

EX NO : 5 File forensics

Investigating MS Word documents

- 1) Note: DOCX is the file format for Microsoft Office 2007 and later. DOCX should not be confused with DOC, the format used by earlier versions of Microsoft Office.

It is possible to say something about the revision history of MS Word documents using forensic tools.

- a) The Strings utility is available from the following Web site

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/strings>

Strings just scans the file you pass it for UNICODE (or ASCII) strings of a default length of 3 or more UNICODE (or ASCII) characters

- b) DCode is a forensic tool (currently available free) at the following Web site:

<https://www.digital-detective.net/dcode/>

Use these tools to see if you can say something about the revision history of MS Word documents.

- 2) Have you ever tried to open a Word Docx file in notepad? If so, then you know that you get a screen full of unintelligible characters. All you need to do is run the Docx file through an unzip program and you can see several files and folders full of XML data. The files can now be opened in Notepad, but if you just double click on them, they will open in your Web browser and be a bit more readable. Browse through the newly created folders and you will find plenty of formatting information and the complete text of the document. You will also find information that could be very useful for forensics. Including files revision, creation and modify dates, document creator and who was the last one to modify the document.

Investigate doc and docx files and include screenshots in your submission

Aim :

To perform forensic investigation of files such as Microsoft Word documents

Algorithm / Procedure:

Make use of the utilities such as Strings and the DCode tool.

Sample Coding : The utilities are used. No coding involved.

Sample Input : See the screenshots below

Sample Output :

```

... // ...
# Vendor defined tag: 73 02 45 20
(CONFIGURE CTL00e4/1827799 (LD 0
# ANSI string -->Audio<--
(INT 0 (IRQ 9(MODE +E)))
(DMA 0 (CHANNEL 3))
(DMA 1 (CHANNEL 7))
(IO 0 (SIZE 16) (BASE 0x0220))
(IO 1 (SIZE 2) (BASE 0x0330))
(IO 2 (SIZE 4) (BASE 0x0388))
(NAME "CTL00e4/1827798[0]{Audio }")
# End dependent functions
(ACT Y)
))

```

```

C:\Demo>strings decompressed.bin

Strings v2.53 - Search for ANSI and Unicode strings in binary images.
Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

FlashaaVersion
/:$version
i.swf
_root

C:\Demo>

```

DCode v4.02a (Build: 9306)

DCode
Convert Data to Date / Time Values

Add Bias: UTC 00:00 ☐ Window on top

Decode Format: Windows: 64 bit Hex Value - Little Endian

Example: FF03D2315FE1C701

Value to Decode: f85f804d0577cc01

Date & Time: Mon, 19 September 2011 19:49:54 UTC

www.digital-detective.co.uk


Cancel Clear Decode




Add Bias: ☐ Window on top

Decode Format:

Example:

Value to Decode: 

Date & Time: 

