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## OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant

### Abstract

The OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant is designed for Internet-connected devices that either lack a browser to perform a user-agent-based authorization or are input constrained to the extent that requiring the user to input text in order to authenticate during the authorization flow is impractical. It enables OAuth clients on such devices (like smart TVs, media consoles, digital picture frames, and printers) to obtain user authorization to access protected resources by using a user agent on a separate device.

### Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

This OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] protocol extension enables OAuth clients to request user authorization from applications on devices that have limited input capabilities or lack a suitable browser. Such devices include smart TVs, media consoles, picture frames, and printers, which lack an easy input method or a suitable browser required for traditional OAuth interactions. The authorization flow defined by this specification, sometimes referred to as the "device flow", instructs the user to review the authorization request on a secondary device, such as a smartphone, which does have the requisite input and browser capabilities to complete the user interaction.

The device authorization grant is not intended to replace browser-based OAuth in native apps on capable devices like smartphones. Those apps should follow the practices specified in "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps" [RFC8252].

The operating requirements for using this authorization grant type are:

- (1) The device is already connected to the Internet.
- (2) The device is able to make outbound HTTPS requests.
- (3) The device is able to display or otherwise communicate a URI and code sequence to the user.
- (4) The user has a secondary device (e.g., personal computer or smartphone) from which they can process the request.

As the device authorization grant does not require two-way communication between the OAuth client on the device and the user agent (unlike other OAuth 2 grant types, such as the authorization code and implicit grant types), it supports several use cases that cannot be served by those other approaches.

Instead of interacting directly with the end user's user agent (i.e., browser), the device client instructs the end user to use another computer or device and connect to the authorization server to approve the access request. Since the protocol supports clients that can't receive incoming requests, clients poll the authorization server repeatedly until the end user completes the approval process.

The device client typically chooses the set of authorization servers to support (i.e., its own authorization server or those of providers with which it has relationships). It is common for the device client to support only one authorization server, such as in the case of a TV application for a specific media provider that supports only that media provider's authorization server. The user may not yet have an established relationship with that authorization provider, though one can potentially be set up during the authorization flow.




Figure 1: Device Authorization Flow

The device authorization flow illustrated in Figure 1 includes the following steps:

- (A) The client requests access from the authorization server and includes its client identifier in the request.
- (B) The authorization server issues a device code and an end-user code and provides the end-user verification URI.
- (C) The client instructs the end user to use a user agent on another device and visit the provided end-user verification URI. The client provides the user with the end-user code to enter in order to review the authorization request.

- (D) The authorization server authenticates the end user (via the user agent), and prompts the user to input the user code provided by the device client. The authorization server validates the user code provided by the user, and prompts the user to accept or decline the request.
- (E) While the end user reviews the client's request (step D), the client repeatedly polls the authorization server to find out if the user completed the user authorization step. The client includes the device code and its client identifier.
- (F) The authorization server validates the device code provided by the client and responds with the access token if the client is granted access, an error if they are denied access, or an indication that the client should continue to poll.

## 2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 3. Protocol

### 3.1. Device Authorization Request

This specification defines a new OAuth endpoint: the device authorization endpoint. This is separate from the OAuth authorization endpoint defined in [RFC6749] with which the user interacts via a user agent (i.e., a browser). By comparison, when using the device authorization endpoint, the OAuth client on the device interacts with the authorization server directly without presenting the request in a user agent, and the end user authorizes the request on a separate device. This interaction is defined as follows.

The client initiates the authorization flow by requesting a set of verification codes from the authorization server by making an HTTP "POST" request to the device authorization endpoint.

The client makes a device authorization request to the device authorization endpoint by including the following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per [Appendix B of \[RFC6749\]](#), with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body:

**client\_id**

REQUIRED if the client is not authenticating with the authorization server as described in [Section 3.2.1. of \[RFC6749\]](#). The client identifier as described in [Section 2.2 of \[RFC6749\]](#).

