929. Similarly, no Chancellor was able to hold a government together for more than 2 years
- Hindenburg's election as President in 1925 was seen as major defeat for pro-republicans since he was a right-wing monarchist, rather than a keen supporter of the republic
- while parties loyal to the republic consolidated their strength in national elections, regional and local election results show a drift to extremist parties of the left and right, even before the impact of the worldwide economic depression of 1929
- the Young Plan of 1929 caused huge controversy and became a rallying point for right-wing elements.

Economic:

- Stresemann's speech in November 1923 warned about the republic's over-reliance on short-term foreign loans. His 'dancing on a volcano' statement suggests real concerns about the republic's economic stability
- industrial relations were not stable between 1924 and 1929 – in 1925, three million working days were lost due to strikes, which doubled to six million by 1925 and 20.3 million by 1928 – even before the Wall St. Crash
- workers' conditions did not greatly improve – real wages remained static – wages rose, but so too did prices
- unemployment remained a persistent issue during the period – this rose to 10% of the workforce in 1926 – higher than during the period 1919 to 1923. By 1929, 2.9 million workers were idle and as a result, social security payments exceeded government income. This is not the hallmark of a country experiencing economic recovery
- only once during the 'Golden Years' (in 1926) did Germany's level of exports exceed those of its imports
- when compared to the growth of the stable economies such as the UK and the USA, Germany's economic performance showed minimal improvements
- Germany's agricultural sector did not hugely recover – foot and mouth outbreaks, poor harvests, foreign competition, and lower prices.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Richard Bessel | Argues that ‘Rather than a boom for Weimar democracy, the social welfare system proved a time bomb with a rather short fuse.’ |
| Eberhard Kolb | Argues that ‘there was certainly progress in establishing law and order and . . . consolidating the regime politically. The economy also revived to some degree. But this stabilisation was fragile and superficial. The Republic did not in fact succeed in consolidating its political and socio-economic system so as to be capable of facing a serious crisis.’ |
| Richard J Evans | Argues that ‘the idea that democracy was on the way to establishing itself at this time is an illusion created by hindsight. . . and the fact that the two major bourgeois parties, the Centre party and the Nationalists, soon fell into the hands of avowed enemies of democracy boded ill.’ |
| Detlev Peukert | Proposes that the period 1924 to 1929 is best described as ‘the illusion of domestic stability.’ The years between 1924 and 1929 seem stable only by contrast with the periods of crisis that preceded and followed them. |

Question 42 **‘The impact of the worldwide economic depression from 1929 was the key reason Hitler was appointed as Chancellor on 30 January 1933.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the impact of the Great Depression as a reason for Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor. Candidates may choose to examine the impact of the depression and contrast this against other factors such as propaganda, political weakness and the politics of intrigue which aided the Nazis’ rise to power by January 1933. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the worldwide economic depression was key to the Nazi achievement of power by January 1933:

- the Wall St. Crash of October 1929 did not have an immediate impact upon Germany. However, since most of the loans received from the Dawes and Young Plans came from the USA, Germany quickly found itself in a precarious financial situation. With legal restrictions accompanying the Dawes and Young Plans, this limited the ability of the central bank to either print more banknotes or devalue the *Reichsmark* (RM)
- with the withdrawal of American loans, many German businesses collapsed. By the summer of 1931, several German banks failed as Germans rushed to withdraw their money
- ultimately, five major German financial institutions collapsed, and millions lost access to their savings and pensions. For ordinary Germans, this was the second time in six years that they had faced financial ruin, and this eroded support for the republic
- as businesses lost orders or collapsed, unemployment rose from 1.2 million in 1929 to 6 million by January 1932. Even those lucky enough to keep their jobs found their living standards eroded by having to accept either shorter hours or wage reductions
- German industry and agriculture suffered from significant declines. Exports slumped from 14 billion RM in 1928 to 5.7 billion RM in 1932 and 4.9 billion RM in 1933
- many farmers had been affected by high interest rates and falling agricultural prices. By 1932, 18,000 farmers had been declared bankrupt. The Nazis were able to capitalise on rural unhappiness with the republic
- between 1930 and 1932, 50,000 businesses collapsed. The Nazis promised economic recovery and employment, and many disaffected Germans began to listen to the Nazi message
- with the collapse of tax revenues, the government curtailed spending on transport, welfare services, housing and education, and this too caused a rise in unemployment when associated sectors of the economy contracted when orders dried up
- faced with rising prices, unemployment, and a dramatic fall in living standards, many German voters concluded that the republic was to blame and that it had to go. Support for extremist parties rose after the elections of 1932.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were responsible for the Nazi achievement of power by January 1933:

Propaganda:

- the Nazis placed great stress on the role of propaganda. Key individuals in local communities were targeted and won over by propaganda. The Nazis appointed Joseph Goebbels to run its propaganda campaigns. Trained speakers were sent out into the community – over 6000 of them by 1932
- Nazi propaganda projected the image of Adolf Hitler as the ‘strong man’ which the country needed
- the relationship between Hitler and media tycoon, Alfred Hugenberg, gave the Nazis access to newspapers and mass media to spread their message
- the Nazis established sub-organisations for women and children and these too were used to win over supporters
- although condemned for their violence, the SA (Stormtroopers) conveyed the image of the Nazis as youthful, organised and anti-Communist. They were highly visible in assisting in soup kitchens for the unemployed and this too won supporters

- Hitler's speeches and rallies, often by torchlight, were visually appealing. The Nazis' use of new technology, such as the aeroplane, allowed Hitler to appear in multiple cities in one day in the 'Hitler over Germany' 1932 Presidential election campaign.

Political Weakness and the politics of intrigue:

- unable to cope with the worsening economic crisis, the SPD's Müller was forced from office in 1930
- his successor, Heinrich Brüning failed to control the worsening economic situation. Brüning became known as the 'Hunger Chancellor'. His proposals to cut unemployment benefit and to confiscate the estates of the landowning *Junkers* and give land to unemployed workers to grow their own food met with a backlash from these elites and Brüning was forced from office in May 1932
- the inexperienced Franz von Papen was appointed as Chancellor with General Kurt von Schleicher acting as Defence Minister. During the autumn of 1932, von Schleicher worked to undermine von Papen and the former replaced the latter as Chancellor on 3 December 1932. In revenge, von Papen forged an alliance with Hitler and was appointed as Hitler's Vice-Chancellor on 30 January 1933
- in the November 1932 election, the Nazis lost 34 seats and 2 million votes — this drop in support was replicated in local elections in December 1932. However, support from von Papen and industrialists such as Krupp, Thyssen, Bosch and Hjalmar Schacht persuaded Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. This could not have occurred without the support of these elites
- by 1932, politicians became increasingly reliant on the ailing Hindenburg to pass laws. In 1930, the President had ruled by Article 48 decree five times. By 1931, 44 presidential decrees were issued, and this rose to 66 in 1932. In contrast, only five new laws were passed by the Reichstag in 1932 and the parliament only sat for 13 days during the whole of 1932 (dropping from 94 days in 1930). Parliamentary democracy was at a standstill
- the inability of the KPD and SPD to forge an anti-Nazi alliance aided Hitler's rise to power. For their part, the KPD had never forgiven the SPD for crushing various Communist uprisings in the early days of the republic. In any case, the KPD within Germany were being directed by the Comintern who opposed cooperation with 'social-fascist' parties like the SPD
- politics became increasingly polarised in the sunset years of the republic. Moderate pro-Weimar parties such as the DDP and DVP saw their vote share collapse. Even the SPD saw its share of the vote decline in a few short years — from 29.8% in 1928 to 20.4% in November 1932.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| John Hiden | Argues that: 'truly stable societies can weather such storms, but grave difficulties were bound to arise in Weimar Germany when the economic crisis of 1929 interacted with a political and social crisis.' |
| Detlev Peukert | Argues that the end of the Republic did not happen overnight and was not the product of any single set of causes. But after 1930, the presidential regimes destroyed the Republican constitution. |
| Richard J. Evans | Argues that: 'the Depression helped to make the Nazis, a catch-all party of social protest, appealing to a greater or lesser degree to virtually every social group in the land. The Nazis, succeeded in transcending social boundaries and uniting highly disparate groups on the basis of a common ideology . . . as no other party in Germany had managed to do before.' |
| William Carr | Argues that in the September 1930 elections 'two out of every five Germans voted for parties bitterly opposed to the principles on which the Republic was created.' |

Question 43 **‘Propaganda was the cement that kept the Nazi regime in power between 1933 and 1939.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To allow candidates to examine the role of propaganda in maintaining Nazi power between 1933 and 1939. Candidates may choose to examine the impact of Nazi propaganda and contrast this against other factors such as the multi-faceted system of government, popular policies pursued by the regime and the role of the security services. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that propaganda was the most important reason in maintaining Nazi power between 1933 and 1939:

Propaganda:

- Goebbels was able to build on the propaganda image of Hitler as Nazi leader which had worked in the electoral campaigns of 1930 to 1932. Once Goebbels was appointed as Minister of Propaganda in 1933, radio, press, film, rallies, art and architecture and all other expressive mediums were harnessed to portray Hitler as a charismatic leader. Hitler was projected as the embodiment of the national spirit
- both Hitler and Goebbels were experts in propaganda. Newspapers, initially in the hands of private owners, were increasingly censored and controlled, and were obliged to contain positive news stories about the regime. The ‘Reich Press Law’ of 4 October 1933 banned Jewish ownership of newspapers and at its peak, Goebbels controlled the output of more than 3600 newspapers and hundreds of magazines – all of these portrayed the Nazi message in positive terms
- anti-Semitic newspapers such as *Der Angriff* (The Assault) and the *Völkischer Beobachter* (Racial Observer) were initially popular, but sales fell between 1933 and 1939
- the Nazis established their own publishing house (*Eher Verlag*) which took over newspapers. In 1933, the Nazis controlled 3% of newspaper circulation, but this rose to 69% by 1939
- the Nazis quickly realised the mass appeal of radio and millions of People’s Receivers (*Volksempfänger*) were produced. Seven million were produced by 1935 and 56 million Germans had tuned into Hitler’s speeches during that year. Key speeches were announced by sirens and work stopped in factories so that workers could listen on loudspeakers
- the Nazi-owned UFA film studios produced propaganda films such as ‘Triumph of the Will’ (1935) and ‘Olympia’ (1938). Some of the annual Nuremberg rallies and the Berlin Olympics of 1936 were turned into propaganda films by Leni Riefenstahl
- the Nazis employed the services of Heinrich Hoffman who acted as Hitler’s official photographer – millions of carefully stage-managed photographs of Hitler were distributed as postcards, souvenirs, and as cards inside cigarette packets
- the annual Nuremberg rallies turned into visual spectacles with choreographed lighting and stage management. The ‘Night of the Amazons’ rallies in Munich were also popular and visually appealing. These mass rallies were designed to cement the commitment of loyal Nazis and to sway bystanders who had not yet been converted to Nazism
- the Olympic Games of 1936 was also used as a vehicle for Nazi propaganda and Carl Orff was commissioned to write ‘*Carmina Burana*’ for the event
- music was also used as a form of propaganda. Works by Jewish composers such as Mendelssohn, and atonal music by Schoenberg were banned. Richard Strauss, head of the Reich Chamber of Music between 1933 and 1935, promoted ‘approved’ works by Wagner, Strauss and Bruckner
- popular policies, such as the construction of the Autobahns were linked to propaganda art exhibitions. In 1935, there were over 1,000 art exhibitions of Nazi-approved works which took place in factories. Art of which the Nazis disapproved was shown in the ‘Exhibition of Degenerate Art’ of 19 July 1937
- through the successful propagation of the ‘Hitler myth’ through propaganda, Hitler came to be viewed as the saviour of the nation
- the Nazi party itself was rebuilt on the *Führerprinzip* (Führer Principle) and once in power, this philosophy was applied to the whole of Germany

- the *Führerprinzip*, cemented Hitler's status as a rebuilder of Germany's strength and a bulwark against the nation's enemies
- the 'Hitler Myth' contributed to Hitler's great personal popularity after 1933. By the late 1930s, 90% of Germans admired him.

Evidence which supports the view that propaganda was not the most important reason in maintaining Nazi power between 1933 and 1939:

The German State:

- although Hitler himself was the ultimate arbiter within the regime, beneath him there was a confusing array of state and party institutions cutting across each other's jurisdictions but all seeking to 'work towards the Führer'. This, rather than the 'Hitler Myth', drove policymaking in Germany
- this process of 'working towards the Führer' was crucial in the Nazi regime. Party leaders and officials competed to win Hitler's approval and often used their own initiative to come up with extremely radical plans and policies
- Hitler was, in fact, surrounded by party leaders and officials who set themselves the task of interpreting the Führer's broad vision statements and drawing up and implementing policies accordingly
- for the most part, traditional power structures were Nazified and went on to serve the Nazi state. Thus, for example, civil servants generally enacted Nazi laws, and the courts and the legal system adapted to the new regime.

Popular Policies:

- in many respects, Hitler was lucky in terms of Germany's economic fortunes. From 1933, the international economy was naturally recovering after the worldwide economic slump precipitated by the Wall St. Crash of October 1929. International trade was improving, and Hitler was the beneficiary of these improvements
- support for the Nazi regime was also generated by the apparent success of Nazi economic policies. For example, the Nazis were able to claim that their government's intervention in the economy had ended unemployment and had assisted economic recovery
- Hitler's elimination of communism was largely welcomed by the majority of Germans
- Hitler's dismantling of the weak Weimar democracy and the creation of strong government was also positively supported by most Germans
- by 1934, Hitler had also dealt with the SA which calmed sections of German society who had feared their socialist aims and violent leadership
- Hitler's political mantra was sufficiently loose and vague to embrace the aspirations of Germany's core group of elites and of the masses
- for many Germans he was the lesser evil: most Germans were prepared to put up with the rough and the smooth, and the good times seemed to outweigh the bad.

The Security Services:

- by 1939, the SS (*Schutzstaffel*) had some 240,000 members and by 1936, the Gestapo had become the regime's most important security agency
- between 1933 and 1939, some 225,000 Germans had been convicted of political crimes and in 1939, a further 162,000 were being held in 'protective custody'
- backed up by the appointment of pro-Nazi judges and the establishment in 1934 of the People's Courts, 225,000 Germans were sentenced to over 600,000 years in prison between 1933 and 1939
- and the range of crimes which carried the death penalty was extended from three in 1933, to 46 by 1939
- Hitler's role in establishing law and order through the SS, Gestapo and other agencies of the Police State was accepted by Germans as progression from the perceived lawlessness of the period from 1929 to 1933.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|---|
| David Welch | Argues that propaganda was effective not least because the Nazis had a great deal of support among the German people. Even so, 'Goebbels' manipulatory skill alone could not have created the quasi-religious faith in Hitler'; without concrete achievements Hitler could not have sustained his positive image. Moreover, 'the idea that propaganda was all-pervasive and totally successful needs to be challenged.' |
| Ian Kershaw | Argues that the ultimate goal of Nazi propaganda was 'the psychological preparation' of the German people for war and so it tried to stimulate chauvinist nationalism and German superiority. However, propaganda did not in fact succeed as much as the Nazis hoped. Beneath the surface 'attitudes and behaviour continued to be shaped by self-interest.' |
| Dick Geary | Argues that the Nazi state sought 'not only to repress and destroy all alternatives but also to mobilise the minds of the people behind the Fuhrer through active propaganda.' Although the regime 'never succeeded in brainwashing an entire people', it was 'able to rely on the support of many Germans as far as a good number of its policies were concerned.' |
| Richard J. Evans | Argues that people did not find it difficult to disbelieve the grandiose claims of the Propaganda Ministry. Propaganda depended for its effect 'on the extent to which it bore at least some relation to the truth. Success bred support for the regime, failure created scepticism about its claims and doubts about its policies.' |

Question 44

To what extent did the Nazis create a racially pure Volksgemeinschaft between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question To allow candidates to discuss the key ideological aim of the Volksgemeinschaft – to create a racially pure Germany – and to assess the extent to which this aim was met via the policies the Nazis implemented. Candidates might look specifically at the impact of Nazi racial policies. Additionally, they might choose to examine the range of Volksgemeinschaft policies and the extent to which these did, or did not, succeed in contributing to the creation of a racial state. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Nazis successfully created a racial state by 1939:

- the Nazis wanted to create a Volksgemeinschaft of healthy ‘Aryans’ committed to the state. This vision was accompanied by hostility to ‘alien elements’ that threatened the supremacy of the German people. These ‘aliens’ were defined in racial-genetic, ideological, and social and behavioural terms, but it was the racial-genetic that was by far the most important
- this led to the persecution of gypsies, homosexuals, religious sects, the mentally ill and ‘asocials’ such as habitual criminals or alcoholics, and, above all, Jewish people
- measures taken against outsiders included job discrimination, imprisonment, and compulsory sterilisation
- in April 1933, a boycott of Jewish shops was organised
- The Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service of 7 April 1933 banned all Jewish people from government employment. Hindenburg insisted on some exceptions – Jewish men who had fought in the Great War
- the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 forbade marriage between Jewish people and ‘Aryans’ and deprived Jewish people of citizenship. In August 1936, Himmler was put in charge of Jewish emigration and the *Anschluss* of March 1938 was quickly accompanied by the forced emigration of 45,000 Jewish people from Austria
- between June and October 1938, Jewish medical practitioners were banned from having any Aryan patients. Jewish people were excluded from some commercial activities. Jewish people were forced to add ‘Sarah’ or ‘Israel’ to their names and stamp their identity card with a ‘J’
- the ‘*Kristallnacht*’ pogrom of 9 to 10 November 1938 symbolised the radicalisation of the regime’s anti-Semitic policies. Thousands of Jewish schools, hospitals and businesses were ransacked and destroyed. Synagogues were burned down, and at least 91 Jewish people were murdered and hundreds died because of brutal treatment in jail. Over 30,000 Jewish people were deported to concentration camps and Jewish people were forced to pay over RM 1 billion for the damage that was caused
- ‘The Decrees for the Exclusion of Jews from Economic Life’ of November 1938. Jewish people were banned from jobs, schools, and universities
- policies attacking other ‘biological outsiders’: the Roma and Sinti; homosexuals; mentally and physically ‘handicapped’ people were enacted
- euthanasia policies were enacted before 1939
- by 1939 Jewish people had been completely excluded from German society
- policies on youth and women and for the workers, the *Mittelstand* and the peasants were often explicitly designed along racial lines. Thus, for instance, policies towards women were designed to ensure that women saw their first duty as the production of healthy ‘Aryan’ children for the Reich
- youth and education policies led to the creation of a hard core of Nazi fanatics especially in the SS. These became the ‘racial warriors’ of the Reich determined to ‘cleanse’ Germany of all racially unfit elements.

Evidence which supports the view that the Nazis were not completely successful in creating a racial state by 1939:

- although the Nazis successfully excluded Jewish people from political, economic, social and cultural life, other policies designed to create a racial state were less successful
- the boycott of 1 April 1933 was stopped quickly when it became clear that many Germans were extremely uncomfortable by its violent edge. The boycott was largely unsuccessful and many Germans, despite intimidation, continued to shop in Jewish-owned businesses throughout the day
- both the President, von Hindenburg and the Foreign Minister, von Neurath, insisted that the boycott should only last one day for fear of international reaction and damage done to Germany's own economy
- Hjalmar Schacht, increasingly critical of anti-Semitic economic measures, resigned as Reich Economics Minister in November 1937. He also objected to *Kristallnacht* of November 1938 and was dismissed from the Reichsbank in January 1939
- increasingly, members of the Christian churches spoke out against Nazi racial policies. Church attendance remained high during the 1930s and these sermons resonated with congregations
- by 1936 there were increasing signs that workers were becoming indifferent to the regime and expressed this through go-slows in the workplace
- Nazi policies on women did not dramatically increase the birth rate
- women were increasingly called back to the workplace by 1939 which undermined the Nazis' ideals of women as home-makers
- initial enthusiasm for the youth organisations gave way to increasing disillusion with Nazi ideology and counter-culture youth groups began to form
- Nazi policies did not undermine traditional class loyalties. Common ethnicity did not overcome the deep social division caused by class.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Tim Kirk | Argues that despite 'the ambitious rhetoric of its propaganda' the Nazi regime did not bring about the Volksgemeinschaft. |
| Ian Kershaw | Argues that one aspect of the attempt to create the Volksgemeinschaft was the removal of the Jewish people from participation in German society. In this the Nazis were completely successful. Otherwise, the attempt to create a national community was not successful. |
| Jill Stephenson | Argues that the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft was an aspiration of the Nazi leadership that remained at best only partially fulfilled. As an ideal it had considerable appeal in the early 1930s, but ultimately the kind of commitment the theorists of the Volksgemeinschaft required was lacking. |
| Mary Fulbrook | Argues that: 'To ignore the sheer extent of Nazi racism is to miss what was arguably the most fundamental aspect of any conceivable Nazi social revolution.' |

Question 45

How far was Hitler's foreign policy driven by economic factors between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question To allow candidates to examine key aspects of Nazi economic and foreign policies between 1933 and 1939 and determine the extent to which foreign policy was dictated by the Nazis' economic policy goals. Responses might consider actions to stimulate the economy motivated by autarky, prelude to territorial expansion, *Lebensraum* and conquest. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Hitler's foreign policy was driven by economic factors:

- tackling unemployment was Hitler's initial aim. As well as being popular with Germans, economic recovery would enable resources to be devoted to building Germany's military strength as a prelude to territorial expansion – unemployment which had peaked at over 6 million in 1932, fell to 1.6 million by 1936, and to 200,000 by 1938
- Hjalmar Schacht, the man widely credited with saving Germany in the 1923 hyperinflation crisis, was appointed President of the Reichsbank in 1933 and then in August 1934 was appointed Economics Minister
- Schacht created 'Mefo Bills' to stimulate economic growth and hide Germany's increasing military budget – these Mefo Bills were credit notes given to companies and payable with interest after five years
- Schacht devised 'The New Plan' of 1934 to tackle Germany's balance of trade deficit. This gave the government powers to regulate imports through controlling the allocation of foreign exchange. Bi-lateral trade agreements were reached to supply Germany with raw materials
- there were two phases in Nazi economic policy – from 1933 to 1936, public works and a revival of consumer demand were more important in economic recovery than rearmament. Whereas from 1936 to 1939, rearmament needs dominated priorities as Hitler geared the economy for war – the 'Guns versus Butter' debate
- Nazi control over the economy and big business was extended and projects such as the *Reichswerke Hermann Goering* (RWHG) and IG Farben were created. By 1939, RWHG was the largest industrial firm in Europe and was involved in the production of coal, military equipment, synthetic fuels and steel
- the 'conservative' economist Schacht was removed as Economics Minister in 1937 and replaced by Göring who then oversaw the Four-Year Plan. The Office of the Four-Year Plan intervened throughout the economy. The plan was to make Germany ready for war within four years
- priority was now given to rearmament and, to avoid any damage that might be inflicted on the economy during war by economic blockade, Germany had to be made self-sufficient in food and industrial production. Self-sufficiency (autarky) proved to be hard to achieve; Germany still depended on imports for one third of its raw materials by 1939
- in the context of a global economic depression and an increasingly protectionist world market, the idea of economic sufficiency underlined Nazi aims of conquest
- however, gradually another method of achieving self-sufficiency was given more stress: conquering other countries to use their resources, for example, Austrian and Czechoslovakian iron. The concept of *Lebensraum* was often tied to the natural resources of surrounding nations.