www.digital-detective.co.uk

Screenshot:

```
File Edit Format View Help
MZ L J yy @
$ AA%\$E2v+E2v+E2v:i+vt+E2vZ0$V-E2vZ0qVAF2v"ñqV,"E2vZ0±VF E2
uqy+yu+yue0l; <EofA+]AU<iyuy+yu+yue0j; <EofA+]AVyt$<ñnCF"EF Ç-
sh <,"ST s0,"ST Ph$L $E èéyyypèl; f$," <,"Sp s0,"$
fx12VYR<@.e.fA.SP $E è0ùyyPèV# wj it$<è" <D$;f0a;";i<ùL <p<0;f
,"a; ièL fÄsyufA;j@Pè7 4EPèfaj ièL fÄsyufA;j@Pè; 4EPèHaj fÄs^]Äyt
HÚL Y^E%u,"AuZhE-L M^è," E^P<ICEA èB "Au1E P.|.L CEAL è~
@ w è8 è,3yhèL Màè <MUEàPEÁPèÀ? o jyQ30èú; sj òuÄèz; sj
€|S; V<ñt+f~+r%f|S; F;W<8v+yt$+wj+PèñçyyfA+weIt; Y_ýt$<IÇFt; èÄL
[<A^]Äa fyt<D$;%Aqr<I.è.fA.Ä Ä;Vw<|S<ñfybv;è"@ 9~1syvq<iwè/|
G Äa<...iþyyek; <C<[+0ÄyG.Ät.Þè0L Y<...iþyyÄa<0Äa<0%$%{;%Cèú
U<iQQW<]a_yw3yè!fèy30<+f0 s-feu VUOCE0&L èb0yy^wè0I; Y_ÉA]ÄPyt$
]içEd + %E0%üy4 F "Äu/E0PE1PSS<0 F hðL yüüCE0; y0E0PEðPj j
% \L vÿp;ÿLaF "Auqj;X9|LÚL 4h h" 'L |$ÇD$; è;c VQH'E'L X;è
0Pyu<Iè{üyy<0<Äèxüyy;0tq<-j <iÿ-9xúl tèn0 <Eðfxúl <B_éLyyyu<iq;
```


EX NO : 6 The Windows Command Line

Forensics investigators should be familiar with the use of the Windows command line when they investigate computers that use the Windows operating system. Forensics software sometimes necessitates the use of the command line. Forensics recovery and data reconstruction requires an understanding of the command line syntax. Before shutting down a computer, the forensic examiner should often capture the volatile information in the system's RAM. Information such as current IP address, contents of RAM, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) tables and current network connection status are not available once the computer has been turned off. Hence the forensic examiner must be familiar with the commands and techniques used to obtain such information on site.

Some DOS commands. Try these.

CD MD RD COPY ATTRIB DISKCOPY DATE TIME DIR PAUSE NETSTAT
TYPE DEL VER DOSKEY PATH PROMPT LABEL VOL DEFRAG XCOPY
ECHO REM MOVE EXIT FORMAT REN TREE MORE PRINT HELP IPCONFIG
ARP CMD CALL CHCP CHKDSK CHOICE CLS ERASE DIR FC COMP FIND
FOR IF MODE RECOVER SET SORT SUBST

Note: Some of the above commands are internal commands. Others are external commands. An external command is an MS-DOS command that is not included in command.com. External commands are commonly external either because they have large requirements or are not commonly used commands. Some external commands are in the above list. Some more are listed here:

BOOTSECT BCTEDIT DISKCOMP HOSTNAME ICACLS CHKNTFS NBTSTAT
NET NETSH PING NSLOOKUP ROUTE PATHPING SYSTEMINFO WMIC FTP
TRACERT

Exercise

- 1) Use commands to find the IPv4 address and subnet mask of your computer.
- 2) Create a batch file that will capture the following volatile information from an evidence system and store it in a file.

Current IPv4 address

Current date

Current time

ARP table

Network connection information

Take screenshots in both cases and include them in your submission.

Note: The ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) cache is a collection of ARP entries (mostly dynamic) that are created when a hostname is resolved to an IP address and then an IP address is resolved to a MAC address (so the computer can effectively communicate with the IP address). ARP cache has the disadvantage of being used by hackers and cyber attackers. ARP cache helps the attackers hide behind a fake IP address and do the harm without being caught. ARP cache can also help to prevent the attacks.

(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARP_cache)

Aim :

To become familiar with the Windows command line for digital forensics investigations

Algorithm / Procedure:

Make use of the appropriate Windows command

Sample Coding : See output

Sample Input : See screenshots below

Sample Output :