**scope**

OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as defined by [Section 3.3 of \[RFC6749\]](#).

For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request:

```
POST /device_authorization HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=1406020730&scope=example_scope
```

All requests from the device MUST use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [\[RFC8446\]](#) and implement the best practices of [BCP 195 \[RFC7525\]](#).

Parameters sent without a value MUST be treated as if they were omitted from the request. The authorization server MUST ignore unrecognized request parameters. Request and response parameters MUST NOT be included more than once.

The client authentication requirements of [Section 3.2.1 of \[RFC6749\]](#) apply to requests on this endpoint, which means that confidential clients (those that have established client credentials) authenticate in the same manner as when making requests to the token endpoint, and public clients provide the "client\_id" parameter to identify themselves.

Due to the polling nature of this protocol (as specified in [Section 3.4](#)), care is needed to avoid overloading the capacity of the token endpoint. To avoid unneeded requests on the token endpoint, the client SHOULD only commence a device authorization request when prompted by the user and not automatically, such as when the app starts or when the previous authorization session expires or fails.

### 3.2. Device Authorization Response

In response, the authorization server generates a unique device verification code and an end-user code that are valid for a limited time and includes them in the HTTP response body using the "application/json" format [RFC8259] with a 200 (OK) status code. The response contains the following parameters:

`device_code`

REQUIRED. The device verification code.

`user_code`

REQUIRED. The end-user verification code.

`verification_uri`

REQUIRED. The end-user verification URI on the authorization server. The URI should be short and easy to remember as end users will be asked to manually type it into their user agent.

`verification_uri_complete`

OPTIONAL. A verification URI that includes the "user\_code" (or other information with the same function as the "user\_code"), which is designed for non-textual transmission.

`expires_in`

REQUIRED. The lifetime in seconds of the "device\_code" and "user\_code".

`interval`

OPTIONAL. The minimum amount of time in seconds that the client SHOULD wait between polling requests to the token endpoint. If no value is provided, clients MUST use 5 as the default.

For example:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

```
Content-Type: application/json
```

```
Cache-Control: no-store
```

```
{
  "device_code": "GmRhmcxhwAzkoEqIMEg_DnyEysNkuNhszIySk9eS",
  "user_code": "WDJB-MJHT",
  "verification_uri": "https://example.com/device",
  "verification_uri_complete":
    "https://example.com/device?user_code=WDJB-MJHT",
  "expires_in": 1800,
  "interval": 5
}
```

In the event of an error (such as an invalidly configured client), the authorization server responds in the same way as the token endpoint specified in [Section 5.2 of \[RFC6749\]](#).

### 3.3. User Interaction

After receiving a successful authorization response, the client displays or otherwise communicates the "user\_code" and the "verification\_uri" to the end user and instructs them to visit the URI in a user agent on a secondary device (for example, in a browser on their mobile phone) and enter the user code.

```
+-----+
|       |
|       | Using a browser on another device, visit:
|       | https://example.com/device
|       |
|       | And enter the code:
|       | WDJB-MJHT
|       |
+-----+
```

Figure 2: Example User Instruction

The authorizing user navigates to the "verification\_uri" and authenticates with the authorization server in a secure TLS-protected [\[RFC8446\]](#) session. The authorization server prompts the end user to identify the device authorization session by entering the "user\_code" provided by the client. The authorization server should then inform the user about the action they are undertaking and ask them to approve or deny the request. Once the user interaction is complete, the server instructs the user to return to their device.

During the user interaction, the device continuously polls the token endpoint with the "device\_code", as detailed in [Section 3.4](#), until the user completes the interaction, the code expires, or another error occurs. The "device\_code" is not intended for the end user directly; thus, it should not be displayed during the interaction to avoid confusing the end user.

