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Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API):  
Delegate if Approved by Policy

Abstract

Several Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) applications work in a multi-tiered architecture, where the server takes advantage of delegated user credentials to act on behalf of the user and contact additional servers. In effect, the server acts as an agent on behalf of the user. Examples include web applications that need to access e-mail or file servers, including CIFS (Common Internet File System) file servers. However, delegating the user credentials to a party who is not sufficiently trusted is problematic from a security standpoint. Kerberos provides a flag called OK-AS-DELEGATE that allows the administrator of a Kerberos realm to communicate that a particular service is trusted for delegation. This specification adds support for this flag and similar facilities in other authentication mechanisms to GSS-API ([RFC 2743](#)).

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## 1. Introduction

Several GSS-API applications work in a multi-tiered architecture, where the server takes advantage of delegated user credentials to act on behalf of the user and contact additional servers. In effect, the server acts as an agent on behalf of the user. Examples include web applications that need to access e-mail or file servers, including CIFS file servers. However, delegating user credentials to a party who is not sufficiently trusted is problematic from a security standpoint.

Today, GSS-API [[RFC2743](#)] leaves the determination of whether delegation is desired to the client application. An application requests delegation by setting the `deleg_req_flag` when calling `init_sec_context`. This requires client applications to know what services should be trusted for delegation.

However, blindly delegating to services for applications that do not need delegation is problematic. In some cases, a central authority is in a better position than the client application to know what services should receive delegation. Some GSS-API mechanisms have a

facility to allow an administrator to communicate that a particular service is an appropriate target for delegation. For example, a Kerberos [RFC4121] KDC can set the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag in issued tickets as such an indication. It is desirable to expose this knowledge to the GSS-API client so the client can request delegation if and only if central policy recommends delegation to the given service.

This specification adds a new input flag to `gss_init_sec_context()` to request delegation when approved by central policy. In addition, a constant value to be used in the GSS-API C bindings [RFC2744] is defined. Finally, the behavior for the Kerberos mechanism [RFC4121] is specified.

## 2. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

## 3. GSS-API flag, C binding

The `gss_init_sec_context` API is extended to gain a new input flag, `deleg_policy_req_flag`, and a new output flag, `deleg_policy_state` `BOOLEAN`. If the `deleg_policy_req_flag` is set, then delegation `SHOULD` be performed if recommended by central policy. When delegation was recommended by the central policy and when delegation was done, the output flag `deleg_policy_state` will be set.

In addition, the C bindings are extended to define the following constant to represent both `deleg_policy_req_flag` and `deleg_policy_state` (just like `GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG` maps to two flags).

```
#define GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG 32768
```

## 4. GSS-API Behavior

As before, if the `deleg_req_flag` is set, the GSS-API mechanism will attempt delegation of user credentials. When delegation is successful, `deleg_state` will return `TRUE` in both the initiator and acceptor output state (`gss_init_sec_context` and `gss_accept_sec_context`, respectively).

Similarly, if the `deleg_policy_req_flag` is set, then the GSS-API mechanism will attempt delegation if the mechanism-specific policy recommends to do so. When delegation is allowed and successful, `deleg_state` will return `TRUE` in both initiator and acceptor output

state. In addition, `deleg_policy_state` will be set in the initiator output state.

If the initiator sets both the `deleg_req_flag` and `deleg_policy_req_flag`, delegation will be attempted unconditionally. When delegation is successful, `deleg_state` will return TRUE in the initiator and acceptor. When delegation was successful, the `deleg_state` will return TRUE in the initiator and acceptor. Additionally, if the mechanism-specific policy recommended delegation, the `deleg_policy_state` will additionally return TRUE for the initiator (only).

Note that `deleg_policy_req_flag` and `deleg_policy_state` apply the initiator only. Their state is never sent over the wire.

## 5. Kerberos GSS-API Behavior

If the initiator sets the `deleg_policy_req_flag` (and not `deleg_req_flag`), the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism MUST only delegate if OK-AS-DELEGATE is set [RFC4120] in the service ticket. Other policy checks MAY be applied. If the initiator sets `deleg_req_flag` (and not `deleg_policy_req_flag`), the behavior will be as defined by [RFC2743]. If the initiator set both the `deleg_req_flag` and `deleg_policy_req_flag`, delegation will be attempted unconditionally.

[RFC4120] does not adequately describe the behavior of the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag in a cross realm environment. This document clarifies that behavior. If the initiator sets the `deleg_policy_req_flag`, the GSS-API Kerberos mechanism MUST examine the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag in the service ticket, and it MUST examine all cross realm tickets in the traversal from the user's initial ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) to the service ticket. If any of the intermediate cross realm TGTs do not have the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag set, the mechanism MUST NOT delegate credentials.

## 6. Rationale

Strictly speaking, the `deleg_req_flag` behavior in [RFC2743] could be interpreted the same as `deleg_policy_req_flag` is described in this document. However, in practice, the new flag is required because existing applications and user expectations depend upon GSS-API mechanism implementations without the described behavior, i.e., they do not respect OK-AS-DELEGATE.

In hind sight, the `deleg_req_flag` should not have been implemented to mean unconditional delegation. Such promiscuous delegation reduces overall security by unnecessarily exposing user credentials, including to hosts and services that the user has no reason to trust.

Today there are Kerberos implementations that do not support the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag in the Kerberos database. If the implementation of the `deleg_req_flag` were changed to honor the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag, users who deploy new client software would never achieve credential delegation because the KDC would never issue a ticket with the OK-AS-DELEGATE flag set. Changing the client software behavior in this way would cause a negative user experience for those users. This is compounded by the fact that users often deploy new software without coordinating with site administrators.

## 7. Security Considerations

This document introduces a flag that allows the client to get help from the KDC in determining to which servers one should delegate credentials, and the servers to which the client can delegate.

The new flag `deleg_policy_req_flag` is not communicated over the wire, and thus does not present a new opportunity for spoofing or downgrading policy in and of itself.

Mechanisms should use a trusted/authenticated means of determining delegation policy, and it must not be spoofable on the network.

Delegating the user's TGT is still too powerful and dangerous. Ideally, one would delegate specific service tickets, but this is out of scope of this document.

A client's failure to specify `deleg_policy_req_flag` can at worst result in NOT delegating credentials. This means that the client does not expand its trust, which is generally safer than the alternative.

## 8. Acknowledgements

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