Evidence which supports the view that Nazi foreign policy was not driven by economic factors:

- Hitler was entirely consistent throughout his career in his approach to foreign policy – destroying Versailles, removing Germany from League of Nations, destruction of 'Judeo-Bolshevism', the expansion eastwards (*Lebensraum*), reuniting all ethnic Germans in one nation, the destruction of France, and in the need for an alliance with the UK
- this was expressed in texts such as Point 1 of the Nazis' 'Twenty-Five Point Programme' of February 1920 (all ethnic Germans to be united in one nation) and in *Mein Kampf* (1924). The Second Book – *Zweites Buch* – of 1928 was devoted almost entirely to foreign policy ambitions. Hitler's memorandum on the Four-Year Plan of 1936, laid stress on smashing 'Judeo-Bolshevism'. In the Hossbach Memorandum of 5 November 1937, Hitler outlined his expansionist proposals

- feeling curtailed by the League of Nations, Germany left the League on 14 October 1933
- the expansion of the German air force, the reintroduction of conscription (both in March 1935), the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 and the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936 were designed to test the resolve of the western allies – principally France and the UK
- Hitler wanted to make Germany great not just by destroying Versailles, but also by uniting all Germans into one empire. This racial element was central to his foreign policy
- the racial dimension of Hitler's foreign policy was also apparent in his quest for *Lebensraum*. He argued that there were not enough resources within Germany itself to be able to meet the needs of all Germans and so Germany had to expand eastwards
- *Lebensraum*, Hitler thought, would ultimately lead to a confrontation with the USSR because in order to meet the needs of all Germans, it would be necessary for Germany to subjugate the Slavic peoples and use them and their lands for the benefit of the German Empire
- the *Anschluss* with Austria in March 1938 and the 'acquisition' of the *Sudetenland* of Czechoslovakia in October 1938 can be seen in the context Hitler's long-held vision of uniting German peoples into the Reich
- conquest was a reason behind Hitler's foreign policy. He wanted to be able to put himself in a position that would enable him to take on the might of the USSR at some point in the future
- there was also a powerful strand of anti-Semitism behind Hitler's foreign policy expressed in the view that there was a world conspiracy of Jewish-Bolshevism that would, if left unchecked, destroy the Aryan race
- another motivating factor in Hitler's foreign policy was the changing international context. He read the west's appeasement policies as a sign that there was no will to oppose him and so he was surprised when, in the end, the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 provoked declarations of war against Germany from Britain and France
- propaganda was also an important aim of Hitler's foreign policy. He needed to ensure that he could win and maintain a broad range of support for the regime. Foreign policy successes were an important way for him to do this, thus sustaining the 'Hitler Myth' and through it, support for the regime. So, for example, Hitler was never more popular than in the immediate aftermath of the *Anschluss*.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Tim Mason | Argues that the demands of consumerism and the military hindered the rearmament programme and made Germany less prepared for war than it would otherwise have been. |
| Richard Overy | Argues that there were two distinct phases to Nazi economic policy. The first between 1933 and 1936 was when public works and a revival of consumer demand were more important in economic recovery. The second period from 1936 to 1939 saw rearmament needs dominating as Hitler geared the economy towards war. |
| Richard J Evans | Argues it was, without question, Hitler's personality which drove Germany towards war from the moment he became Chancellor, subordinating every other aspect of policy to this over-riding aim. |
| Hans Mommsen | Argues that Hitler's foreign policy was largely an opportunist exercise aimed at enhancing Hitler's image and satisfying the Nazi party's demand for action. |

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 46 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the nature of the German Revolution of 1918 to 1919.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Author | Rosa Luxemburg. | Rosa Luxemburg was a key figure in the Spartacist revolt of January 1919 and a founding member of the German Communist Party (KPD). |
| Purpose | Speech to members of the newly created KPD. | It provides evidence of Luxemburg's proposals to members of the KPD and the proposed strategy to bring about a Communist revolution in Germany. |
| Timing | 31 December 1918. | The speech was delivered on the day the KPD was created, and only six days before the launch of the Spartacist Revolt in Berlin on 6 January 1919. |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|--|
| The leadership of the 9 November Revolution sadly fell into the hands of politicians who saw it as their chief duty to issue warnings against a real revolution and who attempted to make this real revolution impossible. | Takes the view that the Social Democrats were opposed to a wholesale revolution. Emphasised by the view that they are 'sadly' making a 'real revolution' impossible. |
| As Marxists we must again march under our flag and begin undermining the Ebert-Scheidemann government by destroying its very foundations through a revolutionary mass struggle led by workers. | Takes the view that Ebert and Scheidemann's government must be defeated through a mass uprising led by workers. Emphasised by the view that 'undermining' and 'destroying' through 'a revolutionary mass struggle' is their aim. |
| The masses must learn to use their power – there is no other way as Ebert and Scheidemann have created the illusion that with the aid of soldiers from the front and other armed groups, they will be able to keep the workers completely under control. | Takes the view that the masses must learn to use their power to see through what Ebert and Scheidemann are doing to completely control the workers, using the army as part of their manipulation. Emphasised by 'use their power' and 'illusion'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- on Saturday 9 November 1918, Prince Max issued a communiqué announcing the abdication of Wilhelm II both as Emperor and as Prussia's king. Max also transferred the office of Chancellor to Friedrich Ebert. That afternoon, Philipp Scheidemann declared Germany to be a republic on the balcony of the Reichstag building. Later that day, Karl Liebknecht announced the creation of Germany as a Soviet Republic. Scheidemann's proclamation thwarted Ebert's attempts to retain the monarchy in some form in the hope of drawing workers away from Communism
- on 31 December 1918, radical members of the Spartacist League formed the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). At a meeting on 5 January 1919 (to protest over the dismissal of Berlin Police Chief Eichorn), USPD and KPD members voted in favour of a general strike in Berlin. Karl Liebknecht argued in favour of a revolution, whereas Rosa Luxemburg voted against it, believing the time was not yet ripe for a revolution
- on 10 November 1918, Ebert and General Gröner discussed matters. A deal was struck – The Ebert-Gröner Pact. In return for the government promising to maintain the authority of the officer corps, Gröner pledged that the army would defend the Republic. The Ebert-Gröner pact involving the army and *Freikorps*, was used on several occasions to prevent any revolutionary situation from further developing.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- on 29 October 1918, sailors mutinied at the port of Wilhelmshaven. The revolt spread to Kiel on 3 November, to Bremen and on to Hamburg. Soviets were quickly established across Germany. In December 1918, the National Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils voted to support Ebert's preference for early elections. In the first elections in January 1919, the SPD gained 38% of the vote, and parties pledged to defend the new republic gained 77% of the ballot. The Constitution, drafted by Hugo Preuss, was generally well received by Germans, and was later ratified by the National Assembly in August 1919, by 262 votes to 95
- the Stinnes-Legien Agreement. Between 8–12 November 1918, German trade unions, led by Carl Legien and big business, led by Hugo Stinnes, met. They issued their agreement on 15 November – workers would resume full production in the factories, and strikes would cease. It was a clear attempt to draw workers away from the allure of Communism. On 15 November 1918 the Central Working Association, the Z.A.G., was created -the *Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft*. This set up arbitration committees of workers, unions and employers and guaranteed workers an 8-hour day for no reduction in wages
- on 6 January 1919, the Spartacists began an uprising in Berlin – they declared themselves to be the new government of Germany and were actively agitating for the overthrow of Ebert's government. Ebert called in the army and the *Freikorps*. On 7 January, over 500,000 Berliners marched to overthrow Ebert's moderate government. Two hundred people were killed in Berlin during the Spartacist Revolt. Both Luxemburg and Liebknecht were murdered in mid-January 1919
- sporadic fighting occurred throughout the rest of 1919. In March 1919, fighting broke out in Berlin, with more than 1200 killed in clashes. Following Kurt Eisner's assassination in February 1919, a second Bavarian Socialist Republic was declared by Max Levien in April 1919. The Bavarian republic was suppressed, again using the *Freikorps*. Over 700 were killed.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|--|
| William Carr | Argues that the Communists' strategy of strikes and demonstrations in December 1918 'was designed to educate the masses to political awareness, not to mobilise them for an immediate seizure of power.' The Spartacist uprising in the early days of January 1919 'was the act of misguided idealists who wanted to give history a push forward.' |
| Eric D Weitz | Argues that Ebert's deal with Gröner was one of the many compromises he made aimed at 'steering Germany from the chaos of defeat and revolution towards democracy and economic revival. And they were fateful compromises.' |
| Detlev Peukert | Argues that Ebert's decisions from 9 November 1918 to 19 January 1919 signalled that 'the revolution was to be confined to constitutional and corporatist measures . . . and that any radical break with the past was impossible.' |
| Eberhard Kolb | Argues that the Spartacist uprising was 'without a clear strategic plan' and was 'hopelessly mismanaged'. Its bloody suppression caused a deep rift within the workers' movement and gave stimulus to political escalation. |

Question 47 **How fully does Source B explain the political challenges which faced the Weimar Republic between 1920 and 1923?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|--|---|
| Many army units which had been recruited to uphold internal order were due to be disbanded and the feeling among their officers was fiercely hostile to the republic. | States that there was discontent and hostility towards the republic from the officer corps of the army over cuts which were to be made to army numbers. |
| The main force behind the Kapp Putsch was, however, some influential wealthy landowners – the <i>Junkers</i> – who resented government efforts to improve the poor pay and conditions of labourers on their estates. | States that the wealthy landowning classes had a particular hostility to the republic and were the real driving force behind the revolt. |
| However, it was trade unions and organised labour who gave the most effective demonstration of hostility to the putsch when they called a general strike. | States that the trade unions and workers who organised a general strike were effective in their efforts to thwart the putsch. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- to comply with cuts to army numbers required under the Treaty of Versailles, the Defence Minister, Gustav Noske, ordered the disbandment of two Freikorps units, numbering some 12,000 men. Lüttwitz refused to comply and on 12 March 1920, these units marched on Berlin and Kapp declared himself to be the new Reich Chancellor
- former civil servant and founder of the short-lived 'Fatherland Party', Wolfgang Kapp, was one of the organisers of the putsch, along with General Walther von Lüttwitz and Captain Hermann Erhardt (the latter in command of one of the affected battalions – the Baltikum Brigade)
- the army was generally ambivalent towards the putsch and did not actively support it. Nor however, did they oppose it and General Hans von Seeckt proclaimed that 'Reichswehr does not fire on Reichswehr'. The putsch collapsed after four days due mainly to workers heeding the call for a general strike – Berlin was without transport, communications, and fresh food.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- there was lenient punishment of the putschists and of the 705 people in the plot, only one person was jailed. This led to perceptions from the left about right-wing political bias within the republic
- there was also the perception of an inherent judicial bias within the republic: few murders and assassinations committed by right-wing elements were ever punished, whereas those committed by left-wing individuals faced much sterner punishment. The right-wing terrorist group, the Organisation Consul orchestrated the murders of Matthias Erzberger in August 1921 and Foreign Minister, Walther Rathenau in June 1922. The assassins escaped the death penalty
- March 1920: in response to the Kapp Putsch, the Communists formed the Ruhr Army, a force of 50,000 workers, to resist the putsch. This was the largest working class revolt of the period 1920 to 1923. Ebert ordered the army to break up the Ruhr Army and in the ensuing action, 100 workers and several hundred police officers and soldiers were killed. This time, the army did not have any qualms about suppressing protesters. It also highlighted that the army was as likely to undermine the republic as it was to support it
- between April 1920 and the summer of 1923, there were disturbances in Saxony and Thuringia, most seriously in summer of 1923 when there was a wave of strikes. The hyperinflation crisis encouraged the KPD to try to organise a Bolshevik-style revolution to be based on Saxony where there was an SPD-KPD led government. In October 1923, government troops overthrew the Saxon government and restored order. Extremist parties developed their own private militias

- on 11 August 1923, Chancellor Cuno's government collapsed over his failure to curb inflation. Since February 1919, there had been six different governments, and this was a political challenge in itself. Gustav Stresemann became Chancellor, and it was his decision to end passive resistance which provoked a furious response from the right and fuelled speculation of a revolt in Bavaria
- on 8 to 9 Nov 1923, the Munich Putsch was organised by Hitler and the Nazis. Although this was less successful than the Kapp Putsch and was easily suppressed by the police and army, Hitler and the Nazis gained a great deal of publicity from it, publicity that benefited Hitler in the long-term
- the Munich Putsch, though a failure in the short-term, gave Hitler a platform from which he was able to present himself as a well-motivated German nationalist and he emerged from prison in a much stronger position in the Nazi party than before, and as a nationally known figure around whom later the forces of conservatism and extreme right could coalesce.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Alan Bullock | Argues that 'Hitler proved singularly ineffective . . . the chances of bringing off a coup in 1923 had never been more than marginal.' |
| Geoff Layton | Argues that the crises between 1920 and 1923 'were insufficient to destroy the republic at this stage. The radical left and right were disunited, and the role of the army was ambivalent.' |
| Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham | Argue that the Kapp Putsch failed 'partly as a result of a general strike called by the deposed socialist government, partly because of the refusal of cooperation by key civil servants and army leaders, and partly because of the incompetence of its leaders.' |
| William Carr | Argues that the leaders of the Republic were successful in dealing with the Left and Right, but little was done to deal with the paramilitary formations of either Left or Right. These paramilitary formations had certain characteristics in common; they hated the Republic and democracy and were addicted to violence. Those on the Right were also ultra-nationalist and deeply anti-Semitic. |

Question 48 **How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the extent of opposition to Nazism between 1933 and 1939?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|---|
| By August 1934 some members of the German Army High Command became concerned that they and all officers and soldiers had to swear an oath of obedience to Hitler, thus removing their traditional loyalty to the nation state. | Suggests that army officers became concerned about the replacement of the oath of loyalty to the nation state with an oath of obedience to Hitler. By forcing an oath of loyalty to one man, rather than to the state, many officers became disenchanted. |
| As the Nazis became increasingly powerful with the creation of their own parallel military system under the control of the SS, this further threatened the independence of the Army and both Fritsch and Beck became opponents of the regime. | Suggests that key figures in the military were unhappy that the neutrality and independence of the armed forces was being undermined. |
| Beck secretly began to build up his own intelligence network and made active contact with other resisters, coming to the conclusion by 1938 that Hitler could only be removed from power by army revolt. | Suggests that plans were being formulated within the armed forces to remove Hitler by force. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- an oath to people and country was sworn by all members of the armed forces. Shortly after Hindenburg's death on 2 August 1934, the oath was changed, and service personnel now swore an oath of binding loyalty to Hitler himself
- despite the oath of loyalty, there was opposition from some officers within the armed forces. General Beck's plan to have Hitler arrested in 1938 was only foiled by Hitler's success at the Munich Conference
- there was also resistance activity within German Military Intelligence (the *Abwehr*). From 1935, it was headed by Admiral Canaris who tolerated resistance activities.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| . . . the Christian churches, never fully 'coordinated' by the Nazi regime, had a large amount of support for opposing any attempts to undermine Christian practices, institutions, and beliefs. | Suggests that the churches were not absorbed into the Nazi state. There was public support for them remaining independent organisations. |
| As institutions, however, the Churches offered only very limited resistance to Nazism, and in the defence of humanitarian rights and civil liberties, the response of both Churches was muted. | Suggests that the churches failed to offer moral or spiritual leadership and only offered token opposition when the rights of some Germans were being restricted. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|---|
| The fight to protect youth organisations was eventually lost, but in some cases, such as the struggle to retain the Crucifix in school classrooms, Nazi rulers were forced to concede in the face of widespread protests. | Suggests that whilst Nazism successfully infiltrated youth groups, in the face of larger more organised opposition from the public to remove crosses from classrooms, the Nazis rescinded this order and backed down. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Protestant ministers, Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, were so concerned at the creation of the Reich Church and the perceived Nazification of Germany's Protestant churches, that they formed the Confessional Church in October 1934. However, the Confessional Church only opposed the regime on religious grounds. There was no vigorous opposition from them to policies that discriminated against Jewish people or political opponents of the regime
- in July 1933, the Nazi government concluded a Concordat with the Vatican. Any opposition from the Roman Catholic Church was effectively neutralised. However, by 1937, concerned at the prosecution of Catholic clergy, the ban on Catholic youth groups and the Führer worship in Nazism, Pope Pius XI issued his '*Mit brennender Sorge*' statement ('With Burning Anxiety')
- the successful protest in November 1937 against the Nazis' attempt to remove crosses from Catholic schools had widespread support, at least among German Catholics and is one of the few examples where the regime publicly retreated.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:

- there was no single, unified resistance movement. Each group who opposed the regime had their own reasons for doing so, and they failed to coordinate their efforts. This limited the extent of opposition. The army opposed Hitlerism on military grounds, the Christian churches resisted due to interference in their churches, youth groups resisted in protest at the conformity of the Hitler Youth and workers resisted due to longer hours with no associated rise in pay – opposition may have been wide-ranging, but it was not strong enough to pose any real threat to the regime
- The Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the Nation and the State* passed on 28 February 1933, was used immediately to repress the political threat posed by the KPD. By the end of March 1933, 20,000 Communists were in prison. This limited the potential for opponents of Nazism to gain an early foothold. Key members of the SPD fled abroad in 1933, initially to Prague, where they formed SOPADE. *The Law against the Formation of New Parties* was passed on 14 July 1933, and created a one-party state. Political opposition had been neutralised
- opposition from youth groups such as the *Edelweiss Piraten* (Edelweiss Pirates), or *Swing Jugend* (Swing Youth) may have been widespread, but they can be seen in the context of rebellion, rather than opposition and were at most, a minor inconvenience to the regime
- the security services were able to penetrate resistance groups in an effective manner
- concentration camps were never hidden from public view by the Nazis. On the contrary, they made every effort to make sure that the concentration camps were being used to deal with anyone, who opposed the regime. The press was invited to the opening of Dachau in March 1933. Released prisoners told of their treatment in the camps and this limited the extent of opposition
- despite the efforts of the German Workers' Front (DAF) to win over workers by offering improved conditions, holidays, and the chance to own a car, workers expressed their opposition through absenteeism, go-slows and other forms of industrial sabotage. Although officially banned, there were an estimated 400 strikes between 1933 and 1935
- among some of the traditional elites, there was discussion of replacing Hitler and the political landscape of a post-Nazi Germany. General Helmut von Moltke's Kreisau Circle centred on a group of army officers, academics and professionals who came together to oppose Hitler from 1933
- some Nazi policies were genuinely popular, and this limited the extent of opposition. Many workers appreciated having jobs and wages after the years of the Great Depression. Many, including Bishop von Galen, applauded Hitler's expansionist foreign policies. This too limited the extent of opposition and resistance.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|---|
| Martyn Housden | Argues that the most significant efforts at resistance came from the establishment sections of German society – the minor nobility, civil servants and, most notably, members of the officer corps. |
| Tim Kirk | Argues that only a tiny minority were involved in active resistance, but it seems that opposition to the Nazis ‘occurred on a number of levels ranging from industrial sabotage in factories . . . to small principled acts of defiance, such as refusing the Hitler salute . . . Popular opposition was often a temporary and limited response to specific policies.’ |
| Detlev Peukert | Argues that ‘although soon robbed of its mechanisms of political expression by Gestapo terror, the resistance mobilised tens of thousands of people into performing acts of courage and sacrifice, but remained decentralised, disorientated and historically ineffective.’ |
| John Hiden | Argues that the sheer numbers of those who were jailed by the regime is evidence of extensive, yet ineffective, opposition. ‘The persecution of hundreds of thousands of Germans by the Hitler regime serves to illustrate that the dissent and nonconformity must have been widespread. Resistance, defined as an organised and sustained attempt to destroy the government, was not.’ |

Section 7 – South Africa: Race and Power, 1902–1984

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 49 To what extent was Hertzog's appeal to the white working class the main reason for the Pact Government victory in the 1924 election?

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which Hertzog's appeal to the white working class was the main reason why the Pact Government of the National Party and Labour Party won the 1924 election at the expense of the South African Party. Candidates might examine the appeal of both NP/Labour policies concerning relations with the British Empire, the economy and race in contrast to the appeal the SAP's proposals regarding the government of South Africa in the aftermath of the 1922 Rand Revolt. Candidates might include political reasons for Pact victory such as the weaknesses of Smuts and strengths of the National and Labour parties, socio-economic reasons and military reasons including the legacy of the First World War and growing threats of rebellion. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that victory in 1924 was due to Hertzog's appeal to the white working class (Socio-economic factors):

- impact of post war recession on white workers economic situation and wages
- Hertzog discusses redistribution of mining profits to workers/rural communities rather than to the British
- 1913 and 1922 strikes over low pay
- Rand Revolt of 1922 saw Smuts put down workers with artillery leading Hertzog to describe him as 'a man whose hands dripped with the blood of his own people'
- influx of Afrikaners into towns/surrounded by wealthy English speakers and felt their jobs were threatened by Black Africans
- increase in trade unions fostered growth of nationalism
- influx of Black workers into cities increased fear of 'Black swamping'
- NP emphasis on Afrikaner interests – rural focus
- NP/Labour Pact attracts trade unionists and farmers
- money provided to British navy reduces SAP expenditure on social provisions
- SAP strategy appeared to combine suppression of white workers with meeting some of their needs through increasing segregationist policy
- Riotous Assembly Act ostracised the working class to protect the economy of the mines, banning all public protests deemed 'dangerous.'

Evidence which supports the view that the outcome of the 1924 election was due to other factors:

Political factors:

- Afrikaners admonish Smuts for being too pro mine owners – exaggerated by SAP merger with Unionist Party after the 1920 election
- SAP need to maintain Unionist Party supporters after 1921 election victory against growing National Party support
- Afrikaners increasingly pro NP rather than SAP
- unpopular connections of Smuts to the British. Hertzog advocated neutrality in 1914
- 1921 election – SAP/Unionist merger fails to satisfy Afrikaners/white workers. Merger broadens party and increases factions.
- NP manifesto to promote South Africa's prosperity, focus on social issues and move away from the Empire

- different attitudes towards Smuts' promotion of a 'single white nation' and one which develops in 'parallel streams' (Hertzog)
- Botha and Smuts regarded as 'creatures of the Empire' according to Hertzog
- pact Government enticing; NP ideas of autonomy and Christian Nationalism, whilst Labour Party helped poor whites with voting rights.

Military factors:

- most damage arguably caused by Smuts' support for Empire in WWI – some Afrikaners supported the Germans. Many of these poor whites had of course recently lost a war against the British
- rebellion by some troops when ordered to attack Germans in North Africa – 190 rebels killed, seen as Afrikaner heroes. Benefits NP due to Hertzog's appeal for them to receive pardon
- Smuts' contribution to the war internationally recognised but he is seen by poor whites to have neglected domestic concerns. Hertzog accuses Smuts of being 'out of touch'
- force used against African tribes causes resentment amongst liberal politicians
- some Afrikaners still hoping to regain independence openly rebelled/went over to the Germans. Many were poor whites. The rebellion fuelled the mythology of growing Afrikaner nationalism
- SAP further undermined as a result of clashes with Black Africans which led to accusations of incompetence from the NP (for example, Action against African Millenarian sect, Bulhoek Farm near Queenstown, 1921 – 163 killed)
- SANNC sponsored passive resistance campaign against pass laws on the Rand. Demonstrations broken up by police using considerable force
- Smuts called in the Active Citizen Force in the Rand, 1922. This resulted in the bombing of white suburbs in Johannesburg and the death of 2000 people.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Herman Giliomee | Argues the suppression of the Rand Revolt as throwing the SAP back onto a shrinking support base of mostly richer and older Afrikaners. The result was that Hertzog and the NP captured half the Afrikaner vote as early as 1915. |
| James Barber | Argues that the main challenge to the government at the time 'came not from Black Africans but from militant white labour.' The SAP did nothing to help Afrikaners. |
| Merle Lipton | Suggests that 'Hertzog outbid Botha and Smuts on issues such as the imperial connection.' |
| Nigel Worden | Argues that the limitations of the SAP's legislation in alleviating hardships suffered by many poorer white workers, both in industry and in agriculture. |

Question 50 **‘The ineffectiveness of resistance to segregation before 1939 was a result of the failure of organisations to co-operate.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the view that resistance before the Second World War was ineffective due to the disunity and lack of co-operation between organisations. Candidates might examine a range of factors such as the nature of the leadership, aims and methods of organisations used to resist segregation, the co-operation between organisations and the context in which they are operating. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the ineffectiveness of resistance to segregation before 1939 was a result of the failure of organisations to co-operate:

- diversity of African resistance movements
- lack of agreement about aims and methods
- early ANC leadership disdainful of popular agitation so failed to link up with other resistance groups
- by the 1930s ANC membership probably did not exceed 1000. The more radical ICU was far more significant in the 1920s because they attempted to establish a mass movement, although this was not the view of the ANC
- by the 1930s the ANC leadership was bitterly divided and split into warring cliques, not least due to Gumede’s flirtation with the Communist Party which deeply divided the ANC
- opposition to Hertzog’s Native Bills was led by the All-African Convention, not the ANC, demonstrating lack of cohesion and competition over which would be dominant.
- the ANC’s policy of working with those who had political power bound them more closely to the ruling class, alienating others
- ANC did co-operate in the late 1920s with the CPSA
- failure to capitalise on rural resistance
- between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s, the ANC had lost its coherence following the collapse of the ICU.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were responsible for the ineffectiveness of resistance organisations before 1939:

Poor leadership:

- financial scandals and internal disputes which destroyed the ICU
- ANC radicals in the Cape mounted a campaign of civil disobedience to achieve the native republic, further exacerbating splits within the organisation
- women played little part in the early ANC – only men could join the organisation
- most of the early leaders (Dube, Plaatje, Gumede, Seme) were mission educated and, as doctors, lawyers, ministers etc they were from the African middle class
- early ANC leaders aimed for equal opportunity, not political power, or African domination.