Authorization servers supporting this specification MUST implement a user-interaction sequence that starts with the user navigating to "verification\_uri" and continues with them supplying the "user\_code" at some stage during the interaction. Other than that, the exact sequence and implementation of the user interaction is up to the authorization server; for example, the authorization server may enable new users to sign up for an account during the authorization flow or add additional security verification steps.



It is NOT RECOMMENDED for authorization servers to include the user code ("user\_code") in the verification URI ("verification\_uri"), as this increases the length and complexity of the URI that the user must type. While the user must still type a similar number of characters with the "user\_code" separated, once they successfully navigate to the "verification\_uri", any errors in entering the code can be highlighted by the authorization server to improve the user experience. The next section documents the user interaction with "verification\_uri\_complete", which is designed to carry both pieces of information.

### 3.3.1. Non-Textual Verification URI Optimization

When "verification\_uri\_complete" is included in the authorization response ([Section 3.2](#)), clients MAY present this URI in a non-textual manner using any method that results in the browser being opened with the URI, such as with QR (Quick Response) codes or NFC (Near Field Communication), to save the user from typing the URI.

For usability reasons, it is RECOMMENDED for clients to still display the textual verification URI ("verification\_uri") for users who are not able to use such a shortcut. Clients MUST still display the "user\_code", as the authorization server will require the user to confirm it to disambiguate devices or as remote phishing mitigation (see [Section 5.4](#)).

If the user starts the user interaction by navigating to "verification\_uri\_complete", then the user interaction described in [Section 3.3](#) is still followed, with the optimization that the user does not need to type in the "user\_code". The server SHOULD display the "user\_code" to the user and ask them to verify that it matches the "user\_code" being displayed on the device to confirm they are authorizing the correct device. As before, in addition to taking steps to confirm the identity of the device, the user should also be afforded the choice to approve or deny the authorization request.




Figure 3: Example User Instruction with QR Code Representation of the Complete Verification URI

### 3.4. Device Access Token Request

After displaying instructions to the user, the client creates an access token request and sends it to the token endpoint (as defined by [Section 3.2 of \[RFC6749\]](#)) with a "grant\_type" of "urn:iETF:params:oauth:grant-type:device\_code". This is an extension grant type (as defined by [Section 4.5 of \[RFC6749\]](#)) created by this specification, with the following parameters:

#### grant\_type

REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "urn:iETF:params:oauth:grant-type:device\_code".

#### device\_code

REQUIRED. The device verification code, "device\_code" from the device authorization response, defined in [Section 3.2](#).

#### client\_id

REQUIRED if the client is not authenticating with the authorization server as described in [Section 3.2.1. of \[RFC6749\]](#). The client identifier as described in [Section 2.2 of \[RFC6749\]](#).

For example, the client makes the following HTTPS request (line breaks are for display purposes only):

