Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 6210

Category: Experimental

ISSN: 2070-1721

J. Schaad Soaring Hawk Consulting April 2011

Experiment: Hash Functions with Parameters in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME

#### Abstract

New hash algorithms are being developed that may include parameters. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) has not currently defined any hash algorithms with parameters, but anecdotal evidence suggests that defining one could cause major problems. This document defines just such an algorithm and describes how to use it so that experiments can be run to find out how bad including hash parameters will be.

# Status of This Memo

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for examination, experimental implementation, and evaluation.

This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6210">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6210</a>.

# Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

### Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.1. Notation	5
2. XOR-MD5 Digest Algorithm	5
3. ASN.1 Encoding	6
4. CMS ASN.1 Handling	6
5. MIME Handling	6
6. IANA Considerations	7
7. Security Considerations	7
8. References	7
8.1. Normative References	7
8.2. Informative References	8
Appendix A. Examples	9
A.1. Encapsulated Signed Data Example	9
A.2. Multipart Signed Message	0
A.3. Authenticated Data Example	2
Appendix B. 2008 ASN.1 Module	3

Schaad Experimental [Page 2]

### 1. Introduction

At the present time, all hash algorithms that are used in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) implementations are defined as having no parameters. Anecdotal evidence suggests that if a hash algorithm is defined that does require the presence of parameters, there may be extensive problems. This document presents the details needed to run an experiment so that the community can find out just how bad the situation really is and, if needed, either make drastic changes in implementations or make sure that any hash algorithms chosen do not have parameters.

In CMS data structures, hash algorithms currently exist in the following locations:

- o SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm holds the digest algorithm used to compute the hash value over the content.
- o DigestedData.digestAlgorithm holds the digest algorithm used to compute the hash value over the content.
- o AuthenticatedData.digestAlgorithm holds the digest algorithm used to compute the hash value over the content.
- o SignedData.digestAlgorithms an optional location to hold the set of digest algorithms used in computing the hash value over the content.
- o multipart/signed micalg holds a textual indicator of the hash algorithm for multipart signed MIME messages.

The first three locations hold the identification of a single hash, and would hold the parameters for that hash. It's mandatory to fill these fields.

The ASN.1 structures defined for the DigestedData and AuthenticatedData types place the digest algorithm field before the encapsulated data field. This means that the hash algorithm (including the parameters) is fully defined, and therfore can be instantiated, before the hash function would start hashing the encapsulated data.

In the ASN.1 defined for the SignedData type, the value of SignerInfo.digestAlgorithm is not seen until the content has been processed. This is the reason for the existence of the SignedData.digestAlgorithms field, so that the set of all digest algorithms used can be seen prior to the content being processed. It is not currently mandatory to fill in this field, and the signature

validation process is supposed to succeed even if this field is absent. (RFC 5652 says signature validation MAY fail if the digest algorithm is absent.)

For the case of detached content, the ASN.1 structures need to be processed before processing the detached content in order to obtain the parameters of the hash function. The MIME multipart/signature content type attempts to avoid this problem by defining a micalg field that contains the set of hash algorithms (with parameters) so that the hash functions can be set up prior to processing the content.

When processing multipart/signed messages, two paths exists:

- 1. Process the message content before the ASN.1. The steps involved are:
  - \* Get a set of hash functions by looking at the micalg parameter and potentially add a set of generic algorithms.
  - \* Create a hasher for each of those algorithms.
  - \* Hash the message content (the first part of the multipart).
  - \* Process the ASN.1 and have a potential failure point if a hash algorithm is required but was not computed.
- 2. Process the message content after the ASN.1. The steps involved are:
  - \* Save the message content for later processing.
  - \* Parse the ASN.1 and build a list of hash functions based on its content.
  - \* Create a hasher for each of those algorithms.
  - \* Hash the saved message content.
  - \* Perform the signature validation.

The first path allows for single-pass processing, but has the potential that a fallback path needs to be added in some cases. The second path does not need a fallback path, but does not allow for single-pass processing.