Ineffective aims and methods of protest:

- the methods of the early ANC including deputations and petitions
- some leaders, including Dube, were reluctantly prepared to accept rural segregation as long as there was a just distribution of land
- most believed that if they were economically successful then whites would give them political representation therefore limiting their methods
- economic success would only be possible with good (and equal) education for Black Africans
- Black intellectuals maintained support for education and working within the existing system despite the impact of the Depression

- they hoped improved understanding, and greater justice, would allow Africans to make a growing contribution to South African society
- failure of international deputations such as that at Versailles
- resistance at this time is described by Beinart as being localised in issue and often in action.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|--|
| James Barber | Contends that resistance at this time was localised in issue and often in action. |
| William Beinart | Argues that regional organisations of the ANC tended to go their own way – Transvaal leaders were drawn into workers’ issues; the Western Cape was influenced by Garveyism. Furthermore, the level of rural resistance was underestimated. |
| Dale McKinley | Suggests, as a Marxist historian, that the ANC failed to establish grassroots organisations among the masses in South Africa, that they were preoccupied by their petty bourgeois interests such as obtaining a free market. |
| Saul Dubow | Argues that the 1920s saw a degree of co-operation between organisations as links were forged between the ANC and the CPSA and also between the ANC and ICU, though these did not last. |

Question 51

To what extent did attitudes to race shape apartheid policies before 1959?

Aim of the question To examine what drove the early apartheid legislation of the National Party between their election victory in 1948 and the introduction of Separate Development after 1959. Candidates might examine influences including the 1948 Sauer Report, National Party ideology, the demands of agriculture, mining and manufacturing, as well as post World War Two social factors in influencing a range of early apartheid legislation. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that apartheid policies before 1959 were determined by attitudes to race:

- establishment of SABRA (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs) and Verwoerd's influence as 'Architect of Apartheid'
- proposals of 'apartheid' set out in the 1948 Sauer Report
- Afrikaner beliefs of ethnic and racial exclusivity vital to the evolution of apartheid, increasingly evident in the works of academics such as Cronje who believed miscegenation led to racial decline
- Theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and influence of Abraham Kuyper
- details of relevant legislation such as the Population Registration Act, Separate Amenities Act, Immorality Act and Mixed Marriages Act
- the influence of the FAK and 1944 Volkskongres on Afrikaner racial policy
- belief that the volk was an organic identity deriving from creation
- influence of Diederichs, Verwoerd and Cronje who studied in Germany in the 1930s.

Evidence which supports the view that early apartheid was driven by other factors:

The demands of the economy:

- tensions increase as a shortage of basic commodities, adequate housing and servicemen gaining little support in finding jobs after World War Two
- Apartheid as a means of extending the benefits of the migrant labour system to manufacturing industry
- decentralisation of industry would enable manufacturers to exploit cheap labour from the reserves – gradual relocation of industry to the fringes of reserves
- reserves no longer able to support Africans therefore other methods discussed such as tighter influx controls and decentralised industry
- commercial farmers would also be granted a ready supply of labour from the reserves
- influx control would restrict process of Black urbanisation/therefore development of an urban proletariat while also protecting the interests of white workers threatened with the low wages of Black workers
- African urban population grew at an annual rate of 3.4% 1936–1946. This increased to 6.6% over the next 6 years.

Fear of growing African resistance:

- the African Mineworkers Union had 25,000 members by 1943
- 1940s saw an attempt at renewal and radicalisation of the ANC under Alfred Xuma, by 1945 there were 4000 members
- Congress Youth League established in 1943 under Lembede – a commitment to more radical confrontation
- 'African Claims' published in 1943 by the ANC – written as demands rather than a polite appeal
- in the 1940s however, resistance leaders still struggled to respond to popular struggles such as the Alexandria bus boycotts
- by 1945, 158,000 Black Africans were trade union members
- increasing strikes destabilising workforce: 1943–1960 large scale strikes, 1944 – African Mineworkers Union saw 25,000 strike demanding a minimum wage supported by the Council for Non-European Trade Unions dominated by the Communist Party of South Africa

- 1946 Black Africans made up 79% of the population increasing fear of ‘die swart gevaar’ – the Black menace
- Apartheid was seen by some as a policy of self-preservation. Fear that equality of the races would lead to the eventual disappearance of the white nation of South Africa
- influx control would restrict process of urbanisation, which had grown rapidly in the 1940s and threatened to create an urban proletariat
- fear over strikes, squatter camps and increasing crime in cities.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|--|
| Hermann Giliomee | Afrikaner historian who considers apartheid as a ‘radical survival plan’ rooted in the Dutch Reformed Church. |
| Deborah Posel | Argues that apartheid was more practical in response to changing socio-economic demands. However, apartheid was initially to preserve the dominance of the white race, primarily the Afrikaners themselves. |
| Lindie Koorts | Contends that it was Malan’s beliefs on the development of Africans and Coloureds, removed from white society to prevent social miscegenation, which formed the basis of early apartheid. Malan practised what he saw as ‘trusteeship’ – this entailed white rule but also white protection of Africans which, the National Party argued, gave Africans the opportunity to develop themselves within their own reserves. |
| Tom Lodge | Argues the 1940s as a ‘watershed in African Politics’ whereby African resistance in the aftermath of the Second World war brought greater pressure on the White governing minority. |

Question 52

To what extent did a fear of growing African nationalism explain the development of apartheid during the 1960s?

Aim of the question To determine the extent to which the growth of African nationalism from 1960 onwards determined the direction and development of apartheid policies of the governing National Party, with the introduction of Separate Development. Candidates might assess a range of factors including ideology of the National Party, changing demands of the economy and the desire to maintain a constant supply of cheap labour for mines, agriculture and manufacturing, and growing resistance to apartheid both nationally and internationally. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that a fear of growing African nationalism after 1960 explains the development of apartheid:

- the Granite Response to the perceived onslaught against white minority rule saw the likes of a Publications Control Board, the Defence Act (1961) extending military training and the requirement of the South African Broadcasting Corporation to openly support the government
- possibly a tactical reaction to the decolonisation of Africa
- ANC's campaign of limited violence (Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK reject all-out violence against the white community). Aims were unstaffed targets such as electricity pylons
- ANC/PAC banned and forced underground, developing bases outside South Africa
- government repression or 'granite response' with 90-day detention law
- real attempts to develop Homelands policy to provide outlet for African aspirations and, perhaps, to assuage international opinion. Separate Development stimulated ethnic differences, even where this ethnic identity was based on created, rather than historic, tribalism
- increases in Africans burning pass books, stay at home protests
- young Africans left South Africa to train as guerrillas in China, USSR and independent African states
- 18,000 arrests following emergency regulations post Sharpeville and active recruitment of additional police forces
- mobilisation of Active Citizen Force. Government increased borders security and raided into areas that were still British protectorates. New police reserve created in 1961
- police infiltration of CPSA and at least one high profile political trial every year after 1965
- 1968 BOSS – Bureau of State Security established.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors best explain the development of apartheid in the 1960s:

Ideological factors:

- aim to secure white dominance in a smaller white state by the move to self-government of the homelands
- ideological shifts away from treating reserves as reservoirs of African labour to the state's defence against increasingly severe international condemnation of Apartheid after the Sharpeville shootings of 1960
- publications Control Board established to prohibit importation of materials considered subversive (socialist/radical). South African Broadcasting Corporation required to openly support the government
- legislation to encourage the relocation of industry to Homelands (unpopular with many industrialists)
- Broederbond increasingly influential (Wet Nel, Botha, Eiselen) so stricter Separate Development and a resultant rapid decline in practical apartheid
- eight homelands (later ten) were established by the legislation of 1959. Four of these (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) were granted independence
- Verwoerd saw apartheid of the 1960s as the self defence of the white race. Relaxation of immigration controls to allow more English-Speaking whites to move to South Africa
- 3,500,000 Africans forcibly removed from homes to rural slums
- approximately a million Africans deported from farming areas consequently given to white farmers

- Verwoerd had promised that by 1978 South Africa would be an all-white country – key to this vision was the Black homelands/Bantustans. ‘If South Africa was to choose between being poor and white or rich and multiracial, then it must choose to be white’ (Verwoerd)
- section 10 residential rights of Africans working in cities now rebranded as an indefensible deviation from separate development and ‘ethnic self-determination’ by the National Party
- record number of white immigrants to South Africa in the early 1960s.

Economic factors:

- economy suffered following Sharpeville. Emigration by professional white workers who feared civil war
- gold and foreign exchange reserves had collapsed from R315m in June 1960 to R142m in June 1961. Need to rebuild economy after recession. Dramatic recovery by the late 1960s
- Homeland/Bantustan development linked to industrial decentralisation of the 1960s relocating industry to the edge of the reserves as an alternative to migrant labour
- lack of local industry forced Africans to travel long distances for work
- increasing manufacturing demands for a stable workforce
- no union rights were granted to Black workers in the 1960s – Illegal for Africans to strike or negotiate wages. Many continued to live and work outside their ‘registered’ homelands
- restricting numbers of workers entering cities was re-described as part of the government’s drive to boost productivity in the reserves
- demand for labour (economic boom in late 1960s) saw ineffectiveness of attempts to increase restriction of residential rights and relocation of industry. Large squatter villages appearing
- Verwoerd describes Separate Development as ‘Political independence and economic interdependence’ (1959)
- aim to mechanise industries in white areas as far as possible to limit requirement for Black workers in cities
- more industries to be developed on borders of the Bantustans so labour could commute daily and therefore avoid residence in white areas.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|---|
| Ian van der Waag | Considers the 1960s, as a military historian, as a period of ‘Hot War’ in South Africa as the government faced dealing with newly militant resistance organisations. Consequently, security of the state was prioritised. |
| Harold Wolpe | Contends that subsistence farming had all but disappeared in the Reserves in the 1950s and therefore so was the basis of migrant labour in spite of the government seeking to maintain cheap labour for manufacturing. |
| Deborah Posel | Argues apartheid in the 1960s as a departure from previous policies. She argues that the state was increasingly alarmed by urban radicalism which had climaxed at Sharpeville. The ‘major impetus within the Bantu Affairs Department to restructure its urban policies derived from the escalation of urban resistance in the late 1950s.’ |
| James Barber | Argues that policies of the 1960s were primarily through necessity as previous apartheid policies were not working. ‘Instead of finding a clear path ahead, the government had marched into a cul-de-sac.’ |

Question 53 **‘The resurgence of the resistance movement in the 1970s was a result of the growth of trade unionism.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the importance of the trade union movement in the development and resurgence of resistance to the apartheid state in the 1970s. Responses might include the impact of the Soweto uprising and the role of Black Consciousness Movement and Steve Biko, the militant campaigns of POQO and MK and the growing support from anti-apartheid campaigns out with South Africa. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that trade unionism led to the resurgence of resistance in the 1970s:

- the growing number of strikes and protests of 1972–1973
- increased worker militancy from c. 1973; 160 strikes in March alone. Between January and September 1973 more than 70,000 workers involved in industrial action
- increased size of the African urban workforce, including skilled and semi-skilled workers. Rebirth of African trade unions
- growing unpopularity of the homelands policy of the National Party contributed to increased urbanisation
- in 1973 as many as 100,000 workers went on strike, compared to the 1960s average 2000 African workers a year. The largest example of worker militancy since the mineworkers strike of 1946
- in September 1973 11 miners were killed by police at a gold mine on the Rand
- Francis Wilson, writing in 1972, concluded that most whites were ignorant of the social injustice associated with migrancy.

Evidence which supports the view that other organisations drove the resurgence in resistance in the 1970s:

The contribution of other organisations:

- the role of the Black Consciousness Movement as a source of inspiration for the Soweto students
- the role of the South African Students Movement (SASM) and discontent resulting from 20 years of ‘Bantu’ education
- Biko helped set up the Black Communities Programme in 1970, establishing Black self-help groups for Black communities
- spread of Black Consciousness ideas among the ANC in exile as large numbers of activists joined ANC training camps
- Black Consciousness failed to penetrate the working class or peasant communities
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness
- by the late 1970s the ANC was increasingly focusing on urban areas and building mass organisations
- role of Biko forming SASO, as president of the Black People’s Convention and death in 1977 in police custody
- the role of the Black Consciousness Movement as a source of inspiration for the Soweto students. The Soweto Uprising originated with a small group of BCM affiliated High School students
- 1975 SASO banned
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness. Vague and undefined political and economic policies
- the Azanian People’s Organisation in 1978 bringing together BPC, BCP and SASO, all organisations which had been banned in 1977 after the Soweto riots.

The impact of other factors:

- poor living conditions and reaction to oppression
- most demonstrations after Soweto localised and spontaneous rather than being directed centrally. This was a new feature of anti-apartheid protests
- government Total Strategy a response to the 'Total Onslaught' or fear of co-ordinated attack orchestrated by Communists to destroy apartheid following Soweto. Total Strategy saw an escalation in the response from MK and POQO
- widespread international condemnation of Soweto bolstered international support for the anti-apartheid campaign from publicly organised events. India and Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, provided aid and support
- increasing resentment of government integrationist policies saw many more prepared to see all whites as enemies
- developments in other African countries, especially the liberation of Angola and Mozambique and their subsequent support of the armed struggle.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------|--|
| Nigel Worden | Considers the growth of the African urban working class and the 'increasingly dynamic trade union movement' in leading to the resurgence of resistance in the 1970s. |
| James Barber | Argues that the labour troubles of 1973 were forerunners of a revival of militant African political activity. |
| Saul Dubow | Argues that 'this labour militancy was a direct response to worsening economic conditions as the oil crisis precipitated an era of 'stagflation'. The strikes foreshadowed the growth of a dynamic union movement which, by the end of the decade, had come to constitute a powerful and permanent political force.' |
| Tom Lodge | Considers the wider generational conflict in the aftermath of Soweto as key for the development of resistance as it was young people who had taken the initiative in Soweto and driven the protests in response to Education legislation rather than BCM initiatives. |

Section 7 – South Africa: Race and Power, 1902–1984

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 54 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the aims of British policies in South Africa before 1910.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source A | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|--|---|
| Author | Alfred Milner. | A British Conservative, he served in Egypt, and as Chairman of Board of Inland Revenue, regarded as an outstanding administrator. He served as British High Commissioner in South Africa after 1902 making him an authority on the government of the region in the aftermath of the Boer War where he had been a signatory on the Treaty of Vereeniging. |
| Purpose | Farewell speech on the future of South Africa delivered at a public banquet. | Milner sets out his vision for South Africa and the road to self-government, useful in reflecting British views on South Africa. He is biased in favour of imperial influence and remains wary of Afrikaner intent, but advocates union for predominantly economic reasons. |
| Timing | 31 March 1905. | Useful in describing the progress of British policies in the region in the aftermath of Boer defeat, though less useful as he is succeeded by Liberal Selborne who pushes through self-government quicker after Milner and marks a change in the British approach in the region. |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| Our vision and efforts of late to develop mutual understanding, sympathy and a common ideal between both the British and the Dutch, we hope will grow in the coming years. | Takes the view that the British are actively trying to improve relations with Afrikaners but acknowledges this will take time. Emphasised by 'efforts of late to develop mutual understanding, sympathy and a common ideal.' |

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|---|
| But our investment in the extension of the railways and in works of public improvement will continue to improve so many bonds of communication and union. | Takes the view that Milner sees the extension of the railways and development of infrastructure as further integrating the colonies. Milner is emphasising the economic advantages union would bring. Emphasised by 'will continue to improve so many bonds of communication and union.' |
| And there is so much still to be done to make this country, favoured as it is in many respects by nature, a fitting home for civilised men, to make it yield them anything like what it is capable of providing, either in wealth or in attractiveness and comfort. | Takes the view that Milner is advocating a prosperous South Africa for the benefit of the white minority. Milner envisages the future of the country as being attractive for white settlement. Emphasised by 'a fitting home for civilised men' and providing 'wealth' 'attractiveness' 'comfort'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Milner regenerated and extended the rail network
- a customs union was created (this was achieved in 1903)
- Milner knew that to build the conditions for political unification he would have to create an economic recovery to persuade the Afrikaners.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the civil service was run by a group of talented but controversial young Oxford graduates 'Milner's kindergarten'
- encouragement of investment by finance capitalists restored the productivity of the mines to pre-war levels, encouraged by both Milner and Selborne
- British restored land to Boer farmers after 30,000 farms were burned down during the Boer War and paid reparations for war damages. Milner's 'restoration' policy
- Milner aimed to anglicise South Africa with an influx of British settlers.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|---|
| Andre Odendaal | Contends that Black Africans were better off before the Boer war, even in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, then under British rule after it. |
| James Barber | Argues that Milner was known for his 'hawkish expansionist goals' as a man of the British Empire. Milner's aim was to 'set out to establish a united South Africa – loyal to the crown; based on a self-governing white community with a British majority; supported by well-treated and justly governed Black Africans; and with a vigorous economy driven by the gold of the Rand. In seeking these ends Milner assumed that Afrikaners, even in the Cape, could not be fully trusted.' |
| Leonard Thomson | Considers the exclusion of Black Africans as 'the natural consequence of Milner's decision to appease the fighting men of the Republics at the expense of the Black population.' |
| Nigel Worden | Argues British policies prioritised political unity for the sake of economic growth. |

Question 55 How fully does Source B explain the reasons for the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism before 1939?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|--|--|
| This was the Afrikaner Broederbond, which was founded in 1918, with the aim of promoting the achievement of a republic. | States that the Broederbond was active in the promotion of Afrikaner nationalism in their drive for autonomy. |
| . . .aiming at securing and maintaining Afrikaner domination in all spheres and at all costs. . . | States that the organisation also sought to advance Afrikanerdom everywhere. |
| They aimed at infiltrating vital educational institutions such as schools and universities in order to better promote the triumph of Afrikaner nationalist ideals. | States that they were active in using educational institutions to promote Afrikanerdom to the younger generations. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Broederbond was initially founded by professionals and was expanded to include white collar workers
- formation of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge FAK, 1929 by the Broederbond and emphasis on Christian National Education which stressed the need for unity
- organisation of the Eufees celebrations of the Great Trek, 1938 by the FAK.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Afrikaner publications. Die Huisgenoot reached over 20% of Afrikaner families by the 1930s
- Malan's break-away Purified National Party founded on Christian Nationalist principles (1933)
- the language movement made rapid progress with Afrikaans becoming an official language in 1925
- 1932 Carnegie Commission on poor whites revealed extent of urban poverty (50% of Afrikaners were urbanised by 1936)
- the FAK organised the Volkskongres of 1939 as a result of a special commission to investigate poverty among Afrikaners
- the Spoorbond (for railway workers) was the first Christian National Trade Union (1934)
- distrust of the Fusion and the formation of the United Party.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

William Beinart

Argues the role of the Broederbond was becoming a 'major foundation of Malan's Transvaal support . . . a front of Christian national, republican and sometimes pro-fascist tendencies.'

Hermann Giliomee

Considers the importance of the language movement and growing interest in Afrikaner history.

Charles Bloomberg

Argues that the Broederbond became involved in organising Afrikaner trade unions 'in order to rescue Afrikaner workers from the clutches of a new anti-nationalist (ie socialist) ideology.'

Dan O'Meara

Considers the significance of the poor white problem on the emerging leadership of the Purified National Party.

Question 56 **How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of African Nationalism in the 1950s, before Sharpeville?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|---|
| Beginning on Freedom Day, 1952, selected ANC activists were enjoined to pledge to serve their country and its people by conspicuously defying apartheid laws. | Suggests that the ANC were increasingly committed (through pledges) to overt anti-apartheid protest, suggesting they saw it as their duty to protest. |
| . . .confrontation was mostly avoided by advertising plans in advance and limiting numbers involved in any one action. | Suggests that the ANC adopted a strategy designed to limit confrontation between its members and the authorities. |
| . . . when rioting broke out in Port Elizabeth, Kimberley, and East London, the ANC called off the national campaign, fearing that popular anger was getting out of hand. | Suggests that the ANC was caught by surprise by the growing level of violence and was forced to back-track on its call for defiance, fearing the backlash from the state on ANC supporters. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Defiance Campaign increases co-operation between the South African Indian Congress, the African Peoples Organisation, the Communist Party and the Council of Non-European Trade Unions in the Congress Alliance
- the ANC Defiance Campaign committed the ANC to a campaign of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience
- 1 May 1950 – National stay-away from work – led to violent clashes in the Transvaal but demonstrated the first combined worker action country-wide.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| The PAC's evident reluctance to include Josias Madzunya in their leadership prompted a rift between the Alexandria Africanists and the new organisation that would detach from it a significant number of potential supporters. | Suggests that the PAC lost supporters on account of discontent over leadership appointments which emphasised divisions. |
| . . .the PAC also sought to extend their influence less directly through seeking trade union affiliation. | Suggests that there were less overt moves by the PAC to extend their reach, particularly through fostering links with trade unions. |
| Sobukwe envisaged that a succession of consumer boycotts that targeted enterprises whose staff habitually treated African customers abruptly or rudely would attract publicity and augment popular political confidence. . . | Suggests that the encouragement of boycotts by the PAC to target racial and economic discrimination was a justifiable tactic that would gain momentum and support. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- from 1955 onwards, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and its affiliated unions continued to encourage African workers to boycott the machinery of the Native Labour Act
- the PAC formed in 1959, reflected the growing frustration at ANC liberalism which was seen by Sobukwe as ineffective and too inclusive
- the PAC swept up support in townships, where African nationalism had become more radical through the development of African culture and trade unionism.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- African nationalism had been deeply influenced by Garveyism in the United States of America, a movement which emphasised the common destiny of Black people across the world
- the Congress of the People and Freedom Charter (1955) – the Charter opposed by the PAC and trade unions so was not a unified declaration
- Treason Trials increased exposure and the popularity of resistance leaders, but also led to commitment by the government to rule without legal restraint
- Federation of South African Women's 1956 marches in Pretoria which drew in 250,000
- the ANC were wary of associating with trade union activity for fear of being linked further with communism
- peaceful popular protest against discriminatory laws which involved non-co-operation with police and entering white only areas without passes
- 8000 arrested over the course of the Defiance Campaign, with increased violence towards the end (included the killing of a white nun by crowds)
- surge in ANC membership from 20,000 to 200,000 after the Defiance Campaign
- protests against government appointed chiefs in the Transvaal in 1957 and resistance against agricultural laws.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------|---|
| Francis Meli | Considers the role of the ANC in the 1950s as instrumental in mobilising the masses to resist apartheid. |
| James Barber | Contends that 'the ANC leaders hoped that their efforts (in the 1950s) would be like an incoming tide . . . If that was the hope, the government was equally determined to turn back the tide.' |
| Dan O'Meara | Argues that the ANC's influence, rather than the PAC's, grew because it worked alongside Trades Unions. |
| Nigel Worden | Argues that 'the popular struggles of the 1950s failed to realise their full potential.' Under the Defiance Campaign though, the 'impetus for mass campaigns was clearly established.' |

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914 – 1945.