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=urn%3AiETF%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Adevice_code
&device_code=GmRhmhcXhwAzkoEqiMEg_DnyEysNkuNhszIySk9eS
&client_id=1406020730
```

If the client was issued client credentials (or assigned other authentication requirements), the client MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described in [Section 3.2.1 of \[RFC6749\]](#). Note that there are security implications of statically distributed client credentials; see [Section 5.6](#).

The response to this request is defined in [Section 3.5](#). Unlike other OAuth grant types, it is expected for the client to try the access token request repeatedly in a polling fashion based on the error code in the response.

### 3.5. Device Access Token Response

If the user has approved the grant, the token endpoint responds with a success response defined in [Section 5.1 of \[RFC6749\]](#); otherwise, it responds with an error, as defined in [Section 5.2 of \[RFC6749\]](#).

In addition to the error codes defined in [Section 5.2 of \[RFC6749\]](#), the following error codes are specified for use with the device authorization grant in token endpoint responses:

#### `authorization_pending`

The authorization request is still pending as the end user hasn't yet completed the user-interaction steps ([Section 3.3](#)). The client SHOULD repeat the access token request to the token endpoint (a process known as polling). Before each new request, the client MUST wait at least the number of seconds specified by the "interval" parameter of the device authorization response (see [Section 3.2](#)), or 5 seconds if none was provided, and respect any increase in the polling interval required by the "slow\_down" error.

#### `slow_down`

A variant of "authorization\_pending", the authorization request is still pending and polling should continue, but the interval MUST be increased by 5 seconds for this and all subsequent requests.

#### `access_denied`

The authorization request was denied.

#### `expired_token`

The "device\_code" has expired, and the device authorization session has concluded. The client MAY commence a new device authorization request but SHOULD wait for user interaction before restarting to avoid unnecessary polling.

The "authorization\_pending" and "slow\_down" error codes define particularly unique behavior, as they indicate that the OAuth client should continue to poll the token endpoint by repeating the token request (implementing the precise behavior defined above). If the client receives an error response with any other error code, it **MUST** stop polling and **SHOULD** react accordingly, for example, by displaying an error to the user.

On encountering a connection timeout, clients **MUST** unilaterally reduce their polling frequency before retrying. The use of an exponential backoff algorithm to achieve this, such as doubling the polling interval on each such connection timeout, is **RECOMMENDED**.

The assumption of this specification is that the separate device on which the user is authorizing the request does not have a way to communicate back to the device with the OAuth client. This protocol only requires a one-way channel in order to maximize the viability of the protocol in restricted environments, like an application running on a TV that is only capable of outbound requests. If a return channel were to exist for the chosen user-interaction interface, then the device **MAY** wait until notified on that channel that the user has completed the action before initiating the token request (as an alternative to polling). Such behavior is, however, outside the scope of this specification.

#### 4. Discovery Metadata

Support for this protocol is declared in OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414] as follows. The value "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device\_code" is included in values of the "grant\_types\_supported" key, and the following new key value pair is added:

device\_authorization\_endpoint

OPTIONAL. URL of the authorization server's device authorization endpoint, as defined in [Section 3.1](#).

#### 5. Security Considerations

##### 5.1. User Code Brute Forcing

Since the user code is typed by the user, shorter codes are more desirable for usability reasons. This means the entropy is typically less than would be used for the device code or other OAuth bearer token types where the code length does not impact usability. Therefore, it is recommended that the server rate-limit user code attempts.

The user code SHOULD have enough entropy that, when combined with rate-limiting and other mitigations, a brute-force attack becomes infeasible. For example, it's generally held that 128-bit symmetric keys for encryption are seen as good enough today because an attacker has to put in  $2^{96}$  work to have a  $2^{-32}$  chance of guessing correctly via brute force. The rate-limiting and finite lifetime on the user code place an artificial limit on the amount of work an attacker can "do". If, for instance, one uses an 8-character base 20 user code (with roughly 34.5 bits of entropy), the rate-limiting interval and validity period would need to only allow 5 attempts in order to get the same  $2^{-32}$  probability of success by random guessing.

