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Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
Name Type Fields

Abstract

SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) defines the Name Type field in the ICMPv6 Trust Anchor option. This document specifies new Name Type fields based on certificate Subject Key Identifiers (SKIs).

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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1. Introduction

SECure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] utilizes X.509v3 certificates that include the [RFC3779] extension for IPv6 addresses to certify a router's authority over an IPv6 prefix for the NDP (Neighbor Discovery Protocol). The Trust Anchor (TA) option in Section 6.4.3 of [RFC3971] allows the identification of the Trust Anchor selected by the host. In that same section, two name types were defined: the DER Encoded X.501 Name and a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).

In any Public Key Infrastructure, the subject name of a certificate is only unique within each Certification Authority (CA). Consequently, a new option to identify TAs across CAs is needed.

In [RFC6494], the certificate profile described in [RFC6487] is adopted for SEND. In these documents, the Subject field in the certificates is declared to be meaningless and the subjectAltName field is not allowed. On the other hand, the Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates is defined as mandatory and non-critical.

This document specifies new Name Type fields in the SEND TA option that allows the use of the SKI X.509 extension to identify TA X.509 certificates. This document also defines experimental and reserved Name Types values.

Finally, this document updates [RFC3971] by changing the "Trust Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registration procedures from Standards Action to Standards Action or IESG Approval [RFC5226].

2. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Name Type Fields in the ICMPv6 TA Option Defined in This Document

The following Name Type fields in the ICMPv6 TA option are defined:

Name Type	Description
0	Reserved
3	SHA-1 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
4	SHA-224 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
5	SHA-256 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
6	SHA-384 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
7	SHA-512 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
253-254	Experimental
255	Reserved

Name Type field values 0 and 255 are marked as reserved. This means that they are not available for allocation.

When the Name Type field is set to 3, the Name Type field contains a 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as described in [Section 4.8.2 of \[RFC6487\]](#). Implementations MAY support SHA-1 SKI name type.

When the Name Type field is set to 4, 5, 6, or 7, the hash function will respectively be: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512. Implementations MAY support SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 SKI name types.

Name Type fields 253 and 254 are marked as experimental, per guidance in [\[RFC3692\]](#).

4. Processing Rules for Routers

As specified in [\[RFC3971\]](#), a TA is identified by the SEND TA option. If the TA option is represented as a SKI, then the SKI MUST be equal to the X.509 SKI extension in the trust anchor's certificate. The router SHOULD include the TA option(s) in the advertisement for which the certification path was found. Also, following the specification defined in [\[RFC3971\]](#), if the router is unable to find a path to the requested anchor, it SHOULD send an advertisement without any certificate. In this case, the router SHOULD include the TA options that were solicited.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA has updated the "Trust Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registry to include the following values:

Value	Description
0	Reserved (Section 3)
3	SHA-1 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)
4	SHA-224 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)
5	SHA-256 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)
6	SHA-384 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)
7	SHA-512 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)
253-254	Experimental Use (Section 3)
255	Reserved (Section 3)

Table 1: New Name Type Field Values in the ICMPv6 TA Option

IANA has also modified the registration procedures for the "Trust Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registry to Standards Action or IESG Approval [[RFC5226](#)].

6. Security Considerations

The hash functions referenced in this document to calculate the SKI have reasonable random properties in order to provide reasonably unique identifiers. Two identical identifiers in the same validation path will cause the router to stop fetching certificates once the first certificate has been fetched. In the case that the upward certificate was configured as a TA by a host, the router will send to this host an incomplete list of certificates, causing the SEND validation to fail.

For experimental values of the Name Type field, the guidance given in [[RFC3692](#)] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed.

7. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.
- [RFC3692] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Considered Useful", [BCP 82](#), [RFC 3692](#), January 2004.
- [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", [RFC 3779](#), June 2004.

- [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", [RFC 3971](#), March 2005.
- [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", [BCP 26](#), [RFC 5226](#), May 2008.
- [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", [RFC 6487](#), February 2012.
- [RFC6494] Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Certificate Profile and Certificate Management for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", [RFC 6494](#), February 2012.

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