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C. Shao
H. Deng
China Mobile
R. Pazhyannur
Cisco Systems
F. Bari
AT&T
R. Zhang
China Telecom
S. Matsushima
SoftBank Telecom
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IEEE 802.11 Medium Access Control (MAC) Profile for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)

Abstract

The Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) protocol binding for IEEE 802.11 defines two Medium Access Control (MAC) modes for IEEE 802.11 Wireless Transmission Points (WTPs): Split and Local MAC. In the Split MAC mode, the partitioning of encryption/decryption functions is not clearly defined. In the Split MAC mode description, IEEE 802.11 encryption is specified as located in either the Access Controller (AC) or the WTP, with no clear way for the AC to inform the WTP of where the encryption functionality should be located. This leads to interoperability issues, especially when the AC and WTP come from different vendors. To prevent interoperability issues, this specification defines an IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile message element in which each profile specifies an unambiguous division of encryption functionality between the WTP and AC.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The CAPWAP protocol supports two MAC modes of operation: Split and Local MAC, as described in [RFC5415] and [RFC5416]. However, there are MAC functions that have not been clearly defined. For example, IEEE 802.11 [IEEE.802.11] encryption is specified as located in either the AC or the WTP with no clear way to negotiate where it should be located. Because different vendors have different definitions of the MAC mode, many MAC-layer functions are mapped differently to either the WTP or the AC by different vendors. Therefore, depending upon the vendor, the operators in their deployments have to perform different configurations based on implementation of the two modes by their vendor. If there is no clear specification, then operators will experience interoperability issues with WTPs and ACs from different vendors.

Figure 1 from [RFC5416] illustrates how some functions are processed in different places in the Local MAC and Split MAC mode. Specifically, note that in the Split MAC mode, the IEEE 802.11 encryption/decryption is specified as WTP/AC, implying that it could be at either location. This is not an issue with Local MAC because encryption is always at the WTP.

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+-			
Functions			Split MAC
	Distribution Service	WTP/AC	AC
+ + + Function + 	Integration Service	WTP	AC
	Beacon Generation	WTP	WTP
	Probe Response Generation	WTP	WTP
	Power Mgmt/ Packet Buffering	WTP	WTP
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	WTP	WTP/AC
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Assoc/Disassoc/Reassoc	WTP/AC	AC
 H IEEE 802.11 QoS H	Classifying	WTP	AC
	Scheduling	WTP	WTP/AC
	Queuing	WTP	WTP
 + IEEE 802.11 RSN + (WPA2) 	IEEE 802.1X/EAP	AC	AC
	RSNA Key Management	AC	AC
	IEEE 802.11	WTP	WTP/AC
-+-+-+-+-+-	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+-+

Note:

RSN - Robust Security Network

RSNA - Robust Security Network Association

WPA2 - Wi-Fi Protected Access 2

Figure 1: Functions in Local MAC and Split MAC

To solve this problem, this specification introduces the IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile. The IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile unambiguously specifies where the various MAC functionalities should be located.

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2. IEEE MAC Profile Descriptions

A IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile refers to a description of how the MAC functionality is split between the WTP and AC shown in Figure 1.

2.1. Split MAC with WTP Encryption

The functional split for the Split MAC with WTP encryption is provided in Figure 2. This profile is similar to the Split MAC description in [RFC5416], except that IEEE 802.11 encryption/ decryption is at the WTP. Note that fragmentation is always done at the same entity as the encryption. Consequently, in this profile fragmentation/defragmentation is also done only at the WTP. Note that scheduling functionality is denoted as WTP/AC. As explained in [RFC5416], this means that the admission control component of IEEE 802.11 resides on the AC; the real-time scheduling and queuing functions are on the WTP.

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	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	Profile 0
-+-+-+-+-+	-+	-+-+-+-
	Distribution Service	AC
	+-	-+-+-+-+-
	Integration Service	AC
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-	-+-+-+-+-
	Beacon Generation	WTP
	+-	
	Probe Response Generation	WTP
	+-	
Function	Power Mgmt/	WTP
	Packet Buffering	
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	WTP
	Fragmentation/	WIP
	Defragmentation	
	Assoc/Disassoc/Reassoc	AC
-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	
	Classifying	AC
IEEE	+-	_
802.11 QoS	Scheduling	WTP/AC
~	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-
	Queuing	WTP
-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+- AC
IEEE	+-	-+-+-+-+-
802.11 RSN	RSNA Key Management	AC
(WPA2)	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	
	IEEE 802.11	WTP
	Encryption/Decryption	

Note:

EAP - Extensible Authentication Protocol

Figure 2: Functions in Split MAC with WTP Encryption

2.2. Split MAC with AC Encryption

The functional split for the Split MAC with AC encryption is provided in Figure 3. This profile is similar to the Split MAC in [RFC5416], except that IEEE 802.11 encryption/decryption is at the AC. Since fragmentation is always done at the same entity as the encryption, in this profile, AC does fragmentation/defragmentation.