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES:

Question 57 To what extent was the First World War the main reason why the Tsarist state was destabilised between 1914 and January 1917?

Aim of the question To display awareness of the impact of the Great War on the tsarist state's ability to defend the empire and to maintain order in the home front. Relevant factors such as leadership of the tsarist elites, mass discontent and revolutionary groups might be considered.

Responses might consider longer-term problems such as peasant discontent, lack of political reforms and the national minorities' demands for freedom. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Evidence which supports the view that the Great War destabilised the tsarist regime:

Military Defeats:

- the Imperial Army lost an estimated 2 million soldiers due to death, injury and missing in action between 1914 – January 1917. POWs were around 3.5 million men
- 1914 Battle of Tannenberg saw the loss of the 1st Army, the suicide of General von Rennenkampf
- 1914 Battle of the Masurian Lakes cost the 2nd Army 125,000 men killed or captured
- 1915 – 'Great Retreat' of Russian Armies from Western provinces – Poland lost in July– September. Baltic provinces and Western Ukraine threatened by German invaders. Another 1 million casualties inflicted on tsarist forces. Morale seriously undermined by defeats from German forces.

Military Successes:

- Imperial Army fares better against both Austro- Hungarian and Ottoman forces in 1914–1917. Ottoman's lose important city of Kars and the Brusilov Offensive in Galicia in summer 1916 nearly destroyed the Austro-Hungarian army on the eastern front. In this 'successful offensive' Russian Imperial Army, however, lost 400,000 men dead, wounded or missing.

Material:

- 1915 – shell shortages, rifles and ammunition in short supply as economy not geared up for a long war of attrition. Soldiers going into attack forced to use rifles from dead comrades.

Military personnel:

- officer casualties – 1914 – 42,000 officers in the Imperial Army but by 1916 most of them below rank of Colonel were dead, wounded or POWs. 1917 – 250,000 officers commissioned who were drawn from mostly ex-peasant backgrounds, students, or promoted NCOs – did not share the regular officer mores of loyalty to the Tsar
- NCOs promoted into junior command positions – these men were able to take active role in both February and October Revolutions (Sergeant Linde of the Finland regiment led the regiment's revolt in Petrograd during February Revolution)
- senior commanders such as Grand Duke Nicholas did not possess the required military skills/experience to lead the Imperial Army to victory. Senior officers promoted due to loyalty to Tsar not on military skills. There were divisions between those who wanted a modern, professional Army and those who preferred to remain in the traditional, aristocratic-dominated army
- Tsar Nicholas II took personal command of the Army in September, 1915 – he was now open to personal blame for military defeats. In 1916 senior commanders/politicians were involved in potential conspiracies to overthrow the Tsar –they were willing to break the military oath to 'save Russia' from the Tsar's weak leadership
- desertions increased in 1916, led to increased lawlessness behind the frontlines as soldiers took to banditry, murder and rape of civilians, especially Jewish people living in the Pale of Settlement in Ukraine
- 1916 uprising in Turkmenistan due to proposed conscription of Moslem subjects who were not usually obliged to undertake military service – leads to punitive measures by tsarist government resulting in massacres and insurgency.

Homefront:

- refugees from Western provinces flooded into Petrograd – increased overcrowding and typhoid epidemics in 1916. Increasing pressure on housing and food supplies in both Petrograd and Moscow.

Evidence which supports the view that the economy was the main cause of destabilisation of the tsarist regime:

- wartime economy under pressure due to high inflation, shortages of consumer goods, for example, prices of everyday items such as food, soap, bread and candles increased by 300% from 1914 – January 1917
- food supplies by late 1916 running short in northern cities due to transport difficulties as railways could not provide enough trains from 'Black Earth' grain-growing region in southern Russia
- Russian government abandoned the Gold Standard to allow the printing of money to meet wartime expenditure – inflation far outstripped wage rises for workers and urban dweller
- consumer goods no longer being manufactured as metal working, leather and canned goods production going directly to Imperial Army not civilians
- peasants stopped producing food for the market as money no longer able to buy scarce consumer goods. Switch by peasants to home production and feeding animals with grain as they make a higher return when sold for slaughter
- vodka sales banned in 1914 by Tsarist government – led to Peasant making home-distilled vodka. Tsarist government received 25% of all revenue before 1914 from monopoly of vodka sales
- agriculture experiencing lack of manpower, fertilisers and horses due to military requisitions. Russian exports from both Baltic and Black Sea ports halted by enemy blockade – stops exports and much-needed imports of military equipment
- Port of Archangel main point of Western aid supplies reaching Russia, but railway needed to be built to transport goods in 1915/1916 using POWs as labour which cost many lives due to harsh environment and lack of concern for safety
- railways lacked the ability to produce new rolling stock and repair for both track and engines. By 1916 there was a serious problem due to lack of maintenance for both civilian and military transport on railways. American engineers sent to restore railways and rolling stock but hampered by 1917 breakdown in order and government control of a crucial strategic industry.

Evidence which supports the view that political factors were the main cause of the destabilisation of the tsarist regime:

- Tsar determined to maintain autocratic principle and refuse to make concessions to Duma and political reforms during wartime crises
- Tsarina viewed by both mass and elites as a German traitor and being under the influence of Rasputin and a cabal of pro-German nobles and officials who were viewed as traitors to Russia
- anti-German riots in Moscow and Petrograd in 1915 – increased volatility of civilian population who are using violence as a patriotic measure against 'German influence' in Russia
- 'Ministerial leapfrog' as Russia had by 1916 destabilised tsarist state – 4 different Prime Ministers, 5 different Ministers of the Interior and 3 different Ministers of War – Rasputin's influence over the tsarina was blamed for this corruption reaching into the appointment of senior ministers
- disillusioned groups by 1916 include – senior military officials, politicians, businessmen and nobles. Progressive Bloc in the Duma seeking to change nature of the regime. Freemasons in Petrograd elite plotting downfall of Tsar Nicholas
- Guchkov and Alexeev plotting to remove the Tsar and seek his brother, Grand Duke Michael, to take the throne as regent for the Tsarevitch to come of age
- Yusopov coup and the killing of Rasputin as a desperate attempt to restore image of the Imperial family in December 1916
- revolutionary leaders such as Lenin and Trotsky were abroad or in exile but their writings and party organisations were present in the lives of 'conscious' workers in Moscow and Petrograd. Shop Stewards in large plants such as Putilov Works or the Leissner factory were adhering to socialist ideas and able to mobilise workers for strikes
- Mensheviks, Bolsheviks and SRs were present in the strikes which became more common and political in 1916. Incoming peasants to cities were volatile workers who could be used to strike and protest as they were disorientated in urban settings
- 14 November 1916 'treason or folly' speech in Duma by Milyukov against Tsarist Government ministers demonstrates extent of political elite alienation being publicly expressed and secret copies distributed to defeat censor.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|---|
| Tsuyoshi Hasegawa | Argues that Russia united against a common threat in 1914, but the tsarist state was unable to defend the Empire as everyone suffered and so lost support and <i>legitimacy</i> . |
| John Keegan | Contends that defeat and drink eroded the peasant-soldiers' loyalty to the tsar and the Fatherland. |
| Beryl Williams | Argues that the time of war, shortages and mass-influx into the cities created a destabilisation in society that was revolutionary. |
| Geoffrey Hosking | Contends that the Tsar was compromised by the rumours that the Royal family was in the hands of Rasputin and that the court was conducting treasonous intrigue with Germany to defeat Russia. |

Question 58

‘The October Revolution was nothing more than a coup d’état.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the view that the October Revolution was a coup d’état, an armed minority seizure of power, overthrowing the Provisional Government on the night of 25 October 1917 in Petrograd. The alternative argument is that the same event was in fact a popular revolt where Lenin’s party were responding to demands for a change of government from workers, soldiers, and peasants. The Bolsheviks were representing the radical demands of a war-weary people. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the October Revolution was a coup d’état:

- 10,000 People – Red Guards, soldiers and sailors – estimated to be involved in the seizure of power in Petrograd, October 25, 1917. A minority of the population of a city of 2 million people
- the Bolsheviks were not that popular with the people of Russia as evidenced by the results of the Constituent Assembly election – where the SRs received the largest votes from the peasant majority of the population
- Bolshevik seizure of power was planned in Sukhanov’s flat on 10 October 1917, when the Central Committee voted to accede to Lenin’s demand to seize power. 12 members of the Bolshevik party decided the outcome
- Zinoviev and Kamenev disagree with proposed seizure of power as they fear the Army garrison are not in favour and that there is a danger of civil war as there is no majority in favour of a Bolshevik government
- Trotsky’s ruse of waiting until Second Congress of Soviets on 26 October meeting offers cover for Bolshevik coup as Soviet power was popular, not a single party seizing power. Gives apparent legitimacy to a coup
- the Army garrison of 150,000 men in Petrograd are overwhelmingly neutral – they remained in barracks and took no part in the seizure of power
- Petrograd proletariat were seeking Soviet power, a socialist coalition government but not a Bolshevik dictatorship. No mandate for coup of 25 October 1917
- action of the Bolshevik dominated MRC can be viewed as a minority of sailors, soldiers and Red Guards in Smolny Institute as a hastily-planned event which was never sanctioned by the Petrograd Soviet, factory committees or garrison committees
- Trotsky as chairman of MRC had the authority to issue arms to Bolshevik supporters to carry out coup from army arsenals which supports idea of a planned attack not a popular uprising of the masses
- Lenin’s demand for a seizing of power in October 1917 indicates his role in forcing the event to take place. There is no agreement from even the Bolshevik leaders or grass-roots members themselves on the need to seize power
- Lenin from town of Vyborg writes to Bolshevik organisations to seize power before the Congress of Soviets meets to ensure that a socialist coalition government is not formed. Lenin states this would, ‘ruin the revolution’
- Lenin’s refusal to share potential power with other socialist parties is further evidence of a coup being launched on 25 October
- day after the October seizure of power there was little evidence of popular involvement, as the trams ran, shops opened and people carried out daily tasks in Petrograd
- Menshevik party leader, Martov, describes the 25 October events as a ‘military plot by one of the revolutionary parties’
- Sukhanov, diarist of the revolution, thought the Bolshevik regime would be short-lived due to a lack of support from the masses of the population
- Provisional Government was weak, riven with internal divisions, discredited in the view of conservative forces especially after the ‘Kornilov affair’ which led to final estrangement of Army High Command who would not support Kerensky’s ailing regime. Bolsheviks had little to fear in taking power by launching a coup

- Democratic Conference met in Moscow on 14 September – SRs and Mensheviks refuse to break with Provisional Government. Kamenev fails to persuade them to seek socialist coalition government and abandon Kadets – Lenin views this as a betrayal of socialism and begins to seek a seizure of power from Bolshevik party
- Bolshevik party had a recent history of seeking assume power by armed revolt, for example, the July Days when the leadership hesitated in supporting Kronstadt sailors organised by lower-level Bolshevik leaders. Lenin's policy then of 'wait and see' was not going to be repeated in October
- Second Congress of Soviets on 26 October – 670 delegates unanimously passes a resolution proposing a socialist, multi-party government lends weight to coup d'état thesis as Bolshevik action was not mandated by the congress representing working class interests
- non-Bolshevik delegates walk out of the congress meeting and hand Bolshevik coup air of legitimacy as the Bolshevik delegates approve action of the previous night as a legitimate act
- Kerensky's action of threatening to transfer the bulk of the Petrograd's garrison to the northern front led to the formation of the MRC by the Petrograd Soviet on 20 October – this organisation used by Trotsky to arm Bolshevik coup five days later. Mistakes by the Provisional Government help to facilitate coup
- Bolshevik party receiving generous funding from German Foreign Office allowing them to buy, for example, commercial printing presses for production of various newspapers – 250,000 roubles in May, 1917. Money also used to pay for supporters to demonstrate and politic among the army garrison units, Baltic fleet sailors and Petrograd factories. This level of enemy support allowed policies and actions that sought the defeat of Russia by an armed group dedicated to their own nation's defeat. Bolshevik coup ultimately in the interests of the German enemy
- Bolshevik policy on 'workers control' in factories was flexible enough to accept the decision of factory workers in the summer of 1917 to seize control and run the factories by themselves – to dispense with 'bourgeois management' – despite Bolshevik official policy of a co-ordinated industrial strategy of state control and technical supervision of industry by qualified technocrats answerable to the centralised government
- Lenin's policy of 'all power to the Soviets' was an appeal directly to the soldiers and workers who saw the soviets are their class-based representatives. There was ambiguity if Soviet power was coterminous with sole Bolshevik power, but this allowed Lenin to seem to be open to co-operation with other socialist parties.

Evidence which supports the view that the October revolution was a popular revolt:

- Bolshevik party membership increases from 10,000 in February to estimated 350,000 by September/October, 1917
- September the Bolsheviks win majorities in both Moscow and Petrograd Soviet elections – Vyborg district of Petrograd 70% of votes go to Bolshevik candidates. Bolsheviks are receiving the support of the workers. Menshevik support collapsing in the cities as working class remove support from them
- the nature of the Provisional Government: it was the liberal remnant from the Imperial Duma – with little legitimacy from the workers, soldiers and peasants whose loyalty was to the Soviets that represented their explicit class interests
- desire to wait for a National Assembly to determine the future of issues such as Land reform played into the Bolsheviks hands as they could portray the government as acting in the interests of bourgeois landlords
- decision to maintain Russia's participation in the war was disastrous as the mass of soldiers by late summer 1917 were seeking ways to end the war and go home. The initial agreement of the Soldiers Committees to keep fighting was seriously undermined by the failure of the 'summer offensive' with 400,000 casualties
- peace was the desire for war-weary soldiers to end the war as soon as possible. At first committees in the Army especially at the front were 'defencist' as they were still willing to defend Russia from external threat but not to fight for 'imperialist land annexation'. After the Kornilov Affair in August these committees in the Army took a pro-Bolshevik line of immediate peace
- Liberal ministers were viewed as being 'bourgeois' and 'class-enemies' by radicalised workers, soldiers and peasants by the summer/autumn of 1917. Kadet ministers and party moving towards the right in their aim of restoring army officer authority, instituting the death penalty at the frontlines and seeking to restore law and order at home

- Second Coalition was formed with the resignation of Lvov and the Kadet ministers over Ukrainian autonomy in 24 July – Kerensky was Prime Minister and Minister for War. Other moderate socialists now joined the Provisional Government – SRs, Mensheviks, Popular Socialists were now in government and would be labelled by the Bolsheviks as ‘counter-revolutionary’ and ‘bourgeois’
- Kornilov Affair in August 1917 has a positive impact on the popularity of Lenin’s party. The ordinary factory workers in Petrograd, railwaymen and Moslem delegates in Petrograd took the lead in defeating General Kornilov’s attempted ‘coup’. 40,000 Red Guards in Petrograd armed by the Kerensky government to defeat Kornilov
- Third Coalition on 8 October was a socialist cabinet save the Bolsheviks but was losing authority in the aftermath of the Kornilov Affair as radicalised masses sought Soviet rule and Lenin’s party gained increased membership and support. Moderate socialists were tainted with being members of the discredited Provisional Government
- SR land policy was taken up by the Bolsheviks which would appeal directly to the Peasantry who made up 85% of the total population of the empire. By May 1917 peasant land seizures started to increase and would do so through the summer as deserting soldiers returned home and led violent seizures of gentry and Church lands. The Bolshevik policy was to encourage peasants to do so.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|---|
| Richard Pipes | Argues that the Bolshevik launched a clandestine coup d’etat in 25/26 October 1917. |
| Sheila Fitzpatrick | Contends that it was support from workers, soldiers and peasants who created the circumstances for Bolshevik success. |
| Alexander Rabinovitch | Argues that the magnetic attraction of the Bolshevik party’s platform of ‘Bread, Land and Peace’ led to increased support from the lower sections of society. |
| Beryl Williams | Contends that the people may have supported Bolshevism but hardly knew what Bolshevism stood for – evidence it was a coup d’etat. |

Question 59

To what extent was protection from capitalist invasion the main aim of Stalin's economic policies between 1928 and 1941?

Aim of the question To demonstrate various reasons why the USSR began to industrialise/collectivise an overwhelmingly peasant/agricultural economy/society. Stalin's policies were designed to build a modern economy, able to defend the world's first socialist state from capitalist invasion – threats from Germany (post-1933), Japan and a lesser extent Poland – were taken seriously as war scares became common in the late 1920/1930s. Candidates might consider other reasons such as to build Socialism, to begin a revolution 'from above', to change Russia from the old state of 'cockroaches and icons' to a modern state like the USA, to bolster Stalin's authority and prestige – to build on Lenin's political revolution to his revolution changing USSR economy and societal superstructure, in Marxist terms truly revolutionary. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the economic policies were designed to protect the Soviet Union from capitalist invasion:

- Stalin aware that the Soviet Union was a 'socialist island in a capitalist sea'. There had been no successful revolutions abroad and the capitalist powers had been successful in stabilising their societies after the Great War
- collectivisation designed to secure food supplies to Red Army and urban population to support economic modernisation. 1927 war scare was followed by a lack of food production from peasantry in subsequent years
- peasant labour was required to bolster the industrial development of Russia begun by the Five Year Plans as peasants flee collectivisation and famine in the first plan of 1928–1932
- increase in urban labour force by ex-peasants leading to 'proletarianisation' of the population as Bolshevik ideology idealised urban Workers and saw the Peasantry as a backward social group whose 'petti-bourgeois' attachment to private property had to be destroyed
- new industrial developments built behind the Urals, for example, Magnitogorsk as these were far away from the exposed western and eastern frontiers where foreign invasion would be expected
- agricultural workforce was to be reduced to meet the needs of the industrial sector which would be expanded massively by the Five Year Plans. 10 million peasants would flee to the urban areas, new industrial zones to find jobs, food and safety from famine and Collectivisation
- Red Army in 1930 was adjudged by Tukhachevsky as Inspector General not to be fit to defend the Soviet Union from invasion due to weaknesses in modern equipment such as tanks, aircraft, metallurgy, communications and technically proficient soldiers
- war scares in late 1926–1927 where multiple Western states such as Great Britain cut off diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and there were no external allies the communists could rely on
- February 4, 1931 – Stalin at first conference of Soviet industrial managers states: 'We are 100 years behind the capitalist powers . . . we make good this in 10 years or we will go under'
- from 1928–1941 military expenditure and production increases massively – 1928–1929 – 880 million roubles. 1934 – 5,019 million roubles, 1937 – 106,238 million roubles, and 1940 – 174,350 million roubles and increased economic performance allows for increased defence expenditure
- Red Army and Navy increases in size from 1928 – 500,000 men, 1937 – 1.5 million men and by 1940 – 3.5 million
- industries such as metallurgy, oil, aeroplane manufacture, steel plants, armaments industries prioritised for investment in First Five Year Plan of 1928–1932 and Third Five Year Plan 1938–1941
- defence factories developed east of the Urals to ensure safety from attack in Western Soviet Union. Chelyabinsk – 'tank town' built in 1933 as a tractor plant but soon building tanks
- 'Magnitogorsk' in Chelyabinsk oblast built to rival Gary, Indiana, as world's largest steel integrated works – supplies most of Soviet steel for wartime production and in 1937 foreigners expelled from city as it was a defence industry of vital national importance for state security

- Western firms invited to build arms factories – Vickers – Armstrong from UK designs tank, artillery and machinegun/rifle factories with new machine tools and technicians to train Soviet workers, Krupp from Germany designs artillery barrels, naval guns for Red Army and Fleet until 1933. American-imported machine tools used to design Christie chassis for T-34 tanks. Ford motors built a huge car and truck plant in Nizhni Novgorod
- from 1940 the Red Army had the world's largest tank fleet, larger than that of Germany, France and Great Britain combined (1940 – 10,000 tanks, in 1928–1955 tanks produced).

Evidence which supports the view that economic policies were designed to build a socialist society:

- Stalin was determined to break the old stranglehold of 'backwardness' of Russia by building socialism – 7 November 1929 – 'we are becoming a country of automobiles, a country of tractors. . . we shall then see which countries are advanced and which are backward'
- Soviet Union was dominated in 1928 economically by small-scale peasant farms whose production was mostly marketed in private markets, state quotas were in lieu of taxation. 80% of the population still lived in the village. 'Bourgeois economic relations' dominated Russian agriculture
- Socialism meant the growth of modern industrial society where the majority of people lived in towns and cities. Growing urbanisation coupled to industrialisation would lead to the building of socialism and 'Homo Sovieticus'. Secularisation of life in urban and rural environment would lead to a decline in religion especially Russian Orthodoxy which still dominated rural life. Women would be 'liberated' to work in factories, offices and be educated away from the family – but this didn't happen fully as there was the so-called 'Great Retreat' of the mid-1930s
- NEP was failing to deliver economic growth and capital accumulation that was needed to move quickly to a socialist society – 'scissors crisis' due to increase in prices for peasants and low price for grain leads to food shortages in the cities. Working class in favour of collectivisation of agriculture to secure supplies to towns and cities
- industrialisation and Collectivisation was predicated upon state-control and direction – use of central planning from GOSPLAN to control production in economy – end of any market-based economy in agriculture and industrial policies
- high unemployment of the late 1920s eliminated by the 1930s as there was a huge demand for labour in the growing factories, mines and offices. Worker's state was in full employment, unlike the capitalist west where the Great Depression was blighting lives with high unemployment
- skilled workers saw wages grow, training opportunities for urban workers to move into management/technical jobs as signs of social progress for proletarians. 1931 egalitarian wage policy ended – a sign of socialism in retreat? Peasant influx from countryside in early 1930s provides unskilled labour for growth of cities and new developments, for example, Magnitogorsk
- industrialisation required that the peasantry provide regular food supplies and excess labour to be utilised either as Gulag inmates, deportees to Siberia/central Asian republics or free labour moving into urban areas to meet labour shortages
- Building socialism was a sign that the heroic days of struggle were not behind the Communist Party – 'there are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot conquer'.

Evidence which supports the view that economic policies was used by Stalin to consolidate his power:

- Stalin intended to cement his power and authority by eradicating the so-called Kulak class as part of his determination to break the peasantry. In agriculture and overcoming the deficiencies of NEP and he was now developing 'Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism' as a theory of rule over the Soviet Union
- Soviet administrative bodies such as OGPU, Peasants and Workers inspectorate, Komsomol and the Union of Proletarian Writers – who sought more control over society welcomed economic modernisation
- Stalin gained support from certain high-level party/state functionaries such as Molotov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze and Kubyishev. These would support and implement policies of Stalin and offer support especially against the 'Right' and Bukharin who sought to maintain positive relations with peasantry
- economists supported Stalin's policies as they saw the programme as overcoming NEP bottlenecks in production
- Komsomol members enthusiastically embraced the policies of economic change as they saw it as an opportunity for heroic struggle – another front in the war to build socialism and those too young to have fought in the Civil War would now have their chance to fight for victory

- Soviet foreign policy in the First Five Year Plan was subordinated to the need to maintain positive relations with the capitalist world as the Soviet Union needed their technical assistance.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------------|---|
| Robert Tucker | Argues that economic change was designed to bolster the security of the USSR as the danger of war approached. |
| Robert Service | Contends that Stalin had introduced socialism to the peoples of the Soviet Union . . . the old ways of life were under assault by the economic changes of the 1930s. |
| Steven Kotkin | Argues for those who participated in economic development there was a sense of pride in building a new society not based on want and war. |
| Richard Overy | Contends that Soviet economic policies were designed to isolate the state from dependence upon capitalist powers and to demonstrate the Soviet Union could maintain growth without capitalist powers. |

Question 60 **‘Developments in the Arts in 1930s Russia were nothing more than propaganda.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To focus on the impact of the developments in Arts in Russia and the extent of their propaganda value for the regime. The Arts might include literature, music, art and cinema. Candidates might assess the extent to which these changes were undertaken to increase state values/control and the subsequent short and long-term impact these changes made upon family life, culture, education, politics, religion and women in the 1930s. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Arts were used for propaganda in Russia in the 1930s:

- the view that the Arts should be employed to educate workers in the spirit of communism.