The fallback path above may also be needed for the encapsulated content case. Since it is optional to place hash algorithms in the SignedData.digestAlgorithms field, the content will be completely parsed before the set of hash algorithms used in the various SignerInfo structures are determined. It may be that an update to CMS is required to make population of the SignedData.digestAlgorithms field mandatory, in the event that a parameterized hash algorithm is adopted.

In this document, a new hash function is created that is based on the XOR operator and on MD5. MD5 was deliberately used as the basis of this digest algorithm since it is known to be insecure, and I do not want to make any statements that the hash algorithm designed here is in any way secure. This hash function MUST NOT be released as shipping code, it is designed only for use in experimentation. An example of a parameterized hash algorithm that might be standardized is a scheme developed by Shai Halevi and Hugo Krawczyk [RANDOM-HASH].

### 1.1. Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

# 2. XOR-MD5 Digest Algorithm

The XOR-MD5 digest algorithm has been designed to use two existing operators, XOR and the MD5 hash algorithm [MD5]. The hash algorithm works as follows:

- 1. A random XOR string consisting of exactly 64 bytes is created.
- 2. The input content is broken up into 64-byte blocks. The last block may be less that 64 bytes.
- 3. Each block is XOR-ed with the random string. The last block uses the same number of bits from the random string as it contains.
- 4. The resulting string is run through the MD5 hash function.

The length of the XOR string was designed to match the barrel size of the MD5 hash function.

# 3. ASN.1 Encoding

```
The following ASN.1 is used to define the algorithm:

mda-xor-md5-EXPERIMENT DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
    IDENTIFIER id-alg-MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT
    PARAMS TYPE MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT ARE required
}

id-alg-MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
    pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-alg(3) 13
}

MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(64))

The octet string holds the value of the random XOR string.
```

## 4. CMS ASN.1 Handling

The algorithm is added to the DigestAlgorithmSet in [CMS].

When this algorithm is used in a signed message, it is REQUIRED that the algorithm be placed in the SignedData.digestAlgorithms sequence. The algorithm MUST appear in the sequence at least once for each unique set of parameters. The algorithm SHOULD NOT appear multiple times with the same set of parameters.

# 5. MIME Handling

This section defines the string that appears in the micalg parameter.

The algorithm is identified by the string xor-md5. The parameters for the algorithm are the hex-encoded Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) ASN.1 encoding. The parameters and the identifier string are separated by a colon. One of the issues that needs to be addressed is the fact that this will generate very long data values for parameters. These will be too long for many systems to deal with. The issue of how to deal with this has been addressed in [RFC2231] by creating a method to fragment values. An example content-type string that has been fragmented is:

```
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
  protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
  micalg*0="sha1, xor-md5:04400102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f0011";
  micalg*1="12131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f102122232425262728292a2b";
  micalg*2="2c2d2e2f203132333435363738";
  micalg*3="393a3b3c3d3e3f30"; boundary=boundar42
```

Arguments could be made that the string should be base64 encoded rather than hex encoded. The advantage is that the resulting encoding is shorter. This could be significant if there are a substantial number of parameters and of a substantial size. Even with the above example, it was necessary to break the encoding across multiple lines. The downside would be the requirement that the micalg parameter always be quoted.

It may be reasonable to require that whitespace be inserted only on encoding boundaries, but it seems to be overly restrictive.

### 6. IANA Considerations

All identifiers are assigned out of the S/MIME OID arc.

## 7. Security Considerations

The algorithm XOR-MD5 is not designed for general-purpose use. The hash algorithm included here is designed for running this experiment and nothing more.

This document makes no representation that XOR-MD5 is a secure digest algorithm. I believe that the algorithm is no more secure than MD5, and I consider MD5 to be a broken hash algorithm for many purposes.

One known issue with the algorithm at present is the fact that the XOR pattern is always 64 bytes long, even if the data is shorter. This means that there is a section of the data than can be manipulated without changing the hash. In a real algorithm, this should either be truncated or forced to a known value.

# 8. References

# 8.1. Normative References

[ASN.1-2008]	$\mathtt{ITU-T}$ ,	"ITU-T	Recommendations	X.680,	X.681,	X.682,	and
	X.683",	2008.					