+-			
Functions		Profile	
		1	
	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- Distribution	AC	
+	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++++	+-+-+-+-+	
	Integration Service	AC	
+	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	+-+-+-+	
	Beacon Generation	WTP	
+	+-		
	Probe Response Generation	•	
+	+-		
Function	Power Mgmt/	WTP	
+	Packet Buffering	<u> </u>	
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	AC	
 +	Defragmentation	AC	
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-		
	Assoc/Disassoc/Reassoc	AC	
+-+-+-+-+-+-	-+		
	Classifying	AC	
+ IEEE 802.11 Oos	-+	WTP	
602.11 QOS			
i	Queuing	WTP	
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+	+-+-+-+	
1	IEEE 802.1X/EAP	AC	
+ IEEE	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++	+-+-+-+-+	
802.11 RSN	RSNA Key Management	AC	
+ (WPA2)	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		
	IEEE 802.11	AC	
+	Encryption/Decryption		
-+-+-+-+-	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++	+-+-+-+-+	

Figure 3: Functions in Split MAC with AC encryption

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2.3. IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile Frame Exchange

An example of message exchange using the IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile message element is shown in Figure 4. The WTP informs the AC of the various MAC Profiles it supports. This happens in either a Discovery Request message or the Join Request message. The AC determines the appropriate profile and configures the WTP with the profile while configuring the WLAN.




Figure 4: Message Exchange for Negotiating MAC Profiles

- 3. MAC Profile Message Element Definitions
- 3.1. IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles

The IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profile message element allows the WTP to communicate the profiles it supports. The Discovery Request message, Primary Discovery Request message, and Join Request message may include one such message element.

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
```

Figure 5: IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles

o Type: 1060 for IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles

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- o Num_Profiles >=1: This refers to the number of profiles present in this message element. There must be at least one profile.
- o Profile: Each profile is identified by a value specified in Section 3.2.

3.2. IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile

The IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile message element allows the AC to select a profile. This message element may be provided along with the IEEE 802.11 ADD WLAN message element while configuring a WLAN on the WTP.

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+=+-+-+-+-+
| Profile |
```

Figure 6: IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile

- o Type: 1061 for IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile
- o Profile: The profile is identified by a value as given below
 - * 0: This refers to the IEEE 802.11 Split MAC Profile with WTP encryption
 - * 1: This refers to the IEEE 802.11 Split MAC Profile with AC encryption

4. Security Considerations

This document does not introduce any new security risks compared to [RFC5416]. The negotiation messages between the WTP and AC have origin authentication and data integrity. As a result, an attacker cannot interfere with the messages to force a less-secure mode choice. The security considerations described in [RFC5416] apply here as well.

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5. IANA Considerations

The following IANA actions have been completed.

o This specification defines two new message elements: IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles (described in Section 3.1) and the IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile (described in Section 3.2). These elements have been registered in the existing "CAPWAP Message Element Type" registry, defined in [RFC5415].

CAPWAP Prot	ocol Message Element	Type Value
IEEE 802.11	Supported MAC Profiles	1060
IEEE 802.11	MAC Profile	1061

o The IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles message element and IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile message element include a Profile field (as defined in Section 3.2). The Profile field in the IEEE 802.11 Supported MAC Profiles denotes the MAC Profiles supported by the WTP. The Profile field in the IEEE 802.11 MAC Profile denotes the MAC Profile assigned to the WTP. The namespace for the field is 8 bits (0-255). This specification defines two values: zero (0) and one (1) as described below. The remaining values (2-255) are controlled and maintained by IANA, and the registration procedure is Expert Review [RFC5226]. IANA has created a new subregistry called "IEEE 802.11 Split MAC Profile" under the existing registry "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) Parameters". The registry format is given below.

Profile	Type Value	Reference
Split MAC with WTP encryption	0	RFC 7494
Split MAC with AC encryption	1	RFC 7494

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6. References

6.1. Normative References

[IEEE.802.11]

IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information Technology Telecommunications and information exchange between
systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific
requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std
802.11-2012, March 2012,
http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.11.html.

6.2. Informative References

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Contributors

Yifan Chen <chenyifan@chinamobile.com>

Naibao Zhou <zhounaibao@chinamobile.com>

Authors' Addresses

Chunju Shao China Mobile No.32 Xuanwumen West Street Beijing 100053 China

EMail: shaochunju@chinamobile.com

Hui Deng China Mobile No.32 Xuanwumen West Street Beijing 100053 China

EMail: denghui@chinamobile.com

Rajesh S. Pazhyannur Cisco Systems 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134 United States

EMail: rpazhyan@cisco.com

Farooq Bari AT&T 7277 164th Ave NE Redmond, WA 98052 United States

EMail: farooq.bari@att.com

Rong Zhang China Telecom No.109 Zhongshandadao avenue Guangzhou 510630 China

EMail: zhangr@gsta.com

Satoru Matsushima SoftBank Telecom 1-9-1 Higashi-Shinbashi, Munato-ku Tokyo Japan

EMail: satoru.matsushima@g.softbank.co.jp

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