Literature:

- Stalin’s written word was presented and accepted as gospel and Trotsky saw this to be a ‘*complete mockery of literature*.’ Literature faced censorship. The impact on writers and cultural development was significant
- the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) formed by a group of proletarian writers who endeavoured to support the revolution through literature and whittle out writers against Communist ideology. Not created nor operated by the state, the group propagated the regime and ideology, it was propaganda produced by the people, which could be considered culturally evolution. In 1929 it held a dictatorship over Soviet literature. As an organ of the people, the RAPP’s agreement with most Central Committee policies shows a certain amount of acceptance among the people, and by extension its impact. RAPP was shut down, considered a personal vendetta by Stalin
- the Central Committee instigated the creation of the Union of Soviet Writers in 1932. This state-built organisation monopolised the production of literature in demanding that all writers belong to the union, only members of the union could publish works, and all works were censored by the union. A political move – A.S. Shcherbakov, was appointed to control the Union of Soviet Writers it is clear that Stalin had immense influence over the nation’s only literary centre, thus the entirety of Russia’s literary canon
- six hundred writers reportedly died on prisons and labour camps during Stalin’s leadership. Still there was defiance. Ossip Mandelstam did publish but died in a labour camp. Alexander Solzhenitsyn refused to conform to the party’s stipulated standards. Solzhenitsyn’s novel ‘*One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*’ was written as a direct attack on Stalin’s regime. Not published until after Stalin’s death.

Propaganda paintings:

- to serve the cult of Stalin and success of Soviet Russia
- ‘Socialist Realism’ meant a return to tradition, realistic paintings of individuals and scenes. Though started as a political policy it was upheld and championed by passionate artists that thrived in this movement, such as Arkadi Plastov. Plastov, born a peasant, produced realistic artwork celebrating the beauty of the agricultural landscape. Though Plastov’s ‘*Collective Farm Festival*’ was painted in the midst of the brutal enforcement of collectivisation and subsequent famines, it is an image of idyllic rural Russia, boasting prosperity with a god-like Stalin looking down on the scene
- paintings which deify the leader undoubtedly appealed to Stalin, a man hungry for devotion. Gerasimov, Aleksandr, ‘*Lenin on the Rostrum*’, 1929–31, shows Lenin the hero and statesman. Stalin manipulated images of Lenin for his own gain as Stalin in 1930 was still far from being the cult object that Lenin had been for the Bolsheviks. From this Stalin built his own basis of support as he made himself out to be the protector of Lenin’s memory and, by an almost natural extension, his state.

Propaganda posters:

- whether encouraging obedience or discouraging loose talk, Soviet propaganda posters were masterpieces of manipulation. By the late 1920s, Soviet propaganda began to focus more on political discipline and ambitious government programs, particularly the collectivisation of land and establishment of industry
- in service of these aims, the government produced countless dynamic, somewhat abstract posters featuring bright colours and distinct shapes. However, this aesthetic was later replaced with one featuring more lifelike images. And always present were core communist symbols like the red star as well as the hammer and sickle
- with the onset of World War II, Soviet propaganda took on a new importance in rallying national support for the war effort and convincing eligible people to enlist
- wartime aside, Soviet propaganda became a defining aspect of the nation's very culture, spreading the aesthetics, values, and lessons of the Soviet ideology throughout the nation and beyond.

Music:

- not used for propaganda purposes
- music never manipulated as much as other art forms. State produced Socialist music, some musicians persecuted; in the 1930s the Association of Proletarian Musicians attacked any originality
- official line unclear: Socialist Realist music became any upbeat music that was upbeat and not formalist. Much was disapproved of by the government but the struggle to fine-tune policy meant much escaped the censor
- Prokofiev and Shostakovich, tense relationships with the Stalinist regime. Prokofiev co-operated with the Stalinist regime; the 1934 orchestral suite Lieutenant Kije, the 1935 ballet Romeo and Juliet and in 1936 the symphonic tale of Peter and the Wolf were all 'accessible. But his major opera, War and Peace, was not given until 1957. His music fitted the traditionalist standards encouraged by the regime but musicologists admire his work
- Shostakovich sometimes followed official guidelines: the 1927 2nd Symphony dedicated to October 1929 3rd Symphony, The First of May, was equally Socialist in content. The opera Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk performed 200 times in Russia, well-received in Western cities, yet Pravda declared it 'chaos instead of music.' His post-war redemption was the Leningrad Symphony because it symbolised his nation's indomitable will to survive
- Maxim Gorky's essay 18 April 1928 'On the Music of the Gross' linked erotic jazz dancing to the degeneracy of the Western bourgeoisie, 1928 to 1936 anyone caught or playing American jazz records could be fined 100 roubles and imprisoned for six months
- in 1929 at the Dneprostroi Dam project a string quartet intended to bring culture to construction workers, but labourers objected, voted the entire cultural fund spent popular music and jazz
- acceptable popular music could not be found: The State Publishing House found less than 1/5th of all tunes sung by marchers in the October parades were ideologically acceptable. Daily Worker columnist, Michael Gold at the 1930 Congress of Proletarian Culture in Kharkov insisted jazz had been created by the African-American and Jewish proletariats. Jazz had to become proletarian. In 1932 Association of Proletarian Musicians was abolished and the popularity of jazz rocketed. Moscow jazz bands played for dancing until 3 am in the Metropol Hotel and until 4 am at the Empire Restaurant; in Leningrad the Evropeiskaia Hotel played jazz dances in its restaurants
- cinema its role in raising cultural level of the masses and propaganda for emphasising socialist ideals
- shadow culture there was Socialist Realism in the creative world, but also a shadow culture of writers, artists and musicians such as Shostakovich, jazzmen like Alexander Tsfasman or Yakov Skomorovsky.

Film:

- to be accessible to the Masses as Propaganda to build Socialism/Stalinism in the 1930s
- in early 1930s Soviet cinema made transition to sound and central planning
- put under a mandate to adopt a uniform film style, commonly identified as 'Socialist Realism', close to 19th century realism
- meant adopting a film style that would be legible to a broad audience, thus avoiding a possible split between the avant-garde and mainstream cinema that was evident in the late 1920s

- the director of Soyuzkino (State Committee for Cinematography) and chief policy officer for the film industry, Boris Shumiatsky (1886–1938), 1931 to 1938, was a harsh critic of the montage aesthetic. He championed a ‘cinema for the millions,’ to use clear, linear narration, this style, which assured tidy storytelling
- various guidelines added to the doctrine: positive heroes to act as role models for viewers; lessons in good citizenship for spectators to embrace; and support for reigning policy decisions of the Communist Party, resulted in a number of formulaic and doctrinaire films
- succeeded in sustaining a true ‘cinema of the masses’
- single most successful film of the decade, in terms official praise and genuine affection from the mass audience, was *Chapayev* (1934), co-directed by Sergei (1900-1959) and Grigori Vasiliev. Based on the life of a martyred Red Army commander, the film was to be a model of Socialist Realism, Chapayev and his followers battled heroically for the revolutionary cause, also humanised the title character, with personal foibles, an ironic sense of humour, and a rough peasant charm. These qualities endeared him to the viewing public: spectators reported seeing the film multiple times during its first run in 1934, and *Chapayev* was periodically rereleased for subsequent generations of movie viewers
- 1930s also saw consistent popular acclaim for the musical comedy, and a master of that form was Grigori Aleksandrov (1903–1984). He effected a creative partnership with his wife, the brilliant comic actress and *chanteuse* Lyubov Orlova (1902–1975), in a series of crowd-pleasing musicals. Their pastoral comedy *Volga-Volga* (1938) was surpassed only by *Chapayev* in terms of box-office success. The fantasy element of their films, with lively musical numbers in a montage aesthetic stretching boundaries of Socialist Realism, genre could also allude to contemporary affairs. In Aleksandrov's 1940 musical *Svetlyi put* (*The Shining Path*), Orlova plays a humble servant girl who rises through the ranks of the Soviet industrial leadership after developing clever labour-saving work methods. A comic take on the Cinderella story while also learning about the value of efficiency in the workplace.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------|--|
| Katerina Clark | Contends that ‘RAPP’s power was not a cause but a symptom of the prevailing atmosphere of extremism.’ – the population’s role in their own cultural reform. |
| Sheila Fitzpatrick | Contends that even the patriotic <i>Leningrad Symphony</i> implicitly comments on all totalitarian regimes. also emphasises Shostakovich’s extensive use of Jewish themes in the early 1940s which can be interpreted as criticisms of Soviet anti-Semitism. |
| Ronald Kowalski | Argues that propaganda, education and cultural developments were central to building socialism. |
| Robert Service | Contends that there was a very positive response of the youth to the Komsomol movement. |

Question 61

To what extent was the Red Army the main reason for Russia's victory in the Great Patriotic War between 1941 and 1945?

Aim of the question To examine why the Soviet Union prevailed in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. The Red Army was in 1941–1942 almost defeated by the Axis powers whose attack on 21 June 1941 reached the outskirts of Moscow by 5 December 1941. Yet, on 9 May 1945 German forces surrendered to the Red Army and Berlin fell to Marshal Zhukov's troops. Other factors such as Stalin's leadership, mistakes by the Axis invaders and support from the Allies might be discussed. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Red Army was the main reason for victory in the Great Patriotic War:

- Red Army had approx. 7 million battlefield casualties in the war. Largest number of casualties of the victorious Allied powers in the war. 75% of all Axis casualties occurred in the Eastern Front in the war (despite the war there lasting 4 years. . . not 6 years that Britain endured)
- 'Operation Barbarossa' achieved almost total surprise as 2.3 million Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union on 21/22 June 1941
- major Red Army defeats – Bryansk, Smolensk, Minsk fell in the first months of the fight. By late September Kiev had fallen and the road to Moscow lay open. Approx 1.8 million Soviet soldiers were killed, captured or missing in the first two months of the campaign
- December, 1941 – fresh Red Army troops from Siberia launch counterattack outside Moscow and drive the Germans back – 45–120 kms. General Georgi Zhukov plans counterattack which saves Moscow
- battle-tested Commanders such as Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Yeremenko, Chuikov emerge as talented, ruthless and effective adherents of modern warfare. They replace Stalin's cronies such as Budenny and Voroshilov in 1942 who are unable to master modern warfare – ex-cavalry commanders from the 1st Cavalry Army of the Civil War era. Zhukov most famous Red Army general of the wartime commanders
- Russians, Ukrainians, Jewish and Belorussian soldiers form the majority of Tank, Artillery and Air Force units as they are in general proficient in Russian and have technical skills to master technology. Other nationalities are recruited and serve in infantry or support units
- Red Army provides unifying socialisation for all national groups to promote cohesion and loyalty
- tanks, artillery and aircraft by 1942/43 are equal to or better than Axis equivalents – T-34/85 tank best of the war and small arms such as PPSH-41 mass produced and effective for tactics of mass firepower, crude-design but reliable and accurate
- 1942/43 – Red Army uniforms designed to appear more Russian – 'pogoni'-epaulettes issued and officer rank titles reintroduced – traditionally used in tsarist army
- 1942/43 – Chuikov's 64th Army holds out in Stalingrad – Zhukov's 'operation Uranus' traps German 6th Army in Stalingrad and holds off Von Manstein's relief attempt
- 1944 – 'Operation Bagration' destroys German Army Group Centre – Leningrad relieved and Baltic States 'liberated'. 120 km advanced in two weeks in summer of 1944 – at the same time as D-Day invasion of Western Europe by Allies
- 1945 – Red Army advances into Poland, all of Eastern Europe and into Balkans. Eastern Germany occupied and Berlin taken on 8 May leads to the surrender of German forces. Allies and Red Army link up at Oder-Niesse river
- August 1945 – Red Army invades Japanese-occupied Manchuria – Blitzkrieg-type assault destroys Japanese forces in 14 days and takes 200,000 prisoners. Red Army and Marines liberate Port Arthur and Korean peninsula – revenge for Russian defeat by Japan in 1905
- Red Army in 1945 – 11.2 million men under arms (inclusive of the Red Air Force). Up to 34 million soldiers served in the ranks of the Red Army during 1941–1945.

Evidence which supports the view that Stalin's leadership was a significant factor for victory in the Great Patriotic War:

- 1937–1938 – Purges destroys Red Army leadership – 3 out of 5 marshals killed, 50 out of 57 corps commanders, 154 out of 186 divisional commanders, 7% of all commanders – junior officers to battalion commanders expelled, executed or imprisoned
- Stalin refused to allow Red Army units to mobilise before launch of Operation Barbarossa despite numerous warnings of impending attack
- 1941–1942 Stalin micro-manages planning of campaigns – leads to failure, for example, failure to allow Budenny to retreat from Kiev leads to capture of 650,000 Red Army prisoners
- Stalin's refusal to leave Moscow and hold the October parade boosts morale – speech exhorts the people to wage war and evokes Tsarist/Orthodox past – princes and saints praised for their defence of the Motherland
- 1942/43 – Stalin begins to allow competent Generals to plan operations and to carry them out, for example, Operation Mars and Uranus bring success to the Red Army
- as a figurehead Stalin was leading the Soviet Union during the war years – he dominated propaganda and adopts mantle of Russian heroic leader – less emphasis on ideology, more on patriotism and love of the Motherland
- Western Allies found Stalin and Molotov to be formidable negotiators and to be able to drive a hard bargain for aid and demands of opening a 'second front'. Western Allies forced to accept re-drawing of Poland's boundaries and absorption of Baltic states into Soviet Union
- Roosevelt found Stalin engaging and trusted Stalin, saw him as a fellow anti-imperialist. Churchill initially wary of Stalin but was charmed by him when they meet in Tehran in 1943
- Stalin chaired State Defence Committee as Peoples' Commissar for Defence liaised daily with Stavka, used trusted subordinates like Molotov, Kaganovitch to run ministries in wartime government, worked 18-hour day with no holidays, workaholic who expected the same degree of commitment for all subordinates
- Stalin had purged 'disloyal' groups such as Chechens, Crimean Tartars, Volga Germans, Ingush *et al* who were deported or imprisoned in 1944 for treason. Beria's NKVD in charge of these punitive measures to punish/deport those deemed disloyal.

Evidence which supports the view that the Soviet economy was a factor in causing Russian victory in the Great Patriotic War:

- planned economy was suitable for wartime exigencies and emergency of production
- forced industrialisation in the 1930s led to Soviet economy being able to mass produce modern weapons of war – 85,000 T-34 tanks, 2.2 million PPSH-41 sub-machine guns, 25,000 Aeroplanes produced from 1941-45
- collective farms and private markets – peasants kitchen gardens – saved the country from starvation in 1941–1943. Production maintained despite manpower shortage, lack of mechanical support for farming and fertilisers being diverted to military use. Military front and to urban centres
- labour militarised before the war – 1 day off per month, sickness and slacking illegal. Trade unions fully supported management in strict labour discipline
- economy received huge support from Allies – machine tools, raw material, locomotives, trucks/Jeeps and aero engines all supplied from Western powers
- oil supplies from Baku oil fields kept the economy fuelled
- 'All for the Front' not just a slogan but a reality – 70% of GDP spent on defence from 1941–1945.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------------|---|
| Victor Davis Hanson | Contends that Stalin was able to coordinate Soviet military/industry to bring victory in the years after Barbarossa invasion and initial defeats. |
| Sean McMeekin | Argues that Soviet access to USA and British economic supplies was a crucial reason for victory as they were not paid for and were of the highest quality. |
| John Keegan | Contends that Red Army commanders by 1943 had mastered modern warfare to allow the defeat of the Axis invaders who were now under-strength. |
| Evan Mawdsley | Argues that Nazis were unable to mobilise anti-communist sentiment inside the territories occupied as they viewed Slavic people as racially inferior and fit for enslavement. |

Section 8 – Russia: From Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 62 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the outcome of the Russian Civil War of 1917–1921?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|--|---|
| Denikin's forces had overstretched themselves in their drive towards Moscow in 1919 because in the rear the Whites had left themselves without enough troops to defend their bases against Makhno's partisans and Ukrainian nationalists, so much so that at the height of the Moscow offensive they were forced to withdraw troops to deal with them. | Suggests that the White army did not have enough troops available to defend their lines of supply from insurgents. This meant they had to withdraw troops for the front to deal with attacks in the rear. |
| Without regular supplies, the White troops broke down into looting peasant farms to which the Cossacks were especially prone as they sought to despoil non-Cossack settlements. | Suggests that significant lack of regular supplies caused Whites to loot peasant farms especially those of non-Cossack farms. |
| The real problem of the Whites was their inability to mobilise enough peasant troops in Ukraine and south Russia because the peasants were afraid that a White victory would lead to the reversal of their revolution on the land. . . | Suggests that the peasants were afraid of the Whites returning land to the landlords so they were refusing to join the White armies. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Whites made the strategic mistake of not conceding to the peasantry the land they had taken from the gentry, church and nobility in 1917
- Whites did not possess enough troops to protect their rear when they advanced as they had few supporters in the Civil War
- reluctant peasants were willing to fight for the Reds if they thought the Whites were winning and about to return the landlord and squire to power. Fear the old-order would be reimposed by a White victory in the Civil War.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| The Red Army emerged as the single most effective fighting force in the Civil War and became the cornerstone of the new regime, primarily because Trotsky was its central figure as he was ruthless, colourful, a disciplinarian and skilled propagandist. | Suggests that Trotsky was of special importance in developing the Red Army who demonstrated the skills he had and needed to possess to lead the Red Army to victory. |

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|---|--|
| Throughout the conflict the Red Army needed soldiers. Military service was introduced after the revolt of the Czech Legion in May 1918, conscription for men aged twenty-one to twenty-five was introduced for Siberia, the Urals and the Volga regions and continued to expand until by 1920 when the Red Army numbered 5 million men. | States that the ability to recruit and conscript in large numbers provided the Red Army with 5 million men a reason for their victory. |
| Former 'bourgeois' Tsarist-officers were conscripted into the Army to provide leadership and professionalism and by 1920 over 50,000 had served the cause of the international proletarian revolution. | States that large numbers of former officers of the ex-Tsarist Army were also taken into compulsory service to provide the needed training and leadership needed for the growing Red Army. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Trotsky was determined to have an army along professional lines of command, formation and equipment. Former – Tsarist officers conscripted into Red Army were on the whole loyal and effective members of the Red Army and Trotsky recognised this
- he had to fight against the idea that the military struggle could be conducted with a militia-type army where there was little discipline, formal command and formation
- threats to the new Bolshevik regime began to grow in 1918 as the White movement organised in different parts of the country, foreign intervention began and the Czech Legion controlled the railways in Siberia.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- White armies were reluctant to recognise independence of former Tsarist-era empire areas such as Finland, the Baltic states and Poland. This hampered them gaining support from these nationalities as they wanted to restore 'Russia: one and indivisible'
- Trotsky had Lenin's crucial support in building a traditional army, employing 'class enemies' as Military Specialists, ending the role of Soldier Committees – caused controversy among Bolsheviks like Stalin
- foreign Intervention by the Allies made the White cause even more unpopular among the people as the Whites were portrayed as lackeys of foreign capital and allowed the Bolsheviks to appear as patriots
- Reds had control over Russia's rail network which allowed them quick communications, resupply and reinforcement. Moscow their capital since 1918 was at the centre of the railway hub
- war industries were located near both Moscow and Petrograd – the Tula Arms factory system and all former imperial arms depots/barracks and training areas were in the control of the Red Army Lenin's government used 'War Communism' to ensure all resources that were needed by the Red Army were produced and sent to the front
- requisitioning Brigades of Cheka, workers were sent to the countryside to take food from peasants and take to the towns to feed the factory workers and their families
- White Armies were lacking in political program that would appeal to the people – they did not recognise the masses were now involved in politics and there was no going back to the pre-revolutionary political/social world which no longer existed
- Cheka used to repress any internal dissent on the home front during the Civil War. Class enemies, 'former people' and political rivals were repressed. Concentration camp system set up to punish and deter those who might rebel. Oppression of enemies – real or imagined was integral to Bolshevik rule from the very beginning of the regime.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------------|--|
| Laura Engelstein | Argues that economics determines the Reds would win as they controlled the war industries and communications of central Russia. |
| Richard Pipes | Contends that Bolshevik use of terror and massive resources mean their victory was inevitable. . . amazed it took so long to defeat the Whites. |
| Evan Mawdsley | Argues that the Reds won due to the availability of huge military resources left over from the tsarist state – the ‘Aladdin’s cave’ of equipment etc. |
| Peter Kenez | Contends the Bolsheviks won because they understood the need to engage the masses and to work to bring their programme to the workers and peasants and to create bodies which could restore to Russia. |

Question 63 **How fully does Source C explain the reasons for Stalin's success in the leadership struggle?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|---|--|
| Stalin had already used the massive power of the Secretariat to promote figures such as Voroshilov, Molotov and Ordzhonikidze who would offer him their unqualified support in the future as they formed a loyal bloc who never voted against their leader. | States that Stalin had used his power to appoint allies to support him in the struggle over power in the leadership struggle of the 1920s. |
| Stalin also offered an encouraging and realistic policy alternative promoting 'Socialism in one Country' as a patriotic and pragmatic contrast to Trotsky's insistence on seeking to sponsor further European revolution as the future of the exhausted and war-weary Soviet Union in developing Socialism. | States that Stalin's policies were more attractive to the exhausted people as they were patriotic and contrasted those of Trotsky which sought to extend revolution into Europe. |
| Other members of the Politburo such as Zinoviev and Kamenev were terrified of Trotsky as they were afraid of the 'man on the horse' taking power as Napoleon had done in the French Revolution. | States that leading members of the Politburo were alarmed by the threat of Trotsky seizing power. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Stalin's administrative power was able to promote those who were his allies and to build his power at the elite level of Soviet society in the 1920s
- policy debates after Lenin dies were between two main options. Trotsky was seeking to promote revolution abroad especially in Europe but Stalin had a more patriotic policy of building a socialist state and not getting involved in wars with foreign powers
- Stalin had support from other leading figures who united to keep Trotsky from winning the power struggle – they did not know that Stalin was the real threat to them.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Lenin's Testament was published after his death in January 1924 – it criticised all the potential contenders for power – Lenin called for Stalin's removal from being General Secretary for being 'too rude' Stalin had verbally abused Krupskaya before Lenin died and he was determined to remove Stalin from office
- Trotsky under suspicion because he was an ex-Menshevik who had only formally joined the Bolsheviks in June, 1917. Bolsheviks feared a coup by Trotsky as he had control of the Red Army – example of Napoleon in the French revolution – 'the man on the white horse.' Jewish background of Trotsky was a factor in a traditionally antisemitic culture of Russia which made his leadership bid unpopular
- Stalin harboured resentment of Trotsky from the Civil War years when they clashed frequently over personnel and policy decisions – Stalin was routinely insubordinate to Trotsky as he was Commissar for War who had authority in military matters
- 'Comrade Card Index' was working to establish a client-patron system through provincial appointments in the Party leadership – these will ensure majority at party congresses post-1924. Stalin had powerbase in administrative offices he held – General Secretary, Orgburo, Inspectorate that the other rivals did not have as their powerbase were localised, for example, Zinoviev in the Comintern and Leningrad or Kamenev in Moscow. Stalin able to build alliances to defeat opponents and then turned on erstwhile comrades – allies with Bukharin and Tomsky to defeat the Left and then turns on them in late 1920s