[CMS]	Housley,	R.,	"Cryptographic	Message	Syntax	(CMS)",
	RFC 5652	, Ser	otember 2009.			

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

- [RFC2231] Freed, N. and K. Moore, "MIME Parameter Value and Encoded Word Extensions: Character Sets, Languages, and Continuations", RFC 2231, November 1997.
- [SMIME-MSG] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

### 8.2. Informative References

- [CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911, June 2010.
- [RANDOM-HASH] Halevi, S. and H. Krawczyk, "Strengthening Digital Signatures via Random Hashing", January 2007, <a href="http://webee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/rhash/rhash.pdf">http://webee.technion.ac.il/~hugo/rhash/rhash.pdf</a>.
- [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, June 2010.

## [SMIME-EXAMPLES]

Hoffman, P., "Examples of S/MIME Messages", RFC 4134, July 2005.

## Appendix A. Examples

Provided here are a set of simple S/MIME messages [SMIME-MSG] that are for testing. The content used is the same as that found in Section 2.1 of [SMIME-EXAMPLES]. The certificates and key pairs found in [SMIME-EXAMPLES] are also used here.

The Perl script in Appendix A of [SMIME-EXAMPLES] can be used to extract the binary examples from this file. The MIME examples can be extracted with a standard text editor.

Note: The examples presented here have not been independently verified. I was unable to use the Microsoft APIs because of the new cryptographic hash algorithm. However, for the purposes of this experiment, I believe that the form of the messages, which can be verified visually as correct, is more important than the question of the message validating.

## A.1. Encapsulated Signed Data Example

This section contains a detached signed data example. The content was hashed with the MD5-XOR algorithm defined in this document. The signature is performed using RSA with MD5. The signature is wrapped as an embedded signed mime message.

```
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: BobRSA@example.com
From: AliceDss@example.com
Subject: MD5-XOR example message
Message-Id: <34567809323489fd.esc@example.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2010 23:13:00 -0500
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data;
   name=smime.p7m;
   micalg*0="xor-md5: 0440010203405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10";
   micalg*1="111213415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20212223425262728292a2b2c";
   micalg*2="2d2e2f30313233435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f40"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m
```

MIIEqAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIEmTCCBJUCAQExUTBPBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADDQRAAQIDBAUGBW gJCgsMDQ4PEBESEwQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMEJSYNKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzBDU2Nzg5Ojs8 PT4/QDArBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgHgQcVGhpcyBpcyBzb21lIHNhbXBsZSBjb250ZW50LqCCAiswggInMIIBkKADAgECAhBGNGvHgABWvBHTbi7NXXHQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBIxEDAO BgNVBAMTB0NhcmxSU0EwHhcNOTkwOTE5MDEwOTAyWhcNMzkxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjARMQ8wDQ YDVQQDEwZCb2JSU0EwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAKnhZ5g/OdVf8qCTQV6meYmFyDVdmpFb+x0B2hlwJhcPvaUi0DWFbXqYZhRBXM+3twg7CcmRuBlpN235ZR572akzJKN/O7uvRgGGNjQyywcDWVL8hYsxBLjMGAgUSOZPHPtdYMTgXB9T039T2GkB8QX4enDRvoPGXzjPHCyqaqfrAgMBAAGjfzB9MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgUgMB

8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFOngkCeseCB6mtNM8kI3TiKunji7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTo9Lhn2LOWpCrz Eaop05Vahha0JDAdBgNVHREEFjAUgRJCb2JSU0FAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQ EFBQADgYEAe45mxfEQPxAgTIhxq3tAayEz+kqV3p00W2uUIQXA8uF+Ks2ck4iH+4u3fn1B YeHk1m354gRVYUW8ZCdEwKG9WXnZHWQ8IdZFsF1oM5LqrPFX5YF9mOY1kaM53nf06Bw7Kd x/UQeX8zbwUArdm962XjgRK/tX6oltrcmI2I/PK9MxggHfMIIB2wIBATAmMBIxEDAOBgNV BAMTB0NhcmxSU0ECEEY0a8eAAFa8EdNuLs1dcdAwTwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAw0EQAECAwQFBg cICQoLDA0ODxAREhMEFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjBCUmJygpKissLS4vMDEyMwQ1Njc4OTo7 PD0+P0CggcowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMD kxMjEwMjMyNTAwWjAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxEgQQlmmuYRtXnoPqECtrSd3A+TBvBgkqhkiG9w0BCTQxYjBgME8GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAMNBEABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITBBUWFxgZGh scHR4fICEiIwQlJicoKSorLCOuLzAxMjMENTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AoQ0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUA MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUABIGAClMpfG4IL1yAdRxWdvYKbtuFz1XKnFqo9ui7V5PndjlDut yib02knY7UtGNhg6oVEkiZHxYh/iLuoLOHSFA1P4ZacTYrEKChF4K18dsqvlFiplvn8BG/ysFUDfbx5VcTG2Md0/NHV+qj5ihqM+Pye6Urp+5jbqVgpZOXSLfP+pI=

### |>sd.bin

MIIEqAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIEmTCCBJUCAQExUTBPBqsqhkiG9w0BCRADDQRAAQIDBAUGBw gJCgsMDQ4PEBESEwQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMEJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzBDU2Nzg5Ojs8 PT4/QDArBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgHgQcVGhpcyBpcyBzb211IHNhbXBsZSBjb250ZW50LqCCAi swggInMIIBkKADAgECAhBGNGvHgABWvBHTbi7NXXHQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBIxEDAO BqNVBAMTB0NhcmxSU0EwHhcNOTkwOTE5MDEwOTAyWhcNMzkxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjARMQ8wDQ YDVQQDEwZCb2JSU0EwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAKnhZ5g/OdVf8qCT QV6meYmFyDVdmpFb+x0B2hlwJhcPvaUi0DWFbXqYZhRBXM+3twg7CcmRuBlpN235ZR572a kzJKN/O7uvRgGGNjQyywcDWVL8hYsxBLjMGAgUSOZPHPtdYMTgXB9T039T2GkB8QX4enDR voPGXzjPHCyqaqfrAgMBAAGjfzB9MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgUgMB 8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFOngkCeseCB6mtNM8kI3TiKunji7MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTo9Lhn2LOWpCrz Eaop05Vahha0JDAdBgNVHREEFjAUgRJCb2JSU0FAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQ EFBQADqYEAe45mxfEQPxAqTIhxq3tAayEz+kqV3p00W2uUIQXA8uF+Ks2ck4iH+4u3fn1B YeHk1m354qRVYUW8ZCdEwKG9WXnZHWQ8IdZFsF1oM5LqrPFX5YF9mOY1kaM53nf06Bw7Kd x/UQeX8zbwUArdm962XjgRK/tX6oltrcmI2I/PK9MxggHfMIIB2wIBATAmMBIxEDAOBgNV BAMTB0NhcmxSU0ECEEY0a8eAAFa8EdNuLs1dcdAwTwYLKoZ1hvcNAQkQAw0EQAECAwQFBg cICQoLDAOODxAREhMEFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjBCUmJygpKissLS4vMDEyMwQ1Njc4OTo7 PDO+POCggcowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMD kxMjEwMjMyNTAwWjAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxEgQQlmmuYRtXnoPqECtrSd3A+TBvBgkqhkiG |9w0BCTQxYjBgME8GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAMNBEABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITBBUWFxgZGh scHR4fICEiIwQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjMENTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AoQ0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUA| MAOGCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUABIGAClMpfG4IL1yAdRxWdvYKbtuFz1XKnFqo9ui7V5PndjlDut yib02knY7UtGNhg6oVEkiZHxYh/iLuoLOHSFA1P4ZacTYrEKChF4K18dsqvlFip1vn8BG/ |ysFUDfbx5VcTG2Md0/NHV+qj5ihqM+Pye6Urp+5jbqVgpZOXSLfP+pI= <sd.bin