A successful brute forcing of the user code would enable the attacker to approve the authorization grant with their own credentials, after which the device would receive a device authorization grant linked to the attacker's account. This is the opposite scenario to an OAuth bearer token being brute forced, whereby the attacker gains control of the victim's authorization grant. Such attacks may not always make economic sense. For example, for a video app, the device owner may then be able to purchase movies using the attacker's account (though even in this case a privacy risk would still remain and thus is important to protect against). Furthermore, some uses of the device flow give the granting account the ability to perform actions that need to be protected, such as controlling the device.

The precise length of the user code and the entropy contained within is at the discretion of the authorization server, which needs to consider the sensitivity of their specific protected resources, the practicality of the code length from a usability standpoint, and any mitigations that are in place, such as rate-limiting, when determining the user code format.

## 5.2. Device Code Brute Forcing

An attacker who guesses the device code would be able to potentially obtain the authorization code once the user completes the flow. As the device code is not displayed to the user and thus there are no usability considerations on the length, a very high entropy code SHOULD be used.

## 5.3. Device Trustworthiness

Unlike other native application OAuth 2.0 flows, the device requesting the authorization is not the same as the device from which the user grants access. Thus, signals from the approving user's session and device are not always relevant to the trustworthiness of the client device.

Note that if an authorization server used with this flow is malicious, then it could perform a man-in-the-middle attack on the backchannel flow to another authorization server. In this scenario, the man-in-the-middle is not completely hidden from sight, as the end user would end up on the authorization page of the wrong service, giving them an opportunity to notice that the URL in the browser's address bar is wrong. For this to be possible, the device manufacturer must either be the attacker and shipping a device intended to perform the man-in-the-middle attack, or be using an authorization server that is controlled by an attacker, possibly because the attacker compromised the authorization server used by the device. In part, the person purchasing the device is counting on the manufacturer and its business partners to be trustworthy.

#### 5.4. Remote Phishing

It is possible for the device flow to be initiated on a device in an attacker's possession. For example, an attacker might send an email instructing the target user to visit the verification URL and enter the user code. To mitigate such an attack, it is RECOMMENDED to inform the user that they are authorizing a device during the user-interaction step (see [Section 3.3](#)) and to confirm that the device is in their possession. The authorization server SHOULD display information about the device so that the user could notice if a software client was attempting to impersonate a hardware device.

For authorization servers that support the "verification\_uri\_complete" optimization discussed in [Section 3.3.1](#), it is particularly important to confirm that the device is in the user's possession, as the user no longer has to type in the code being displayed on the device manually. One suggestion is to display the code during the authorization flow and ask the user to verify that the same code is currently being displayed on the device they are setting up.

The user code needs to have a long enough lifetime to be useable (allowing the user to retrieve their secondary device, navigate to the verification URI, log in, etc.) but should be sufficiently short to limit the usability of a code obtained for phishing. This doesn't prevent a phisher from presenting a fresh token, particularly if they are interacting with the user in real time, but it does limit the viability of codes sent over email or text message.

### 5.5. Session Spying

While the device is pending authorization, it may be possible for a malicious user to physically spy on the device user interface (by viewing the screen on which it's displayed, for example) and hijack the session by completing the authorization faster than the user that initiated it. Devices SHOULD take into account the operating environment when considering how to communicate the code to the user to reduce the chances it will be observed by a malicious user.

### 5.6. Non-Confidential Clients

Device clients are generally incapable of maintaining the confidentiality of their credentials, as users in possession of the device can reverse-engineer it and extract the credentials. Therefore, unless additional measures are taken, they should be treated as public clients (as defined by [Section 2.1 of \[RFC6749\]](#)), which are susceptible to impersonation. The security considerations of [Section 5.3.1 of \[RFC6819\]](#) and [Sections 8.5 and 8.6 of \[RFC8252\]](#) apply to such clients.

The user may also be able to obtain the "device\_code" and/or other OAuth bearer tokens issued to their client, which would allow them to use their own authorization grant directly by impersonating the client. Given that the user in possession of the client credentials can already impersonate the client and create a new authorization grant (with a new "device\_code"), this doesn't represent a separate impersonation vector.