Use commands to find the IPv4 address and subnet mask of your computer.
Command used is Ipconfig

```

C:\Users\student>ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::cc98:ea23:94d9:2ea7%10
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 172.16.8.94
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.254.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 172.16.8.1

Ethernet adapter VMware Network Adapter VMnet1:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::89c4:6019:bdac:bf81%13
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.162.1
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 

Ethernet adapter VMware Network Adapter VMnet8:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::f59c:f5f9:20d0:e8a4%15
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.150.1
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 

Ethernet adapter VirtualBox Host-Only Network:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::6114:9679:2ea0:32e6%17
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 192.168.56.1
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.{0C9A4B99-3E33-4074-B743-0783C1687598}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.{C0241C26-6665-4166-B942-CEE7897FE731}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.{7E383C2D-7C85-4707-93CE-BE91F1BE79A9}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

Tunnel adapter isatap.{C177EAC8-47EB-410A-916D-26BCF2E14D4D}:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 

```

Create a batch file that will capture the following volatile information from an evidence system and store it a file.

Current IPv4 address

Current date

Current time

ARP table

Network connection information

Code used:

@echo off

```
FOR /F "delims=: tokens=2" %%a in ('ipconfig ^| find "IPv4") do set
_IPAddress=%%a
```

ECHO IP address is: %_IPAddress% >> grv.txt

For /f "tokens=2-4 delims=/ " %%a in ('date /t') do (set mydate=%%c-%%a-%%b)

For /f "tokens=1-2 delims=/" %%a in ('time /t') do (set mytime=%%a%%b)

echo Date: %mydate% >>grv.txt

echo Time: %mytime% >>grv.txt

echo. >>grv.txt

echo ARP Table >>grv.txt

FOR /L %%A IN (1,1,5) DO (

arp -a | findstr 20-7c-8f-3f-03-9c

cls

if %errorlevel% GEQ 1 (

echo The device is offline

Echo Device is offline at %time% on %date%. >> grv.txt

) else (

echo The device is online.

Echo Device is online at %time% on %date%. >> grv.txt

)

timeout 3 >nul /nobreak

)

echo. >>grv.txt

echo Network Connection Information >>grv.txt

netstat -a>>grv.txt

Screenshot:

```
grv - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
IP address is: 192.168.56.1
Date: 2018-08-13
Time: 0637 AM

ARP Table
Device is online at 6:37:12.18 on Mon 08/13/2018.
Device is online at 6:37:12.18 on Mon 08/13/2018.
Device is online at 6:37:12.18 on Mon 08/13/2018.
Device is online at 6:37:12.18 on Mon 08/13/2018.
Device is online at 6:37:12.18 on Mon 08/13/2018.

Network Connection Information

Active Connections

Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
TCP 0.0.0.0:80 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:443 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:902 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:912 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:1521 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:7279 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:8082 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:8083 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:27000 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:49152 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:49153 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:49154 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:49159 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:49162 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 0.0.0.0:49178 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 127.0.0.1:5939 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 127.0.0.1:8080 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 127.0.0.1:8307 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 127.0.0.1:27000 AB313SCS59:49173 ESTABLISHED
TCP 127.0.0.1:49156 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 127.0.0.1:49171 AB313SCS59:49172 ESTABLISHED
TCP 127.0.0.1:49172 AB313SCS59:49171 ESTABLISHED
TCP 127.0.0.1:49173 AB313SCS59:27000 ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:139 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 172.16.8.94:1521 AB313SCS59:49163 ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:7279 AB313SCS59:49187 ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:49163 AB313SCS59:1521 ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:49187 AB313SCS59:7279 ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50948 maa05s02-in-f3:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50949 maa05s02-in-f10:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50951 maa05s01-in-f3:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50952 maa05s01-in-f13:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50953 74.125.24.99:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50955 maa05s01-in-f3:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50956 maa05s01-in-f14:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50960 maa03s28-in-f3:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50961 maa05s04-in-f3:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50962 maa05s06-in-f2:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 172.16.8.94:50963 maa05s01-in-f3:https ESTABLISHED
TCP 192.168.56.1:139 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 192.168.150.1:139 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP 192.168.162.1:139 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:80 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:135 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:443 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:445 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:7279 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:8082 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:8083 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:27000 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:49152 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:49153 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:49154 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
TCP [::]:49159 AB313SCS59:0 LISTENING
```