- provincial party leaders were more impressed by Stalin's unpolished proletarian background/style than polished 'bourgeois' Trotsky. Post-1924 'Lenin enrolment' of approx. 1 million new members from the urban working class were looking for strong leadership and not sophisticated Marxist thinkers – Stalin appealed to them as a fellow Proletarian
- 'Socialism in one country' viewed as more patriotic and attractive to a war-weary populace than the prospect of continual conflict that Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' offered
- Trotsky's arrogance – he believed he would win leadership struggle without allies, relying on his own brilliance to overcome opponents was a factor in his defeat. Trotsky was a loyal Bolshevik who never entertained the idea of using the Army to launch a coup. Trotsky might win the debate but Stalin always won the vote . . . majorities in Party Congress were in favour of Stalin's line
- Stalin seemed to be a conciliator and looked to build consensus when there were disagreements in the Politburo – he seemed determined to maintain unity in the Party
- 'Ban on Factions' used to discredit Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev when they organised 'United Opposition' against Stalin in the late 1920s. Stalin seemed to be promulgating Lenin's policy on unity within the party as adopted in 1921.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|--|
| Ivan Deutscher | Argues that to Trotsky it seemed a bad joke that Stalin, this wilful and sly but shabby and inarticulate man in the background, should be his rival. |
| Martin McCauley | Contends that Stalin had luck on his side. . . had Lenin not died he would have been sent to the provinces to work for the Party. |
| Harold Shukman | Argues that Trotsky's policy of permanent revolution was not a popular one with the party members nor the public at large. They were tired of war and wanted material prosperity. |
| Adam Ulam | Argues that Trotsky's 'Lessons of October' united all the leading Politburo members against him as he outlined their weakness, mistakes and lack of courage in the events of the October Revolution. |

Question 64 Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the motives for the Purges in 1930s Russia.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Author | Joseph Stalin. | Stalin head of the Soviet government, instigator of the Purges of the 1930s. |
| Purpose | Speech to the Central Committee of the Party. | CC the elite leadership body of the Party and State Speech designed to give a rationalisation for the Purges which are unmasking enemies throughout the USSR – both ordinary people, and Party elites. |
| Timing | 1937. | 1937 at the height of the Purges as elites being decimated, denunciations expand and the military are about to be purged brutally. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| Kamenev and Zinoviev flatly denied that they had any kind of political platform because they were afraid to demonstrate their real political platform of restoring Capitalism in the USSR. | Takes the view that the Purges were designed to stop hostile senior political figures such as Zinoviev and Kamenev who he accused of seeking to re-introduce Capitalism into the Soviet Union. Emphasised by 'flatly denied' which becomes the excuse given by Stalin to allow him to act. |
| The influence of the contemporary wreckers, the Trotskyists lies in the Party card which gives them power because their strength lies in the fact that their Party membership card gains for them political confidence and gives them access to all our institutions and organisations. | Takes the view that Trotsky's secret supporters were in possession of Party membership which gives them access to Soviet institutions and organisations which they can use to their advantage. Emphasised by these 'wreckers' were 'enemies' are powerful in 1937 and they were causing problems for the state again from Stalin's point of view. |
| The Party must be on guard to unmask these traitors who seek to destroy us: the capitalist powers, the fascists, are in league with these wreckers and double dealers who are seeking to undermine our socialist country from within. | Takes the view that political opponents of Stalin were in league with fascist/capitalist powers seeking to undermine the Soviet Union and they were to be unmasked by the Party in the Purges to save socialism. Emphasised by using the words 'double dealers', again from Stalin's point of view. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Stalin in control of the reins of power and is outlining the reasons for the Purges of enemies
- political rivals such as Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin who helped lead the revolution and the Soviet government in the 1920s were arrested, tortured and killed after 'Show Trials'
- Trotsky's policies and his followers were critiquing Stalin and the bureaucracy as a sign of a new ruling, exploitative class subverting the ideals of the October revolution
- Stalin was determined to destroy any potential 'Fifth Column' in event of war breaking out in the 1930s as war became more likely when Hitler comes to power.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- purges spun out of control as ordinary citizens denounced colleagues, rivals, and neighbours to NKVD
- Yezhov – head of NKVD – in 1937–1938 was eager to demonstrate the institutional necessity of the NKVD in defeating enemies and forced the pace of purging so-called enemies of the people vigorously
- purges used to cover for and to explain why there were economic problems – low production, shortages, lack of housing and consumer goods – caused by 'wreckers', spies and saboteurs
- Stalin was determined to destroy those who knew of his personal, intellectual and moral weakness and inferiorities – 'Old Bolsheviks' were destroyed in the Purges
- 1936–1939 Soviet Union faced potentially war on two fronts with no strong allies.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|
|-------------------|---------------------------------|

| | |
|---------------------------|---|
| George Gill | Contends that the Purges expanded as denunciations rose as people hoped for leniency for their family, friends and self. |
| Sheila Fitzpatrick | Argues Purges came from below as leadership made decisions to purge as a reaction to a series of events/crises in the 1930s. |
| Robert Tucker | Contends Stalin was seeking to destroy traitors within the Party and state who did not share his vision. |
| J Arch Getty | Considers Purges were not a well-developed plan but as a result of institutional rivalry, ad hoc decisions by Stalin and elites such as Yezhov had agency in increasing the momentum and scope of the purges. |

Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 65 **How important was the agrarian problem in causing tension in Spain in the 1920s?**

Aim of the question To examine the importance of the agrarian problem in causing tension in Spain in the 1920s. In doing so, candidates may wish to consider the agrarian system in different parts of Spain; land ownership and the *Caciques*; latifundios; day labourers and the precarious nature of rural existence; the growth of rural trade unions. Candidates may also wish to consider the relative importance of the agrarian problem in causing tension compared to the problems with the church, the army and regional questions as well as the political situation under Primo. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the agrarian problem was very important in causing tension in Spain in the 1920s:

- the nature of the Spanish agricultural system meant the land was unproductive. The problem, at its simplest was Spain's inability to feed and nurture its population due to inefficient, unfairly maintained rural economy
- especially in the South, there were vast unproductive estates, latifundia. Instead of producing much needed food they often used large amounts of land to raise prize bulls
- Spanish aristocracy felt little impetus to improve their land or become more efficient. Their status came from owning the land and their family name
- half of Spain went to bed hungry. There was a general lack of suitable food for much of the population. In many of the rural areas, the farm labourers had no land or even common land to grow anything on for themselves; and in the urban areas, periods of depression or bad harvests would mean a lack of money or increase in food prices resulting in malnutrition
- most of the peasant class lived an existence which was below subsistence due to under employment. Most were day labourers, hired when there was work to be done but with no obligation on the part of the landowners to relieve their poverty when there was no work
- the lack of industrialisation elsewhere in Spain meant there had not been the same rural to urban migration that had occurred in many other countries. Many historians have pointed to this as the greatest block to progress in Spain. The push and pull effects of an overpopulated countryside and a need for workers in factories which had fed industrialisation elsewhere was lacking in Spain
- the landed aristocracy were part of the Spanish establishment and their power in the countryside was supported by the forces of the State, including the Guardia Civil
- the growing resentment at their plight led to many rural workers joining the agrarian arms of the trade unions which had blossomed in the urban areas, although some of these were repressed by Primo de Rivera which often led to more countryside unrest.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were important in causing tension in Spain in the 1920s:

The army:

- the army was desperately seeking a role and a new identity in the 1920s. A former colonial power, Spain's colonies were reduced to little more than Spanish Morocco, where a disastrous war raged in the early part of the decade
- the Spanish army was extremely expensive, consuming around 40% of GDP. This was unsustainable and clearly a block on progress as it diverted funds which could have been used for social improvement. It was also the most top-heavy army in Europe, with a ratio of officers to men which made no sense in military terms and was responsible for wasting much of the money spent on the armed forces

- since the Spanish army had played no part in WWI, it had not modernised in the way that others had. Horsemanship was still prized among officers
- the army was generally resented by the working class as they were seen as an arm of the repressive state and were used to break strikes and protests. They were also resented for conscripting young men from rural and working areas into the army to fight in Morocco, with scant regard to their welfare. Disasters like the Battle of Annual in 1921 cost the lives of around 10,000 men and caused uproar in Spain
- the imposition of what was effectively a military dictatorship in 1923 emphasised that the army saw itself as the final arbiter in Spain. The army intervened to 'rescue' the King from political embarrassment and overthrew the flimsy democracy that had existed.

The Church:

- the Church was part of the Spanish establishment, one of the pillars of the traditional Spanish state and heavily linked with the Monarchy
- the status of the Church was in contrast to its day-to-day relevance among ordinary Spaniards. Attendance at church services was in decline, down to around 20%, and in some urban parishes, priests said mass to empty churches
- the Church still had a virtual monopoly on education but had little interest in improving the high rates of illiteracy among the population, particularly the rural poor
- there was a growing anti clerical movement in Spain which existed among both the middle class who wanted social and political reform and who viewed the Church as a barrier to this; and the working class who resented the oppressive role the Church played in conjunction with the State authorities.

Regional issues:

- there had long been regional tensions in Spain, but these became more acute in the 1920s. There was a disparity in the needs of the more industrialised areas such as Catalonia and the Basque country and the rural economies elsewhere in the country, especially in the south. The traditional Spanish establishment was comprised of the landowners and aristocratic families. This brought tensions with the emerging capitalist class
- particularly in Catalonia, there was a growing political movement that linked social reform with greater regional autonomy. Unlike earlier in the century when much of Catalan nationalism was right-wing, there was a growing Catalan left movement which agitated for social progress and decentralisation of the Spanish state
- there was an upsurge of pro-devolution in other areas too, including the Basque country and Galicia
- the Dictadura meant an entrenching of the centralist nature of Spain, which led to regional pressures being suppressed and along with those for other social progress. This helped to link them clandestinely.

The political situation:

- in the early part of the decade, the 'turno pacifico' produced relatively stable but democratically corrupt government with a limited franchise
- even this sham was swept away with the pronunciamiento and imposition of the Dictadura in 1923, under Primo de Rivera, in what was effectively a military coup d'etat
- the growth of left-wing movements, including the socialists and the anarchists coincided with the increasing demands of an anti-clerical and pro-republican middle class who were agitating for parliamentary democracy
- the Dictadura went through different stages, including some initial acceptance and a reduction of overt political strife but by the end of the decade was clearly failing.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---|---|
| Paul Preston | Argues 'Repression had intensified the hatred of the braceros for the big landowners and their estate managers.' |
| Antony Beevor | Contends 'The Church was detested by the workers and labourers for preaching acceptance of poverty while amassing vast riches.' |
| George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert | Argues 'The Army was in the forefront of internal and civil disputes.' |
| Hugh Thomas | Claims 'The landless labourers of the south were the most potentially revolutionary group in the country.' |

Question 66

To what extent did the revolt in Asturias in 1934 substantially increase the likelihood of civil war in Spain?

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which the events in the Asturias region in 1934 increased the likelihood of a civil war. In doing so, candidates may consider the violent nature of the uprising and the brutal suppression of it by the army. Candidates may also consider the repression which followed including the banning of some political groups, the censorship of certain publications and the arrest of many politicians and trade union activists. Candidates may also consider the continuation of democracy, the non-proscription of opposition parties and the legal status of the participants. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the revolt in Asturias substantially increased the likelihood of civil war.

- this was an armed insurrection by elements on the Left who had munitions and explosives. This was not a normal part of a healthy democracy
- the brutality of the oppression which followed showed how the army was ready to take on the workers in armed combat, like the battles with militia which were to come. Regular troops against armed trade unionists was like a foretelling of the early days of the Civil War in 1936
- the Left had good reason to fear Robles' rhetoric. The CEDA leader wanted to crush reform and any form of socialism. If that meant abandoning democracy, he was prepared to do that too
- the Asturias uprising was inspired by the legal inclusion of elected members, therefore it was an illegal attack on the Government. Short-term devastation over and above that required to restore order, therefore an attack on workers by the forces of reaction. This was a country with sides so divided that it was in armed conflict with itself
- Asturias was not alone, there were strikes all over Spain. Although the Asturias was the longest lasting and fiercest fighting, it was not isolated
- declaration of Catalan State on announcement of Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) delegates was undemocratic. This showed an abandonment of due process by some of those who had helped to set up the Republic
- insurrectionary behaviour of Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (CNT), Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI). There were many strikes and illegal acts by the unions who showed a disregard for democracy
- reactions to Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra (FNTT) strikes, banned on grounds of harvest being 'sacred'
- suspension of El Obrero de la Tierra, suspension of strike meetings
- Azaña, Companys and Caballero imprisoned
- government of Catalonia disbanded, statute of autonomy suspended
- martial law
- polarisation between right and left.

Evidence which supports the view that it did not substantially increase the likelihood of civil war:

- co-ordinated by trade unions therefore a 'normal strike'. This was effectively a general strike, similar to that held in Britain in 1926
- the Civil War did not break out until 1936 and when it did, it was initiated by the Right. Therefore, there was not only time between these events and the Civil War but a reversal of roles
- labour conditions in Asturias were horrendous and strike action was justified. The miners were fighting against dangerous and outdated working practices
- brutality of Casas Viejas
- Cortes not disbanded. There was no attempt, even by CEDA to abandon parliamentary democracy. They continued in Government and even held fair elections in 1936, which led to the Popular Front gaining control

- no right-wing coup. This was not used as pretence for the staging of a takeover from the Right. Ultimately there was a return to democracy after the Asturias uprising
- Socialist Party and trade unions not proscribed. Both were allowed to continue with many of those originally imprisoned later released
- both sides participated in the 1936 election and initially accepted the results
- it was election defeat which persuaded the Right to rebel. The uprising convinced the Right that the Left had abandoned democracy. This raised the stakes. Civil war was closer but not necessarily inevitable
- the acceptance of CEDA into the cabinet and the reversal of reform convinced the Left that any gains made in 1931–1933 were doomed. It seemed as if Spain was going backwards and that the modest success of the Bienio Reformista was being undone but this did not mean civil war
- one result of the failure of the Asturias uprising was that the Left knew that unity was essential. The divisions which were partly to blame for the lack of success of the strikes outside of the Asturias showed the need for those on the Left to work together. This helped to bring about the Popular Front.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Raymond Carr | Argues that ‘Robles had declared . . . that socialism must be defeated at all costs. When it (the Asturias Rising) was over the nation was morally divided between those who favoured repression and those who did not.’ |
| Paul Preston | Emphasises the increasing mimicking of Fascist tactics: ‘A crowd of 20,000 gathered and shouted ‘¡jefe!¡jefe!¡jefe!’ and ‘Our Leaders never make mistakes!’ This showed the abandonment of democracy by CEDA. |
| Hugh Thomas | Argues that: ‘Largo reaffirmed his belief in the necessity of preparing a proletarian rising . . . describes this as a fatal error of judgement. Political feelings were . . . worsened beyond cure (during Bienio Negro) Where lay the difference between Dollfuss and Gil Robles? Gil Robles did nothing to make it clear.’ |
| Gerald Brenan | Argues that Asturias ‘first battle of the Civil War’ (left united against CEDA). |

Question 67

To what extent was the Spanish army responsible for the rising of 1936?

Aim of the question To examine the reasons for the rising in 1936 and specifically consider whether the Spanish army was responsible. In doing so, the candidate may consider that the rising was by elements of the army and it was largely generals who were involved in the planning of the attempted coup. Candidates might also consider other reasons for the rising including that only sections of the armed forces revolted; there had been increasing political violence that effectively came to a head; that polarisation of Spanish society made a conflict of some sort inevitable; and that the Right had abandoned democracy after their defeat in the 1936 election. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates may refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Spanish army was responsible for the rising of 1936:

- the leader of the plot was General Mola and most of the others were also army generals determined to take control
- although afterwards they tried to blame events such as the murder of Calvo Sotelo, the plotting of the rising began virtually immediately after the election of the Popular Front
- only the army could have tried to thwart democracy like this, although the political right had armed militias such as the *requetes*, they would not have been strong enough to combat the organised working class movements of the political left
- the proposed new head of state was to be Sanjurjo, the exiled former army general who had already tried to lead a military rising in 1932
- the uprising was carefully planned over a period of months by Mola and although it did not succeed, it was designed to be similar to the *pronunciamientos* which had previously seen the army bring about regime change in Spain
- the rising was coordinated by generals in key strategic locations throughout Spain. In each case, a general was to become the head of a city
- Franco later claimed that the army were forced into rising to save the nation but this was always the justification for military take-overs and was against a government who had won power in free, fair and democratic elections only months earlier
- the rising began in Morocco when elements of the Army of Africa, afraid their plotting had been discovered, took over control of the territory and killed any who showed loyalty to the Republic
- many elements within the army had never been comfortable with civilian rule and had worked against the Republic since its inception. The replacement of the centre-right governments of the Bienio Negro with a centre-left Popular Front meant their patience with democracy had worn out.

Evidence which does not support the view that the Spanish army was responsible for the rising of 1936:

Candidates may refer to:

- the rising was not of the Spanish army but of some generals and sections of the armed forces. Most generals stayed loyal to the Republic and many of those soldiers who joined the Nationalists had little option because their Unit as a whole had joined
- since coming to power in February, the Popular Front had faced increasing political violence which saw death squads assassinating rivals in increasing numbers. Many thought that some drastic action had to be taken and called on the army to restore order
- the murder of Calvo Sotelo was, for many, the last straw. This was the event which finally persuaded Franco to join the rising
- Spain had been polarising virtually ever since the foundation of the Second Republic in 1931. Some argued that conflict was inevitable at least since the Asturias rising – of the Left – in 1934. The events of July 1936 were therefore a culmination of the journey that Spain had been travelling

- the political Right, as much as the army, could be considered responsible for the rising in 1936. After the election defeat at the start of the year, the largest right-wing party, CEDA had abandoned their accidentalism strategy – which wanted to gain power in the way that Hitler had by using the mechanism of democracy against itself. They were now in the catastrophist camp alongside the Falange, who were determined to overthrow the government by force.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-----------------|---|
| Hugh Thomas | Contends that The Second Republic failed because it came to be rejected by powerful groups both to the Left and to the Right. |
| Raymond Carr | Argues that though the military rising had been planned some time before, the murder of Calvo Sotelo made revolt inevitable. |
| Julian Casanova | Contends that the leading role in the preparation of the rebellion was played by General Emilio Mola. His plan was for military leaders in different parts of Spain to join the uprising and declare a state of war in order to place civil authority in military hands. |
| Paul Preston | Argues that because the election results represented an unequivocal statement of the popular desire for a strong Republican – Socialist government. Henceforth, the right would be more concerned with destroying the Republic than taking it over. Military plotting began in earnest. |

Question 68 **‘The Nationalists held most of the significant advantages at the start of the Civil War.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question This question invites candidates to assess the validity of the view that the Nationalists held most of the significant advantages at the start of the Civil War. Candidates may include reference to the geographical split of forces, the division of officers and other ranks, the equipment each side had and the division of the army, navy and air force. The candidate may also examine the division of other resources available to each side, including economic assets. The candidate should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Army:

- the Nationalists had the Army of Africa, considered both the most experienced and the fiercest troops in the Spanish army. It consisted of two parts, the foreign legion (Tercio de Extranjeros) and the Regulares, including the local Moroccan troops. They were used to combat, harsh conditions and to dealing ruthlessly with enemies
- in terms of size, the Army of Africa consisted of around 35,000–40,000 men and the Nationalists secured around 60,000 men and officers on the mainland
- the Nationalists had most of the senior officers and their Generals had the advantage of having planned the coup months in advance. They also had around 30,000 other armed police from the Carabineros, the Assault Guard and the Civil Guard. This gave them a total of around 130,000
- the Republic had around the same number of men from the peninsular army, though fewer officers. They also had slightly more from the armed police units. This meant they had around 90,000 men
- army equipment and munitions were fairly evenly split, although the Nationalists had more automatic weapons and artillery, the Republic had the factories to make more.

Navy and Air Force:

- although the Spanish Air Force was small, virtually all of it remained loyal to the Republican Government
- the navy was central to the Nationalist uprising and the vast majority of officers rebelled, however the junior ranks were well organised and over-powered the officers on most ships, leaving almost all of the navy in Republican hands. Most of the merchant marine was also at the disposal of the Government
- the Nationalists held most of the naval ports and dockyards.

Militias/Civil Guard:

- both sides had militias, with Falangists and Carlists on the Nationalist side and trade unionists, Nationalists and Left parties on the Republican side
- the Civil, and Assault, Guards were split into equal parts. They tended to side with the successful side: joining the Nationalists in their territory, but remaining loyal to the Republic in the main cities such as Barcelona and Madrid.

Economic:

- the Republic had the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain. This meant they could buy weapons if anyone would sell them to them
- the Republicans had most of the large cities with their industrial areas and workforce. They held the mining areas and also had control of the largest export of Spain, the fruit crop via Valencia. They also held the country's gold reserves. About two-thirds of the Spanish mainland remained in Republican hands
- in addition to holding key industrial territory, the Republic held on to most of the railways and motorised infrastructure
- the Republic controlled the two main entry points for rail and road to France as well as the North coast

- the Republic controlled the country's coal in Asturias, as well as chemical and explosive plants
- the Nationalists had most of the best agricultural land. They also held Spanish Morocco and the help of the Riffian tribes
- the Nationalists possession of Morocco, the Canaries and the Balearics, together with most of the territory surrounding friendly Portugal gave them a strategic advantage
- in terms of crops, the cereal growing regions around central Spain were almost equally divided. The Republic held most of the grape and olive growing regions, though the Nationalists held most of the sheep, pig and cattle regions.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---|--|
| Antony Beevor | Argues that for a long war, it looked as if the Republic had the advantage. |
| Paul Preston | Suggests that the Nationalists held roughly one third of Spanish territory in one block as well as the main wheat growing areas, but the main centres of both light and heavy industry remained in Republican hands. |
| Raymond Carr | Takes the view that the strength of the Nationalist army lay in the fact that it captured the allegiance of most of the junior officers. |
| George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert | Contend that, in the early weeks of the fighting, the insurgents enjoyed several major advantages over their opponents. However, a number of factors mitigated against a quick insurgent triumph. |

Question 69

To what extent can the victory of the Nationalists be attributed to the aid from Germany and Italy?

Aim of the question To examine the extent to which the victory of the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War was due to the aid from Germany and Italy. In assessing this, candidates might consider the extent of aid from both countries, the timing of aid, the quality of aid and the credit provided to purchase the aid. Candidates might also wish to consider other reasons for the victory of the Nationalists, including how Franco's leadership helped win the war, including his military style. His discipline, his relationship with the various parts of the Nationalist cause and his links with other countries; the divisions within the Republican side and the unity of the Nationalists. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the victory of the Nationalists was due to German and Italian aid:

- it was German and Italian planes which were able to transport the Army of Africa across the straits of Gibraltar in order to ensure the Civil War continued on the Iberian Peninsula
- German aid was far superior to anything else in Spain in the latter part of the war. The Condor Legion eventually gave Franco total air superiority. This was displayed at Guernica and most of the successful battles for the Nationalists. The Germans provided an air force, artillery, technicians and ammunition among other support
- although there is some evidence that the Germans were happy to prolong the war, they were prepared to put enough support into Spain to ensure Franco's eventual success. They used Spain as a testing ground for their new air force and weaponry, meaning that the Nationalists had access to the most up to date equipment
- Italian aid was not always as great technically but was large in terms of troops. By February 1937 there were 50,000 Italian troops serving in the Nationalist army. The Italians also provided aircraft and tanks, among other supplies. The Italian navy also helped in the Mediterranean. It was said that Italy was effectively at war with the Spanish Republic. Especially after the Italian defeat at Guadalajara
- Mussolini could not afford to suffer a Republican victory, so was prepared to give any amount of military support needed.
- the Nationalists were able to obtain aid from Germany and Italy on credit. They were being supported for ideological and strategic reasons. The methods of payment were of secondary importance.

Evidence which supports the view that the victory of the Nationalists was due to other reasons:

The leadership of Franco:

- Franco's leadership, although criticised has also been interpreted as cleverly controlled to ensure total political control and ensure a sustainable victory
- Franco also merits acclaim for personal involvement in securing aid without conceding much
- Franco was able to equip his army largely on credit so that his troops could get up to date and plentiful armaments
- Franco was the head of the Army of Africa. Consisting of experienced Spanish troops, Moroccan mercenaries and the Legionnaires, they were by far the best fighting – and most feared – soldiers in the Spanish Army. In the war in the South, in the first few months, the Army of Africa swept across vast areas of land, deliberately terrorising the defeated areas in order that Republican defenders further ahead were demoralised
- Franco was meticulous, although some criticised him for this, it meant that he always secured the areas he had taken thoroughly. He was in undisputed control of his zone which helped him when looking to lead
- although he was criticised for making a detour to relieve the Alcazar at Toledo, it was a terrific propaganda coup which gained Franco both international recognition and made him even more popular with his troops and others on the Nationalist side

- Franco was the only one through whom Hitler and Mussolini wanted to channel their aid. This gave Franco a prestige and made him the natural leader of the Nationalists. Franco was chosen because of his leadership of the Army of Africa.