## A.2. Multipart Signed Message

This section contains a detached signed data example. The content was hashed with the MD5-XOR algorithm defined in this document. The signature is performed using RSA with MD5. The signature is wrapped as a detached signed mime message.

```
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: User2@example.com
From: BobRSA@example.com
Subject: MD5-XOR signing example
Message-Id: <091218002550300.249@example.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2010 00:25:21 -0300
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
  micalq*0="xor-md5: 0440010203405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10";
  micalg*1="111213415161718191alb1cld1e1f20212223425262728292a2b2c2d2e";
  micalg*2="2f30313233435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f40";
    boundary="---=_NextBoundry____Fri,_18_Dec_2009_00:25:21";
    protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
----= NextBoundry Fri, 18 Dec 2009 00:25:21
This is some sample content.
-----E_NextBoundry____Fri,_18_Dec_2009_00:25:21
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
```

MIIEiAYJKoZlhvcNAQcCoIIEeTCCBHUCAQExUTBPBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADDQRAAQIDBAUGBw gJCgsMDQ4PEBESEwQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMEJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzBDU2Nzg5Ojs8 PT4/QDALBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgggIrMIICJzCCAZCgAwIBAgIQRjRrx4AAVrwR024uzV1x0D ANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdDYXJsulNBMB4XDTk5MDkxOTAxMDkwMloX DTM5MTIzMTIzNTk1OVowETEPMA0GA1UEAxMGQm9iUlNBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4 GNADCBiQKBqQCp4WeYPznVX/Kqk0FepnmJhcq1XZqRW/sdAdoZcCYXD721ItA1hW16mGYU QVzPt7cIOwnJkbgZaTdt+WUee9mpMySjfzu7r0YBhjY0MssHA11S/IWLMQS4zBgIFEjmTx AjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFIDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTp4JAnrHggeprTTPJCN04irp44uz AdBgNVHQ4EFgQU6PS4Z9izlqQq8xGqKdOVWoYWtCQwHQYDVR0RBBYwFIESQm9iU1NBQGV4 YW1wbGUuY29tMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBAHuOZsXxED8QIEyIcat7QGshM/pKld6dDl  $\verb|trlCEFwPLhfirNnJOIh/uLt359QWHh5NZt+eIEVWFFvGQnRMChvVl52R1kPCHWRbBdaDOS||$ 6qzxV+WBfZjmNZGjOd539OgcOyncf1EH1/M28FAK3Zvet144ESv7V+qJba3JiNiPzyvTMY  $\tt IB3zCCAdsCAQEwJjASMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdDYXJsUlNBAhBGNGvHgABWvBHTbi7NXXHQME8G$ CyqGSIb3DQEJEAMNBEABAgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITBBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIwQlJi coKSorLC0uLzAxMjMENTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AoIHKMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0B  ${\tt BwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTEwMTIxMDIzMjUwMFowHwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMRIEEJZprm}$ EbV56D6hAraOndwPkwbwYJKoZIhvcNAQkOMWIwYDBPBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADDQRAAQIDBAUG BwqJCqsMDQ4PEBESEwQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMEJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzBDU2Nzq50j  $\verb|s8PT4/QKENBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAASBgEDMeyAkXMYqg/wW2B3P| \\$ i8HWwGnZVA/4muJJ7+dEPacv3bRqE7n4dP0vXIYR7TJ1eRJk9uB/wry2fRPcnG3Y/Rn0Jy CqXsb+dXXfwOGK/rvLvJOloXUCy4+HxQk6eaYIBrjiVIUgZjpZXGJcZg2xq5yH1e4aw50v fQlfQXPiKp1l

```
-----ENextBoundry____Fri,_18_Dec_2009_00:25:21--
```

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s

## A.3. Authenticated Data Example

This section contains an authenticated data example. The content was hashed with the MD5-XOR algorithm defined in this document. The authentication was done with the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm. The key is transported using RSA encryption to BobRSASignByCarl certificate.