### 5.7. Non-Visual Code Transmission

There is no requirement that the user code be displayed by the device visually. Other methods of one-way communication can potentially be used, such as text-to-speech audio or Bluetooth Low Energy. To mitigate an attack in which a malicious user can bootstrap their credentials on a device not in their control, it is RECOMMENDED that any chosen communication channel only be accessible by people in close proximity, for example, users who can see or hear the device.

## 6. Usability Considerations

This section is a non-normative discussion of usability considerations.

### 6.1. User Code Recommendations

For many users, their nearest Internet-connected device will be their mobile phone; typically, these devices offer input methods that are more time-consuming than a computer keyboard to change the case or input numbers. To improve usability (improving entry speed and reducing retries), the limitations of such devices should be taken into account when selecting the user code character set.

One way to improve input speed is to restrict the character set to case-insensitive A-Z characters, with no digits. These characters can typically be entered on a mobile keyboard without using modifier keys. Further removing vowels to avoid randomly creating words results in the base 20 character set "BCDFGHJKLMNPQRSTVWXZ". Dashes or other punctuation may be included for readability.

An example user code following this guideline, "WDJB-MJHT", contains 8 significant characters and has dashes added for end-user readability. The resulting entropy is  $20^8$ .

Pure numeric codes are also a good choice for usability, especially for clients targeting locales where A-Z character keyboards are not used, though the length of such a code needs to be longer to maintain high entropy.

An example numeric user code that contains 9 significant digits and dashes added for end-user readability with an entropy of  $10^9$  is "019-450-730".

When processing the inputted user code, the server should strip dashes and other punctuation that it added for readability (making the inclusion of such punctuation by the user optional). For codes using only characters in the A-Z range, as with the base 20 charset defined above, the user's input should be uppercased before a comparison to account for the fact that the user may input the equivalent lowercase characters. Further stripping of all characters outside the chosen character set is recommended to reduce instances where an errantly typed character (like a space character) invalidates otherwise valid input.



It is RECOMMENDED to avoid character sets that contain two or more characters that can easily be confused with each other, like "0" and "O" or "1", "l" and "I". Furthermore, to the extent practical, when a character set contains a character that may be confused with characters outside the character set, a character outside the set MAY be substituted with the one in the character set with which it is commonly confused; for example, "O" may be substituted for "0" when using the numerical 0-9 character set.

## 6.2. Non-Browser User Interaction

Devices and authorization servers MAY negotiate an alternative code transmission and user-interaction method in addition to the one described in [Section 3.3](#). Such an alternative user-interaction flow could obviate the need for a browser and manual input of the code, for example, by using Bluetooth to transmit the code to the authorization server's companion app. Such interaction methods can utilize this protocol as, ultimately, the user just needs to identify the authorization session to the authorization server; however, user interaction other than through the verification URI is outside the scope of this specification.

## 7. IANA Considerations

### 7.1. OAuth Parameter Registration

This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC6749](#)].

Name: device\_code  
Parameter Usage Location: token request  
Change Controller: IESG  
Reference: [Section 3.4 of RFC 8628](#)

### 7.2. OAuth URI Registration

This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC6755](#)].

URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device\_code  
Common Name: Device Authorization Grant Type for OAuth 2.0  
Change Controller: IESG  
Specification Document: [Section 3.4 of RFC 8628](#)

### 7.3. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC6749](#)].

Name: authorization\_pending  
Usage Location: Token endpoint response  
Protocol Extension: [RFC 8628](#)  
Change Controller: IETF  
Reference: [Section 3.5 of RFC 8628](#)

Name: access\_denied  
Usage Location: Token endpoint response  
Protocol Extension: [RFC 8628](#)  
Change Controller: IETF  
Reference: [Section 3.5 of RFC 8628](#)

Name: slow\_down  
Usage Location: Token endpoint response  
Protocol Extension: [RFC 8628](#)  
Change Controller: IETF  
Reference: [Section 3.5 of RFC 8628](#)

Name: expired\_token  
Usage Location: Token endpoint response  
Protocol Extension: [RFC 8628](#)  
Change Controller: IETF  
Reference: [Section 3.5 of RFC 8628](#)

### 7.4. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata

This specification registers the following values in the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry [[IANA.OAuth.Parameters](#)] established by [[RFC8414](#)].

Metadata name: device\_authorization\_endpoint  
Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's device authorization endpoint  
Change Controller: IESG  
Reference: [Section 4 of RFC 8628](#)

## 8. Normative References

- [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]  
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