Internal divisions on the Republican side:

- from the outset, the parties comprising the Popular Front had little in common. There was a wide range from centre-left middle class republicans to communists and pro-revolutionary socialists. Within the politicians of the Popular Front the gap was arguably even wider and even within the PSOE there was open disagreement between Prieto and Caballero
- in the Civil War the divisions within the Republican side were even wider as there were also anarchists and the POUM. The growth in importance of the Communists set them on a collision course with these two groups. This caused disagreements over strategy and different parts of the armed forces pursuing different objectives
- the war or revolution debate dominated Republican thinking during the early stages of the war. In the areas where the revolution had taken hold in the summer of 1936, in Catalonia and Aragon in particular, there was a creeping 'Republicanisation' of the armed forces as regular divisions replaced militia. Although some argue that this meant the army was more efficient, defending the gains of the revolution was what many on the Left were fighting for, causing a drop in morale among some on the Republican side
- Soviet aid was channelled through the communists and meant that they were increasingly important on the Republican side. It also meant that some parts of the army were better equipped than others – the events of May 1937 in Barcelona showed that the divisions on the Republican side were deep. The clashes between the anarchists and POUM on one side and the Government/communists on the other resulted in the ousting of Caballero and the virtual takeover of the Republican side by the communists. This can be seen as a turning point in the war
- battles such as the Ebro were dictated by communist thinking, and it could be argued that their strategy meant that the republic suffered unnecessary defeats by taking risks and officers being unable to give realistic assessments due to a fear of giving bad news
- the lack of unity in command on the Republican side was in contrast to the singularity of the Nationalist leadership once Franco had become Generalissimo.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|----------------------|---|
| Antony Beevor | Argues that 'German and Italian regimes were at least reassured that France, as well as Great Britain, would do nothing to hinder their intervention in Spain.' |
| Paul Preston | Contends that the Nationalists had as much potential for division as the Republicans. |
| Gerald Brenan | Argues that 'Foreign intervention was crucial.' |
| Raymond Carr | Believes that 'Axis fears of rebel defeat led to extra aid in November 1938. Republican government blamed lack of unity.' |

Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 70 **How fully does Source A explain the reasons for the fall of the monarchy in 1931?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to information given</i> |
|---|--|
| . . . a political opposition had developed in left-liberal and intellectual circles, the most important of which became known as the Alianza Republicana whose aim was not just to do away with the dictatorship but with the monarchy. | States that new political movements were established to bring the monarchy down. |
| When, in 1930, the socialists opposed the monarchy and the dictatorship, UGT membership began to rise rapidly. | States that opposition to the monarchy was popular among the Left. |
| University students and workers openly campaigned for an overthrow of the monarchy. | States that opposition to the monarchy was widespread in Spanish society and being voiced in public. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Liberal politicians were organising opposition not just to the dictatorship but to the monarchy
- the growing political unrest increasingly focused on Alfonso and the Monarchy as a barrier to reform. Alfonso became the personification of the problems of Spain and his removal a necessity. The anti-monarchic sentiment became a rallying point for all those who wanted to progress, with Alfonso as the villain in chief
- in December 1930, the UGT called for a general strike and the following month a university strike began.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Pact of San Sebastian in 1930 coalesced the Republican forces into a coherent force. Now all of those who wanted reform of virtually any type in Spain were united and the Monarchy was left increasingly on the other side. One of the few outlets was the support for Republican candidates in the municipal elections of 1931 and the result was a victory for Republicans which Alfonso could not withstand
- the army was a massively powerful force in Spain and could put down any rebellion, as happened in the failed coup of December 1930, but they failed to provide support to Alfonso in the end which meant he could not continue. The Monarchy could not continue because the Army had decided that it should not. This showed that yet again it was the Army who was effectively deciding the course of events in Spanish politics
- Alfonso was ‘His Most Catholic Majesty’ and had become linked to an increasingly anti-liberal institution, now dominated more than ever by the large landowners. Those who were anticlerical were therefore anti-Monarchy
- the Monarchy had failed to act on fundamental problems in Spanish society, including agrarian reform, regional tension and the power of the church. Alfonso appeared increasingly aloof. Alfonso was viewed as someone completely out of touch with the Spanish people. Almost anyone who wanted reform in any sphere of Spanish life, increasingly saw Alfonso as an obstacle due to his detachment

- the actions of Alfonso in his private life meant that he was perceived as being incompetent and unworthy as a leader and out of touch with his people. His adulterous, playboy lifestyle showed both his own hypocrisy and that of his position as Spain's most Catholic Majesty
- decline of the church and loss of faith in the clergy amongst many of the poor. The church had been declining in active membership for a number of years, with priests sometimes saying Mass to no congregation. The secularisation of Spanish society went hand-in-hand with the growth of republicanism and Alfonso's downfall was therefore as much a result of the tide of events as anything else.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Raymond Carr | Explains 'the Republicans rejected monarchy as an illegitimate and outmoded form of government; the Carlists rejected the Alfonsine branch . . . The Socialists considered (it) reactionary . . . The anarchists rejected it. To the regionalists it . . . strangled local interests . . . The radical regenerationists believed (in) root and branch reform . . . (it was) the personal unpopularity of the king himself (which brought down the monarchy). The conservative classes, during 1930, lost confidence in the monarchy.' |
| Gerald Brenan | Argues that 'the ease with which the dictator had been brought down encouraged the middle classes . . . to think that Alfonso could be got rid of too. Since 1788 not a single Spanish sovereign had had a natural reign. The Army had become increasingly sensitive to any criticisms.' |
| Antony Beevor | Considers 'Alfonso treated the ruling of Spain as little more than a fascinating hobby. The Spanish Church was said to have owned up to one-third of the total wealth of Spain. (The Latifundias') subjects were treated almost as a subject race.' |
| Paul Preston | Suggests 'loss of Imperial power coincided with emergence of left-wing movements. (The monarchy) had fallen into disrepute by the time Primo seized power.' |

Question 71 **How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of opposition to Azana's reforms between 1931 and 1933?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|---|
| Every public manifestation of religion – including Holy Week, Epiphany and even carnival processions – would have to be officially approved, which even Liberal newspapers denounced. | Suggests that opposition to the reform did not just come from the right. |
| Spanish Catholics were forced into having to oppose the constitution if they wished to criticise its educational policy. | Suggests that Catholics were forced into opposition to wider reforms because of the anti-clerical reforms. |
| Alcalá Zamora, the Prime Minister, and Miguel Maura, the Minister for the Interior, resigned in October. | Suggests that there was opposition from within the Republican government |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- it was not just the right-wing press which criticised some of the reforms. Even liberal leaning newspapers condemned some of the pettiness of the anti-clerical reforms and the clauses which allowed for expropriation of land
- the attacks on the Church provided a rallying point for opposition and forced some to choose between backing the Church and supporting the whole notion of the Republic
- the resignation of senior politicians was a blow although Zamora returned as President shortly afterwards.

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| . . . José Maria Gil Robles, declared to the Republican-Socialist majority in the parliament, 'Today, in opposition to the constitution, Catholic Spain takes its stand.' | Suggests that Gil Robles was leading the Catholic opposition. |
| Gil Robles' rhetoric during the Republic reflected the feelings and the fears of his most powerful backers, the big landowners or <i>latifundistas</i> , which highlighted their outrage at the sheer affrontery of the landless labourers reflected their sense of social, cultural and indeed near racist superiority over those who worked their estates. | Suggests that his backers were the large landowners who were allying with the Catholic opposition. |
| The monarchist daily newspaper, the ABC, portrayed the landless labourers of Extremadura as no better than those the army had been fighting against in Morocco, calling them, 'bloodthirsty brutes and Marxist hordes.' | Suggests that the right-wing press were opposed to improving the lives of the landless labourers, who they deemed inferior. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the growth of opposition was led by Gil Robles who used the anti-clerical reforms as a rallying call to oppose the Republican government
- the *latifundistas* were petrified that the parts of the constitution which allowed for expropriation would see a land grab which would rob them of their traditional privileges and wealth
- there was opposition from most of the press to most of the reforms. Large sections of the predominantly Right-wing press kept up constant attacks.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the main source of opposition was to the anti-clerical measures. This came from the Church and politicians but also from many people who would otherwise have supported the republic. The emphasis on Church reforms over agrarian reforms has been heavily criticized
- the opposition within the Cortes tried to delay reforms as much as possible and used the bureaucracy of the new state to do so. The boards set up to try to regulate agriculture were particularly hampered in this way
- there was opposition to the reforms from inside the Centre-left block. The timidity of the agrarian reforms were criticised by Caballero as ‘an aspirin to cure appendicitis’
- the anarchists strongly opposed the lack of reform, particularly in the countryside, leading to the growth of their agrarian trade union
- the UGT did not want to see the anarchists grow at their expense and became more militant in opposing the mild reforms for not going far enough
- there was opposition from the Civil Guard and others who were meant to uphold the new laws. In the countryside they constantly took the landowners’ side in disputes and defiance of legislation
- sections of the military opposed the reforms, particularly those to the army. This culminated in the ill-fated Sanjurjada.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|--|
| Hugh Thomas | Shows that ‘The government’s confidence was reduced by a series of strikes organised by the anarchists in July and August 1931.’ |
| Paul Preston | Argues ‘From the first days of the Republic right-wing extremists disseminated the idea that an alliance of Jews, Freemasons and the working class Internationals was conspiring to destroy Christian Europe.’ |
| Antony Beevor | Contends that ‘The army reforms provided disgruntled army officers with the funds and the time to plot against the Republic.’ |
| Edward Malefakis | Believes ‘. . . the nature of the rural oligarchy and its operation of the large estates may have made land reform economically justifiable . . . they did not thereby make it especially practicable in economic or political terms.’ |

Question 72 Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of as evidence of the reasons why some people fought for the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source D | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|---|
| Author | Franco. | At this time is the undisputed leader of the country and the Falange. He would have full knowledge of the motivation of various groups of people who fought for the Nationalists would only put forward his own romanticised version. |
| Purpose | This is a speech given to the faithful. | His intention is to rewrite history with his version of the Civil War. Also very mindful of the World War which was taking place. |
| Timing | December 1942. | This is after the Civil War but during the Second World War. Spain is neutral but all Franco's rhetoric is pro-Axis powers. |

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|--|---|
| . . . the preservation of her eternal traditional values, with our catholic soul, our history and our greatness. | Takes the view that that the Nationalists were fighting to uphold Spain's traditional values. Emphasised by 'eternal traditional values' and 'Catholic soul'. |
| The foundations of our policy were laid in the beginnings of our movement, when our youth prepared itself to fight and merged the traditional values with the social yearnings of our times. | Takes the view that the merger of different elements of the Nationalists brought its own purpose to their fight. Emphasised by 'merge traditional values' and 'social yearnings of our youth'. |
| During the last war Russian demobilisation led to a situation in which communism seized power and established a barbarian dictatorship of the proletariat and indeed we have battled to defeat this movement in Spain. | Takes the view that they were fighting against Bolshevism as established in the Soviet Union. Emphasised by the 'barbarian dictatorship of the proletariat'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- groups like the Carlists were deeply religious and saw the Nationalist cause as a holy crusade
- Franco merged the Carlists and the Falange to create a new movement, the FET y de las JONS
- the Nationalists liked to portray their cause as that of a fight against communism, but in fact in July 1936 there were very few communists in Spain and none in government.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- many fought because of an accident of geography. They were in Nationalist controlled Spain and were conscripted into the army
- many of those fighting were regular army troops, especially those in the army of Africa as well as other military units
- some of those believed it was the only way to preserve their privileged position in Spanish society which was otherwise under threat from Popular Front reforms
- many of those fighting were volunteers from different countries who would believe in Fascist ideology.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|---------------|---|
| Paul Preston | States 'In the provinces of Seville and Cordoba, many landowners joined mixed columns made up of soldiers, Civil Guards, <i>requetes</i> and Falangists.' |
| Antony Beevor | Contends 'The Catholic Church provided the Nationalist alliance with both a common symbol of tradition and a cause to transcend ideological division within their ranks.' |
| Hugh Thomas | Believes 'In Navarre there was never any doubt about the Nationalist victory with the enthusiastic support of 6000 Carlists <i>requetes</i> in Pamplona.' |
| Raymond Carr | Shows that, 'the peasants of the Castilian heartland joined the Nationalists. . . who called them 'the moral reserve of the nation.' |

Section 10 – Britain at war and peace, 1938–1951

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 73 **To what extent had Attlee revived the fortunes of the Labour Party by 1939?**

Aim of the question To examine the Labour Party of the late 1930s and undertake an assessment of the extent to which a revival had taken place under Clement Attlee's leadership. A successful answer would, therefore, be able to briefly set the context of the schismatic period of 1931–1935. Candidates might outline the measures taken by Attlee to unify the party and indicate the stance of the party on the key political issues of the day. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Attlee had revived the fortunes of the Labour Party:

Difficulties of the 1930s:

- mention of the decline of the Labour Party from holding office, 1929–1931, to its cabinet split
- fall from power and relegation to a minority party in the Commons after the schism over MacDonald and proposed spending cuts
- a very brief review of Lansbury's period as leader and the overtly pacifist stance he brought to the Labour Party.

Labour under Attlee's leadership:

- Clement Attlee replaced George Lansbury as leader of the Labour Party in 1935, beating Morrison and Greenwood in the contest
- there was some division within the Labour ranks on the result (Dalton expressed disappointment whilst Laski was heartened by the fact that they had selected a 'left-centre socialist')
- Attlee introduced major policy changes – greater emphasis on planning as a socialist tool, the abandonment by late 1937 of opposition to rearmament (in light of the Spanish Civil War) and a qualified abandonment of pacifism at the 1935 General Election Labour achieved a net gain of 94 seats and a swing of 9.4% nationally, leaving them with 154 seats.

The Labour Party on the eve of war:

- Labour Party opposition to the Munich Agreement of September 1938
- Labour Party demanded, in vain, that Chamberlain change his appeasement policy
- internal Labour Party disagreement over how to oppose the dictators, the Left headed by Stafford Cripps wanted to construct a United Front against the dictators, the National Executive turned them down. Cripps, Bevan and five others were expelled by the Party
- Labour Party pressure, ignored by Chamberlain, to come to an agreement with the USSR
- a review of the party's national status by 1939, including evidence of success in by-elections (especially Ipswich in February 1938 where a National Government majority of 7000 was overturned)
- party membership had increased from 1.9 million in 1934 to 2.6 million in 1938 and that the party was able to run several big campaigns on focus issues each year, for example, 'peace and security' and 'food and farming' in 1938/1939
- over 150 local constituency parties had their own newspapers and by the end of the 1930's Labour could boast the support of the country's biggest selling morning paper, the Daily Herald
- with the outbreak of war in September 1939, Labour agreed to an electoral truce, but refused to join Chamberlain's Government.

Evidence which supports the view that Labour Party revival was incomplete:

- in spite of its growth the Labour Party suffered a number of glaring weaknesses
- support for the Labour Party was built around particular industries, rather than class lines
- whilst Labour had made some limited headway in attracting lower middle class professionals in suburban areas, middle class support for Conservatism was overwhelming. Sections of the working class, especially those who migrated to find work in the light-industries also backed the National Government
- as with the Conservative Party, the role of women within the party was a cause of tension and the party remained a male-dominated institution
- membership remained relatively small in comparison with Continental socialist parties and was not keeping pace with the Conservatives. Membership numbers varied enormously within and between various parts of the country
- in a handful of weaker seats where there was neither a substantial membership nor a strong trade union base, the existence of the party depended entirely on the dedication of a handful of activists
- significantly, historians are not convinced that Labour could have won an election in 1940. The by-election successes did not in themselves represent anywhere near a big enough swing to produce a Labour government in 1940 and as Andrew Thorpe says, 'the overall impression was of a party that had reached an electoral plateau'
- the consensus of opinion is that Labour had made significant strides on the road to recovery but would have to wait for the impact of the war to provide the political impetus to propel the party into power
- in December 1939, an opinion poll showed that 53% of those questioned preferred the National Government, against 47% for the opposition.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Steven Fielding | Argues that limited progress had taken place but cast doubts on any possible election victory in 1940 '... taking the situation as a whole, it was quite clear that the various crises (of 30s) had done little to actually stimulate political change, either by raising interest or by changing allegiances. Conservative dominance remained intact.' |
| Ben Pimlott | Argues that no leader of the opposition has been more abused or deserving of that abuse for a weak performance than Attlee in the late 1930s. He criticises Attlee for his insipid despatch box performance of the late 30s in the face of the massive social problems of the time. |
| Stephen Brooke | Places great emphasis on structural and ideological changes within the party and the extent to which Attlee had committed it to state planning as a basic tenet of party philosophy, but 'had there been an election in 1939 or 1940 it is unlikely that Labour would have won it.' |
| Derrick Murphy | Believes that there was little chance of Labour ousting the National Government in a potential election of 1940, 'Labour would have stood little chance of victory. The electoral hill to be climbed was simply too steep.' |

Question 74

‘The Royal Navy made the greatest military contribution to the prevention of a German invasion of Britain in 1940.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the reasons behind Britain’s survival at a crucial point in the war, the credit for which has typically been attributed to the actions of RAF Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain. Responses might outline the threat facing Britain and examine the role played by the respective branches of the British military forces. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the actions of the Royal Navy prevented invasion in 1940:

- the belief amongst the Navy that fast-moving ships at sea were safe from German air attack
- no capital ship had been sunk by an aircraft up to that point
- that the German threat of stretching a minefield across the channel to prevent the Navy assisting in repelling an invasion force was an empty one since the German fleet contained very few of these mine laying ships anyway
- Britain had 52 minesweepers, and 16 minesweeping trawlers arrayed against four German minelayers
- that a slow-moving German invasion fleet of barges filled with soldiers would have been sitting ducks for the Navy and that the certainty of massive loss of human life from such attacks by the Royal Navy would have dissuaded the Germans from launching any invasion even if they had gained temporary air superiority
- the disparity between the navies was huge with Britain having 36 destroyers close by and a similar number two days away. The Navy also had five capital ships on hand, whereas the Kriegsmarine had lost ships during their invasion of Norway
- German naval losses in Norway meant that no German capital ships were available for an invasion of Britain in 1940
- the Kriegsmarine’s Commander in Chief Admiral Raeder stated, ‘the Norway losses weighed heavily upon us for the rest of the war’
- the German navy could now not prevent the evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk
- invasion was not necessarily inevitable in the summer of 1940, and many German commanders had serious misgivings – and a fear of the Royal Navy
- recent research suggests that the German Navy had utterly rejected the notion of an invasion on all of these grounds if only because it would have been almost impossible to supply and reinforce any German troops from the first wave of landings who did make it ashore
- further evidence suggests that Churchill himself thought an invasion highly unlikely but talked up the prospect as a method of drawing the USA into the conflict, keeping the British public behind the war effort and the trade unions quiet during his period of political difficulty in late 1940
- after Dunkirk the Royal Navy transported Navy and Army demolition parties to Europe to destroy oil stocks, 2 million tons, which the Germans could have used in any invasion of Britain
- the Royal Navy attacked potential invasion harbours including Zeebrugge, Calais and Boulogne in 1940 putting them out of action for a time
- British warships blew invasion barges out of the water. Hitler ordered the dispersal of the barges to safer areas.

Evidence which supports the view that the RAF prevented invasion:

RAF Fighter Command/Battle of Britain:

- a review of the events of the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940 with an explanation of the reasons why the RAF was able to defeat the Luftwaffe
- the RAF had 644 fighters to the Luftwaffe's 725 at the beginning of the battle. However, by October 1940 Britain was far outproducing the enemy
- evidence of the severity of the Luftwaffe's attacks on the RAF and its bases and the loss of life which accrued because of this. Some assessment of the degree to which these attacks stretched Fighter Command to its utmost limits and how German losses compared. How close Germany came to achieving its stated goal of air superiority
- out of these heroic efforts, the idea that a few hundred pilots and ground crew thwarted the German aim of achieving control of the skies and therefore, thwarted any attempt at invasion
- Churchill's Battle of Britain phrase, 'Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few', was hijacked by the British propaganda machine in 1940
- an examination of the nature of Operation Sealion and the extent to which Hitler believed he had to win air superiority over the Channel to allow the invasion to take place.

RAF Bomber Command and the threat of invasion:

- the Air Ministry claimed that Bomber Command destroyed many invasion barges
- but precision bombing was extremely difficult, and Churchill was unconvinced about the raids. He stated, 'what struck me was the apparent inability of the bombers to hit these very large masses of barges.'

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|-------------------|---|
| Christina Goulter | Argues that while it would be wrong to deny the contribution of Fighter Command, it was the Navy that held the Germans from invading. |
| Gary Sheffield | Suggests that Bomber and Coastal Command both made a significant contribution to the battle by attacking the German invasion preparations and airfields across the Channel. |
| Angus Calder | Suggests that indeed, Bomber and Coastal Command lost proportionately more men than Fighter Command. In winning the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command lost 537 pilots killed. Bomber Command lost 718 aircrew killed in action. Coastal Command lost 230 airmen. |
| Andrew Gordon | Contends that the Germans stayed away because while the Royal Navy existed, they had no hope of capturing these islands. |

Question 75

How effective were Britain's civil defence measures in protecting the country during the Second World War?

Aim of the question To examine the effectiveness of the range of civil defence measures put in place by the government. The candidate might explain the role of a number of initiatives including, the government's attempts to control the civilian population, their successes and failures to protect the population from air attack and their plans to defend the British population in the face of impending invasion. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Britain's civil defence measures were effective:

Controlling the population:

- the Emergency Powers Act (1939) was an attempt to have centralised control over the lives of citizens including where they worked, what they ate and wore and what they read, watched and heard in the media
- censorship and propaganda was used by government to shield the population from the stark reality of war. Used to protect, as well as to keep morale high. These controls gave government some command over the perception of the war in the general population. It allowed the illusion of a 'united' experience of war which was important in a society that was entrenched in class division prior to the war
- the treatment of foreigners in Britain. The candidate may give an explanation of how the British population was protected from the influence of people deemed by the government as alien. Restrictions were put in place. The 'undesirable' were interned in camps such as the camp on the Isle of Man or even deported to Canada. These people were of Italian, German and Austrian extraction. There were also internees whose politics were deemed to be subversive.

Coping with air attack:

- the blackout and its consequences. Candidates may give an evaluation of blackout procedures and their effectiveness in protecting the civilian population
- the fact that Blackouts were generally unpopular and the ARP wardens who enforced them were routinely disliked may be offered as evidence that they were effective. Civilians who contravened the blackouts were fined demonstrating that the government had created a system to incentivise compliance
- provision of 38 million gas masks by Chamberlain's Government
- an evaluation of the success of the shelter provision. The effectiveness of Anderson and Morrison shelters may be given. Included in this evaluation there may be a consideration of their distribution, affordability and effectiveness
- London Underground Stations (the Tube) as shelters and the government's actions concerning them
- government actions to deal with a potential attack using chemical or biological weapons. The consequences of advanced German weaponry such as the V1 and V2 rockets, (1944 and 1945) and the ability of the government to counter their threat
- an analysis of the positive impact of evacuation as an evaluation of its success as a civil defence measure, such as 1.5 million evacuees successfully billeted into reception areas within the first three days of war.

Evidence of effectiveness in defending Britain:

- candidates may offer an evaluation of the effectiveness and sacrifice of the fire service. It was one of the services that were vital in keeping the country's infrastructure intact during the many air attacks that Britain endured during the war
- candidates may also analyse the effectiveness of the police in protecting the civilian population and the effectiveness of the medical services and its structure at this time
- an explanation of the effectiveness of the Home Guard and the plans put in place to provide protection in the event of invasion by Axis forces. Home Guard comprised men between the ages of 17 and 65. They acted as sentries, removed road signs and also checked that people were carrying their Identity Cards
- Anthony Eden established the Home Guard and changed its name to Local Defence Volunteers and by August 1940 had a membership of 1.5 million men
- there might also be recognition given to the effectiveness of the Observer Corps and the Anti-aircraft defences in preventing increased casualties in densely populated areas.