MIME-Version: 1.0
To: BobRSA@example.com
From: AliceDss@example.com
Subject: MD5-XOR example message
Message-Id: <34567809323489fd.esc@example.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2010 23:13:00 -0500
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=authenticated-data; name=smime.p7m; micalg\*0="xor-md5: 0440010203405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10"; micalg\*1="111213415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20212223425262728292a2b2c2d2e"; micalg\*2="2f30313233435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f40"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m

MIICRQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAQKgggI0MIICMAIBADGBwDCBvQIBADAmMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMMB0 NhcmxSU0ECEEY0a8eAAFa8EdNuLs1dcdAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEgYCH70EpEikY7deb 859YJRAWfFondQv1D4NFltw6C1ceheWnlAU0C2WEXr3LUBXZp1/PSte29FnJxu5bXCTn1g elMm6zNlZNWNd0KadVBcaxi1n8L52tVM5sWFGJPO5cStOyAka2ucuZM6iAnCSkn1Ju7fgU 5j2g3bZ/IM8nHTcygjAKBggrBgEFBQgBAqFPBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADDQRAAQIDBAUGBwgJCg sMDQ4PEBESEwQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMEJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzBDU2Nzg5Ojs8PT4/QDArBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgHgQcVGhpcyBpcyBzb21lIHNhbXBsZSBjb250ZW50LqKBxzAYBg kqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0wOTEyMTAyMzI1MDBa MB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDESBBCWaa5hGleeg+oQK2tJ3cD5MGwGCSqGSIb3DQEJNDFfMF0wTw YLKoZIhvcNAQkQAw0EQAECAwQFBgcICQoLDAOODxAREhMEFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjBCUm JygpKissLS4vMDEyMwQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0CiCgYIKwYBBQUIAQIEFLjUxQ9PJFzFnWraxb EIbVbg2xq1

### |>ad.bin

MIICRQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAQKgggI0MIICMAIBADGBwDCBvQIBADAmMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMMB0 | NhcmxSU0ECEEY0a8eAAFa8EdNuLs1dcdAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEGYCH70EpEikY7deb | 859YJRAWfFondQv1D4NFltw6C1ceheWnlAU0C2WEXr3LUBXZp1/PSte29FnJxu5bXCTn1g | elMm6zNlZNWNd0KadVBcaxi1n8L52tVM5sWFGJPO5cstOyAka2ucuZM6iAnCSkn1Ju7fgU | 5j2g3bZ/IM8nHTcygjAKBggrBgEFBQgBAqFPBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADDQRAAQIDBAUGBwgJCg | sMDQ4PEBESEwQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMEJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzBDU2Nzg50js8PT4/ | QDArBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGgHgQcVGhpcyBpcyBzb21lIHNhbXBsZSBjb250ZW50LqKBxzAYBg | kqhkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0wOTEyMTAyMzI1MDBa | MB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDESBBCWaa5hGleeg+oQK2tJ3cD5MGwGCSqGSIb3DQEJNDFfMF0wTw | YLKoZIhvcNAQkQAw0EQAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMEFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjBCUm | JygpKissLS4vMDEyMwQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0CiCgYIKwYBBQUIAQIEFLjUxQ9PJFzFnWraxb | EIbVbg2xq1 | <ad.bin

Schaad Experimental [Page 12]

END

The ASN.1 module defined uses the 2008 ASN.1 definitions found in

```
Appendix B. 2008 ASN.1 Module
```

```
[ASN.1-2008]. This module contains the ASN.1 module that contains
 the required definitions for the types and values defined in this
 document. The module uses the class defined in [CMS-ASN] and
 [RFC5912].
MD5-HASH-EXPERIMENT
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
   pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
   id-mod-MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT(999) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
 IMPORTS
   -- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS]
  DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
   SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, DIGEST-ALGORITHM
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
       pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }
   -- Common PKIX structures [RFC5912]
  ATTRIBUTE
   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)};
   mda-xor-md5-EXPERIMENT DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-alg-MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT
      PARAMS TYPE MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT ARE required
   id-alg-MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
      pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-alg(3) 13
   MD5-XOR-EXPERIMENT ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(64))
```

Author's Address

Jim Schaad Soaring Hawk Consulting

EMail: ietf@augustcellars.com