Evidence which supports the view that Britain's civil defence measures were not effective:

Controlling the population:

- enforcing the measures contained within the Emergency Measures Act was exceptionally difficult
- efforts at censorship were also limited. Ministry of Information reports make reference to concerns that British civilians were listening to broadcasts of Nazi propaganda by William Joyce (Lord Haw-Haw)
- crime rates increased – black economy and profiteering
- the government covered up inefficiencies in controlling ration books
- to some it is contended that they were unnecessarily cruel with little sense of security as a result.

Coping with air attack:

- the blackout resulted in hundreds of fatalities caused by road accidents
- criminals used the cover of the blackout for their nefarious purposes
- class difference in shelter provision and access to shelters
- candidates may offer description of 'trekking' as evidence in the inadequacies in shelter provision
- the failures within the evacuation scheme such as the limited up-take, social-mis-matching and unexpected and burdensome costs for families which led to extensive 'drift-back'
- civilian casualties. There may be a statistical analysis of the casualties in relation to the air raid provision and link to the effectiveness of government initiatives in civil defence
- this includes the impact of the Blitz not only in London but in Coventry and also Clydebank (August 1940 to May 1941).

Historians

Perspective on the issue

| | |
|--|---|
| Stuart Hylton and Nick Tiratsoo | Argue that the government failed to adequately defend the public against bombing. There is real disagreement amongst historians as to the degree to which the civil defence wing of the military was effective. |
| Andrew Roberts | Contends that shelter provision was as effective as it could have been under the pressures of war. |
| Angus Calder | Argues that the government failed to implement the evacuation scheme adequately, 'the first part of the evacuation scheme had largely failed. The cities were still loud with children.' |
| Clive Ponting | Suggests that the government should have done more earlier on in the war to provide access to deep shelters for the working classes. |

Question 76 **‘The decline of Britain's imperial influence can be directly attributed to the Second World War.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the validity of the view that Britain's post-war imperial decline can be directly attributed to the Second World War. Although the British Empire emerged from war in 1945 territorially intact, the pace of imperial decline was remarkably rapid. Responses might review the extent of decolonisation that had taken place by 1951, setting it within the context of imperial decline, and offering an appreciation of the factors at work in hastening decolonisation and a degree of analysis of whether the war was the primary agent in bringing about this process or merely an accelerating agent. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence to support the view that the decline of Britain's imperial influence can be directly attributed to the Second World War:

- reference to specific examples of decolonisation, in particular India and Pakistan independence (1947) but also Transjordan (1946), Burma and Ceylon (1948), Palestine (1948) and Libya (1951).

Colonial nationalism in response to war:

- prior to 1939 Britain followed a policy of ‘indirect rule’. The Second World War necessitated an increase in imperial direction that forced colonial governments into taking unpopular actions
- recruitment methods for compulsory military service were not always fairly applied
- overseas trade was regulated, production of cash crops was restricted resulting in shortages, inflation, poorer living standards which led to growing colonial discontent
- Bengal famine (1943) claimed the lives of 3 million Indians. Claims that this was caused by imperial policy added further weight to demands for independence
- rates of taxation and import duties also rose substantially
- the burden of colonial administration increased during war – food control, propaganda, censorship. Consequently, the administrative machine was badly run down in many colonies by the war's end which increased the challenge of coping with re-emerging nationalist movements after the war.

The domestic political situation:

- an analysis of the cost of the war and Britain's additional military and financial obligations as a reason for decolonisation. For example, India, once a debtor, became a creditor – £1000 million
- Britain lacked both the funding and the political will to stay in Palestine
- the Labour Party had adopted an anti-colonialism stance from its formation
- the Labour Party had close links with Indian Nationalist movements and Attlee appreciated that Britain had no option but to leave India
- Labour took seriously the idea of the Commonwealth – moving from exploitative stance where Great Britain was the superior power to a sharing of resources
- social democracy was incompatible with Empire and the British public felt indifferent towards it
- the post-war expansion of the welfare state paved the way for imperial disengagement ‘as the Welfare State began to live the Empire began to die.’

The influence of international politics:

- Atlantic Charter, 1941 – a new world of self-determination (war not just about defeating Nazis, democracy and self-determination)
- the pressure placed on Britain by the superpowers to decolonise and in particular the desire of the USA to gain access to British colonial markets
- the USA was firmly against Britain continuing to govern India
- the USA demanded that the state of Israel should be established and Britain, dependent on USA loans, had to accept American demands
- the growing Commonwealth and the emerging European Community, as potentially conflicting circles of interest, influenced the pace of decolonisation

- two forces accelerated the end of the Empire as Britain sought to salvage its international image: criticism at the United Nations and decolonisation in the other European empires
- Britain's decolonisation can be attributed to pragmatism and prestige, with officials convinced that refusing to decolonise would tarnish Britain's image forever.

Evidence to refute the view that the decline of Britain's imperial influence can be directly attributed to the Second World War:

Colonial nationalism in response to war:

- an analysis of the extent to which the process of decolonisation was underway before the war
- the argument that even in Britain's weakened post-war state, the challenges for anti-colonial nationalist movements to force their imperial rulers into retreat were significant.

The domestic political situation:

- at the end of the Second World War much of Europe was in ruins. Britain considered the Empire and Commonwealth to be its future
- Labour still saw Britain as a Great Power despite the poor economic outlook at the end of the war
- Britain was short of dollars – demand for USA products and dollars to pay for them, 'Desperate for Dollars'
- Empire members produced high value goods for which dollars would be paid (rubber from Malaya, cocoa from the Gold Coast)
- the 'sterling area', which included the Empire, Commonwealth (the main exception was Canada) and some other countries, accounted for half of the world's trade in the early post-war year
- Attlee and Bevin believed Britain's economic recovery and the survival of sterling as a great trading currency required closer integration with the old 'white' dominions
- across the whole spectrum of party opinion, British leaders had no doubt that Britain must uphold its status as the third great power, and that it could only do so by maintaining its Empire and the Commonwealth link.

The influence of international politics:

- Britain's strategic defence against the new Soviet threat required forward air bases from which to bomb Southern Russia – the industrial arsenal of the Soviet Union. That meant staying on in the Middle East even after the breakdown of British control in Palestine
- in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the Gulf, the British were determined to hang on to their treaties and bases, including the vast Suez Canal zone and sought support against Soviet influence in Asia.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--------------------------|--|
| David Reynolds | Contends that 'the war had undermined the foundations of British power in some of its dependencies.' |
| Alan Sked and Chris Cook | Argues that decolonisation was often the result of economic necessity. In particular the decision to quit Palestine was ultimately a cost-cutting exercise. |
| John Darwin | Argues that it is a mistake to present monocausal explanations of such a complex issue. Instead, he suggests that imperial decline resulted from a variety of political, economic, strategic, and ideological influences. |
| W Roger Louis | Argues that American anti-colonialism was always balanced against its desire for security and anti-communism. Historians should therefore be cautious not to overemphasise the significance of American influence on British decolonisation. |

Question 77

To what extent were the party reforms carried out by Butler and Woolton the main reason for the Conservative election victory of 1951?

Aim of the question To examine the various factors, including the reforms of Butler and Woolton, which contributed to Churchill's Conservative Party winning the 1951 General Election. To many observers the election result may appear to be surprising given that Attlee's Governments had introduced the welfare state which was proving to be very popular. Candidates might examine the reasons for voter disenchantment with the Labour Party. However, it should be remembered that the Labour Party actually polled more votes than the Conservatives did in 1951, and candidates might discuss the peculiarities of the British electoral system. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that party reforms by Butler and Woolton was the main reason for the Conservative election victory:

- Churchill appointed RA Butler as chairman of the Industrial Policy Committee which produced The Industrial Charter (1947). This was the first and most important in a series of policy statements and was followed by The Agricultural Charter and Imperial Policy
- these policy statements formed the basis for the party's official programme, The Right Road for Britain, published in July 1949 and the subsequent manifestos of 1950 and 1951
- the Conservative Party had united around a commitment to Keynesian economic management, full acceptance of the established welfare system and promised no further extensions of state power/abolition of irksome controls
- the Conservative emphasis upon individual freedom within a communal framework appealed to both the Conservative base and attracted disaffected Conservative voters, who had been lost in the swing to the left, back. A post-war 'consensus'
- under the direction of the dynamic Lord Woolton, the popular party Chairman between 1946 to 1955, the party reformed its finances and constituency organisation and was in a much better position to fight for seats and votes than in 1945
- the 'Million Fund', a deliberately ambitious appeal to local associations to raise £1 million, achieved its target ahead of schedule
- a national campaign to recruit a million new members was launched April 1948. Party membership had reached 2.76 million by 1950 having sat at 1.2 million at the end of 1947
- there was a successful drive to secure the future of party support with the creation of a youth wing, The Young Conservatives.

Evidence which supports the view that the Conservative party election victory was due to other factors:

Voter disenchantment with the Labour Government:

- by 1945, the population had grown tired of austerity. Increased rationing and seemingly petty bureaucracy seemed to cause disaffection especially in the middle class vote
- import controls limited the quantity and range of consumer goods available; Bread was rationed between 1946 and 1948; Clothes rationing remained until 1949 and rationing of most basic foodstuffs and petrol continued until 1950
- the government tried to encourage consumption of whale meat and snoek (an unknown inedible fish). This did not prove popular
- the black market flourished and queues and shortages were common
- the British Housewives League pressure group had 100,000 members and campaigned against rationing and shortages
- continuing economic difficulties, for example, devaluation of the pound
- the Conservative were able to exploit Labour's setbacks with slogans such as 'shiver with Shinwell' during the coal crisis. Conservative attacks on excessive red tape also found a receptive audience; 'set the people free' became the slogan of the 1950 election

- the chaos in the economy caused by Attlee's decision to participate in the Korean War and the subsequent rise in defence expenditure which resulted in cuts in welfare spending
- post-war financial and economic problems had prevented the Labour Governments from meeting its ambitions in house building and the country was facing a serious housing shortage in 1950-1951. The Conservatives were able to offer the attractive pledge of 300,000 homes per year (significantly above Labour's best performance of 200,000)
- Labour's nationalisation programme was expensive to implement (compensation to private owners reached £2,700 million). Some argued that the money could have been better spent elsewhere and the attack on the Government's nationalisation of iron and steel provided a strong platform for Conservative opposition
- there was resentment among some trade unions at Labour's slowness in responding to worker's demands.

Problems within the Labour Party:

- the apparent disagreement within the Labour Party about its future direction, namely whether to consolidate existing reforms or to push ahead with a more radical reforming agenda
- many members of the Labour Party were unhappy with Britain's involvement in the Korean War which led to a split in the party
- the right/left dispute over expenditure cuts and the resignation of Nye Bevan, Harold Wilson and Freeman
- conversely, participation in the Korean War revitalised Churchill in his role as international statesman making him an electoral asset once more
- the loss of Labour heavyweights such as Ernie Bevin who died in April 1951 and Stafford Cripps who resigned due to ill-health in October 1950
- Attlee made a mistake in being persuaded to hold another election so soon. All the opinion polls showed that he should have held off until 1952
- in 1951, the Labour Government was exhausted and not in prime condition to fight another election. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party had seen an influx of bright young MPs following the 1950 election who were eager to take on the tiring government.

The British electoral system:

- boundary changes. The 1948 Parliamentary Reform Act changed many constituency boundaries to reflect recent population movement. This severely disadvantaged Labour as many previous supporters now found themselves living in safe Tory seats
- postal voting was introduced for the first time and experts estimate that the Tories benefitted by a ratio of 10:1
- Labour's vote held up well in their traditional heartlands but fell in the marginal seats of the south-east
- the Liberals failed to field any more than 109 candidates compared to 475 in 1950. The vast majority of ex-Liberal voters voted Conservative.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|--|--|
| Kevin Jefferys and Peter Hennessy | Contends that changes within the Conservative Party enhanced their electability and also emphasised the damage done to the Labour Party by policy drift. |
| Stuart Ball | Argues that the Conservative victory owed more to the problems of the Labour government than to any action on the part of the Conservatives. |
| Kenneth Morgan | Argues that the years of austerity and overbearing state control had taken their toll on the electorate. |
| Alan Sked and Chris Cook | Suggests the real problem was the wider disaffection of middle opinion (not necessarily middle class opinion) against a program of consolidation which was at best drab and puritanical, and at worst illiberal and restrictive of choice. |

Section 10 – Britain at war and peace, 1938–1951

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 78 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the socio-economic conditions in Britain by 1939?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

| Point in Source A | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given |
|---|---|
| Most 'new industries' were located in the South and Midlands where there was remarkable expansion in the aircraft industry, at Bristol and Coventry, and in the production of cars at Longbridge in Birmingham and Dagenham in Essex. | Suggests that the South and Midlands were doing well as a result of the development of new industries such as aircraft and car manufacturing. |
| Work in the light-engineering factories was cleaner and easier and better paid than in the old staple industries. | Suggests that working conditions in the new industries were substantially better than they had been in traditional industries. |
| Furthermore, the economic growth led to better roads, new branches of banks and insurance offices, entertainment and the prospect of better education and social services. | Suggests that the development of new industries stimulated further economic growth resulting in a widening of both economic and social opportunities. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- certain sectors of the economy were thriving, light engineering, plastics, chemicals and electrical engineering, motor vehicle and the aircraft industry
- improvements at work such as reduction in working hours, holidays with pay
- wider economic opportunity could be seen in the growth of the banking sector including Building Societies providing mortgages for homeowners and employment for many in the financial sector; there was a growth in leisure activities which indicates general higher disposable income.

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|---|
| Yet, by the late 1930s, after a period of growth, there were indications that Britain was heading back into a slump as unemployment rose from 10.8 per cent to 12.9% in 1937, causing fresh social tensions in the process. | Suggests that unemployment re-emerged as a problem in the late 1930s resulting in social as well as economic repercussions. |
| The results were obvious to shoppers in London's Oxford Street, five days before Christmas 1938, who were shocked to see a hundred unemployed men carrying yellow placards and shouting 'Work or bread' and 'We want extra winter allowances'. | Suggests that unemployed men engaged in political protest to highlight their plight, particularly the inadequacy of social welfare provision. |

| Point in Source B | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given |
|--|--|
| Unemployment was still stubbornly high at 11% when war broke out in 1939 and although last-minute rearmament was helping to reduce it, it would take the Second World War to finally push unemployment below the 10% mark at last. | Suggests that unemployment remained a serious economic issue that had not been resolved by September of 1939 despite the boost to heavy industry and ancillary services provided by the necessity to re-arm. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- heavy industry in the north of England, South Wales and the west of Scotland was adversely affected because of the global economic downturn of the Depression years and unemployment remained a persistent issue in these areas
- other example(s) of any political pressure which highlighted the effects of unemployment, for example, the 1936 Jarrow Hunger march
- high unemployment caused stagnation in social mobility; it allowed many to descend into poverty, especially those workers who were on or teetering around the breadline but from 1937 onwards increased armaments production created employment.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:

- with high unemployment, tax revenue was reduced and government spending on welfare increased. This became a serious political issue for the National Governments
- the National Government introduced the Special Areas Act to attract light industries to distressed areas
- inequality in living standards. The falling standard of living for many resulted in a poor diet for millions and subsequent decline in the population's health
- at this time Britain's housing stock was mainly owned by private landlords, not council housing and was occupied largely by the working class
- housing conditions were often poor, rents were high and overcrowding was common which had an effect on the overall health of the population
- Government slum clearance plans to provide better housing for the working classes were shelved due to poor economic conditions but some local councils built 500,000 council houses, which not only helped the housing shortage situation but also pumped money into the economy
- evidence of unequal access to education: Although education was supposed to reflect a meritocratic philosophy, the reality was that intelligent children from the working class found it difficult to access an academic education because there was still an element of payment needed
- evidence of improving living standards for some: prices fell in the Depression, which meant more money for luxuries for those in employment; the popularity of professional sport especially football, dance halls, and a thriving fashion industry aimed at the middle classes.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Angus Calder

Argues that 'it was the best of times, it was the worst of times. It was a time of intense political activity for the few, and apathy for the many; of derelict shipyards and packed super-cinemas; of neglected farmland and pluperfect batting wickets.'

Tony Mason

Is critical of the unequal distribution of wealth in Britain at this time despite Britain's position as one of the richest countries in the world.

Charles Loch Mowatt

Argues that Britain at this time was a divided nation and that a national class consciousness emerged in the thirties brought about through literature and the threat from fascism in Spain.

Martin Pugh

Contends that the National Government could have done more to ease the plight of the unemployed. 'The timidity of the ministers was not due to the absence of alternative economic theories but to a failure of political will.'

Question 79 Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of Churchill's effectiveness as a wartime leader.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

| Aspect of Source C | | Possible comment on the source rubric provenance |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Author | Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke. | His role as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, placed him as lead military adviser to Churchill. Alanbrooke had a close, and often fraught, working relationship with Churchill. |
| Purpose | A personal diary to record his experiences. | Not written with the intention of publication. Dedicated to his wife. It reveals the honest reflections and frustrations of working alongside Churchill during times of intense pressure. |
| Timing | 30 August 1943. | Days after the Quebec Conference. The tide of war had turned in the Allies favour by this point and discussions were underway for the invasion of France. |

| Point in Source C | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance |
|---|--|
| Winston made matters almost impossible. Like a spoilt child, he has an unfortunate trick of setting his heart on some isolated operation without ever really looking into it and brushing everything else aside. | Takes the view that Churchill was childish, obstinate and single-minded in focussing on very specific operations to the detriment of other things without all the details. Emphasised by both 'almost impossible', 'spoilt child'. |
| Perhaps the most remarkable failing of his is that he can never see a whole strategical problem at once, so it is difficult to make him realise the influence of one theatre on another. | Takes the view that Churchill had weaknesses in overall strategic planning and ability to see the bigger picture. Emphasised by the phrase 'remarkable failing'. |
| It is a wonderful character – the most marvellous qualities of superhuman genius mixed with an impulsiveness, and although he is quite the most difficult man to work with, I should not have missed the chance to work with him for anything on earth! | Takes the view that despite his obvious character flaws, emphasised by the phrases 'impulsiveness' and being the 'most difficult man to work with', he is glad to have worked with Churchill and acknowledges him as an outstanding and charismatic individual. Emphasised by the phrase 'superhuman genius'. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Churchill was often brusque and regularly dismissed senior military officers if they did not agree with his military strategies
- Churchill's military strategy was often misguided/wrong, for example, arguably Churchill's decision to defend Greece helped to delay victory in North Africa by two years
- Churchill's insistence on the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers at the Casablanca Conference prolonged the war claimed his critics.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Churchill was a great orator and his inspiring speeches boosted the morale of the country
- Churchill provided strong and decisive leadership skills at a time of national crisis, leading Britain when she was fighting Nazi Germany alone (June 1940 to June 1941), he made it clear that he had no intention of negotiating with Hitler in May/June 1940 despite the advice of other senior politicians. This galvanised the whole country
- Churchill's ability to persuade Roosevelt that the defeat of Germany was the first priority of the Allies after Pearl Harbour. Britain borrowed huge sums of money from the USA \$4.3 billion (£2.2 billion) at 2% interest rate, a triumph for Churchill who had exerted considerable diplomatic pressure in his efforts to win the loan from the Americans
- it was Churchill's skill as a negotiator and diplomat which bound together the vital alliance of Britain, USA and USSR and forged victory in the war.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------|---|
| Richard Lamb | Argues that Churchill was militarily naïve and lacked strategic awareness. |
| Samantha Heywood | Argues that he did accept advice on military matters, 'Unlike Hitler or Stalin, however, Churchill did not overrule any of his Chiefs of Staff. He bullied them, and his generals, but he only got his way if he managed to persuade them that his idea was right.' |
| Nigel Knight | Argues that Churchill employed Britain's commitment to the bomber offensive as a ploy to deflect the Soviet desire for the western Allies to mount a Second Front in France. |
| Jonathan Schneer | Contends that Churchill managed the War Cabinet well, 'He exhorted and encouraged them when necessary, congratulated them when appropriate, and sympathised with them in their troubles.' |

Question 80 **How fully does Source D explain the effectiveness of Labour ministers in creating the welfare state between 1945 and 1951?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

| Point in Source D | Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given |
|---|---|
| The National Insurance Act (1946), in the words of James Griffiths, the responsible minister, 'represented the culmination of half a century's development of our British Social Services' through consolidating and enlarging existing provisions. | States that the Labour minister James Griffiths was effective in the field of social security by introducing new legislation to integrate and enhance existing provision. |
| Although Bevan's Health Bill was initially opposed by the British Medical Association, the doctors in the end gave way with more and more doctors prepared to join the new National Health Service after it was inaugurated in July 1948. | States that Labour Minister for Health Aneurin Bevan successfully overcame opposition from the BMA and brought an increasing number of doctors on board with the NHS after its inauguration in July 1948. |
| By November, Bevan was able to inform the House of Commons that 93.1 % of the population were enrolled, marking a significant personal triumph. | States that Bevan was effective in making the National Health Service available to the majority of the population. |

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Griffith introduced a raft of legislation to tackle Beveridge's giant 'want': the Family Allowances Act (1945), the National Insurance Act (1946) and the National Assistance and Industrial Injuries Acts (1948). This took Britain's social security system from a 'patchwork without overall design' to one that covered the needs of citizens from the 'cradle to the grave'
- Bevan overcame significant opposition from the GPs, who were concerned that nationalisation of hospitals would turn them into salaried civil servants, by 'stuffing their mouths with gold'
- the NHS was recognised as being 'the jewel in the crown' of the Labour Welfare reforms and was greeted with national applause. Bevan is, therefore, credited as one of the chief architects of the British welfare state.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- 1942 Beveridge Report identified the 'Five Giants', Disease, Want, Squalor, Ignorance, Idleness, which had to be addressed. Attlee's Government introduced the recommendations of the Beveridge Report creating the welfare state, which provided care for all of the population from the cradle to the grave
- in implementing the Butler Act of 1944, Education Secretary, Ellen Wilkinson, endorsed the tripartite division of secondary education, increased the budget for education and raised the school leaving age to 15
- Bevan, who also held responsibility for housing, experienced a myriad of difficulties due to shortages and lack of skilled workers and with neither the time nor the energy to devote to the issue, his record in delivering much needed housing was disappointing
- supporters of Bevan would point to the creation of high-quality council homes for rent as evidence of his effectiveness in this area
- Hugh Dalton played a role in the creation of the welfare state as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Areas that may be discussed: support of Bevan in financing the NHS; pursued a policy of full employment – unemployment was extremely low at 2.5% in 1946

- Herbert Morrison, the third member of ‘Labour’s Big Three’, held wide ranging responsibilities and was generally regarded as Deputy Prime Minister. As Lord President his primary task was to coordinate home policy. This meant he was responsible for the smooth passage of government legislation through parliament, especially the nationalisation program
- as Prime Minister, Attlee took overall responsibility for his government’s record of achievement in social policy. By 1951, his ministers had created a welfare state which provided care for all of the population. However, critics point out that they failed to redistribute wealth or to break down rigid class barriers; 1% of the population, for example, still owned 50% of all private capital.

| Historians | Perspective on the issue |
|------------------------|---|
| Kenneth Morgan | Argues that Labour’s achievements may not have changed society as much as they would have liked, but their achievements ‘acted as a platform for successive governments to effect much change.’ |
| Kevin Jefferys | Argues that Labour’s introduction of social welfare reform in the face of economic problems at the end of the war was a clear success. |
| Corelli Barnett | Contends that the creation of an expensive welfare state was ill-affordable in a time when there were other more pressing priorities. He criticises the education reforms which led, he says, to a dependency culture from which Britain has never broken free and bemoans the lack of investment in technical education. |
| David Vincent | Argues that the middle and upper classes benefited much more from the Welfare State than the working class. |

[END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]